Analysis of 1995 Missile Defense Proposals in the Senate (Submitted by Senator John Glenn)
Last July, the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) reported out the FY96 defense bill (S. 1026), which contained several provisions that would, if implemented, place the United States in violation of the ABM Treaty (ABMT). Included were provisions requiring the deployment of a multiple-site national ballistic missile defense system and prescribing a unilateral U.S. definition of the scope of systems subject to the ABMT, thereby circumventing the ABMT formal amendment process.
Following widespread criticism of this proposal, Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner offered in August a bipartisan substitute. Though the substitute does not require immediate deployment of BMD systems in violation of the ABM Treaty, the substitute does not resolve several outstanding questions about America's intentions with respect to its obligations under the ABMT. The table in Annex 1 of this memo illustrates some of the inconsistencies between the substitute and the ABM Treaty.
This memo (1) describes and analyzes the SASC missile defense recommendations, and (2) describes and analyzes the substitute proposal.
1. SASC ACTION
In summary, the bill moves U.S. policy: (a) away from nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction); and (b) away from several ABMT prohibitions (including: multiple-site deployments, ABM systems based at sea and in space, giving TMD systems capabilities to intercept strategic missiles, space-based sensors useful against strategic systems, etc.). The bill contains a unilateral U.S. definition of an ABMT-permissible system. The bill also limits the negotiating flexibility of the President and prohibits the President from spending funds to implement more restrictive ABM controls.
The current text of S. 1026 was reported out of Committee on July 12. Subtitle C of Title II (RDT&E) contains 11 sections pertaining to `missile defense.' The proposed language covers theater missile defense (TMD) against theater ballistic missiles (TBMs), national missile defense (NMD) against strategic ballistic missiles (SBMs), announces several findings and new national policies covering both systems, alters the U.S. policy toward the ABMT, and repeals 10 other missile defense laws. While not quite abrogating the treaty outright, the SASC language still sets the US on a course out of the ABMT.
Findings and policy
In S.1026, Congress `finds' that: missiles are posing a `significant and growing threat' to the US; the development of TMDs `will deny' US adversaries an option for attacking the US and its allies; the intelligence community sees a growing missile threat; TMDs will `reduce the incentives' for missile proliferation; the ABMT's distinction between strategic and non-strategic missile defense is `outdated'; nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction) is `not a suitable basis for stability'; TMD and NMD enhance strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strikes; export control and arms control regimes are not alternatives to TMD and NMD; and the ABMT prevents the US from establishing a limited missile defense.
In response to such findings, the SASC favors the following US policies: to `deploy as soon as possible' TMDs; `deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system'; `deploy as soon as practical' effective defenses against `advanced cruise missiles'; invest in R&D for follow-on BMD options; employ `streamlined acquisition procedures' to speed BMD deployments; and `seek a cooperative transition' away from the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
System Architecture
With respect to TMD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) shall establish a `top priority core theater missile defense program' consisting of (by year of deployment) PAC-3 (1998), Navy Lower Tier (1999), THAAD (2002), and Navy Upper Tier (2001). These systems are to be interoperable and are to exploit air and space-based sensors and battle management support systems. The Corps SAM and BPI systems will be terminated. The SecDef shall develop a plan for deploying follow-on systems. The SecDef shall submit a report in 60 days specifying a plan to implement these provisions.
With respect to NMD, the SecDef shall develop a NMD system for deployment by 2003 consisting of: ground-based interceptors in such locations and numbers as are necessary to provide a defense of Alaska, Hawaii, and CONUS against `limited ballistic missile attacks; fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors; and battle management/command, control, and intelligence (BM/C3).' SecDef shall develop an `interim' capability by 1999 as a `hedge against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats.' SecDef shall use `streamlined acquisition procedures' to expedite NMD deployment, while saving costs. SecDef shall submit a report in 60 days on the implementation of this law and analyzing options to improve the system, including: additional ground-based interceptors or sites; sea-based missile defense systems; and space-based kinetic energy and directed energy systems.
With respect to cruise missiles (CMs), SecDef shall undertake `an initiative' to ensure effective defenses against CMs. He shall submit a plan in 60 days.
The ABM treaty (ABMT)
The bill offers a sense of the Congress that the Senate should undertake a review of the `value and validity' of the ABMT and should consider establishing a `select committee' to review the ABMT and that the President should cease negotiating any understandings on the ABMT until this review is completed. The sense of the Congress also includes a requirement for SecDef to submit a declassified negotiating history of the ABMT. The bill provides a unilateral demarcation line to designate permissible BMD systems: if a system or component has not been `flight tested in an ABM -qualifying flight test' (defined in the bill as a flight test against a missile target that is flying over a range of 3,500 km or at a speed of greater than 5 km/second), it is not covered by the ABMT.
The Senate finds, however, that these parameters are `outdated' and hence should be `subject to change' after the Senate review of the ABMT. The bill prohibits the expenditure of funds to implement any lower standard. SecDef is to certify annually that no US BMD system is being constrained more than as provided in this bill.
