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Sen. WALLOP. We have the leadership meeting that is taking place at the White House now. They would be prepared to be back here, I believe, at 12:15.

We also have an order at 1 o'clock to move back to the national service conference report. So we really have an hour and a half now. I suggest that we try to handle the Wallop amendment within that hour and a half.

I say to my friend from Arizona that, because of the uncertainty relating to the Bingaman amendment, it would not be possible now to say that we could turn to his amendment at 12, but it would be my intent, if that amendment is obviated in terms of a compromise, that we would turn to his amendment at 12 and we could complete that debate by 1 o'clock.

Mr. DeCONCINI. Not if you are going to do the Wallop amendment first.

Mr. NUNN. Yes, you are right. I missed an hour there. I was calculating incorrectly.

If we do the Wallop amendment in an hour and a half, we would not be able to get the DeConcini amendment until after we completed the national service bill, which would be around 4 o'clock.

Mr. DeCONCINI. If the chairman will yield, if he is going to enter into a time agreement with the Senator from Wyoming, would he also consider including that my amendment would come up after the Bingaman amendment and after the Wallop amendment and after the national service bill and restrict it to 1 hour?

Mr. NUNN. Yes. Let us work on that. Let us go ahead and start the debate on this amendment and I will work on a unanimous-consent agreement.

Is the Senator willing to have one-half hour on each side?

Mr. DeCONCINI. Yes.

Mr. WALLOP. Would the Senator want to limit the Wallop amendment amount now?

Mr. NUNN. Why do we not begin the debate and I will check it and make sure, and that way we will not waste any time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming has the floor.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the amendment that Senator Warner and I are offering today would provide an up-to-date, commonsense standard for determining the compliance of theater missile defense [TMD] systems with the ABM Treaty. It does not require renegotiation or reinterpretation of the treaty and it neither requires nor authorizes the United States to undertake actions that would violate the treaty. It simply updates existing compliance standards that have been overtaken by technological, political, and regional security developments since the senate ratified the ABM Treaty 21 years ago.

This amendment is not about the ABM Treaty per se. We do not intend to debate the value of the treaty or the merits of renegotiating specific provisions. What we are attempting to do is simply say that ambiguities in the treaty should not be allowed to hinder critical programs that are obviously not ABM systems. What we are talking about are defensive systems like Patriot and more modern versions like the Theater High Altitude Area Defense System [THAAD], which we are building to defend our overseas forces and allies from the growing ballistic missile threats that are emerging around the world--threats, I might say, specifically identified by the Secretary of Defense and by the President of the United States as being among those items which are most threatening to the United States and our allies. These are not controversial systems; in fact TMD is the one part of the overall ballistic missile defense effort that enjoys broad political support in Congress and the administration.

Even if you believe that the ABM Treaty is sacrosanct and should not be modified in any way, you should support this amendment if you also believe that the United States needs a TMD system capable of defending our forces and allies against the full range of theater ballistic missile threats. We saw what happened in the Persian Gulf war, when our missile defenses were inadequate. If this amendment is not passed there is a very real chance that our future TMD systems will be as ill-suited to the threat as Patriot was when we deployed it to the gulf.

Sen. NUNN. One might reasonably ask: Why is this amendment needed? After all, Patriot and THAAD are not ABM systems, and the ABM Treaty does not limit TMD systems. Unfortunately, the ABM Treaty is ambiguous when it comes to defining what actually is and is not an ABM system. That is because, in fact, it was drafted 20 years ago when modern technological events had yet to occur. The treaty sought to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union--remember them?--from building an unaccountable ABM system under the guise of an air defense system. But the language is so vague that on its face it is impossible to determine what is and is not permitted.

Article VI of the treaty simply states that it is prohibited to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and to test non-ABM systems in an ABM mode. Yet the treaty does not define the terms `capabilities,' `strategic ballistic missiles,' or `tested in an ABM mode.'

To deal with this ambiguity, the Department of Defense has long maintained criteria for evaluating its acquisition programs for treaty compliance. This was a relatively straightforward procedure when the only defensive systems we were developing or building were either clearly ABM systems or clearly air defense systems. But as the ballistic missile threat has diversified and proliferated, these compliance standards have become outdated. The TMD systems we must build to meet the growing missile threat are far more capable than the air defense systems of the past and in many ways do resemble ABM systems.

The principal reason why it has become so difficult to distinguish between ABM and non-ABM systems is due to the fact that the distinctions between strategic and nonstrategic missiles has dramatically narrowed. This is not entirely a new dilemma. Recall, for example, that we defined the Soviet SS-20 as an intermediate-range ballistic missile, even though it had a range of 5,000 kilometers.

But today, the situation is even more complex. As more and more countries acquire long-range ballistic missiles, the term strategic becomes less and less applicable. Increasingly, regional powers are developing or seeking to acquire ballistic missiles that threaten entire regions and often neighboring regions. The Chinese-built CSS-2, with a range of approximately 2,700 kilometers, has been exported to the Middle East. From there--mark my words--it can reach much of Southern Europe, including several NATO capitals. Certainly for those within its range, the CSS-2 is a strategic weapon.

This situation is radically different than the one envisioned by the authors on the ABM Treaty, who were concerned only with the United States-Soviet strategic balance. Obviously it would be ridiculous to allow a cold war, United States-Soviet Treaty to prevent us from dealing with the new multipolar strategic context we face today.

As I mentioned before, the ABM Treaty prohibits non-ABM systems from being given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles. What confuses the issue is that today there exist theater ballistic missiles that are virtually as capable as some older Russian ballistic missiles that were categorized as strategic in 1972 for purposes of SALT I--in particular, the SS-N-6 with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers. Although this class of ballistic missiles will be retired from the Russian inventory around the end of the year, the SS-N-6 continues to define the lower end of what we consider strategic.

