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• Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, as you know, the President vetoed the defense authorization bill last December due primarily to the legislation's direction that a national defense system be deployed by the year 2003. As I commented during the veto override debate, on a political level, the veto did serve to more clearly define the stark differences between the Clinton administration and this Congress on key national security issues such as ballistic missile defense. It is unfortunate that an issue as fundamentally important as whether or not the American people should be defended against the threat of ballistic missiles in the decade ahead has become so controversial--but it is where we find ourselves.

• Adding further to the controversy, the Department of Defense announced last week that they do not intend to spend all of the funding appropriated for national missile defense programs this fiscal year, as well as the surprising decision to delay several of the most promising theater missile defense programs--an area in which I did not believe there was much controversy until now. The combination of the President's strong opposition to deploying a national missile defense and now, an apparently conscious decision to scale back theater missile programs leaves us plenty to begin sorting through.

• The National Security Committee has a responsibility to raise the visibility of important security issues and through discussion, debate and even disagreement, to hopefully inform and educate the citizens of this country. Today, we started that effort with the first in a series of full committee and subcommittee hearings on ballistic missile defense. In addition to hearings, I have prepared a short paper, `Memorandum on the Ballistic Missile Threat,' which I distributed to the members of the National Security Committee yesterday.

• The text of the memorandum is as follows:

As last year's debate and veto of the FT 96 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1530) demonstrated, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has become a defining national security issue. Today, the United States has no defense against even a single ballistic missile. According to polls, this fact is not appreciated by the American people, who continue to believe that we have the means today to protect ourselves against ballistic missile attack. Although the technology exists to develop and field a limited defense against such threats, the American people remain hostage to a national strategy of conscious vulnerability, codified by the 1972 anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and reinforced by Cold War notions of strategic stability.

The debate over whether deployment of a national missile defense is warranted ought to pivot in large part on forward looking assessments of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In his December 28 veto message, the President stated that H.R. 1530's call for a national missile defense system addresses a long-range missile threat `that our Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming decade.' The purpose of this memorandum is to address this issue and to provide a better understanding of the missile threats facing the United States now and in the future.

The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that the shorter-range, or theater, ballistic missile threat is real and growing. Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated that ballistic missiles `are clearly becoming a common battlefield weapon.' 1

More than 15 countries currently possess ballistic missiles. Most are based on Soviet-derived designs like the SCUD, which was used by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. However, the types of theater missiles being sought and acquired by third countries today are of increasing range, lethality, and sophistication.

Footnotes at the end of article.

In addition, more than 25 countries currently possess, or are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. According to unclassified estimates, some 24 countries currently have ongoing chemical weapons programs. 2
Ten countries are reportedly pursuing biological weapons research. 3 At least as many are reported to be interested in developing nuclear weapons. 4 The trend toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that can carry them is `decidedly negative,' with `no limits on the ambitions of unstable actors to acquire the most advanced and deadly weapons available, either through internal or external sources. 5

The Administration is less convinced, however, of the threat posed by longer-range missiles. In particular, a recently completed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), prepared by the intelligence community, concludes that the threat to the United States posed by long-range ballistic missiles is lower than previously believed. 6 A letter by the CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs to Senators Levin and Bumpers, written on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, asserts that the previous intelligence community estimate of the missile threat to the United States, as reflected in the language of H.R. 1530, `overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.' The letter states that it is `extremely unlikely' any nation with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be willing to sell them; declares that the U.S. early warning capability is `sufficient to provide many years in advance of indigenous development'; and judges the prospect of an operational North Korean ICBM within the next five years to be `very low.' 7

The Administration's conclusions on these issues are seemingly at odds with previous intelligence community estimates; are at variance with the view of other responsible experts within and outside the intelligence community; and have raised troubling questions concerning the politicization of intelligence. 8

There are numerous reasons why a growing number of nations seek to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons provide a military edge against regional adversaries and serve as symbols of national power and prestige. Ballistic missiles offer small and medium powers--for the first time--a strategic weapon potentially capable of deterring great powers militarily and politically. An adversary armed with ballistic missiles and WMD may deter the United States from undertaking certain actions for fear of retaliation against U.S. regional assets of allies. Long-range ICBMs are even more attractive assets for hostile powers wishing to deter the United States from exercising its power projection capabilities by placing U.S. territory directly at risk and threatening our most valued asset: the American people. Importantly, the lack of any effective defenses against ballistic missiles may actually serve to encourage hostile states to acquire missile capabilities and makes them the weapon of choice for nations seeking to threaten others. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has concluded, `the ballistic missile, mainly on account of its range, speed and cost relative to that of a manned aircraft, is a favored delivery means for proliferating states and is likely to remain so until a proven anti-ballistic missile defense system has been deployed.' 9