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Budget categories
For budgetary purposes, the bill identifies the following as of the national BMD program: PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, Other TMD, NMD, and Follow-On and Support technologies.
Repeal of 10 BMD Laws
The SASC bill repeals the following, including several significant provisions:
1. In the MDA91: Congress endorsed US efforts to work with Russia on strengthening nuclear command and control, reduce strategic weapons, and strengthen nonproliferation efforts. Congress also: defined the US BMD system as directed against `limited' ballistic missile threats declared that this system shall be `ABM Treaty-compliant' and limited to `100 ground-based interceptors'; urged the President to pursue `discussions' with the Soviet Union to clarify what is permissible with respect to space-based missile defenses and to permit other changes in the ABMT (including adding sites, using space-based sensors, etc); required the SecDef to include `burden sharing' in a BMD report; clarified that the `limited' BMD defense capability shall only cover threats `below a threshold that would bring into question strategic stability'; and provided $4.1 billion for SDI projects, including $465 million for `space-based interceptors' (including Brilliant Pebbles).
2. In sec. 237 of the NDAA94: the SecDef was prohibited from approving any TMD project unless it passed `two realistic live-fire tests.'
3. In sec. 242 of the NDAA94: Congress sought to increase burden-sharing of BMD development costs; the SecDef was to prepare a plan of cooperation with allies (specifically cited were NATO, Japan, Israel, and South Korea) to avoid duplication and reduce costs; the section contains a sense of the Congress that whenever the US deploys a TMD system to defend a country that has not provided financial support for that system, the US should consider `whether it is appropriate to seek reimbursement' to cover some of the cost of that deployment; the section also
established a special `Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account' (subject to audit by GAO) to receive foreign funds to support TMD development.
4. In sec. 222 of the DDAA86: Congress prohibited the deployment of any `strategic defense system' unless the President first certifies that the system is both `survivable' and `cost effective' (i.e., that it `* * * is able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome it').
5. In sec. 225 of the DDAA86: Congress found that the President's Commission on Strategic Forces had declared in its report to the President dated 3/21/84 that `One of the most successful arms control agreements is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972'; noted that the Secretary of State has stated that `* * * the President has explicitly recognized that any ABM -related deployments * * * would be a matter for consultations and negotiation between the Parties'; and issued a sense of Congress that it `fully supports the declared policy of the President * * * to reverse the erosion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972,' that Congress's support for SDI `does not express or imply an intention on the part of Congress that the United States should abrogate, violate, or otherwise erode such treaty,' that such funding `does not express or imply any determination or commitment on the part of the Congress that the United States develop, test, or deploy ballistic missile strategic defense weaponry that would contravene such treaty,' and that funds `should not be used in a manner inconsistent with any of the treaties commonly known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.'
6. In Sec. 226 of the NDAA88/89: The SecDef was prohibited from deploying `any anti-ballistic missile system unless such deployment is specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment of this Act.'
7. In Sec. 8123 of the DDApA89: This was a sense of the Congress on SDI. It said SDI `should be a long-term and robust research program' to provide the U.S. with `expanded options' to respond to a `Soviet breakout' from the ABMT and to respond to other future Soviet arms initiatives; such options `can enhance' U.S. `leverage' in arms reductions negotiations; funding levels `must be established using realistic projections of available resources'; and the `primary emphasis' on SDI should be `to explore promising new technologies, such as directed energy technologies, which might have long-term potential to defend against a responsive Soviet offensive nuclear threat.'
8. In Sec. 8133 of the DDApA92: Congress here reached several findings about the implications for our NATO allies of modifying the ABMT, including--that all of our NATO allies `have in the past been supportive of the objects and purposes of the ABM Treaty'; that `changes in the ABMT would have profound political and security implications' for these allies and friends of the U.S.; and that before seeking to negotiate any changes in the treaty, the U.S. should consult with U.S. allies and `seek a consensus on negotiating objectives.'
9. In Sec. 234 of the NDAA94: Congress reached several findings, including that: the MDA91 `establishes a goal for the United States to comply with the ABM Treaty'; DoD is `continuing to obligate hundreds of millions of dollars' on development and testing of systems before a determination has been made that such items would be in compliance with the ABMT; and the ABMT `was not intended to' limit systems designed to counter modern TBMs `regardless of the capabilities of such missiles' unless such TBMs `are tested against or have demonstrated capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.' The SecDef was required to conduct a review of several listed BMD systems to determine if such systems (including Brilliant Eyes) `would be in compliance with the ABM Treaty.' The SecDef shall immediately notify Congress if there is any compliance problem in pursuing advanced TMDs and describe the problem. The bill attached funding limitations pending submission of the report.
