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Military


Central African Republic - Military Doctrine

The primary opposition forces are disenchanted members of the military who have mutinied numerous times since April 1996. The majority of the rebels are located in Bangui, in the Camp Kasai, Ouango, Petevo, Fatima, and La Kouanga areas. They are led by Captain Saulet. There are also external opposition forces (both expatriates and Central Africans in exile) that are based primarily in France, where they are organized into the United Front.

Under military restructuring plans formulated 1999-2000, the civilian Minister of Defense controlled and directed all armed forces, including the Presidential Security Unit (UPS), which had previously been seen as a militia supporting the president. This distinction had become somewhat blurred in recent years, as President Bozize holds the title of Minister of Defense and President and his son, Jean Francis Bozize, was the Deputy Minister of Defense. As of August 2009, the C.A.R. armed forces numbered about 7,000, including army, air force, gendarmerie, national police, Presidential Guard, and local police personnel.

Following the 2003 coup, CEMAC and C.A.R. armed forces assumed responsibility for securing the capital city. The Economic Community of Central African States (known by its French acronym, CEEAC) took over the CEMAC forces in 2008 and established the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX). MICOPAX forces currently total approximately 500 soldiers and are supported by an additional 250 French soldiers. Military cooperation and training programs exist between the C.A.R. armed forces and France, South Africa, Greece, China, Morocco, and other nations.

In 2007, the United Nations and the European Union authorized the deployment of a multidimensional security and police presence in eastern Chad and northeastern C.A.R. with a civilian and humanitarian protection mandate. The UN component of the mission (MINURCAT) consisted of police deployed to Chad only and a multi-dimensional liaison office deployed in Chad and C.A.R. The Security Council’s resolution 1861--which authorized the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to follow up a European Union Force (EUFOR) in both Chad and the Central African Republic--extended MINURCAT’s mandate for a period of 12 months beyond its March 2009 expiration.

The UN took over EUFOR’s military role in the region on March 15, 2009. MINURCAT was authorized to establish a presence in Birao in northeastern Central African Republic to create a more secure environment, protect civilians and humanitarian workers in danger; and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel. At the behest of the Chadian Government, MINURCAT departed Chad, and as a result the C.A.R., in late 2010.

In February 2008, elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army entered the C.A.R. Since that time, LRA elements have attacked and abducted thousands of Central Africans. In the summer of the 2009, the Ugandan national army, known as the Ugandan People’s Defense Force or UPDF, began operations to pursue the LRA and to help protect local populations. In October 2011, President Barack Obama announced that the United States would deploy a small number of U.S. forces to act as advisors to the national militaries in the region, including the UPDF and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), that are pursuing the LRA. Forces were deployed to C.A.R. in December 2011.

The Central African authorities published, in June 2008, in the context of the allocation from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a priority plan for peacebuilding. The priority plan identifies SSR as the first area of intervention, and addresses the related issue of DDR. In this context, SSR is seen as a process of restructuring and training, involving all segments of the security sector, notably the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), the national gendarmerie, national police, customs officers, certain non-state actors, judiciary and penitentiary administration, intelligence services, and protection of natural resources administration (rangers, etc…).

A comprehensive national security sector reform strategy should consist of more than simply equipment and barracks; it should include training, vetting, ethnic balance, military justice, parliamentary oversight and payment of salaries and encompass other actors involved in the provision of security.

Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional implications, the Security Council authorized on 10 April 2014 deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation – MINUSCA, with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other initial tasks included support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes. MINUSCA subsumed the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) on the date of the establishment. On 15 September 2014, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) transferred its authority

MINUSCA’s strategic objective is to support the creation of conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups through a comprehensive approach and a proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping. MINUSCA was to promote and support the rapid extension of State authority over the entire territory of the CAR, including by supporting the immediate redeployment of police and gendarmerie in priority areas and main supply routes, which would contribute to the development of stable security institutions in more remote areas.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) would include:

  1. To provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a strategy for the SSR, taking into account the work done by EUMAM-RCA and in close coordination with EUTM-RCA, and with the aim of ensuring coherence of the SSR process, including through a clear delineation of responsibilities of the FACA, the internal security forces, and other uniformed entities, as well as the democratic control of both defence and internal security forces;
  2. To support the CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions;
  3. To take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and implementation of a capacity-building and development plan, undertaken pursuant to an overall security sector reform strategy, and by providing technical assistance, in close coordination with other technical assistance providers, to the CAR Government;
  4. To support the CAR government in developing an incentive structure for police and gendarmerie and the selection, recruitment, vetting and training of police and gendarmerie to include at least 500 new police and gendarmerie elements, with the support of donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), taking into account the need to recruit women, and in full compliance with the UN Human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP);
  5. To coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the CAR, in particular with EUTM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of both the FACA and the CAR internal security forces (police and gendarmerie);
  6. To coordinate with the CAR authorities in designing a plan for the progressive, and coordinated re-operationalization of FACA and other internal security forces within the framework of the SSR programme and in compliance with the HRDDP, in close coordination with EUTM-RCA;

