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The CHAIRMAN. The bill will be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule for a period not to exceed 10 hours.

During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition to a Member who has caused an amendment to be printed in the designated place in the Congressional Record. Those amendments will be considered as having been read.

The time for the 10-hour debate is beginning at 4:50 p.m., and we will keep track of that.

Are there any amendments to the bill?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SPENCE

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, No. 39, printed in the Congressional Record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Spence: At the end of title II (page 12, after line 25), add the following new section.

(a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and its allies face existing and expanding threats from ballistic missiles capable of being used as theater weapon systems that are presently possessed by, being developed by, or being acquired by a number of countries, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.

(2) Some theater ballistic missiles that are currently deployed or are being developed (such as the Chinese CSS-2 missile and the North Korean Taepo Dong-2 missile) have capabilities equal to or greater than the capabilities of missiles that were determined to be strategic missiles more than 20 years ago under the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement I (SALT I) Interim Agreement of 1972 entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(3) The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not intended to, and does not, apply to or limit research, development, testing or deployment of missile defense systems, system upgrades, or system components that are designed to counter modern theater ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of such missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system components are tested against or have demonstrated capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.

(4) It is a national security priority of the United States to develop and deploy highly effective theater missile defense systems capable of countering the existing and expanding threats posed by modern theater ballistic missiles at the earliest practical date.

(5) Current United States proposal in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) would multilateralize the ABM Treaty, making future amendments or changes to the Treaty more difficult, and would impose specific design limitations on United States theater missile defense (TMD) systems that would significantly compromise the United States TMD capability.

(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that further formal negotiations in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and any informal discussions or negotiations on either the demarcation between theater missile defense (TMD) systems and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, or any other effort that bears on the viability of the ABM Treaty, including multilateralization of the treaty, should be suspended until the One Hundred Fourth Congress has had the opportunity to review those matters.

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One of the highest priority defense capabilities currently under development by the Department of Defense is theater missile defense. The U.S. theater missile defense systems are designed to defend our U.S. military forces deployed overseas, along with friendly forces and allies, from ballistic missile attack.

The threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is expanding. Several countries, including North Korea, are developing missiles of increasing range and accuracy. Others, such as Iran, have purchased missiles and production technology from North Korea. Such proliferation underscores the importance of fielding, at the earliest practical date, advanced TMD systems, as advocated in title II of this bill.

Unfortunately, our ability to field high-effective TMD systems is in jeopardy. Specifically, under the guise of `clarifying' the terms of the 1972 anti-ballistic treaty, this administration has proposed in talks with Russia and others to impose specific design limitations on two theater missile defense systems that will significantly compromise our United States capability.

They have also proposed to multilateralize the ABM Treaty, making future amendments or changes to the treaty, such as those to deploy an effective missile defense of our country, more difficult.

Based on these concerns, I cosigned a letter to President Clinton on January 4, along with the entire House Republican leadership, suggesting that further negotiations be suspended until the new Congress had an opportunity to examine those issues in detail. Unfortunately, the President's reply rejected our suggestion and stated his intention to continue negotiating such an agreement.

I would note that, according to a February 13, 1995, Washington Times article, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch also has grave misgivings about the current U.S. negotiating approach, as does our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili. According to the Times, Mr. Deutch in a February 6 memorandum, affirmed that countering missile proliferation was `an urgent defense requirement.' But he also suggested that in light of Russian intransigence in these negotiations, we should `shift our proposal to a more principled demarkation position.' I strongly agree with Secretary Deutch's alleged statements.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to more explicitly communicate our deep concerns about the administration's position in these negotiations and the adverse impact they would have on our missile defense programs.

My amendment does just that. Specifically, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that further formal negotiations in the standing consultative commission and any informal discussions or negotiations on either the demarkation between the theater missile defense systems and ABM systems or any other effort that bears on the viability of the ABM Treaty, including multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, should be suspended until the 104th Congress has had the opportunity to review those matters. It is a statement of principle and not binding language. Nevertheless, my hope is that the President will listen more carefully this time.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by our committee chairman.

