Germany - Military Policy

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz unveiled the country's first "National Security Strategy" on 14 June 2023. The plan envisages more coherent foreign and security policies to prevent Berlin from being wrong-footed by geopolitical events. The country's first national security strategy cites Russia as the greatest security threat “for the foreseeable future”. Chancellor Olaf Scholz said the new strategy, which his three-party governing coalition pledged to draw up when it took office at the end of 2021, had gained added importance since Russia attacked Ukraine almost 16 months ago. The war in Ukraine has heightened anxiety in Germany about the preparedness of its own armed forces, prompting Scholz to announce a “turning point” on military spending.

Scholz pointed out that, while the past policy documents focused on defense, the new strategy would focus more on foreign policy. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in Feburary 2022 demonstrated “what many of our neighbours in Eastern Europe have warned us about — that Europe is vulnerable,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock told reporters at a news conference in Berlin also attended by Scholz and other top officials. The 76-page document outlining the strategy states that “today’s Russia is, for the foreseeable future, the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area."

Scholz's three-party government agreed to create a more comprehensive strategy in its coalition pact in November 2021, and the proposal gained more traction when Russia launched the war in Ukraine in February 2022. The war exposed deficiencies in the German military, the country's overreliance on Russia for energy and questions over how critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines could be protected.

Germany will provide the NATO military alliance with 35,000 troops as of 2025, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said 12 October 2023. The announcement is linked to extensive plans — numbering some 4,000 pages — that have been drawn up by the alliance. They describe in detail how critical locations on NATO territory should be protected by deterrence, and defended in an emergency.

As many as 300,000 NATO troops and equipment are to be assigned for quick deployment from their home countries to a specific territory or country. Germany will make some 200 aircraft and other key assets available for rapid deployment, Pistorius said. About 4,000 German soldiers are to be stationed permanently in Lithuania.

The plans had been made in light of Russia's war in Ukraine and are aimed at preparing the military alliance for worst-case scenarios such as an attack on a NATO member, either by Russia or a terrorist group. The minister spoke as he arrived for the second day of a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels. He has previously said that Germany would have a dual role under the new plans. It would serve as a logistical hub for the deployment of troops and material while also beefing up defense capabilities on NATO's eastern flank.

Germany's Zeitenwende [“sea change”] is a term for epochal change that Chancellor Olaf Scholz used to define the impact that Russia's invasion of Ukraine had on the country's foreign policy and position in the world. War had broken out in Europe again — and this took many people in Germany completely by surprise. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, especially the ruling parties decided to change tack on several key policies. The issue of national defense, the original purpose of the Bundeswehr, is coming back into focus. For far too long it had been entirely unclear where Germany stood. Now everyone knows.

It was a powerful speech on Ukraine that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered in the Bundestag 27 February 2022. It was clear that it's the end of ifs and buts, as well as the politics of hesitant little steps. Germany is sending weapons to Ukraine and massively investing in the Bundeswehr. This marked the beginning of a new era, a reality the chancellor himself repeatedly referenced.

The Society for the German Language (GFDS) in Wiesbaden named "Zeitenwende" the word of the year for 2022 on Friday after Chancellor Olaf Scholz used it to describe his overhaul of Germany's foreign and security policies following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The word is not new to Germany's dictionary — defined by Duden as "the ending of an epoch or era and the beginning of a new time" — but in 2022 it became a political buzzword.

For propaganda purposes in Moscow, it is a 'special military operation,' and for many, particularly in NATO, it's simply a war of aggression. But also in political parties with a pacifist tradition, the view has established itself that Ukraine must be supported with weapons, to defend its integrity as a state and later achieve a lasting peace in eastern Europe. The most obvious political party are the Greens. Once an opposition party railing against NATO membership and the presence of US nuclear weapons on German soil, and arguing that even the Bundeswehr's limited international involvement went too far, the party has arguably become the most hawkish voice within the three-way coalition in Berlin.

Germany's coalition government had taken a clear stance against Russia the aggressor. Finally, NATO allies, in particular the Baltic states, know where they stand with Germany. There is a fear there that Putin's Russia wants to force them into its sphere of influence, along with Ukraine. Scholz made it clear that Berlin will not tolerate that and that it stands firmly behind its NATO commitments.

Exporting German weapons to conflict areas was long a no-go, especially for the Greens, who are the second-largest party in the new coalition government. The Green Party has its roots in the peace movement of the 1980s. The party has supported peace missions by Germany's army, the Bundeswehr, but always advocated a very restrictive arms export policy.

For decades, given the country's history as an aggressor, anyone in Germany who advocated strengthening the Bundeswehr was quickly considered a warmonger. But now the military is to be upgraded, and massively so. The armed forces are to be brought up to speed with a special fund to the tune of €100 billion ($111 billion).

Germany is to a large scale dependent on Russian energy supplies: Russia accounts for more than half of Germany's natural gas imports and more than 40 percent of its oil imports. They can hardly be replaced quickly. To counteract dependence on Russia for gas, terminals for liquefied gas from the US are now to be built.

Armed deployments must be approved by parliament. Rare exceptions such as immediate defense needs allow for deployment without a Bundestag vote. A war-weary West Germany cautiously built its new army in the aftermath of two losing World Wars in the first half of the 20th century. The army was formally established in 1955, six years after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany - and with much contention. During the Cold War, the sole purpose of the West's army was national defense. In the 1990s, a united Germany sent its military abroad on peacekeeping missions, generally in cooperation with NATO, of which Germany is a member.

No other member of the government has pushed as hard for Germany to increase its role abroad since taking office in 2013 than Ursula von der Leyen, the country's defense minister. From the very start of her term, she has sought to distance herself from the "military reserve" preached by conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel and by former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. Von der Leyen wants to transform the Bundeswehr into an intervention army capable of mastering deployments like those in Kosovo or Afghanistan. And the idea of deterrence based on powerful combat units and heavy weapons also gained currency as a result of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.

