Space

The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the Department of Defense prematurely to lock into a specif ic technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii), the bill would likely require a multiple-site National Missile Defense architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that since I understand Senator Kennedy is not going to be utilizing his 5 minutes, 2 minutes of his 5 minutes be allocated to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. To conclude, Mr. President, the statement from the administration:

By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from cold war levels, thus significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of administration policy, stating that the President will veto this conference report and the reasons why be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC., December 15, 1995

Statement of Administration Policy

(This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned agencies.)

H.R. 1530--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 Conference Report, Senators Thurmond (R) SC and Nunn (D) GA.

If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill.

The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15, 1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry out our national security objectives and implement key Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise serious constitutional is sues by restricting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers.

The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD) prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together wi ll reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to commence a contingency operation and the requirement to submit a supplemental re quest within a certain time period to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under United Nations (UN) operational of tactical c ontrol, the bill infringes on the President's constitutional authority.

In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about the following: onerous certification requirements for the use of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding for the Def ense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-to-military contact programs; directed procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards, without a valid industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity C onflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and finally the Administration continues to object to the restrictions on the ability of female service members or dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. military hospitals abroad.

While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial to the Department, including important changes in acquisition law, new authorities to improve military housing, and essential pay ra ises for military personnel. The Administration calls on the Congress to correct the unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of l iving adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the Christmas recess.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is a finding concerning the ballistic missile threat to the United States, which is cited in the bill as justification for deploying an NMD system, and doing so quickly. Section 232, paragraph (3) of the Senate-p assed bill is the following finding:

The intelligence community of the United States has estimated that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated missiles , (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capa ble of reaching Alaska or beyond within five years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile threat to the United States is not forecast within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined countries will acquire inter continental ballistic missiles in the near future and with little warning by means other than indigenous development.

Mr. President, this statement of threat sounded too dire to me and to Senator Bumpers, so we wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence to ask whether it was an accurate statement of the intelligence community's assessment. It is no t.

The CIA response to our letter said that `the bill language overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.' Here is what the intelligence community believes, which is rather different from the bill language I just read:

[Page: S18886]

Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet regional security goals; however, most of these missiles cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Ala ska--but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within 5 years is very low.

The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely any nation with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous development.

I bring this to the Senate's attention because it is clear evidence that the rationale given for moving ahead so rapidly with a deployment of a national missile defense system, what we used to call ABM, is significantly overstated. There is no imminent threat from ballistic missiles to the United States, and there isn't likely to be one anytime soon. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the letters to and from the CIA be printed in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the U.S. currently has a policy of developing ballistic missile technologies to find which ones are most likely to work, and to have a capability to deploy a national missile defense system within about 4 years if necessary--well within the window of warning that the intelligence community estimates it will have for indigenous development of missiles that could threaten the United States.

That is a rational, reasonable and prudent policy, and there is no need to replace it with a policy that would likely increase the threat to our Nation by committing up to breach the ABM Treaty and pushing the Russians to abandon START II, and possibly even cease implementing the START I reductions which are well ahead of schedule.

Mr. President, I think our colleagues should be aware that the actions the Senate has already taken in considering proposals to abandon the ABM Treaty have already taken a toll on Russian confidence in our commitment to abide by our treaty obligations, as was clearly explained in an article in yesterday's Washington Post, and I ask unanimous consent that the article by Rodney Jones and Yuri Nazarkin be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. LEVIN. Even though we have not decided to commit to deploy a treaty-busting ABM system, some Russian policy makers and parliamentarians have already concluded that we don't care much for the ABM Treaty, and that we wish to free ourselves of its con straints. This is putting in doubt the Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.

It is important that we help make clear that the Senate, which gave its advice and consent to the ABM Treaty, and which has a unique constitutional responsibility to consider treaties for ratification, is firmly committed to the proposition that the Un ited States will meet its obligations under the ABM Treaty and all treaties into which we solemnly enter. Let us leave no doubt that we understand our security is intertwined with Russia's security. We cannot simply act unilaterally and expect to be more secure.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject this Conference Report because of its missile defense provisions, if for no other reason. But there are many other reasons, and I know my colleagues will discuss some of them in detail. I might ment ion a few briefly now.

. . .

[Page: S18888]

Mr. LEVIN.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, on no set of issues is bipartisan cooperation more important than in the area of national security. We need not all agree on every issue, but we must strive to work together in a bipartisan spirit. We have a broad spectrum of views on th e House and Senate Armed Services Committees, but we have a long history of working together, across party lines to try to put together the best bill we can. Regrettably, the conference this year fell short of that objective both in process and in spirit. Too many of these contentious issues were left to only the majority staff of the two committees to hash out, and months passed without resolution. By that time, the defense, military construction and energy and water appropriations bills had been passed and enacted. I urge the leadership of both the House and Senate committees to reexamine what transpired and accelerate the learning process so that next year, and I stand ready to work with them to try to restore the tradition of cooperation on the Defens e authorization bill.

Mr. President, this conference report, in this regard alone, would have us threaten a very, very significant gain that we have made four our security. That gain is the actual reduction of nuclear weapons and the commitment to reduce thousands more nucl ear weapons in the Russian inventory.

We should not do this against the clear advice of our military. And there are many other reasons for rejecting this conference report.

Again, I regret that I have reached this conclusion because of my affection for Senator Thurmond, but I feel, given the flaws in this report, that we should defeat this report, and I will vote against it.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, November 1, 1995.

Hon. John Deutch,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC.

Dear John: When the Senate considers the Conference Report on the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, we will again debate the ballistic missile threat to the United States.

Sec. 232 para. (3) of the Senate version of the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill states `The intelligence community of the United States has estimated that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated m issiles , (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile threat to the United States is not forecast within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future and with little warning by means other than indigenous production.'

We would appreciate your unclassified comments on whether the above statement accurately reflects the present position of the intelligence community. We would also appreciate your assessment of the likelihood that countries will acquire `with little wa rning' ICBMs either through indigenous production or by other means.

