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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
(Senate - August 11, 1995)

[page S12330]

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Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, at the request of the Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Cohen, Levin, Warner, and I have been meeting intensively for the past several days to address issues raised by the proposed Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth in S. 1026, the pending national defense authorization bill. The goal of our effort was to develop an amendment establishing a missile defense policy that could be supported by a broad bipartisan group of Senators. Today, we have filed a bipartisan substitute amendment reflecting our best efforts to meet that objective.

I want to begin by expressing my thanks to my three colleagues for the diligence, tolerance, and goodwill each of them showed throughout the long and, at times, difficult negotiations that have led to the agreement embodied in the substitute amendment. I believe the amendment is a significant improvement to the version in the bill, and I support its adoption.

The bill as reported set forth a proposed policy for future national missile defenses. It also proposed a demarcation between theater and anti-ballistic missile defenses. In my judgment, however, and that of many other Senators, the proposal addressed the se vital issues in a manner that unnecessarily presented major difficulties in terms of arms control and constitutional considerations.

Mr. President, I support the development of national missile defense. I have supported a missile defense system against limited, accidental, or unauthorized attacks since the early 1980's when I called for a development of ALPs--an accidental launch prote ction system. I will support the deployment of a system to defend against limited, accidental, or unauthorized missile attacks, assuming that the system meets the deployment decision criteria set forth in this amendment--it must be affordable and operatio nally effective; an appropriate response to the threat, and we must weigh carefully any ABM Treaty considerations that could affect a deployment decision.

The revised version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth in the bipartisan substitute amendment, addresses these issues in a manner that serves three important functions:

First, it clarifies the intent of the United States with respect to decisions about future missile defenses;

Second, it defuses a potential constitutional contest between the Executive and Legislative branches; and

Third, it makes clear to the international community our policy toward the ABM Treaty.

Let me try to highlight these accomplishments by comparing what was in the bill as reported and what the bipartisan substitute amendment would provide, if adopted. Section 233 of the bill as reported would set forth a policy to `deploy' a multi-site natio nal missile defense system. The same section of the bill as reported also stated that the system, `will be augmented. . .to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated [missile] attacks.' This phrasing confused the stated objective--to have an effective defense against accidental, unauthorized, or limited attacks--with the concept of a thicker missile defense system to defend against larger attacks. It is important to keep the system focused on the appropriate objective--defending agai nst limited, accidental, or unauthorized attacks.

The substitute version of section 233 in the bipartisan amendment makes the following changes:

The policy is no longer stated as a binding commitment to deploy a national missile defense system. That is a decision that will be made in the future. Instead, the national missile defense policy in section 233(2) of the bipartisan substitute amendment i s to `develop for deployment'.

The substitute adds several important qualifiers, such as:

The system must be `affordable and operationally effective'. This requirement appears in section 233(2) and is reemphasized throughout the amendment.

The system is limited to addressing only `accidental, unauthorized, or limited attacks'. That qualification, which is set forth in section 233(2), is repeated throughout the amendment.

There is no commitment to deploy an augmented system. It depends on the threat.

Under section 233(2) of the substitute, any development of an `augmented' system will also be confined to augmenting a defense capability to address `limited, unauthorized, or accidental' missile attacks.

One of the most important qualifications under the substitute is the requirement in section 233(3) for `congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy the system developed for deployment . . . of: (a) the affordability and operational effectiveness o f such a system; (b) the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.' These vital issues will all be considered before we take any step in the future to authorize and appropriate funds for the deployment of a national missile defense system.

Section 235(e)(2) of the bipartisan substitute amendment specially requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an assessment as to whether deployment is affordable and operationally effective'; and

Perhaps the most important qualification, both in terms of arms control and the separation of powers is section 233(8), which requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of the entire Missile Defense Act `throug h processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.'

The revised version also contains language taken from the Cohen amendment which was approved by a 69-26 vote last week, and which is largely incorporated into the substitute amendment in sections 233(2) and 237. Collectively, the Cohen provisions encourag e the President to undertake negotiations with the Russian Federation to provide modifications or amendments to allow us to deploy a multisite national missile defense in compliance with the Treaty, and, if the negotiations are not successful, they call f or consultations with the Congress to review our options, including our legal right to withdraw.

Section 235(a) of the bill as reported required achievement of an initial operational capability (IOC) for a multisite national missile defense system in 2003. The substitute provision in the bipartisan amendment calls for development on a timetable that would make it, `capable of attaining' such an IOC, if there is a decision to deploy such a system.

Finally, Mr. President, let me address the theater missile demarcation provisions briefly. Section 238 of the bill as reported would have established in permanent law a specific demarcation between theater and strategic missile defenses, and would have pr ohibited the President from negotiations or other actions concerning the clarification or interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the line between theater and strategic missile defenses. The bipartisan substitute amendment strikes all of section 238, and provides a limited funding restriction in section 238(c), with the following provisions:

The funding restriction that applies only for fiscal year 1996;

This substitute restriction applies only to the implementation of an agreement with the successor states to the Soviet Union, should one be reached, concerning:

A demarcation between theater and strategic defenses for the purposes of the ABM Treaty; and

Additional restrictions on theater missile defense systems going beyond those in the demarcation.

In addition, to being limited to one year, the substitute funding limitation in section 238(c) has three exceptions. The limitation does not apply:

`To the extent provided' in a subsequent Act;

To `implement that portion of any such agreement that implements' the specific terms of the demarcation set forth in the amendment; and

To `implement an agreement that is entered into pursuant to the Treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution.'

Mr. President, there are many other changes for the better in the bipartisan substitute amendment. I ask unanimous consent that a line-in-line-out version of the amendment, comparing the amendment to the bill as reported, be printed in the Record. I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment provides a useful statement of Congressional policy and intent, presented in a framework that makes clear that we seek a negotiated set of changes with the Russian Federation to allow for more effective defens es against limited missile attacks than either side is permitted today. I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment is not, and should not be seen by Russia as a threat by the United States either to abandon the ABM Treaty or to reinterpret the Treaty unilaterally to our advantage. Both we and Russia face a threat of ballistic missile attacks; the threats may differ somewhat, but the need for defenses should be clear to both sides. What we have to do is to arrange for both sides to be able to de ploy more effective defenses than exist today, against accidental, unauthorized and limited strikes, while maintaining overall strategic stability.