This is a sense-of-the-Congress amendment so it is not binding, but it is a very important one because it gets at the heart of what is now going on between our administration and Russia in terms of the ABM Treaty.

As our chairman pointed out, both the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memo that I will include for the Record, as well as the comments by General Shalikashvili that we are concerned about the administration policymakers not adopting treaty changes which would prohibit the Defense Debarment from deploying new theater defense systems that meet U.S. requirements.

What is important for our colleagues on the minority side is that one of their basic contentions is that theater missile defense is of the highest priority.

Now, your Deputy Secretary of Defense, or, I should say, ours and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are both raising a red flag saying, let us not let those negotiators move too fast. So this is an extremely important amendment.

I want to get at the heart of why I think it is so important. My first amendment on the floor of this House in 1987, when many of the more liberal Members of our Congress were saying that we should adhere to the strictest possible interpretation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment that acknowledged that the Kransnowarsk radar system in Siberia was in fact a direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Guess what we have found out, Mr. Chairman, after in fact the Russian military leaders have retired and reported what there intent was with that radar?

In a recent article in the Russian military historical journal, written by retired General Votintsev, who said the ABM and space defense troops of the National Air Defense Forces, from 1967 until 1985, he states that it was clearly the Soviet Union's intent to break out and violate the ABM Treaty.

Many of the more liberal Members in this body, during that debate, were saying, oh, this is wrong. It is just an accident. It is just being used for radar. It is not being used for defensive operations. In fact, here is the general, who was in charge of that system at the time, not publicly stating what we said on this House floor.

He said, furthermore, that he was ordered to do this by the Chief of Staff, Marshall Ogarkov and was told that if he did not locate this radar in Krasnowarsk that General Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, directed that anyone who continued to object would be removed of his duties.

Mr. Chairman, all of us want to work with the Russians. I cochair the Russian Energy Caucus. I am working with them on their nuclear waste problem.

But as Ronald Reagan said, we must trust but verify.

[TIME: 1700]

What we are saying is that should be the hallmark of our negotiations with the Russians now. We should not let our negotiators bargain away the ability for us to develop a continued theater defense system which the minority side feels so strongly about. This amendment protects that. I applaud my chairman for the amendment, and I would be happy to support it.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his hard work and leadership on this issue.

I think it is important for Members to realize what we are doing here. The administration, according to our own senior military officials, is trying to negotiate into the ABM Treaty, which is between the United States and the Soviet Union, some limitations on our ability to put out systems that will defend our troops, like those that were in Iran or in Iraq, against incoming theater ballistic missiles.

There are two parties to the ABM Treaty, us and the Soviet Union, yet there are countries like Libya, North Korea, China, and others that are developing theater ballistic missiles that could be targeted on our troops. They are not signatories to the ABM agreement and they do not care what kind of restrictions we must put on. In fact, they would like us to put restrictions on our defensive systems.

What the gentleman is talking about, Mr. Chairman, is a total curtailment of theater ballistic missile defense systems that Democrats and Republicans agree are very, very important to the survivability of our troops. That means that when we have a troop concentration, whether it is Marines or Army units in the Middle East, in Europe, in Southeast Asia, and we need to put a footprint, a defensive footprint around them, whether it is the THAAD system or a Patriot system, upgraded Patriot, or the Navy lower tier system, all those systems are little theater missile defense systems that can shoot down incoming missiles. When we try to put those up, we are now going to be facing limitations.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] has expired.

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The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to figure out exactly what this amendment does. We are kind of worried, when the gentleman is taking a lot of time here, and we really do not have a chance to do that.

Mr. HUNTER. I will be happy to strike the requisite number of words on my own.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I appreciate very much the gentleman doing that.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my unanimous-consent request.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record these articles and this information.

The information referred to is as follows:

Washington, DC, February 7, 1995.

Memorandum for: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Director, Ballistic Missile Defense; Senior Deputy General Counsel, International Affairs and Intelligence.

Subject: BMD program logic.

Here is a revised outline based on your inputs and pulled together by Ash Carter. As always, your suggestions have been helpful.

Attachment.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

I. BMD Program is determined by:

• A. The threat--present and anticipated.