We would also welcome your providing us with any other information that you feel is relevant to this issue. Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

DALE BUMPERS,

CARL LEVIN.

Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Levin: The DCI has asked me to respond on his behalf to your letter of November 1, 1995, asking for the Intelligence Community's comments on the Defense Authorization Bill language that discusses the future ballistic mi ssile threat to the United States. In the past, representatives of the Intelligence Community openly portrayed the future ballistic missile threat to the US as reflected in the statement from Sec 232, para (3) of the Defense Authorization Bil l. We wish to point out, however, that the Intelligence Community continuously evaluates this issue and the Bill language overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.

Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet regional security goals; however, most of these missiles cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Ala ska--but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low.

The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and we are confident that our warning capability is sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous development.

An original of this letter is also being provided to Senator Dale Bumpers. Similar letters are being provided to Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Sam Nunn.

Enclosed herewith is an unclassified publication on The Weapons Proliferation Threat. We hope this information is useful. Please call if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Joanne O. Isham,
Director of Congressional Affairs.

[Page: S18889]

Exhibit 2

From the Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1995

Off to a Bad START II--In Both the United States and Russia, Hopes for the Strategic Arms Pact Are Fading

After months of delay, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee moved last week to bring the START II treaty up for a vote on the Senate floor. The pact would reduce U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 70 percent of Cold War levels and also eli minate land-based multiple-warhead missiles , the most threatening of Russia's weapons. Unfortunately, while a favorable Senate vote on the treaty is virtually assured, ratification of the pact by Russia has become increasingly uncertain in recent months. As Russians go to the polls today, many will be voting for politicians who question whether START II is still in Russia's best interest.

The prime cause of Russian second thoughts, according to parliamentarians and defense experts in Moscow, is the Republican-led effort that began this summer to mandate the deployment of a multi-site strategic anti-ballistic missile , or ABM, sys tem by the year 2003. This system was called for originally in the Senate version of the defense authorization bill and endorsed last week by a House-Senate conference committee. Yet it will violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which for more than two decades has helped curtail a costly buildup of defensive nuclear weapons and countervailing offensive weapons.

It first became clear that START II was in serious trouble last month when parliamentary leaders in Moscow who had supported START II hearings in July concluded that a ratification vote in the waning months of 1995 would fail. To avoid a foreign policy cr isis over a negative vote, they postponed further action on the treaty.

Regrettably, the prospect for unconditional Russian ratification of START II next year is no more promising. Following today's election, the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, is expected to be even more critical of START II and of the Uni ted States than its predecessor. Russian political parties and factions opposed to the treaty will probably gain seats at the expense of the reformist and democratic parties that generally support it. President Boris Yeltsin's poor health and the growth o f assertive nationalism in Russia further clouds START II's chances.

Even the Russian military leadership, which had steadfastly supported START II, shows signs of cooling toward the treaty in the wake of U.S. congressional action threatening the ABM Treaty. The Russian military fears the United States' real intent is t o gain strategic superiority over Russia. The Russian military dismisses as preposterous U.S. assertions that the legislation is aimed at protecting American soil from the threat of a handful of long-range missiles from North Korea and other small countries. In effect, Russian military leaders argue, the United States would be deploying new defensive missiles just as Russia was completing the reduction of its offensive missiles under START II's requirements. Russia would be more vulnerable and the United States less so.

Ivan Rybkin, the Duma speaker, expressed the growing disenchantment with START II in the newspaper Nezavissimaya Gazeta on Nov. 5: `We cannot be bothered any longer, given this situation that propels plans for NATO enlargement and reveals our U.S. cong ressional colleagues' intentions to begin a process that threatens the ABM Treaty--the cornerstone of the existing arms control regime.'

Russian misgivings about START II haven't come overnight. Initially Yeltsin and the Russian military leadership firmly believed that START II was in Russia's interest. They recognized benefits for Russia--the fact that START II's deep reductions would enhance stability, reduce future defense costs, ensure formal strategic parity with the United States and contribute to long-term cooperation between the two powers. The Clinton administration also worked to alleviate Russian uneasiness over U.S. national missile defense activities. But the ABM developments of late have changed Russian feelings toward START II.

If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization bill as he has promised, a direct conflict over the ABM Treaty will be avoided. Congressional direction of the U.S. military might then be provided exclusively in the defense appropriations bill. That legisla tion, which the president approved earlier this month, says nothing about deploying an ABM system.

This silence, however, is unlikely to assuage Russian concerns, since Russia must worry that the ABM issue will return in the next congressional session. Moreover, the appropriations bill mandates completion of the Navy's `Upper Tier' system, a defense initiative to produce shorter-range missiles that Russia also finds objectionable because of its potential for use against long-range weapons.

Russian arms control experts are also troubled by the thinking of some U.S. lawmakers who believe that the ABM Treaty is an obsolete Cold War measure. The Russians point out that if the ABM Treaty is to be revised in light of the post-Cold War situatio n, they see it as equally reasonable to amend and adapt the START treaties. After all, they argue, the cumbersome and intrusive START verification provisions were elaborated in a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust and were based on worst-case scenar ios about the other side's intentions.

These Russian critics suggest that Moscow's obligations under START II are largely irrelevant to current realities. The Russians are required by the treaty to alter the structure of their strategic triad by 2003. This will entail sizable expenditures both to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles ) and to replace them with single warhead missiles . Given the current U.S.-Russian partnership, Russian START II critics argue, such measures are not e ssential to the strategic security of both nations and should be open to revision.

The Russians are completely uninterested in negotiating amendments to fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. This apparently was well understood by those pushing the antiballistic missile initiative in Congress, for they also included the po ssible alternative of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Russia might consider changes to the ABM Treaty--but only along with parallel changes in START II.

Would this be acceptable to U.S. officials, legislators and 1996 Republican presidential candidates? Renegotiating current nuclear treaties with the purpose of adapting them to new realities--as instruments for regulating the nuclear forces of both nat ions--would mean embarking on a long and formidable process.

