Nicaragua - Military Policy

The Military Code granted the army complete institutional stability by ratifying the army’s nonpartisan nature and national character. Article 1 of the Code says: “The army of Nicaragua . . . is the only legally recognized armed military entity in Nicaragua. The army will govern itself in strict adherence to the Political Constitution and the Laws to which it will show respect and obedience: as well as in accordance with international agreements and treaties ratified by Nicaragua on the subject of human rights. The members of the army cannot conduct politically partisan proselytism, whether from within or from without the institution, nor perform public duties of a civil nature.”

Nicaragua has adopted the policy of the "Containment Wall", which means that Nicaragua seeks to cut off the flow of drugs to the north and the flow of arms and money to the south. Nicaraguans attribute the low levels of crime and murders in Nicaragua to this policy in contrast to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

The current (1995) Constitution of Nicaragua, which came about as a result of the reforms of 1987, certified the army as “an armed institution for the defense of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity” (Article 92); a “national institution, of a professional, nonpartisan, apolitical, obedient, nondeliberative nature” (Article 93); and an institution that will “govern itself in strict accordance with the Political Constitution, to which it will show respect and obedience” (Article 95).

With the approval of the Military Code and the constitutional reforms of 1995, the army gained the stability it longed for, and the anxiety that characterized it in previous years gave way to an attitude of self-confidence. The Army had succeeded in guaranteeing its legitimacy and permanent institutional stability within the framework of the democratic system.

Like other armies in Latin America, Nicaragua’s army redefined its roles and missions by adjusting to the international opportunities that came about after the end of the Cold War and the predominance of the concept of shared security currently in vogue around the world. The army developed social-action works to justify its permanence at a time when most armed bodies are under intense scrutiny. The army’s new missions included

• Actions against narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and international terrorism.
• UN peace missions.
• Humanitarian de-mining operations.
• Environmental-protection actions, especially with respect to maritime and forest resources.
• Preventive health campaigns such as sanitation, vaccination, and abatement.
• Humanitarian and emergency assistance to the most vulnerable sectors of Nicaraguan society after national disasters.
• Actions to support the Supreme Electoral Council by protecting electoral material and personnel and maintaining internal order during electoral processes.

When the army comes to the aid of those who are most vulnerable in Nicaragua, it deepens its level of acceptance in these social sectors. The services it provides to the Supreme Electoral Council help consolidate the country’s democratic process.

Nicaragua worked to develop a Defense White Paper in 2004 and 2005 to help define defense and security policy and the evolving role of the Nicaraguan Army and its relationship with civilian authorities. The final report, a product of protracted negotiations between the army, Ministry of Defense, and civil society groups, was released in early 2005, shortly before the resignation of then-Minister of Defense Jose Adan Guerra. Guerra was a strong promoter of White Paper goals, which include professionalization of the army, integration with, and civilian control via the Ministry of Defense, and increased budget transparency.

Many in the Nicaraguan army, jealous of their autonomy, resisted the process from beginning to end and continue to work against any efforts that threatened their privileges.

Representatives of four political parties contesting Nicaragua's 05 November 2006 national elections pledged to support (more or less) the Nicaraguan Defense White Paper should their party come to power. Enthusiasm for White Paper policy goals varied, however, between officials of the Sandinista Front (FSLN), Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC). The FSLN representative equivocated on the role of civilian authority over the armed forces, while the MRS spokesman stated that White Paper policies could be addressed only after the PLC-FSLN pact is destroyed and the rule of law instituted and respected. The ALN and PLC representatives were more fully supportive of the White Paper, including promoting civilian control over the military and increased budget transparency.

All of the representatives praised the army as a professional, independent institution, reflecting the prevailing public perception. While the army has come a long way since 1990, senior officers still expect direct access to the President and near absolute autonomy in terms of promotions and budget control. The army also derives off-budget income from several private businesses. No matter which party wins the elections, the army will likely continue to resist substantive challenges to internal control and privileges.

The Nicaraguan Army and the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) remained two of the few independent, apolitical forces in Nicaragua despite the Ortega Administration's clear goal of reverting both the NNP and the Nicaraguan Army back into completely subsidiary organs of the Sandinista Front, as they once were during the days of the Sandinista Revolution. The continued institutional independence and professionalism of the NNP and the Nicaraguan Army was one of the few positive indicators remaining under Ortega's increasingly authoritarian regime and has been the foundation of our strongest remaining areas of cooperation with the current administration.

One of Ortega's first efforts in 2007 was an attempt to bring the military under his direct control. After the National Assembly forced him to abandon two separate candidates for Defense Minister, he chose to leave the top two seats at Defense vacant and bestow the "rank of minister" on a weak, but personally loyal Secretary General with no relevant experience. The Ministry has since been purged of all professional-level technocrats, with all key positions now staffed by FSLN ideologues. The marginalization of the Defense Ministry has allowed the uniformed military to largely retain its professional and apolitical stance, but has left no civilian buffer between Ortega and Chief of Defense General Omar Halleslevens.

On 02 December 2015, the National Assembly passed the Sovereign Security Law, broadening the definition of state sovereignty and security and establishing a National Committee of Sovereign Security (NCSS), an executive-level committee with the enforcement backing of the military. The law defines “sovereign security” as the “existence of permanent peace” within the country and additionally states the government is responsible to protect against “any risk, threat, or conflict that puts itself against sovereign security.” The law includes “any other factor that creates danger to the security of the people, life, family, and community, as well as the supreme interests of the Nicaraguan nation,” when outlining potential risks and threats to the nation’s sovereign security. The law stipulates the NCSS will consist of representatives from the NNP and the military and will have the power to dispatch security forces. Human rights groups expressed strong concern over the law and its implications on democratic space in the country.