• B. Technical and Program Options.

• C. Cost and affordability--more resources for BMD means some other modernization opportunities must be forgone.

• D. ABM (and other) treaty implications.

II. The Threat

1. Russian ICBM and SLBM threat.

2. China--CSS4.

3. No Rest of World (ROW) BM threat to CONUS expected before 2005 at the earliest. (Clapper testimony)

4. Vulnerability to surreptitiously delivered or air-delivered nuclear device.

B. Future threat against CONUS

1. Russia and China.

2. ROW Proliferator indigenous development, e.g., North Korea, Iran, Libya.

3. Delivery by BM or air breathers, e.g., cruise missile.

D. Theater Ballistic Missile Threat

1. Here today--for US and Allies; SCUDs NO DONG, CSS-2, etc.

2. TBM can carry nuclear or unitary/submission CW/BW warheads.

3. If unchecked, significant problem for U.S. forward operations, esp. SWA, ROK.

4. ROW by purchase or SLV conversion.

5. Urgent defense requirements for US and Allies.

III. TBM Defense first priority ($2 billion/year)

1. PAC-3 First Unit Equipped (FUE) 1998

2. THAAD FUE 2002

3. Navy Lower Tier FUE 2000

1. Navy Upper Tier

2. Boost Phase Intercept

3. Corps SAM (MEADS)

D. Depending upon performance, any effective TBM system (especially with the over-the-horizon threat cueing) will have some marginal capabilities against faster strategic incoming BM targets in one-on-one engagement.

E. U.S. will not accept limitations on TMD capabilities that pose no threat to the basic principles of the ABM Treaty.

IV. Technical and Program Options for National Missile Defense (NMD)

1. Early warning/Surveillance

2. Target acquisition and track--mix of ground based multifunction radars, early-warning radars, space based EO/IR sensors.

3. Interceptors--number, location, and performance.

4. Battle Management C3

C. The DoD NMD program consists of two elements

1. BMD Technology. R&D on BMD components that could eventually be part of an advanced NMD or TMD system and growth of TMD system for limited NMD capabilities.
   • a. Technology; Kinetic energy Boost Phase Interceptors, advanced sensors, high powered lasers, advanced lightweight projectile (LEAP), small business innovative research, and innovative science and technology

   • b. Expenditures: $170M/year.

2. The Baseline Program. A treaty compliant three year R&D program that will provide the option for deployment over an additional three years, of an initial NMD system which might or might not be treaty compliant. There is room for further growth in system capabilities.
   • a. The system consists of a ground-based radar (GBR), ground-based interceptor (GBI), and space based sensors (SBIR-LEO) for cueing.

   • b. Expenditure: $520M/year (including $120M for SBIR-LEO).

1. Such a system consists of 20-50 exo-kill vehicles (EKVs) on MINUTEMAN II or III boosters with DSP, early warning radar, and multifunction radar cueing.

2. This Emergency Response System would take two years to develop (at a cost of $1 billion to the baseline) and two years to deploy (at an additional cost of $2-4 billion to the baseline)

3. The Emergency Response System would not be compliant with either the ABM or START treaty.

4. ERS would be more effective to degree we know what threat it would meet; therefore not wise to commit to deployment until threat is clearer.

NMD PROGRAM OPTIONS 1 1 Treaty issues subject to review by Compliance Review Group.

R&D phase

Deployment phase

1. BMD technology:
   • Advanced sensors
     Ongoing

     Not defined.

   • KE boost phase
     $170M/year

   • DE boost phase
     Treaty compliant

2. Baseline NMD: Ground-based KE interceptors with ground and space-based cueing
   • 3 year; $520M/year; treaty compliant

   • 3 years; not funded; possibly treaty compliant.

3. Emergency response: Ground-based KE interceptors with early warning radar cueing
   • 2 years; not funded; possibly not treaty compliant

   • 2 years; not funded; not treaty compliant.

F. Choices include:

1. Adding funds for NMD technology, to create more choices for the future, such as strategic application of Navy uppertier technology.

