Military

Mercenary / Private Military Companies (PMCs)

The term mercenary is applied to a variety of historical situations which do not appear to have elements in common. Casca, the eternal mercenary, pulled the duty of nailing Christ to the Cross and was doomed to spend eternity as a soldier, a career that can lead to billets like sitting on five-gallon water cans in the cold desert wind on Christmas Eve in Saudi Arabia.

The use of mercenaries in warfare goes back to ancient times. Over the centuries, a great many States and cities have employed professional soldiers from other lands to provide for their defence or expand their empires. Mercenaries were used extensively, for example, by the kingdoms of the Warring States period of China 475–221 BCE. They were used, with varying degrees of success, by Carthage in its wars against Rome from 264 to 146 BCE and by innumerable kings and princes around the globe throughout the Middle Ages. The demand that King John banish his mercenary forces from England forms part of the first version of the Magna Carta in 1215 – illustrating that possession by the sovereign of a force owing no allegiance to the country, or its people, has long been regarded as a threat to the rights of subjects.

It was during the brutal Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that the use of mercenaries reached one of its most notorious excesses. Huge mercenary bands laid waste to much of Europe with little regard for the suffering of the common peoples who were killed, mutilated and despoiled at the whim of marauding “soldiers of fortune”. These wars also exemplified a major objection to mercenary service – soldiers who fight only for pay have no interest in bringing war to an end. As Niccolò Machiavelli pointed out, they were greatly dedicated to their own preservation and also had an unsettling propensity to turn against their former master when funds ran out.

Mercenaries produced, however, many practical advantages. They came ready-trained and could be deployed almost immediately. They were often highly skilled in the art and science of war. Their services could usually be dispensed with at the end of the conflict. A State could also distance itself from their brutality in a way that was not possible with a national army. Throughout history, mercenaries were found to be particularly useful for putting down rebellions since they had no common feeling for citizens. They were, therefore, often the tools of tyrants who used them to repress popular attempts to gain political freedom. The colonial powers from the dawn of the modern era through to the middle of the twentieth century made extensive use of mercenaries, often recruiting from one indigenous group to fight against another. Until recently, however, international law had no position on their legality per se and they were treated, for most purposes, simply as combatants.

The activities of mercenaries in post-colonial Africa generated particular animosity to this form of military service amongst emerging States. Mercenarism was inextricably linked in public opinion to colonialism, racism and denial of self-determination. Although they were, on occasion, capable of fighting “cleanly”, mercenaries were also involved in numerous atrocities, for which accountability was often lacking due to their ambiguous status. This distaste for mercenary service led to the drafting of the Organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which was opened for signature in Libreville on 3 July 1977.

That same year, mercenaries were denied combatant status by article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “Geneva Additional Protocol I”). This position has since been described as a rule of customary international law. While captured mercenaries are not entitled as of right to prisoner of war status, the capturing power may, nevertheless, afford them equivalent status. They must also be treated humanely and may not be convicted or sentenced without previous trial. The major impact of the provision is disqualification from combatant immunity.

While a lawful combatant who complies with international humanitarian law bears no criminal responsibility for killing or injuring enemy combatants or damaging military objectives, that is not the case for mercenaries. A capturing force could, for example, put a mercenary on trial for murder for killing one of its soldiers. Furthermore, mercenary service itself might constitute a crime under the domestic law of the capturing State. The best-known post-World War II example of such a trial occurred on 28 June 1976 when an Angolan court sentenced three Britons and an American to death and nine other mercenaries to prison terms ranging from 16 to 30 years.

Mercenary service is not, however, listed as a “grave breach” under Geneva Additional Protocol I. Although some States had by that stage already criminalised mercenary activity, there was no international law obligation to do so. This situation remained unsatisfactory to a number of States, particular those from the African continent.

The recruitment and use of mercenaries is legally defined in international law, in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, to which Ukraine is a party. The criteria for a mercenary are taking part directly in hostilities, motivated primarily by the desire for private gain, being paid substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of the party to the conflict, and not being a national of the party to the conflict or a resident of the territory controlled by a party to the conflict. The recruitment and use of mercenaries is prohibited by international law.

