Georgia - Security Policy

The large-scale military aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Georgia in August 2008 made it clear that, for certain countries, open military aggression is still a tool they are willing to employ in order to accomplish their political goals in today’s world. The military aggression by the Russian Federation in 2008, the occupation of Georgian territories, and the deployment of occupation forces in Georgian territories significantly worsened Georgia’s security environment. The 2008 war demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia’s choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy.

Broadening the integration processes in Europe is important for the security of Georgia. Georgia is a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore, the expansion eastward of NATO and of the European Union is important for Georgia.

In September 2006, the Parliament unanimously approved a policy concept of “Total and Unconditional Defense” with the intent of creating a pool of 100,000 reserve personnel. It includes a provision that directs the MOD to train a substantial number of reserves and form additional wartime structures. By 2007 the National Guard Department was finalizing their concept to meet the government’s guidance. Georgia’s enhanced integration in NATO will imply a revision of “Total and Unconditional Defense concept”. Based on anticipated changes to the existing legislation concerning the “Total and Unconditional Defense” the overall structure of the National Guard will be significantly reduced.

In December 2004 the Law on Defence of Georgia defined the roles of the President, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence. A civilian Minister of Defence now leads a civilian MOD, separate from the General Staff. A Law on Military Service, which defines the obligations of citizens, regulates contract service and sets up a military police, has passed its first reading in Parliament. A military discipline code, drafted with the involvement of military commanders, NGOs and external advice, is awaiting Presidential signature and promulgation. MOD legal department intends shortly to begin drafting legislation preparing the way for an all professional force and for a Status of Forces agreement with NATO.

The Georgian Armed Forces [GAF] is capable of defending and counterattacking against lower level military forces. Land and air capabilities are sufficient to counter a small military or paramilitary force supported with limited combat support and combat service support assets. Fixed and rotary wing capabilities are limited primarily to day operations. Ground support capabilities are marginal, due to aircraft and the lack of practiced air-ground procedures. Naval forces are ill-prepared to execute assigned missions of maritime surveillance, protection of sea lines of communications, or defense of the coastline or ports. However, the Navy can conduct “show the flag” deployments, support civilian authorities during emergencies, conduct limited sea-based search and rescue operations, and support the Coast Guard in law enforcement activities. Special Force capabilities are currently marginal, with little training or the necessary equipment needed to conduct traditional missions such as strategic reconnaissance, direct action or hostage rescue.

In order to assess Georgian Armed Forces combat capabilities, to set up a conceptual background and to create plans for military requirements and structural modifications, an intensive and extensive review was conducted. As a result, “The Interim Report on Strategic Defence Review” was published in May 2006 and the “SDR Final Document” was completed in June 2007 and approved by the Parliament and President in November 2007. The “SDR Final Document” is the first document in Georgian history that thoroughly addresses the current status of the Georgian Armed Forces. It defines the requirements for military capabilities, identifies major capability shortfalls and identifies the means to eliminate the shortfalls. Based on key military and political assumptions, the SDR recommends future Georgian Armed Force structure modifications for the short- (2007-2009), mid- (2010-2012) and long-term (2013-2015) periods. Accordingly, essential conceptual documents such as the “National Military Strategy”, the annual “Minister’s Vision”, the national “Threat Assessment Document”, “Defence Policy Priorities” and other Ministry-level documents were developed based on the results of the Strategic Defence Review. These documents form the conceptual basis for elaborating future national security policies.

Georgia’s first National Security Concept (NSC) was approved in 2005 by the Georgian Parliament and President. This document outlines the nation’s fundamental national values, national interests, threats, risks, and challenges. The NSC also provides the major directions for national security policy as well as its foreign, social, and economic policy priorities. The NSC outlines challenges and threats to the country’s national security, such as violations of its territorial integrity, renewal of hostilities in the separatist regions, smuggling and terrorism corruption and ineffective governance, economic and social challenges, dependence on a single source of energy supply, absence of an effective information policy, and ecological problems. This underscores the vulnerability resulting from Russia’s control of Georgia’s energy resources.

Georgia’s first National Military Strategy (NMS) was signed by the President of Georgia in November 2005. It provides guidance to enhance combat capabilities for self-defence in meeting current threats, and improving the defence management system. Its main theme is the necessity for Georgia to attain long-term security through deterrence gained by collective defence, specifically membership in NATO. The need for collective defence is underscored by Georgia’s inability to put significant resources against a variety of internal and external threats, some originating from significantly more powerful sources.

The Minister’s Vision guides the development of all defense planning. It provides an annual set of goals and objectives to ensure unity of effort within the MOD. These goals and objectives are fully consistent with the National Security Concept and National Military Strategy and provide a common vision for security planning. It is developed with a clear focus on the internal and external threats facing Georgia and articulates the continuing effort to continue to move towards enhanced NATO integration and the collective security assurances that it provides for the nation.