2. Adding funds for baseline system--risk reduction and, schedule acceleration.

3. Adding funds for R&D phase of Emergency Response System.

V. Treaty Compliance

B. The 1972 ABM Treaty does not reflect either the changed geopolitical circumstances or the new technological opportunities of today. We should not be reluctant to negotiate treaty modifications that acknowledge the new realities provided we retain the essential stabilizing purpose of the treaty.

1. The ABM Treaty permits one particular `thin' system--100 interceptors at Grand Forks ND with GBR and space based sensor adjuncts. May be possible to deploy a satisfactory NMD within these limits.

2. Other NMD configurations or TMD systems that do not meet specific prohibitions of the treaty but are comparable to the permitted `thin' system, e.g., the Emergency Response system, would not undermine, the Treaty and should be permitted.

1. Present US position proposes limits on demonstrated capability of components (no testing against targets with velocity 5 KM/sec or range 3500 km) and interceptor velocity. This approach aimed at negotiability and prompt Russian acceptance.

2. If Russians do not accept essential elements of US TMD demarcation proposal soon, we should consider shifting our proposal to a more technically straight forward position based on the actual capability of a deployed TMD system to defend against a substantial Russian retaliatory missile strike

[Page: H1812]

Background: The Spence amendment would modify Title II by adding a new section that expresses the Sense of Congress that negotiations with Russia and others to extend the ABM Treaty to theater missile defense (TMD) systems be suspended until the 104th Congress has had an opportunity to review this matter.

Talking Points: The U.S. ability to field effective TMD systems is being jeopardized by the Clinton Administration.

In negotiations with Russia, the Administration has proposed turning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty into an `ABM-TMD Treaty'.

Additionally, they seek to `multilateralize' the Treaty, so that instead of just two parties to the Treaty, there could be ten or more. This would give Belarus or Uzbekistan a veto or modifications/amendments to the Treaty, making it more difficult to amend the Treaty were the U.S. to request such changes.

They have also proposed to impose specific design limitations on U.S. TMD systems (e.g., setting `speed limits' on how fast U.S. TMD systems can fly). Such self-imposed design limitations would have the effect of `dumbing down' U.S. TMD systems and compromising the effectiveness of U.S. TMD systems.

Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch in a recent memorandum warned against the dangers of the Administration's current approach to these negotiations.

Secretary Deutch suggested that, in light of Russian intransigence in these negotiations, the U.S. should `shift our proposal to a more principled [demarcation] position'. This clearly underscores the folly of the Administration's current approach.

In a January 4 letter to the President, Mr. Spence, Mr. Livingston, Mr. Gilman and the Republican Leadership in the House suggested that these negotiations be suspended temporarily. Unfortunately, the President has thus far refused to budge.

The Spence amendment once again puts the Congress on record as having deep concerns about the Administration plans and the adverse impact they would have on national security.

I urge my colleagues to vote YES on the Spence amendment.

Congress of the United States,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, February 15, 1995.

Dear Colleague: One of the highest priority defense capabilities currently under development and being fielded by the Department of Defense (DoD) is theater missile defense (TMD). U.S. TMD systems are designed to defend U.S. military forces deployed overseas, along with friendly forces and allies, from ballistic missile attack.

The threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is expanding. Several countries, including North Korea, are developing missiles of increasing range and accuracy. Others, such as Iran, have purchased missiles and production technology from North Korea. Such proliferation underscores the importance of fielding, at the earliest practical date, advanced TMD systems--as advocated in Title II of H.R. 872, the National Security Revitalization Act.

Unfortunately, the U.S. ability to field highly-effective TMD systems is being jeopardized by the Clinton Administration. Specifically, under the guise of `clarifying' the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, U.S. negotiators have proposed in talks with Russia and others to impose specific design limitations on U.S. TMD systems that will significantly compromise U.S. TMD capability. They have also proposed to `multilateralize' the ABM Treaty, making future amendments or changes to the Treaty, such as those to deploy an effective ABM defense of the United States, more difficult.

