2014 - Elections

Indonesia is a multiparty democracy. In 2019 Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) won a second five-year term as president. Voters also elected new members of the House of Representatives and the Regional Representative Council, as well as provincial and local legislatures. Domestic and international observers deemed the elections to be free and fair.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings by government security forces; torture by police; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious abuses in the conflict in Papua, Central Papua, Highland Papua, South Papua, and West Papua Provinces (the Papua region), including unlawful civilian deaths or harm, torture, and physical abuses; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the use of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups; crimes involving violence or threats of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and laws in Aceh Province criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.

Armed conflict between government forces and separatist groups continued in the Papua region. There were numerous reports of abuses against civilians including unlawful or arbitrary killings, physical abuse, and destruction of property. The government investigated and persecuted some of these, but civil society reported instances of impunity. The conflict caused the displacement of thousands of residents. Outside the Papua region, there were numerous reports of unknown actors using digital harassment and intimidation against human rights activists and academics who criticized government officials, discussed government corruption, or covered issues related to the conflict in the Papua region.

There were numerous reports that security officials committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Many of these reports related to security forces’ counterinsurgency operations against armed separatist groups in the Papua region. In cases of alleged extrajudicial killings by government officials, police and the military often did not conduct investigations and when they did, failed to disclose the findings of these internal investigations. Official statements related to abuse allegations sometimes contradicted nongovernmental organization (NGO) accounts, and inaccessibility of areas where violence took place made confirming facts difficult.

NGOs made numerous reports of police and security forces using excessive force during detention and interrogation, with some cases resulting in death. KontraS reported 677 injuries from alleged torture and other abuse by security forces between July 2021 and June 2022.

Aceh Province has special authority to implement sharia regulations. Authorities there carried out public canings for violations of sharia in cases of sexual abuse, gambling, adultery, alcohol consumption, and sexual relations outside of marriage. Same-sex sexual conduct is a criminal offense in Aceh, punishable by caning; there were no known cases of punishment for this crime during the year. Sharia should not be applied to non-Muslims, foreigners, or Muslims not resident in Aceh; however, it sometimes was.

Overcrowding was a serious problem, including at immigration detention centers. According to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, as of September there were more than 276,000 prisoners and detainees in prisons and detention centers designed to hold a maximum of 132,107. Overcrowding posed hygiene and ventilation problems. Guards in detention facilities and prisons regularly extorted money from inmates, and prisoners reported physical abuse by guards.

Lack of legal resources was particularly problematic for persons involved in land disputes. Local government officials and large landowners involved in land grabs reportedly accused community activists of crimes, hoping the resulting detentions or arrests and the community’s lack of legal and financial resources would hamper efforts to oppose the land grab. Land access and ownership were major sources of conflict. Police sometimes evicted those involved in land disputes without due process, often siding with business-related claimants over individuals or local communities.

There were multiple media and NGO reports of police temporarily detaining persons for criticizing the government, participating in peaceful demonstrations, and other nonviolent activities. Media reported cases in which suspects were detained longer than allowed by law, in some cases – especially of low-level crimes with sentences less than a year – resulting in immediate release of persons found guilty because the time served in pretrial detention equaled or exceeded their sentence.

Spreading hate speech or false information is punishable by up to six years in prison. Language in the law regulating pornography has been broadly applied to restrict content deemed as offending local morals. Blasphemy is punishable for up to five years in prison. Blasphemy cases, however, were usually prosecuted under the Electronic Information and Transactions law, which was often used to regulate online speech and carries a maximum six-year prison sentence. NGOs reported this law was also often used to prosecute critics of the government.

From January to September 2022, the Alliance of Independent Journalists reported 30 cases of violence against journalists that included doxing, physical assaults, and verbal intimidation and threats perpetrated by various actors, including government officials, police and security personnel, members of mass organizations, and the public.

NGOs and media reported that paid groups of cyber troops, colloquially called “buzzers,” used bots and fake social media accounts to shape political discourse online. Researchers reported that buzzers were frequently used by both pro- and antigovernment groups. Media reported that the government directly financed some buzzer operations.

In May 2022 demonstrations triggered by rumors that the 2024 election could be postponed and President Jokowi’s term extended drew thousands of students and other protesters around the country. Police responded with water cannons and tear gas.

Indonesia’s relationship with China will be a key issue in the 2024 presidential election, with two of the three candidates appearing to have a pro-Beijing tilt, Jakarta think-tank CELIOS said in its brief released on 04 Augst 2023. The future leader will have to navigate tricky terrain because China is Indonesia’s top foreign source of investment while also viewed as a threat to the territorial sovereignty of Southeast Asia’s largest country. The three Indonesian presidential hopefuls are vying to succeed Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who has forged a close relationship with Beijing,

Among the contenders, former Jakarta Gov. Anies Baswedan seems to be the only one skeptical of China, which is vying with its number one rival, United States, for influence in Southeast Asia. Candidate Ganjar Pranowo, who is from Jokowi’s party and is governor of Central Java province, is expected to continue his predecessor’s policy, according to CELIOS. And on the face of it, it appears that the third contender, Prabowo Subianto, the defense minister who is a former army general, may also continue Jokowi’s policy, CELIOS said. For instance, Prabowo, as defense chief, sought to boost military cooperation with Beijing.

