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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
(Senate - September 06, 1995)

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, while I commend the work of the Senators involved in negotiating this compromise amendment on missile defenses, which is certainly an improvement over what is currently in the bill, I cannot support the amendment. By nature, compromises are never perfect, but they usually take the form of something each side can live with. In this case, I do not believe that the language in this amendment is something we can afford to live with.

Despite the changes, this proposal still commits us to the deployment in the near future of expensive and destabilizing missile defense systems. This is not the way we should be going. The time and energy the Senate has put into this issue would be much more wisely spent on ratification of the START II and chemical weapons treaties, which are sitting in the Foreign Relations Committee. The proponents of robust missile defenses argue that the end of the cold war makes obsolete arms control treaties negotiated in that area. I could not disagree more. The way to a more secure United States and a more peaceful world is through building on our arms control treaties, not destroying them.

This amendment, while designed by its authors to be compliant with the ARM Treaty, moves us in the direction of fundamentally altering or even withdrawing from the treaty. The AMB Treaty is a cornerstone of our arms control policies, and I believe we must retain its integrity, especially to ensure Russian ratification and implementation of START II. Putting at risk this ratification makes us less safe, not more.

I am also concerned about the costs of deploying national missile defenses, which has not entered into this debate to the extent it should. By one estimate, it could cost some $100 billion, and the way weapons systems go, like the B-2, it is not hard to imagine the costs soaring higher. Many of the proponents of this star wars-like deployment joined me in supporting the balanced budget amendment, but have not explained how they would reconcile that goal with the huge costs of this program.

I recognize the choices that had to be made on this issue, and Senators Nunn and Warner got the best deal that they could. But when Senator Warner says that the amendment sets a clear path to deployment of national missile defenses, I have no choice but to oppose it.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend my colleagues who were involved in drafting this amendment on missile defense.

The hard work that went into the crafting of this compromise is strong evidence of both the importance of the issue and the dedication of the members and staff who spent many days and nights attempting to defense common ground on this critical issue. Their efforts, and the several votes we have already had on the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization and appropriations bills regarding missile defense will be viewed one day as the turning point in the debate on defending America and American interests against ballistic missile attack.

There are elements of this compromise that I am satisfied with. For example, section 232(9) contains the following language: `Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at a single site, the United States is currently prohibited from deploying a national missile defense system capable of defending the continental United States, and Hawaii against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.' While some might find virtue in being defenseless against even the most limited of threats--a threat not even contemplated during the negotiations of the ABM Treaty--I do not. This defenselessness can only serve as an invitation to those with interests that are hostile to our own to develop or acquire the capability to put the United States at risk from long-range ballistic missiles. That this amendment recognizes our inability to defend against even a limited threat should be regarded as progress.

The recent revelations about Saddam Hussein's weapons program should teach us that we won't ever know as much about some ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs as we think we do. Combine this with the cavalier export control regimes of other countries currently possessing these weapons and delivery systems, and the oft-stated l10 years until the United States could be threatened by long-range missiles sounds more like wishful thinking than dispassionate analysis.

I have three major concerns with this amendment:

First, unlike the committee-reported bill, the amendment does not require the deployment of a national missile defense system capable of defending all of the United States against even the most limited of threats. This must change. We have been engaged for too long in developing for deployment the necessary systems. Instead of committing to deploy an NMD system against a limited threat, this amendment commits to more procrastination. We've had enough of this, and anything short of a commitment to deploy is unacceptable.

Second, section 238 of the amendment prohibits the use of funds to implement an ABM /TMD demarcation agreement with any of the states of the former Soviet Union which is more restrictive than that specified in section 238(b) without the advice and consent of the Senate or enactment of subsequent legislation. This funding prohibition is fine, as far as it goes; unfortunately, it does not go far enough. The amendment is silent on the possibility that the administration could enact a more restrictive demarcation unilaterally. In essence, the amendment tells the administration that if it wants to have a more restrictive demarcation standard than that spelled out all it has to do is announce the standard unilaterally, without Russian agreement. This amendment would not prohibit the use of funds by the administration if it were simply to take the current Russian proposal on demarcation and adopt it as the unilateral position of the United States. To go one step further, as written this amendment would allow both the United States and Russia to adopt the same Russian proposal unilaterally without triggering the prohibition on the use of funds in section 238(c). If we are not willing to permit, as part of a bilateral or multilateral agreement, a more restrictive demarcation standard than that specified in the amendment, why should we be willing to allow the adoption of a more restrictive standard unilaterally?< p>Third, prior to deployment of a national missile defense system capable against a limited threat, section 233(3) of the amendment mandates congressional review of, `(A) the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.' In addition to the fact that section 233(3) (A) and (B) are unnecessary restatements of a basic purpose of each year's Defense authorization and appropriations bills for all defense programs, the requirement in section 233(3)(C) is completely backward. Instead of requiring review of the effect of defending America on the ABM Treaty, we ought to review the effect of the ABM Treaty on defending America. The defense of our country is more important to me than the defense of a treaty that puts our country at risk.

There are other parts of the amendment in need of improvement, though they are of lesser importance than the problems I've already raised. I'll conclude by making four observations: First, notwithstanding the desire by some to ignore the threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile delivery systems, this threat is serious and we cannot continue to procrastinate over employing the means at hand to reduce this threat. Second, a national missile defense against a limited threat would in no way undermine United States-Russian deterrence, and would only enhance deterrence of rogue nations or groups with interests contrary to those of the United States, all of whom are limited by scarcity of funds. We would do well to pay close attention to what Secretary Perry said recently, that, `The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future, and they may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.' Third, however the Russian Duma acts on the START II Treaty, its decision will be based on many factors, only one of which is their perception of United States actions with regard to the ABM Treaty. It is incorrect to suggest that Duma ratification of START II is based solely on our ballistic missile defense legislation, and the Senate cannot allow itself to be held hostage by threats of retaliation by the Duma. Fourth, the missile defense provisions in the underlying bill will not violate the ABM Treaty unless the administration takes no action to modify the treaty. Indeed, Secretary of State Christopher made this point in an August 14, 1995 cable, where in talking points provided for selected U.S. embassies he said, `The provisions as proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee call for deployment of a national, multiple-site missile defense that, if deployed, without treaty amendment, would violate the ABM Treaty.' Secretary Christopher is saying that a multiple-site NMD system could be made ABM Treaty-compliant by simply amending the treaty. The assertions that have been made on this floor and by administration officials that, in and of itself, the underlying bill violates the ABM Treaty, are wrong. If you don't want to take my word for it, ask Secretary Christopher.

I think the amendment weakens the committee-reported Missile Defense Act of 1995, but having said that it is important to get this bill to conference where we will have an opportunity to improve these provisions.

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Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, 1 month ago I rose to support the Missile Defense Act of 1995, as the Armed Services Committee reported it. It seemed to me to be just about the right response to the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles. Frankly, I was a bit surprised by the vehemence with which some of my colleagues opposed the bill once it came to the floor.

Many Americans are unaware that right now, America is defenseless against ballistic missiles. If that fact were better known, I think many Americans would be very angry that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 ran into so much opposition from the Clinton administration and some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.

But the fact is that our choice--the choice of those who want to protect America from this growing threat--was between this revised amendment or no bill at all. Given the other important aspects of this bill, and given Saddam Hussein's recent revelations, we chose to work things out and to take a step toward defending America--although it is not as big a step as we wanted. Nevertheless this amendment is a step forward and, let us not forget, we will have an opportunity in conference with the House to make modifications.