If the United States is not prepared to enter such a process, yet withdraws from the ABM Treaty or takes steps in that direction it would mean the end of START II--the end of real, dramatic reductions in the numbers of the world's most destructive weap ons.

Is it still possible to resuscitate START II in Russia? Right now, it seems unlikely. If Clinton vetoes the defense authorization, with its ABM mandate, the prospects for saving START II would improve, but only slightly.

Russian opponents of START II may now insist on delaying Russian ratification until the results of the 1996 U.S. presidential (and congressional) elections can be evaluated. Repairing the growing damage to U.S.-Russian relations and U.S. interests in n uclear threat reduction will become steadily more difficult unless Congress revives the tradition of bipartisan statesmanship on nuclear weapons issues that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

Exhibit 3

Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Levin: This is in response to a request from your staff concerning the position of the Office of the Inspector General on Section 901(j), `Conforming Amendments Relating to Operational Test and Evaluation Authority,' of H. R. 1530. This section substantially diminishes the independence, authority and responsibilities of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and may lead to the eventual elimination of the office and its functions. This action is being taken `under the cover' of eliminating from statute all of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. However, in the case of the DOT&E, the impact is significantly different. For example, the importance and input that the office can have in ensuring that weapons a re suitably for operational deployment is effectively restricted by deleting the annual reports to Congress summarizing operational test and evaluation activities and deleting the duties of the office contained in Section 139 of title 10.

I strongly disagree with the proposal to eliminate the independence of the DOT&E and replace him with a designated official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense . The Office of the Director was created by Congress to provide independent valida tion and verification on the suitability and effectiveness of new weapon systems and to ensure that the Military Departments acquire weapons that are proven in an operational environment. I am strongly for acquisition reform in the Department of Defense a nd have offered many suggestions to improve the acquisition process. However, this is not reform but a step backward in the direction of deploying weapons and equipment that are later proven to be ineffective or inefficient to operate and maintain.

This proposal eliminates one of the independent checks in our weapon systems acquisition process. An independent Director is the conscience for contractors and project managers and ensures they deliver usable weapon systems to the military members. I have testified in the past against proposals to weaken the authority of the Office of the Director, and steadfastly believe the Director saves the Department funds while ensuring service members receive operationally effective weapons.

If we may be of further assistance, please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
Deputy Inspector General.

[Page: S18890]

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to correct several incorrect statements that have been made over the last several days regarding the ballistic missile defense provisions in this conference report. It has been asserted that this conference r eport requires the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system and even a space-based system. Both of these assertions are flat wrong.

The conference report does require the Secretary of Defense to deploy a ground-based national missile defense system by the end of 2003. But nothing in the conference report requires the system to include multiple sites. I continue to believe t hat the United States should ultimately deploy a multiple-site system, but nothing in this conference report requires such a system. Nor does the conference report advocate, let alone require, a violation of the ABM Treaty. The language in the conference report urges the President to undertake negotiations with Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense system. This and other provisions in this conference report envision a cooperative process , not unilateral abrogation.

It has been asserted that there is no way to defend the territory of the United States from a single site, and therefore this conference report indirectly requires a multiple-site system. While I believe that a multiple-site system should be our goal, I must point out that the Army has concluded that it can defend all 50 States, including Alaska and Hawaii, from a single, ABM, Treaty-compliant, site. I would also point out that the Army's report on this subject was prepared at the request of the rankin g minority member of the Armed Services Committee. I ask unanimous consent that the Army report, entitled `Evolutionary Approach to National Missile Defense ,' be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Evolutionary Approach to National Missile Defense [NMD

1. The Army's Program Executive Office for Missile Defense (PEO-MD) has made a proposal that would take advantage of the significant investment that BMDO has made in ground-based missile defense technology. Planning includes an evolutio nary deployment for defense against long range ballistic missiles , initially focusing on unsophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The approach is to provide a cost and operationally effective single-site system as the f irst step in system deployment. This initial system will provide defense of all 50 states against an unsophisticated ICBM attack.

2. The Army PEO's NMD approach is to take advantage of the infrastructure at Grand Forks, North Dakota and deploy an initial NMD system and then grow this system in response to changes in the quantity and quality of the threat and in accordance with th e modifications negotiated in the treaty over time. The initial capability can be expanded by adding additional interceptors and by adding more sites. Space-based sensors (Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS)) could be added to provide increas ed battle space and dual phenomenology tracking and discrimination to enhance defense effectiveness against more advanced threats.

3. The Army PEO has shown that the initial NMD system can provide effective defense of the 48 continental United States against limited threats (a few RVs with simple penetration aids and/or jammers). Analysis indicates that, with certain enhancements, th e initial system can also provide an effective defense for all states. These enhancements include the following:

a. Improved quality of Early Warning Radar (EWR) data including additional advanced radars at Shemya (in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska), in Hawaii, and on the east coast.

b. Increased interceptor booster velocity.

c. Onboard target selection capability of the kill vehicle.

4. Each of these improvements is discussed below:

a. Improved EWR data is necessary to provide tracking information of sufficient quality for the NMD battle management/command, control, and communications (BM/C3) system functions. The concept of using EWR data is not different from the CONUS defense c oncept; however, to extend this capability to Alaska and Hawaii requires upgrades to the EWRs, adding advanced EWRs at Shemya, in Hawaii, and on the east coast. The upgraded EWRs and additional EWRs would provide early acquisition of the ballistic miss ile threat and allow the interceptors sufficient time to intercept these targets. The advanced EWRs would be based on the technology the Army has developed with BMDO sponsorship.

b. Another important change is an increase in the interceptor velocity to reduce the fly-out time and increase coverage. For CONUS defense, a velocity of about 6.5 km/sec is sufficient; however, defending Alaska and Hawaii from a single interceptor sit e at Grand Forks, North Dakota, requires a velocity greater than 7.2 km/sec. The Army NMD Program Office has identified commercial booster motors that will provide a velocity greater than 8 km/sec and plans to utilize this capability in the ground-based i nterceptor.

c. The third characteristic required is the onboard capability of the kill vehicle to select the lethal object from a cluster of objects. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) was specifically designed to achieve this capability. This capability allows the system to commit the interceptor against a cluster of objects, designate, and intercept the lethal object in a target complex.

