Syria - Military Spending

By all standard indicators, the economic burden of defense was large. Although government defense expenditures declined during the five years after the June 1967 War, they jumped markedly in 1973, beginning a rapid ascent that continued in 1985 and 1986. From 1983 to 1985, defense expenditures reportedly grew from US$2.6 billion to US$3.3 billion, and in 1986 the defense budget was estimated at US$3.6 billion.

According to the Syrian government's 1986 Statistical Abstract, estimated national security expenditures were US$3.7 billion. Between 1985 and 1986, defense expenditures were inflated by the high cost of maintaining nearly 25,000 troops in Lebanon. In 1985, for example, defense expenditures consumed about 30 percent of all central government expenditures. In 1986 there were reports that defense would account for over 55 percent of total government expenditures in Syria's 1987 budget, and that government spending on defense was driving Syria into heavy debt and an acute economic crisis.

Syria has consistently ranked among the countries with the highest burdens of defense on society. Economic and military analysts contended that the Syrian government's growing defense expenditures have severely limited expenditures in other areas vital to the nation's social and economic progress. According to data compiled by Ruth Leger Sivard in World Military and Social Expenditures, for example, in 1983 military expenditures per capita were the equivalent of US$249 (ranked 27th in the world), while public expenditures for education were US$102 (ranked 52nd); for health they were US$7 (ranked 95th).

In spite of these figures, observers agreed that the government's officially reported defense expenditures markedly understated the actual resources devoted to national defense. The same observers also suspected that the reported expenditures did not include such important items as construction projects for military use.

In the 1980s, the Asad regime and the Syrian military elite had a strong, mutually dependent relationship. The military elite provided a crucial service to the regime — the maintenance of internal and external security. In return, the Asad regime provided the military with substantial resources — 21.8 percent of Syrian GDP in 1985 alone. There was no indication that the regime wanted to significantly cut military expenditures — expenditures that had averaged 15.3 percent of GDP since Asad came to power. Ideologically, the regime's stance toward Israel justified the elevated status of the military in Syrian society and the substantial amount of resources the military received.

While high, these figures most likely underestimated Syrian military expenditures. The data cited does not include spending on major weapons programs that in the 1980s were still supplied by the Soviet Union on highly concessional terms. Syrian military expenditures reflected primarily domestic spending on public works, construction, and light manufacturing — spending used primarily to maintain support in patrimonial relationships.

Following the Iraqi defeat by the US led coalition in the 1991 Persian Gulf War; the Syrian regime purchased massive amounts of weaponry with the cash aid itreceived for its participation. This came at the same period as Syria's acceptance and participation in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Through the 1990's, Syria'smilitary spending equated to 8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at over $800 million. These are the official numbers; the actual numbers are most likely significantly higher. This level of spending is commensurate with other nations military spending inthe region such as Israel at 9.5 percent of its GDP, Jordan at 7.8 percent and Egypt at 8.2 percent.

Defense spending accounted for an estimated 6 per cent of the 2001 Syrian budget, which was approved by the People's Assembly in late April 2001. The Damascus government publishes few details of the budget and nothing on politically sensitive defense allocations. The 2001 defense budget had been set at US$838 million, clearly a figure that is totally insufficient to fund armed forces of this size and complexity. At the very best no more than US$75 million could be allocated to army procurement expenditure from this figure.