The Defence Policy Guidelines of May 2011 set the strategic framework for the mission and the tasks of the Bundeswehr as an element of the whole-of-government approach to security. They describe the security objectives and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are based on an assessment of the current situation and also include current and likely future developments. The Guidelines are reviewed at regular intervals. They form the binding basis for the conceptual framework of the Bundeswehr and all related subsequent work in the portfolio of the German Ministry of Defence.

The Bundeswehr is to retain capabilities for operations across the entire intensity spectrum, including observer missions, advisory and training support as well as preventive security measures. Assets must be specifically put together for each mission, they must be quick to respond, flexible and modular and possess both escalation capability and robustness. Cohesion – operating as part of a system – is an essential prerequisite for success on operations and therefore a major determinant in the design of interfaces between organisational areas. Sustainability must be ensured for forces that are earmarked for enduring operations.

The capabilities of the Bundeswehr are derived from its mission and tasks, with the national level of ambition acting as a guideline. A prioritisation within the capability spectrum is based on the likelihood of risks and threats that require a military contribution, on the time needed to provide these capabilities, on an assessment of national interests, and on the availability of funds. On this basis, a “prioritised capability profile” for the Bundeswehr is developed, which describes individual capabilities according to type, quality and scale. It thus defines the number and sustainability of capabilities subject to different requirements. In this profile, particular consideration is given to the capabilities required for a framework nation, on which the contingents of other troop-contributing nations can rely.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit in autumn 2010, defines collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security based on partnerships as the main tasks of the Alliance. This approach takes account of changes in the security environment. One such change is that national security facilities have become significantly more vulnerable to cyber attacks. This requires an effective and coordinated response from the Alliance with a view to enhancing its capability to repel such attacks, thus extending the Alliance’s task spectrum.

The European Union is developing a broad spectrum of civilian and military instruments for preventing conflicts, managing crises and supporting post-conflict rehabilitation which it will use to contribute towards security measures agreed with, coordinated with and also – where appropriate – performed in mutual reliance on the capabilities and structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. The conceptual framework for this aim is provided by the guidelines for Common Security Policy and Permanent Structured Cooperation as defined in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Under the doctrine introduced by the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines, Germany continues to give priority to the transatlantic partnership with the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, Germany is giving increasing attention to coordinating its policies with the European Union through the Common European Security and Defense Policy. According to former German Defense Minister Peter Struck, Germany does not face a conventional military threat to its territory. In his own words, "At present, and in the foreseeable future, a conventional threat to the German territory is not recognizable." However, Germany faces a threat from international terrorism, as was illustrated by the failed attempt by two Lebanese visiting Germany in July 2006 to explode suitcase bombs on German trains.

The North Atlantic Alliance links Europe's security to that of North America. The solidarity within the Alliance guarantees that it is in the common interest to protect the freedom and security of every single member. From the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1955, which made it possible for the fledgeling Federal Republic to become a member of the Alliance, to the Cuban crisis and the Prague Spring right down to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact: NATO has always been an unshakeable pillar of German foreign and security policy.

Article I of Protocol II of the October 1954 Paris Agreements established limits to the size and strength of the Bundeswehr. Although these limitations were not officially published in the press, it is known that the total size of the West German Armed Forces should not exceed 500,000 men, including 400,000 ground troops, 80,000 in the air force and 20,000 in the navy. The effective strength of the ground forces was to be 12 divisions, the air force was to have 20 air groups (around 1,350 aircraft) while the navy would have 21 squadrons (approximately 200 ships).

In accord with Protocol III, West Germany assumed an obligation not to produce on its territory nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, long-range missiles and strategic aircraft. Construction was prohibited of combat surface vessels with a tonnage over 3,000 tons (with the exception of 8 antimissile destroyers with a tonnage of not more than 6,000 tons each) and submarines of over 350 tons (with the exception of 6 submarines up to 1,000 tons), in addition to any class of fighting ships with a nuclear propulsion unit.

On 5 May 1955 the last of the documents with which NATO members ratified the Federal Republic's membership was deposited in Washington. Thus (West) Germany officially became a member of the Alliance on 6 May. Despite the previous failure of the European Defence Community, the young Republic was hence able to realize its ties to the West. Only a short while before, it had nominally achieved defence sovereignty when the Paris Agreements were signed.

The nineties were a time of change for the Alliance and for German security policy. The division of Europe was finally overcome with German unification in 1990 and the accession of former Warsaw Pact countries to NATO later in the decade. However, the increasingly tense situation in former Yugoslavia made it clear that the Alliance needed to find answers to new security risks such as civil wars and gross violations of human rights. Operations in Bosnia in 1995 to implement the Dayton Accord can therefore be considered a turning point. That was the first time that the Bundeswehr served "out of area" in a NATO peacekeeping operation.

The summits in Prague (2002), Istanbul (2004) and in Brussels put forward proposals on improved ways of dealing with new threats such as international terrorism, on forging new partnership links with countries in the region around the Gulf and Mediterranean and on further improving the politico-strategic dialogue within the Alliance. As Foreign Minister Fischer stressed on the occasion of the Prague summit, Germany "intends to give sustained support to the projects launched [at the Prague summit] and take an active part in bringing them to fruition".

The European Union stands for political stability, security, and prosperity in Germany as well as its other member states. It has evolved into a recognised actor in international crisis management, with an increasing capacity for taking action on foreign and security policy matters. One of the primary goals of German security policy is the strengthening of the European area of stability through the consolidation and development of European integration and the European Union's active neighbourhood policy with the states of Eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean region.