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Military


Tunisia - Military Budget

The Tunisian National Army (Arme Nationale Tunisienne — ANT), which was divided into army, air force, and naval components, had a threefold mission: to defend the country's territorial integrity against hostile foreign powers, to assist the police as necessary in maintaining internal security, and to participate actively in government-sponsored civic action programs. The government has also sought to ensure, largely with success, that the ANT had little influence in the political sphere.

Contemporary Tunisian society reflects little of the military tradition that permeates the national life of the other Maghribi countries. Many scholarly observers have attributed this anomaly partly to legacies of the era before Tunisia's protectorate period and to experiences encountered during the 75 years of French domination.

Political scientist Jacob C. Hurewitz has also pointed to changes that have occurred within the society, including the virtual disappearance of traditional Berber culture. Thus Bourguiba and the PSD did not have to depend on the leverage of a preeminent military establishment to settle internal disputes between contending ethnic or regional groups as have leaders in other developing countries. Neither had it required military help in unifying the large homogeneous population behind the goals and aspiration that Bourguiba and his political elite have upheld as national objectives.

Lacking any hope of absolute defense and preferring to invest in domestic programs, the Tunisian government had long been content to maintain a military establishment of modest size and limited combat effectiveness compared with those of its neighbors. The military and a largely paramilitary police system were key elements in a defense strategy that called on the security forces to provide credible deterrence against external aggressive threats and, failing that, to deal effectively with minor incursions until assistance arrived from friendly states.

The republic's domestic difficulties were compounded by problems with neighboring states. Tunisia is flanked by Algeria and Libya, two much larger and militarily stronger states whose militancy on Third World and Pan-Arab issues contrasted with Bourguiba's more pro-Western attitudes. During the early 1980s relations with Algeria began to improve, and a treaty of friendship and concord made the countries virtual allies. At the same time, however, Libya has repeatedly posed a potential threat to the Bourguiba government. By periodically threatening Tunisia with greater military strength and by instigating at least one armed rebellion in Tunisia, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al Qadhaafi had proved himself a dangerous neighbor.

Since the nation's formal independence from France in 1956, the Tunisian government generally attempted to concentrate its efforts and resources on domestic development while maintaining harmonious relations with its neighbors and other powers. Despite these efforts, Tunisia's location between Algeria and Libya—two states long characterized by their oil wealth and revolutionary ethos—its identity as an Arab and Islamic state, and the generally pro-Western, modernist tendencies of Bourguiba's leadership have prevented the country from avoiding regional disputes.

In the first years after independence the Bourguiba government was concerned with clashes and threats from France and Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic). France, occupied with the revolution in Algeria, had kept a large number of troops on Tunisian soil after 1956. Intent on limiting Tunisia's role as a sanctuary for Algerian revolutionaries or as a conduit for materialassistance, the French on several occasions used force against Tunisians who were giving support to the Algerians. The most notable example was the French bombing in 1958 of the Tunisian border village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef.

After its independence from France in 1962, Algeria soon moved to the forefront of Tunisian external security concerns. Under the leadership of its first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria took an active role in supporting "progressive" and "revolutionary" forces in Africa and the Middle East, including Tunisian opponents of Bourguiba. In the early 1980s Tunisia and Algeria steadily strengthened their relationship into a de facto alliance.

Secretary of State for Defense Ahmed Mestiri first proposed a long-term plan that included military modernization and involvement of the civilian population in the country's defense in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War. Greatly impressed by the Israelis' ability to defeat larger Arab forces in the brief encounter, Mestiri believed that Israel's defense strategy could be adopted by Tunisia. More important than the quantity of armaments, he pointed out, were the qualities of technical ability, leadership, the ingrained organizational structure of units, and the kind of faith that animates soldiers. He was greatly impressed by the concept of the Israeli citizen-soldier and advocated a program that would involve both the military and the civilian population in national defense. The program proposed by Mestiri seemed more economically feasible than joining a North African arms race, and the government approved it.

Between 2011 and 2016, over 600,000 irregular migrants and refugees1 reached Italy via the Central Mediterranean. Some were successfully smuggled across, while others were rescued at sea and disembarked in Italy. More than 13,000 died attempting the crossing, and many more died on their journey through the Sahara. Few sub-Saharan migrants pass through Tunisia heading for Europe, but Tunisia could nevertheless face the issue of transit migration in future.

The EU-Tunisia cooperation portfolio contributes to addressing the root causes of irregular migration. In cooperation with GIZ, Agence Française de Développement, Expertise France and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the EU supports Tunisia in the implementation of the National strategy on Migration. In line with the priorities of this Strategy, the program will aim at reinforcing socio-economic opportunities for young Tunisians in the regions most affected by emigration, mobilising Tunisians abroad to invest in the country, as well as setting up a platform for the sustainable reintegration of Tunisian returnees. In practical terms, this programme supports the creation of 30 enterprises by the Tunisian Diaspora in Europe, the socioeconomic development of 1 200 young Tunisians and the reintegration of 200 Tunisians through psychosocial and economic support.

Following a 21 September 2018 meeting of EU leaders in Salzburg, Austria, where they agreed to cooperate closer with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya to curb illegal migration German Chancellor Angela Merkel has advocated for taking the European deal with Ankara, according to which Turkey agreed to help with more than 3 million refugees in exchange for several billion dollars, as an example for an accord with the Northern African states.



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