

**END OF TOUR REPORT
MEDTC 1972-1974**



**JOHN R. D. CLELAND
Major General, U. S. Army**

MEDTC

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM CAMBODIA

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
20 February 1974

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report

Commander in Chief, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96610

1. The attached End of Tour Report is submitted in accordance with CINCPACINST 3000.7A. The report covers the period February 1972 to February 1974.
2. The report records the efforts and experiences of MEDTC, its successes and failures, over the past two years.
3. The report is organized into two parts. Part One is an historical analysis of Cambodia during the reporting period. Part Two is a series of annexes on specific MEDTC activities, programs and problem areas.
4. The report's principal conclusions and recommendations are contained in Part One. Each of the annexes contained in Part Two addresses a separate topic and is designed to provide a succinct reference source on that topic.
5. It is hoped that the identification of problem areas contained herein, and the delineation of courses of action that worked or did not work, will be of assistance in determining policy and organization should the United States at some future date be charged with providing support under circumstances similar to those with which MEDTC was confronted.

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as


JOHN R. D. CLELAND
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief

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END OF TOUR REPORT

MEDTC 1972-1974

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PART ONE

CAMBODIA DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

I. INTRODUCTION

On 18 March 1970 a coalition of nationalist elements in Cambodia comprising students, intellectuals, military, and Buddhists called for a successful motion in the National Assembly deposing Prince Sihanouk as Chief of State. Their actions were prompted by fear of a growing North Vietnamese presence, both military and political, within Cambodia. LTGEN Lon Nol continued as Prime Minister, head of the National Assembly Cheng Heng became Chief of State. Shortly thereafter, at the request of the new Cambodian government, President Nixon reinstated a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia using funds from the worldwide 1970 MAP. An initial investment of \$8.9 million for the remaining two months of FY 1970 was followed by Congressionally authorized programs of \$172.7 million in FY 71, \$180 million in FY 72, \$133.3 million in FY 73, and an estimated \$325 million for FY 74.

These monies were expended in pursuit of three objectives - to aid our "Vietnamization" program, to maintain a neutral government in Cambodia non-hostile to U.S. interests, and to improve the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) that they might defend that neutrality. The Military Assistance Program for Cambodia is implemented thru the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC). The early development of MEDTC is discussed in the End of Tour Report of BG Mataxis dated 12 February 1972. This report will review MEDTC performance since that date vis a vis the above national objectives. Detailed reports on MEDTC organization, relationships with other headquarters, specific in country activities/programs, and problem areas encountered are appended as annexes to this report. What follows is an historical analysis of Cambodia during the reporting period. It is made from the point of view of the three principal groups in the Cambodian drama: The Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) and its armed forces (FANK); the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Khmer Communists (KC); and the United States Government (USG). The analysis concludes with the report's principal conclusions and recommendations.

II. CAMBODIA: TRADITIONALIST SOCIETY IN A MODERN WAR

A. The Threat

From its inception the war in Cambodia has been a main force war. Initially the enemy was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). For years it maintained several regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regimental and divisional sized units on Cambodia territory. Although the main force war is now being waged by Communists who are Khmer, the essential leadership remains North Vietnamese. The KC now number 175+ battalions and are equally hostile to the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) supported by the U.S. The DRV played midwife to and continues to support the KC directly. Without DRV support the KC would founder.

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B. National Strategy

NVA forces easily countered the military efforts of the fledgling Khmer Armed Forces in the early months of the Republic and Lon Nol ceded the northeast and north to the communists. The enthusiasm of Cambodian youth flocking to the colors, a common scene on U.S. TV during 1970, had by late 1971 waned in the face of military reality. This was the period during which FANK grew topsy-turvy from a 35,000 man palace guard/road construction force to a loosely controlled mass of semi-autonomous battalions numbering perhaps as many as 300,000 personnel. A number of boldy conceived, poorly planned and poorly executed operations by this force against NVA and VC units led eventually to Chenla II and the demise of FANK offensive spirit. The presence of U.S. trained Mike Force units of Cambodian origin and U.S. air support precluded the failure from deteriorating into a total rout.

A national strategy was clearly demanded. By virtue of his position, and from lack of any other definitive guidance, the military objectives of Marshal Lon Nol became the national strategy. It involved three phases:

Phase I: The retention and solidification of territory and population centers then under GKR control while building and training the armed forces.

Phase II: Spreading GKR control to territory and population south of the Nol Line, a line which extends from the Thailand border generally along route 6 and 7 to the Republic of Vietnam border. This phase also entailed the elimination of enemy insurgency and the consolidation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the United States.

Phase III: Reconsolidation of the nation by moving north from the line to regain control of all GKR territory and total elimination of enemy forces and insurgency.

