Morocco - Personnel

Between 1964 and 1974 the FAR increased its manpower from 40,000 to 60,000, with 884 commissioned officers who had been trained at Saint Cyr, Toledo and Meknes, top military academies. It was increased further due to the conflict over Western Sahara and by 1999 the number of the FAR in Morocco was at 198,500 on active duty with another 150,000 as reservists and remain so till they reach the age of 50.

Total army strength is 175,000, of whom 100,000 are probably conscripts. The bulk of the FAR is made of Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Para-Military and Auxiliary Forces which represent only around 10% of the total forces. The Para-Military has over 50,000 men and women, of which 23,000 in the Gendarmerie Royale. The Auxiliary Force, organized under the Army, has 30,000 men, including 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps.

Whether the FAR should be a professional force based solely on volunteers or an institution dependent at least in part on a selective service system has historically been a matter of great political concern. At issue in this question were two opposing viewpoints. On the one hand the king has been determined to maintain personal control of a loyal armed force, and it is generally believed that volunteer forces would be more likely to be unswervingly dedicated to the monarchy. On the other hand the civilian political parties and activists have favored obligatory military service, which, they felt, would not only result in a truly national army but would also afford their adherents access to influential ranks within the FAR. In the early 1980s the struggle appeared to have been resolved: conscription was enforced, the king maintained unquestioned control of the military, and the politicians were apparently irrelevant in military affairs.

At independence in March 1956 Hassan, backed by the newly created General Staff, had decided that the army would be professional rather than conscripted, a move recommended to and accepted by his father, Mohammed V. Maintaining such a volunteer force at necessary manpower levels proved not to be difficult. In a country beset with a high rate of unemployment, military service offered considerable security; moreover the high prestige of a military uniform was an attraction of some value in a society proud of its long-standing fighting tradition. In the 1960s, during the few enlistment periods that occurred to increase the size of the army, the commanding officers of the military units operated their own recruiting services, a system borrowed from the French. Under this system renewable enlistments of five years' duration were permitted, and the resulting reenlistment rate was invariably high. Enlistees, most of whom could neither read nor write, were assisted in filling out occupational questionnaires and were given medical examinations, including X-rays, but there were no clinical or aptitude tests.

For most military members the conditions of service — except perhaps for those associated with the lengthy tours of duty in the Western Sahara — provided a higher standard of dignity and comfort than many had found before the reforms that followed the attempted coups of 1971 and 1972. Members of the Moroccan armed forces were paid a basic monthly salary augmented by certain allowances. Within each rank there were several base pay steps determined by length of time in grade, total years of service, or a combination of both. At the time of commissioning and throughout their military careers, officers with credentials indicating completion of secondary school or higher education received two years of service seniority for pay purposes. Married officers received slightly higher housing allowances than bachelors. Other allowances were based on the number of children in the family. Rations and pay compared favorably with standards in the civil sector and in most cases were considerably better. Other advantages, such as medical care, retirement benefits, and in-service training for civilian career specialties, also made military service attractive.

The favorable pay structure, however, had not always been a reliable feature of military service. As an example, officers' pay rates established in 1956 were lower than those offered to civilians performing similar duties in the government. This discrepancy, plus the fact that military pay scales were not increased for the first seven years after independence and promotions came more slowly than for workers in other government agencies, created growing dissatisfaction among the officers, particularly those in the lower grades. Some junior officers consequently resigned their commissions and sought higher paying positions in the civilian branches of government service. Prompted by the drop in officer morale, Hassan approved a new pay scale in mid-1963 that was retroactive to several months.

An important element of the reforms instituted after the coup attempt of 1971 was the implementation of a new pay scale designed to place the compensation received by military personnel on a par with that of the civil service. Pay for military personnel sent to the combat zone in the Western Sahara after 1976 was reported doubled for the period of the three-month tours they served in the area. As a result, service in the Western Sahara was a much sought-after assignment in the mid-1980s.

The army's traditional status as a professional service changed somewhat after the king's zahir of 1967, which introduced a system of conscription, and especially after the reforms instituted in the wake of the coup attempts of the early 1970s. Since then the FAR has consisted of a carefully selected corps of volunteers serving as a cadre augmented by conscripted personnel, who under the king's zahir have been required to serve for 18 months in the armed forces after reaching the age of 18.

The FAR benefited from a high rate of reenlistment, and many soldiers preferred to remain in the service until forced out by age. Maximum age-in-grade limits, ranging from 41 for lieutenants to 61 for generals, have been fixed by law. Statutory age limits for NCOs and enlisted men ranged from 45 for privates to 50 for warrant officers. Highly qualified NCOs or enlisted men who performed special duties were authorized to serve beyond their statutory age limit. This occurred less frequently with officers.