10. In Sec. 235 of the NDAA95: This section listed 13 program elements for the BMDO, for budgetary purposes.
Analysis of the SASC Language
The SASC language establishes a policy of deploying a multiple-site national ABM system--this cannot be implemented without either amending or abrogating the ABMT. Amending the treaty would permit the Russians to deploy their own multiple-site system, including enhanced BMD features ostensibly intended only for TMD systems but which would have some significant capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles. The measure thus focuses only on what may be potentially gained from expanded BMD efforts, and ignores what may be potentially lost--including the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the ABMT itself, the START process, and the NPT, as the strategic arms reduction process comes to a halt amid new missile defense developments.
The committee text also places into law a unilateral U.S. definition of systems that can be developed within the ABMT--under that treaty, such changes are supposed to be arranged by through an amendment process based on mutual agreement of the Parties. A unilateral U.S. definition would serve as a dangerous precedent inspiring Russia to insert its own `most-favorite-notions' of BMD into its own statute books. Moreover, the 5 km-second/3500 km range demarcation line is well above the parameters of most TBM systems today (which fly at about 2 km/sec), yet dangerously close to the slowest SBM systems (which fly at between 6-7 km/sec). Thus the Committee language serves to: blur the distinction between strategic and theater systems; raise the risk of technological surprise and treaty `break out' activities; complicate treaty verification (given the greater growing ambiguity over which systems are strategic and which are theater); and jeopardize the strategic arms reduction process.
The Committee language also repeals several laws that specifically required U.S. adherence to the ABMT and that required burden-sharing in the form of increased financial contributions from our allies for BMD systems.
The premise of all the SASC proposals are the findings that the U.S. is now facing a serious missile threat and that this threat is growing. Both of these premises are open to question.
There are at least six rebuttals to the proposition that the U.S. is now facing a `serious and growing threat' that requires either the amendment or abrogation of the ABMT to counter--
(1) A Growing Threat? In April 1987, President Reagan announced the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime to regulate international commerce in goods relating to missiles that are capable of delivering a 500 kg warhead a distance of 300 km. Since that time, Congress has heard Administration spokesmen repeatedly testify about the 15-20 countries that either now have such missiles or are developing them (or may have the capability to develop them). Yet the number of countries alleged to be developing such missiles has remained, to a considerable extent, constant since the MTCR was established.
Arguably, the worst missile threats facing the U.S. are those that involve the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or U.S. allies. The most potentially destructive threat comes, and will continue to come for the foreseeable future, from Russia's nuclear-tipped ICBMs--a situation that will likely persist for quite a while. Ironically, nothing would be more effective in encouraging Russia both to halt its nuclear disarmament activities and to expand its missile fleet than if the United States decides to deploy--or even prepare to deploy--a multiple-site national missile defense system in contravention of the ABMT. The ABMT has succeeded in permitting the superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals because the treaty gives each country high confidence in the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Eliminating or watering down that treaty is thus the wrong way to go about alleviating the worst nuclear and missile threats now facing the United States.
The worst missile threat to the U.S. is, in short, the old missile threat, not a new one. The U.S. has a big stake in the success of the START/ABM process: its success will mean that America's worst missile threat will be a declining threat.
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Is the global WMD proliferation threat--serious though it is--growing? If not,
then the global missile threat may not be as grave as is commonly believed.
Support for international nonproliferation regimes provides one indicator of the WMD proliferation threat. As of August 1995, the NPT has 178 parties; over 159 countries have signed the CWC and 135 countries have ratified the BWC. Though some parties may well be in violation of those treaties, it is difficult to deny that these three treaties enjoy widespread, almost universal international support, and that this support is growing. The rush is on to get rid of chemical and biological weapons, not to acquire them. The stockpiles of the nuclear weapon states are going on a downward, not an upward, trend. If the CTBT is successfully concluded in 1996, there will be no more nuclear explosions anywhere for any purpose. Progress is being made on a cutoff of the production of fissile nuclear material for weapons or outside of safeguards. To point to the illicit weapons activities of a few states is not to suggest the existence of a new international proliferation norm.
Moreover, the interest that Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel have shown in developing long-range missile capabilities needs to be interpreted in light of other international trends. Over the last three decades, the following surface-to-surface missiles have either been cancelled or are going nowhere: South Korea's NHK-1; Taiwan's Chin Feng (`Green Bee'); Argentina's Condor II; Egypt's al-Zafir, al-Kahir, Ar-Ra'id, and Vector; Saudi Arabia's CSS-2; Iraq's Al-Hussein; Iraq's Al-Abbas; Iraq's Badr-2000; Brazil's SS-300; the Israel/Iran `Flower' project; the Libyan Otrag rocket program; all of the United States and ex-Soviet INF missiles; the disarmed and to-be-dismantled ICBM's in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the South African missile and space launch vehicle program; the China/North Korean DF-61; and several others. It is wrong, therefore, to declare without qualification that the missile threat against the United States is only growing--in some respects it continues to jeopardize U.S. interests, but in other respects the threat is arguably declining.
