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AMENDMENT NO. 2425

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe there is an amendment, No. 2425, which is an amendment to the Missile Defense Act , pending at the desk. I ask that amendment be reported.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Cohen, proposes an amendment numbered 2425.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 49, strike out line 15 and all that follows through line 9 on page 69 and insert the following in lieu thereof:

Subtitle C--Missile Defense

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 3 hours of debate scheduled on this amendment, 2 for the Senator from Georgia, 1 for the Senator from South Carolina.

The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need at this point, and I do not intend to make long remarks at this point to give each of my colleagues a chance to lay down their views and to make their remarks on this amendment, which is a very important amendment. Then I will conclude with other remarks as we proceed through this debate.

Mr. President, at the request of the majority and minority leaders, Senators Cohen, Levin, Warner, and I spent the better part of the week preceding the August recess meeting intensively addressing iss ues raised by the proposed Missile Defense Act of 1995 , as set forth in S. 1026, the pending Defense authorization bill.

The goal of our effort was to develop an amendment establishing a missile defense policy that could be supported by a broad bipartisan group of Senators. On Friday, August 11, we filed a bipartisan substitute amendment reflecting our best effor ts to meet the objective, and I hope that all Members have had an opportunity during the recess to review this bipartisan amendment.

I want to express my thanks to my three colleagues, Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, and Senator Levin, for the diligence, tolerance, and good will each of them showed throughout the long and at times ve ry difficult negotiations that occurred over a very intensive period of about a week that led to the agreement embodied in the substitute amendment that is now reported and pending.

I believe the amendment is a significant improvement to the version in the bill, and I support its adoption.

Mr. President, the revised version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995 , if passed in this amendment as set forth in this substitute, serves three very important functions. First, it clarifies the intent of the United States with respect to decisions about future missile defenses . Second, it diffuses a potential constitutional contest and confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. And, third, it makes clear to the international community our policy toward the AB M Treaty.

Under the bipartisan substitute, the policy is no longer stated as a binding commitment to deploy a missile defense system. That is a decision that will be made in the future. Instead, the national missile defense policy, and section 23 2 of this substitute, is to `develop for deployment.' The substitute adds several important qualifiers such as the system must be `affordable and operationally effective.' This requirement appears in section 232 and is reemphasized throughout the amendmen t. And the system is limited to addressing only `accidental, unauthorized or limited attacks.' That qualification, which is set forth in section 232, is repeated throughout the amendment.

One of the most important qualifications under the substitute is the requirement in section 2333 for `congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy the system, of development or deployment of (a) the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system, (b) the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.'

These vital issues will all be considered before we take a step in the future to authorize and appropriate funds for deployment of a national missile defense system.

Mr. President, perhaps the most important qualification, both in terms of arms control and the separation of powers, is section 2338, which requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of the entire Missile Defense Act `through processes specified within or consistent with the ABM Treaty which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the treaty.'

Mr. President, finally, let me address the theater missile demarcation provision briefly. Section 238 of the bill as reported would have established in permanent law a specific demarcation between theater and strategic missile defenses and would have prohibited the President from negotiations or other actions concerning the clarification or interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the line between theater and strategic missile defenses . The bipartisan substitute amendment strikes al l of section 238 and provides in the bipartisan substitute a limited funding restriction with the following provisions concerning the demarcation or the definitional distinction between theater and national missile defenses .

First, the funding restriction applies only to fiscal year 1996.

Second, this substitute restriction applies only to the implementation of agreement with the successor states in the Soviet Union, should one be reached, concerning a demarcation between theater and strategic defenses for the purposes of the AB M Treaty and additional restrictions on theater missile defenses going beyond those in the demarcation.

In addition to being limited to 1 year, the substitute funding limitation in section 238 has three exceptions. The limitation does not apply `to the extent provided in a subsequent act ' to implement that portion of any such agreement that imple ments specific terms of the demarcation set forth in the amendment, to implement an agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution.

Mr. President, there are many other changes that improve the overall thrust of this subject matter in the bipartisan substitute. I believe that the bipartisan substitute amendment provides a useful statement of congressional policy and is intended to b e presented in a framework that makes clear that we seek a negotiated set of changes with the Russian Federation to allow for more effective defenses against limited missile attacks than either side is permitted today.

I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment is not, and should not be seen by Russia as, a threat by the United States either to abandon the ABM Treaty or to reinterpret a treaty unilaterally to our advantage. Both we and Russia face the threat of ba llistic missile attacks. It is not simply the United States; it is also Russia. The threats may be somewhat different, but the need for defenses should be clear to both sides.

What we have to do is arrange for both sides to be able to deploy more effective defenses than in use today against accidental, unauthorized, and limited attacks while maintaining overall strategic stability and while making it plain that neith er side seeks to combine offensive capability with defensive capability thereby giving either side what has for years been feared as a first-strike capability. Some people use that term in connection and synonymously with the term `strategic stabi lity.' Some people use the term `strategic stability' in a broader context.

But, nevertheless, it is my view that, if we are going to proceed to enjoy the benefits of 20 years of work and negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons under the treaties that have been entered into, like the START I Treaty or treaties now pending like the START II Treaty, it is very important that both sides understand that strategic stability is being maintained, that neither side is intending to combine offensive striking power with defensive abilities so that either side would be tempted at any point in the future--whatever developed--to develop anything resembling a first-strike capability.

That is the scenario that the ABM Treaty was originally designed to prevent. It has some relevance today. But it needs changing in some very important but modest aspects.

Mr. President, it is important that whatever we do with defenses --and I favor going forward with both the theater missile system and also a national missile system against limited and unauthorized attacks and third-country attac k--whatever we do we should make sure that we continue to carry out the reductions of the armaments that have been most threatening against the United States for the last 20 years, the heavy missiles . And those missiles are part of both ST ART I and START II reductions.

It is enormously important that we not send signals to the Russian Parliament, the Russian leadership, to the Russian people that they in any way should fear for their own security and that they, therefore, should not go forward with the reductions of the missiles that they have either agreed to or that are pending in the START II agreement.

Mr. President, that is what this is all about. I know there will be some who will agree with the changes. There will be some who may not agree with the changes. But this does represent the best effort that Senator Levin and I on the De mocratic side, together with Senator Warner and Senator Cohen on the Republican side, were able to put together in an effort to achieve these goals that I have enumerated.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. I will later address this pending amendment. But I would like to ask a question of my distinguished colleague. I think we concur, the four of us, Senator Thurmond, Senator Cohen, myself, and Senator Levin and also our distinguished ranking member. It would be my hope that the Senator from Georgia would have an opportunity to make some assessment as to how the administration views this amendment. I wondered if the Senator would share with th e Senate what he has.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia that I talked to Secretary of Defense Perry about this amendment, and I think it is fair to say that he believes it is a dramatic improvement over the original version.

I would not be able to portray to the Senator from Virginia that I conveyed this or that I have discussed it in any kind of detail with the White House. And I cannot give any message about how they view either this authorization bill or the appropriati ons bill which was passed. There are a number of other areas that do not concern this that have been of concern to the White House and the Secretary of Defense , including, in the bill we just passed, the appropriation bill, the elimination of some very important funding that the Secretary of Defense had undertaken under the Nunn-Lugar program for working to reduce the Russian military establishment.

That is a concern to Secretary Perry; it also is a concern to me, that funding was eliminated both in the appropriations bill in the House and Senate. But as far as this particular provision is concerned, I have no doubt that Secretary Perry feels it is a great improvement, and I would assume, without having directly talked with the President about it, that he would also view it in that way.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague, but I hope the administration would view this as an effort to reconcile important differences and that it is a work product worthy of support by the Senate and by the administration.

Mr. NUNN. It is also my hope that would be their view. I would say to my friend, I know there are other provisions in this bill and the appropriations bill that concern both the White House and the Secretary of Defense . So I can make no stateme nt here that indicates their feeling on the overall product we now have. I am sure they will be heard from as we move into conference.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. Thurmond addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to support the bipartisan missile defense amendment which was worked out prior to the August recess.

While I continue to believe that the missile defense provisions in the bill reported to the Senate by the Armed Services Committee are sound and reasonable, I also agree that the compromise is a positive step away from the status quo.

The compromise amendment does not include everything that I wanted, but it does not fundamentally undermine any of the policies or initiatives that I viewed as critical. In my view, it is an adequate position to take to conference. The House defense authorization bill differs in several ways from the Senate compromise missile defense amendment. Obviously, there will be considerable discussion before a consensus is reached between the two Chambers.

Let me again thank all those who worked so hard prior to the August recess. And I especially wish to thank Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, Senator Nunn, and Senator Levin. Also, let me thank the leaders for their cooperation.

Finally, I would like to draw to the attention of the Senate an article by the Republican leader, Senator Dole, in today's Washington Times which addresses the subject of missile defense . This is an excellent piece for which I commend the Republican leader. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the article be printed in the Record following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. THURMOND. In closing, Mr. President, let me once again urge my colleagues to support the bipartisan compromise on missile defense . It is a positive step that all Members should be able to endorse.

I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

A Timely Reminder From Iraq

When Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and former chief of mass destruction bolted, apparently threatening to tell all, the Iraqi director preempted and sent us the loudest wake-up call we are likely to get on the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction. As we finish up the Department of Defense Authorization Bill, it's time to heed that call.

According to their belated admission, the Iraqis filled nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and aflatoxin. In addition to the shockingly advanced nuclear weapons program already revealed, Ir aq now says it ran a second program to develop a nuclear weapon by April 1991 with material diverted from nuclear power reactors.

The latest revelations from Baghdad underscore four points.

First, arms control treaties and export controls did not prevent Iraq from pursuing its deadly aims. Don't get me wrong--diplomatic efforts increase the cost, time and technical challenge required to acquire weapons to mass destruction. We should press on with them. The point is simply that diplomacy does not prevent malevolent countries like Iraq from acquiring these weapons and there are a number of countries of Iraq's ilk out there.