On 5 December 1979, Nigeria, acting on behalf of other Member States of the United Nations, sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General requesting that an item entitled “Drafting of an international convention against activities of mercenaries” be added to the agenda of the General Assembly’s thirty-fourth session. The General Assembly adopted resolution 34/140 of 14 December 1979, by which it decided to consider the drafting of an international convention to “outlaw mercenarism in all its manifestations”. At its thirty-fifth session, in 1980, on the recommendation of its Sixth Committee, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries composed of thirty-five Member States. On 17 February 1989, the drafting group produced the draft articles of the Mercenaries Convention.

The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 44/34 of 4 December 1989. It entered into force, in accordance with article 19, on 20 October 2001.

The "International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries", which noted that "the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries should be considered as offences of grave concern to all States and that any person committing any of these offences should either be prosecuted or extradited..." This convention defined a mercenary, as a person, who among other attributes "Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party..."

The Mercenaries Convention had been ratified by 36 States. There are a further nine signatories which have yet to ratify. The Mercenaries Convention has, therefore, met with only moderate acceptance internationally. After more than three decades, less than one in five Members of the United Nations are parties, and recent accessions to the treaty are only slowly increasing. No permanent Member of the Security Council is a party, and relatively few major military powers have ratified. This may be due in part to the widespread, but contestable, belief that the definition of mercenary in article 1 is too complex or limited. It may also be thought that the use of mercenaries is now a relatively minor or historical problem.

Article 1 sets out the critical definition of a mercenary, who may be of either of two types. The first is any person who:

• Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
• Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
• Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
• Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
• Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

Article 1.2. extends that definition to include a person who:

• Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
• Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
• Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
• Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
• Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.

Although sometimes criticised as too complex to be workable, the definition is no more complicated than is the case with many other international crimes. The specific intent of the mercenary must be private gain over and above that which an ordinary soldier would receive. While this may be difficult to prove in some cases, it coincides with the general conception of a mercenary.

General Assembly resolution 54/151 of 17 December 1999 stressed the need for a better and more precise legal definition of mercenaries that would make for more efficient prevention and punishment of mercenary activities. Governments were requested to make proposals towards a clearer legal definition and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was asked to convene expert meetings to study and update the international legislation in force and to propose recommendations. To date, however, no better definition than that set out in the Mercenaries Convention has been agreed upon.

The Mercenaries Convention does not ban, per se, the employment of foreigners individually or in special units of national armed forces, such as the French Foreign Legion, or Britain’s Brigade of Gurkhas. It also has no direct impact on the activities of so-called “private military and security companies” (hereinafter “PMSC”) which have been extensively used by major military powers in recent armed conflicts, occupations and other war-like operations. These private commercial concerns supply logistical and administrative support to the armed forces and carry out certain security tasks – sometimes with poor human right results. It is asserted by those who use them, however, that they do not take a direct part in hostilities – a prerequisite of mercenary status. The dividing line between the activities of PMSC and mercenarism in practice may not always be so clear cut.

Although described as “offences of grave concern to all States” in the Mercenaries Convention’s preamble, mercenary activities were not enumerated among the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Nevertheless, the recruitment, training and use of mercenaries is widely regarded as a destabilising element in regional politics, a likely impediment to the rapid and peaceful resolution of conflict and a challenge to the demand for accountability in respect of human rights breaches and war crimes. The Mercenaries Convention, despite its modest adherence rate, sets out a norm which is now seldom refuted. It therefore adds, in a concrete way, to the international stigmatization of this form of military service.

With regard to foreign fighters, there is no internationally agreed legal definition of foreign fighters, nor a specific regime governing them. A foreign fighter is generally understood to refer to individuals who leave their country of origin or habitual residence and become involved in violence as part of an insurgency or non-State armed group in an armed conflict. Foreign fighters are motivated by a range of factors, notably ideology, but can also be attracted fight for financial reward. Foreign fighters are obliged to respect applicable rules of international human rights and humanitarian law during armed conflicts.

The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-determination was established in July 2005 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2. It succeeded the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries, which had been in existence since 1987 and was serviced by Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros (Peru) from 1987 to 2004 and Ms. Shaista Shameem (Fiji). In March 2008, the Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the Working Group for a period of three years. In September 2014, the Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the Working Group for a period of three years.

Given that the “modern” national state military dates back only 200 years, the privatized military industry (PMI) is not the departure from tradition that it first seems. But PMIs are not purely mercenaries. They come in three general types: providers, consultants, and support services. Executive Outcomes was a provider (i.e., a combat force). Consultants are more accurately designated military advisors and trainers; for example, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a spin-off from the Lockheed-Loral merger, built the Croat army. A representative support PMI is Brown & Root Services, the Halliburton subsidiary that is currently a major contract rebuilder in Iraq.