5. The Army PEO has proposed an accelerated, evolutionary NMD development program which will meet requirements if funded at the appropriate level. The proposed NMD Program will develop a system for deployment that will provide an effective defense of t he entire United States against a limited threat. The proposal begins with an initial deployment of an NMD system of ground-based interceptors (GBI), a ground-based radar (GBR), upgraded and advanced EWRs (U/AEWR), and associated BM/C3. The proposal would initially deploy about 20 Developmental or User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) GBIs, an X-band NMD GBR, and associated BM/C3 in the Grand Forks, North Dakota, vicinity. This system would be supported by existing space-based sensors. A/UEWRs, and up graded command and control (C2) to support USCINCSPACE in the centralized control of the NMD mission. This initial capability would be fully utilized in the continued evolutionary development of the objective system.

6. This proposed system could provide effective protection of the entire United States in the 2000 time frame from a limited ICBM attack of a few RVs for an acquisition cost of about $5B. The initial NMD system could be augmented through negotiations t o deploy additional GBIs, additional ground-based sites, a space-based sensor system (SMTS), and/or a space-based weapon system as required and permitted by treaty obligations to address a larger and/or more sophisticated threat.

7. In summary, the initial system, using additional EWRs, can provide costs and operationally effective defense of all 50 states against ballistic missile threats limited to a few RVs and simple penetration aids. The ground-based radar being de veloped will provide high quality track and discrimination. On threats that require early commit of the interceptor, the kill vehicle will have the capability to receive in-flight updates including target object map data. The kill vehicle will also have onboard target selection and designation capability. By combi ning these capabilities and allowing for multiple interceptor shots at each threatening object, a very high probability of kill can be achieved. Additional interceptor sites would provide increased defense robustness as threat quantity and quality increas e. Space-based sensors would increase defense confidence against larger and more stressing threats.

8. This evolutionary deployment approach is a prudent, affordable, and effective means of providing protection for all 50 states against a limited ballistic missile attack. It must be noted, however, that current budgetary constraints preclude the Army and BMDO from substantially accelerating NMD. This evolutionary program is executable only with strong continued congressional support at the $1B per year level, which must not come at the expense of other critical Army or BMDO programs.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, unfortunately, despite all our efforts in conference to resolve concerns related to the ABM Treaty, we continue to hear the artificial argument that this conference report constitutes an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treat y. Since there is no requirement to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system in this conference report, there can be no anticipatory breach contained in it.

But even if there were a multiple-site requirement, this would still not constitute an anticipatory breach. Since there are treaty-compliant ways to get to a multiple-site system, just having a policy that points us in that direction cannot constitute an anticipatory breach. To quote the senior Senator from Alabama, who was a distinguished judge prior to coming to the Senate, `While there are legal methods to deploy multiple sites within the framework of the ABM Treaty, there can be no anticipatory bre ach.'

It has also been argued that this conference report requires a space-based defense. The conference report does call on the Department of Defense to preserve the option of deploying a layered defense in the future. But there is no requirement to deploy any specific space-based system or to structure an acquisition program that includes space-based weapons. The conference report does increase funding for the space-based laser program. But this increase is merely to keep a technology program alive. We hav e asked for a report to illustrate what a deployment program would look like, but this is hardly a mandate to deploy.

We can certainly debate the merits of what this conference report requires. But let's be clear about what it actually contains. If Senators want to debate the need for deployment of a national missile defense system by 2003, that is a legitimat e debate. But to argue, as several Senators have, that this conference report requires deployment of space-based weapons and mandates a violation of the ABM Treaty is simply an act of disinformation. Senators are entitled to their views, but they owe the American people an honest statement that distinguishes between fact and fiction.

[Page: S18891]

Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed on the remaining time of Senator Kennedy, 5 minutes from the time allocated to the minority leader, Senator Daschle, and 2 minutes to c orrespond to the 2 minutes given to Senator Inhofe.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee.

Mr. President, it is an interesting paradox that I have noted since I have been here that the things that are really the most important and the most serious to our Nation and, indeed, to the world are the ones that seem to draw the least attention and are least understood.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is one of those things. It was entered into in 1974 between Brezhnev and President Nixon. The really salient language of that treaty is found in article I. Here it is on this chart. As they say, the mother tongue is English, and this is as clear in English as you can get.

Article I:

Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the treaty for deployment of antiballistic missile systems or their components.

Single means one. The ABM Treaty limits each party to one strategic anti-ballistic missile site. It was ratified in 1976, and it is a binding treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia.

There is not any question that this bill intends to proceed with the deployment of a strategic antiballistic missile systems at multiple sites. The bill also says that we will decide whether a missile defense system is tactical or strat egic; that is, whether it is designed to intercept tactical missiles or strategic missiles . The United States will decide. And if the Russians do not happen to like our decision, that is just tough, and we will abrogate the treaty.

How does the bill justify these new policies? Here on this chart is what the 1995 Ballistic Missile Defense Act says. Here is the threat that is being used by those who want to deploy this National Missile Defense System. Here is what t he Missile Defense Act says:

North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years.

Within 5 years, the bill says.

Second:

Determined countries--

I do not know what a determined country is. I guess you have determined countries and undetermined countries.

Determined countries can acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future and with little warning by means other than indigenous production.

Senator Levin and I wondered where this information came from. So we took this language and wrote to John Deutch, the Director of the CIA, and said, `What does the intelligence community have to say about this threat?'

Here is what he wrote back to us a little over 2 weeks ago; this is what the CIA said:

The bill language overstates what we currently believe to be the future threat.

The CIA goes on to say:

A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within 5 years is very low.