(2) Clear and Present Dangers. The worst dangers come from the further proliferation and use of WMDs by additional countries or subnational groups. As for systems of delivering such weapons, Congress's preoccupation with missiles--typically ballistic missiles--is baffling. The massive investments called for in the legislation for TMD and NMD will surely not address the worst (albeit unlikely) military threat now posed to the United States involving the delivery of WMD--that is, an all-out Russian strategic nuclear attack on the United States. It will do little to address attacks coming by means of cruise missiles and various remote piloted vehicles. And it will do nothing to prevent or deter a country of subnational group from deploying a weapon of mass destruction in the U.S., against U.S. citizens or troops, or against U.S. allies by means of any of several non-missile delivery systems that would be available for such a mission, at a fraction of the cost.
Among the most attractive delivery systems--in terms of ready availability, cost, reliability, and potential effectiveness--are advanced strike aircraft. These are delivery systems that are not regulated by any treaty or regime. As for national policy, the United States continues to export nuclear-capable strike aircraft or parts for such aircraft without even verification measures or host-country commitments to guarantee non-nuclear uses. Pakistan, for example, a country now under U.S. nuclear sanctions, continues to make commercial U.S. purchases of spare parts for its F-16 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. France, meanwhile, is seeking buyers for its Mirage 2000 wherever they can be found. The F-16C aircraft has a maximum weapons load of 5,400 kg and a combat radius of 930 km; the Mirage 2000 has a maximum weapons load of 6,300 kg and a combat radius of 700 km. By comparison, the North Korean Nodong--now under development--will have a reported 1000 kg payload and a 1000 km range.
In November 1991, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control issued a report entitled, `Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control,' authored by a panel of participating experts that included three senior officials now in the Clinton Administration, including the current Secretary of Defense, William Perry. The report found that: `Advanced-strike aircraft are generally as capable as missiles, and in many cases more capable, for delivering ordnance, so it is logical to devote, at minimum, comparable efforts to their control.' Yet US efforts, epitomized by the SASC bill and past BMD legislation, continue both to neglect this clear and present threat. These efforts instead focus shortsightedly on (a) the ballistic missile threat, (b) developing technological defenses against such missiles, while (c) neglecting the potentially negative military consequences of developing such defences, and (d) ignoring other means of addressing the missile proliferation threat (i.e., prevention, preemption, and deterrence).
(3) Future Threats. Both the CIA and the DIA directors have recently testified that the U.S. will not face a new missile proliferation threat for at least a decade. As stated earlier, even North Korea's Taepodong will at best be able to reach remote U.S. island territories sometime in the 21st Century, assuming that country remains in existence and its missile development program is successful.
Also, if the ballistic missile threat to Israel, Japan, and South Korea were so immediate and direct, the gravity of this threat is still not reflected in national funds invested by these countries in missile defense ventures. Though these countries have expressed interest in TMD systems, the United States is still paying most of the bills.
Missiles are not the only means by which a country could attack the United States. A variety of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could serve as potential delivery vehicles for WMDs, including nuclear weapons. For example, the Tier 2+ experimental reconnaissance UAV now under development in the United States, was described in the July 10, 1995 issue of Aviation Week as having the following performance characteristics: a 14,000-mile range, a 2,000-pound payload, an ability to stay in flight for more than 42 hours, and a maximum altitude of 65,000 feet. The United States, and U.S. forces abroad, may well be facing a graver threat from such aircraft in the next decade than they will face from ballistic missiles. Smuggled or covertly deployed WMDs also remain a serious threat, as do WMDs deployed by means of land vehicles or a wide variety of ships.
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Proponents of the new legislation raise the specter of North Korean missile attacks against the United States. Yet North Korea is still many, many years away from having a missile that could reach the continental United States, or even Alaska or Hawaii--assuming it would want to launch such a missile even if it had such a capability. Nevertheless, the SASC's missile defense proposal would lead the United States out of the ABMT (and thereby scuttle the START process), a multi-billion-dollar proposal intended largely to cope with the Taepodong's hypothetical worst-case capabilities in the 21st Century. An alternative to this approach would be to concentrate more on discouraging North Korea from building such missiles in the first place.
Furthermore, certain trends in advanced conventional weaponry may rival or surpass the threat to U.S. forces in the years ahead that will come from ground-to-ground missiles--especially with respect to increasing accuracy and stealthiness of advanced conventional weapons.
(4) Missiles Have Not Historically Been Decisive. From Hitler's V-2 rocket bombardment of London, through the Iraq/Iran war of the cities, to the recent war in Kuwait, missiles have not proven to be a decisive weapon, either as an offensive weapon or as a weapon of deterrence. Israel's significant technological edge in nuclear and missile technology did not prevent it from being repeatedly attacked by modified Iraqi Scuds; nor did the Patriot antimissile batteries deter Iraq from launching repeated missile strikes on both Israel and Saudi Arabia. It is also not at all clear that the widespread deployment of TMD systems in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East would necessarily alleviate the nuclear weapons proliferation threat in those regions--it could even aggravate that threat by stimulating the search for new weapons designs and delivery systems.