Second, Iraq managed to conceal a good part of its activities from the rest of the world, even after post-Gulf War U.N. sanctions made it the most inspected country on earth. Clearly, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The lesson is that we no longer have the luxury of waiting for our intelligence bureaucracy to gather reams of evidence before `validating' a threat. Our own defense programs need to start anticipating emerging threats.

Third, what makes these weapons truly menacing is the prospect of their delivery with ballistic missiles , which allow countries that never before wielded such power to vault themselves onto the world stage. Imagine trying to put together the coali tion for Desert Storm if Cairo, Ankara, Rome or London had believed they were vulnerable to missiles loaded with anthrax. And let's not forget that the United States and its key allies may soon be a target. In just three to five years, the North K orean Taepo-Dong II intercontinental
ballistic missile could reach American soil. Those lacking in imagination about what that implies should recall the words of Saddam Hussein: `Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If they could reach Washington, we would strike it if t he need rose.'

Fourth, the Clinton administration and its allies hobble America's missile defense efforts by clinging to the 1972 ABM Treaty with the now defunct Soviet Union. They have even tried to drag our theater missile defense programs, never co vered by the ABM Treaty, under new limits that the administration has hatched from ever-burgeoning interpretations of that treaty.

It's time to defend ourselves in the multipolar world of the 21st century. It's time to change the regime established by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which currently leaves the American people vulnerable to missile attack from any country capable of de veloping or buying a long-range missile , I think there are ways we can cooperate with Russia on missile defenses , but that is partly up to them. Our job on the defense bill is to lay out what is necessary for America's defense . We now have a defense bill which takes important steps in that direction.

First, it establishes a Cruise Missile Defense Initiative, the need for which was just underscored by Iraq's admission that it was experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles, cousins of the cruise missile , to deliver biological agents.

Second, it establishes a theater missile defense `core program' to ensure that we stay focused and move toward deployment of those systems that are clearly needed as soon as possible, adding the crucial Navy Upper Tier system to the core. This system will allow our Navy to take missile defenses wherever in the world American interests are threatened.

Third, it precludes arms control zealots from dragging theater missile defense systems which are not covered by the ABM Treaty into a web of new limitations. It calls for a year of careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM Treaty in the longer term. During that time, the president should seek to negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial agreement that will allow the United States to proceed with its multiple-site deployments.

Most important, it establishes U.S. policy to develop for deployment by 2003 ground-based interceptors at multiple sites, fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors for a defense of the United States of America.

Mr. President, it's time to defend America.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?

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Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Maine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. President, let me thank Senator Thurmond for his confidence in asking Senator Warner and me to represent the Republican side in the negotiations with Senator Nunn and also Senator Levin.

The four of us have enjoyed working together over our years of service on the Armed Services Committee, and it was a special privilege for me to be able to sit down for hours and hours, well into the night, in fact, on several occasions, working from a t least 5 in the afternoon until midnight on at least two occasions, but the issues that were involved were serious. They required that kind of attention to detail.

Notwithstanding some of the comments that were made earlier today by some of our colleagues, words do make a difference. Poets are not the only individuals who pinch words until they hurt. Arms controllers do as well.

Words within the field of arms control carry specific meaning, and it was very important that we took great care as we tried to hammer out a compromise between our respective positions, in making sure that we would not do damage to longstanding precede nts and longstanding interpretations. Notwithstanding the fact there has been some criticism leveled at this bipartisan proposal, we believe the care which we have taken to describe in some detail, with some great sensitivity, I might add, the meaning of the words that were used, carries significant implications for arms control and national security.

We have to remind our colleagues again and again we are not seeking to rekindle the debate over star wars, some sort of astrodomic system that is going to hover over the United States and protect this county from an all-out assault from the former Sovi et Union or any major power that may emerge in the future. We could not do that. We do not envision that. We agree, in light of the proliferation of missile technology that we are agreed upon, that there is a grave danger of missile techno logy proliferating at an ever and ever faster rate that poses a threat to the United States, also to the former Soviet Union. They also should have great concern about the proliferation of this kind of technology.

How do we quantify it? How great is that threat? I do not think any of us are in a position to make a judgment. But we do not want to be in the position 3 or 4 or 5 years down the road of having some accidental launch, an unauthorized launch, or a limi ted attack against the United States and all the President of the United States could do would be to tell the people targeted: `Sorry, we will do the best to clean up the thousands if not millions of dead after the missile hits. We have no means of protecting you. And, yes, we understand what 5 o'clock traffic is in Washington, New York, and every major city and the chances are you will not be able to get out of the city on 30 minutes' notice, and so all we can do is hope to minimize the slaughter that will take place by sending in our rescue teams, assuming they survive the blast.'

That is an untenable position, and so we have to have some means of defending against these types of limited, accidental, or unauthorized launches, and there should be no dissent on that. This is not a matter of partisanship. There is no dissent that we need to have that capability.

In June, when the Armed Services Committee marked up the Defense authorization bill, the committee voted to put the United States on the path to deployment of a highly effective system to defend the American people against limited missile attacks.

Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site defense . And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also evolve and a research-and-development program to provide options for the future. Since the National Missile Defense Program approved by the committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we a dded $300 million above the $371 million requested.

We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result, reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A related matter involved negotiations b eing conducted with Moscow to define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems.

Over the last year and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted toward accepting Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable ways--in effect, to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was never intended to cover theater defens es . The committee addressed this troubling situation with two steps. First, we voted to write into law the Clinton administration's initial negotiating position on what constitutes an ABM system. And second, we adopted bill language to prevent the ad ministration from implementing any agreement that would have the effect of applying ABM Treaty restrictions to TMD systems.

Last month, when the Defense authorization act came to the floor, the committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile defense . And another amendm ent was offered eliminate the policy to deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems.

As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed in relatively close votes.

Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979 and have spent some of that time in the majority. It has not been our practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on the minority. Instead, we have usually soug ht to develop as broad a consensus as possible on important issues of national security.

In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader consensus.

Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing `the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack.' His amendment setting forth this basic principle, w hich was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5.

And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also approved by a very large margin, 69-26.

I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this is a clear indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus.

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THE BIPARTISAN AMENDMENT

The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four Senators designated by the two leaders to attempt to resolve this issue. In order to reach agreement on this amendment, both sides mad e concessions, although it should be noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less concessions than clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's intent.

Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues.

MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language.

The bipartisan text states that `it is the policy of the United States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system.' The difference with the original text is that it substitutes the words `develop for deployment' f or the word `deploy.'

This change is consistent with the fact that what we are funding in this bill is research and development on national missile defense , not procurement. There will be a number of authorization and appropriations bills to be acted upon be fore we begin to fund the actual deployment of the system. I would note that the words `develop for deployment' were in the committee-approved bill, in the NMD architecture section, and so this clarification is consistent with the committee's intent.

Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states--as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site system is essential if we are to defend all of the Uni ted States and not just part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD architecture section, which states that the system must be optimized to defend all 50 States against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks.

This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the compromise at various places that the system must be `affordable and operationally effective.' An NMD system confined to a single ground-based site would not be operationally effective, as n oted in the ninth finding.

The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD system will be one that `can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile thr eats.' This passage was of great importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving threat.

The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system `will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense .' There were strong feelings on our side about the words `will be augmented.' In the end, we agreed to change this to `can be a ugmented.' Again, while the committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years.

The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words `limited, accidental, or unauthorized' clarify the ballistic missile threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the intent of the committee's bill.

At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent and the realities of the congressional bud get process. Funds to begin deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate. Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor consideration, and conference action.

Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the Senate last month. This states that it is U.S. policy to `carry out the policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of 1995 ) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.'

It also states that it is United States policy to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for the NMD systems specified in the NMD architecture section. At the urging of Congress in the Missile Defense Act of 1 991, President Bush initiated such negotiations with Moscow.

It is my understanding that tentative agreement was reached to provide for the deployment of ground-based multiple-site NMD systems. But the Clinton administration discontinued those negotiations. Under this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to once again engage Moscow in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or otherwise allow for multiple-site NMD systems.

The policy section then states that `it is the policy of the U.S. to * * * consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to consultations betwe en the President and the Senate.'

I would note that both amendment to the treaty, as provided for in articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the treaty, as provided for in article XV, are `processes specified within the ABM Treaty.'

Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never advocated abrogation of the treaty and the bill reported out by the committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that took place during the committee mark-up made i t clear that there was absolutely no intent to abrogate.

These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with Moscow taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the bipartisan amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the committee.

Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are `the policy of the United States.' Not the policy of the Senate or the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are not its policy but merely the

sense of the Congress.

The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy section and which will be in the form of s ense of the Congress. In fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a statement of U.S. policy.

Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S. policy.

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NMD ARCHITECTURE

The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications in section 235, regarding the architecture of the national missile defense system.

The committee's bill stated that the NMD system `will attain initial operational capability by the end of 2003.' The bipartisan amendment states that the NMD system will be `capable of attaining initial operational capability by the end of 2003.' This is a useful clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks within a specific period of time.

Section 235 also states that the NMD `system shall include * * * ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the cont inental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks.' The committee's version of this provision was identical except that the bipartisan amendment inserted the words `capable of being.'

I found this suggestion from the other side to be acceptable because I do not think it really changes the meaning of the original text. Interceptors are inherently `capable of being deployed at multiple sites.' I cannot conceive of any technical reason that an interceptor would be incapable of being deployed at multiple sites. Accordingly, `capable of being deployed at multiple sites' does not, as far as I can tell, in any way limit the NMD system proposed by the committee. Indeed, one could

argue that the only way that ground based interceptors are `capable of being deployed at multiple sites' is if there are multiple sites.

So, I am pleased that this change helped to produce a bipartisan resolution to this matter, even if I cannot find any substantive result of this change.