Third, the CIA says:

The intelligence community--

On whose information we are supposed to be relying around here when we spend money--

The intelligence community believes it extremely unlikely any nations with ICBM's will be willing to sell them, and we are also confident that our warning capability is sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous development.

So what is our response to the intelligence community? It is to spend $200 million more for the Navy's upper-tier system and $400 million more for the national missile defense system. So much for the $30 billion or so per year that we spend on intelligence. What is the national missile defense system required to do in this bill? It is required to cover all 50 States, including Hawaii and Alaska. How will it do that? The only way it can be done, by deploying interceptors at multiple site s.

What do you do when you deploy multiple sites? You say to Russia, `Adios, friend. If you don't like it, we'll pull out of the treaty,' which we have a right to do.

But the danger of abrogating the ABM Treaty and the Russians and the United States both having antimissile defense systems, strategic and to a lesser extent tactical, is the world becomes a much less safe place. Everyone knows that, if Russia and China think the United States has an ABM system that can shoot down their ICBM's, they will begin to deploy more ICBM's to compensate. Instead of arms cuts, we will have a new arms race.

I do not know of a single person in the world, I do not know anybody who really studies this and keeps up with it who thinks what we are doing here is in our best interest. It is not.

The bill says that the national missile defense system has to be deployed by the year 2003. That is 8 years from now. We may lock ourselves into a technology we do not even want.

Do you know what the Russians have already said? `We summarily reject this unilateral action you are taking.' We summarily reject it, and if you do it, Russia will have no choice but to stop implementing the nuclear weapons cuts specified in the START Treaty.

I do not have much time, so let me go on to a couple of other items.

. . .

Mr. NUNN.

This morning during remarks on problems that I see in the conference report, I noted that I would have a separate statement addressing the missile defense provisions in the conference report.

I had adressed this subject at the end of last week.

After I spoke, Senator Lott made an eloquent, but occasionally inaccurate, statement in defense of the conference report. I want to briefly comment on and correct a few of the Senator's statements about missile defense, particul arly regarding my role.

The Senator from Mississippi suggested that, since I supported the deployment by a fixed date--1996--of a limited NMD system in the 1991 Missile Defense Act, I was being inconsistent in opposing the deployment of an NMD system by 2003 in the co nference report.

I first observe that I was not a party who injected the 1996 date in that act. I thought it was unrealistic but I did not oppose it in theory, I opposed it in terms of practicality. But it did go into the report and I did not oppose the overall act. I supported the overall act, notwithstanding my feeling at that time that 1996 was not realistic.

There are a couple of very, very significant differences between the 1991 Missile Defense Act and the language in the conference report before us today.

Let me begin by quoting exactly what the 1991 Missile Defense Act says about the NMD system:

(2) Initial deployment.--The Secretary shall develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost-effective, operationally-effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant a nti-ballistic missile system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauth orized launches or Third World attacks. The system to be developed should include--

(A) 100 ground-based interceptors . . .

(B) Fixed, ground-based, anti-ballistic missile battle management radars; and

(C) optimum utilization of space-based sensors, including sensors capable of cueing ground-based anti-ballistic missile interceptors and providing initial targeting vectors, and other sensor systems that also are not prohibited by the ABM Treat y, such as a ground-based sub-orbital tracking system.

Mr. President, it is clear from this paragraph that the NMD system specified in the 1991 act was to be developed to be fully compliant with the ABM Treaty as it then existed. A similar paragraph was included in the Senate compromise language passed las t September, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to:

(8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of (this Act) through processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.

This language, which was dropped in conference, stands in sharp contrast to the language in the conference report, which merely states in a completely different section that the programs contained in the conference report, quote, `can be accomplished' in ways consistent with the ABM Treaty--it nowhere requires that the NMD Programs shall be carried out in compliant fashion.

As a matter of fact, it implies very strongly just the opposite, which is the reason so many of us oppose it.

The conference report also abandons other safeguards found in the Senate compromise. Gone is a requirement for a congressional review prior to a decision to deploy the system to determine whether the proposed deployment would be affordable and cost eff ective, whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether ABM Treaty considerations should affect the decision to deploy.

In other words, Mr. President, all of these safeguards that we had in the Senate bill are omitted from the new conference report language. There is no requirement to determine prior to a decision to deploy whether the proposed system would be affordabl e, cost effective, whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether the ABM Treaty considerations should affect the decisions to deploy. In my view, all of those are absolutely essential preconditions to making an intelligent decision about wh ether to deploy a system and when to deploy a system.

So, the conference report language, contrary to the assertion made earlier, does not have the same effect as the language in the 1991 Missile Defense Act--not by a long, long shot. That act clearly calls for a ABM-compliant system--a system comp liant with the ABM Treaty. In my view, the administration has rightly found the language in the conference report to be unacceptable because of these considerations.

I repeat what I have said earlier. The last thing we want is to take an effort to mandate now certain language that the administration--and they are the ones negotiating this with the Russians--that the administration believes is likely to have the res ult of not having a ratification of START II, and perhaps not even a continuation of START I reductions.

We have had two Republican Presidents do a very good job in negotiating both START I and START II. Those treaties, if they are complied with, will require a two-thirds reduction in the number of missiles aimed at the United States, including th e missiles we have always felt were more likely to be launched early, perhaps by mistake, perhaps by the other military leaders making a mistake in terms of warning, because these are highly MIRV'd systems with a lot of warheads and the fear would be, by the other side, that they might be knocked out on a preemptive strike.

We have always worried about those MIRV'd missiles . These two treaties are able, after lots of negotiations over more than 10 or 12 years, to get rid of those systems that we have always considered to be highly destabilizing as applied in the c old war period. We finally achieved that. And to take language in this bill and to take a real risk that the results of those two treaties would be obviated is not only unwise but it is totally unnecessary.

I repeat, also, what I have said earlier. The administration and those of us negotiating offered to take on the section of national missile defense language, we offered either the House version or the Senate version, on the national missile def ense language. Why in conference you cannot solve the national missile defense language with either the House version, as passed by the House, or the Senate version, as passed by the Senate, when you offer the conferees either version, is bey ond me. It is a real puzzle.

