Costa Security Policy

The main threats to Costa Rican security are Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and the ever-growing and more violent criminality caused by drug trafficking. Although not all crimes are derived from drugs or drug proceeds, most crimes have a drug-connection. Both the northern and southern borders are relatively "easy" to pass through, but the most porous area is clearly the southern border with Panama, especially in the Paso Canoas area. It is in this area, as well as the landing zones that go-fast boats use to land drugs on Costa Rica's Pacific coast, that Costa Rican security organizations have the least impact on illegal contraband movement.

Lacking an army, Costa Rica has relied on collective security arrangements, including the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) for protection from possible invaders. Close ties with the United States, whose military and economic strength had long given it a measure of power and influence throughout the region, also helped ensure the country's security aains external enemies.

The 1948 civil war lasted only a few weeks but had cost some 2,000 Costa Rican lives, a tragedy for a small country that had prided itself on its peaceful, democratic traditions. During the civil war and the election crisis that preceded it, the army had flagrantly displayed its partisanship and indiscipline.

There was some speculation that the military would be reestablished as a small, well-paid, highly trained professional force composed of veterans from the national liberation force. Without forewarning, however, in a speech on December 6, 1948, Figueres announced that the army was no longer needed and would be disbanded. "It is time," he stated, -for Costa Rica to return to her traditional position of having more teachers than soldiers." The army was to be replaced by a small national police force limited strictly to internal security functions and a small rural guard.

On November 7, 1949, a constitution was proclaimed that made the abolition of the armed forces the law of the land. Article 12 of the document states:- "The Army as a permanent institution is proscribed. For vigilance and the preservation of public order there will be the necessary police forces. Only through continental agreement for the national defense may military forces be organized; in either case they shall always be subordinate to the civil power; they may not deliberate or make manifestations or declarations in individual or collective form."

In 1968 the United States ceased providing military training and equipment to Costa Rica's police forces. A United States congressional ruling in 1978, however, defined the Civil Guard as having primarily military responsibilities and permitted selective programs to be instituted to improve the security forces.

The weakness of the security forces has been a reflection of the public's aversion to building up sources of power that could be controlled exclusively by the central authorities. in the 1970s this attitude was particularly prevalent among members of Costa Rica's politically influential upper class who saw a concentration of power in the government as a potential threat to their interest. Without changes in basic social and polittrol attitudes, the development of highly qualified police forces in Costa Rica did not seem likely.

The nature of the country's post-1949 security forces was defined during the 1950s by three successive presidents: Ulate (1949-53), Figueres (1953-58), and Mario Echandi Jimenez (1958- 62). The wording of the Constitution allowed considerable leeway for interpretation in defining the scope of "the necessary police forces," which could entail any sort of paramilitary body. (Nicaragua, in theory, had no army at the time, only a "national guard" that was the most powerful armed force in the region.) Costa Rican presidents, however, chose to maintain police forces at the minimum size and cost necessary to perform internal security duties. Ulate kept the size of the Civil Guard, as the national police force was named, limited to 1,500 men, while the Rural Guard was limited to several hundred. The role of the force was also deemphasized when Ulate chose not to appoint a minister of public security to his cabinet.

The president of the republic is designated commander in chief of the public security forces, but the methods and bureaucratic mechanisms for directing and coordinating the various components of those forces have varied from president to president.

In the early 1980s five separate ministries were charged with responsibilities for the different elements of the security establishment. The Ministry of Public Security ran the Civil Guard and its component parts as it had since the end of the Ulate administration; the Rural Assistance Guard was under the control of the Ministry of Government and Police. The smaller Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigaci6n Judicial - OIJ), which performed criminal investigations at the behest of the courts, came under the purview of the Supreme Court of Justice in coordination with the Ministry of Justice. There were also small units of the Treasury Police and Customs Police that operated under the Ministry of Economy and Commerce to control contraband. Finally, the Ministry of the Presidency was technically responsible for the Francisco J. Orlich National Police School (which trained personnel from all of the forces), although Civil Guardsmen were in charge of its day-to-day operation.

The decentralized organization of the security forces had long been a handicap to their efficient operation. It has been suggested that all of the security forces-or at least the Civil Guard and the Rural Guard--should be placed under the authority of a single cabinet miniter. The Monge government, however, decided to improve police coordination by emphasizing the role of the National Security Council. In 1983 Monge declared that body to be the sole authority for national security policy, including that of internal security.

Tactical cooperation was further refined after a Nicaraguan incursion in September 1983, when the Monge government directed that all the border authorities-including Rural Guardsmen and customs authorities-operate under the command of the local Civil Guard chief. In practice, the long-established institutional autonomy of each of the security forces militated against their close cooperation.

Despite the obvious weakness of the security establishment, there has been no major political move since 1949 to reestablish the army or even to take moves that would significantly strengthen the existing forces. Even when faced by the security threats of the earl), 1980s, the Costa Rican public strongly opposed militarization. When United States ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick suggested on a trip to Costa Rica in 1981 that Costa Rican democracy was being undermined by communist subversion and offered aid to build up the police force, goveniment and opposition leaders alike protested against the sharp tone of her remarks.

President Carazo criticized her "exaggeration and falsehood" and stated that "we do not want an army," and presidential candidate Monge emphasized the economic dimensions of his country's problems. According to a poll cited by Monge in 1983, some 83 percent of Costa Ricans opposed the creation of an army. 80 percent opposed a draft, and 77 percent were against purchasing arms. Although Monge has aroused suspicion in some quarters by seeking modest improvements in the security forces, his government, like others before it, has not proposed to improve professionalism by changing the system of recruiting guardsmen on the basis of political patronage. Costa Rican governments have also consistently refused pay increases that would make service with the Civil Guard a more attractive job and draw better qualified personnel.

The weakness of the security forces has been a reflection of the public's aversion to building up sources of power that could be controlled exclusively by the central authorities. in the 1970s this attitude was particularly prevalent among members of Costa Rica's politic-ally influential upper class who saw a concentration of power in the government as a potential threat to their interest. Without changes in basic social and polittrol attitudes, the development of highly qualified police forces in Costa Rica did not seem likely.