The proliferation of these weapons heightens the risk that adversaries will seek to use them or threaten their use against the U.S. or American allies and interests. For instance, in the Gulf War, Iraq used SCUD missiles against Israel as political weapons in an attempt to draw Israel into the conflict and fracture the allied coalition. Libya recently declared its willingness to fire ballistic missiles at Naples, Italy, the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. 10 In fact, Libya launched ballistic missiles against a NATO base in Italy in 1986. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has spoken of his desire to acquire `a deterrent--missiles that can reach New York,' and has stated, `We should build this force so that they [the U.S.] and others will no longer think about an attack.' 11 Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas warned ominously in 1990 that `some day we will have missiles that can reach New York.' 12 And Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani has called missiles `the most important and the most essential weapons of the world. 13 Clearly, the incentive to develop or otherwise acquire these weapons is enhanced by the lack of defenses against them.

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The conclusions expressed in the CIA letter referred to above have required the intelligence community to adopt a number of benign assumptions about the ballistic missile threat to the United States that are not supported by previous intelligence estimates or independent analyses. 14 For example:

An assumption that nations will be limited to their indigenous industrial and technological base when developing ICBMs and that foreign assistance will be minimal or nonexistent. By discounting the likelihood that ICBM components or entire missiles may be purchased from more advanced nations, the intelligence community appears to place faith in a universal adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or in self-imposed restraints on trade of such items. However, the MTCR, which establishes guidelines for controlling the transfer of missile equipment and technology, is a voluntary effort, lacks the force of international law, contains no enforcement mechanisms, and has been repeatedly violated. For example, Russia has transferred critical missile components, in contravention of MTCR guidelines, to India and Brazil. 15 More recently, missile guidance components capable of being used in an ICBM were intercepted in Jordan in transit from Russia to Iraq. 16 Regardless of whether this particular transfer was sanctioned by the Russian government or was a `rogue operation,' the incident is troubling and demonstrates that the MTCR provides no guarantee against the transfer of ICBM technology.

In addition, several known proliferant states--such as China and North Korea--are not members of the MTCR. Chinese sales of intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia and North Korean exports of SCUD missiles and production technology to Iran and Syria are clear indicators that arms control regimes like the MTCR cannot halt potentially dangerous transfers of missile technology.

Furthermore, the assertion in the December 1995 CIA letter that sales of ICBMs are `extremely unlikely' is seemingly at odds with the assessment by Larry Gershwin, former National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs at the CIA, who stated in 1993, `We also remain concerned that hostile nations will try to purchase from other states ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States.' 17 Indeed, Russia has aggressively marketed variants of the SS-25 and SS-19 ICBMs for space launch purposes. 18 A recent change in the START I Treaty would allow Russia to transfer a missile to any other country as long as it is called a `space launch vehicle' and it remains under Russian control. 19 However, as a practical matter, the United States has no ability to verify that such a missile will be used to launch a satellite (as compared to a warhead), or that Russians `control' it.

The intelligence community's focus on indigenous production also discounts the possibility that the `import' of scientific expertise acquired from other nations may accelerate the indigenous development of potentially hostile states of long-range missile capabilities. Former DCI James Woolsey has testified that `the acquisition of key production technologies and technical expertise would speed up ICBM development.' 20 Given Russia's dire economic situation, the prospect that Russian scientific and technical talent will seek work elsewhere (the `brain drain' factor) is troubling.

In short, the compliance problems and loopholes intrinsic to arms control agreements, the increasing availability of foreign expertise, the strong incentives that exist for missile and component sales by states in need of hard currency, and the geopolitical desirability of long-range missiles, justify a more sober assessment of the likely future missile threat to the United States.

An assumption that countries with the capability to develop ICBMs will not do so. The recent intelligence community assessment reflects an apparent and questionable conclusion that those nations most technically competent to develop ICBMs, such as Japan, Ukraine, and India, have little motive to acquire ICBM acquisition could easily and rapidly change, and it is prudent to assume relations and attitudes among nations will be relatively constant in the international order in the coming decade. Indeed, few predicted the monumental changes in the strategic environment that have occurred over the past 5-10 years. At a minimum, any analysis that assumes continuity must be balanced with an equity valid analysis that postulates alternative futures.

It is conceivable, for example, that India might want ICBMs to deter the United States or other powers from becoming involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. Ukraine might want ICBMs if it finds, once Keiv is bereft of all nuclear weapons now based on its territory, that the United States loses interest in Ukraine's future, or if Ukraine wishes to increase its leverage in future dealings with Moscow. And Japan may look at some future point to acquire long-range missile capabilities for deterrence purposes if it no longer has faith in U.S. security assurances, or if China or Russia assumes more aggressive international or regional stances.