In conjunction with these broad military objectives was the objective of retaining a strong military force under the control of and loyal to Marshal Lon Nol. It was the U.S. Mission position at the time, still considered valid, that with certain limitations related to the practicality of Phase III, the above strategy and the related concept of a strong central government should be supported. The rationale was that without strong central government, prospects for the survival of the GKR were not promising. There was no strong U.S. military presence to bolster the country during a period of political turmoil such as occurred in

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Vietnam during the Mid-60's. The massive U.S. military and economic aid which held the NVA/VC in check until the political situation could be stabilized in RVN was not available to the GKR. Consequently, U.S. support of strong leadership and centralized control was considered essential. As events would show, strong leadership in the limited, feudalistic sense of a "grand patron" would be present but centralized control in the sense of impersonal, functioning governmental organizations responsive to national objectives was something that would evolve only painfully.

C. "LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE "

Early actions taken by MEDTC during this period were aimed at reorganizing FANK to support the above GKR strategy within the predetermined light infantry concept. A study was made to identify, from within the mass of existing FANK units, those organizations that appeared most effective and to use them as the basis for a streamlined, more realistic force structure of 220,000 personnel. Standardized TO&E's were developed, distributed and used as the basis for issue of more modern equipment.

The imposed objective was the creation of an unsophisticated light infantry force with some light artillery but no tanks. It was never intended that this force would be able to operate independently against NVA main force units. When and if it did, it would be in conjunction with regular South Vietnamese units and with the support of both SVN and U.S. air power. The primary purpose of the force was to combat the "Khmer Insurgents." That such "insurgents" might one day evolve into main force units in their own right, thus requiring a rethinking of the "light infantry concept", was a possibility never fully addressed within the parameters and limitations of MAP and prescribed U.S. Mission objectives.

Though not the most significant, this initial premise is one of the reasons for FANK's subsequent mediocre performance.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

There were no illusions that the mere enunciation of a national strategy, or the reorganization and streamlining of the FANK force structure, would be sufficient for the conduct of the war. The GKR and FANK would have to effect a transition from concept to implementation. It did not happen. The GKR and FANK proved unable to fully marshal their resources. The result was that throughout 1972 and 1973, the initiative belonged to the enemy. He not only dominated the countryside by default, but proceeded to cut the GKR's vital lines of communication. FANK lost Route 1 in the spring of 72. Route 2 went in the early summer of 73 followed by routes 6-7 late that summer. It was not until 1973 that FANK began to demonstrate some ability to establish priorities and reallocate forces based on operational objectives. The planned reorganization of FANK began to take hold at this time. The equipment for constituting the divisions arrived, and the forces to form the infantry intervention brigades

were designated and standardized in terms of organization, equipment and command structure. The successful defense of Phnom Penh in August 73 can be attributed primarily to U.S. Air Force firepower and the defense put up by the four newly formed divisions and two of the intervention brigades. Air power destroyed the attacking KC's ability to sustain an offensive with mass. The remaining enemy did not have the will or the capability to continue an offensive drive prior to the rainy season. FANK's defense of Kompong Cham later in the fall was made possible by rapid movement of four intervention brigades, newly arrived C-123's and the initiative of the Khmer Navy. The latter half of 1973 also saw the FANK command and control structure continue to evolve and provide a degree of effective control to its forces in the field. Central to this control was the establishment of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) in mid 1973 and an Artillery Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) in August 1973 and their integration with the FANK Operations Center in a single, Combat Operations Center (COC). These steps were only taken when FANK was essentially restricted to a perimeter defense of Phnom Penh, having conceded the initiative elsewhere throughout the country.

E. ANALYSIS

It is important to realize that the Cambodian leaders with whom the U.S. has chosen to associate itself reflect the above background and it thus impacts directly on the manner in which the GKR and FANK conduct the war. As part of a separate study in May 1972, MEDTC listed the five most critical constraints to effectiveness within FANK. Aside from emphasizing that it is the system, and not any individual leader such as Lon Nol, that is under discussion here, the comments contained in that study are still valid. While Marshal Lon Nol is mentioned by name, it is too easy an explanation to place the blame for these problems on personalities. The Marshal performed as well and probably better than any possible replacement within the limitations of the system. As viewed by MEDTC in May 1972, that system engendered operational constraints in the following areas:

1. Leadership, command and staff, and discipline.

- a. Leadership begins at the top with Marshal Lon Nol. He is a political figure and uses the FANK for political as well as military ends. He insures that promotion and good assignments go to loyal officers, not all of whom are capable. He ignores normal staff procedures in many instances, going directly to officers whom he knows and trusts. Several officers may be tasked by the Marshal for a solution to the same staff problem. When major operations and in many cases minor operations are planned or underway he has the commander or commanders involved report directly to him.