(5) BMD Proliferation. The ABMT is not just an arms control treaty. It is also a nonproliferation treaty, in two respects. First, Article IX prohibits Russia and the United States from exporting strategic missile defense systems or components covered by the treaty. If the ABM treaty collapsed, there would be no legal obstacle to Russia exporting highly-capable missile defense technology to hot spots around the globe, such as East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The export of such systems could well foster or aggravate regional WMD and missile races. Some of Russia's BMD interceptors are reportedly nuclear capable. Others have characteristics (range, thrust, navigation systems, materials and coatings) very much like offensive ballistic missiles. The simulated offensive ballistic missile used as a
target in testing the Israeli Arrow TMD interceptor, for example, is another Arrow. Second, if horizontal (or geographical) BMD proliferation becomes popular thanks to the collapse of the ABMT, this will also stimulate more vertical proliferation of both existing strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
(6) Alternatives to Missile Defense. To the extent that the U.S. and its allies face missile proliferation threats, there are more--and more effective--ways to approach this threat than in searching for technological shields. The massive funds that have been spent on missile defense have drained valuable resources away from needed investments in nonproliferation regimes, sanctions, export controls, intelligence collection and sharing, active and preventive diplomacy, conventional war-fighting capability, and other such classic nonproliferation tools. Arguably, the U.S. Marines remain today America's best `ground mobile TMD system,' if one factors in cost, effectiveness, and treaty considerations. Given past underinvestment in sharpening the classic tools of nonproliferation, one should not be surprised to see chronic nuclear and missile proliferation threats.
2. THE NUNN/LEVIN/COHEN/WARNER SUBSTITUTE
In summary, while the substitute dulls the teeth of the SASC's missile defense language, it surely does not `defang' that language. The text still sets the U.S. on a course out of the ABMT: it requires the `development for deployment' of a multiple-site missile defense system covering all U.S. territory; it accepts all the SASC findings about the gravity of the missile threat; it questions the value of nuclear deterrence; it establishes a provocative new national policy to `consider . . . the option of withdrawing' from the ABMT if Russia refuses to accept unilateral U.S. proposed treaty amendments; it seeks the accelerated development and `streamlined' acquisition of systems that are not ABMT-compliant; it endorses the `demonstrated capabilities' definition of an ABMT-compliant system; and it endorses a unilateral U.S. definition of the velocity and distance criteria for distinguishing strategic from non-strategic missiles.
The BMD provisions are broken down into the following sections: findings (232); policy (233); TMD architecture (234); NMD architecture (235); cruise missile defense initiative (236); policy toward ABM treaty (237); spending prohibition (238); BMD program elements (239); definition of ABM treaty (240); and repeal of 10 laws (241). A copy of these provisions appeared in the Congressional Record on August 11.
The substitute includes the following notable findings: (a) the existence of a `significant and growing' missile threat to the U.S. (later called an `increasingly serious threat'); (b) TMD can reduce incentives for proliferation; (c) NMD can `strengthen strategic stability and deterrence'; (d) the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (`MAD') is `questionable'.
The bill would establish the following national policies to: (a) deploy `as soon as possible' TMDs against TBMs; (b)`develop for deployment' a multiple-site NMD system (and to `consider' withdrawing from the ABM treaty if Russia refuses to agree to necessary treaty amendments); (c) develop BMD `follow-on' options; (d) streamline the BMD acquisition process; and (e) seek a `cooperative transition' away from MAD.
The SecDef is to report to Congress (before submitting the FY 1997 defense budget) on the costs of RDT&E/deployment of each BMD system (both TMD and NMD).
The bill includes Navy Upper Tier system and THAAD within TMD core program--both of which have been criticized as having potential strategic ABM capabilities.
Requires the SecDef to develop a NMD system by 2003 that shall `be capable of being deployed at multiple sites,' include space-based sensors, include a limited NMD `hedge' capability by the year 2000 involving `one or more' sites. SecDef shall conduct an analysis of options to improve NMD effectiveness, including sea-based and space-based weapons, and additional ground-based interceptors.
The SecDef shall prepare a plan to upgrade U.S. cruise missile defenses.
The Senate should undertake a review of the `value and validity' of the ABM treaty.
The President cannot implement over the next fiscal year a more restrictive definition of an ABM -permissible system than that established in the bill--the bill establishes a demarcation line at targets traveling at 3,500 km range, 5 km/second velocity, and the ban only covers deployment of systems that are `flight tested' against targets fitting this definition.
The bill repeals 10 TMD/NMD-related laws (following the SASC bill).
Analysis of the substitute proposal
The table in Annex 1 compares this proposal with key provisions of the ABMT. The most troublesome language pertains to the requirement to develop for deployment a multiple-site BMD system along with specific new systems (e.g., space-based and sea-based) that are not now permitted by the ABMT.
