Rep. Lee H. Hamilton on Foreign Affairs

May 1996/Volume XVI No. 5/ 2314 Rayburn H.0.B.

The Missile Defense Debate

The Star Wars debate is back. The Republican leadership in Congress has introduced a bill, H.R.3144, to require the development and deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system within seven years. It would force the Administration to choose a system now and deploy it, even though the threat is distant. It would mandate an untested and potentially destabilizing new military posture based on a missile shield that does not yet exist. It would also violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the cornerstone of all nuclear arms control agreements. The United States needs some kind of missile defense: The question is what kind and when?

WHAT IS THE THREAT?

The missile defense debate turns on differing perceptions of the threat. There is a need to defend U.S. troops (or those of our allies) against possible missile attack in places such as the Middle East or Korea. To meet the threat posed by shorter range missiles - those with a range of less than 600 miles - the United States has upgraded the Patriot missile, and will soon deploy more advanced systems.

There is more controversy about the treat from inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach U.S. territory. Today, only Russia and China pose a threat, and China has only a handful of ICBMs. For 40 years, U.S. nuclear forces have deterred their use. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, any new ICBM threat is unlikely during the next 15 years, with the exception of a North Korean missile program that might produce a weapon to reach Alaska or Hawaii - but not within five years. An accidental ICBM launch, or the chances that a rogue state could obtain an ICBM to threaten the U.S., are remote.

CURRENT U.S. POLICY.

The United States is pursuing a three-fold approach to missile defense. The first element consists of missile reduction and prevention - defense by other means, as it is called. The Missile Technology Control Regime, signed by 28 countries, makes it more difficult for non-member states to import missile parts and components. Other international export control agreements block nuclear, chemical, and dual-use transfers of technology for use in missile or warhead development.

Arms control agreements are a key ingredient. Under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), Russia dismantled hundreds of ICBMs and 3800 nuclear warheads. START II, if ratified by the Russian Duma, will reduce Russian strategic forces by 70 percent. Other agreements - including the U.S.-North Korean pact that has frozen North Korea's nuclear program, the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention - slow the development of weapons that can be placed atop unfriendly missiles.

The second element is deterrence. By maintaining credible military forces, the United States deters missile attack on its territory. Any nation foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States must know that the U.S. response would be devastating and overwhelming.

The third element is the interception of incoming missiles. Because the chief threat to troops and allies comes from shorter-range missiles, the U.S. is focusing efforts on theater defenses, including an improved version of the Patriot, sea-based systems, and a system called Theater High Altitude Area Defense.

The U.S. is also pursuing research and development aimed at developing a national missiles defense system that could shoot down ICBMs aimed at the United States. Such a system could be deployed in 2003, eight years sooner than the threat is likely to exist, according to intelligence estimates. The Administration has chosen not to deploy a system earlier because it sees no pressing threat, wants to develop promising technologies further, wants to save money, and does not want to violate the ABM treaty. That treaty puts sharp limits on U.S. and Russian defensive systems and has been key to the success of nuclear deterrence.

DEBATE IN CONGRESS

. In the coming weeks, the House will decide whether to endorse this policy or adopt an accelerated missile defense strategy, outlined in H.R.3144, requiring deployment of a national missile defense by 2003. I oppose this bill. First, it would set back arms control efforts. By requiring development and deployment of space-based lasers or interceptors, sea-based or multi-site ground based ABMs, the bill would violate the ABM Treaty. In response, the Russian Duma would likely block ratification of START II, and fail to implement other arms control agreements. The current Russian effort to eliminate its ICBMs would likely cease.

Second, this bill would lock the United States into an expensive deployment of a massive national missile defense system today, irrespective of the threat assessment tomorrow. It is better to proceed with vigorous research and development, but withhold deployment until the threat is clear. Finally, this bill is a budget buster. The Congressional Budget Office says it would cost $7 billion more than is currently budgeted for missile defense over the next five years. Through 2010, the system would cost between $31 billion and $60 billion - plus operating costs.

CONCLUSION

. H.R.3144 would have the United States spend up to $60 billion to deploy a national missile defense system prematurely for a threat that may not develop. The wiser course is to develop a system, assess the threat in a few years, and decide then on deployment. We have defense options even if an unexpected threat emerges. We should commit to deployment only if a plausible threat develops.



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