In any case, there can be no doubt that this bill and this amendment take concrete steps toward establishing effective theater and national missile defenses.

On the essential question of national defense, this amendment establishes as U.S. policy the deployment of a multiple-site national missile is operationally effective against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United States--a defense system that can be augmented over time to provide a layered defense. The Secretary of Defense is instructed to implement this policy by developing a national missile defense system--consisting of ground-based interceptors, fixed ground-based radars, and space-based sensors--capable of being deployed by the end of 2003.

Unlike some of my colleagues who still believe that the cold-war-era ABM Treaty defends America, I believe that nothing short of the development and deployment of an effective national missile defense system will truly protect America against the threats of the 21st century.

The recent revelations by Saddam Hussein--that the Iraqis filled nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with biological and toxin weapons--should drive this point home.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, this legislation calls for a year of careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM Treaty in the longer term. During that time the President could and should seek to negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial agreement that will allow the United States to proceed with multiple-site deployments. Furthermore, this legislation prohibits the use of funds to implement an agreement limiting theater missile defenses--which were never limited by the ABM Treaty--without the advice and consent of the Senate. This was intended to address to the very real concern that the administration has not abandoned the ill-conceived course of negotiating changes to the ABM Treaty that would restrict theater missile defenses despite oft-stated and deep-seated Senate objections.

This legislation also establishes a theater missile defense core program and a cruise missile initiative that focuses our resources on deploying effective systems that are needed right now to defend, American interests around the globe.

Mr. President, this amendment does not achieve all of the objectives I would like to have seen achieved. However, it does take firm, tangible steps toward defending America--most importantly by setting a goal of 2003 to deploy a multiple site, effective defense of the United States of America. On this there cannot be and will not be any compromise. We will have a conference with the House. And if the conference report that is worked out is acceptable and is passed by the Congress, the responsibility will be with the President to sign this bill so that defending America becomes the law of the land.

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HANS BETHE WARNED OF THIS

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, at a point in our history when we have successfully avoided the Armagedonnic catastrophe of nuclear confrontation and have began the sensible process of limiting nuclear warheads by treaty, the Senate proposes to adopt a bill that could resurrect the nuclear arms race, and, in the process, jeopardize 23 years of arms control treaties. The Armed Services Committee has presented the Senate with a bill that proposes a national ballistic missile defense system. The Congressional Budget Office estimates this is a $48 billion proposition.

Can we in good conscience embark on a project to doubtful feasibility and enormous cost, which only addresses one of many nuclear threats? Potential adversaries will simply channel their resources into producing delivery vehicles that the system could not defend against; submarines, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, terrorists car bombs.

In 1977, Prof. Han Bethe of Cornell University, one of the most distinguished figures of sciences in the nuclear age, during a visit to my home in upstate New York, warned me that such a plans would 1 day be presented to the Senate.

On March 23, 1983, with little attention given to the technical details, President Reagan proposed an initiative which became known as the strategic defense initiative [SDI]. We have yet to work out the technical details of a national missile defense system. Yet there are those in this body who appear to be bent on deploying some remnant of the SDI, without regard to the potential threats that exist, or the costs involved.

In testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee in 1992, Dr. Bethe elaborated on his objections to deploying such a system. I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from the transcript of that hearing be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 1992

Senator Moynihan. I recall that 15 years ago, Dr. Bethe, you and Mrs. Bethe very graciously came to lunch, and you tried to warn me against something I never heard of. I really didn't know what you were talking about. It turned out to be Star Wars.6

You described, as I recall, having me with a Soviet physicist in a conference in Rome or some such place and you both agreed that there were those people who thought one could have a small nuclear device explode in space and send out a laser beam that would zap something on the other side of the universe. You both agreed
that it was crazy but that there were plenty of crazy people in both our countries and they were likely to try it. You were not wrong.

But now we are further down in our notions. Brilliant Pebbles I think is the most recent formulation.

Do you think we should pursue this kind of anti-missile technology at this level? I know that you thought at the grand level it would not prove coherent, and it did not. But might it at a lower level? Did you have any thoughts for us on this?

Dr. Bethe. I have a strong opinion on Star Wars. I thought it was misconceived from the beginning, and by now I think there is no reason at all to pursue it or to pursue any variation of it.

Senator Moynihan. Or to pursue any variation of it.

Dr. Bethe. The Brilliant Pebbles, in contrast to the X-ray laser, are likely to be technically feasible. But I am terribly nervous about having 1,000 such devices cruising about above the atmosphere. One of them might hit an asteroid. They tell me and I think they are right that they have precautions against that. But I believe that the only thing that should be done is research. That should continue. But we should not deploy any of these devices.

Senator Moynihan. Did I hear you correctly when you said that it might hit an asteroid?

Dr. Bethe. Yes.

Senator Moynihan. I thought for a moment you had said `astronaut.' But it might be both or either, for that matter, if it comes to it.

May I say to the Chairman and to my colleague, Senator Robb, that in 1977, Hans Bethe on our back porch in upstate New York, said one of these days some crazy scientist is going to come along to you fellows in the Senate and say I have a plan whereby we put these nuclear weapons in place all over the atmosphere and at a certain point we detonate them and they produce a laser and it goes zap. And he said it's coming and when it comes, tell those people they are loony.

Well, it came, just as he predicted. In 1945, he wrote that the Soviets could have the bomb in 5 years; they got it in 4. After our luncheon in 1977 we got Star Wars in 5, I think.

We could have saved ourselves a lot of grief, it seems to me, if we had listened to you in the first place. You know, the people who built these bombs know
something about how they work. Dr. Bethe, you've even suggested you could go down into the basement and turn uranium into reactor fuel. It is not that much of a technical feat.

But you would keep the research going on the general principle that you ought to know as much physics as you can but leave it on the ground and not deploy any Brilliant Pebbles or Sullen Sods or whatever.

Dr. Bethe. I think we should not deploy any of this. I think even if they are effective, everybody has agreed that they are no good against a strong enemy like the Soviet Union used to be. I think it would be a mistake to deploy such devices against accidental launch of Third World countries.

Is that the answer you wanted?

Senator Moynihan. Yes. I wanted your view, but that was the question I wanted answered. Yes.

Does Ambassador Nitze have a different view?

Ambassador Nitze. I think the terms involved are very confusing and are not precisely defined. With respect to the interception of shorter-range ballistic missiles, for instance, such as the Patriot missile, which was used during the Gulf War, I think that is an important thing which one should continue to develop.

Dr. Bethe. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator Moynihan. I think you are getting agreement from your colleague at the table. But those are ground-based or at least based within the atmosphere.

Ambassador Nitze. They are ground based, the Patriot missile. I think most of the devices which might be used against, for instance, shorter-range things, such as SCUDS, would be ground-based. But there are some that are not.

The man who really invented Brilliant Pebbles--I forget his name--now works at Los Alamos and he believes that one ought to go for something which he calls `burros,' being the stupidest animal around. Instead of having these bright interceptors, you have ones with low capability but which would be very good against shorter range missiles, which would be in the lower atmosphere. I think he may be right about that.

So if there are ways and means of dealing with the shorter range threats, which the Saddam Husseins or the Iraqis and so forth are capable of, I think we ought to be willing to deploy those in the event the technology works out.

So it's a question of I want to know precisely what it is that we are talking about when we say don't do it or do do it.

Moynihan. Dr. Bethe does not seem to disagree with that.

Dr. Bethe. I agree that it would be good to have an effective means against shorter-range missiles. Brilliant Pebbles is not the right thing, and I believe some knowledgeable people think that we can have such a device. When we see one, I am in favor of it.

