National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996
for Fiscal Year 1996
Senate Missile Defense Act of 1995
Sec. 231. Short title.
Sec. 232. Findings.
Sec. 233. Missile defense policy.
Sec. 234. Theater missile defense architecture.
Sec. 235. National missile defense system architecture.
Sec. 236. Cruise missile defense initiative.
Sec. 237. Policy regarding the ABM Treaty.
Sec. 238. Standard for assessing compliance with the ABM Treaty.
Sec. 239. Ballistic Missile Defense program elements.
Sec. 240. ABM Treaty defined.
Sec. 241. Repeal of missile defense provisions.
SUBTITLE C--MISSILE DEFENSE
SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the `Missile Defense Act of 1995'.
SEC. 232. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:(1) The threat that is posed to the national security of the United States by the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles is significant and growing, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
(2) The deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems will deny potential adversaries the option of escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United States forces, coalition partners of the United States, or allies of the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to offset the operational and technical advantages of the United States and its coalition partners and allies.
(3) The intelligence community of the United States has confirmed that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile threat to the continental United States is not forecast within the next 10 years there are ways for determined countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future and with little warning by means other than indigenous development.
(4) The deployment by the United States and its allies of effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges, as well as against cruise missiles, will reduce the incentives for countries to acquire such missiles or to augment existing missile capabilities.
(5) The Cold War distinction between strategic ballistic missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles and, therefore, the ABM Treaty's distinction between strategic defense and nonstrategic defense, is technologically and geostrategically outdated.
(6) The concept of mutual assured destruction, which provides the philosophical rationale for the ABM Treaty and continued reliance on an offense-only form of deterrence, is adversarial and bipolar in nature and is not a suitable basis for stability in a multipolar world and one in which the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
(7) By undermining the credibility of, and incentives to pursue, destabilizing first-strike strategies, theater and national missile defenses can contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability as missile threats proliferate and as the United States and the former Soviet Union significantly reduce the number of strategic nuclear forces in their respective inventories.
(8) Although technology control regimes and other forms of international arms control can contribute to nonproliferation, such measures are inadequate for dealing with missile proliferation, and should not be viewed as alternatives to missile defenses and other active and passive defenses.
(9) Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at a single site, the United States is currently prohibited from deploying a national missile defense system capable of defending the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--(1) deploy as soon as possible highly effective theater missile defenses capable of countering existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
(2) deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system that (A) is highly effective against limited ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and (B) will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats;
(3) improve existing cruise missile defenses and deploy as soon as practical defenses that are highly effective against advanced cruise missiles;
(4) pursue a focused research and development program to provide follow-on ballistic missile defense options;
(5) employ streamlined acquisition procedures to lower the cost and accelerate the pace of developing and deploying theater missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, and national missile defenses; and
(6) seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature mutual assured destruction and an offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.
SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Establishment of Core Program: To implement the policy established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a top priority core theater missile defense program consisting of the following systems:
- The Patriot PAC-3 system, which shall have a first unit equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 1998.
- The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system, which shall have a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 1999.
- The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which shall have a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational capability (IOC) no later than fiscal year 2002.
- The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system, which shall have a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal year 1999 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2001.
(c) Termination of Programs: The Secretary of Defense shall terminate the following programs:
- The Corps Surface to Air Missile system (Corps SAM).
- The Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI).
- The Secretary of Defense shall develop an affordable development plan for follow-on theater missile defense systems which leverages existing systems, technologies, and programs, and focuses investments to satisfy military requirements not met by the core program.
- Before adding new theater missile defense systems to the core
program from among the follow-on activities, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report describing--
- (A) the requirements for the program;
- (B) how the new program will relate to, support, and leverage off existing core programs;
- (C) the planned acquisition strategy; and
- (D) a preliminary estimate of total program cost and budgetary impact.
SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.
(a) In General: To implement the policy established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system, which will attain initial operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2003. The national missile defense system to be developed for deployment shall include the following:
- Ground-based interceptors deployed at multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against limited ballistic missile attacks.
- Fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile Tracking system, the mix, siting and numbers of which are to be determined so as to optimize sensor support and minimize total system cost.
- Battle management, command, control, and communications (BM/C3).
(b) Interim Operational Capability: To provide a hedge against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats against the United States and to support the development and deployment of the objective system specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop an interim national missile defense capability, consistent with the technical requirements and schedule of such objective system, to be operational by the end of 1999. In developing this capability the Secretary shall make use of--
- developmental, or user operational evaluation system (UOES) interceptors, radars, and battle management, command, control, and communications (BM/C3), to the extent that such use directly supports, and does not significantly increase the cost of, the objective system specified in subsection (a);
- one or more of the sites that will be used as deployment locations for the objective system specified in subsection (a);
- upgraded early warning radars; and
- space-based sensors.
- reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of developing the national missile defense system specified in subsection (a); and
- ensure that the interim national missile defense capabilities developed pursuant to subsection (b) are operationally effective and on a path to fulfill the technical requirements and schedule of the objective system.
(d) Additional Cost Saving Measures: In addition to the procedures prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense shall employ cost saving measures that do not decrease the operational effectiveness of the systems specified in subsections (a) and (b), and which do not pose unacceptable technical risk. The cost saving measures should include the following:
- The use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
- The use, where appropriate, of existing or upgraded systems and technologies.
- Development of systems and components that do not rely on a large and permanent infrastructure and are easily transported, emplaced, and moved.
- The Secretary's plan for carrying out this section.
