The Military In Politics

In 1952 the MNR downgraded the military as an institution and attempted to create new armed forces imbued with revolutionary zeal. This event initiated a long and complex relationship between the armed forces and politicians. The 1964 coup by General Barrientos began a cycle of military intervention that culminated only in 1982, with the withdrawal of the military from the political arena. By then the military as an institution had been reduced to a collection of factions vying for control over the institution and the government.

Until 1970 reformist factions in the military had remained small and had gained significant influence only during the Barrientos administration. By 1970 the military's reformist faction, the Generational Group, had about 100 members, most of them young officers. Historian Maria Luise Wagner postulates that the rise of Juan José Torres González to the presidency (1970-71) marked the culmination of a reformist trend in the FF.AA. that had begun in 1936. The trend, however, reemerged in late 1978 when another reformist, David Padilla Arancibia (1978-79), who was favored by junior officers, took power.

According to Klein, under General Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971-78) "the role of the military was seen as one of protection of the upper classes and their middle-class allies, within nondemocratic regimes." Thus, military intervention was regarded as "a long-term alternative to open politics." Although military cooperation with the United States grew considerably and the military budget increased under Banzer's rule, the United States suspended military aid to Bolivia in late 1977 because of the regime's authoritarianism.

A process of disintegration within the armed forces reached its extreme form under General García Meza, who took power in 1980 after overthrowing Lidia Gueiler Tejada (1979-80), a civilian constitutional president. By that juncture, however, the military was plagued by deep internal cleavages along ideological, generational, and rank lines. The connection of García Meza and his followers to the burgeoning cocaine industry further divided the armed forces.

During the García Meza regime (1980-81), so many top officers were alleged to be involved in corruption and drug trafficking that both foreign and Bolivian officials called it "the cocaine government." As de facto president, García Meza angered many officers by promoting a number of undistinguished colleagues-- whose only merit appeared to be a record of loyalty to him--to top army positions. García Meza resigned and left the country in September 1981, and the military finally stepped aside in October 1982 to allow the National Congress to reconvene and Siles Zuazo to begin serving out his truncated second term as president (October 1982 to August 1985).

Officers such as Banzer and García Meza represented the last vestiges of the prerevolutionary armed forces that sought unsuccessfully to eradicate populism in Bolivia. In the process, however, they discredited the military and, at least in the short run, eliminated the institution as a power option in Bolivian politics. The older generation retired in disgrace, accused of narcotics trafficking, corruption, and violations of human rights.

Since 1982 the military underwent a major reconstruction process. The old guard of "coupist" officers was replaced as the generation of officers who had graduated from the new military academy in the 1950s reached the upper echelons of the armed forces. The younger generation appeared committed to the rebuilding of the military and manifested its support for civilian rule. It also accepted end-of-year promotions authorized by the Senate.

After 1982 key officers rejected overtures from a few adventuresome civilians and soldiers who were dismayed by the "chaos and disorder" of democratic rule. The military command was even involved in aborting a coup attempt in June 1984 that included Siles Zuazo's brief kidnapping. Officers realized that a coup against Siles Zuazo or any other civilian would disturb the military's efforts to rebuild.

Three coup attempts against Siles Zuazo by dissident officers in June and December 1984 and January 1985 were thwarted because the military, increasingly commanded by younger, more professional officers, remained loyal to the government. The military also honored the constitutional transfer of power to Paz Estenssoro in August 1985 for a four-year term in office.

The military's unwillingness to launch another coup was even more significant given the economic and political situation in Bolivia between 1982 and 1985. The COB and business, regional, and peasant groups exerted untenable demands on the Siles Zuazo government. All of these groups tried to coerce the regime by using tactics such as strikes, roadblocks, and work stoppages.

The military remained in its barracks despite the social turmoil that enveloped the country. Indeed, the only military action during this period occurred in response to a presidential directive. In March 1985, Siles Zuazo called upon the military to restore order after miners occupied La Paz. Once this had been accomplished, the armed forces retreated obediently. Their mission then became one of ensuring the peaceful transfer of power to the victor of the 1985 elections. The military's role in support of democracy in the late 1980s was in large measure dependent on the success of Paz Estenssoro's reforms under the NPE. In early 1989, Bolivia's armed forces had no reason or excuse to intervene.

Because of the military's willingness to engage in joint exercises with United States troops and in drug interdiction programs in the late 1980s, the military once again became the recipient of aid that had been drastically reduced since 1980. The joint antinarcotics operation with the United States, dubbed "Operation Blast Furnace," also provided the military with important equipment and training. In fact, a close partnership developed between Bolivia's armed forces and the United States Southern Command.

A new generation of officers were to assume command of the armed forces in the 1990s. Most were young cadets during the 1970s and were given special treatment and protection by General Banzer. Some observers had suggested that these officers might have intervened if Banzer had been denied the presidency in 1989 by a congressional coalition.

The police and armed forces are historical rivals in Bolivia; in February 2003 they shot at each other in La Paz's main square the Plaza Murillo leaving one soldier dead. Both the police and armed forces submitted their own proposals to the Constituent Assembly (CA) writing the new constitution in 2007. Early drafts of the Commission on Security and Defense report had the military only serving an external function and losing to the police its function as guarantor of the constitution. Senior military officials balked at the proposals, making the commission rethink its position towards increasing the police's role. The police, in turn, responded by protesting in front of the commission.

In late 2007 it appeared that troops would only intervene in "Media Luna" opposition states if leaders clearly break with the constitution, for example by declaring independence. Although field commanders may be anxious about day after scenarios if they disobey orders, it would be difficult for the government to replace "insubordinate" officers, particularly if officers refused such orders en masse. It is unlikely the government would find more loyal commanders in the lower ranks, uncertain if rank and file troops would recognize them, and unclear if such an overly political reorganization would be tolerated by the high command. Unlike his erstwhile ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Evo does not have a network of personal friends within the military (although his Presidency Minister Juan Quintana does), and the military is leery of taking on any role considered remotely political. The military fears above all a repeat of the bloody military-civilian conflicts in El Alto in 2003, which brought down the Goni government. Many commanders are still bitter about the fallout from those events and believe the military took the risks and the blame for political decisions.