But the think-tank added a caveat: All of Prabowo’s actions were really those of the Jokowi administration, so they ought to be viewed in that light, and if elected president, it is possible Prabowo may change direction.

CELIOS said the candidate who would most likely “transform” the current government’s foreign policy if he wins is Anies. Anies appears more interested in building relations with the United States and Western countries, said he think-tank’s researcher, Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat. “During his tenure as a Governor of Jakarta, Anies has visited several European countries to solicit cooperation, starting from the construction of the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) to collaborative smart city,” Zulfikar said during a webinar hosted by CELIOS in Jakarta.

He noted that despite the Jokowi government leaning towards China, Anies has regularly been engaging with the West – he visited Britain, Germany, France, and Luxembourg in 2022. According to CELIOS, Anies may feel closer to the West because he lived and studied in the U.S. for many years. “Anies ostensibly understands that with the steady anti-China sentiment in society, Indonesian politicians who have close ties with the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) generally experience defeat at the polls,” the policy brief said.

“It could be that not being labelled as a ‘Chinese lackey’ can be a surefire way to gain public sympathy.” CELIO was referring to China’s massive infrastructure projects in Indonesia, which are often dogged by controversies to do with labor conditions, environmental impact and the possibility of drawing Indonesia into a debt-trap. “Anies wants to change the way Indonesian people view the government, which has been criticized by the public for being overly pro-China,” Zulfiqar said.

Ganjar Pranowo, the Central Java governor who is the candidate of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) in the 2024 presidential election, has publicly proclaimed he would carry on with Jokowi’s policies if elected, CELIOS researcher Zulfikar said. Jokowi and Ganjar’s party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have a history of warm ties. “Jokowi himself has a close relationship with China, as witnessed by the focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy during his leadership which was more inclined towards China, especially in development and infrastructure sectors,” Zulfikar said during a webinar hosted by CELIOS in Jakarta.

Jokowi’s infrastructure focus was in line with China’s worldwide infrastructure-building program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the think-tank said. “Geopolitically, Indonesia has a strategic geographical advantage and a large market share to absorb and realize China's interests in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative. … The growing ties between the two countries have continued to develop throughout Jokowi's second term,” the policy brief said.

Besides, Ganjar, as Central Java governor, has had frequent contact with China and “frequently praises China,” Zulfikar said. “Central Java Province has signed various cooperative programs with China in the scope of regional partnerships.” For instance, dozens of Chinese investors in the wood and furniture sectors invested nearly U.S. $2 billion in the Central Java economy in 2019.

In May 2023, Ganjar also signed an investment deal with the Chinese for the construction of an energy factory at Batang Industrial Estate, which is expected to create jobs for at least 10,000 local workers, CELIOS said.

As for incumbent Defense Minister Prabowo, CELIOS said he “is part of a system in which the current government's foreign policy is closely aligned with China's interests.” While Prabowo stressed to his Chinese counterpart in September 2022 – during a time of escalation of tensions in the disputed South China Sea – that Jakarta would continue to uphold its free and active foreign policy, most of his other meetings with Chinese officials have been about defense cooperation, the think tank said.

“The frequency of Prabowo's interactions with China so far is noteworthy as an indicator of the potential direction of Indonesia's foreign policy in the future, if he is elected president,” the policy brief said. “However, it should be stressed that the relationship that exists is inseparable from the fact that many of these engagements were carried out as part of his official position as minister in Jokowi's cabinet.”

The think-tank noted that in recent years, the China Coast Guard and Chinese ships have been very active in illegally patrolling around Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – “to the point of entering the North Natuna waters.”

“Nevertheless, the Indonesian navy did not prevent these vessels from entering and only monitored from a distance of less than a mile,” the policy brief said. “The president-elect must be firm and consistent in dealing with China's aggressiveness in the South China Sea.”

Indonesia does not have any territorial disputes with China, but it has repeatedly lodged protests against Chinese fishing boats and coast guard vessels entering its EEZ near the Natuna Islands. Yeta Purnama, another analyst at CELIOS, said the next president also needed to renegotiate projects that could potentially lead Indonesia into a debt trap, including the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project. “The most concerning issue is the miscalculation that leads to increases in construction costs which could potentially become a debt trap,” Yeta said during the webinar.

The next Indonesian president needed to uphold Jakarta’s free and active foreign policy and maintain a certain distance from China, said Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, a political scientist at the University of Queensland in Australia. “If Indonesia gets too close to China, we will fail to maintain our position in the battle of superpower countries,” he said at the webinar. “It will not have a good impact in the long term.”