- An analysis of options for supplementing or modifying the
national missile defense architecture specified in subsection
(a) before attaining initial operational capability, or
evolving such architecture in a building block manner after
attaining initial operational capability, to improve the
cost-effectiveness or the operational effectiveness of such
system by adding one or a combination of the following:
- (A) Additional ground-based interceptors at existing or new sites.
- (B) Sea-based missile defense systems.
- (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
- (D) Space-based directed energy systems.
SEC. 236. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
(a) In General: The Secretary of Defense shall undertake an initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile defense programs, projects, and activities of the military departments, the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to ensure that the United States develops and deploys highly effective defenses against existing and future cruise missile threats.(b) Actions of the Secretary of Defense: In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
- to the extent practicable, the ballistic missile defense and cruise missile defense efforts of the Department of Defense are coordinated and mutually reinforcing;
- existing air defense systems are adequately upgraded to defend against existing and near-term cruise missile threats; and
- the Department of Defense undertakes a high priority and well coordinated technology development program to support the future deployment of systems that are highly effective against advanced cruise missiles, including cruise missiles with low observable features.
- the systems that currently have cruise missile defense capabilities, and existing programs to improve these capabilities;
- the technologies that could be deployed in the near- to mid-term to provide significant advances over existing cruise missile defense capabilities, and the investments that would be required to ready the technologies for deployment;
- the cost and operational tradeoffs, if any, between upgrading existing air and missile defense systems and accelerating follow-on systems with significantly improved capabilities against advanced cruise missiles; and
- the organizational and management changes that would strengthen and further coordinate the cruise missile defense efforts of the Department of Defense, including the disadvantages, if any, of implementing such changes.
SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Sense of Congress: In light of the findings and policies provided in this subtitle, it is the sense of Congress that--- the Senate should--
- (A) undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty with the intent of providing additional policy guidance on the future of the ABM Treaty during the second session of the 104th Congress; and
- (B) consider establishing a select committee to carry out the review and to recommend such additional policy guidance on future application of the ABM Treaty as the select committee considers appropriate; and
- the President should cease all efforts to modify, clarify, or otherwise alter United States obligations under the ABM Treaty pending the outcome of the review.
- To support the comprehensive review specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other appropriate officials of the executive branch, shall provide the Senate with a complete, declassified version of the ABM Treaty negot
iating record, including--
- (A) within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, an index of the documents comprising the negotiating record; and
- (B) within 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the documents comprising the negotiating record in unclassified form.
- If the Secretary considers it necessary to do so, the Secretary may submit the documents referred to in paragraph (1)(B) in classified form when due under that paragraph. If the Secretary does so, however, the Secretary shall submit the documents in unclassified form within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 238. STANDARD FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Policy Concerning Systems Subject to ABM Treaty: Unless and until a missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that exploits data from space-based or other external sensors (such as the Space and Missile Tracking System, which can be deployed as an ABM adjunct, or the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability), is flight tested in an ABM-qualifying flight test (as defined in subsection (c)), such system, system upgrade, or system component--
- has not, for purposes of the ABM Treaty, been tested in an ABM mode nor been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles; and
- therefore is not subject to any application, limitation, or obligation under the ABM Treaty.
- Appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official of the Federal Government for the purpose of--
- (A) prescribing, enforcing, or implementing any Executive order, regulation, or policy that would apply the ABM Treaty (or any limitation or obligation under such Treaty) to research, development, testing, or deployment of a missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that exploits data from space-based or other external sensors; or
- (B) taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty (or any limitation or obligation under such treaty) to be applied to research, development, testing, or deployment of a missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that exploits data from space-based or other external sensors.
- This subsection shall cease to apply with respect to a missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that exploits data from space-based or other external sensors, when that system, system upgrade, or system component has been flight tested in an ABM-qualifying flight test.
- a range of 3,500 kilometers, or
- a velocity of 5 kilometers per second.
(e) Congressional Review of Range and Velocity Parameters: Congress finds that the range and velocity parameters set forth in subsection (c) are based on a distinction between strategic and nonstrategic ballistic missiles that is technically and geostrategically outdated, and, therefore, should be subject to review and change as part of the Senate's comprehensive review under section 237.
SEC. 239. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS.
(a) Elements Specified: In the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department of Defense budget for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996 (as submitted in the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code), the amount requested for activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization shall be set forth in accordance with the following program elements:
- The Patriot system.
- The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system.
- The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
- The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system.
- Other Theater Missile Defense Activities.
- National Missile Defense.
- Follow-On and Support Technologies.
(c) Treatment of Core Theater Missile Defense Programs: Funding for core theater missile defense programs specified in section 234, shall be covered in individual, dedicated program elements and shall be available only for activities covered by those program elements.
(d) BM/C3I Programs: Funding for programs, projects, and activities involving battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) shall be covered in the `Other Theater Missile Defense Activities' program element or the `National Missile Defense' program element, as determined on the basis of the primary objectives involved.
(e) Management and Support: Each program element shall include requests for the amounts necessary for the management and support of the programs, projects, and activities contained in that program element.
SEC. 240. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term `ABM Treaty' means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974.
SEC. 241. REPEAL OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROVISIONS.
The following provisions of law are repealed:
- The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part C of title II of Public Law 102-190; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
- Section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
- Section 222 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 613; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 225 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 614).
- Section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180; 101 Stat. 1057; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 8123 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-463; 102 Stat. 2270-40).
- Section 8133 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1992 (Public Law 102-172; 105 Stat. 1211).
- Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1595; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2701; 10 U.S.C. 221 note).
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