Of course, what happened is that we made the compromise on the Senate floor--which Senator Levin, Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, and I worked out and which every Republican voted for except one, and th e people who were opposed to it were mainly on the Democratic side, because they felt it went too far. We had an unusual 4- or 5-day intensive, word-by-word examination and we got, not only the agreement in this body, with every Republican but one voting for it, but we got the administration signing off on it, albeit reluctantly with some concerns. And then we went into conference and we offered either the Senate-passed language or the House language--not the entire language of the House on everything, bu t on the national missile defense part--and we could not satisfy people because they wanted to go much further than either the House version or the Senate version. To me that is just very puzzling.

It is sad to see a bill jeopardized, in terms of becoming law, because of that.

Mr. President, I will now address the negotiations as I saw them, from my point of view, and the possibilities that still exist in putting this bill together if it is vetoed, and if the veto is not overridden.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The administration strongly objects to the ballistic missile defense language adopted by the conferees, and I agree with the administration's assessment. Mr. President, the Congress has been dealing with difficult issues related to BMD since th e star wars debates of the early 1980's. I have been part of putting together bipartisan agreements on BMD for over a decade, many years facing much more difficult challenges than this year. That is why I am puzzled that the Republican majorities--with tw o bipartisan paths open to approval by the President--chose a third path to certain opposition.

As Members will recall, the issue of ballistic missile defense was one of the primary subjects of debate and difficulty when the Senate considered the National Defense Authorization bill during the summer. There was strong opposition on the flo or to the BMD provision reported by the committee. During the debate, the bipartisan leadership designated a group of Senators to address this subject. Senator Dole designated Senators Warner and Cohen to represent the Republicans. Senator Daschle designated Senator Levin and myself to represent the Democrats.

Mr. President, we dealt with that issue in the old-fashioned way, with Senators closely examining each word of the proposed amendment. Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I worked and reworked the amendment, line-by-line, to address the issues raised by the administration and our respective party caucuses.

It was clear to all concerned that the administration had serious reservations even bout the bipartisan amendment we developed in the Senate. After expressing their concerns and examining every word and every phrase carefully, the administration reluct antly agreed to accept this final Senate compromise language.

On August 11, 1995, Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I each provided detailed explanations of the bipartisan amendment in speeches to the Senate. We also placed extensive information in the Congressional Record, incl uding the text of the bipartisan amendment, a detailed comparison to previous language, and related materials. As a result, detailed explanatory information was available to all Senators and the public for a thorough review for nearly a month before we ac tually voted on the amendment on September 6.

The bipartisan amendment provided extensive guidance to ensure that the United States would develop a more focussed missile defense program than we had previously authorized, particularly in the area of national missile defense .

The bipartisan amendment stated that it--

. . . is the policy of the United States to . . . develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system that: (i) is affordable and operationally effective against limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats.

The bipartisan amendment required the Secretary of Defense to `develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is ca pable of attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.'

The bipartisan amendment also set forth the understanding of the Senate as to the demarcation between theater and ballistic missile defense systems, and established a prohibition against use of funds--

. . . to implement an agreement with any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995 that would establish a demarcation between theater missile defense systems and anti-ballistic missile syste ms for purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the performance,
operation, or deployment of United States theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent provided in an Act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to implement that portion of any such agreement that implements the criteria in subsecti on (b)(1); or (3) to implement any such agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution.

The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 85-13, with only one Republican voting against the amendment. Without this bipartisan agreement and approval, it is doubtful the Senate would have passed the authorization bill.

Although the conference on this bill was convened on September 7, there were no Member-level bipartisan House-Senate discussions on this subject by members of the conference for over 2 months. Eventually, we were able to reach agreement on the theater missile defense demarcation language, but could not reach a consensus on the national missile defense provisions. The failure to reach an agreement is puzzling to me, since the administration was prepared to accept either the House-passed or Senate-passed versions of the national missile defense language.

The Senate, as I noted earlier in my remarks, established a requirement to `develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, an d which is capable of attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.' The House established a requirement to `develop for deployment at the earliest practical date an affordable, operationally effective national missile defense [NMD] system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.'

Either version of this language--approved overwhelmingly by each House--would have been acceptable to the administration, but neither was approved in conference. The main stumbling block was the insistence of some of the conferees that Congress go beyo nd language approved by either the Senate or the House and mandate a specific requirement to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. This problem was compounded by an insistence that the conferees use a new baseline draft proposal in con ference, rather than work off the carefully crafted bipartisan Senate language. As a result, the conference report lacks many of the carefully drafted provisions of Senate-passed bill.

During attempts to forge a conference agreement acceptable to the administration, I emphasized that we could use national missile defense language that had received overwhelming Republican support this year. I believe that it is still possible to do so if this bill is not enacted. There are two primary options, each of which would use language approved by an overwhelming majority in the Senate or the House.

The first option would simply use the bipartisan national missile defense and theater missile defense provisions which were approved by the Senate on September 6, 1995 by a vote of 85 to 13, with only one Republican Senator voting again st that amendment.

The second option would substitute the House-passed national missile defense language for the national missile defense portion of the bipartisan Senate-passed bill, using the Senate-passed bill for the remainder of the missile defens e language. Either of these provisions would provide the basis for renewed focus in our National Missile Defense Program and an even stronger effort on theater missile defenses .

Mr. President, if the national missile defense language in the Senate bill was strong enough to win virtually unanimous Republican support, it should have provided an adequate basis for our conference report.

If the national missile defense language in the House bill was strong enough to win overwhelming Republican support in the House, it should have provided an adequate basis for a conference agreement.

Either of these approaches could have represent a solid step forward on the important subject of national missile defense .

The alternative ultimately chosen by the conferees was to use language that was in neither bill mandated a specific requirement to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. That language is unacceptable to the administration, and is a m ajor element of the administration's announced intention that this bill will be vetoed.