It is important to note that existing SLVs in these and other countries could be transformed into ICBMs in reasonably short order. In fact, there is no practical ability to distinguish between an ICBM and SLV for verification purposes--thereby denying the United States `timely warning' of a new missile threat. A report of the Proliferation Study Team, chaired by former National Security Agent Director LTG Williams Odom (USA, Ret.), noted in 1993 that `[t]he conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threat to the United States during this decade or early in the next decade can be sustained only if plausible but unpredicted developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.' 21 Moreover, according to the study team's report, the transfer and conversion of SLVs would require `relatively modest effort.' 22

The System Planning Corporation found in a 1992 report that conversion of SLVs to military ballistic missiles would be `fairly straightforward' and that extending the range of missiles has already been achieved by China, North Korea, Iraq, and Israel. 23 Additionally, a report prepared in 1992 by Science International Corporation concluded: `The increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental U.S. with United States with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.' 24

An assumption that there is a low risk of deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental missile launch by Russia or China. According to Russian sources and U.S. experts, the Russian General Staff may have operational control of the strategic nuclear forces and could launch those forces without President Yeltsin's permission. Given the elevated emphasis being placed on nuclear weapons in Russia's new military doctrine, this is a particularly worrisome prospect. Russian General Geliy Batenin, former commander of an SS-18 ICBM division and a military advisor to President Yeltsin, has warned that the General Staff and even individual ICBM flight crews could execute an unauthorized missile launch. Batenin has also warned that Russian nuclear submarines may carry launch codes that would allow a submarine commander to conduct an unauthorized launch of SLBMs. 25

Russian political instability, the erosion of Russian military discipline, and the deterioration of technical infrastructure, including radar and early warning systems, are conditions that increase the possibility of unauthorized or accidental nuclear use. 26 Brookings Institution analyst Bruce Blair has testified that `The world remains unsafe as long as there are thousands of launch-ready nuclear weapons at the fingertips of a Russian command system that is tottering on the edge of civil collapse.' 27 The Russian General Staff's unauthorized nuclear alert during the August 1991 coup attempt, the October 1993 Parliamentary crisis, the January 1995 nuclear alert in reaction to Norway's launch of a meteorological rocket, and recent nuclear sabre rattling against proposed NATO expansion, should cause more than a little concern about the Russian nuclear threat. 28 It is disturbing the extent to which knowledgeable Russians are apparently more worried about the possibility of unauthorized or accidental use of Russian nuclear weapons than the US intelligence community. 29

The solidity of China's command and control system is also in question. Based on admittedly limited knowledge, it appears that technical control over China's ICBM force is significantly less structured than that of either Russia or the United States. Also, China's willingness to use ballistic missiles for political purposes was evident in the recent series of Chinese missile launches against `targets' off the coast of Taiwan. And the reported Chinese warnings to the United States that it would consider nuclear strikes against American cities to deter U.S. involvement in a possible future conflict with Taiwan reinforce the conclusion that China believes ballistic missiles carry both political and military utility. 30

The desire of nations to acquire ballistic missiles that can threaten the United States or U.S. and allied interests has not abated. In fact, the absence of ballistic missile defenses may actually encourage other states to acquire such weapons. Perhaps the only way Third World nations can directly challenge the United States in the next ten to twenty years given overall U.S. military capabilities is by developing or acquiring missiles capable of deterring U.S. action or making the `price' of such action exceedingly high.

The ability of other nations to acquire ballistic missile capabilities will expand and under any circumstances is unlikely to be halted by arms control regimes like the MTCR. The countries of greatest proliferation concern are either not members of these regimes or have failed to abide by their international nonproliferation obligations under them.

Indigenous development of ICBM capabilities is one way, but not the only or even most probable way, for other nations to acquire long-range missile capabilities. Given the willingness of regimes such as North Korea to trade in missiles and components, and Russia's refusal or inability to control the flow of missile components as well as scientific and engineering talent to Third World countries, the trend is clearly in the direction of more proliferation rather than less.

The Russian military is not immune to the tremendous societal strains currently underway in Russia. These strains, along with changes in military doctrine that increase reliance on nuclear weapons, call into question the sanguine assessment that the risk of a deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile launch from Russia remains low. Likewise, Chinese threats to use ballistic missiles raise troubling political and military concerns.

The intelligence community's recent downgrading of the long-range missile threat is premised on assumptions that are highly questionable. The latest intelligence community estimate of the long-range missile threat to the United States is at variance with previous intelligence estimates, the public testimonies and statements of acting and former U.S. intelligence officials, and the analysis of respected non-governmental experts.

The American people remain entirely vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack. As recent focus groups have reaffirmed, Americans are surprised and angered when presented with the knowledge that they remain unprotected against this threat.

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1 Secretary of Defense, `Annual Report to the President and the Congress,' February 1995, p. 241.

2 Testimony of R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 24 February 1993.

3 Cited in `Proliferation, Potential TMD Roles, Demarcation and ABM Treaty Compatibility,' report prepared by the National Institute for Public Policy, September 1994, p. 7.