The UN would provide technical assistance to the CAR Authorities to identify, investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and of violations and abuses of human rights committed throughout the CAR so that they can be brought to justice, and to help prevent such violations and abuses. It would provide support and to coordinate international assistance to the justice and correctional institutions to reinstate the criminal justice system, within the framework of the United Nations global focal point on rule of law, in a manner that emphasizes civilian oversight, impartiality and the protection of human rights.

The UN would provide technical assistance to the CAR Authorities in partnership with other international partners, to operationalize of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) consistent with CAR laws and jurisdiction and in line with the CAR’s international humanitarian law and international human rights law obligations, with the aim of supporting the extension of State authority.

French officials have said: Our troops are going to disarm anyone in public spaces who is not part of the African Union force or part of the Central African Republic gendarmerie or police. That is a very tall order and in a lot of areas of this country we are talking about communities that have been armed, either for hunting or for self-protection or for other activities or just out of a sense of security, for generations, including with artisanal weaponry or even machetes or other forms of weaponry that might not be obvious or easy to find.

On 14 April 2016, the president began a series of discussions with the leaders of the armed factions to keep channels of communication open and to pave the way for a national program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR), funded by international partners. A special presidential advisor for security-sector reform (SSR), DDRR, and national reconciliation was appointed in May, and the president initiated a national framework for SSR, DDRR, and national reconciliation in July. In October the president convened the first meeting of the national DDRR consultative committee, which included representatives from 11 of 14 armed groups. In late June 2016, however, the UN independent expert noted the discussions had not led to the conclusion of clear agreements on disarming armed groups and dismantling of militias.

On 10 June 2016 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera, on Friday in New York to discuss the situation in the country, including contact The President with the representatives of the armed groups. "The Secretary-General stressed that the country had entered a new phase following the holding of democratic elections. He welcomed the President for extending his hand to the armed groups and for his vision of a holistic strategy to address the root causes that have prompted these groups to take up arms, "the spokesman said in a report the encounter.

The Head of the United Nations welcomed the determination of the President and his Government to continue this process in a spirit of national reconciliation and inclusion, while being guided by the principles and recommendations of the Bangui Forum. He urged armed groups to seize the opportunity offered to them through the initiative of the President, "by committing themselves in good faith, to bring peace and stability to the country". He stressed that the rapid restoration of state authority was crucial in promoting security and socio-economic recovery in the country.

"The Secretary-General has stressed the importance for the international community to continue to support the Central African Republic in addressing the root causes of the crisis and supporting its recovery plan," the spokesman added. He reiterated the commitment of the United Nations and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (UNMIS) to support the peace process.

The strengthening of the security sector of the Central African Republic was enabled by the strong commitment of the State to the implementation of its national strategy for security sector reform and its sectoral plans, which aim to redeploy professional, ethnically representative and regionally balanced national defence and internal security forces. The UN Mission provided advice and guidance to the security sector reform coordination cell in the Presidency and other national security sector reform actors and continued to serve as coordinator for international assistance for security sector reform, including for safe weapon and ammunition management practices. The many achievements are reflected in the detailed frameworks presented herein. In addition, over 800 existing internal security force personnel were retired during the period, paving the way for a new, inclusive recruitment campaign in support of the implementation of the capacity-building and development plan for the police and gendarmerie and the integration of former combatants from armed groups, in support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

In the continued absence of a political agreement on a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process, the President of the Central African Republic launched a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration pilot project. The Government, with the support of MINUSCA, adopted a new approach to pursue bilateral agreements with armed group leaders, which resulted, in the last quarter of 2018, in some armed groups expressing their willingness to disarm and committing to join the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process.

One sectoral plan for the defence sector was ratified on 11 September 2017 and the remaining sectoral plans were under development. The implementation of the sectoral plan and an action plan for integration of gender parity in security sector reform that was adopted in January 2018 were ongoing as at the end of the 2017/2018 reporting period. A total of 5 policies and pieces of legislation were developed: (a) national defence plan; (b) draft military programming law 2019–2023; (c) redeployment plan of the internal security forces; and (d) two decrees on the organization and functioning of the Central African armed forces and its headquarters. Implementation was ongoing as at the end of 2018.





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