Uganda - Military Spending

Official figures show that since Museveni’s inauguration in 2011, taxpayers have spent Shs 5.2 trillion on the army, police and intelligence agencies. And by the end of President Museveni’s term in 2016, the figure will have risen to Shs 6.671 trillion. Of that, the ministry of Defence (where the army falls) takes the lion’s share of Shs 5.171 trillion. It means that the Defence budget for the five years of Museveni’s current term was two times bigger than what was spent in his last term. For instance, the Defence budget swelled from Shs 974bn in 2011 to Shs 1.048 trillion in the 2013/14 financial year.

In February 2015 the parliamentary committee on the National Economy rejected a request from the army to borrow $170m (Shs 470bn) to procure sophisticated military equipment. The defence officials reportedly pegged the need for the money to the “volatile” security situation in the country. They refused to disclose the type of equipment they want to purchase under the guise of classified expenditure.

The total approved budget including funds for AMISOM last FY 2011/12 was 947,996,754,686/= and the approved supplementary budget was 132,500,000,010/=. The budgets out-turn including supplementary expenditure was 1,072,057,153,137. The actual releases up to June 2012 were 1,072,057,153,137.

In the course of the FY 2011/12, MOD received additional funds through supplementary appropriations as follows; a supplementary of UGX 132.5b was provided of which UGX 22.150bn was to cover the shortfall of the total wage requirement for FY 2010/11 and UGX 28.932bn was to cater for food, 32.7bn for fuel, 0.700bn for medical, 23.5bn, classified expenditure, 28.9bn, Aircraft maintenance 1.18bn, Clothing, 8.6bn electricity and 4.130bn was for Operation Lightening Thunder (OLT). The revised budget of the MOD including supplementary was UGX 1,080,496,754,696.

Since re-invigorating its campaign against the LRA in northern and eastern Uganda in 2002, Uganda has sought to boost official defense spending substantially. The Ugandan government announced in October 2003 that it was to cut expenditure of various government ministries and departments and re-allocate more funds to the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). Reequipping the UPDF is hampered by the government’s obligation to donors that it will not spend more than 2% of GDP on defense.

In 2011, Uganda’s military expenditure hit US$1.02 billion. As of 2011, according to various international sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Uganda is ranked as the 73rd country in percentage defence spending vis-Ã -vis the GDP in the world. Uganda's defence spending had been hovering over 1.9% of GDP, Kenya at 2% in recent years, Tanzania at 1.5% of GDP.

From 1975 to 1985, Uganda's reported military expenditures averaged less than 3 percent of gross national product (GNP) and ranged between 14 and 30 percent of government spending. Arms imports multiplied eightfold between 1977 and 1982, however, from about US$8 million to US$65 million, measured in constant United States dollars. Expenditures then declined to an annual average of US$11 million between 1983 and 1986 and increased slightly in 1987. In 1988-89, the government allocated US$40.7 million to the military. This figure represented a larger portion of government spending than in other East African countries but substantially less in absolute terms than defense spending by those governments.

The fiscal year (FY) 1992 budget included total government spending of 674.35 billion Uganda shillings (USh), or about US$911.3 million, of which the government claimed defense spending would constitute about 20 percent. Educational expenditures would constitute 12 percent; health care, 6.5 percent; 3 percent was earmarked for providing safe drinking water. Roughly one-third of expenditures were to be financed by government revenues; one-third by foreign grants; and one-third by borrowing, debt rescheduling, and the sale of treasury bills.

In September 2014 the Public Accounts Committee recommended disciplinary action against Rosette Byengoma, the permanent secretary in the ministry of Defence, over accumulated arrears of nearly Shs 40bn. Speaking to The Observer last week, Alice Alaso, the Serere Woman MP and PAC chair, said that by failing to provide documents to justify expenditure beyond what it was allocated, Byengoma violated the Public Finance and Accountability Act.

Byengoma told MPs that the debt accumulated is due to the perennial inadequate budget to finance key items such as food, fuel, uniforms, medical and electricity. Byengoma also faulted the policy on arrears management, which requires that debts from a previous financial year must be paid with available resources before any more supplies are borrowed. This, she argued, meant that “the planned commitments will not be paid as funds are diverted to clear arrears of the previous period.”