Based on these concerns, we sent a letter to the President on January 4 suggesting that further negotiations be suspended until the new Congress has had an opportunity to examine these issues in detail. The President's reply rejected our suggestion and stated his intention to continue negotiating such an agreement. (The January 4 letter and the President's response are attached for your information.)

It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to again communicate our deep concerns about the Administration's position in these negotiations and the adverse impact they would have on U.S. missile defense programs. The amendment offered by Rep. Floyd Spence, Chairman of the National Security Committee, does just that. (A copy of the Spence amendment is printed below.)

We strongly urge your support of both the Spence amendment and Title II of H.R. 872 regarding missile defense.

Sincerely,

Newt Gingrich.

Floyd Spence.

Bob Livingston.

Dick Armey.

Ben Gilman.

Bill Young.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY REPRESENTATIVE SPENCE

At the end of Title II (page 12, after line 25), add the following new section:

Sec. 204. Sense of Congress on Theater Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

(a) Findings: The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and its allies face existing and expanding threats from ballistic missiles capable of being used as theater weapon systems that are presently possessed by, being developed by, or being acquired by a number of countries, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.

(2) Some theater ballistic missiles currently deployed or are being developed (such as the Chinese CSS-2 missile and the North Korean Taepo Dong-2 missile) have capabilities equal to or greater than the capabilities of missiles that were determined to be strategic missiles more than 20 years ago under the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement I (SALT I) Interim Agreement of 1972 entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(3) The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not intended to, and does not, apply to or limit research, development, testing, or deployment of missile defense systems, system upgrades, or system components that are designed to counter modern theater ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of such missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system components are tested against or have demonstrated capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.

(4) It is a national security priority of the United States to develop and deploy highly effective theater missile defense systems capable of countering the existing and expanding threats posed by modern theater ballistic missiles at the earliest practical date.

(5) Current United States proposals in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) would multilateralize the ABM Treaty, making future amendments or changes to the Treaty more difficult, and would impose specific design limitations on United States theater missile defense (TMD) systems that will significantly compromise United States TMD capability.

(b) Sense of Congress: It is the sense of the Congress that further formal negotiations in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and any informal discussions or negotiations on either the demarcation between theater missile defense (TMD) systems and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, or any other efforts that bear on the viability of the ABM Treaty, including multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, should be suspended until the One Hundred Fourth Congress has had the opportunity to review those matters.

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, January 4, 1995.

Hon. Bill Clinton,

The White House,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. President: We appreciate your letter of October 22, 1994 responding to the letter of September 19, 1994 signed by a bipartisan group of legislators regarding the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and constraints on theatre missile defenses.

We welcome your assurances that your Administration is `not going to rush' the process of negotiating changes to the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is our expectation that the new Congress and relevant Congressional committees will want, as an early order of business, to examine the wisdom of expanding the ABM Treaty's limitations in the name of `demarcating' strategic and theatre missile defenses and multilateralization this agreement. We also anticipate that there will be considerable interest in reviewing the more fundamental issue whether a treaty that is intended to prohibit an effective defense of the United States against missile attack is consistent with our Nation's vital security interests and emerging threats.

Therefore, we respectfully suggest that further negotiations on either the demarcation or multilateralization efforts, or any other efforts that bear on the viability of the ABM Treaty, be suspended until the new Congress has had an opportunity to examine these questions with care.

Sincerely,

Richard K. Armey.

Floyd Spence.

Newt Gingrich.

C.W. Bill Young.

Henry J. Hyde.

Benjamin A. Gilman.

Christopher Cox.

Larry Combest.

Tom DeLay.

Susan Molinari.

John A. Boehner.

Bob Livingston.

Jerry Lewis.

Joe Skeen.

Bill Paxon.

Joe Barton.

Joseph M. McDade.

[Page: H1813]

Washington, DC, January 26, 1995.

Dear Mr. Leader: Thank you for your recent letter concerning theater missile defenses and the ABM Treaty. I believe it is important for the Administration and the new Congress to continue our dialogue on these important issues.