The administration is very concerned that the national missile defense language in the conference report goes well beyond the mandates of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills.

The administration has expressed serious concerns about the impact of the conference report language on Russian consideration of the START II Treaty, which is designed to produce a second major reduction in United States and Russian nuclear weapons. Th e administration is also concerned that the language could lead the Russians to abandon other arms control agreements if they conclude that it is United States policy to take unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty. Russian spokesmen have made plain t hat Russia has neither the technology nor the defense resources to allow them to match United States missile defense efforts. Therefore, they state that their only available reaction to a large-scale U.S. national missile defense program w ould be to retain additional strategic missiles and nuclear warheads, which would require them to forego START II and perhaps even abrogate START I limitations. This is what is at risk. These are not small stakes.

In a letter to Senator Daschle, dated December 15, Secretary of Defense Bill Perry stated:

[Page: S18894]

[B]y directing that the NMD [National Missile Defense] be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states including Hawaii and Alaska, the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the ter ms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the n umber of U.S. and Russian strategic warheads by two-thirds from cold war levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

In my judgment, the administration's concerns are well-placed. Moreover, this struggle over language is, in my judgment, completely unnecessary. I believe we can achieve both START II ratification and progress toward the deployment of a highly-effectiv e national missile defense system to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or limited third-world attacks. Since the late 1980's I have advocated development of a National missile defense system in the form of an accidental launch prot ection system [ALPs].

Mr. President, it is important to understand the historical context for this concept. National missile defense proposals began with President Reagan's star wars proposal in 1983, designed to render ballistic missiles `impotent and obsolete .' This was followed in the mid-1980s by a slightly more modest proposal, called the `Phase-I' system, with the objective of defeating a full Soviet counterforce first-strike. This, in turn, was followed in the early 1990s by G-PALS, or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, which also turned out to be too ambitious.

This progression was what led to the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which envisioned simply getting on with the development of a treaty-compliant NMD system. And, when I say `treaty-compliant,' that means with the treaty as it currently exists, n ot as it might someday be modified.

In my judgment, even if the ultimate answer to our requirements is a system requiring amendment to the ABM Treaty--such as a multiple-site NMD system with more than 100 interceptor missiles --there is no need to insist on a commitment to that to day. Common sense tells us that even if a multi-site system is the end-objective, we will begin by deploying a small number of interceptors at a single site. At this stage, we do not know what the performance or cost of the various NMD system components u nder development will be, or whether such a system would be `affordable and cost-effective.'

Also, Mr. President, the strategic environment is different

today than it was in 1991. When the Missile Defense Act of 1991 was passed, we faced thousands of Soviet missiles and more than 10,000 warheads, all aimed on hair-trigger alert at the United States or its military forces. The consequenc es of even a small accidental launch would have been enormous, because of the likelihood of escalation. Today, START I has cut the inventory of weapons, and START II will cut levels further, once it enters into force. Moreover, the Soviet Union is gone, r eplaced by a less hostile Russia; United States and Russian missiles are now targeted on broad ocean areas, rather than on each others' territory. The policy of targeting broad ocean areas has reduced but not eliminated the consequences of an acci dental launch.

Finally, there is a future threat of missile attack on the United States by some rogue Third World power. This was recognized as a possible threat in the 1991 act, and in the Senate compromise. However, no such threat has yet materialized, and the latest from the intelligence community on the likelihood of such an event reads as follows:

Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet regional security goals; however, most of these missiles cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Ala ska--but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low.

The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely that any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and we are also confident that our warning capability is sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous development.

That information was provided in a December 1, 1995 letter on behalf of CIA Director Deutch by Joanne Lsham, CIA Director of Congressional Affairs. The missile defense language in the conference report is misguided. There is no need for: First, strident language or second, ironclad commitments today to deploy by a date certain an NMD system that is clearly an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Enactment of this language is likely to prevent the START II Treaty from entering into force, whic h would compound the problem of developing affordable and cost-effective defenses. Without the START II reductions, missile defenses capable of dealing with potential accidental or unauthorized launches would likely have to be much more extensive. If the 5,000 or so warheads to be retired under START II remain in Russian inventories, this will greatly complicate our missile defense problem. Because of the magnitude of the threat, star wars and its successors were deemed too costly and of t oo limited effectiveness to be worth pursuing. In my judgment, we should be pursing first things first. First, the development of all the components of an NMD system, and a limited deployment of a strictly treaty-compliant system, so as to learn more about the cost and effectiveness of NMD systems. Th en, depending on cost and effectiveness, depending on the evolution of the threat and the course of negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty, we can make further decisions on further deployments. But, let us not jeopardize the advantages of the START II Treat y by a headlog rush to deploy something.

Mr. President, there are four fundamental aspects to an effective protection against nuclear weapons. The first is to reduce nuclear warheads by two-thirds as envisioned by START I and START II, thereby substantially decreasing the weapons that could b e used against us deliberately or accidentally.

The second is to vigorously pursue the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union.

The third is to develop and deploy effective theater missile defenses . A strong majority in the Senate and the Congress fully support the development and deployment of highly effective theater missile defenses .

The fourth is to develop for deployment an affordable and cost-effective national missile defense program to address the potential for accidental, unauthorized, or limited strikes.

No one of these programs, by itself, is sufficient. Each one can have a significant impact on the other. The national missile defense program, in particular, could have either a positive or negative impact on the pace and likelihood of START I and START II reductions. Moreover, even in combination, these programs are not a guarantee against threats by other means, such as conventional delivery by a terrorist through a smaller aircraft or vessel. That threat will require additional counterprolif eration and counterterrorist efforts.

In summary, Mr. President, it is important to pursue the development of a national missile defense system, but we must do so in a manner that preserves and encourages the important reductions we can achieve through START I, START II, and Nunn-L ugar. Because the language in the conference agreement is likely to severely undermine these efforts in Russia, I cannot support the conference agreement in its current form.

. . .