Morocco has not experienced difficulty in meeting its need for military manpower. According to United States government estimates, from a population estimated at 23.6 million in 1984 there were some 5.2 million males aged 15 to 49. Of these, an estimated 3.2 million were considered to be fit for military service. Roughly 255,000 reached the age of 18 annually and were subject to the system of limited conscription. In 1985 the number of physically eligible youths conscripted annually was not known with any degree of certainty.

Persons classed as Berbers made up the bulk of Moroccans in the French and Spanish armies during the protectorate period. As late as 1971 they were estimated to constitute about 80 percent of the troops in the FAR and over half of the officers. Their predominance in the officer corps, particularly at its upper levels, ended, however, with the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 when the involvement of leading Berber officers belied their reputation for loyalty to the king.

The numerical dominance of Berbers in the officer grades had actually begun to decline soon after independence. At that time newly instituted standards favoring a candidate's academic background and test performance rather than noble birth discouraged the entry of rural Berbers from prominent families and increased the proportion of better educated townspeople, most of whom were considered Arabs. Accelerating in the period after the coup attempts, the proportion of Arabs in the FAR as a whole reportedly had increased to some 40 percent in the early 1980s; their proportion in the officer corps was believed to be much higher.

Observers have classified members of the officer corps in terms of generational differences, often labeled them by the year in which they graduated from the Royal Military Academy. The first generation of officers, who initially served as soldiers in the Spanish and French armies, were generally characterized by a relatively low level of education and by an apolitical conservatism. Few of these remained in the FAR in 1985. The most prominent was Brigadier General Driss Ben Aissa Faqir, inspector general of the FAR, who had been retained in the service beyond retirement age by the king. A second generation of officers, trained in the early classes of the Royal Military Academy or military schools in France and Spain, had generally come from an urban environment where they had enjoyed better educational advantages; many were the sons of government bureaucrats or from families associated with commercial industries. Subsequent groups — those who joined in the late 1960s and 1970s — generally came from middle-class backgrounds, mainly in urban areas. Another intergenerational group of officers was made up of NCOs who had earned commissions, primarily in the army.

Historically, most educated urbanites have tended to view a military career with suspicion and disdain, partly because of the repressive role of the army during the protectorate period and partly because of its occasional use in suppressing student and worker riots. The rural population, however, has always been attracted to the military, which is viewed as an honorable vocation and one that offers economic security. Some observers thought that the widespread support for the Moroccan cause in the Western Sahara war may have altered the views of some groups of urban Moroccans toward a military career.

One of the most significant characteristics of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) is the status gap between officers and enlisted. Getting a job as an officer in the Moroccan military is seen as prestigious. It is relatively well paying and can lead to future opportunities and advancements. Officers are required to attend a military academy and many have degrees in higher education. Moroccan officers usually speak several languages, including Arabic, French, and English. They conduct all military business in French. Officers are seen as being of a higher class than enlisted and thus they are treated better and have more privileges. Many Moroccan officers have trained at U.S. military schools.

The enlisted Moroccan, however, joins the military out of desperation, due to the high unemployment rate, widespread poverty, and lack of other opportunities. Enlisted are typically uneducated and often illiterate. Many enlisted can only speak Arabic. Enlisted are treated very poorly by the officers, and as a result, the officers are often despised by the enlisted.

Absolute loyalty to the King is demanded of all military personnel. Members who disagree with any policies would never mention it in public. Any hint of disloyalty or religious extremism can lead to termination or jail. It is not appropriate to ask military personnel their opinions on national politics. The FAR is made up of Arabs and Berbers. In the past, Berbers were purged from the military, but this is no longer the case. Berbers and Arabs are treated equally in the FAR. There are also female military personnel, but they hold almost exclusively administrative roles.

Morocco has what is considered one of the strongest militaries in the region. Their forces frequently train with foreign militaries and are involved in several international peace keeping operations. Most of their foreign training comes from the United States and France. They are enthusiastic about working with the United States, and morale during bilateral training is high. The Moroccan forces are also very proud people and may become defensive if they feel they are being treated condescendingly.

A comprehensive domestic training system is in place but Moroccan troops are also trained in France and have the benefit of US advisers. Moroccan Army training teams are on loan to the armed forces of Equatorial Guinea and the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi). The army is competent and has concentrated on counterinsurgency operations in Western Sahara. It also has expertise in mountain and desert warfare. The FAR is, however, considered underfunded and lacks spare parts.