In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a concession. The committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense `to develop an interim NMD capability to be operational by the end of 1999.' In order to achieve agreement with the other s ide, we have modified this to require the Secretary `to develop an interim NMD plan that would give the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational capability by the end of 1999 if required by the threat.' In both versions, the interim capability woul d have to not interfere with deployment of the full up NMD system by 2003.

Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the Secretary of Defense analyzing `options for supplementing or modifying the NMD system by adding one or a combinatio n of sea-based missile defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or space-based directed energy systems.' As I discussed earlier, such options for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many Members.

To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile defense . It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site NMD system with options for layered de fenses as the threat changes. But it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made for several years.

TMD DEMARCATION

The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. I would like to summarize the resolution that was achieved in section 238, which was completely rewritten with t he assistance of many Senators.

The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty `does not apply to or limit' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note that `the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that would

substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution.' What this means is that any agreement that would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems u nder the ABM Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate.

Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject.

Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater missile defenses . This prohibition would not apply to t he portion of an agreement that implements the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-per-second criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the Senate.

But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to impose any restrictions other than the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-per-second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD s ystems or system components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles , and restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles . Under section 238 of the bi partisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the administration is barred from implementing any of these potential restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation, or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades.

At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238 controls is the implementation of any restricti ons on TMD systems.

Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way.

I want to commend Senator Nunn, once again, and Senator Levin and Senator Warner for the many, many hours that were spent negotiating over specific words. As I mentioned before, words matter a great de al when we are talking about arms control.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could take a minute.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I just want to take 30 seconds to thank my distinguished colleague from Maine. He ended up on a very important note, `use of words.' I can assure you, when we were sitting around, time and time again, we referred to him as the master craftsman for the use of words, the placement of a comma and the prose that flows. Make no mistake about that. If this thing ever has to go to court, it is your fault.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields the Senator time?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Michigan such time as he may desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. NUNN. Within reason.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if we can get a parliamentary interpretation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is exactly 1 hour and 50 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I definitely thank the Chair, and I think I thank my friend from Georgia.

Mr. President, first let me echo the words of those who have already spoken about the process just for a minute. The four of us have worked together now many, many years in this Senate, particularly on the Armed Services Committee, but on other matters as well. We know each other, like each other a great deal, respect each other as individuals and also for the depths of our beliefs and our feelings.

It was a true pleasure to work with Senators Nunn, Warner and Cohen as we crafted this substitute. There is a lot in here representing each of us. Most important, I believe this substitute reflects a w ise course relative to national missile defense .

I agree fully with what Senator Warner just said about Senator Cohen. No one is a greater crafter of words around this place than Senator Cohen. He is not just a poet, but he is a writer of fiction as well, and some darned good nonfiction, too.

Mr. President, first, I want to start with what the law currently is. There is a lot of misconception, I think, in this body about what the current law is relative to national missile defense . We are not starting with a clean slate here called a bill and then adding a substitute for consideration by the Senate. We are starting with an existing law on national missile defense , then there is a bill, then there is a substitute.

The existing law already provides that it is a goal of the United States to develop the option to deploy an antiballistic missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attack s from ballistic missiles .

So that is the ground on which we are starting, that we already have in law a goal of the United States to develop the option to deploy this national missile defense system that we are talking about.

The bill that is before us, to which many of us had strong objections, goes way beyond saying that we should develop an option to deploy and then at some future time decide whether to exercise the option. The bill that we have before us says that we `s hall deploy' and that is what gets us into great difficulty. It gets us into great difficulty in terms of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of certain systems, antiballistic missile systems, at multiple sites.

The section of the bill before us, section 233, says that it is `the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system.'

No ifs, no ands, no buts. That is the policy of the United States in the bill. The trouble with that is we have a number of impediments to that policy being a wise one. We have the question of what the threat is, what the cost effectiveness is, what th e military effectiveness of such a system is, and we have an agreement with the Russians called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which President Nixon entered into and which has helped to create some major stability in the relationship between th e two countries when there was a cold war. And now that the cold war is over, we must figure out how to deal with a new Russia who is a partner, a friend, an ally hopefully, not an adversary of the United States.

When the bill says that we will deploy a system which the ABM Treaty says we cannot, what the bill does is set us on a course of action which is not only unwise but is reckless.

e received letters from both General Shalikashvili, who is our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense , Secretary Perry, in strong opposition to the bill because of what it does to the ABM Treaty but, most important, be cause of the jeopardy in which it places the Start II Treaty that we are hoping to ratify. That treaty will reduce significantly the number of nuclear warheads on both sides, and that is really the issue.

The issue here is the impact of the action of the Senate on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons which threaten us. Surely it is not in our national interest to be trashing an agreement relative to antiballistic missile systems if, by und ermining that agreement, we are then going to end up facing thousands more warheads on ballistic missiles which Russia would insist on keeping if we unilaterally pull out of the ABM Treaty. That is why General Shalikashvili said:

While we believe that START II is in both countries' interest, regardless of other events, that we must assume that unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader security relation ship with Russia as well.

That letter was dated June 28, 1995 .

And in a letter dated July 28, 1995 , Secretary Perry said:

Certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S. treaty obligations, such as establishing a deployment date of a multiple-site NMD syste m, the bill would jeopardize Russian implementation of the START I and START II treaties which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.

We tried to modify the language in the bill pursuant to the amendment process prior to the recess. We tried to strike language which committed us to a course of action which would, by violating the ABM Treaty, jeopardize the reductions in the numbers o f offensive nuclear weapons on the side of the Russians. We failed to do that by a couple votes.

Let me put some numbers on this. If the Russians see us violating a treaty which has allowed us to negotiate reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, the likelihood is that we are going to face 8,000 Russian nuclear weapons instead of about 3,000. To p ut this in very specific numbers, that is what we are talking about. That is what the stakes are here, and that is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense expressed such grave doubts about the language in this bi ll.

There were a number of problems which we confronted and which, we hope, we resolved in a sensible way. One problem which was in the bill which we have attempted to address was the unilateral declaration as to what the dividing line is between theater < B>missile defenses and strategic missile defenses . It is clear that the ABM agreement does not cover theater missile defenses . I think everybody would agree to that.

I think everyone would also agree, at least I hope they would, that in the event of a substantial modification of the ABM Treaty, that the President then must submit that modification to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. As a matter of fact, this substitute amendment refers to section 232 of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act which provided exactly that. That is existing law; it says that:

The United States shall not be bound by any international agreement that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution.

That is the law regardless of this bill. That is the law of the land. You cannot substantially modify a treaty unless you get advice and consent to ratification by the Senate, which previously approved that treaty. That is the law, with or without our statute saying that. We already have a statute which repeats that law, and we made reference to that statute.

But unless this substitute language is adopted, the bill declares what the dividing line is between these strategic and theater missile defense systems, declares the specific dividing line and says to the President in the bill, you cannot negotiat e any other dividing line. You cannot sit down with the Russians and come up with any dividing line between strategic and theater missile defense systems other than the one we are unilaterally declaring in this bill. That makes the Senate the nego tiator, not the President of the United States.

While we can advise and consent to ratification, we are not the party that negotiates the treaty. It was a mistake in this bill to attempt to put that dividing line between strategic missile defensive systems covered by the ABM Treaty, and the theater missile defense systems not covered, into law. We have corrected that. We have indicated what we believe the correct dividing line is. We have now told the President, in effect, that you are free to negotiate, but if you negotiate a differ ent demarcation, do not use the funds that we provide in the appropriation bill to implement that without giving Congress the opportunity to approve or to disapprove. That is very different. That is strikingly different from what was in the bill itself.

Following these efforts to amend the language in the bill prior to the recess, we entered into lengthy discussions at the request of the majority leader and Senator Daschle, the Democratic leader. The four of us spent many days, as has been outlined, in devising the substitute which is before us. This substitute corrects the major defects and many of the smaller defects in the original language. It basically returns us to the approach in current law. The approach in current law is that we want an option to deploy. We are not committed to deploy, but we want an option.

The approach in the substitute is that we want to develop for deployment a national missile defense system, but what we say in the substitute is that we are not deciding to deploy that here and now. That is very explicitly left to a later decis ion. We also say that decision should follow consideration of a number of things: Cost effectiveness, military effectiveness, the threat, and the impact on the ABM Treaty. That is the vital difference between the bill's language and the substitute.

In section 233 of the substitute, we explicitly state that the policy of the United States is to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system. And then we go into the ifs, ands, and the buts. The bill said `deploy'--no ifs, ands, or buts. The substitute says `develop for deployment', but with these ifs, these ands, and these buts. The critical ones, again, are to be cost effective, militarily effective, consistent with the threat, and not adversely affect the ABM Treat y, or at least, if we are going to decide to deploy, do so in a way which is through processes that are specified within or consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The critical language here is that we say explicitly that it is the policy of the United States to `ensure congressional review prior to a decision to deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph 2 of (a) the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system, (b) the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.'

Mr. President, again, I want to thank our colleagues for their long and very arduous discussions. It has produced a substitute which I can, in good conscience, support, because we have removed the objectionable language in the bill which committed us t o deploy a system which, by violating the ABM Treaty, would have almost certainly led to our facing thousands of more offensive nuclear warheads than we otherwise would be facing. We have attempted to carry out the thoughts of General Shalikashvili and hi s caution to us about the importance of our relationship with Russia and trying to maintain it in a stable way and not to be unilaterally declaring that we are going to abrogate agreements we have entered into with their predecessor. We have done so in a bipartisan way. I hope that we have done so in a constructive and a thoughtful way which will command the broad support of Members of this body.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a number of documents, including the letters referred to from General Shalikashvili, Secretary Perry, a side-by-side comparison of the bill and the substitute language re lative to the ABM Treaty, as well as a further amplification of my statement.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Secretary of Defense ,
Washington, DC, July 28, 1995 .