Estimates of the number of private international security personnel range from 15,000 to 20,000. That is as much as 15 percent of the total US presence of about 130,000 soldiers. These private contractors -- who most often work for corporations, diplomats, or journalists -- have no accountability to the US military. These private security contractors can earn up to $1,000 a day. NATO forces have used private soldiers for security in the Balkans. But the proportion of private security personnel to regular military soldiers was no greater than 10 percent.

Part of the US Occupation force in Iraq, the in-country commander, LTG Sanchez decreed that federal civilians will not carry weapons. But being well acquainted with some fellow federal civilians, if they were armed over here it would scare the "you know what". Consequently, every time civilians leave their "safe area", they must have what are called "shooters" with along. They are sometimes the mercenary security teams who are hired and paid by the contractors. Other times they are young American men and women in the US Army.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a disproportionate growth in the tail to tooth ratio on the battlefield; that is, a marked escalation in the number of support functions relative to actual combat power. As weapons and equipment become more complex and challenging to maintain and operate, there is a greater willingness to rely on civilian contractors who can provide services ranging from monitoring advanced weapon systems to rendering technical assistance and logistical support. No longer restricted solely to acquisition and logistical functions, contractors often accompany the military into war zones and even into battle.

Is the battlefield contractor, in a sense, a corporate soldier and is the US military becoming increasingly commercialized, privatized, and outsourced? The presence of civilians accompanying the force on the battlefield has legal and ethical ramifications and raises troubling questions relating to issues of chain of command, authority, accountability, force protection, and, ultimately, mission effectiveness. That presence, too, provokes discussion about the growth of the privatized military industry and the reliance on civilians in the realm of military training, international security missions, and peacekeeping operations.

The post Cold War world has given rise both to new problems and new opportunities. In many areas we need to test the received wisdom against an evolving post Cold War reality. The global confrontation of the Cold War and its massive military establishments have been winding down; instead we find ourselves in a world of small wars and weak states. Many of these states need outside help to maintain security at home. There may also be an increasing need for intervention by the international community. At the same time, in developed countries, the private sector is becoming increasingly involved in military and security activity. States and international organisations are turning to the private sector as a cost effective way of procuring services which would once have been the exclusive preserve of the military. It is British Government policy for example to outsource certain tasks that in earlier days would have been undertaken by the armed services.

The demand for private military services is likely to increase. The cases that attract most attention are those where a government employs a private military company to help it in a conflict - as the governments of Sierra Leone and Angola have done. Such cases are in practice rare and are likely to remain so; but we may well see an increase in private contracts for training or logistics. Some of this demand may come from states which cannot afford to keep large military establishments themselves. But demand may also come from developed countries. It is notable for example that the United States has employed private military companies to recruit and manage monitors in the Balkans.

A further source of demand for private military services could be international organisations. The private sector is already active and effective in areas that would once have been seen as the preserve of the military - demining for example. And both the UN and international NGOs employ private companies to provide them with security and logistics support. A strong and reputable private military sector might have a role in enabling the UN to respond more rapidly and more effectively in crises. The cost of employing private military companies for certain functions in UN operations could be much lower than that of national armed forces. Clearly there are many pitfalls in this which need to be considered carefully. There are, for example, important concerns about human rights, sovereignty and accountability.

A private military advisory and training company has the ability to assist a dysfunctional state by providing the initial professional and neutral framework to serve as a core around which new security forces can be formed and moulded. The client government may well have trained and capable personnel, but may lack functioning structures and systems and may be plagued by the lack of mutual trust in the residue of an internal conflict. A professional and neutral (impartial and a-political) organisation can fill those gaps and simultaneously create an opportunity for the client country's own surviving professionals to recover and begin to rebuild.

A private military advisory and training company can equally assist a functioning country that is recovering from a conflict, or which faces a sudden threat and must quickly build up armed forces. More often than not a country in such a position will need foreign assistance, but may not be keen on committing itself to any one country and may then opt for a private company. It may also be acquiring equipment from countries antagonistic to each other, which could create real practical problems where training teams of those countries were to encounter each other on site. A neutral training team from a private company can offer real advantages in such a situation.