Senator Moynihan. Thank you very much.

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Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, George P. Shultz recounts in his biography `Turmoil and Triumph' that SDI was President Reagan's own idea but that the plan was announced after a favorable endorsement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then Secretary of State Shultz reports that when Lawrence Eagleburger informed him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told the President that a strategic defense system could be developed, the Secretary responded, `The Chiefs are not equipped to make this kind of proposal. They are not scientists.' Of course, when the scientists were consulted, it was concluded it could not be done.

Finally, consideration must be given to the possible response of Russia to our actions. The original bill would have required us to abrogate the ABM Treaty. If we were to break the ABM Treaty unilaterally, it is clear that Russia would respond by rejecting START II. This amendment still proposes that if the Russians do not agree to modify the ABM Treaty to allow us to deploy a national missile defense system that consideration be given to United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Russian nationalists would certainly be pleased if we would do so.

My point is simply that the national missile defense system envisioned in this bill will only be effective against limited ballistic missile attacks. Limited is not defined, but it is unlikely that it might be referring to a capability of defending against 1,400 ballistic missiles launched simultaneously? We can wipe out 1,400 ballistic missiles; not with a ballistic missile defense system, but with a treaty. The START II Treaty. Treaties can go a long way to protecting us against nuclear weapons. If we jeopardize ratification of START II, we risk a lot for this limited ballistic missile defense system.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, during the August recess, I had about seven events each day and never passed up the opportunity to let them know about the most critical threat facing America today--missile attack. I spoke about the fact that the actions we take today will directly affect the kind of defense posture our country has in 5 to 7 years.

The danger we face is real. Yet I was surprised and shocked at the ambivalence and lack of understanding that exists concerning this vital issue. Many people simply do not realize--and are themselves shocked to be told--that our country today has no missile defense system in place capable of protecting American cities from long range missile attacks.

I estimated that perhaps most Oklahomans were not readily aware of some of the basic terms of the debate currently going on in Washington about the important missile defense provisions of the current defense authorization bill.

I would suggest that part of the reason for this has to do with the media, particularly the national media, most of which has either not adequately focused on this issue or has skewed it in such a way as to downgrade its importance. But there are also similar problems with the local media.

For example, in Oklahoma there are two major daily newspapers, the daily Oklahoman and the Tulsa World. Their differences reflect similar disparities in the national media.

The Tulsa World reflects a consistent liberal view of the world, one which favors the expansion of the role of government in almost every area except defense. Their left-leaning editorial view tends to distort the reality of significant issues such as missile defense.

The daily Oklahoman, on the other hand, much more clearly reflects the conservative social and economic values of Oklahomans. It is a larger paper and provides a much more realistic approach to issues such as national defense.

During the past month, each of these papers had major editorials on the threat of missile attack. There is quite a difference in their approach. I think it will be instructive for my colleagues to examine these editorials and ponder how the media is shaping the debate about vital issues facing our country.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that the two editorials I mentioned concerning missile defense--one from the Tulsa World and one from the daily Oklahoman--be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, some of my colleagues who have been complaining about the liberal eastern media should be aware that there are similar problems and concerns reflected in the local media in the very heartland of America.

As we approach a vote on the missile defense provisions of the defense bill which have been worked out among our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I want to commend Senators for their good-faith efforts to reach a compromise on this very complex and contentious issue.

I supported the wording of the original bill that came out of the committee as a good start which recognized the threat and put us on the road to providing the real missile defense we need.

While I will vote in favor of the new compromise provisions, I am not pleased with the weakening of language and goals that this compromise represents. I am very hopeful that the language can be significantly strengthened when we get to conference.

We started out saying that we would deploy a national missile defense system.

Now we are just going to develop for deployment a national missile defense.

This compromise urges deployment of theater missile defenses to benefit our deployed troops and allies, but only allows a missile defense for the American people to be developed for deployment.

We began by simply calling for highly effective missile defenses; we have now required that they be affordable missile defenses.

No one wants to waste money. But how will affordability be defined? How do we put a price on defending America from missile attacks?

The truth is that the term `affordable' will simply be used as a club by opponents of missile defense for whom the price of security is always too high.

The term `cost effective' will just be used to fight every dollar that we try to spend on missile defense from now on.

Cost effectiveness should not even be an issue--the destruction by one bomb of a single building in Oklahoma City cost $500 million. Imagine how much a limited strike by nuclear weapons will cost.

We claim to recognize that the era of mutual assured destruction is over. But instead of recognizing the reality that the ABM Treaty is a relic of the cold war and mutual assured destruction, this compromise requires negotiations with the Russian Government within the context of the ABM Treaty before we defend the American people from attack.

This is a much smaller step forward than it should have been. We should stop talking about developing options, and begin to deploy a national missile defense system.

The American people must know that the threat we face in the very near future is real and it affects all of us. It would be the height of irresponsibility if we were not prepared to meet this reality.

The challenge before us is to face the facts. Former CIA Director James Woolsey, who served in the Clinton administration and is no partisan advocate, has told us bluntly: Up to 25 nations either have or are developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.

The CIA currently tells us that North Korea is now working on a long-range missile--the Tapeo Dong II--which may be capable of reaching Alaska and Hawaii within 5 years.

These are serious challenges. It is our duty to face them now and not blind ourselves by rationalizing that we can wait 10 more years or 20 more years. If we do, it may well be too late.

So it is my hope that when the defense bill gets to conference we will be able to strengthen the language so that we make it clear that we are proceeding on a course which will put in place a national missile defense system within 5 to 7 years.

In my mind, this is the least we can do to meet our highest constitutional obligation--the one without which no other obligations have any meaning--to provide for the common defense--the protection of our people, our freedom, and our country.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, the Senate is considering the bipartisan compromise on ballistic missile defenses [BMD]. Although two key amendments by opponents of BMD were voted down by the Senate on August 3 and 4, the bipartisan amendment is necessary in order to advance the Department of Defense authorization bill and to bring it to a conference with the House.

I supported the original version of the bill submitted by the Armed Services Committee. The original version set a proper course for deployment of theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses on a time-line commensurate with the potential threat. Additionally, the original language repudiated the ABM Treaty and its philosophical basis, mutual assured destruction, by declaring that it is the policy of the United States that the two are `not a suitable basis for stability in a multipolar world.'

Though I am not at all entirely pleased with the compromise language, the present version does preserve the fundamental principles of the original bill: immediate deployment of theater missile defenses; the possibility of multiple site national missile defense deployments; layered defenses; and review of the ABM Treaty. The new language differs from the original bill in three sections. I hope that these differences, which are as follows, are addressed by the conferees.

First, the compromise calls for the United States to embark on a program to develop for deployment a national missile defense system. This characterizes the research we have undertaken for the last 12 years and changes nothing with respect to our Nation's commitment to deploy defenses. The original bill clearly called for deployment of a national missile defense system and is a more proactive statement of congressional intent to deploy a national missile defense system rather than to conduct research forever.

The threat facing the United States, its allies and troops abroad by the proliferation of ballistic missiles mandates that we move forward toward deploying ballistic missile defenses. In a March 1995 report, `The Weapons Proliferation Threat,' the Central Intelligence Agency observed that at least 20 countries--nearly half of them in the Middle East and Asia--already have or may be developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--pose the greatest threat because of the aggressive nature of their weapons of mass destruction program. All already have or are developing ballistic missile that could threaten U.S. interests.

Second, in addressing the requirements of a layered defense system, the compromise language merely calls for a system that can be augmented over time as the threat changes. The original bill required a system that will be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense. The key issue here is whether the DOD plans now for a layered defense system, one potentially with space-based assets, or does DOD merely hold out the option for the possibility of evolving to a layered defense?