The Administration is firmly committed to two fundamental objectives in the area of missile defenses. First, we believe it is critical to preserve the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. This important Treaty remains a cornerstone of U.S. security policy and our new relationship with Russia. It is also essential if we are to continue implementing the dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear forces negotiated during the Reagan and Bush Administrations (START I and START II). Second, we are committed to deploying highly effective theater missile defense systems (TMDs).

The key to preserving both the ABM Treaty and a robust TMD program is the successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). These negotiations seek to clarify the distinction in the ABM Treaty between TMDs (which are not limited by the Treaty) and strategic ABMs (which are limited by the Treaty). This is not a question of `expanding' the ABM Treaty's limitations. Rather, we are acting in consonance with the sense of Congress, as clearly expressed in the Missile Defense Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-190) and recently reaffirmed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, that we pursue negotiations to clarify the boundary between TMDs and ABMs. The U.S. position in these negotiations is intended to ensure that advanced U.S. TMD systems can proceed, even though some of them may have a theoretical capability under certain scenarios to intercept certain ballistic missiles.

Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in the SCC towards achieving these objectives. All parties to the negotiations agree on the need to clarify the TMD/ABM boundary, and there appears to be an emerging consensus that such important TMD systems as THAAD, CORPS SAM, Navy Lower Tier and PAC-3 do not cross this boundary. There are, however, still a number of substantive issues that need to be resolved, including our commitment to secure specific deployment options related to air-based TMD and Navy Upper Tier. As I said in my letter of October 22, we will not rush this process or enter into any agreement that does not meet our national security requirements for highly effective TMDs. This commitment was underscored by my recent decision to proceed with demonstration/validation testing of the THAAD TMD system.

I look forward to working closely with Congress as we pursue our common objectives in this area.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise first of all, along with a number of other Members on this side, to make inquiries as to exactly what the purpose of this particular proposal is.

First of all, could I ask the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter], the particular objection we have, other than the fact that we are multilateralizing the ABM Treaty, and I do not think we multilateralized it, they did, when they splintered into a number of different countries.

The former Soviet Union is no more, so countries which have missile weapons, that missile defense system is still there.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, the administration, by the President's own admission, because he has sent a letter back to the Republican leadership after they initiated a letter essentially asking the President, having heard reports from the Pentagon that senior arms negotiators were attempting to expand or were discussing with the Soviet Union, with their negotiation team, the expansion of the ABM Treaty to include limitations on theater defenses, and concerns with that negotiation position were expressed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili.

They were expressed at the hearing in which the gentleman sat in with me when the Secretary of Defense appeared before us. My understanding of his words, the transcript speaks for itself, is that he, too, was concerned with negotiating limitations on theater defenses.

The Republican leadership sent a letter to the President and asked him not to engage in negotiations that would limit theater defensive systems. Let me say that the President responded with a letter, and I can get the letter and we will have it before me, but as I recall, the letter did not say or did not alleviate the concerns of the Republican leadership.

Mr. SPRATT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, just to clarify the question, the gentleman's real concern is not multilateralizing it, because that is sort of a fact accomplished by the breakup of the Soviet Union, but it is the fact that this administration seems to have expressed concerns about the THAD in particular.

Mr. HUNTER. No, Mr. Chairman. If the gentleman will continue to yield, there were two concerns expressed by the Republican leadership. One is multilateralization, bringing in the former Soviet States, Byelorus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and others, but it was also the limitations that are projected to be placed on the development of theater defensive systems that has upset both our own military people, who are concerned about protecting American military contingents in theater, and a number of people, I think, on both sides of the aisle.

Therefore, the Chairman's resolution, as I understand, is a sense of the Congress resolution advising the President that we do not wish him to place constraints on theater ballistic missile systems through the ABM Treaty.

Mr. SPRATT. The provision that is printed in the Record ends by saying `These negotiations should be suspended until the 104th Congress has had the opportunity to review these matters.'

I would ask the gentleman, Mr. Chairman, does he have in mind simply a hearing? What is the opportunity of review?

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will continue to yield, since I am the world's greatest expert on my own opinion and my own perception, I think it is a terrible mistake to enter in, when Navy upper tier, I think the best theater defense system that the Navy is developing, is possibly going to be constrained under what the President's negotiators have proposed, I think it is a mistake to impose limitations on theater defensive systems when we have a rapidly evolving threat coming from China, from North Korea, from other sources.