By any modern standard, the SS-N-6 is not a strategic ballistic missile. But for purposes of arms control it is so defined. This poses a dilemma for our TMD development efforts. If we are to develop and deploy TMD systems with good capabilities to counter the full range of theater ballistic missiles, including the CSS-2, they will possess some inherent capability against the SS-N-6. Since the SS-N-6 will be gone from the Russian inventory within a year, and the next most capable system has over twice the range, this should be less of a problem, therefore, in the future.

Sen. WALLOP. This is a time-urgent matter. A number of TMD systems or system upgrades, including THAAD, must be certified as compliant with the ABM Treaty within the very near future if they are to remain on schedule. Recognizing this fact, the Armed Services Committee included a provision in the defense authorization bill (section 223) that fences half of the TMD funding for fiscal year 1994 until the Secretary of Defense reports that these programs comply with the ABM Treaty.

I agree with the intent of this provision: To force the DOD to get on with its compliance reviews and not to spend money on programs it may be unable to proceed with. Unfortunately, for the last several years--and including the 9 months of this year--the DOD has failed to come up with an up-to-date standard for judging TMD compliance. Without such a new standard, section 223 might inadvertently delay key TMD systems like THAAD. Even worse, it might lead the DOD to revise these programs downward, taking capability away from them in an attempt to avoid even the appearance of infringing upon the ABM Treaty. Either outcome would be disastrous.

The amendment we are offering today seeks merely to complement section 223. It in no way undermines this provision; in fact, we believe it clarifies and strengthens it. Given DOD's inability to come up with a new compliance standard for its TMD systems, we believe that the time has come for Congress to step in and establish one. We believe that the standard set forth in our amendment is reasonable and should be acceptable to all Senators who support TMD, even if they are ardent supporters of the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, let me quickly describe the amendment. The premise and principal objective of the amendment is set forth in paragraph (2)(a): That the United States should be permitted to develop and deploy TMD systems to counter the full range of theater ballistic missiles in existence at the time such TMD systems undergo compliance review.

But the amendment recognizes that this does not satisfy the specific requirements contained in article VI of the ABM Treaty. To stay within the framework of the treaty and the established compliance process at DOD, paragraphs (2)(b) and (2)(c) deal with the treaty's prohibition against testing non-ABM systems in an ABM mode and giving now-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles.

To satisfy paragraph (2)(b), a TMD system may not have been tested against a modern strategic ballistic missile. This is a relatively straight-forward provision, since the DOD already has working definitions of testing in an ABM mode and what constitutes a modern strategic ballistic missile--which, by the way, includes the SS-N-6.

To satisfy paragraph (2)(c), a TMD system may not have demonstrated a capability to counter such a modern strategic ballistic missile. According to this standard, a TMD system's capability to counter a modern strategic ballistic missile must be physically demonstrated before it can be the basis for determining that such TMD system violates the ABM Treaty. Mathematically simulating such a capability is not sufficient.

This demonstrated standard is the means by which systems like THAAD can be given capabilities to counter the CSS-2 while the Russians maintain the SS-N-6 in their inventory. It also recognizes that any TMD system will have some limited degree of capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles, and that this residual capability also should not be the basis for a non-compliance finding.

Mr. President, however one defines the term strategic ballistic missile, however one does that, it is clear--it must be clear to the Congress of the United States, to the Secretary of Defense, to the people of this country--that we and out allies face another class of ballistic missile threats that we now refer to as theater systems.

Senator Warner and I, in offering our amendment, are simply saying that we must be able to design theater missile defense systems to counter the full range of theater threats. Otherwise, we are destined to repeat the situation we faced in the Persian Gulf war where our missile defense capabilities were clearly inadequate.

We must not allow a treaty that was designed to govern cold war United States-Soviet relations to prevent America from defending its forward forces against missiles possessed by countries like Iraq, like Iran, like North Korea.

There is no excuse, there is absolutely no excuse not to provide American forces the protection they need against the full range of missile threats that they face and we know will face in the future. Remember that the largest number of casualties we suffered in the gulf war was the result of a missile attack on a barracks.

If our amendment is not adopted, a similar tragedy will almost certainly take place on some future battlefield. We will have then nobody but ourselves to blame. But, Mr. President, we will not shoulder that blame. The Congress will find some way to blame it on somebody else. The Department of Defense will find some way to blame it on somebody else. Some lawyers now working will long since be gone and they will be blamed because they will have interpreted the ABM Treaty in ways which constrain the existing capability of the United States to protect the existing forces that we have against threats that we know are in existence or are coming.

We will not shoulder it. We will weep for the dead and we will decry their sacrifice and we will send nice letters to their mothers, but we will not remember that we could have made the difference.

This is a logical and reasonable amendment. It is also a compromise. My preference would have been to exempt all TMD systems entirely from the restrictions of the ABM Treaty or simply to do away with that treaty altogether, but I realize that those are extremely controversial positions. I will refrain from entering into this debate today. We are not here talking about the merits of the ABM Treaty but the requirement to protect American forces, American allies from theater missiles that we know exist.

Every Member of the Senate should agree that it would be irresponsible to unnecessarily underdesign or unnecessarily delay TMD systems simply because language in a treaty is vague when the reality is not vague. There is no doubt about what we face. There may be doubt about how the treaty phrases itself.

Why should we impose unilateral restrictions upon ourselves, especially when the price of doing so is likely to be paid, certainly to be paid with American blood, the blood of allies? We should be able to agree on the standards set forth in our amendment and to get on with what the President has identified as his No. 1 missile defense priority. The President of the United States, President Clinton's No. 1 missile defense priority is theater missiles. Mr. President, this Congress and this Senate should not let him or future soldiers and sailors and airmen down.

I yield to the Senator from Virginia, a cosponsor.