I believe the commitment for layered defenses is important. Space-based interceptors provide worldwide, instantaneous protection against missiles launched from anywhere in the world, and are both cheaper and more effective than their ground-based counterparts. Missiles launched--either by accident or in anger--against the United States or our allies and friends, could be destroyed in the early stages of their flight, before they release their warheads if, but only if, we have space-based interceptors. This is especially important with multiple warhead missiles or missiles with chemical or biological warheads. With the latter, the early intercept results in more harm to the attacking nation as chemical or biological agents would be dispersed over its territory. Another advantage of space assets is that they are always on station.

Third, both the compromise and the original bill have language concerning the demarcation line between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses. This section was necessary because the current position of the Clinton administration constrains key theater missile defense systems. The effect of what the Clinton administration proposed was to degrade the only advanced theater systems in research and development in the United States. The bill and compromise both require the administration to submit for approval by the Senate any agreement it reached with the Russians on limiting theater missile defenses. In addition, it prohibits the expenditure of funds for 1 year only to implement any agreement that would limit the capability of our theater missile defense systems. It is my hope that in conference, the restriction will be made permanent.

The compromise version, however, does not make clear that it is the intent of the Senate, that any unilateral limitation by the United States should also be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The administration has received five letters from Members of the Senate and has participated in countless meetings over the past 8 months on this subject. That the Senate takes this matter seriously and would not look favorably on attempts to circumvent the clear intent of the Senate, should be abundantly clear.

The United States must proceed immediately with the development and deployment of theater ballistic missile defenses, and, at the earliest practical time, should deploy national missile defenses. During the last 4 weeks, while Congress has been on recess, information has surfaced concerning Iraq's military buildup of weapons of mass destruction. The Washington Post reported that Iraq turned over 147 boxes and two large cargo containers containing information which describes a broader and more advanced effort by the country to produce nuclear arms, germ weapons and ballistic missiles than previously known. Among the new disclosures is an Iraqi admission that it had germ or toxin- filled shells, aircraft bombs and ballistic missile warheads ready for possible use during the Persian Gulf war.

Iraq also admitted to having begun a crash program in August 1990--the month it invaded Kuwait--aimed at producing a single nuclear weapon within 1 year. And, finally, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq plans to investigate Iraq's admission that it was capable of indigenously producing engines for Scud missiles and that it has made more progress in developing a longer range missile than it had previously stated.

The important lesson is that we almost always know less about a country's program to develop weapons of mass destruction that we think we do. We cannot afford to be sanguine about how long it will take one country or another to develop a ballistic missile that can threaten the United States. The evidence suggests that the threat is closer than we think. It is time to seriously address this issue.

In closing, Mr. President, I want to stress that my preference is to stick with the original bill language, and I will work with the conferees to reinstate some of the critical sections of that bill. However, in an effort to advance the DOD bill to conference, I am reluctantly supporting the compromise amendment.

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Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn-Warner-Levin-Cohen amendment. I commend my colleagues for their tireless efforts in developing a compromise on this issue which moves us away from some of the most dangerous steps called for in the committee version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995.

I still have serious reservations about the compromise language, particularly the effect it may have on Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. I also question whether the greatest threat of a nuclear detonation in the United States comes from ballistic missiles.

However, given the likelihood that the Defense authorization bill will pass, I will support the amendment before us as a way to remove some of the more egregiously misguided provisions in the current bill language on missile defense.

I would like to discuss briefly some of the areas where I see improvement and to point out candidly those provisions in the amendment which I regard as still being problematic.

The amendment clearly makes significant improvements over the current language. It moves us away from the certainty of deploying a national missile defense system by 2003. It narrows the focus of missile defense efforts from all ballistic missile threats to accidental, unauthorized, or limited missile attacks. It guarantees a decisive role for the Congress before deployment can occur. It removes restrictions on the President's ability to negotiate with Russia an appropriate demarcation standard between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses. And it includes the requirement that missile defenses be affordable and operationally effective.

These are no small achievements. They represent significant substantive improvements over the current language.

There are still several areas of weakness, however.

As I said earlier, I am particularly concerned about the effect this amendment may have on the START process. While the authors of this amendment have done their best to move us away from a collision course with the ABM Treaty, and many of us believe that they have, that may not be a view shared in Moscow by the Russian Duma.

I am not sure they will understand the fine distinction between `develop for deployment' and `deploy.' I am not sure they will understand what we mean when we say that we will proceed in a manner which is consistent with the ABM Treaty, and then say that we are anticipating the need and providing the means to means the treaty. And I think they will be alarmed by references that are made to withdrawing from the treaty.

I am concerned about the consequences if the Russians believe that we are not acting in good faith, but are intent on abrogating the ABM Treaty. As I said on this floor a month ago, the most likely consequence of our breaching the ABM Treaty would be a Russian refusal to ratify START II.

Why? Because the cheapest way to defeat a missile defense system is to overwhelm it. So, if the Russians feel threatened by our development of a national missile defense system, they are likely not only to scratch the START II Treaty, but to begin a strategic buildup. We will counter with our own buildup and efforts to improve missile defenses, and before you know it we will be in a costly arms race, which the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.

A costly new arms race is not what Americans expected with the end of the cold war. But that is exactly what they will get if we are not careful to avoid damaging the ABM Treaty, which has been the basis for all strategic arms control agreements over the past two decades. I might add that these agreements were made without the United States deploying a strategic missile defense system.

A second fundamental concern I have is whether we are correct to focus our resources on defending against nuclear warheads delivered by ballistic missiles. Even the kind of limited program the authors of this amendment are talking about would cost tens of billions of dollars to eventually deploy.

The threat of ballistic missile attack from rogue states or terrorists groups is at best a questionable one, and is not likely to arise in the next decade, if ever.

The more likely means of delivery of a nuclear explosive device to our shores, as I have said on this floor repeatedly, would be an innocuous ship making a regular port call in the United States. A determined group could assemble a device in the basement of a landmark such as the World Trade Tower with catastrophic results. Terrorist groups or outlaw states would not need a ballistic missile to reach our territory.

And that is where we should be focusing our resources: On tracking these terrorist groups and rogue states and securing the many tons of fissile material now spread throughout the vast territory of Russia.

In conclusion, let me again thank Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner for their efforts on this vital issue. They have greatly improved upon a piece of legislation, which unamended would have seriously threatened our national security.

Unfortunately, despite these improvements, I believe that the potential is still there to undermine the ABM Treaty and our security in the process. However, the choice between the two alternatives--the missile defense language in the bill versus the amendment before us--is really not a choice. I will support the amendment to avoid the more damaging consequences of the current bill language.

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Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the Senate has before it today two legislative proposals that address U.S. policy toward the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM ) Treaty and missile defense generally. There is language in S. 1026 that would require the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system, an action that would violate the ABM Treaty. Its alternative, the substitute offered by my colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin, Warner, and Cohen, would only require the United States to `develop' such a defense `for deployment.'

Though I am not happy with either proposal, I will vote for the substitute only because it does less damage to the ABM Treaty than its alternative. Nobody should interpret this vote, however, as a ringing endorsement of the policies set forth in the substitute, for reasons which I would like to discuss in some detail in this statement today. In my opinion, neither the original language in S. 1026 on missile defense, which was narrowly approved by a straight party vote in the Armed Services Committee, nor the substitute addresses my deepest concerns about the future of the ABM Treaty.