My own opinion is I think we should not constrain theater defensive systems. I think we need to have our intelligence personnel appear before us. I think we need to see if Secretary Perry is going to prevail, and if General Shalikashvili is going to prevail.

Mr. SPRATT. What the gentleman is seeking is just a hearing with the relevant parties and interests before the committee so we could better understand what is going on and express our opinion?

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will continue to yield, I would advise my friend, the gentleman from South Carolina, also to work with the administration and try to change their opinion.

What I would like to do and what others would like to do is change the position of the administration and not constrain theater missile defense. I think it is a very difficult thing to do right now when the threat is evolving rapidly, and I think also the multilateralization is a problem.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for expressing some clarification of what it is they seek. I have no particular problem with it. I propose simply that we accept it and move on.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the gentleman's amendment. I believe it is important to send a clear message to President Clinton that a majority of Members in this Chamber do not agree with the administration's position with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Along with a number of other senior Republicans, including Members of the Republican leadership, I requested the President to suspend ongoing negotiations with regard to the ABM Treaty until he consulted with the 104th Congress.

The President respectfully declined to do that. That's because the administration is in the midst of negotiating changes to the treaty that could undercut our ability to deploy highly effective TMD's.

The administration is also seeking to add other countries as signatories to the ABM Treaty. That could pose an obstacle to deployment of effective missile defenses for our national territory.

This amendment is a shot across the bow to the administration, sending a clear signal that we are serious about this issue.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support Mr. Spence's amendment.

[Page: H1814]

Mr. Chairman, let us move on. This is about hearings. We ought to have them. We are on the record saying we ought to explore these insignificant questions.

Let us not debate this matter. Let us accept it, and move on to other more substantial and substantive amendments. We are prepared to deal with it. I would have hoped that my colleague would have alerted me earlier about this amendment and we could have talked about it in committee, we could have looked at it thoroughly in committee.

Notwithstanding that, let us get beyond this, accept the amendment, and let us move on to other items.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, this is an important policy decision that the administration is undertaking right now with respect to theater defense limitations.

[TIME: 1710]

I think it is an extremely important issue. I would like to get a vote on it because I think it is important to have a sense of the House, regardless of the final outcome of the bill, on this issue. I think it is a very important arms control limitation amendment. And I would like to have a vote.

Mr. SPRATT. We accept the amendment. Is that not sufficient?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has the time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me first respond to my colleague by saying, look, we all know there are very significant amendments here. Take the amendment. Every time you call for a vote, you take out of the debate much more significant amendments that we need to debate here. You are going to win today. We thought you had written the bill the way you wanted to write it in the first place. You have got the votes to do it. Why now trample upon the little bit of time that we have to try to make up for it here? You could have written this bill any way you wanted to. We accept the amendment, and let us go forward.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN. Is the distinguished and esteemed gentleman acknowledging, or am I hearing something incorrectly, that the policy is flawed as stands and should be changed?

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman knows that both of us are very articulate people. We need not put words in each other's mouth. I am saying very specifically, you have got the votes. Go on and accept the amendment. Let's not filibuster this issue. Let's get on to other amendments that are very important. That is exactly what the gentleman is saying.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my friend the gentleman for yielding.

Let me just say to him that if this were a motion to adjourn or some kind of a delaying motion, I would agree with him completely. I am just saying to my friend, and I hope he will accept this, I think this is a very important part of arms limitation. It got a lot of us riled up when we saw it happening. You and I know the difference between having a vote in which you have real numbers on the scorecard instead of an acceptance where we say, `Well, we accepted it to get it off the table and under the carpet.'

I do intend to call a vote on it because I think it is important to have a vote. I guarantee my friend I will be short of words for the rest of the day.

