Austria - Security Policy

Defense Minister Klaudia Tanner explained: "The war in and around Europe makes it clear that a well-positioned national defense is of existential importance for a neutral state." On 14 March 2024, the Chief of the General Staff, General Rudolf Striedinger, informed all commanders of the Federal Army about the current status of the "Austrian Federal Army 2032+". The aim was to create a common level of knowledge about the objectives and planned further development of the Federal Army on the way to the "Austrian Federal Army 2032+".

The military strategic goal of the "Austrian Federal Army 2032+" has been defined and is: The "Austrian Federal Army 2032+" is capable of defending Austria against any military attack and protecting its people. The Federal Army is capable of defense! In addition to an introduction to current and planned procurements, the current situation in Europe and the neighboring regions was presented. Security policy developments have confirmed the Austrian Armed Forces' focus on domestic military defense as set out in the "Our Army" force profile.

The armed forces profile "Our Army" means a shift towards the military protection of Austria's sovereignty with a focus on its own territory. Solidarity contributions in the form of multinational missions to stabilize conflictual developments with effects on Austria and the EU remain in place.

The military strategic objective is achieved through the "Austrian Armed Forces Reconstruction Plan 2032+".

• Structure: The small units (battalion, regiment) and units (brigades) are strengthened (missing equipment is supplemented, new equipment is procured, additional equipment is received).
• Locations: All locations of the small associations and organizations will remain and will be improved in terms of infrastructure, modernized and adapted to the tasks.
• Military branches: each small unit retains its military branch, and the tasks/capabilities are adapted through modernization and new equipment.
• Militia: The independently structured units and battalions are assigned to the brigades. The independently structured units are integrated into the independently structured battalions. These battalions then take on the character of the brigades to which they are assigned in their tasks/capabilities.

Previously, the overall change in the military-political situation in Europe, caused by the influx of uncontrolled migrant flows, the growth of terrorist attacks and the war in Ukraine, had led the Austrian leadership to change approaches to defense and military construction. As a result, the Austrian Armed Forces launched a new phase in their history.

Austria’s defense policy was based on the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2014 Defense Strategy, and the 2015 Military Strategy. It includes maintaining military capabilities to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Austria, provide military support to civilian authorities, and participate in abroad. The level of capability for crisis response operations is to be able to deploy and maintain a minimum of 1,100 troops. In February 2016, Austria completed a review of its reform program for the Armed Forces (ÖBH 2018). The survey showed that the main indicators of the Armed Forces capabilities have significantly decreased. But the number of military personnel assigned to international missions remained unchanged, increasing the burden on the Armed Forces.

The review pointed to the security environment in which migration flows, international terrorism and international crisis management operations threatened to overwhelm the defense capability of the Armed Forces. The original plan called for the reduction of armaments and personnel. Nevertheless, the review stated that the reduction of personnel should stop and that funds should be directed towards improving combat training and increasing the number of exercises, strengthening command and intelligence.

Until the early 1990s, Austria's security policy centered on a strategy of Abhaltestrategie (deterrence or dissuasion). Its aim was to convince a prospective invader that any possible advantages derived from an attack on or across Austria would easily be offset by a loss in time, personnel, and equipment. The Austrian version of deterrence flowed from the philosophy of Comprehensive National Defense, also embraced by such other European neutrals as Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland. This concept encompasses the psychological, civil, economic, and military defense of the homeland. Military defense is based on an area defense combat doctrine that uses Austria's geography--its mountains and forests--to the utmost. Austrian forces would use hit-and-run tactics to slow and wear down the aggressor, while avoiding pitched battles. Defense of preselected key zones and strong points along or near primary areas of approach would be used to channel the enemy's advance to make it more susceptible to both commando and limited armor counterattacks.

Austrian military planners concluded that the least likely threat scenario was one in which Austria would be involved in an all-out nuclear war, a role that in any event was beyond the capability of such a small country. Rather, the problem was how Austria could best use its limited military capacity to deal with the range of threats with which the country might realistically be faced. Three levels of threat were identified. The first was a localized political crisis near Austria's borders, such as the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the Slovenian assertion of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. These situations could be faced by rapidly shifting armored and mechanized standing forces to the border area where trouble could break out. Austrian military leaders stressed that their purpose would be to avoid hostilities and to give credence to their determination to prevent, as one former army commander expressed, "wanton or negligent disregard of Austria's neutrality."

A second level of threat might arise in the case of hostilities between neighboring states. In such an event, Austria might have to deny right of passage, prevent Austrian territory from being used as a base or refuge, or defend the integrity of its air space. In this situation, reserves would have to be partially or fully deployed. In the other situation contemplated, defense against clear aggression threatening the state, the nation's entire military potential would be deployed.

In the third level of threat, it was assumed that the aggressor would consider Austrian territory useful only as a base of operations against a primary enemy. Thus, the purpose of an Austrian military buildup would be to compel a potential aggressor to conclude that the advantages of mounting an attack against Austria were out of proportion to the price that would have to be paid and the delay encountered.