Hon. Sam Nunn,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

[Page: S12588]

Dear Senator Nunn: I write to register my strong opposition to the missile defense provisions of the SASC's Defense Authorization bill, which would institute Congressional micromanagement of the Administration's miss ile defense program and put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty. The Administration is committed to respond to ballistic missile threats to our forces, allies, and territory. We will not permit the capability of the defenses we field to meet those threats to be compromised.

The bill's provisions would add nothing to DoD's ability to pursue our missile defense programs, and would needlessly cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks. The bill would require the US to make a decision now on developing a specific national missile defense for deployment by 2003, with interim operational capability in 1999, despite the fact that a valid strategic missile threat has not emerged. Our NMD program is designed to give us the capability for a de ployment decision in three years, when we will be in a much better position to assess the threat and deploy the most technologically advanced systems available. The bill would also terminate valuable elements of our TMD program, the Boost Phase Intercept and MEADS/Corp SAM systems. MEADS is not only a valuable defense system but is an important test of future trans-Atlantic defense cooperation.

In addition, certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be very damaging to US security reasons. By mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard US Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of a multiple-site NM D system--the bill would jeopardize Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons. The bill's unwarranted imposition, through funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions, and would raise significant international legal issues as well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs. T hese serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such drastic and far-reaching measures.

Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national security interests of the United States. I will continue to do everything possible to work with the Senate to see that these priorities ar e not compromised.

Sincerely,
William J. Perry.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, June 28, 1995 .

Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Levin. Thank you for your letter and the opportunity to express my views concerning the impact of Senator Warner's proposed language for the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill on current theater missile defense (TMD) programs.

Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would deal in isolation with unilateral US legislation detailing technical param eters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we believe that START II is in both countries' interests regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader security relationship with Russia as well.

We are continuing to work on TMD systems. The ongoing testing of THAAD through the demonstration/validation program has been certified ABM Treaty compliant as has the Navy Upper Tier program. Thus, progress on these programs is not restricted by the lack of a demarcation agreement. We have no plans and do not desire to test THAAD or other TMD systems in an ABM mode.

Even though testing and development of TMD systems is underway now, we believe it is useful to continue discussions with the Russians to seek resolution of the ABM/TMD issue in a way which preserves our security equities. Were such dialogue to be prohibited, we might eventually find ourselves forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD development programs or proceeding unilaterally in a manner which could undermine the ABM Treaty and our broader security relationship with Russia. Either alt ernative would impose security costs and risks which we are seeking to avoid.

Sincerely,

John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Page: S12589]

Missile Defense Act of 1995 : Substitute Amendment

Side-by-side comparison of the Missile Defense Act in S. 1026 and the substitute amendment of August 10, 1995 .

SEC. 233. POLICY

The bill asserted that the policy of the U.S. was:

To `deploy a multiple site' national missile defense system that `will be' augmented to provide a larger defense in the future.

The substitute amendment has as the policy:

To develop for deployment a national missile defense system that can be augmented.

To negotiate with Russia to provide for such a system, based on the ABM Treaty.

To consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

The purpose of the system is to defend only against limited, accidental and unauthorized missile attacks.

A new provision in the substitute amendment states the policy that:

Congress shall review the affordability, the operational effectiveness and the threat to be countered by the national missile defense system, and ABM Treaty considerations, prior to deciding whether to deploy the system.

The last new policy provision:

To carry out the policies, programs and requirements of the Missile Defense Act through processes specified in or consistent with the ABM Treaty.

SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE ARCHITECTURE

The bill requires the Pentagon to meet certain dates for the specified programs.

The substitute amendment:

Relaxes the requirement to meet those dates,

Requires a report for each program/date explaining the cost and technical risk of meeting those dates,

And requires a report on the specific threats to be countered by each TMD system.

SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE

The Bill requires the Pentagon to develop a national missile defense system which will be operational first in 2003. It requires the system to include ground-based interceptors `deployed at multiple sties'.

The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a national missile defense system that is capable of being first operational by the end of 2003. It states that the system shall include ground-based interceptors capable of being deploy ed at multiple sites.

Interim capability: The bill required the Pentagon to develop an interim capability to be operational by 1999.

The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a plan instead of a capability, and that it would give the U.S. the ability to have such an interim capability in place by 1999 if required by the threat.

The substitute amendment also requires a report that would include information on the cost of the program, the specific threat to be countered, and the Defense Secretary's assessment of whether deployment is affordable and operationally effecti ve.

SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY

The Bill has sense of Congress language that:

p>The Senate should conduct a review of the ABM Treaty.

The Senate should consider establishing a Select Committee to conduct the review, and

The President should cease all efforts to `modify, clarify, or otherwise alter' our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

The Bill requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a declassified record of the ABM Treaty negotiations.

The substitute amendment adds findings related to the ABM Treaty, including that the policies, programs and requirements of the Missile Defense Act can be accomplished in accordance or consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The substitute amendment:

Strikes the proposal to establish a Select Committee.

Strikes the proposal that the President cease all efforts to modify or clarify our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

Strikes the entire provision calling for a declassified treaty negotiating record.

States that the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees should conduct the review of the Treaty.

SEC. 238. PROHIBITION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT A TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENT

The Bill:

States the policy that `unless and until' a missile defense system is tested against a target missile with a range greater than 3,500 km or a velocity greater than 5 km per second, it has not been tested `in an ABM mode' nor `been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles ' (both of which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty), and therefore is not subject to ABM Treaty application or restrictions.

Prohibits any appropriated funds from being obligated or expended by any official of the federal government to apply the ABM Treaty to TMD systems, or for `taking any other action' to have the ABM Treaty apply to TMD systems. (This would prevent any di scussion or negotiation by federal officials with the Russians to consider any other demarcation than the one specified in the bill.)

The substitute amendment strikes Sec. 238 and replaces it with:

Two findings that restate items from previous Acts .

Sense of the Congress language defining the TMD demarcation (3,500 km/ 5kps), and stating that unless a TMD system is tested above the demarcation threshold, the system has not been tested in an ABM mode, nor deemed to have been given capabilities to c ounter strategic ballistic missiles '.

Sense of Congress language saying that any agreement with Russia that would be more restrictive than the demarcation provided should require ratification.

Binding prohibition on funding: FY 96 DOD funds cannot be used to implement a demarcation agreement unless: provided in a subsequent act (majority vote), or if the agreement goes through the ratification process.

Mr. LEVIN. Again, I thank my good friends from Georgia, Virginia, and Maine for their hard work. I thank the chairman for his support of this effort, and I thank, also, Senator Daschle, who has spent so much time on this effort to make sure that we come up with a solution which satisfies the basic principles that we set out to achieve.

I yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner.

Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. COHEN. Would the Senator from Virginia be willing to delete from the Record the depositing of any legal responsibility on my doorstep?

Mr. NUNN. I will object to any such deletion, Mr. President. I think the responsibility is clearly established.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think that brief exchange underlines what has been said by all of my colleagues preceding me regarding the four of us having been associated now more than 17 years together on this committee, under the tutelage of Senators like Senator Thurmond, Senator Stennis, Senator Tower, and Senator Jackson. These were great teachers. We had the opportunity to learn from them. I hope that today in our service to the Senate as members of this committee, we can achieve some of the goals that those great Senators contributed to legislation for the national security of the United States.

Mr. President, as I listened to these remarks, it occurs to me that if we were walking down Main Street America today and we were to be stopped and questioned by any of our constituents, candidly, I say to the Senate, they would think this system is in place today.

It is inconceivable after the billions and billions and billions of dollars we have spent on our national defense over the last, really, two decades, that a series of Presidents and a series of Congresses have not put in place for the basic pro tection of the American citizen something to interdict the accidental or unintended firing of an intercontinental missile .

This is not star wars. I will ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have printed in the Record following my remarks an article that appeared today in the Washington Post, in which I and other Members were interviewed to talk about t his particular piece of legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. WARNER. It took me some time to try to get home to the reporter, and indeed I think he grasped it rather readily, that the biggest burden we had is to overcome the lingering apprehension that what we are doing in this amendment is laying the founda tion for another star wars program. That is not the case. It is a very limited defense . It is precisely as described by those who have spoken previously, a system for limited purposes.

It is in the interest of the former Soviet Union, and particularly Russia, that this be put in place because should an accidental firing occur, perhaps the first focus of attention would be turned to Russia. I am hopeful that this technology that will be developed could be used by Russia to install their own system. We do not fear in this country Russia putting in a system comparable to this. It is in the mutual benefit of both nations to have such a system.

I am happy to have joined with my colleagues. Someone mentioned it is like the old four horsemen getting together once again to resolve a situation which for a period of time appeared to be unresolvable.

I want to say that Senator Cohen and I particularly value the advice and counsel we received from the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, Senator Lott, Senator Smith, and Senator Kyl. Each of these Senators have spent a number of years studying this question. Particularly in the House, Senator Kyl was well known for his knowledge on this subject. He was particularly helpful in the course of our negotiations.

Prior to taking the position Senator Cohen and I worked up with our colleagues to its final stage, Senator Thurmond convened the full Armed Services Committee. Every single member was present. They looked it over very carefully. Then we sat down and finalized it with our distinguished colleagues and friends of long standing, the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Michigan.

It is a significant step forward. I was extremely heartened tonight when Senator Nunn said he had an opportunity to speak with the Secretary of Defense . I think this Nation is fortunate to have such a fine man as Secretary Perr y to take on that heavy and, indeed in many respects, thankless responsibility. This is an area in which he has worked for many, many years. All four of us that negotiated this have worked with the Aspen Institute when he was one of the leaders of that di scussion forum, and we covered many times--many times--issues relating to the intercontinental missile systems, the deterrence, and the several treaties. Given his background, I hope that he can be persuasive to the President and other members of the administration so that this amendment can be accepted. Indeed, not only accepted, but perhaps supported.

