Nicaragua Air Force

In their struggle against Somoza, the FSLN guerrillas had no helicopters. After their victory in July 1979, they inherited from the Somoza National Guard seven helicopters. By 1985 they had 30 helicopters, including a half dozen of the world's fastest, best armed attack helicopter, the Mi-24/HIND. This is the principal attack helicopter of the Soviet army and held the world helicopter speed record. Its heavy underside armor makes it less vulnerable to small arms fire. It has a heavy machine gun, can fire anti-tank missiles, and can drop bombs. The HIND-D added a new dimension to warfare in Central America since areas of Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica would be within range of these flying "tanks" as they were described in Jane's All the World's Aircraft.

Should the Sandinistas decide to launch offensive operations against Honduras, the most obvious avenue of approach would be through the area as the Choluteca Gap, in the northwest coastal plain of the Honduran / Nicaraguan border. The Sandinistas have conducted training with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and long-range artillery areas close to the Choluteca Gap. This narrow routing could prove difficult for the Sandinista tanks if the Honduran Air Force retains the air superiority it enjoyed in 1985. But, if this Honduran deterrent capability was sufficiently neutralized by a strengthened Sandinista air force and an effective air defense system, then the disadvantage of a restricted route into Honduras would be appreciably reduced.

When the Sandinistas assumed control in 1979, the Sandinista Air Force/Air Defense Force (Fuerza Aerea Sandinista Defensa Anti-Aerea—FAS/DAA) inherited only the remnants of the National Guard's small air force. Equipment included a few AT-33A armed jet trainers, Cessna 337s, and some transports, trainers, and helicopters. The time required to train pilots and construct airfields precluded a rapid FAS/DAA buildup. Beginning in 1982, the Sandinistas received from Libya the Italian-made SF-260A trainer/tactical support aircraft and the Czech L-39 Aero Albatros, a subsonic jet trainer that could be missile-armed for close-in air defense. In addition to light and medium transport aircraft, the air force acquired a fleet of helicopters from the Soviet Union that served as a vital asset in the war against the Contras. They included Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters and later the Mi-24, followed by its export variant, the Mi-25, a modern armored assault helicopter. It also had revetments for fighter aircraft.

By late 1984, pavement of a 3,050 meter runway and taxiway was complete, and 16 aircraft revetments were under construction. No support facilities had been built yet, but three anti- aircraft artillery sites defended the airfield.

The status of the airfield and the possibility that Moscow might send jet fighters and other Soviet military aircraft there were key national security issues during the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). As a result, the US Intelligence Community (IC) monitored Punta Huete closely, and the administration made heavy use of intelligence to support its policy of attempting to limit Soviet influence and military presence in the region. The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete airfield, when completed, was to be the longest military runway in Central America. The airfield was never completed during the Cold War and the MiGs were never delivered, however, and Punta Huete lay abandoned and un-used after the Sandinistas lost control of Nicaragua’s government in February 1990 and after the Soviet Union collapsed the following year. In 2010, the Sandinistas finally made Punta Huete operational as a commercial airfield, with Russian financial assistance.

Most of the Air Force was equipped with airplanes and some helicopters of Western origin. The Air Force also had ten Soviet helicopters and an unspecified number of Soviet military transport aircraft. In addition to the large military force and substantial military equipment, the Sandinistas built what some considered the largest airfield in Central America. This airfield was built at Punta Huerte, across Lake Managua from the capital city of Managua. The significance of this airfield was that the runway was 12,000 feet long, and could accommodate all military aircraft currently in the Soviet inventory.

There were approximately 70 Nicaraguans reported to be in Bulgaria receiving pilot and aircraft mechanic training. There were also five Nicaraguan pilots in the Soviet Union receiving similar training on the MiG—21. Although the Nicaraguans had not received any MiG fighters for their Air Force, a number of Bulgarian'trained Nicaraguan pilots were flying MiGs based in Cuba. The Air Force helicopter build—up included not only Soviet MI-8 "Hip" troop transport helicopters, but also the larger MI—24 "Hind" attack helicopter which hds been used in Afghanistan since 1979. The Mi-24 can carry troops, rockets, and machine guns.

After Humberto Ortega revealed that Nicaragua had approached France and the Soviet Union for Mirage or MiG fighter planes, the United States warned against introducing modern combat jets to the region. Although Nicaragua began construction of a new airbase with a longer runway and protective revetments, it did not succeed in acquiring new fighter aircraft. A series of radar sites were constructed to give the Sandinistas radar coverage over most of Nicaragua, with the added capability of monitoring aircraft movements in neighboring countries. A Soviet-designed early-warning/ground-control intercept facility gave the air force the potential to control its combat aircraft from command elements on the ground.

After 1990 the FAS/DAA was no longer able to maintain its full aircraft inventory without Soviet support. The personnel complement fell from 3,000 in 1990 to 1,200 in 1993. Airbases at Bluefields, Montelimar, Puerto Cabezas, Puerto Sandino, and Managua remained operational. Combat aircraft were reduced to a single mixed squadron of Cessna 337s, L-39s, and SF-260As. However, the serviceability of all these aircraft was doubtful. In 1992 a number of helicopters and six radar units were sold to Peru. A small fleet of helicopters, transports, and utility/ training aircraft was retained.

By 2015 Nicaragua was considering buying Russian MiG-29 fighter aircrafts in order to fight the drug trade in the region. Some in Washington feared that the arms deal would become an "asymmetric response" to the US meddling in Ukraine and the Baltic states, right on the borders of the Russian Federation. "Because of the US presence in countries abutting Russia, Russia may be looking to do the same in our region," noted Carlos Rivera Bianchini, president of the Foundation for Peace and Democracy in San Jose, Costa Rica. "Russia is using power projection in an attempt to erode US leadership and challenge US influence in the Western Hemisphere," stressed General John Kelly, the head of US Southern Command in a congressional hearing on March 12, 2015.

Carlos Murillo, professor at the National University of Costa Rica and a member of RESDAL, said the announcement of Managua was perceived as threatening in the region: "As the real intention of buying equipment, especially fighter aircraft, is not to fight against drug trafficking, but has other unclear purposes. It has been interpreted as intended to discourage these two countries to promote some actions that could undermine Managua's territorialist arguments. In the case of Costa Rica, not to present any information under the process in The Hague, especially on maritime boundaries and in the case of Colombia, does not increase its military presence in San Andrés. It is generally considered that attempts to reactivate the arms race in Central America, as well as facilitate Russia's presence in the Caribbean as part of the project of Putin against the West."