On November 4, 2013, the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries urged the countries of the world to create a binding agreement that would regulate the operations of private military and security companies (PMSCs). The Montreux Document is the first international document to reaffirm the international legal obligations of States regarding the activities of private military and security companies. It also contains a series of best practices designed to help States take appropriate measures to comply with their obligations under international law.

The Montreux Document is a reflection of the consensus that international law is also applicable to private military and security companies and that they do not operate in a legal vacuum. It is a practical and realistic contribution to promoting compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights. The document contains answers to legal questions raised by the use of private military and security companies without creating new obligations. It is not legally binding as such.

he Montreux Document is the result of an initiative launched by Switzerland and the ICRC in early 2006. A first draft of the Montreux Document was prepared during four intergovernmental meetings that took place between January 2006 and September 2008. The final document was adopted by consensus of the participating states at the fourth and last meeting, which took place in Montreux from 15 to 17 September 2008.

In December 2014, the Montreux Document Forum was created as a venue platform for informal consultation exchange between the participants of the Montreux Document. The forum's objective is to help implement the Montreux Document at the national level level and to encourage other States and international organisations to support it.

PMSCs are obliged to comply with international humanitarian law or human rights law imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as other applicable national law such as criminal law, tax law, immigration law, labour law, and specific regulations on private military or security services. The personnel of PMSCs are obliged to respect the relevant national law, in particular the national criminal law, of the State in which they operate, and, as far as applicable, the law of the States of their nationality. The status of the personnel of PMSCs is determined by international humanitarian law, on a case-by-case basis, in particular according to the nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved. They are entitled to prisoner-of-war status in international armed conflict if they are persons accompanying the armed forces meeting the requirements of article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention.

Today's world is a far cry from the 1960s when private military activity usually meant mercenaries of the rather unsavoury kind involved in post-colonial or neo-colonial conflicts. Such people still exist; and some of them may be present at the lower end of the spectrum of private military companies. One of the reasons for considering the option of a licensing regime is that it may be desirable to distinguish between reputable and disreputable private sector operators, to encourage and support the former while, as far as possible, eliminating the latter.