4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, `Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,' August 1993, p. 64.

5 Institute for National Strategic Studies, `Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition,' National Defense University, 1995, p. 116.

6 Director of Central Intelligence, `Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,' NIE 95-19, November 1995.

7 Letter dated 1 December 1995. In a similar vein, the former Deputy Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), William Evers, has described the view of the intelligence community this way: `Russia, the former Soviet states, and China will not use [ICBMs] intentionally, will not launch them accidentally, and will not sell them.' (Comments at a conference sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 28 April 1995, reported in John Donnelly, `House Panel to Examine Russian Command and Control Issues,' Defense Week, 26 June 1995, p. 1+.)

8 Because NIEs are classified, a detailed discussion of their findings is not possible here. However, a comparative analysis of past and present NIEs indicates that the official assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States has been downgraded. The issue of politicization of intelligence is highlighted in Rowen Scarborough and Bill Gertz, `Missile-Threat Report `Politicized,' GOP Says,' Washington Times, 30 January 1996, p. A1+.

9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, `The Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 281.

10 `Libya: Gadhafi Ready to Use Missiles,' Minneapolis Star Tribune, 1 January 1996, p. 4.

11 Speech on 18 April 1990, reported by Tripoli Television Service, 19 April 1990, and translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, FBIS-NES-90-078, 23 April 1990, p. 8.

12 Cited in `A Terrorist Talks About Life, Warns of More Deaths,' The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990, p. 1.

13 Cited in Thomas L. McNaughter, `Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, International Security, Fall 1990, p. 6.

14 See footnote 8.

15 See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith, `U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile Technology Sale to Brazil,' Washington Post, 8 June 1995, p, A23; Fred Hiatt, `Russian Rocket Sale Strains U.S. Ties,' Washington Post, 24 June 1993, p. A29.

16 See R. Jeffrey Smith, `U.N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound Military Equipment,' Washington Post, 15 December 1995, p. A30. According to a U.S. official, Iraq's missile program `poses a threat to all of Europe.' A U.N. official, noting that Iraq is seeking to develop a longer-range missile, stated, `Should Saddam build such a missile, it could easily reach London or Moscow.' See Stewart Stogel, `Missile Plans by Iraq May Aim at Europe,' Washington Times, 16 February 1996, p. A1+.

17 Speech before the American Defense Preparedness Association, 18 May 1993.

18 See, for examply, Anna Bakina, `Strategic Missile Under Conversion Into Space Booster,' ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1995, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service , `FBIS Report: Arms Control and Proliferation Issues,' FBIS-TAC-95-004, 8 August 1995, pp. 38-39 `RSA To Turn Swords Into Plowshares,' Kommersant Daily, 7 July 1995, p. 9, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, `SS-19s To Be Converted into Rokot Space Carrier Rockets', FBIS Report: `Arms Control and Proliferation,' FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 4 August 1995, p. 97; Vitaly Chukseyev `Russia to Supply Boosters For U.S. Missiles,' ITAR-TASS, 13 October 1995, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, `Daily Report: Central Eurasia,' FBIS-SOV-95-198, 13 October 1995. p.30.

19 See Bill Gertz, `U.S. Relaxes START, Raising Missile Fears,' Washington Times, 9 November 1995, p. A1+.

20 Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, 28 July 1993.

21 The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States' February 1993, p.1.

22 ibid, p.1.

23 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat,' 1992, pp. 26-28

24 Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate. `GPALs and Fforeign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities,' SAIC February 1992, p. 18.

25 See Allen Levine's interview of Russian General Batenin, in `Soviet General Says Unrest May Spark Nuclear Terror,' Atlanta Constitution, 16 October 1991, p. 2.

26 See Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller, and Charles Zraket, `Soviet Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union,' Center for Strategic and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1991.

27 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, reported in Rowen Scarborough, `Russia Losing Nuke Control, Senators Told,' Washington Times, 23 August 1995, p. A1+.

28 On the Russian nuclear alert in January 1995, see `Norwegian Science Rocket Puts Russian Defense On Alert,' Washington Times, 26 January 1995, p. 16; `Russian Radars Alert Moscow After Detecting Missile Launch,' Agence France-Presse, 25 January 1995; Vasiliy Kononenko, `Yeltsin Leaves Chechnya Behind in Lipetsk, But Takes the `Black Attache Case' With Him,' Izvestiya, 27 January 1995, p. 1; Nikolay Devyanin, `Football: All That Has Happened, Alas, Had to Happen,' Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 7, 29 January-5 February 1995, pp. 1, 12.

29 See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, `The Mysteries of the Nuclear Button,' Moscow New Times, No. 4, January 1992, pp. 20-23.

30 See Patrick E. Tyler, `As China Threatens Tawian, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens,' New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. 1+.