There is a real danger that this language will be perceived by the Russian parliament and by Russian military and political leaders as a U.S. intention to abandon the treaty. If this occurs, then the consequences for both arms control and nonproliferation will be grave. We can expect the following:
The Start II treaty will be in jeopardy; Russia may even consider withdrawing from Start I.
The other nuclear weapon states (France, China, and Britain) will be reluctant to join in the process of nuclear arms reductions if Russia and the U.S. are no longer constrained by the ABMT.
Russia's reactions to the U.S. deployment of a national multiple-site missile defense system could well include a reversal or even an expansion of its offensive nuclear arsenal and deployment of its own national multiple-site defense against U.S. missiles--all of which would lead the U.S. to consider following suit.
There is adequate reason to believe that the Russians will indeed interpret the U.S. policy to develop a national multiple-site BMD system for deployment as an intention to violate the ABMT, an action that could jeopardize the Start process. Russian perceptions of the U.S. legislation will have a profound impact upon the future of several strategic arms control initiatives, as indicated in the following statements:
On August 17, Mikhail Demurin, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, told a wire service reporter that Russia believes the legislation pending in the U.S. Senate on missile defense would lead to the `actual liquidation' of the ABMT.
On August 4, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrote to the Senate Majority Leader that the NMD language in S. 1026 `would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty. . . . The effect of such actions would in all likelihood be to prompt Russia to terminate implementation of the START I Treaty and shelve ratification of START II.'
On July 28, Defense Secretary Perry wrote a letter to Sen. Nunn in which he said that the SASC's BMD language would `put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty . . . jeopardize Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties . . . [and] threaten to undermine fundamental national security interests of the United States.' By continuing to call for the development with the intention of deploying a multiple site BMD system, the compromise language keeps the U.S. on the `pathway' to abrogation.
On June 28, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Shalikashvili, wrote to Sen. Levin that `Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would deal in isolation with unilateral U.S. legislation
detailing technical parameters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we believe that START II is in both countries' interests regardless of other events, we assume such unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader security relationship with Russia as well.'
On June 20, Russian President Yeltsin submits the START II treaty to the Russian Duma with a cover letter stating that `It goes without saying that the Treaty can be fulfilled only providing the United States preserve and strictly fulfill [the] bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972.'
On April 27, Russian foreign ministry spokesman Nikita Matkovskiy expressed alarm that the US has started testing anti-missile defense systems that the US unilaterally claims are non-strategic; Matkovskiy stated that `In our opinion the continuation of the policy of accomplished facts instead of an intensive search for a mutually acceptable solution can only complicate matters, if not drive them into a blind alley.' (Interfax)
On April 23, Russian arms control expert Anton Surikov stated that US BMD plans `are in fact yet another attempt to push through the back door the old Reagan SDI idea. That's why they pose a considerable threat to strategic stability in the world and provoke China and other `minor nuclear countries' to sharply build up their nuclear missile forces.' (Itar-Tass) On August 4, Surikov specifically claimed that the US Senate's BMD language `prompts our country to refrain from ratifying the START-2 Treaty and reconsider some provisions under the START-1 one.' (Itar-Tass)
On March 28, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev commented on prospects for Russian ratification of the START-II treaty, noting that `It is also essential that no attempts be made to evade the ABM Treaty, since both treaties are closely connected with each other.' (Itar-Tass)
On March 17, columnist Vladimir Belous wrote in Segodnya that `Some [US] senators even demand that the administration stop the ABM negotiations, which can allegedly limit US freedom of action. In fact the intention is to reanimate the Reagan SDI program, although in a more modest form . . . It must be admitted immediately that if the ABM Treaty is effectively undermined, further implementation of the START I Agreement will be in question.
On March 7, Aleksander Piskunov, the vice-chairman of the Duma Committee for National Defense, stated after a meeting with American congressmen that `It is absolutely obvious that the discussion of the possibility of implementing the ABM system will be fraught with serious consequences and will tell negatively on the upcoming ratification of an agreement on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons.' (Itar-Tass)
On February 10, retired Major-General Vladimir Belous, writing at length in Segodnya about ABMT-related developments, concluded that each Party `will give its own interpretation to the parameters for delimitation and will be guided by them, which could lead to the de facto undermining of the treaty as a document of international law. Too much is at stake for there to be haste or inconsistency on this issue. The profound connection between strategic offensive and defensive weapons must be pointed out once more. This signifies at this stage that the ratification of the START-2 treaty by the Russian parliament is possible only when the delimitation of strategic and `non-strategic' . . . has been achieved and officially affirmed. And in no case before that.'
On January 18, Aleksandr Sychev wrote an article in Izvestiya warning that `The White House plan to avail itself of a new ABM defense system gives rise to the suspicion that the United States is trying to bypass the ABM Treaty and attain military-strategic superiority.'