Neither side gained everything they want. That is the essence of a negotiation. The result of this effort is a Missile Defense Act of 1995 , a substitute for the original one in the bill which sets a clear path for deployment. That is th e way I would like to state it--a clear path to deployment.

We in the United States cannot--particularly the legislative branch of Government--dictate that a certain system will be deployed. Frankly, we do not even know that it will work, we say with considerable candor. The technology is unfolding so rapidly, we do not know exactly whether it can work.

There is also a very serious element of the cost associated with this system. These are things that have to be worked out in the future. But we have set, in this amendment, the United States of America on a clear path of deployment. Let there be no mis take about that, no wavering--I can certainly speak for this side of the aisle--no wavering of the intents of the present composition of the U.S. Senate on this side of the aisle as to the ultimate goal of deploying such a system.

Why? Because it is in the mutual interests of ourselves and Russia and other nations of the world; and secondly, the American public not only demands it, they think it is its place right now. They would expect no less of a President or series of Presid ents and a series of Congresses.

In the course of our deliberations, there were many concerned with the issue of why now? Why must we press this on now? If we start tonight on developing this system, it might well be to the year 2003 or later--7, 8, 9, 10 years--before the system can be developed; that is, research and development completed and in place to protect the American citizen--perhaps a decade.

In the same period of time, there are estimates that those nations apart from Russia and our allies who particularly want to develop for themselves the missile system, they will have in all likelihood systems of their own in place. Many of the nations that we fear most today have this as a top agenda item, to build this type of system.

My point is, there is a coincidence in time of the defensive system that we want to put in place and the offensive systems being developed by other nations, call them rogue nations, who very much desire to threaten the United States some day wi th a missile .

The revised Missile Defense Act of 1995 establishes a policy of development for deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense system capable of defending the United States--that is, from the limited attack--and prohibit s any final effort by the administration to impose limitations without the consent of the U.S. Senate pursuant to the Constitution of the United States on the development and deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense system by virtue of new int erpretations of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

I was extremely heartened to hear my distinguished colleague from Michigan say unequivocally that that treaty does not cover short-range ballistic missile systems. That is important. I would rejoin by saying, but the technology advances that ha ve taken place since 1972 force now this type of legislation which is intended to maintain an operation between the theater systems and the intercontinental systems and maintain that separation in a way that will not undermine the fundamental goals of the ABM Treaty.

The principle focus of my remarks today is on the changes made to section 238 of the Missile Defense Act of 1995 . That is a section that I worked on as a member of the Armed Services Committee and an amendment which I put forth in that committee which was eventually incorporated into the bill as now written. And that amendment of mine is being revised by this amendment, which is the subject of the discussion for the moment.

As it originally appeared in my amendment, section 238 used the Senate's power of the purse to impose a broad and absolute prohibition on the administration's ability to take any action which imposed ABM Treaty restrictions on the development and deplo yment of theater missile defense systems. These systems are urgently needed to protect the lives of the men and women of the armed services and our allies in their forward-deployed situations.

How well we know that. Senator Nunn recounted, in the course of our last debate, how Senator Nunn, Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and I were in Tel Aviv when the last Scud missile fell and we saw firsthand the use of that system, not for military purposes but for purposes of sheer terrorism.

Saddam Hussein leveled that system on Tel Aviv for no other purpose than to terrorize those people. The Patriot, as best it could--the best defense we had at that period of time--I think in a credible manner interdicted a number of those missil es . That is why we are here tonight to lay the foundation to move ahead in the technology so that we can employ all of the brains, all the technology without any restriction imposed by the ABM Treaty on developing the future systems to interdict the short-range ballistic missiles that were encountered during the gulf war.

The bipartisan amendment, which we urge the Senate to adopt, achieves our goal, namely to prohibit the administration from implementing any agreement with Russia which would impose limitations including performance, operation or deployment limitations on theater missile systems unless the Senate exercised, pursuant to a Presidential submission of such agreement, its constitutional right of advice and consent.

The 1972 ABM Treaty never intended, never envisioned the theater systems. I was in the Department of the Navy at that time. I was in Moscow in 1972, when ABM was signed, as a part of President Nixon's delegation. My duties then were related primarily t o naval matters, but all of us in the Department of Defense watched with great interest how this treaty, the ABM Treaty, was developed.

Dr. John Foster, who was then the Director of Research and Development in the Pentagon, was one of the key individuals. I recently consulted him about his recollection with respect to the ABM Treaty, and he confirmed what I believed was true then, as I do today, that the negotiators never had in mind the theater systems which we must employ now in our defense .

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

[Page: S12590]

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask if I may have a few more minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may require for further debate.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman.

As I said before the Senate went on recess, during the original debate on this amendment, I have long believed that we must accelerate the development and then the deployment of operationally effective theater missile systems for our troops, defenses that are not improperly constrained by the ABM Treaty. This amendment does that. Likewise, we must, in the interests of the American people, make a clear statement of our national determination to proceed to a national defense syste m to protect against the threats enunciated in this bipartisan amendment.

The threat that theater missiles propose to our forces is clear. Thirty nations have short-range theater ballistic missile systems, and more and more each day are acquiring the same capability.

The gulf war should have caused all Americans to unite behind the missile defense effort. What can be more terrifying than the thought of U.S. citizens, both at home and deployed overseas, defenseless against this type of weapon of terror, once used by Saddam Hussein, and which could be used in the future by others. Yet, here we are, 5 years after that conflict in the gulf, and our troops are still not adequately, in my judgment, protected from ballistic missile attacks. And there are t hose who still resist efforts to move forward in this area.

Fortunately, I think, as a result of this compromise, we now have gained sufficient strength in the U.S. Senate to move this amendment tomorrow in a positive way.

Mr. President, it became evident to me, earlier this year, that our crucial effort to develop and deploy the most capable theater missile defense systems was in danger of being unacceptably hampered by the administration's desire to achieve a d emarcation agreement with the Russians. They were actively negotiating toward that goal. Several of the negotiating positions either proposed or accepted by the administration would have severely limited the technological development of U.S. theater mi ssile defense systems, and would have resulted in an international agreement imposing major new limitations on the United States. Consequently, I have taken actions in 1994 and now in 1995 to prohibit such actions by the administration.

Mr. President, previously I have tried other avenues to have the Senate's voice heard on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation. My preferred option--and the one which I tried last year--was simply to require the President to present to the Senate for advice an d consent any demarcation agreement which would substantially modify the ABM Treaty. The Congress adopted my views and made them part of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization Act .

However, despite that legal requirement, the administration has made it abundantly clear that it does not intend to submit any such demarcation agreement, pursuant to the Constitution, to the Senate for advice and consent. Although the administration w as negotiating an agreement that would, in effect, make the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty, administration officials believed that there was no need for the Senate to exercise its constitutional right to provide advice and consent to that agreement.

It was clear that a new approach was needed. Therefore, I focused on the Congress' power of the purse to ensure that the views of the Senate were considered in the demarcation negotiations.

The bipartisan missile defense amendment preserves this approach. Section 238 prohibits the expenditure of funds for fiscal year 1996 to implement an agreement that would establish a demarcation between theater missile defense systems a nd ABM systems or that would restrict the performance, operation or deployment of U.S. theater missile defense systems, unless that agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty-making powers of the President, or to the extent provided in an act subsequently enacted by the Congress. In other words, for the coming fiscal year the prohibition stands unless the Senate takes an affirmative act to change or remove that prohibition.

In addition, this provision establishes as a sense of the Congress the generally accepted demarcation standard between TMD and ABM systems. Section 238(b)(1) states that `unless a missile defense system, system upgrade, or system component, inc luding one that exploits data from space-based or other external sensors, if flight tested against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, such missile defense system, s ystem upgrade, or system component has not been tested in an ABM mode nor deemed to have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles .' This was the standard used by the Clinton administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations in November 1993. The administration would be well-advised to return to that standard.

Mr. President, I would have preferred a prohibition that would have remained in effect for more than 1 fiscal year. I would have preferred a demarcation standard adopted in a binding form, rather than as a sense of the Congress. But I believe that the essence of my original amendment was preserved in this compromise package.

This legislation represents a significant step forward in the effort to provide the men and women of the Armed Forces with the most effective theater missile defense systems that our great nation is capable of producing. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Finally Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge my special appreciation and respect for Senator Cohen's very valuable contribution to the negotiations leading up to the bipartisan amendment. We have worked together for 17 years on the Arm ed Services Committee, and I value his advise and counsel.

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Exhibit 1

Congress to Push For a National Missile Defense

Two years after the Clinton administration placed the program on a back burner, Congress is about to redouble U.S. efforts to build a national system against ballistic missile attack, putting it at odds with the White House and at risk of confr ontation with the Kremlin.

Republicans leading the initiative stress their plan is not a return to the `Star Wars' dream of President Ronald Reagan, who envisioned a space-based shield that would make the United States impenetrable to a massive launch of enemy missiles . Rather, the stated aim now is to erect a more modest, ground-based system that would protect the country against accidental launch or limited attack at a time when more nations are coming into the possession of ballistic missiles .

But opponents regard even this scaled-back effort as dubious technologically and not urgent strategically since little immediate threat exists. They say the program is a waste of the billions of dollars that the House and Senate appear ready to pour in to it over the next few years.

Moreover, administration officials worry that a hellbent congressional effort to develop a missile defense system, coupled with renewed Republican talk of undoing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, will upset relations with M oscow and scuttle the planned elimination of thousands of nuclear warheads.

When the Senate returns from its August recess today, it is scheduled to debate a compromise measure hammered out by a four-man bipartisan group to avoid breaching the ABM Treaty while still calling for accelerated development of a national missile defense system.

In attempting to establish a policy that can be supported by a broad majority of senators, however, the measure effectively postpones the day of political reckoning between proponents and opponents of a national system and between Washington and Moscow .

The measure would direct the Pentagon to `develop for deployment' a multisite missile defense system capable of being operational by 2003. But the decision to deploy would be put off until an unspecified time and subjected to considerations of affordability, effectiveness, threat assessment and treaty implications.