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Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I find it a distinct pleasure to associate myself with my good friend, long-time friend and colleague from the State of Wyoming. My only regret is he no longer is on the Armed Services Committee because when he served on that committee he was the most knowledgeable person, or certainly no one was more knowledgeable on our side of the aisle, about the complexity of strategic defenses than the Senator from Wyoming. His remarks this morning I find brilliant and they capture precisely the objectives that the two of us have had these many years working together as it respects the theater missile defenses.

If I might add a personal note. The distinguished chairman of the committee from Georgia, myself, Senator Inouye, and Senator Stevens were in Tel Aviv the night the last Scud missile was fired against our brave and valuable ally, Israel. While we were not in any immediate danger, we were visiting with the Minister of Defense at that time and he and others, of course, had to step aside from the meeting and deal with that particular attack. But that little personal experience brought home the fact so eloquently stated by my distinguished friend and colleague.

Sen. WALLOP. We are here today simply to ask that the adoption of this amendment be accepted by the Senate for the purpose of providing guidelines to the Department of Defense--and more specifically the President and the Secretary of Defense--as they comply with the bill that is on each and every desk. It simply gives them the guidelines by which they come back and determine the necessity, or the lack of necessity, which I hope and I am confident they will find, of applying certain nebulous provisions of the ABM Treaty.

But my colleague points out the disaster to our troops when that one missile penetrated and caused upward of 50 lives to be lost. We, the Congress of the United States, will be accountable if in a future action such a tragedy were to be repeated and we, the Congress of the United States, are on record as having impeded the ability of the technical brains of this country to have devised the best system possible to prohibit such a tragedy, not only to our troops but the allied troops serving with us and, indeed, to those nations on which territory is our forward deployed position of defense in the cause of freedom, those nations and their civilian populations.

It is our responsibility. We are the Nation with the leading technology in this field.

I would like to pose a question to my distinguished friend from Wyoming at this point.

I find, as I study this question, that this ABM Treaty--which you pointed out is between two parties, the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and the United States--I find that any unbiased, objective mind in Russia today should say that their interests in theater missile defense and the production of the technology to protect them should be identical to ours and that in all probability they would support the efforts that the Senator from Wyoming and myself are now advancing to the Senate. I ask that question.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I will respond to the Senator from Virginia that, in fact, the Russian Republic is probably significantly more threatened by these events than are any American military personnel or our allies. The instability of the world that is likely to erupt is first and foremost perhaps directed toward them.

Keep in mind, we are not seeking--you and I with our amendment--to violate the terms and testing of the ABM Treaty. We are merely trying to define theater missiles in light of technological achievements unheard of, undreamed of at the time the treaty was signed.

The answer to my colleague's question is clearly yes. They would not likely find objection to this and, in fact, would very likely like to have the same capability themselves.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. It confirms my own belief that it is in their interest and, indeed, in the interest of the free world that this Nation move ahead in concert with other nations and, indeed, perhaps Russia in the development of the technology that can begin to provide an adequate deterrent and defense against the proliferation of this type of theater missile.

In my own personal judgment, this particular type of missile, coupled with the advancing technology in cruise missiles, coupled with the advancing technology in weapons of mass destruction, be they fissionable material, biological material, or chemical material, those are the categories of threats that are most serious to our Nation and our Nation's ability to defend freedom for our allies abroad.

It is incumbent upon this body to adopt this type of amendment to free up the brains in this country such that we can develop the very best system to prevent that.

So I congratulate my colleague. I will withhold further remarks if there is some other speaker here. I could pursue this for a minute or two.

Mr. President, I see the chairman of our committee, Mr. Nunn, is indicating I should go ahead.

In my judgment, Mr. President, if we were to continue to operate in a manner to thwart the ability of our brains to move forward in this country and devise the best technical defense, then, indeed, this Chamber and the other body would be held accountable someday for our failure to release the chains on the technical brains in this country to go ahead and devise the best system possible.

Sen. WARNER. The problem, Mr. President, is with the ambiguities as pointed out by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, ambiguities in the ABM Treaty, this treaty signed and drafted 20 years ago. And I might say, ironically, I was there in Moscow in my capacity as Secretary of the Navy in May 1972 when this particular treaty was signed. I had then been in the Department of Defense some 3 years, and I can assure you that no one at that time envisioned the problems associated with theater missiles and theater missile defense. It has all evolved in the years subsequent, and we should not become entangled in these technical interpretations of ambiguous clauses in this treaty and allow that confusion to impede our progress in advancing our ability to defend ourselves and our allies in the face of the proliferation of theater missiles.

The treaty, the ABM Treaty, prohibits giving non-ABM systems the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles, but the treaty does not define `capability' and the distinction between `strategic' and `theater' systems is unclear. For example, U.S. and allied forces face existing theater missile defenses that have ranges and reentry speeds similar to certain Soviet ballistic missiles that were designated `strategic' ballistic missiles 20 years ago.

These old Soviet missiles had theater, not intercontinental, ranges and had slow, not fast, reentry speeds. They are clearly obsolete and are no longer even part of the current Russian military inventory.

In short, we are allowing ourselves to be condemned to the past unless this amendment is adopted. Old Soviet systems designated `strategic' but with theater ranges and reentry speeds are not surprisingly comparable in capability to some Third World theater systems currently in existence or under development. The result is that unless we establish criteria to define what is a `theater' missile defense and what is a `strategic' missile defense, we will either underdesign, delay or choose not to deploy key theater missile defense programs necessary to protect our troops, our allies or others with whom we may be associated in a future conflict. We even place at risk the theater high altitude aerial defense which this body has strongly supported year in and year out.

Mr. President, the key to this amendment is very simple. It establishes a clear, common sense set of rules for determining a `theater' ballistic missile defense and a `strategic' ballistic missile defense system. It simply says a theater ballistic missile defense system is compliant if it can, one, counter the most capable theater missile in existence today, and, two, has never been tested against or demonstrated to have the capability to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.

Mr. President, this is not an SDI vote. Let us not confuse it. It is a theater missile defense issue, a program most of the Senate has said they support.

Just recently the Secretary of Defense released his bottom-up review, and specifically he states as one of his goals, and I quote, `Restructure ballistic missile defense program.'

This amendment is to aid the Secretary of Defense, the President with the ultimate responsibility, in restructuring the theater missile defense. This amendment does not affect defenses which the Committee of the Armed Services placed on funding for various missile defense programs. However, it does provide guidance to the administration in formulating its response to those instances which relate solely to the theater missile defense programs. It does not change a single word of the ABM Treaty. It merely updates unilateral U.S. definitions decided some 20 years ago.

I conclude by asking each Senator as he or she addresses their position on this amendment to think back to the tragedy of the loss of life, the single largest loss of life as occurred to our forces because of the inability to adequately defend ourselves against the very systems that are now proliferating in the world. We must not fail in our responsibility to the men and women of the Armed Forces whom we order abroad in far-flung places of the world without equipping them with the very finest military equipment, not only to use offensively, if necessary, but equally and often more important to use defensively.

Sen. WARNER. I yield the floor.

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Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to give my strong support to this excellent amendment. It is well thought out, and highly necessary to clear up a serious ambiguity in the ABM Treaty that could have an adverse effect on our theater missile defense effort. At the same time it is limited in scope and does not attempt to overturn the treaty. It simply clarifies what level of theater missile defense capability is permitted under the treaty.

The ABM Treaty was not intended to limit theater defenses, only defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. But the treaty did not define the term `strategic ballistic missiles.' Today we are facing theater missile threats that would have been classified as `strategic' in 1972 when the treaty was signed. Unless we get the clarity this amendment provides, we run the risk of underdesigning our TMD systems to avoid possible treaty violations. That means they will not be capable of countering missile threats already out there, the CSS-2, for example. TMD is now the top priority, and rightly so. But we must deploy the most capable TMD systems that technology will allow. There can be no excuse for the ABM Treaty or any other artificial obstacle to get in the way of building highly capable interceptors and censors that can intercept not just primitive Scud missiles but also the newer generation of ballistic missiles that we see proliferating in the world's traditional trouble spots.

I urge the adoption of this amendment.

(Mrs. BOXER assumed the chair.)

Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I regret I cannot support this amendment as it is currently drafted. The Senator from Wyoming has been a tremendous member of the Armed Services Committee, and I share the sentiments of the Senator from Virginia, who made a real contribution not only in this important area of missile defense but in many areas where he has acquired significant expertise.

I share a common goal, I believe, with the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Wyoming as well as the Senator from South Carolina in developing and deploying on an urgent basis the most effective theater missile defense program we can have against tactical ballistic missiles. I do think that is a priority for our Nation and for our allies. Also, the administration believes that is a priority. They made that clear in their budget submission.

The committee has included a provision in our bill that requires early compliance with theater defense systems in terms of review of those systems and how they would be affected by the ABM Treaty. In fact, we make it a very serious requirement because we say that they cannot spend more than half the money for these theater systems until they have completed that compliance review. What that really means is in approximately 6 months they are out of money unless they have done a compliance review. So we are very serious about a compliance review in our committee.

The problem with this amendment is that it preempts the compliance review. It basically is a congressional edict defining what we believe the ABM Treaty means but doing it in a definitive, legal way. So Congress would be setting itself in the position of interpreting the ABM Treaty regarding theater defense before the administration, a new administration just coming into power, before they have a chance to basically give their own assessment of the situation.

I know the Senator from Wyoming has been pushing the Bush administration and before that the Reagan administration to come up with definitions in this area. And I know the Senator from Virginia has. So my critique here in a way relates to what they have done. They have been absolutely consistent. They pushed very hard the Republican administrations to come up with definitions and now they are pushing a Democratic administration. So that is consistent. I have no problem with that.

The problem is, though, we had the Reagan administration and the Bush administration that did not do these kinds of compliance reviews in any kind of thorough way, and they did not come to definitive conclusions over a 12-year period.

Sen. THURMOND. Now we have a Democratic administration that has come in and has made theater missile defense a very high priority, the highest priority in terms of any kind of system, and they have allocated most of the money in SDI, a great deal of it, to this theater system. But they have asked for a decent period of time for compliance review to see if any of this plan, any of the plan for testing of deployment, would run afoul of the ABM Treaty.

It is my own view that this matter has to be discussed with the Russians. I think the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Wyoming are correct in saying the Russians have a very significant problem against their own country from these types of theater weapons. They have a more severe problem than we do. I think it is going to be in their interest to take another look at the ABM Treaty and, where clarifications are necessary, to join in this.

But when the Senator from Wyoming and the Senator from Virginia say they believe the Russians' own national interest points in this direction, they believe the Russians--I believe the Senator from Virginia said, the reasonable, rational Russians he talked to would agree with this. It seems to me that is an argument for giving the administration enough time to see if there is any kind of violation, No. 1, or any kind of problem or potential problem, No. 2, and then to discuss it with the Russians and deal with it under the ABM Treaty itself so we do not get people in the Russian military, we do not get people in the Russian Government who basically say the Americans are plowing on their own, the ABM Treaty no longer means anything to them, they are defining on the floor of the U.S. Senate definite terms as to what strategic missiles mean and what theater missiles mean, and, therefore, the ABM Treaty is of no use.

It could have a spillover effect in terms of attitudes toward the START II treaty. If the Russian Parliament comes to the conclusion that we in the Senate of the United States simply are going to stand up and basically declare what a treaty means, without waiting for an administration and legal interpretation, then they may do the same thing with the START II treaty. I do not think any of us would welcome that. We all hope the START II treaty and other matters can be ratified in due course and particularly countries like the Ukraine will come on board with both START I and START II.

So I guess, Madam President, what I am saying is that I do not favor this kind of amendment, this kind of method of handling this although I completely agree with the goal because I do believe that it is in our interest, even if we have to have an amendment to the ABM Treaty, to move forward. This is one possible way of moving forward after we have an administration compliance review.