On January 16, a senior Russian foreign ministry official criticized a recent test of `a tactical ABM system'; noting that the test occurred `at a time when both countries were holding discussions . . . on distinctions between strategic and tactical ABM systems,' the official stated that `Washington's actions worsen the atmosphere at the consultations and may have a negative effect on the entire complex of security negotiations in general.' (Interfax)
The danger that Russia will interpret the substitute as an intention to abrogate the ABMT is further aggravated by the repeal in both the Committee's bill and the substitute of provisions of existing law that require the United States to remain in compliance with the ABMT (e.g., repeal of the Missile Defense Act of 1991).
The substitute includes in a Sense of the Senate certain technical parameters to define the types of BMD systems that are permissible under the ABMT: any system that has not been tested against test targets flying at or above 5 km/second or exceeding a 3,500 km range would be permissible. Though the substitute is an improvement over the SASC bill's provision, in that it is non-binding, it nevertheless places the Congress in favor of adopting a BMD testing standard that has not been agreed by the Parties to the ABMT.
The substitute also prevents the President from spending any funds in the next fiscal year to implement any more restrictive standard. Moreover, in establishing a US national policy that a BMD system will be controlled only if it is actually flight tested, the substitute departs from the ABMT's prohibition on developing systems that have inherent capabilities to destroy strategic ballistic missiles. The substitute language would, therefore, put Russia on notice that the United States would have no objection if Russia developed and even deployed sophisticated strategic BMD systems as long as the systems are not flight tested against the unilaterally-defined US target criteria. Any subsequent Russian action to exercise these options would serve to weaken the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.
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IMPACT OF THE SUBSTITUTE PROPOSAL ON THE ABM TREATY
[Although the text does not explicitly require the U.S. to abrogate the ABMT, the substitute MDA95 would require the Executive to take steps that would--if implemented without amending the treaty--violate both the letter and the spirit of that treaty. Examples:]ABM Treaty (ABMT) ------ Missile Defense Act of 1995 (MDA95)
Preamble: considers that `effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons'; proceeds from the premise that `the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems . . . would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms'
The substitute effectively substitutes `expand' and `expansion' for the ABMT Preambles terms for `limit' and `limitation.' Sec. 232 (4) `finds' that the deployment of `effective defenses' against ballistic missiles `of all ranges' can reduce incentives for missile proliferation. Sec. 232 (5) refers to the difference between strategic and non-strategic ballistic missiles as a `Cold War distinction' in need of review. Sec. 232 (7) `finds' that BMD systems `can contribute to the maintenance of stability' as missile proliferation proceeds and as the U.S. and the CIS `significantly reduce the number of strategic forces in their respective inventories.' Such findings are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the preamble of the ABMT. The findings, moreover, are not balanced: they fail to address any of the strategic benefits that the U.S. has gained from the ABMT.
Article I: Bans the following--deployment of ABM systems for a `defense of the territory of its country,' the provision of a `base' for such a defense, and deployment to cover an individual region. In short, the ABMT allows limited defenses against strategic missiles, but they cannot be deployed to protect the whole country. The treaty thus permits missile defenses against both strategic and non-strategic missiles, but defenses against the former must be limited to one site (and even then, only certain types and numbers of ground-based interceptors are permissible) and defenses against the latter may not be given capabilities against strategic missiles Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to `develop for deployment' a `multiple-site national missile defense system' protecting against limited missile attacks `on the territory of the United States.' Though this language echoes a similar provision in sec. 231 of the Missile Defense Act of 1991, it omits language in that act requiring U.S. compliance with the ABMT; indeed, the substitute repeals the MDA91 in its entirety. The substitute also opens up a can of worms for treaty verifiers and arms control lawyers. In light of the bill's positive `finding' in sec. 234(4) about a defense against missiles `of all ranges,' the language could be read both to authorize a territorial, multi-site defense against `limited' attacks involving strategic missiles--exactly what the treaty prohibits. Note that the text does not define `limited'--and given all missile attacks are in some ways limited, the language invites a treaty interpretation that would ultimately permit a defense against all missile attacks. If implemented without modification of the treaty, this would violate several key provisions of the ABMT, including (but not limited to) the bans on: (1) multiple ABM sites; (2) `development' of space-based and sea-based ABM components; (3) giving non-strategic BMD systems capabilities to counter strategic missiles; (4) developing a `base' for a territorial ABM defense; and (5) developing a missile defense for an individual region. The term `territory of the United States' covers a third of the globe, including: (in the Pacific) the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Baker and Howland Islands, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Island, Palmyra, and Wake Island, and (in the Atlantic) the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico--it is hard to imagine an ABM -compliant system that would be `operationally effective' in defending such an area without violating the ABMT. Even if the scope were limited to Hawaii, Alaska, and the CONUS, this would cover an area of over 3.7 million square miles; the total area would be far greater. It would not be unreasonable to interpret this proposal as a statement of a U.S. intent to break the treaty. Indeed, the dictionary defines the preposition `for' (as used in the phrase `develop for deployment') as meaning: `with the object or purpose of.'