I recognize the hard work that my colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin, Warner, and Cohen, have devoted to forging a bipartisan consensus on this controversial issue. Yet several provisions remain in both proposals that jeopardize the future of the ABM Treaty and, as a result, the stability of the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia.

Before identifying section by section my specific concerns with these proposals, I would like to address some broader issues.

CONTEXT OF MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUES

For almost a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has helped to preserve the peace by guaranteeing the United States the means of retaliating in the event of a nuclear attack by Russia. By prohibiting Russia from deploying a national multiple-site strategic missile defense system, the treaty works to ensure the reliability of the United States nuclear deterrent; in performing this function, the treaty also saves the taxpayer the burden of supporting a robust national missile defense system.

The majority in the Armed Services Committee knows all about the importance of protecting U.S. deterrence capabilities--during committee deliberations over the stockpile stewardship program, I heard a lot about the specter of `structural nuclear disarmament' and the vital importance of maintaining a vital nuclear second-strike capability.

I therefore cannot explain why there is language in this bill referring to deterrence as a mere relic of the cold war. With thousands of Russian and United States nuclear weapons continuing to threaten each other, there is no law that Congress can pass that would repeal nuclear deterrence--it remains an unpleasant reality, a basic fact of international life. Mutual assured destruction is not so much a policy or a doctrine as a fundamental reality about the current strategic relationship between the United States and Russia.

It is good for our security that the ABM Treaty prohibits Russia from developing or deploying systems to kill United States strategic missiles. Similarly, the lack of a strategic missile defense system in the United States enhances Russia's confidence in its own deterrent. As a result, the treaty has provided a solid foundation upon which the superpowers can reduce their nuclear arsenals without jeopardizing strategic stability. This process is now well underway with the START I and II treaties. It is a process that, at long last, appears to be actually working: the stockpiles are indeed being reduced.

The ABM Treaty, however, is now under assault by critics who believe it is obsolete. They believe that recent technological developments offer the prospect of a safe harbor against theater and limited strategic missile strikes. This is, of course, not the first time that a technological innovation has led to great strategic instability, great expenditures, and great dangers to our national security. This is not the first time that unbounded faith in technological fixes has captured the imagination of defense specialists and editorial writers.

The development of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), for example, was once heralded as a giant technological innovation that would bolster U.S. national security. Yet the START II treaty will eliminate all ground-based MIRV's precisely because of the risks they pose to strategic stability. MIRV's were introduced, lest we forget, amid fears that Russia was deploying a missile defense system. The American and Russian experience with MIRV's should remind us all that technology must remain the tool of policy to serve the national interest--it must not drive that policy.

Yet technology is very much what is driving the current debate over the future of the ABM Treaty. The whole debate boils down to a few fairly straightforward questions: One, are the gains to U.S. and international security from developing and deploying a national strategic missile defense system worth the risks? Two, are these gains worth the costs of acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of such a system? Three, will these investments address genuine threats? Four, are there more effective and affordable alternative ways to preserve national and international security than by developing missile defenses? Five, does the legislation before us today enhance or erode the national security? And six, is America in the post-cold war environment really best served by a go-it-alone missile defense strategy, or is our security more dependent upon cooperation with our allies and maintenance of strong military and intelligence capabilities against potential adversaries?

Congress simply has not fully examined the costs we would pay from abandoning the ABM Treaty. When it comes to domestic regulatory decisions, the new congressional majority claims to favor rigorous cost/benefit analysis. Yet its members appear reluctant to apply such analysis to our national defense policy, particularly with respect to existing proposals to hinge America's security on star wars or its many sequels. Unfortunately, even the substitute missile defense amendment brings new risks and costs into the debate on missile defense.

THE FABLE IN THE FIRST-DEGREE AMENDMENT

Let us imagine for a moment that a fictitious new party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [NPT], is suddenly swept up in a new wave of collective national paranoia. Rumors of new foreign threats are rampant, though always hard to pin down. Nevertheless, the country decides to embark on a policy to acquire an affordable and operationally effective nuclear weapon to serve as a deterrent against limited, accidental, or unauthorized foreign nuclear attacks. Since the legislators of country x know that the NPT contains a provision that permits withdrawal from the treaty on only 90 days' notice, these members of parliament promptly decide--after very little debate--to enact a new law authorizing the development for deployment of nuclear weapons, so long as this is accomplished within, or consistent with that treaty. The law then goes on to define specific technical characteristics of such weapons that can be developed without breaching the treaty. And the only weapons that are taboo under this new law are those that exceed these standards and that are actually detonated.

On the 91st day of the international outcry over this incredible law, country x unveils a robust nuclear arsenal without ever having breached the treaty, leaving the whole world to ask, what went wrong?

Now forget country x. Let us take some concrete examples. What if the Iranian parliament decides that this approach makes great sense as an approach to NPT implementation? What if the Russian Duma someday decides that this is also the way to go in insert its own most-favorite notions of defense policy into its laws implementing the START II Treaty? What if Syria becomes a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and passes a law permitting the development for deployment of certain specific types of biological weapons for what it asserts are purely defensive purposes? What if Germany decides that its commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime only extend to missile systems that are actually demonstrated or flight-tested above the standard 500 kg payload/300 km range guidelines? What if each of the 159 countries that have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention decides to enact new laws defining the specific technical characteristics of chemical weapons that are controlled under that treaty? And specifically with respect to the ABM Treaty, if it had been acceptable in the last decade to develop for deployment weapons systems and components that are banned under the ABM Treaty, would Russias notorious Kraysnoyarsk radar station have violated that treaty?

Mr. President, I submit that this is not the way to go about interpreting treaties. This is not the way to stop proliferation. This is not the way to pursue arms control. This is not the way to enhance the national security interests of the United States. And this surely does not serve the interests of international peace and security. Yet this, I regret to say, is the essence of the approaches now before the Senate with respect to the development and deployment of missile defense systems that are not allowed by the ABM Treaty.

Though I disagree with this aspect of both of these approaches, the substitute has the advantage of at least not requiring the immediate deployment of prohibited missile defense systems. It continues to suffer, however, from several important weaknesses. It contains vague and dangerously ambiguous language. For example, the term limited, as used in the term limited, accidental, or unauthorized, is undefined and hence expands significantly the scope of the national missile defense [NMD] scheme. It requires the development, with the express intention of deployment, of an NMD system that is not allowed under article I of the ABM Treaty. It requires the development of TMD systems, such as THAAD and Navy Upper Tier that have capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles, a mandate that conflicts directly with article VI of the ABM Treaty. It accepts the committee's one-sided and largely unsubstantiated assertions, or findings, about the grave imminent missile threat facing the United States, while ignoring several ways in which this threat has been attenuated in recent years. It fails to offer a single finding about the positive and constructive ways that the ABM Treaty has served key U.S. security interests. It repeals laws that require U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. And it places the U.S. Congress on formal record endorsing a unilateral U.S. definition of an ABM Treaty-permissible missile defense system.

Yet despite all these serious weaknesses, the substitute is still marginally better for arms control and nonproliferation than the missile defense measure contained in S. 1026. In sum, though the substitute has clearly not de-fanged the missile defense proposal found in the bill, it has at least filed down some of its incisors.

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FROM FABLE TO NIGHTMARE

I would now like to turn from the fable to the nightmare: namely, the missile defense language in S. 1026. On August 4, 1995, Anthony Lake wrote to the majority leader that `* * * unless the unacceptable missile defense provisions are deleted or revised and other changes are made to the bill bringing it more in line with administration policy, the President's advisors will recommend that he veto the bill.'