But I urge, on behalf of the White House--I have not talked directly to them. Our staff has talked to some of the people at the National Security Council. But I urge that we go slow in this area, give them at least the 6 or 8 months that we anticipate in this bill to determine what their own position is and then let us determine if this is the most rational way to approach it or whether we would rather have the Russians on board. It seems to me there is a real case to be made for getting the Russians to agree. If they do not agree, we always have the national clause in there about our national security where we have the right to abrogate a treaty if it violates our national security interests. That is part of the treaty itself and was envisioned.

So I urge my colleagues to think carefully on this one, and I urge the Members of the Senate, unless there is some toning down of this amendment, to oppose the amendment at this point.

Yet, again, I want to emphasize that I commend the Senators for their interest in this. We do have a lot of money going into theater defense. We do have to find out soon whether it is going to be any kind of potential problem. Otherwise we may be developing systems where we end up saying we cannot do these because they violate the ABM Treaty. But we have to come to terms with this. We have to determine the compliance, and we have to understand what these terms mean. And if they do indeed interfere with any of the theater defense developments, then I think we have to take the proper course with the amendment.

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Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I may ask a question of my distinguished friend and colleague. I go back to his own actions with regard to this treaty some several years ago. Did he not, in the Nunn-Levin amendment, do precisely what the Senator from Wyoming and I are endeavoring to do today? There was a clear example where the congressional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, namely, the broad versus narrow, was pursued by our distinguished chairman, and, indeed, it was his position. So it seems to me there is a certain parallel.

Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator from Virginia that in that situation what we had there was an administration who set out to do their own review. They came to their own conclusions after a great deal of deliberation. The Senator from Georgia sat back and watched that take place, gave them plenty of time to come to their own conclusions. They came to their own conclusions, and those conclusions were contrary to what the Senator from Georgia felt that treaty meant.

I am asking for exactly the same course. I am saying that the new administration should have the right to come in and take a look at the theater systems, determine if they are in compliance, or, if they determine they are not, what they plan to do about it, and report to the Congress. Then, at that stage, if the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Wyoming will say, `We do not agree with this interpretation; we think the Congress ought to go on record,' then at that stage I think that is a different situation.

So I think there is a parallel here, and I urge the Senate to follow that parallel; that is, wait until this administration comes up with their own view on this and then decide whether we agree with that view. I am not saying Congress does not have a right to give our own interpretation of the treaty. It may be some kind of system that the Senate, on this subject, would think would be appropriate. But I distinguish between that and simply an edict in law at this stage.

Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, the Senator from Georgia suggests that we tone it down. We have spent 7 weeks trying to tone it down. This does not interpret anything to do with the ABM Treaty. It is not an equivalent parallel. In fact, what we do is say that we can develop a theater missiles defense system based on the range of the longest one that exists today. We carefully stay away from interpreting the treaty.

It is not like the situation a few years back when in fact the Congress legislated an unleavened amendment as an interpretation of that treaty. Some of us thought it was a fair diversion from the ordinary procedure that the President of the United States is a negotiator or interpreter of treaties. We legislate the specific terms of what we believe that theater to be. This does not do that. In fact, these guidelines are totally general.

Let me just ask the Senator if he is also aware that the standards we currently have were not discussed with the Russians; they were informed of them.

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Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I would have to get a further clarification of that latter question. What standards does the Senator refer to?

Mr. WALLOP. The standards we currently use in interpreting missile defenses. We simply informed the Russians that we were going to use them. These are not standards about anything dealing with the provisions against testing, and other things, of the ABM Treaty. This merely defines, in a general way. It does not limit the administration or preempt them. It simply lays down general principles to be used on their final interpretation.

Mr. NUNN. I simply say to the Senator, Madam President, let us give the new administration a chance to look and see whether we have a problem. If they say we do not have a problem, then we do not have one. If they come to the conclusion that we have an ambiguous situation, they may need to get with the Russians and help clarify that.

Some of us thought it was a fair diversion from the ordinary procedure that the President of the United States is a negotiator or interpreter of treaties. We legislate the specific terms of what we believe that theater to be. This does not do that. In fact, these guidelines are totally general.

Let me just ask the Senator if he is also aware that the standards we currently have were not discussed with the Russians; they were informed of them.

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Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I would have to get a further clarification of that latter question. What standards does the Senator refer to?

Mr. WALLOP. The standards we currently use in interpreting missile defenses. We simply informed the Russians that we were going to use them. These are not standards about anything dealing with the provisions against testing, and other things, of the ABM Treaty. This merely defines, in a general way. It does not limit the administration or preempt them. It simply lays down general principles to be used on their final interpretation.

Mr. NUNN. I simply say to the Senator, Madam President, let us give the new administration a chance to look and see whether we have a problem. If they say we do not have a problem, then we do not have one. If they come to the conclusion that we have an ambiguous situation, they may need to get with the Russians and help clarify that.

But in terms of the parallel the Senator from Virginia mentioned between the debate we had on the narrow versus broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we never did legislate any interpretation in law. We basically required----

Mr. WALLOP. That was an unleavened amendment based on the United States' compliance with the treaty.

Mr. NUNN. Madam President, we required that the tests they were going to take and the steps they were taking under the SDI program would not violate that narrow interpretation. We never did put an edict in law. But that is quibbling on a technical point.

The point I make--what I am saying is let us give the administration a chance and find out what they think. We have waited 12 years under three different terms of Republican Presidents, and we have never gotten any kind of definitive answer in this area from those administrations.

We now have a new administration who says they are going to give us a definitive answer within 6 or 8 months. We also have a very clear statement from the administration that there is nothing in the 1994 fiscal year program that in any way violates the ABM Treaty under anybody's interpretation.