Mr. DELLUMS. If I might reclaim my time, Mr. Chairman, then let's get on with it. Call for the vote and let's do it.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the need to move on when both sides are in agreement about who is going to win today here on an important amendment. I have not criticized anybody on the other side of the aisle for raising a little ruckus around here about the Republican Contract With America and having the most unusual 100-day period we have ever had here. The reason I have not objected to the passion of anybody on the other side, from the new conscience of the minority, Harold Volkmer, or to any other passion is that I spent one-third of my adult life, no, one-third of my entire 60 years in the minority on this side and I feel your pain, and I mean it. But this is a moment I have waited for, for a long time.

Look, Mr. Chairman. We all know that over 1 million Americans are following this debate on C-SPAN. That is the Rose Bowl filled 100 times, or 10 times. That is the Coliseum filled 10 times. And they don't have close-up cameras all the time.

I want to make a few points as the self-appointed historian of this body, and I don't know who takes that role in the Senate.

Fifty years ago today, the Nazi empire of Hitler's Fortress Europe was pushing buttons and launching in this month of February, 50 years ago, hundreds of ballistic missiles. Their guidance systems were rudimentary, but they were good enough to kill innocent men, women, and children all over southern England. And those that did not make the route killed innocent people as they fell on the Netherlands or Belgium working their way to wreak havoc. Hitler's V-1, a cruise missile in today's terminology, and his V-2, a ballistic missile, were not named V for victory, they were named V for vengeance. Believe me, we can, God forbid, have in the future what one of the great liberal papers of America calls a `rogue missile' coming at us.

Listen to what one of America's 3 major newspapers says in closing in an editorial that I found much exception to on technological points, but listen to this closely. And I will tell who it is afterward:

`While it remains a global power and within the limits of technological and financial sense,' and this is what we will debate with the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] in his forceful and articulate manner in hearings later in the year, `the United States must be able to protect forces that it sends on distant missions. And also to protect our allies. There lies the irreducible rationale for an effective theater missile defense.'

That is the liberal great Washington Post.

Now, while we possess the technology to defeat a threat, certainly at the level of Hitler's vengeance weapons, we now have the ability to detect, to intercept, and to destroy incoming missiles, but we still do not have the ability to protect one single American city, not a village, hamlet, or town, not an innocent man or woman anywhere in the continental United States or our possessions from Guam, where our day begins, to the Virgin Islands, from Alaska to Hawaii, nowhere can we defend ourselves from missiles. And we still hear voices in this Chamber defending the ABM treaty signed with an evil empire, an entity that is gone. It does not exist anymore.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DORNAN. We must later in the year address this ghastly problem of us failing the Preamble to our great Constitution, the original contract, to provide for the common defense.

There are lots of statements people make around here out of polling, from all sorts of great pollers on both sides of the aisle, and we say it is true that most Americans are opposed to most abortions, then we debate that ad nauseam.

Then we have all sorts of things, we say do Americans want this, do they want that?

Here is a statement that I say that I know cannot be refuted. Not 0.1, not 1 percent of this Nation knows that with the trillions of dollars spent under Reagan-Bush or a quarter of a trillion that we are going to spend every year into the future, that is $1 trillion during the Clinton years, that we are unable to defend ourselves from some rogue missile sent by some terrorist group.

I know the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] carefully talks----

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has again expired.

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Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, with all due respect, we are operating here with a very tight time constraint. We do appreciate your historical perspectives. But I think we do have to move on and get to the substance of this bill. We have real concrete concerns that we have got to view here with the American public and with our colleagues and we have got to move on. We would ask that we call for a vote on this amendment.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would yield, I would ask my colleagues since we are going to call for a vote, I think a vote is important to send a message to the President. I would ask my colleagues to refrain from making more speeches so there is time left for the other side to offer the amendments that they have planned in the next several hours.

Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, with the caveat that this would be the last 30 seconds, that we are going to restrain ourselves from the unanimous consent and ask for the vote immediately following this 30 seconds, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DORNAN. The gentleman is so gracious, I will cut it to 15 seconds to finish my point.

I look forward to a debate with one of the fairest former chairmen ever, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] on the danger of suitcase bombs being dumped out of old freighters into the mud of our harbors. That is equally as dangerous as a rogue missile. We will discuss that later. But we must fulfill this part of the contract on theater missile defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 320, noes 110, not voting 4, as follows: