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Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, with my distinguished colleague from California, Mr. Berman, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Operations, I introduced H.R. 2155 to strengthen and revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. It is my intention, Mr. Speaker, that this legislation will be fully considered and marked up by the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, which I chair, and then it is my intention to include this bill as a separate title to the State Department authorization bill, which will be considered by the full Foreign Affairs Committee within the next few weeks.

Mr. Speaker, a debate is now taking place within the executive branch of regarding our Government's best organizational structure for arms control. This is a serious issue and the timing for the consideration of this issue could not be more appropriate as we face grave uncertainties and critical problems in the post-cold war era. Clearly the arms control agenda has changed. During the cold war era we had massive nuclear arsenals locked in a relatively stable equilibrium. We are now facing anarchy, chaos, and disintegration, but at a far lower level of destructive power. Instead of mutually assured destruction between the two superpowers, we are now faced with multiple and unforeseen threats from third powers. No danger to our national security is greater than the continuing spread of nuclear weapons to undeclared nuclear states, coupled with the widespread proliferation of medium range delivery systems and the growing availability of biological and chemical weapons agents and production equipment.

Pakistan, India, and other nations are all believed to possess clandestine nuclear arsenals. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told my subcommittee only last month that he was convinced that North Korea had the bomb. Most experts agree that Iran is actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability and is trying to purchase warheads from republics of the former Soviet Union. Iraq could well have gone nuclear by now if it had not been for the Israeli destruction of the Osirak reactor in 1981, and more recently, Operation Desert Storm, both of which actions I strongly supported. South Africa just recently revealed that it was abandoning its bomb, developed in secret during the 1970's and 1980's, and the list goes on.

Despite the end of the cold war, we continue to face threats to our national security, although these threats are more diffused, less predictable, and much less controllable than in the past. As undemocratic regimes--such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea--strive to go nuclear, arms control and nonproliferation regimes are more critical than ever.

Mr. Speaker, I find it surprising that at this time when there is an even greater need for an independent advocate within the executive branch for arms control and nonproliferation, there is serious discussion of abolishing ACDA altogether. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I find the arguments in favor of revitalizing ACDA and maintaining a separate, independent arms control agency to be much stronger.

Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Speaker, the International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights Subcommittee held a hearing to consider the future of ACDA in light of these striking changes in the international scene. Mr. Sherman Funk, the Inspector General of the Department of State and of ACDA, appeared before our Subcommittee to discuss with us at some length a thorough study of ACDA which he prepared at the direction of the Congress--`New Purposes and Priorities for Arms Control.' The Congress directed the Inspector General to review ACDA's performance in carrying out its major functions and to recommend any changes in executive branch organization and direction that were considered appropriate.

Under Mr. Funk's direction a panel of distinguished former diplomats, arms control experts from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and from the CIA and ACDA considered the challenges currently facing U.S. foreign policy and the best organizational way of achieving our international objectives.

The panel interviewed past Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy as well as several hundred senior present and former experts and key officials throughout the Government.

On the basis of this thorough and extensive evaluation, the panel considered 11 organizational concepts for arms control which were evaluated in the published report. In his testimony before our subcommittee, Mr. Funk said: 'The panel rejected each of these concepts as either inherently impractical or as being inadequate to address the challenges facing us today. Only two alternatives survived the panel review: Fold ACDA into State, or retain ACDA as a separate agency but only if it is reshaped and rejuvenated.'

Mr. Funk explained to our subcommittee the panel's preferred option: `Upon completing its work, the panel concluded--and I agreed--that U.S. interests relating to arms control, including nonproliferation, would be served best by the continuation of an independent arms control advocate.'

He continued: It remains important to have a specialized, technically competent arms control institution. We felt that a separate agency is the better solution to retaining continuity, enhancing technical expertise, fostering innovation and providing a needed independent perspective on arms control issues.

Mr. Speaker, Inspector General Funk expressed in clear and concise terms the fundamental and powerful argument in favor of maintaining an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:

Against this background of increased regional tensions, the conflict between arms control goals and bilateral relationships is intensified. Our fundamental concern for the future of arms control is grounded in the lessons of our past: When there is a policy conflict between U.S. nonproliferation goals and bilateral relations, the tendency of diplomacy, of the State Department, is to protect bilateral relations with U.S. friends and allies, or potential allies.

Recognizing this, the long-term interest of the United States would therefore be better served by an independent advocate--an independent watchdog, if you will--for nonproliferation. ACDA's independent status, in fact, has enabled it to force discussion of issues on which other agencies held opposing views. Significant examples include, perhaps most importantly, the tracking of Pakistan's nuclear program, interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, Inspector General Funk made the argument--very convincingly in my view--against simply merging ACDA into the Department of State. He told our subcommittee:

My very real fear is that if ACDA is folded into State, the kind of high caliber scientific and technical talent which is an essential component in any agency devoted to nonproliferation concerns will either not accept that fold or leave soon after. This fear would be alleviated, or perhaps even obviated, if there were any indication that State's personnel system and long-entrenched attitudes showed any sign of becoming flexible enough to accept significant change. In my six years at State, I have yet to see such a sign.

Mr. Speaker, on the basis of Inspector General Funk's informative and thoughtful presentation, as well as serious reflection and discussion on this matter, I have concluded that we must maintain a separate, independent agency focusing on arms control and nonproliferation issues. A separate and independent agency would provide a continuing resource for technical analysis and support in the arms control arena. A separate and independent agency would be a better advocate for arms control solutions, foster innovation and technological advancement, and would better serve as a watchdog on issues of arms control implementation and nonproliferation. These critical national objectives can be achieved more efficiently and more effectively by having a separate, independent ACDA.

At the same time, Mr. Speaker, it is obvious that in order to play this critically important role in the post-cold-war world, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency needs to be revitalized and strengthened if it is to achieve its promise and accomplish its important tasks. During our hearing with Inspector General Funk, he identified this as a critical issue:

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Since its formation in the early 1960s, ACDA has had its ups and downs. The last 12 years have not been one of their great ups. But in point of fact there has been a loss by ACDA of some of its best people, some of its most qualified scientists have pulled out. I suspect this had to do with the reflection of what they regarded as the lack of clout of the agency. If ACDA is to continue serving those functions that I mentioned, it presupposes that ACDA is going to have some of the best qualified people in town to represent it in negotiations, in discussions and in backstopping on negotiations.

Mr. Funk told our Subcommittee that the effectiveness of any agency in participating in policy determination is dependent upon the clout of the head of that agency and the quality and technical qualifications of the people who represent that agency. In order to achieve this goal, action must be taken to strengthen and revitalize ACDA.

Mr. Speaker, the legislation that Mr. Berman and I have introduced will deal directly with the problems and organizational shortcomings that were identified by Inspector General Funk and by various other studies of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation organization and policy. I would like to review with my colleagues the specific changes that our legislation would make in the structure of ACDA. I also would like to emphasize areas where our legislation affirms and restates our support for the guiding role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and execution of our Nation's foreign policy. Furthermore, I want to emphasize that our legislation is in no way intended to weaken or undermine the current National Security Council process for defining our Nation's international priorities and policies.

Our legislation is intended to provide impetus to improving the ability of our government to manage the complex process of negotiating and implementing arms control treaties and to assure that there is central leadership and control of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The new legislatin--H.R. 2155--strengthens the position of the Director of ACDA. Section 2 of the bill specifies that he or she shall serve as principal advisor to the President and other executive branch officials on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues. Previous legislation stated only that the director serves as advisor to the Secretary of State and the National Security Council. At the same time, the new legislation clearly provides that the Director of ACDA acts under the guidance of the Secretary of State to assure coordination and coherence to our Nation's foreign policy.

The most important provision of our bill relating to the position of the Director of ACDA makes him or her a full member of the National Security Council. Current legislation provides only that the Director shall attend National Security Council meetings involving weapons procurement, arms sales, consideration of the defense budget, and arms control and disarmament matters. Making the director of full member of the National Security Council assures that arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation issues will be fully considered at the highest level of our foreign policy-making.

Section 3 of our bill provides for the appointment of Special Representatives for Arms Control and Nonproliferation by the President with the rank of ambassador to participate in international forums dealing with arms control, disarmament and proliferation, with one such Special Representative serving as the U.S. Governor on the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Current legislation permits the appointment of only two such Special Representatives, but with the increased number of international arms control forums, it is important that the President have the authority to designate additional representatives, and it is important that the United States be represented at such conferences by officials of this rank. These officials shall be supported by ACDA.

Section 4 of the bill provides that ACDA shall have the primary responsibility for the preparation, formulation of policy, support, and transmission of instructions and guidance for all such arms control and nonproliferation negotiations and forums. Clearly that process will involve interagency coordination with the Department of State, with overall policy guidance coming from the Secretary of State. Other agencies--the Departments of Defense and Energy as well as the CIA--clearly will be key participants in that process, but it is important that ACDA play the role of coordinating arms control and nonproliferation participation.