So we do not really have to do this, this year. We may have to do something like this next year.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I may take up on the point of the distinguished chairman, I am sure he is aware that here in November 1993, 60 days hence, the administration has to review the THAAD design program. And if someone is of the view that that program on its current course is not complying, then it has to be, as a program, totally revised. So the Senator from Wyoming and I are conscious of decisions which are imminent that have to be made, and we are anxious for this body to be on record as providing the guidelines to help make the proper decision.

It is going to cost us a great deal of money if that program has to be revised on the assumption that there is some conflict with the ABM Treaty. Congress, by November or December, is likely to be dispersed, and that will be costs to the American taxpayers. And also, to go back to the very words of the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, we will have been failing to do our duty in this body; namely, freeing up, removing the chains on the technicians to build the best system possible.

So my question is: Are you aware of the fact that that design review is needed some 60 days hence?

Mr. NUNN. I understood that was a technical review of that system, but not a compliance review as to whether it complied with the ABM Treaty. I may be in error, but I felt those were two separate tracks, and what we had on the THAAD program was a technical review.

Mr. WARNER. My understanding, Madam President, is that it is not separate tracks. It may be separate tracks, but they cross in November.

Mr. NUNN. At some point, they will cross. I do not know how they can do it in November, because the administration does not intend to have the compliance review completed that quickly. I believe that will be done sometime next year.

Mr. WARNER. The problem is that if they cannot determine in November that the system as now designed is compliant, they have to redesign the program or stop it. That is the point.

Mr. NUNN. They are not going to address compliance in November, so they are not going to know anything about compliance. They will not know that until they get through their legal review, Madam President.

Mr. WARNER. I urge the chairman to make a call or two on this. I think I have raised a valid point, showing the time urgency of action by the Congress on this point. I have done some independent research.

I suggest that the chairman might take the opportunity to do inquiring about the THAAD program.

Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to follow that suggestion.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might say, also, the Senator from Wyoming and I will talk to the chairman about possibly some resolution of this, and I know the chairman is thinking about a sense-of-the-Senate.

What is the chairman's personal view now with respect to the objectives of this country in devising theater missile defenses? What guidance would the chairman give the administration on this question of whether or not ABM?

Mr. NUNN. I think the guidance the chairman would give the administration would be pretty clearly set forth in this bill. I do not know how you can be much more forceful than saying you cannot spend more than half of the money until you get the compliance review completed.

Madam President, I agree that it is a very high priority. Believe me, the people in the Department of Defense are going to understand that.

Mr. WARNER. I did not speak clearly enough. I understand that is a procedural issue.

But the chairman himself, Madam President. What would he like to see that review produce in terms of an answer?

Mr. NUNN. I would like to see it produce an honest, legal, objective opinion about what the ABM Treaty interpretation is, Madam President. if it is ambiguous, I think they ought to say it is, in which case there are several alternative courses. If it is clear that none of these systems are going to be in violation, then I think we ought to proceed forward vigorously.

If it is clear that the programs are in violation of the treaty--which I think it is much less likely to come to that result than an ambiguous result--then I think we ought to determine whether it is in our supreme national interest to abrogate the treaty because of the importance of the theater missiles defense, or whether we can persuade the Russians to come up with an amendment that would clarify this for both countries.

I say to my friend that there is a lot more at stake here than simply the ABM Treaty. I know the Senator from Wyoming would just as soon that stay in the dustbin of the industry. But there is a lot at stake here. We have a newly emerged Russian nation.

You have an awful lot of Russian nationals. You have some people in the Russian military that are paranoid about the whole subject of defenses. You have others who are looking at it rationally in Russia, at their borders and their security and what they may need.

When you take all of that into account, I think it is in the interest of this country's national security to at least have consultation with the Russians before we proceed unilaterally in this area. Otherwise, we may end up curing one problem but creating a lot more serious problem.

So there is more at stake here than the ABM Treaty. The question is how do we proceed with the newly-emerging democracy that is the successor to a state that we negotiated the ABM Treaty with.

Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question on that point?

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. WALLOP. We have specifically stayed away. I did not want to get into the debate on terms of the ABM Treaty. We specifically stayed away from that. We do not deal with the issues of testing in an ABM mode or other kind of things.

We are simply trying to find in general terms--and I say again we do not preempt the administration--what constitutes a theater missile. We do not say in here that we can test in an ABM mode or any of those kinds of things which are violations of the treaty.

We are simply saying that for the purposes of our programs, the longest existing, namely the Chinese theater ballistic missile, is the standard by which the theater missile defenses are created. We do not suggest that the administration test them in an ABM mode or take other elements of an ABM system and attach them to them. So it is important not to put this into an interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

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Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it seems to me, and I sympathize with the debate today, it is one of substance which the Senator from Wyoming and I tried to incorporate in this amendment and one of procedure, namely, following the chairman's line of reasoning, that the administration should have some reasonable opportunity to address this problem. The chairman indicated that possibly a sense-of-the-Senate amendment along the lines of one presently before the Senate might be a way to reconcile whatever differences the chairman has with the two proponents of this amendment.

I once again return to the chairman with my question, which I interpreted as indicating the chairman felt just as strongly as do I, the Senator from Wyoming, and, I presume, the majority of the Senate, that this country should proceed to develop the best system that can be devised for our own security interests and that of our allies. And we have to take into consideration the collateral problem with Russia today as we move in that direction.

But do I understand the chairman, in reply to my earlier question, as indicating he is strongly in favor of this country moving ahead and unleashing any restraints on our technicians to provide the best system possible, unless there is some very credible reason as it relates to other relationships with Russia that that not be done?

Mr. NUNN. I think my general answer to that question would be yes, I do agree with that. But I do also believe that we have a lot at stake in terms of upholding the principles under which treaties are negotiated.

We do not enter into treaties lightly. We have them come before the Senate of the United States. They have to be not only presented by the President, but they have to be defended and presented in a way that the Senate of the United States will ratify by the constitutional requirement of two-thirds.

So we treat treaties in this country very importantly. And I think that is appropriate because treaties are the law of the land. That is provided in the Constitution.