The letter addressed specific concerns over the ABM Treaty and NMD

language. If enacted, the letter stated, these terms--

. . . would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty by mandating development for deployment by 2003 of a non-compliant, multi-site NMD and unilaterally imposing a solution to the on-going negotiations with Russia on establishing a demarcation under the Treaty between an ABM and a TMD system. The effect of such actions would in all likelihood be to prompt Russia to terminate implementation of the START I Treaty and shelve ratification of START II, thereby leaving thousands of warheads in place that otherwise would be removed from deployment under these two treaties. [Emphasis added.]

This language echoes similar views expressed by Defense Secretary Perry and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili. At issue here is not a duel between liberals or conservatives or Democrats and Republicans--at issue is the gain and loss to the national security of the United States from abandoning the ABM Treaty. By my reading, there is no contest.

I do not believe that it in any way serves our national interest to set ourselves on a course to abrogate that treaty. It surely does not serve America's interests to encourage Russia--as this bill inevitably would--to develop its own multiple-site strategic ABM system, an action which would only weaken our own nuclear deterrent. The costs to cash-strapped American taxpayers of repairing that damage could potentially mount into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars.

I cannot understand how the supporters of the bill's missile defense provisions can simultaneously claim to worry about what they call, `structural nuclear disarmament' while they are also pushing for a course of action--abrogating the ABM Treaty--that would truly undercut the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It in no way serves our interests to encourage Russia to reconsider its commitments under the START I and START II treaties.

And by derailing the strategic arms control process, the bill's missile defense language also aggravates the global threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Coming on the heels of the successful permanent extension of the NPT, the bill's language on both missile defense and nuclear testing would weaken, rather than strengthen, the global nuclear regime based on the NPT, an outcome that would prove catastrophic to our global security interests.

Few people realize that if there is no ABM Treaty, Russia will even be able to export its strategic missile defense capabilities, something that Article IX of the ABM Treaty now expressly prohibits. I doubt many of my colleagues are aware that the ABM Treaty is not just an arms control convention--it is also explicitly a nonproliferation treaty. Article 9 reads as follows:

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Note that this language does not prohibit the United States from assisting its friends and allies to develop and deploy TMD systems. The treaty does, however, prevent both Russia and the United States from sharing strategic missile defense capabilities with other countries. And in the case of Russia, those capabilities include interceptors with nuclear warheads.

It seems appropriate, therefore, that before we set ourselves on a course of abrogating the ABM Treaty, we should carefully examine the full implications for U.S. defense interests around the world of eliminating the only international constraint on the proliferation of these strategic missile defense systems.

How will such proliferation affect the ability of the United States to respond to regional crises that might arise around the world in the years ahead? How will it affect the United States ability to project power? I am not satisfied that anybody has seriously weighed such considerations.

The treaty, furthermore, does not only ban the horizontal or geographic spread of such missile technology. It also helps to constrain both the size and sophistication of the United States and Russian nuclear weapon stockpiles--in short, the ABM Treaty also constrains the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. By banning the deployment of national strategic missile defense systems, the treaty works to protect the effectiveness and reliability of the US nuclear arsenal and thereby works to stabilize nuclear deterrence. Abandonment of the treaty will trigger a new offensive nuclear arms race, as leaders both here and in Russia will have to find new ways to defeat these new missile defense systems.

Yet I have seen little indication in the process of reviewing this proposal

that anybody here has considered how these particular side effects of the bill's ABM proposals--in particular the proliferation-related aspects of these proposals--would affect the full range of U.S. national security interests around the world.

Even our allies, Britain and France, would be affected--the collapse of the ABM Treaty would mark an end to any hopes of encouraging these countries to engage in deep cuts of their nuclear stockpiles. And I cannot believe for a minute that China would sit by as its neighbors ringed its borders with strategic missile defense capabilities. Among China's many options to respond to such a development would be a dramatic expansion of its offensive nuclear capability. The next crisis, predictably, would be the collapse of the NPT itself as country after country submits its 90-day withdrawal notice--following the course taken by Country X.

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SOME SPECIFIC CONCERNS

I would now like to outline my specific concerns with these proposals--concerns which I will address section by section.

Sec. 232 (Findings): Both the bill and the compromise language on missile defense lack any congressional findings acknowledging the positive and constructive ways that the ABM Treaty has advanced America's arms control and nonproliferation interests. In failing to address these benefits of the treaty, and in failing to recognize that in some ways the missile threat to the United States has actually lessened in recent years, the proposed findings seriously mischaracterizes--and in my view overstates--the missile proliferation threat facing the United States.

Few of us here will disagree that the spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, jeopardizes our security. Many, however, would disagree that developing systems that would be in violation of the ABM Treaty is the right way to go about addressing that threat, especially when there are so many ways of delivering such weapons other than by missile.

Sec. 233 Policy: With respect to the Policy section, the substitute is ambiguous on the fundamental issue of the U.S. intent with respect to compliance with the its obligations under ABM Treaty. To the limited extent that it addresses this issue, it focuses only on compliance with a particular version of the ABM Treaty, namely, the treaty's obligations as they are unilaterally interpreted in this bill. The language also sets in gear significant initiatives without any prior consensus among the parties to the treaty. The terminology about `multiple-site' deployments will apply to systems that have capabilities against strategic missiles. And given that all missile attacks are limited by the laws of nature, it is by no means clear what these current proposals mean by the term `limited' missile attack.

Indeed, this term `limited, accidental, or unauthorized' combines the features of a wild card and an elastic clause: though precedents have already been set using this undefined term, I would not want Russia to enact legislation unilaterally defining its own interpretation of these terms. Changes such as these to an important international agreement should be made on the basis of mutual understandings between the parties and in accordance with the conventional amendment and ratification process, rather than dictated by statute.

References in these proposals to the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty are either redundant--since this right is quite explicit in the treaty--or outright extortionary, since they seek to prescribe a specific diplomatic outcome which only negotiations can appropriately accomplish.

The compromise proposal also contains language that questions the continued importance of nuclear deterrence as a basis of U.S. national security, despite considerable evidence that deterrence remains as a foundation of our national security and despite the lack of any viable alternative.

Neither the original bill nor the compromise language addresses the issue of nuclear-armed BMD systems--it would surely seem to me that before we consider taking actions that will lead to multiple violations of the ABM Treaty, we should examine fully some of the consequences of that decision, especially with respect to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many people forget that the ABM Treaty also prohibits the global spread of strategic ballistic missile defense systems. Considering that Russia has just such nuclear-capable systems, it hardly seems wise to set ourselves on a course to abandon a treaty that prevents the spread of just such technologies. As part of their efforts to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons as a basis of their security, both the United States and Russia might well consider pursuing an agreement to outlaw nuclear-armed missile defense systems.

Sec. 234. TMD Architecture: The initial operational capability dates in this section and in section 235 (NMD Architecture) should be consistent with understandings reached between the parties to the ABM Treaty.

THAAD and Navy Upper Tier should only be included in the Core Program if the parties to the ABM Treaty agree that such systems and their components are permissible under the treaty; the same should apply to space-based sensors including the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS), and to follow-on systems.

Sec. 235. NMD Architecture: As I have already noted, the term `limited'--used both in the bill and the compromise to refer to future missile defense capabilities--is undefined in both proposals. Clearly, this term should not be defined only by one party to the treaty--if this term has a meaning which Russia does not share, it will only open the door to Russia legislating its own definitions of key terms not only in the ABM Treaty but also the START II treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and possibly other important arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements.

