Guyana - Military Doctrine

The police commissioner heads the Guyana Police Force (GPF), which reports to the Ministry of National Security and is responsible for maintaining internal security. The Guyana Defense Force is responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. The defense force, headed by a chief of staff, falls under the purview of the Defense Board, which the president of the country chairs.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the police and military, and the government has mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.

Inadequate training, poor equipment, and acute budgetary constraints severely limited the GPF’s effectiveness. There were reports of corruption in the police force. Authorities charged and brought to court GPF members for various crimes, including robbery, simple larceny, bribery, and indecent assault. Other police charges were unnecessary use of force, unlawful arrest, and neglect of duties. According to the Caribbean Development Report 2009 commissioned by the UN Development Program and the Americas Barometer Survey 2015, public confidence in the police force was very low.

The Guyana Defence Force was initially organised and philosophised to meet the national security interests of the United Kingdom. It was essentially Georgetown based. No sooner than Guyana became independent, the necessity to modernize and redeploy forces to mee new and emerging threat was quiet evident. But, it was the Venezuelan sponsored and assisted failed Rupununi uprising in January 1969 and the Surinamese failed attempt to seize lands east of New River which clearly demonstrated that the Defence Force needed to redeploy and adopt defence policies that reflect Guyana’s national security interests.

Until 1969 the GDF observed British military ethics, which held that the armed forces should be loyal to the "government of the day" and not otherwise be involved in politics. Beginning in 1973, the PNC regularly used the GDF to help it win every national election. Because of irregularities in previous elections, the opposition parties had argued that the ballots be counted in each electoral district for the 1973 general election. However, the PNC insisted that ballot boxes be taken to three designated counting centers. As occurred in the 1968 elections, opposition members were not allowed to accompany the ballot boxes to the counting centers. On July 16, 1973, election day, GDF personnel shot and killed two PPP members as they protested the removal of ballot boxes from a polling station.

At the PNC's first biennial congress in 1974, the GDF was required to pledge its allegiance to the PNC. During the 1970s and 1980s, GDF soldiers routinely received political indoctrination. The GDF also scheduled marches to celebrate major PNC political events, such as party congresses.

The PNC's increasing politicization and subordination of the GDF disturbed many members of the officer corps. When some expressed a desire for military neutrality, PNC informants in the armed forces alerted Burnham to the dissension within the GDF. In August 1979, Colonel Ulric Pilgrim, the operational force commander, and Colonel Carl Morgan, a battalion commander, were dismissed. Pilgrim and Morgan had been two of the most popular officers in the GDF. Burnham appointed a PNC loyalist, Colonel David Granger, commander of the GDF. To extend his influence further, Burnham also replaced the army chief of staff, Brigadier General Clarence Price, with a Burnham loyalist who had been a civilian police officer. The appointment of Norman McLean, a former traffic chief, shocked and enraged many GDF officers. The PNC government attempted to rebuild support by issuing a postage stamp in 1981 honoring the GDF.

The Force was compelled to rethink, build with relevance and train for role. As a consequence, the Guyana Defence Force acquired air, land and maritime assets to meet the challenges of national defence and security. Alliances were forged with nations friendly with our then socialist ideology which enabled rapid expansion in the area of artillery and light infantry.

Guyana's security forces had received riot control training from the UK and may be capable of handling a level of violence associated with previous elections -- mob activity in central Georgetown. However, the more powerful weapons and sophisticated tactics used by criminals in Guyana since 2001 posed a greater threat. The GPF is incapable of preventing or responding to this type of threat; the GDF would need to get involved.

There is need for government to articulate a national defence and national security strategy. The changing face of crime and new and significant threats to food security along with increase in oil and food prices indicate that the Government must now harmonize all of its resources to meet these threats. Every facet of life is affected.

Guyana’s borders are porous, airstrips, ports and rivers are not effectively monitored. In addition, national professional and social standards have fallen and, in this context, severe pressure is placed on the security forces in responding to youths turning to crime as a solution to the absence of multiple economic opportunities. It must be remembered that crime is a social problem that requires a social solution. The intervention of the Defence Force in support of the Police is measure only. Social intervention by the State is a necessary requirement.

Despite claims to territory by two of Guyana’s neighbors, bilateral cooperation with those countries are essential to combat trans border crimes. The Guyana Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs must establish respective protocols to promote border cooperation. The Force, in keeping with its role, must train to contribute to the development of enhanced enforcement capacity of the civil powers to combat environmental irregularities and civil disasters. These robust responsibilities will certainly tax the human resource capacity of the Force, but the Force could use its reserves to satisfy these non military threats to the nation.

The organisational analysis of the Guyana Defence Force was commissioned in March, 2008 as part of a four-stage plan to reengineer the Force. The other three critical outputs are the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the Strategic Defence Plan (SDP) and the GDF Multi-year Development Plan (MYDP) which will be “role over” in concept. This analysis is aimed at generating an understanding of the current strengths and weaknesses of the organisation with a view to positioning the military to meet the short to long term strategic goals envisaged in response to the traditional, transnational and other threats to which the Guyana Defence Force must have the capability to respond to.

The 2009 organisational analysis was cognisant of the development of the National Security strategy and the need for the continuous refinement of tactical and strategic responses to national defence and security. The end state; the development of strategies to neutralise the external and internal threats inimical to the security interest of Guyana.

• The development of a military capability comparable to at least one of our neighbouring countries.
• Acquisition of naval platforms for force projection and enforcement of national laws in the territorial sea and EEZ.
• Development of a reliable defence and security capability to provide for surveillance, detection and interdiction operations.
• Development of significant offensive capability (Air, Naval and Army) to deter aggression.
• Development of a highly skilled and educated Officer and Other Ranks Corps.
• Development of a highly skilled and motivated Reserve Force to support the Regular Force.
• Development of a Regular and Reserve Force that earns the respect of the people.
• Development of strategic and statecraft partnerships with state, non state and foreign military in order to exponentially enhance human and material development.
• Defend national independence, preserve sovereignty, and intensify and guarantee the normal functioning of installations and the security of the nation against any armed aggression.
• Defend the country’s democratic system of governance.

The sugar and rice industries affect the lives of close to 205,000 persons which is close to 33% of the population of Guyana and earns close to 41% of the country’s foreign exchange. Its continued survival is therefore crucial to Guyana’s economic fortunes which are directly related to security, especially food security for the people of Guyana. The Guyana Defence Force must be prepared to defend and protect these two industries.

The Force, as an institution, must reorganize its combat elements to meet possible threats to the survival of these industries in the light of internal destabilization activities and rising food prices. Quick reaction forces should be ready to support the Police in the event of industrial unrest.