So the real question is, do we basically use the procedures and the overall approach in terms of clarifying treaties that we have historically used?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I respect that argument, but I want to come back and determine what can be done today.

Do I understand that if this were converted into a sense-of-the-Senate the chairman of the committee would consider supporting the amendment if it were?

Mr. NUNN. If it were a sense-of-the-Senate urging the administration to come up with an early compliance review, and that the administration should then advise the Congress as to what steps they need, what steps need to be taken, to move forward the theater defense in any event, any ambiguity, I would not object.

Mr. WARNER. That responds more to the procedural aspects. I am interested in the chairman's position on the substantive issue of our Nation having the best possible defense that we can achieve, given the technical aspects.

Sen. EXON. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I have a great deal of respect for the Senator from Nebraska, Senator Exon.

Since it is clear he has not read the amendment--talking about sending the wrong signal around the world; I would say the wrong signal sent around the world is that the United States does not have will enough to protect its combat troops from theater missiles--I will read them for the Senate, since the Senate is disinclined to study it. The amendment specifically made it clear that these are not going to violate the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph (1) applies to a theater missile defense system, system upgrade, or system component that--

(A) has the capabilities necessary to counter the most capable theater ballistic missile existing at the time of the review of such review or determination;

(B) has not been tested against a modern strategic ballistic missile; and

(C) has not demonstrated a capability to counter such a modern strategic ballistic missile.

The signal we are sending is trying to be something different than this Congress sent in early 1980 when it defanged the Patriot and caused the death of some 50 American military personnel in the gulf. We defanged it.

What we are trying to do is say that this Congress and this Senate surely have the right and the obligation to defend American forces from the most capable theater missile defense system that exists in the world when we are designing it.

We are not talking about designing a ballistic missile defense system. We are, in fact, specifically outlawing those things in this amendment.

So the signal we are going to send around the world, failing to do this, is that we are again weak-willed and uncertain as to our to obligations and our rights to defend our own personnel and our own allies against threats that we have identified--the Secretary of Defense has identified, and the President of the United States has identified--as the most pressing that exists today.

There is nothing in this amendment that is half so constraining on the administration as the amendment that is contained in paragraph 223, which fences half their funds until the compliance review. That is constraint, I say to my friend from Nebraska, not this, which provides only a definitional structure of the area in which the United States ought to get on.

I would say again that the current set of standards that we have were not consulted with the Russians; they were informal. And the current set of things that we are trying to do here is take it out of the ABM Treaty specifically item by item. Paragraph (2)(1)(A), (2)(1)(B), (2)(1)(C) are very, very specific in their terms of defining the ABM Treaty.

Now, I do not understand the kind of red-herring arguments that come up here when some in the administration we understand are quite content with this amendment.

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Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence--a committee I served on for many years and at one time I was chairman of that subcommittee--you talk about signals around the world. This reminds me of how you take two horses and hobble them together so they do not run off in the corral.

And we are hobbling ourselves to Russia and blinding ourselves to North Korea, to Iraq, to Iran, and other countries which are bending steel night and day to try and build the systems which some day may be a threat to our Armed Forces.

Yes, a signal will go out around the world that the Congress of the United States is going to sit back and let this ambiguity exist. We may as well go ahead full steam and build these systems, because if, at some point in time, we are attacking them or their interests or their allies or their friends, there will not be in place a sufficient defense.

Sen. WALLOP. So let us not put the blinders on and let the hobbling of the past, of 20 years ago, as pointed out by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, be the reason that at some future point in time we cannot defend ourselves.

Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WARNER. Am I not correct about hobbling the horses in the corral, the two of them together?

Mr. WALLOP. Absolutely.

The question I would direct to the Senator from Virginia is, is it not true that in the gulf, in the most perfect set of circumstances you could imagine--desert, no hills, no foliage, more or less clear skies--that we did not destroy a single missile battery from the air on the ground; not one?

Mr. WARNER. That is correct.

Mr. WALLOP. The only destruction that took place was with a try-hard but relatively inadequate Patriot missile.

What we are asking for is for the Congress and the people of the world to understand that we are not going to find these missiles on the ground and shoot them from 20 miles away with F-15's. We are either going to defend the men and women of the armed services of United States and our allies from missiles we know that exist, theater missiles that we know exist, or not. It is a very simple question in front of the Senate.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is correct.

And I repose my question to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, the chairman of the subcommittee: Do we not have a threat from North Korea, from Iraq, from Iran who are working on these systems right now? The question is posed.

Mr. EXON. I am glad to respond.

I would simply say that I have some of the same identical concerns that have been expressed very eloquently, I think, by my friend from Virginia and my friend from Wyoming.

I would simply point out, by and large, that is why we have language in the bill that is before us that the administration has agreed to proceed with and welcomed, and that is for a study and review of this matter pending recommendations from the administration.

Certainly, I do not wish to be placed--and I hope the Senator from Wyoming and the Senator from Virginia are not trying to place those of us who think the timing of their amendment is wrong--in a position of not wanting to defend properly the troops of the United States of America and our allies.

I would simply remind my colleagues that the making of treaties, world negotiations on treaties, are first in the purview of the executive branch of Government. The executive branch of Government in this case, as I understand it, the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, have agreed that the language we have in the bill to do a review certainly expresses the recognition on the part of the administration that they share the concerns that have been raised on the floor by this amendment from the Senator from Wyoming.

The administration, as I understand it, is in agreement with the point of view that I have expressed and the point of view expressed by the chairman of the committee that they think we would be going too far too fast on this matter, but they have agreed, as you know full well, to do a study of this, to come back with recommendations to us as to what and what should not be written into the law.

I would simply reiterate once again that I am not questioning the motives nor the intent of the Senator from Wyoming or the Senator from Virginia. I just say I think we should allow the President, who, under our Constitution, has the right to make laws and enter into treaties--we have the right to either accept or reject those--but I am afraid that what is being suggested here by the Senator from Wyoming would be the U.S. Senate getting ahead of the administration on treaty matters, which I think is not wise.

Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator simply address one short question?

Mr. EXON. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. WARNER. Do we not have a threat from theater missiles from Iraq, from Iran, and possibly other sources and, therefore, we should---

Mr. EXON. May I answer the question?

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. EXON. In my opinion, the answer is, yes.

Mr. WARNER. That answers my question, Madam President.

And, therefore, we should not look at this issue in the narrow context of a Russia alone as hobbled.

Mr. EXON. Oh, now, in fact I would agree wholeheartedly with the Senator from Virginia in that I believe the threats to the United States of America, our allies and our troops, in at least the immediate future as we view it today, the threats to our combat troops are from other than the Soviet Union, Russia, or the Republics of what has come out of the demise of the Soviet Union.

I really think we have a particular threat from some of the countries that my colleague has mentioned, and possibly others, that concern me. I share my colleague's concern. I question whether this is the time to make the move that he is suggesting.

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Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I rise in very strong support of the amendment offered by my friend from Wyoming, Senator Wallop. I ask at this time unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor to the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMITH. I also want to compliment my friend from Virginia for his efforts in this area. The American people owe a debt of gratitude to the Senator from Wyoming for his leadership on the issue of missile defense. He has been a long-time leader in the U.S. Senate on the issue, and a leader in America in general. I think when history records the events of this time and we look back on today, this debate is going to take on a whole new meaning. And the Senator from Wyoming will be remembered for his perseverance. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be the majority opinion of this body that the Senator from Wyoming is correct. But I have never been one to stand on the sidelines whether I am in the majority or minority. The question is whether the cause is just and proper. In this case, there is no question about it, and the national security of the United States of America is hanging in the balance.

During each of the past 2 years, the Senate has overwhelmingly endorsed the development and deployment of effective theater missile defenses. Implicit in this action was the assessment that theater missiles pose a clear and present danger to U.S. troops and our friends and allies abroad.

What is also very clear is the fact that the 1972 ABM Treaty which prohibits nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles was not intended to restrict theater missile defenses deployed abroad to protect our forward-deployed forces. The architects of the ABM Treaty had no way of knowing, nor did they attempt to predict, how technology would evolve in the future. The treaty was only intended to apply to the missiles that were covered by the SALT I agreement on strategic offensive arms.

In the 20 years since ratification, new technologies have blurred the line between the 1970's strategic missiles, such as the Soviet SSN-6, and the Chinese CSS-2 theater ballistic missile, which is deployed today in Saudi Arabia. The SSN-6 has a range in excess of 2,400 kilometers and a maximum speed of approximately 4.7 kilometers per second. It is considered a strategic missile, bound by the ABM Treaty. The CSS-2, as sold to Saudi Arabia, is estimated to have a range of 2,700 kilometers and a reentry velocity of 4.7 kilometers per second. It is considered a theater missile. Thus, technology and time have blurred the distinction between what constitutes a strategic missile and what constitutes a theater missile. But we should not let semantics dictate national security. We must be very, very careful here.

To be sure, any effective U.S. theater defense system must be able to counter the full range of current and projected theater missile threats.

And Congress has a responsibility to take action to clarify that theater systems such as THAAD, Arrow, and Patriot upgrade are not bound by a treaty never intended to restrict their deployment. This amendment does just that. It ensures that our theater missile defense programs have the capabilities necessary to counter the most capable theater ballistic missile threats that the United States will face.

Now more than ever, Congress and the administration must set politics aside and get on with the business of defending the United States of America. That is what the Constitution says we must do. That is what the American people expect us to do.

In today's threat environment, we simply cannot afford to underdesign our theater missile defense capabilities out of unilateral compliance with a treaty that was never intended to restrict these systems in the first place.

The Wallop amendment represents a very timely and substantive clarification of this issue and the Senator from Wyoming deserves a great deal of credit for his persistence and diligence. I have seen him, year after year, debate after debate, in the Armed Services Committee--which unfortunately he is no longer a member of--making these points saliently and succinctly. Unfortunately, too few of our colleagues have listened to the eloquent words of the Senator from Wyoming.

Let me conclude by saying this. The amendment before us applies only to theater missile defense systems. It ensures that they have the capabilities necessary to counter the most sophisticated theater ballistic missiles in existence and that they have not been tested against a modern strategic ballistic missile, or demonstrated a capability to counter a modern strategic ballistic missile. In short, this amendment ensures that we comply with the letter of the ABM Treaty, while at the same time, develop effective theater defenses. How can anyone be opposed to that?

I say to my colleagues who appear--I hate to use the term but frankly I think it is appropriate--to have a knee-jerk reaction, who oppose this amendment as just another pro-SDI effort, that somehow SDI has become a profanity in the Halls of Congress these days as we slash and cut. But, not only are we slashing and cutting SDI, we are slashing and cutting the defense of America.

This amendment is designed to protect forward-deployed U.S. troops. We have an obligation, a serious obligation, to protect our troops who go into harm's way

no matter where they are. This amendment is not about broad versus narrow. It is an effort to ensure that never again will our forward-deployed troops enter battle ill-equipped to defend themselves.

Think about it. Think about the Persian Gulf war. For the first time in modern history, an American commander was directly attacked by ballistic missiles. We owe it to the 28 brave men and women who lost their lives in the Dhahran barracks at the hands of a Scud missile, never, never to allow this tragedy to occur again.

I must say that we are walking a tightrope today. If we defeat the Wallop amendment, we may again expose more young men and women to that same type of attack and expose another commander to a direct hit from ballistic missiles. We must not put the American people and our troops in that position. The only way to prevent it is to support the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. This is the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I move we temporarily set aside the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, the amendment is set aside.

Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I will send a modification of my amendment to the desk.

I withdraw the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is set aside.