The compromise requires the development for deployment of an NMD system capable of being deployed at multiple sites, a policy that if implemented would violate the current text of the ABM Treaty. Development and deployment of NMD systems are matters that must be arranged pursuant both to negotiations and to existing treaty amendment procedures, including ratification.

Similarly, space-based sensors should be developed only as agreed by the parties. I believe the President should at the very least be required to prepare a formal assessment of the arms control and nonproliferation implications of any systems being developed or deployed for purposes of NMD. References in this section to sea-based and space-based systems and expanded numbers of ground-based interceptors only invite the international community to doubt our willingness to live up to our ABM Treaty obligations not to develop or to deploy such systems.

Sec. 236. Cruise Missile Defense Initiative: Both the compromise and the bill contain language addressing the dangers from the continued global spread of weapons of mass destruction. Yet both also fail to clarify that some of the most likely delivery systems for most weapons of mass destruction do not involve ballistic or cruise missiles. It seems to me that before we launch into framing defense initiatives around specific weapons systems, we should understand better the nature of the specific and anticipated threats they pose relative to other weapons systems.

I can think of at least two other delivery systems that may pose a threat to US defense interests that is equal to or greater than the proliferation threat now posed from ballistic missiles--first, the capabilities of advanced strike aircraft (Pakistans F-16s come to mind here as just one example) to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and second, the threat coming from terrorists using such weapons. Spending tens and hundreds of billions on missile defense will not help us to address either of these clear and present dangers.

Sec. 237. ABM Treaty: References in the compromise proposal to provisions of the treaty relating to the amendment and withdrawal process are unnecessary since such provisions are already law of the land. Including them only signals an intention to implement such rights. Neither proposal acknowledges some of the positive contributions the ABM Treaty has made to the national security of the United States. It should not be for United States alone, nor Russia alone, to define unilaterally key terms of this treaty--the process of interpretation must involve Russia and the normal process of making, ratifying, and amending treaties. Also the comprehensive review called for in the compromise proposal fails to include specifically an assessment of the full implications for U.S. diplomatic and security interests of a collapse of the ABM Treaty.

Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds: The velocity/range demarcation standard is unilateral--it has not yet been agreed by the parties. The implementation of the demonstrated capabilities standard should also be governed by mutual agreement of the parties. The specific prohibition on funding should only apply to systems that are not in compliance with the ABM Treaty as agreed by the parties. Since section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1995 remains law of the land, there is no need to repeat it in this bill with respect to the President's treaty-making powers.

Sec. 241. Repeal of Other Laws: The current first-degree amendment follows the existing language in the bill by repealing outright 10 laws pertaining to missile defense. Some of those provisions are obsolete. But other parts of those laws--such as those dealing with the U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty, the requirement for realistic tests, the importance of financial burden-sharing with our friends, the requirements for consultations with our allies, previous congressional findings about the positive value of the ABM treaty, and requirements for consultations between the parties to the treaty on activities relating to implementation.

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CONCLUSION

Thus to vote for the missile defense proposal in the bill amounts to a vote against the ABM Treaty, and a vote against that treaty is to vote for the proliferation not just of defensive missile systems, but for the proliferation of the strategic nuclear missiles that will be necessary to defeat those defenses. In a very real sense, the death of the ABM Treaty could well signal the deaths of both strategic nuclear arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. I cannot support any such proposal.

I therefore urge my colleagues to oppose the committee language on missile defense. Let us by all means get on with the business of reducing external weapons threats to our country's security, a business the ABM Treaty makes legitimate with respect to TMD. But let us not retreat into a technological Fortress America as we would with the missile defense provisions in S. 1026.

Today, we have before us a choice between one missile defense proposal that is a nightmare and another that is a fable. Given additional time, Congress may well have been able to construct a third option, one which built upon and acknowledged the important contributions that the ABM Treaty continues to make to our national security. But the schedule is such that we do not have such time. Accordingly, I will vote for the least bad of the two proposals before us.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at this point an analysis prepared by my staff of the missile defense provisions now before the Senate, and a table comparing key provisions of the ABM Treaty with the proposals found in the substitute amendment.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I support the Nunn amendment identified as `The Missile Defense Act of 1995.' Last week there was a curious, trumped up suggestion in a local newspaper that, somewhere along the line, I had mysteriously changed my position regarding the ABM Treaty. I have not, and the reporter who wrote the story knew it. I have always questioned the wisdom of the ABM Treaty, and I still do.

In fact, this past April I wrote to President Clinton stating my belief that the current U.S. position on the ABM Treaty is rooted in cold war mentality. In 1972, Mr. President, neither United States nor Soviet negotiators had any way to envision the security environment of 1995, characterized as it is by the rampant proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technology.

Even former Secretary of State Kissinger--one of the principal architects of the ABM Treaty--recently told me that he too feels that strategic stability in the post-Cold war world has moved beyond the current scope of the ABM Treaty. I use the word `current' because the ABM Treaty itself contains provisions for modification or legal abrogation.

Mr. President, the national security interests of the United States should be our number one priority, and for that reason I have directed the Committee on Foreign Relations, in consultation with the Committee on Armed Services and other appropriate committees, to undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing value of the ABM Treaty for the purpose of providing additional policy guidance during the second session of the 104th Congress.

In this regard, I reiterate my opposition to the creation of yet another special Select Committee replete with bureaucratic trappings, staff, and cost to the American taxpayer for the purpose of reviewing this treaty. We already have standing committees with the responsibility for making these determinations and recommendations, and we are going to do our job.

In conclusion, I support the Nunn amendment for its foresight in developing a missile defense system to protect all Americans. Still, I confess having reservations about the amendment because I am convinced that it may compromise some of the decisive language and vision contained in the original bill.

Mr. President, I reiterate my support for passage of the Defense Authorization Bill of 1995.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I intend to make a statement concluding the final passage of the authorization bill outlining some of the challenges I think we have in conference. I do think there have been a number of improvements made in the bill in the Chamber, most notably the Missile Defense Act, which I anticipate will be approved in a few minutes on a rollcall vote.

There are a number of other challenges we have in conference if this bill is going to become law, and I will speak to that at passage of the authorization bill because I think it is enormously important that we work together in a cooperative way with the administration to make every effort to see that this bill will be one the President will be willing to sign.

There are a number of items that are in the bill now which will not meet that definition according to what I have been reliably informed.

So I will be working with my colleagues to both identify the administration objections and to see if those can be worked on as we go forward.

I also think the committee chairman and all those who worked in good faith in the Chamber have a real stake in trying to make sure we get a bill that can become law this year, and I know we will work together in that regard.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my distinguished colleague, I know there are Senators on this side of the aisle, particularly Senators Kyl and Smith, who likewise feel very strongly about this amendment about to be voted on, so I am sure their voices will be heard as this matter proceeds to resolution in conference.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I was referring both to that matter and to other matters also. My comments were in general because there are a number of areas where the administration and the Secretary of Defense have noted they want to work to see that changes are made. So I was not speaking just on the Missile Defense Act but that was included in my remarks.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wanted to make sure I protected the interests of my colleagues who did work on this particular amendment about to be voted on.

Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Has the time arrived now for the vote?

AMENDMENT NO. 2425

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 9:30 has arrived and the question now is on the Nunn amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma desires about 2 minutes. I suggest he be given 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.

During the course of this recess, I averaged about seven events a day throughout the State of Oklahoma, and during that time I did not let an opportunity go by without letting the people of Oklahoma know how serious the threat of missile attack will be to the United States within just a very few years, probably as early as the year 2000.

I also let them know that we do not have a national missile defense system, and probably the most significant thing we will do is to keep this system going so that when we have a friendlier environment in the White House we can have this system ready to be deployed by the year 2000 or 2001.

We know the threat that exists from North Korea right now. We know the threats that were articulated by Jim Woolsey, the chief security adviser to the President, when he said that we know of between 20 and 25 nations that are working on weapons of mass destruction and the missile means of delivering those weapons.

I know the negotiators worked very hard, and I commend the work product. However, I am a little disappointed it did not come out stronger. I intend to support the missile defense portion of this bill, but I think when we used the words that we want to deploy a national missile defense system and they changed it to `develop for deployment,' that is too weak. I think that when we are calling for highly effective missile defenses that we now have changed to `affordable,' I suggest to you, Mr. President, there is nothing that is more significant going on right now than preparing for a national missile defense system.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.

The question is on agreeing to the Nunn amendment No. 2425. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

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Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] is necessarily absent.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] is absent because of attending a funeral.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 13, as follows:

Rollcall Vote No. 398 Leg.

• Abraham
• Ashcroft
• Baucus
• Bennett
• Biden
• Bingaman
• Bond
• Breaux
• Brown
• Bryan
• Bumpers
• Burns
• Byrd
• Campbell
• Chafee
• Coats
• Cochran
• Cohen
• Conrad
• Coverdell
• Craig
• D'Amato
• Daschle
• DeWine
• Dodd
• Dole
• Domenici
• Exon
• Faircloth
• Feinstein
• Ford
• Frist
• Glenn
• Gorton
• Graham
• Gramm
• Grams
• Grassley
• Gregg
• Hatch
• Hatfield
• Heflin
• Helms
• Hollings
• Hutchison
• Inhofe
• Inouye
• Jeffords
• Johnston
• Kassebaum
• Kempthorne
• Kennedy
• Kerrey
• Kerry
• Kohl
• Kyl
• Levin
• Lieberman
• Lott
• Lugar
• Mack
• McCain
• McConnell
• Mikulski
• Murray
• Nickles
• Nunn
• Packwood
• Pressler
• Pryor
• Reid
• Robb
• Rockefeller
• Roth
• Santorum
• Sarbanes
• Shelby
• Simpson
• Snowe
• Specter
• Stevens
• Thomas
• Thompson
• Thurmond
• Warner

• Boxer
• Bradley
• Dorgan
• Feingold
• Harkin
• Lautenberg
• Leahy
• Moseley-Braun
• Moynihan
• Pell
• Simon
• Smith
• Wellstone

• Akaka
• Murkowski

So the amendment (No. 2425) was agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am going to vote against this bill as I did in the Armed Services Committee. We have had a good debate on the Senate floor on the bill and I went into this debate hopeful that we would fix many of the problems I saw in the bill as reported.

We have fixed some of those problems. For example, the Department of Energy provisions have been almost completely rewritten and all the provisions I objected to during committee deliberations have been corrected, with the exception of the hydronuclear testing provision which Senators Exon and Hatfield sought to eliminate.

Elsewhere, unfortunately, the improvements have been modest. The Missile Defense Act of 1995 has not been changed enough for me to be able to support it. I commend Senator Nunn and Senator Levin for their efforts to defuse the worst features of the reported bill's missile defense provisions. I voted for their language as a substitute for the reported bill. But I believe that these provisions will still contribute to the unraveling of critical arms control agreements that would enhance our security far more than accelerating the development and deployment of a limited national missile defense system.

Our current policy on missile defense, the Missile Defense Act of 1991 as amended, makes it a goal of the United States to comply with the ABM Treaty while developing, and maintaining the option to deploy, a limited national missile defense. That is as far as we should go. We simply do not need to be making a several-hundred-million-dollar downpayment this year for a multitens of billion dollar national missile defense system.

The bill has many other provisions which I oppose. Section 1082 prohibits retirement of strategic weapons delivery systems that the nuclear posture review says we don't need. We cannot afford to keep every nuclear weapon delivery system, even those the Pentagon says we don't need, as bargaining chips for future arms control negotiations. We should not be sending the signal that we expect the START II and START I treaties to unravel and therefore intend to maintain the maximum nuclear capability possible within the START

counting rules. If we end up with the nuclear posture review force structure, we will be quite adequately defended and will hardly have to sue for surrender if the cold war is revived.

Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree with the need to add $7.1 billion to the President's defense request. The weapons research and production funded with that money are only going to make our out-year defense budget problems worse. The committee has admitted that it has designed a defense bill that will require many billions of dollars in additional defense spending in future years beyond the budget resolution levels. Since I didn't support the first $33 billion added by the budget resolution, I can't support a bill that assumes even more spending in future years. I regret that the Kohl-Grassley effort to enforce budget discipline failed.

I regret that my efforts to cut spending for unneeded antiarmor munitions and for an amphibious assault ship we don't need to buy before 2001, if then, were defeated in votes on the companion Defense appropriations bill. These are the tip of the iceberg of unneeded Member-interest spending in this bill and the companion appropriations bill.

Mr. President, this bill is better than the House bill in most respects. The House bill has terrible provisions on discharging members who are HIV positive and on denying female service members and female dependents of service members the right to get an abortion in overseas military medical facilities with their own money. The House bill funds additional B-2 bombers with their multitens of billions of dollars out-year funding requirement. The House bill has a fundamentally misguided provision that attempts to lock in the Bottom-Up Review force structure of 1.445 million active duty service members in permanent law. The House bill's combination of force structure and weapons systems provisions would require rapid real growth in defense spending in future years, even more rapid than the Senate bill's. This is simply not in the cards.

Mr. President, we go to conference with two bad bills, each deserving a veto in my view. It's possible that we will strip the worst of both bills in conference and end up with a product acceptable to the President. But far more likely is a result that the President would have to veto.

This is the first time in my 13 years in the Senate that I have voted against a Defense authorization bill. I do not do it lightly. I regret that I feel compelled to do this.

I urge my colleagues who believe this bill spends too much money on unneeded and wasteful defense projects or who oppose its cold war revival provisions to join me in voting against this bill.

STRATCOM

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to bring to my colleagues' attention an important initiative by USSTRATCOM to provide the regional CINC's with mission-planning analysis for counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis is of proven value to regional commanders charged with responding to proliferation threats.

In situations that could require putting American forces in harm's way, it is vital that all factors--the risks, benefits, and consequences of contingency plans--are thoroughly understood in advance. Once a crisis breaks out, it is too late to undertake the studies required to assess the potential threats.

STRATCOM's unique planning analysis method gives commanders advance warning of danger by helping to identify and characterize current and emerging proliferation threats in the region. In cases when proliferation activities challenge U.S. interests and military operations, this unmatched mission-planning analysis capability allows defense planners to identify a variety of potential military targets; assess the effectiveness, consequences, and costs of military operations; and develop alternative contingency plans that maximize mission effectiveness, while minimizing the risk, cost, and collateral effects.

Moreover, in the case of countries with embryonic weapons activities, STRATCOM's mission-planning analysis can provide the early and detailed alert that will allow policy makers to fashion effective export controls and other preventative measures to block weapons programs before they become a threat to the United States or other nations.

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Mr. McCAIN. I agree with Chairman Thurmond's assessment of USSTRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis activities and the importance of this program in supporting the broad spectrum of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation goals. Unfortunately, during our markup of the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, we were unaware that the program is not adequately funded in the budget request for STRATCOM.

Without funding, analysis that commanders find essential for mission planning will at best be performed on an ad hoc basis or, worse, not at all. This issue is too vital and the risks of proliferation are to great to be ignored by the Senate.

I hope the conferees will see fit to include the required funding for this program.