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the defense authorization conference report today with some regret. I did not care for the bill as it left the Senate, and I voted against it then. Now the conferees have contended at length and come ba ck with I believe a more objectionable bill.

I know that a number of the Senate minority conferees tried to return with a workable bill devoid of excesses, but, unfortunately, they did not prevail.

I am particularly concerned by the provisions setting the stage for a national missile defense . This legislation requires that the United States build an `operationally effective' defense of all 50 States by the year 2003.

Such a new system almost certainly would require deployments of ballistic missile defenses at multiple sites, since such a defense would likely be well beyond any capabilities we could put into our presently mothballed single ABM site at Grand Forks, ND. The cost could quickly mount into the tens of billions of dollars over the next 7 years.

An immediate problem with all of this is that it could send a message to the Russians that we do not intend to live up to the ABM Treaty. This could well undermine any prospects we might have that they, in turn, will ratify and abide by the terms of th e START II Treaty. That treaty has just been approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations in an 18 to 0 vote and is awaiting Senate action.

Heretofore, both we and the Russians have been comfortable with mutually agreed steps to curb and reduce nuclear armaments secure in the knowledge that the ABM Treaty ensured that our deterrent worked and would work at lower levels. It would be very mu ch against our interests if the train of reductions were to stop now. A renewed strategic arms buildup might even be in prospect.

If all of that happened, the new National Missile Defense System would be woefully outmatched, since it would be designed to deal with accidental launches and new and emerging threats and not with a major continued Russian threat. One might ask why we need new defenses against accidental launches when we did not need them before.

Mr. President, we should pause to think of these new threats. First, it is important to understand that there is no official intelligence analysis to indicate that we are likely to have any new missile threat over the next decade or so. Any nat ion thinking of moving in that direction would have a very hard time finding a supplier or suppliers. It is extremely difficult to develop missiles indigenously, and any nation doing so would certainly be caught at it.

We should ask ourselves how we would react if some nation were trying to get a small fleet of missiles to attack us with. We and others could apply serious political and economic pressures to make that nation cease and desist. If we and others had to act militarily to end the threat, we could. That fact alone would add strength to our diplomatic efforts.

The least reasonable response would be to spend billions of dollars deploying a last-ditch, Fortress America ballistic missile defense that would, at best, make little or no contribution to our national defenses and would, at worst, start a pro cess under which strategic stability and the very fruitful process of arms control could be dealt a terrible blow.

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. . .

Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
Democratic Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Leader: I would like to convey my assessment of the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (H.R. 1530). The bill in its current form continues to contain objectionable provisions that raise s erious constitutional issues and unduly restricts our ability to execute our national security and foreign policy responsibilities.

The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary NMD deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the Department of Defense prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In additio n, by directing that the NMD be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now writte n. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to commence a contingency operation and the requirement to submit a supplemental re quest within a certain time period to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under United Nations (UN) operational or tactical c ontrol, the bill infringes on the President's constitutional authority.

In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about the following: onerous certification requirements for the use of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding for the Def ense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the Technology Reinvestment Program; restrictions on retirement of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on the Department of Defense's ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-to-military contact programs; directed procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid industrial base r ationale; restrictions on my ability to manage the Department of Defense effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

We will weigh heavily the actions of the Congress on these matters in advising the President whether to veto the Defense authorization bill that is ultimately presented to him. This letter outlines many, but not all of the concerns with the legislation . I continue to be willing to work with the Congress to develop an acceptable bill. In its current form, however, I would have no recourse but to recommend a veto.

Sincerely,
William J. Perry.

Statement of Administration Policy

If the Conference Report on H.R. 1530 were presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill.

The Conference Report on H.R. 1530, filed on December 15, 1995, would restrict the Administration's ability to carry out our national security objectives and implement key Administration programs. Certain provisions also raise serious constitutional is sues by restricting the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and foreign policy powers.

The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary National Missile Defense (NMD) deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the Department of Defense (DOD) prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In addition, by directing that the NMD be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together wi ll reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to commence a contingency operation and the requirement to submit a supplemental re quest within a certain time period to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under United Nations (UN) operational or tactical c ontrol, the bill infringes on the President's constitutional authority.

In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about the following: onerous certification requirements for the use of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding for the Def ense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the Technology Reinvestment Program, restrictions on retirement of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on DOD's ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-to-military contact programs; direct ed procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid industrial base rationale; provisions requiring the discharge of military personnel who are HIV-positive; restrictions on the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage DOD effectiv ely, including the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and finally the Administration continues to object to the restrictions on the ability of female service members or dependents from obtaining privately funded abortions in U.S. military hospitals abroad.

While the bill is unacceptable to the Administration, there are elements of the authorization bill which are beneficial to the Department, including important changes in acquisition law, new authorities to improve military housing, and essential pay raise s for military personnel. The Administration calls on the Congress to correct the unacceptable flaws in H.R. 1530 so that these beneficial provisions may be enacted. The President especially calls on the Congress to provide for pay raises and cost of livi ng adjustments for military personnel prior to departure for the Christmas recess.

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Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in closing, I understand the give and take of a conference and that no bill is perfect. I have never seen a perfect bill on this floor, and I do not have that as my standard. However, this conference report goes far beyond that which can be justified in that give and take context.

I would further point out that a full defense appropriations bill including $7 billion more than the President requested has been signed into law. I supported that bill. I spoke for it. I urged that the President not veto it. I urged that he approve it . So the money is not the issue here with me.

I favored increasing the defense budget. We are not debating the funding bill. We are debating an authorization bill and the issues of matters of policy, very important matters of policy, not matters of the level of appropriations. I cannot vote for th e bad policy embedded in this conference report. If the bill is vetoed, as has been recommended by the Secretary of Defense, we will have an opportunity to correct the many flaws and produce a bill that can be signed into law. There are other provisions w hich I enumerated this morning which I strongly support, and I will work certainly with Senator Thurmond in retaining those and in making whatever corrections are required if this bill is vetoed by the President and if a veto is not overr idden.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.