`I am not opposed to having an option to deploy providing we don't move toward it in a hasty way,' said Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), a liberal whose involvement in negotiating the compromise was key. `What I strongly oppose is doing it in a way that would undermine the relationship with Russia and the whole planned dismantlement of nuclear weapons.'

For the Republicans who won control of Congress last November, revival of the missile defense issue seemed at first a simple way of dramatizing their general appeal for a stronger defense , while also addressing their real concern about the growing number of rogue states with access to ballistic missiles .

The GOP's `Contract With America' called for faster deployment of a national missile defense system. Many Republicans have sought to frame the political debate around the fact that the United States has no system to fend off even a single incom ing ballistic missile . Opinion polls show that most Americans are surprise to learn the country lacks such a system.

But wrangles over the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty have complicated the debate. So has a related dispute about where to draw the line between a national defense system, which is covered by the treaty, and increasingly powerful `theater ' systems for guarding against shorter-range missile attack, which do not come under the treaty's purview.

The 23-year-old ABM pact was meant to block Washington and Moscow from building nationwide defenses against ballistic missile attack, on the premise that as long as each country is vulnerable to the other's nuclear arsenal, neither will attack the other. The accord allows each side to establish a single-site system with no more than 100 interceptor missiles .

Administration officials say the treaty remains a cornerstone of international arms control efforts and abrogating it would jeopardize plans to cut U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to 3,000 warheads and possibly fewer under
strategic arms reduction treaties. Such arms control agreements, not antimissile weapons systems, offer the more reliable protection for U.S. interests, say missile defense skeptics.

`No one will reduce their strategic forces if there's a buildup in strategic defense ,' said Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., director of the Arms Control Association. `If we lose all of this for a system that might kill only a handful of missiles , i t's madness. We'll soon find much of the Defense Department's procurement budget going into this Fortress America.'

But some key Republican players have questioned the relevance of the ABM Treaty in today's security environment, arguing that Cold War logic does not hold in a world no longer dominated by U.S.-Soviet tensions and now menaced by less familiar adversari es.

`Frankly, we think the ABM Treaty has to be renegotiated, so I'm not too concerned about bumping up against it,' said Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.). `We've pretty much established the need to revise it, so we might as well face up to that.'

A month ago, Senate Republicans were backing language in the 1996 defense authorization bill that required deployment of a multisite missile defense system by 2003. Arguing that such a move would violate the ABM Treaty, Democrats prepar ed to filibuster and the Clinton administration threatened to veto the bill if it passed.

After nearly a week of intensive talks in early August, Sens. Levin, Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), John W. Warner (R-Va.) and William S. Cohen (R-Maine) offered a compromise substitute amendment--expected to win floor approval this week--that promises to avert a s howdown with the White House for now and clear the way for passage of a defense authorization bill.

The measure reaffirms that U.S. policy is to act consistently with the ABM Treaty but also approves negotiations with the Russians on the admissibility of the planned U.S. system. If those talks fail, the amendment asserts, the United States ca n consider withdrawing from the treaty.

The House already has approved a 1996 defense bill calling for deployment `as soon as practical' of a national missile defense system, without specifying the number of sites. And both the House and Senate are proposing to add several hu ndred million dollars to the Clinton administration program in fiscal
1996 for work on a national missile defense system.

The Clinton administration is not opposed to developing a system capable of protecting U.S. territory. It budgeted nearly $400 million for 1996 to pursue technologies for a ground-based system, beefing up the program a bit in view of congressional inte rest to include a deployment contingency early next century.

But when it took office in 1993, the administration drastically reordered the priorities of the Pentagon's missile defense effort, shrinking work on a national system, renaming the supervising agency, and concentrating about 80 percent of the f unds of what is now called the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization on fielding theater defense systems to protect U.S. troops in combat zones abroad.

The rationale for the shift was the belief that the spread of shorter-range ballistic missiles poses a more immediate threat than the possibility of hostile nations developing intercontinental missiles that can strike the United States.

Currently, more than 15 Third World nations have ballistic missiles and 77 have cruise missiles , according to U.S. intelligence reports. By contrast, only several former Soviet states and China possess missiles capable of reachi ng the continental United States, and the U.S. intelligence community sees no new country developing the capability to hit the United States with a long-range missile for the next decade.

Administration officials also contend the likelihood of accidental launch by Russia or China is decreasing due to the elimination of many nuclear warheads in the former Soviet states and more reliable command and control procedures for Russian and Chin ese forces. Moreover, they argue that with rapid advances occurring in information technologies, premature deployment of a U.S. system would limit the technical options and risk saddling the United States with an overly costly and quickly outdated system.

Other critics of a national system note that the country has been trying off and on for several decades to build one, without much success. More than $38 billion went into Reagan's Star Wars program alone.

`People are talking as if we've never tried this before,' said Stephen I. Schwartz, director of the Brookings Institution's U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project. `We don't seem to learn from the fact that we spent a lot of money before and didn't ge t much for it.'

But many Republican legislators worry the administration is underestimating how quickly the threat of ballistic missile attacks from rogue countries may materialize. They cite development of North Korea's Taepo Dong-2 missile , capable of reaching Alaska or parts of Hawaii, and the potential sale to Third World countries of Russia's SS-25 as a space launch vehicle.

In fact, the U.S. intelligence community has been slow to provide a current estimate of the emerging missile threat to the United States. Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, who heads the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said in an interview that he has been waiting more than eight months for an update measuring the degree of uncertainty in the U.S. prediction.

Advocates of a national system, mindful of past failures to achieve their dream, contend the technology is now within reach.

`This is not Star Wars, this is not an umbrella system,' asserted Warner, the Virginia senator. This is a bare bones effort to build a system to intercept missiles launched accidentally in limited number.'

Some of the more hawkish proponents still argue for a more ambitious setup, criticizing the Pentagon's current focus on ground-based interceptors. A study earlier this year by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank recommended concentrating instead on a Navy plan to deploy ship-based interceptors within three or four years, and then move to a space-based system by early in the next decade.

One area in which Republicans and Democrats generally agree is on the need for effective theater missile defense systems, with the GOP eager to add even more money to development efforts there as well. But the growing sophistication of theater systems, is posing an ABM Treaty problem.

Some of the theater systems under development by the Pentagon may prove powerful enough to thwart ballistic missiles , meaning the Russians may view them as a national defense system and thus a circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Administration efforts to negotiate with Moscow a distinction between defenses against long-range strategic missiles and short-range theater missiles have drawn Republican concern that the administration may be willing to accept too many limits on development of theater defenses , particularly on the speed of interceptors.

Accusing the administration of trying to apply the ABM Treaty to theater systems, Senate Republicans originally moved to include in the 1996 defense bill a unilateral declaration of the dividing line between strategic and theater weapons and a ban on the president negotiating any other demarcation.

Administration officials protested that a unilateral interpretation of the demarcation line was unwarranted because the ABM Treaty is not constraining theater programs, and unwise because enactment would threaten ratification of the second Strategic Ar ms Reduction Treaty and set a dangerous precedent.

The Senate compromise includes a nonbinding `sense of Congress' provision reasserting what has been the demarcation standard, which would exempt the Pentagon's fastest, longest-range theater antimissile systems from ABM coverage as long as they were no t tested against a missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers (or about 2,174 miles) or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) per second. But the measure also would permit the president to negotiate an alternative demarcatio n line between strategic and theater missiles , provided he sought congressional ratification of any new agreement with Moscow--a condition the administration has been reluctant to accept.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Georgia.

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Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the bill as reported set forth the proposed policy for future missile defense as outlined here on the floor this evening. It also proposed the demarcation between theater and anti-ballistic-missile defenses , and I am talking about the underlying bill, not the substitute. In my judgment, however, and that of many other Senators, the proposal addressed these vital issues in a manner that unnecessarily presented major difficulties in terms of arms control and const itutional considerations.

As Senator Levin pointed out so well, what we want to do is move forward with a missile defense against limited, unauthorized, third-country-type attacks, but what we do not want to do in the process of trying to accomplish tha t goal, that important goal, we do not want to end up inadvertently and unintentionally ending the reduction of missiles pointing at us that have already been agreed to. It would be the supreme irony if, in dealing with a future threat, we ended u p basically negating 20 years of efforts to reduce the current threat, which is, of course, the continuation of very large numbers of multiwarhead missiles pointing at the United States by Russia, which we have agreed to dramatically reduce both i n START I, which has been entered into, and START II, which is now pending and which we hope at some point the Russian Duma, or legislative body, will, indeed, agree to.

So, in my floor statement on August 3, I outlined five major problems with the version of the bill that this substitute is intended to correct and I believe does correct. This is the underlying bill.

First, I said on August 3, it abandons U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty. What I meant by that, and what I would mean by that now, is it is an anticipatory breach, the way the original underlying bill is worded.

Second, abandoning adherence to that ABM Treaty now is unnecessary. We can conduct an effective missile defense program, developing for deployment, as the substitute called for in the near term, while continuing our adherence to the ABM Treaty. We do not have to make that choice now. So why risk the very large reductions of the threat now aimed toward us that are underway in order to accomplish a goal where we do not have to make that move at this point in time?

Third, abandoning adherence now to the ABM Treaty is likely to impose huge costs on us if Russia declines to carry out some of its legal obligations and in response to our anticipatory breach.

Fourth, the Senate Armed Service Committee bill abandons adherence by stealth rather than directing the administration to use the legal withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty.

Mr. President, if we decide that the ABM Treaty is no longer in our interest--we may get to that point at some point in the future because we may find that we cannot negotiate the modest amendments required to provide for this national defense . I hope that we can because I think it is in the mutual interest of the United States and Russia. But if we get to that point, then we ought to do what the ABM Treaty calls for, and that is to use legal withdrawal proceedings in our national interest, sup reme national interest. Of course, we can do that. I believe the timeframe is 6 months.