To deal with these contingencies, Austria developed the area defense (Raumverteidigung) concept in the mid-1970s. Under this plan, all of Austrian territory was denoted as either a key zone (Schlüsselzone) or an area security zone. The key zones were those having prime value as military routes of advance, such as the Danube and Inn river valleys and the mountain passes of southern Austria. Austria's combat strength was to be concentrated in these key zones, where enemy forces could be funneled and then destroyed by armored and mechanized units. Main lines of communication were to be defended by static defenses consisting of fortified gun positions and prepared demolitions positioned around or near natural obstacles. Rearechelon units of the enemy were to be simultaneously harried by reserve light infantry forces. In the area security zones (Raumsicherungszonen), the objective would be to deny unchallenged use of the terrain by the use of prepared artillery positions, antitank obstacles, and guerrilla-type actions (Jagdkämpfe) on the enemy's flanks and rear, forcing the invader to deploy combat troops to protect service and support operations.

The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the subsiding of East-West tensions in 1990 and 1991 necessitated a fundamental reappraisal of Austrian security policy. Austrian planners no longer expected a large-scale invasion requiring defense of the entire territory. Therefore, changes in the security policy were undertaken in 1993 with the New Army Structure (Heeresgliederung Neu). This policy, to be completed in 1995 in intended to meet local crises arising from internal instability in countries on Austria's borders that would precipitate large refugee flows and spillover violence. Contemplated structural changes emphasize the immediate availability of reaction forces that could deal with particular situations without the need for mobilization.

Commenting in 1992, Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend said that although the collapse of the Soviet empire had put an end to East-West confrontation, the dramatic changes had contributed to new risks in the form of local and ethnic conflicts. Although the danger of world conflagration had diminished, Austria was in one of the regions where instability had actually increased.

Austria's miliary leadership saw a continuing mission to defend the country's border to prevent the Yugoslav civil war from spilling into Austrian territory. The breakup of Czechoslovakia into two states in 1993 also raised threats of instability on the nation's northern flank. Control over refugees attempting to flee fighting or economic hardship could also necessitate intervention of the armed forces.

The Security and Defense Doctrine, which was adopted in December 2001, provides the political and strategic guidelines for adapting Austria’s security policy to the challenges of the post-Cold War era. It includes plans to further develop and adapt the Cold War-driven concept of “Comprehensive National Defense” to the new risks and challenges posed by a multipolar security environment. Austrian security-political priorities have changed from reactive defense to proactive and multinational stabilization.

On 16 January 2007, Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer presented the government program of the Grand Coalition between the Social Democratic (SPO) and the People's Party (OVP) to parliament. A large portion of the coalition program's chapter on foreign policy focuses on European affairs. The program expresses strong support for the EU aspirations of the Western Balkan nations. The program calls for the EU to coordinate negotiations with Croatia as soon as possible, while other Western Balkan countries should have an accession perspective. On Turkish accession, the program reiterates the GoA,s insistence on holding a referendum in Austria on Turkey's EU accession, should negotiations conclude successfully. The EU Neighborhood Policy should encourage Ukraine and Moldova to adopt European standards and values, it says. The government also would like to make an active contribution to the discussion of the EU constitution.

The program underscored Austria's constitutionally mandated permanent neutrality in the context of the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Stability in the Balkans remained at the core of Austrian foreign and security policy efforts and, the program says, contributes to Europe's security. In the Middle East, Austria will continue to support a peace settlement on the basis of the Road Map. The GoA hoped to expand its assistance to the Palestinians, and further intensify dialogue with Arab civil society. The program noted that relations with the Islamic world require Austria's special attention.

During his 16 January 2007 presentation to Parliament, Chancellor Gusenbauer reiterated Austria's commitment to strengthen transatlantic relations. OVP Parliamentary Floor Leader (and outgoing Chancellor) Wolfgang Schuessel stressed that Austria desires and needs a good functioning relationship with the United States. Referring to U.S. assistance to Austria after World War II, Schuessel said Austria should be thankful to the United States. While emphasizing Austria's status as a neutral country, the government program on &Security and National Defense8 underscores Austria's commitment to the ESDP goals, ongoing cooperation within PFP, and continued engagement in international peacekeeping missions.

The coalition pledged active Austrian commitment to goals within the ESDP, such as the EU,s Headline Goal 2010 and the EU's civil crisis management goals for 2008. Regarding international peacekeeping/crisis management missions, the coalition plans to streamline, and, thus, expedite the decision-making process for sending Austrian personnel abroad. To ensure adequate personnel for international operations, the government aims to make service in international missions mandatory for professional army personnel. In addition, the coalition paper calls for better training and equipping of the military. The GoA hoped to achieve these goals through progressive adaptation of appropriate defense budgets.