MPRI was purchased by L3, DynCorp was purchased by CSC, and Vinnell was purchased by Northrup Grumman. 5/29/2023 Security companies jumped again to the forefront of global events after the Russian Wagner Company took control of the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut after confronting a regular army. This calls into question the role that these companies play, and whether we are heading towards the privatization of wars, the decline of the tasks of armies in international conflicts, and the repercussions. This is based on human rights and legal accountability. Although security and military companies first appeared after World War II, their roots are ancient and linked to mercenary gangs that are paid money in exchange for carrying out military operations, such as assassinations, blocking roads, protecting convoys and important figures, and participating in wars. Several countries and empires throughout history recruited mercenaries, and even had military teams of mercenaries similar to the Roman Empire, one of the reasons for its downfall was its greater reliance on mercenary teams and the failure of its youth to enlist in the army and participate in combat. To this day, France still maintains the Foreign Legion (Foreign Legion), which was founded in 1831, with elements mostly foreign, with the aim of expanding the colonization of Algeria at that time, so that the work of the Legion would extend to various parts of the African continent, as a result of foreigners being prevented from serving in the French army after The July Revolution of 1830. However, the term “mercenary” with a hideous connotation is being reshaped under new names of a commercial nature in exchange for security or military services. Controversy still exists regarding it and the extent of its legality and legality. Although the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, signed in 1990, criminalizes the phenomenon of mercenaries, several countries have legalized the establishment of security and military companies, similar to the United States, while others have allowed their activity even though the law criminalizes them, such as the situation of the Wagner company in Russia. advertisement Play Video ??? ??????? 02 minutes 06 seconds 02:06 From mercenary to security trade The first appearance of a security company in the world was in the United States in 1946, according to a study by Dr. Yassin Taleb at the University of Algiers. It was founded by veterans, and they called it “DynCorp.” In the 1960s, British Colonel David Stirling founded a security company under the name “Watch Guard International,” which provided its services to some Gulf countries, according to the Algerian academic. Perhaps the most famous example of the role of mercenaries in the second half of the twentieth century was done by the French mercenary Bob Dinard (whose real name is Gilbert Bourgeau), who worked for several countries, whether for France and Belgium during the colonial period in African countries, or for American and British intelligence during the Cold War, and served In Iran during the time of the Shah, and in Yemen during the era of the Imami. In the 1980s and 1990s, Bob Dinard (1929-2007) led a group of mercenaries to overthrow the government in Benin and the Comoros. He succeeded in one of his attempts to bring Ahmed Abdallah Abdel Rahman to the presidency of the Comoros in a military coup, and thanks to this success, he was appointed commander of the National Guard. But the group of mercenaries led by Bob Dinar, which offered its security and military services to anyone who requested them, did not have a legal structure, and was not officially recognized by any government. advertisement However, the fame of security companies rose after the occupation of Iraq in 2003, and their role in protecting civilian and military figures and facilities in exchange for contracts worth billions of dollars paid by the American administration to these companies, such as Blackwater. However, Blackwater's reputation was tarnished after it committed massacres and abuses against unarmed civilians, such as the Nisour massacre in Baghdad in 2007, which was described as a "murder party" during which 17 civilians were killed. Play Video ??? ??????? 49 minutes 21 seconds 49:21 Why do countries resort to security companies? One of the main reasons why some countries and armies resort to security and military companies is that they are not subject to the controls of international law, and they can be disavowed if they are involved in war crimes or crimes against humanity without the blame being placed on the regular armies. Also, security and military companies are usually led by professional officers outside the service, who are distinguished by high efficiency in performing the tasks assigned to them, and are free from the bureaucratic restrictions that control regular armies, and they can work outside their countries, and they adopt a flexible and mobile military system that resembles guerrilla warfare, unlike regular armies that They tend to occupy the ground, entrench themselves around it, and defend it behind fixed bases and positioning points that are easy to identify and target. But what distinguishes the work of security companies from mercenaries in the traditional sense is that they work in coordination with governments and regular armies or with armed groups and militias that correspond to the interests of their countries. Among the criticisms directed at security companies are that their members are affiliated with the owner of the company, not the state, are not governed by military law, and are not ranked in the ranks, which makes controlling them not easy, and they appear more ferocious and violent in order to achieve their goals, in the absence of an explicit law that deters them. Sometimes the members of these companies have immunity in the countries that use their services, which makes them more daring in violating human rights and using violence, even against civilians, indiscriminately. Even when the US army bombed Wagner members in Syria after targeting one of its sites in the country, killing dozens of them, Russia disavowed them, otherwise it would have been forced to respond, and this could lead to the outbreak of a direct military confrontation with the United States that could develop into a nuclear war. In addition, human losses among the army would demoralize the people, and might prompt the families of dead soldiers or soldiers on the battlefields to demand an end to the war at any cost, as happened with the Americans in the Vietnam War. But resorting to security companies, foreign mercenaries, and prisoners reduces the psychological effects of the war on public opinion, and reduces the official losses of soldiers, even if they are large among members of the security companies, which are not announced, similar to what happened in the Iraq War. advertisement Play Video ??? ??????? 03 minutes 34 seconds 03:34 Private armies The escalation of the roles played by security and military companies, especially during periods of conflicts and wars, makes them a competitor or even parallel to the regular armies, if not the active and vital party in wars. This situation would transform regular armies into bureaucratic bodies whose role is limited to providing logistical support to private companies, such as supplies, weapons, ammunition, and providing funds and salaries. Private companies have not yet reached the stage of possessing an integrated air and naval force, but these issues are developing. The Wagner company in Libya owns drones and “Pantsir” air defense systems. In fact, a military helicopter with Wagner members on board was shot down in the middle of the Libyan desert in 2020. . Security companies are on the verge of turning into small, flexible and fast armies that are more effective in achieving victory than traditional armies, by using former military and technical officers and experts. However, this would cause them to invade the state, for the benefit of an individual or specific lobbies, if their interests conflict with the state’s policy. The best example of this is the Bob Dinard mercenary group. It helped Ahmed Abdel Rahman return to power in a military coup in the Comoros in 1978, and then killed him when the presidential guard, which was led by the French mercenary, was dissolved in 1989. advertisement Historically, one of the reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire was its reliance on mercenary armies, after its youth were too lazy to join the army and participate in wars. Therefore, security companies are still viewed with a lot of suspicion, even though they have expanded in recent years to exceed 300,000 companies around the world, with varying sizes and tasks. However, what unites them is that they provide security and military services in exchange for contracts (money) like any commercial company. Source : Anadolu Agency