We have the right under that treaty to state that in our supreme national interest, it is no longer in our supreme national interest to be a part of that treaty, and then we withdraw from the treaty in accordance with the terms of treaty. That is the w ay to do it if we ever have to move in that direction or feel that it is in our interest to move in that direction.

Fifth, by failing to use the legal option under the treaty, the Senate would be compelling the executive branch to abandon adherence to the ABM Treaty by usurping certain powers of the executive branch over the conduct of foreign policy, a move that ce rtainly would raise serious constitutional issues.

So, Mr. President, this is the underlying bill and the problem with the underlying bill. That is what we are basically correcting with this substitute amendment.

Mr. President, again, I thank my colleague from Michigan, who did a superb job on this. I thank my colleague from Virginia and my colleague from Maine, Senator Warner and Senator Cohen, who are indeed not only knowledg eable but they are skillful in their negotiating ability and in their discerning ability to understand the fundamental issues as opposed to some of the rhetorical issues. I think that is the reason we were able to work this out.

I thank the Senator from South Carolina, because he was the one who came up with the idea of getting the four of us to work on this proposal and to try to find a way to reach a consensus. He also not only instigated this effort but discussed it with th e majority leader and the minority leader. He also constantly gave us both the encouragement and support, and indeed some very timely prodding to get this agreement worked out.

So I appreciate the Senator from South Carolina and his leadership.

Mr. President, I believe that there are no other remarks after the Senator from Michigan, who may want to conclude. I believe we are about to wrap up the debate. I believe the Senator from Texas wants to take some remarks.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a brief question on this matter.

During the course of my remarks, I opined that I thought this amendment as currently drawn would be in the mutual interest of the United States and Russia. Should an accidental firing occur, I think all attention would instantly focus on Russia as bein g the origin. And, therefore, it seems to me, whether it was from Russia or wherever the missile was fired from, I think the initial reaction of the American public would be, well, they are the ones that have it, because many do not understand in the years immediately preceding other nations have come forward now and have made fundamental investment in the system.

So I just ask if my distinguished colleague concurs with my view that it is in the mutual interest of both Russia and the United States.

Mr. NUNN. I do. I say to my friend from Virginia that I think it is in the interest of the United States and Russia to both move forward with modest adjustments to the ABM Treaty so both can protect their countries against accidental unauthorized launc h or third-country launch.

As the Senator from Virginia well knows, I first posed this question to the then head of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Dick Ellis, a wonderful and fine Air Force general, now deceased. But that was in the early 1980's. I asked him the question, I sai d, `General Ellis, what basically is our ability to detect the origin of some limited attack against the United States? Could we know for sure where that attack originated? We would not have the ability to defend against it, and would we know for sure the origin of that attack?' He said he needed to study that.

He did study it. He and his whole team studied it for almost a year and came to the conclusion that the United States, while we had some capability of determining the origin of attack, it was not nearly as good as it should be and the Russians' ability was not as good as ours. Most of that study remains classified.

But I came out with a profound not only sense of unease about our ability and their ability to detect the origin of attack, let us say from an underwater submarine which could be from a third country, but we would both assume it was coming, if we were struck, from the other superpower in terms of nuclear arms. I came to the conclusion that neither of us had the capability that we needed in that regard.

But more importantly, I came to the conclusion that we both had a mutual stake in the ability of each to be able to detect the origin of an attack and also to be able to defend against that kind of an attack so that we never got into an inadvertent war that no one intended by mistake or by accident. And I still have that conclusion even though the circumstances between the United States and Russia have now changed dramatically. We are no longer in this confrontation. We still have nuclear arms that will be with us for years to come even after we reduce under START I and START II.

So that is a long answer to the Senator's underlying question, but I think it is a very important question. And the answer is, yes, I do believe Russia has a similar interest. I think we have many mutual interests. In fact, our interest in terms of nucle ar arms, in terms of destruction, the safety, the handling, the prevention of leakage of this kind of material, both nuclear, chemical, biological, as well as technology and the scientists, we have a tremendous mutual type of security interest now with Ru ssia more than perhaps any other nation because we are the two that have these nuclear weapons and the awesome responsibility to deal with them responsibly so that we never, God forbid, have nuclear disaster, not only in this country but in Russia or in t he world.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I conclude that I, too, remember General Ellis very well. He was a highly decorated fighter pilot in World War II. He was head of the Strategic Air Command. And, as my colleague will recall , he was appointed to the standing consultative commission, which, Mr. President, is that body that is entrusted with resolving underlying questions with respect to the framework of arms control treaties, including the ABM. And he discharged that responsi bility with great distinction.

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Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from Georgia for his kind remarks.

I now yield to the able Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, such time as she may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I, too, want to commend the chairman of the committee, the ranking member from Georgia, and the group that got together and worked long into t he night before the summer recess in an attempt to reach an accommodation that would allow everyone to feel comfortable about how we are treating theater missile defense .

Mr. President, I want to speak because I believe that we have only settled this issue in a very temporary way this year. But I want to say that it is very important for us to look at this for the future because this is going to be one of the major poli cy decisions that we are going to have to make, not only today but for the future. I think the Senator from Georgia was correct when he said that we may have to make some adjustments in the ABM Treaty. It may well be not only in our best interest to do so , but it may be in the best interest of Russia as well.

We are continuing to make adjustments in the post-cold war era. We do not live in a bipolar world anymore. We now live in a multipolar world, but we have treaties that were based on the bipolar world. We have many other concerns that were addressed in a bipolar context. We know now that technology exists for ballistic missiles in more than 10 countries around the world.

No longer is the threat just from the missiles that we know are in Russia and some of the former republics of the Soviet Union that are now independent countries. We now recognize that there are capabilities in many other nations around the wor ld and that in the future the technology will likely proliferate to such an extent that many countries may soon have the capability of launching ballistic missiles that could threaten our Nation.

So it is incumbent on us as leaders of our country to prepare, and we must have the time to do that and we must start looking at some of these policy issues that must be addressed in this new multipolar world.

As many of us who have traveled into some of the central European countries and into the republics of the former Soviet Union know, this is an unstable world.

We are seeing ethnic conflicts. We are seeing border disputes. We are seeing turf wars. I think the United States is going to have to step back and decide, what our role should be in this new world? When are our armed forces going to be needed? When do we have a U.S. interest and when is that interest a vital U.S. security interest?

I think it is clear just from what has happened in the last 2 weeks that the world is looking to America for leadership. If there is one thing America is--and it is probably the consensus in the world--we are the beacon for a democracy that has worked and that has created the strongest Nation in the history of the world. Because of that, many countries are looking to us for leadership, and we must determine how much leadership we can give, how much is monetary, and how much is security oriented. And I think that is going to have to set the stage for how we prepare to be the world's superpower and yet maintain our strength and protect our shores.

The greatest lesson of all is that the cold war was ended; we obtained that peace through strength. We did not end the cold war through weakness. Other countries in the world knew that we had the capacity and the commitment to protect our interests. We must never veer from that fundamental principle that we are a superpower that will protect ourselves. We must not allow unilateral disarmament of any kind, of any type.

When you talk about a treaty that was made in a bipolar world between the two preeminent powers at the time you cannot have any confidence that those who wrote that treaty could envision all of the things that could happen in the world today. No treaty at that time could ever envision the technologies available to many countries today that have rendered the treaty outdated, outmoded, and no longer a strong approach for us to take. So we are going to have to look at our strategic interests, and in doing that we are going to have to determine what we must do as the leaders of our country to make sure we will have appropriate defenses against any missile that could ever come into our borders.

That is something we are going to have to debate this year, and we are going to have to continue our vigilance to make sure our young people know they can be assured of the strength of our country and that we have the foresight and the vision to mainta in that strength.

I am going to support the compromise that has been reached, but I do have reservations that we are not as a group looking to what we must do to make sure we have the strength to withstand any kind of attack that technology has the capability to deliver to our shores. And I think we are going to have to continue our debates, continue our studies, continue our technological advances, and under no circumstances at any time should we say we are not going to defend our shores, that we are not going to make sure that our nuclear stockpile, which is dormant, is nevertheless still capable. Unilateral disarmament is not anything we can consider in any manner if we are going to remain the greatest and only superpower left in the world.

So I commend my colleagues for coming to this conclusion. But it is merely the beginning of a very important policy debate that I think is going to be more important as we learn more of the technologies and the intelligence about what is happening arou nd the world in the area of defense and security.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. After the debate is concluded on this matter, then we will have a wrap-up tonight. I have asked Senator Warner if he would conduct the wrap-up on this side. He has agreed to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Michigan has some concluding remarks and I would yield him such time as he may desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Georgia.

Mr. President, I will be very brief, indeed.

Section 232 of Title X, which is the current law, reads as follows: that the goal of the United States is `to develop and maintain the option to deploy an antiballistic missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles .'

So the current law is to develop the option to deploy, but to decide at a future time whether or not to deploy, depending on the circumstances at that time, including the threats at the time, and the cost and military effectiveness of such a system. The b ill says deploy. The current law says develop with an option to deploy. The bill says deploy.

The substitute amendment goes back to the fundamental approach of the existing law, which is to develop so that we can deploy, but then makes it very clear that we will make the decision on whether to deploy at a future date and specifies what the crit eria are for consideration at the time of that decision.

Section 233 of our bill says that it is the policy of the United States, in subsection 3, to `ensure congressional review prior to a decision to deploy the system developed for deployment, under paragraph 2', of four things: the affordability and opera tional effectiveness of such a system, the threat to be countered by such a system, and fourth, ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.

In doing this, this substitute recognizes the importance of the ABM Treaty to our security. The ABM Treaty has been one of the reasons we have been able to reduce the number of offensive nuclear weapons that face us.