Section 5 of the bill provides statutory authority for ACDA to participate in deliberations regarding the issuing of export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act, the Atomic Energy Act, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. While, in practice, ACDA presently does participate in the review of decisions for issuing of licenses for exports of military equipment and nuclear materials, at present, participation is informal and not necessarily required by law. It is essential that ACDA's involvement be established unequivocally in legislation.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation is an important step in strengthening and revitalizing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It continues the philosophy of President John F. Kennedy, under whose administration it was established in 1961. Over the past three decades, the international environment has changed substantially, but the dangers of failing to control the spread of conventional military equipment and weapons of mass destruction has increased. In this climate it is essential that we have the benefit of a strong independent voice at the policy table speaking for arms control and nonproliferation. This is the purpose of the legislation that I have introduced. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting its adoption by the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I include the full text of H.R. 2155 in the Record at this point.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

The purposes of this Act are--

(1) to provide renewed impetus in improving the United States Government's ability to manage the complex process of negotiating and implementing arms control treaties;

(2) to provide central leadership and coordination to United States nonproliferation policy; and

(3) to improve congressional oversight of the operating budget of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(a) Director.--Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended to read as follows:

`(a) Appointment.--The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No person serving on active duty as a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the United States may be appointed Director.

`(b) Duties.--The Director shall serve as the principal adviser to the President and other executive branch officials on matters relating to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. In carrying out his or her duties under this Act, the Director, under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall have primary responsibility for matters relating to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, as defined by this Act.'.

(b) Permanent Membership on National Security Council.--Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(a)) is amended--

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as paragraphs (6) through (8), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph (5):

`(5) the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;'.

(a) In General.--Section 27 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2567) is amended to read as follows:

`(a) Appointment.--The President may appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, Special Representatives of the President for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Each Presidential Special Representative shall hold the personal rank of ambassador.

`(b) Duties.--Presidential Special Representatives shall perform their duties and exercise their powers under direction of the President, acting through the Director. One such Special Representative shall serve as the United States Governor to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

`(c) Administrative Support.--The Agency shall be the Government agency responsible for providing administrative support, including funding, staff, and office space, to all Presidential Special Representatives appointed under this section.'.

(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking `Special Representatives for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (2).' and inserting `Special Representatives of the President for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.'.

Section 34 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2574) is amended to read as follows:

`The Director shall have primary responsibility for the preparation and management of United States participation in all international negotiations and implementation forums in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. To this end--

`(1) the Director shall have primary responsibility for the preparation, formulation, support, and transmission of instructions and guidance for all such negotiations and forums, and shall manage interagency groups established within the executive branch to support such negotiations and forums; and

`(2) all United States Government representatives conducting negotiations or acting pursuant to agreements in the fields of arms control, disarmament, or nonproliferation shall perform their duties and exercise their powers, under the direction of the President, acting through the Director.'.

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(a) Arms Export Control Act.--Section 38(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

`(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, taking into account the Director's assessment as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other bilateral arrangements.'.

(2) Section 42(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2791(a)) is amended by striking out all that follows `(3)' in the last sentence and inserting the following: `the assessment of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as to the extent to which such sale might contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements. No decision shall be made over the objection of the Director unless the Director has been informed in writing of the reasons why the Director's opinion was not deemed sufficient to deny the proposed sale, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to appeal the proposed decision.'

(3) Section 71 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2797) is amended--

(A) in subsection (a) by inserting `, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,' after `Secretary of Defense';

(B) in subsection 7(b)(1) inserting `and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency' after `Secretary of Defense'; and

(C) in subsection (b)(2)--

(i) by striking out `and the Secretary of Commerce' and inserting in lieu thereof, `the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency'; and

(ii) by striking the comma after `applicant' and all that follows through `documents'.

(b) Atomic Energy Act.--(Section 131 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160(b)) is amended--

(A) in paragraph (2) by inserting `and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency' after `Secretary of State'; and

(B) in paragraph (3) by inserting `and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency' after `Secretary of State'.

(2) Section 142 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2162) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

`f. All determinations under this section to remove data from the Restricted Data category shall be made only after consultation with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. If the Commission, the Department of Defense, and the Director do not agree, the determination shall be made by the President.'.

(c) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.--Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 2139a) is amended to read as follows:

`(c)(1) The Department of Commerce shall maintain controls over all export items, other than those licensed by the Commission, which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes.

`(2) The Commission shall not grant any individual, distribution, or project license for the export of items controlled pursuant to paragraph (1) without prior consultation with the Department of State, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense.

`(3)(A) The Secretary of Commerce shall, within 90 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, establish orderly and expeditious procedures which are mutually agreeable to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These procedures shall include provision for establishing the list of export items required by paragraph (1), for permitting automated access to all license applications for such items to all agencies listed in paragraph (2), and for formal interagency referral of license applications for the export of items on the list.

`(B) The procedures in effect under this subsection on the date of enactment of this paragraph shall cease to apply 90 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph or upon the effective date of the new procedures required by this paragraph, whichever occurs first.'.