Article II: Defines a strategic ABM system as including not just interceptors, launchers, and radars, but also system components which are `undergoing testing,' `undergoing . . . conversion,' or `under construction.'
Sec. 233 establishes a national policy of developing a NMD system that will be `operationally effective' against limited ballistic missile strikes (regardless of their origin or flight characteristics) against `the territory of the United States.' Sec. 235 defines the NMD `architecture' and directs the SecDef to `develop' a specific system achieving this goal. This provision is unilateral, given that Russia has not yet agreed to the BMD testing parameters found in the substitute. Sec. 235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use of `upgraded early warning radars' and `space-based sensors' in the NMD plan.
Article III: The ABM system may cover only one deployment area (of fixed dimensions) and consist of no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles; also radar limitations. [This provision is pursuant to Article I of the ABM Protocol of 1974.]
Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to `develop for deployment' a `multiple-site national missile defense system' protecting against limited attacks `on the territory of the United States' (see comments above). Such a deployment would thus violate both Article III of the ABMT and Article I of the ABM Protocol of 1974. Sec. 235 (a) requires the SecDef to `develop' an NMD system (covering CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii) involving ground-based interceptors `capable of being deployed at multiple sites'.
Article V: Bans development, testing, or deployment of (a) ABM systems or components which are air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based; (b) ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor at a time from each launcher; (c) rapid reload ABM launchers
Sec. 235 (a) requires the SecDef to `develop' a NMD system (covering CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii) involving ground-based interceptors `capable of being deployed at multiple sites'. The system is to include `space-based sensors' including the SMTS (formerly Brilliant Eyes) and BM/C3 systems. Sec 235 (b) requires the SecDef, in developing the NMD plan, to `make use of . . . one or more of the sites' that will be used as deployment locations. Same section requires the SecDef to prepare `an analysis of options' for developing NMD system that includes several systems that are not ABMT-compliant, including: `additional' (presumably in addition to the 100 authorized by the ABMT) ground-based interceptors at existing or new sites, sea-based missile systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, and space-based directed energy systems. This list amounts to a congressional requirement for the SecDef to evaluate `options' to violate the treaty--an action that could reasonably be interpreted in Moscow as a prelude to treaty abrogation.
Article VI: Bans giving non-strategic defensive missiles, launchers, or radars any capabilities to counter strategic missiles, and not to test such missiles in an ABM mode; bans deployment of future radars for early warning of strategic missiles except at locations along the periphery of its territory and oriented outward
235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use of `upgraded early warning radars' and `space-based sensors' in the NMD plan. The purpose of the NMD system (sec. 235(a)) is to develop an `operationally effective' counter to a `limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack'--yet the only systems permitted under the ABMT that can be `operationally effective' against limited/accidental/unauthorized launches of strategic missiles can only be deployed at one site, cannot be deployed at sea/air/or mobile/or with rapid reloads, etc--none of these restrictions appears in the bill. Also, given that (a) the term `limited' missile attack is not defined, (b) every missile attack is limited in some way, and (c) there cannot be infinite missile attacks--the law effectively constitutes a green light to counter all missile attacks on all U.S. territory--just what the ABMT was created to prohibit. The substitute also distinguishes between a BMD system having an inherent capability against strategic missiles and a BMD system that has been `tested against' such missiles. This language contrasts sharply with the ABMT's ban on giving non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles.
Article IX: Bans transferring ABM systems or their components to other states or deploying them `outside its national territory'
Sec 235(b) requires the SecDef to prepare `an analysis of options' for NMD including sea-based missile systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, and space-based directed energy systems--all of these would presumably be `outside the territory' of the United States. Under a unilateral interpretation of its own obligations under the ABMT, Russia could in turn argue that it is permissible for Russia to deploy its own ABM systems around the world to counter `limited, accidental, or unauthorized' U.S. missile attacks. Russia could (if the ABMT is finally abrogated) also export whole strategic NMD systems or critical components to all destinations.
Article XIV: Allows amendments; but agreed amendments shall enter into force with the same procedures governing the entry into force of the treaty. The amendment process provides no authorization for unilateral national definitions of key terms of the treaty. Moreover, the substitute misleadingly claims (in sec. 237(a)(4)) that all the programs in this bill `can be accomplished through processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.' By the same reasoning, any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could `accomplish' a robust nuclear weapons arsenal fully `within' the procedures of the NPT, simply by following the 90-day withdrawal procedure. Indeed, either the U.S. or Russia could go ahead and develop and deploy a completely impermeable, national Star Wars system fully `within the ABM Treaty' simply by exercising that treaty's right to withdraw (or by not engaging in flight tests). The proposal thus converts a prohibition into a right or even an obligation.
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