We are going to be facing a small percentage of the nuclear weapons that used to confront us because, the Russians have told us over and over again, we have adhered to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That has allowed them to agree to these v ery drastic reductions in the numbers of their offensive weapons. And so we are on the threshold of seeing continuing significant reduction in offensive weapons that we face, or that we could theoretically face, no longer from an adversary but now from so meone with whom we are having a growing and a deepening partnership.

It is not just the current law that we should develop technology for a national missile defense --that is the law I read--it is also the policy of this administration to develop that technology in a way that we could deploy it in time to counter any ballistic missile threat that emerges to the United States. So we have a law that says develop and we have a current policy that says develop. But both by current law and current policy the decision whether to deploy is left for a future time .

That is the approach which this substitute restores; develop, but leave the decision to deploy for a future time based on criteria which will be considered at that time to help us make a decision which makes sense for the security of this Nation.

So the road to reductions is dependent in part on the existence of an ABM Treaty. That treaty still continues to serve our national interest. This substitute in a number of ways explicitly and otherwise recognizes the importance of that treaty to this relationship and to the continuing reductions in the number of offensive weapons.

So I do hope that our colleagues will find favor with this substitute and will support this substitute. Again, I want to thank all the colleagues who participated in the formulation of it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

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Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. If I could ask for a minute.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as the able Senator from Virginia shall require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the concluding remarks by our colleague from Michigan, I think, set the tone when he seeks to reassure the Senate that this legislation is in the best interest of our Nation and that he is hopeful that we will gain the suppor t of other Senators, because no single Senator fought harder for certain changes in this amendment than did the Senator from Michigan. And I think we conclude debate on a very positive note.

With that statement, I yield the floor.

MR.KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia, but I continue to have strong reservations about the remaining aspects of the Missile Defense Act . The amendment makes an unwise provision better, an d I commend Senators Nunn, Levin, Warner, and Cohen for their effective work in achieving this compromise. It fails, however, to do what is necessary to serve the best interests of our na tional security.

The remaining shortcomings in the Missile Defense Act become clear when we consider the principal threats that the United States faces from nuclear missile attack, and the more effective way these threats are addressed by current admini stration policy, which is also longstanding bipartisan policy under both Republican and Democratic administrations.

One of the threats we face is clearly from nations which now lack ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, but which may develop them in the near future. Proponents of building a national missile defense argue that the prospe ct of such a threat is sufficient grounds for deploying a defensive system as soon as possible.

The weakness in this argument, however, is revealed in the undisputed testimony of Lt. Gen. James Clapper before the Armed Services Committee last January. General Clapper at that time was the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He stated that:

We see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the continental United States with a long range missile for at least the next decade.

The missile threat from a new nuclear power is neither real nor imminent, and it will not materialize for at least ten years. The Defense Department's missile defense plan calls for a research and development program that will e nable us to build and deploy a national defense rapidly if unforeseen threats materialize. The Clinton defense plan will keep us safe from ballistic missile threats from new nuclear powers.

A more serious threat comes from existing nuclear arsenals of potential adversaries. There is a very low likelihood in the current world situation that we will be subject to nuclear attack from Russia or China. But such a possibility is the most seriou s potential threat to the security of the United States, and therefore merits careful consideration.

Russia, and to a lesser extent China, possess nuclear arsenals that threaten the security of the United States. This fact is nothing new. The arsenal controlled by Moscow has posed this threat to our Nation for roughly 40 years. Yet, we were able to en sure the security of the United States over this period, in spite of the tensions and conflicting interests of the cold war. We did so by maintaining a nuclear arsenal that could deter the use of nuclear weapons against us by any adversary. Mutual deterre nce guaranteed our security from nuclear attack throughout the nuclear age, and it is still our best guarantee.

Now, in the post-cold-war era, the stability and effectiveness of this deterrent relationship is even greater than it was during the cold war, and it is just as important. Russia is no longer our adversary, and therefore the likelihood of conflict betw een us has greatly diminished. We have signed the START I and START II Treaties which, if implemented, will create stable deterrence at reduced levels of nuclear weapons.

In his famous phrase, President Reagan called on us to trust but verify. Now, the increased trust between our nations has magnified our ability to verify. The START Treaties provide for verification with extensive and effective monitoring that was not possible during the cold war. As the political and military leaders of Russia confirm, the deterrent relationship that has long existed remains the centerpiece of nuclear safety for our two nations. And we can achieve even greater safeguards in the future by maintaining that cooperative relationship. It makes no sense to take unilateral actions that would jeopardize that relationship, as the missile defense advocates would do.

Mutual deterrence is the foundation of the United States-Russian strategic relationship, and the ABM Treaty is the basis for mutual deterrence. For over two decades, the ABM Treaty has insured that the superpowers' nuclear arsenals continue to be effec tive as deterrents, which is the necessary condition for strategic stability. The Russians themselves have reaffirmed the importance of this longstanding treaty to cooperation in arms reduction.

The proponents of the Missile Defense Act place too little value on the improved strategic relationship between the United States and Russia, and the essential role of the ABM Treaty as the heart of that relationship. Deploying a multisite m issile defense would violate the ABM Treaty as it currently stands.

The Russians have clearly stated that they will not ratify START II if the United States violates or withdraws from the ABM Treaty. In my view, the United States is safer facing a Russian arsenal of 3,000 weapons under START II, than if we possess seve ral hundred ABM interceptors while facing the present Russian arsenal of 10,000 weapons.

Deploying a national missile defense system will also impair the cooperative threat reduction programs, under which Russia is accepting United States funds to help dismantle their nuclear weapons.

In addition, withdrawing from the ABM Treaty may also cause the Russians to put their nuclear arsenal on a higher state of alert, increasing the risk of accidental launch against the United States.

The course set by this bill may also lead the Russians to reverse the negotiated step, achieved in 1994, whereby we agreed not to target each other's territory with the missiles deployed in silos and on submarines. If the Russians retarget thei r missiles , the threat of catastrophic damage to the United States from accidental or unauthorized attack will clearly rise.

The proponents of the Missile Defense Act ignore all of these considerations. They are proposing a more dangerous course for our national security which Congress should not follow.

The Nunn/Levin/Warner/Cohen amendment will improve the bill compared to its present terms, and I urge adoption of the amendment. But I also urge my colleagues to support the administra tion's more sensible course on the development of missile defenses . President Clinton's policy is designed to explore the new avenues of nuclear safety opened to us by the end of the cold war, without sacrificing the solid foundation of our securi ty--the mutual deterrence established and supported by Democratic and Republican administrations alike over the past four decades.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

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Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not know if anyone is going to want to speak any more on this one on either side. I do not have any more requests on the Democratic side.

Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan know of anyone else who would like to speak on this?

Mr. LEVIN. No.

Mr. NUNN. As I understand the time agreement, we will have the vote on this at 9:30 tomorrow morning.

Does the Senator from South Carolina know when we will be coming in on the bill? Should we reserve any time in case anyone wants to speak in the morning?

Mr. THURMOND. We will be coming in at 9:25 in the morning, and we will get on the bill by 9:30.

Mr. NUNN. Then we will vote at 9:30.

Mr. THURMOND. We are supposed to vote at 9:30.

I am prepared to yield back my time, Mr. President.

Mr. NUNN. I think, just in case there is a minute or two someone wants to speak in the morning, we ought to probably reserve 2 minutes on each side and give back the remainder of the time. That would give us a chance if somebody else wants a minute to be heard.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are agreeable to that.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would yield back all of my time except 2 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. The same here.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time is yielded back with the exception of 2 minutes on each side.

Mr. NUNN. I know the Senator from South Carolina would like us to handle several amendments that have been agreed to before we conclude the debate on this Missile Defense Act of 1995 substitute. And, again, I want to thank my friend fro m Michigan, who did a superb job, and my friend from Virginia and my friend from Maine, who did, I think, a very good job in terms of negotiating what is a consensus, I think a positive step forward, as the Senator from Virginia said, for our Nation.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my colleague with respect to all the efforts that were made. Indeed, it was a monumental task. I think the result will be accepted strongly by the Senate tomorrow.

Mr. President, I wonder, if I can have the attention of the distinguished chairman and the ranking member of the committee, if I could bring up another point. That is, Mr. Chairman, I think it is imperative that the Senate receive a briefing from the a dministration on the situation as it exists in Bosnia today.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have already made the request.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished chairman, because I have written a memorandum to the chairman. It would not be on his desk until tomorrow morning.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have 5 minutes each in the morning. I have a closing statement I would like to make in the morning just before we vote on this bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, all time will be yielded back with the exception of 5 minutes on each side.

Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent that--I understand I probably would make that after the bill passes, and so just as to say 2 minutes to each side before that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, could I inquire of the Chair as to the time agreement now?

I understand that we have the Missile Defense Act to be voted on at 9:30.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. NUNN. Could the Chair inform the Senate of what takes place after that amendment has been voted on and disposed of? It is my understanding we have several other possible amendments, including an amendment by the Senator from South Carolina that is relevant and an amendment by the Senator from Georgia, myself, that is relevant, as well as a Levin amendment which may or may not be required to be voted on. We will have time for remarks before final passage of the bill. I believe that is what the Senat or from South Carolina has made reference to.

I do not believe the Senator is going to need more time for speaking on this amendment which we vote on at 9:30. I think we will have other time on the bill before that is concluded.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator would yield for a comment. We believe we worked out the Levin amendment which you referred to, and that it will not require a rollcall vote. We have not agreed yet on the final language, but we have agreed on the principle of an amendment. So we do not expect a rollcall will be necessary on the Levin amendment.

Mr. NUNN. We will have other amendments that have to be accepted tomorrow morning. We have not worked them out. We will not be able to conclude all of those. We are going to have to have some time--I hope it will not be a lot of time--after the passage of this Missile Defense Act , assuming it passes, before we vote on final passage.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection to that.

I hope we can wrap everything up tonight as much as possible and have as few things to do tomorrow before we vote.

Mr. NUNN. I believe we are prepared to have some of the amendments that have been agreed to now propounded to the Senate.