The Ugandan government is focusing on implementing its Defence Strategic Infrastructural Investment Plan (DSIIP), which is professionalising the UPDF and building its capacity. However, operational and personnel requirements have in the past amounted to more than 90 per cent of defence budgets, leaving little money for badly needed overhaul and modernisation programs. Cooperation in defence and security within the region especially in the East African Region, will be enhanced and the Memorandum of Understanding will be upgraded to protocols.

In late 2009 the Government of Uganda (GOU) released the first tranche of funding for its three-year, USD 600 million Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP). GOU commitment to live up to its PRDP promises is a recurring concern for the USG, other donors, development partners, and most of all, for northern Ugandans themselves.

The PRDP is a planning framework intended to strengthen the coordination of post-conflict recovery and development efforts in northern Uganda. The plan will ultimately involve 40 districts throughout northern and northeastern Uganda, or roughly half of the districts in the country. The GOU is committed to funding 30 percent of the PRDP's total USD 600 million budget. Donor partners will fund the remaining 70 percent. USAID provided approximately USD 138 million in FY2008 and USD 112 million in FY2009 in support of PRDP goals and activities.

GOU contributions will focus on health, water, education, and roads. District level governments will manage 80% of central-level GOU funds. The remaining 20% will be centrally managed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Individual districts submitted PRDP work and procurement plans in June 2009. Although there has been some delay in allocating central GOU funds to the PRDP districts, Gulu District received its first quarterly tranche of PRDP funding in mid-September, making it the first official recipient of PRDP funds. Gulu was slated to receive approximately USD 2.3 million in PRDP funds for 2009.

GOU delays in disbursing PRDP funds contributed to suspicions over GOU commitment and intentions. Some feared the PRDP was a government ploy to get donors to fund reconstruction efforts in northern Uganda, or a political ploy to bolster President Yoweri Museveni's 2011 presidential re-election bid. The allocation of approximately USD 650,000 in PRDP funds to Gulu District in northern Uganda has allayed many of these concerns, as northern Ugandans and development partners are now cautiously optimistic about the GOU's commitment to make good on PRDP promises to fund reconstruction of the north.

While the disbursement of funds to Gulu was good news, serious challenges remained. One of these challenges was funding. Because PRDP money came from a myriad of different donors and budgetary sources, the funds themselves are difficult to track. There was also confusion over the actual contributions of individual donors. The USG and other donors disclosed their PRDP funding contributions to the Ministry of Finance. However, this information rarely trickled down to relevant district and local level stakeholders responsible for drafting local PRDP development plans.

To minimize confusion and avoid overlap, donor partners worked with the OPM and the Ministry of Finance to consolidate and analyze funding data, integrate PRDP activities, and ensure that local stakeholders are aware of the amounts and sources of PRDP funding affecting their constituencies.

The GOU was also struggling to coordinate a dizzying array of intra-governmental stakeholders (i.e. local, district, and national level government entities), bilateral and multilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The GOU is also struggling to define the specific roles and responsibilities of NGOs involved in PRDP implementation. After providing emergency relief services for nearly two decades, many humanitarian actors had been slow to replace these programs with the transitional development services suitable for post-conflict zones like northern Uganda.

Complicating matters further was the traditional reluctance of many of the NGOs on the ground in northern Uganda to share information on their planned activities and budgets with the GOU. NGOs are sometimes hesitant to disclose this information for fear that doing so could result in political pressure or increased corruption.

Accountability, both real and perceived, posed another major hurdle for the PRDP, as many Ugandans believed PRDP money will be mismanaged by corrupt government officials. To address these valid concerns, the GOU must monitor, evaluate, and fully report PRDP progress to ensure accountability for PRDP funds and demonstrate transparency among stakeholders. The GOU plans to monitor program progress and sustainability through a variety of oversight committees and working groups. These groups then report to a higher-level PRDP Monitoring Committee (PMC), which served as the ultimate oversight authority for PRDP resources.