- b. This proclivity of the Marshal to ignore the established command/staff system makes the development of an effective chain of command and a functioning staff at FANK EMG difficult if not impossible. Field commanders bypass the EMG or ignore EMG directives to the extent they

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believe their political affiliations will allow. This failure to recognize the authority of EMG is a serious problem. It impacts on personnel actions with unit commanders proselyting for personnel and forwarding incorrect and late reports; it impacts on the intelligence system since units fail to forward the intelligence information and commanders rely on their own private intelligence sources; it impacts on operations since it almost requires personal emphasis by the Marshal to get units out and aggressively moving; it impacts on logistics since the directives issued by the J-4, which if followed could alleviate many logistics problems, are often ignored. As a consequence the staff is frustrated and cautious and the commanders in the field castigate the staff in Phnom Penh for inactivity and lack of support.

c. All of the above affect discipline which, since it is not demanded at the top, is not always demanded at lower echelons. The MNK is relatively well disciplined since the CNO insists on performance. The KAF is not well disciplined and discipline in the Army depends on the individual unit commander.

2. Strategy and force structure. The only operative strategy is the often enunciated Lon Nol strategy. This has not yet been converted into a military plan with phased operational strategy. Operations are conducted in reaction to the enemy. This reaction strategy was probably necessary when FANK was small. FANK now has the capability to begin limited offensive operations but has no clear stated objectives nor a viable plan for operations. This lack of strategic and tactical guidance impacts on the force structure. Although mobile

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battalions are grouped into brigades and sometimes brigade groups, their employment is often haphazard. Many of them have been assigned missions to protect installations which should be a responsibility of regional units. In some cases regional units are used as mobile forces. An order of priority for bringing units up to strength, allocating them to commands, and assigning them operational missions which contribute to the defeat of the enemy is required. Without an agreed strategy this is difficult and results in a great deal of lost motion.

3. The FANK Personnel System:
The FANK personnel system has not kept abreast of the growth of the FANK. This has resulted in chronic understrength in combat units and a loss of control of military personnel which enables individuals to shift from one unit to another and has forced commanders to compete with one another for personnel. This lack of an effective personnel system is, at the moment, the single most pressing problem facing FANK in which they have the capability to make a significant improvement.

4. Logistics: Progress is being made in the FANK logistics system, however, much remains to be done and until unit commanders are assured of adequate resupply in the field they will be reluctant to cooperate with the system. Thus a more effective distribution system for ammunition, spare parts, and other essential items to the depots and units in the field must be developed.

5. Training: FANK has tended to leave responsibility for training with the training centers in RVN and Thailand with

unit training being practically non-existent. That an improved FANK training capability in-country to train recruits, units and selected individuals in special skills is vitally needed. Without this capability a sense of Khmer national spirit and discipline, development of Khmer tactics as well as trained Khmer officers, NCO's and specialists capable of operating within the FANK will not be realized. A Khmer training base is essential to pulling the FANK together as a coordinated military force.

Since the writing of that study, progress has been made in command and control, force structure, the KAF, and in creating personnel, finance and logistical systems within FANK. The specific measures taken and progress noted are discussed in the appropriate annex. These successes are best described however, as the "grafting of centralized organs onto a decentralized nervous system." The prognosis for their survival is thus dependent upon continued emphasis and overwatch by the U.S. Mission and most specifically MEDTC. Progress in stabilizing a training program has also been difficult to achieve. The loss of the training facilities in South Vietnam upon the signing of the Paris Peace Accords dealt a serious blow to unit training. A deteriorating tactical situation hampered the full activation of an in-country training base and the Terms of Reference under which MEDTC operated specifically precluded the use of even a small U.S. training mission. The restrictions on the number and function of U.S. personnel contained in the same Terms of Reference were a distinct limiting factor to improving FANK effectiveness.

F. CONCLUSION

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military organization. Thus it is the momentum of the war itself which has forced managerial growth and modernization within FANK.

III. DRV: CREATION OF A PEOPLE'S ARMY

A. Initial Objective

DRV's strategy envisioned quickly overrunning Phnom Penh following the "events" of 18 March 1970. They failed in this.

B. Long Term Strategy

Instead, the DRV early on adopted a two point strategy which has served them well while costing them little. Flowing back into the sanctuary areas following the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, the NVA quickly regained control of them. In a series of sharp clashes with South Vietnamese and Khmer forces they indicated that their primary strategic objective in Cambodia would be to insure the uninterrupted use of the border LOC's essential to their operations in South Vietnam. Their second objective became the "Khmerization" of the war against the GKR. At best, this secondary objective promised to give them a Communist satrapy, while at worst it cut their own involvement and losses to a minimum.

C. Creation of the Khmer Communist Army

The presence of NVA units controlling large portions of Cambodian territory guaranteed a sufficient population base to support a Khmer Communist (KC) Army. What the DRV provided was 2000+ Hanoi reared Communists of Cambodian extraction as permanent cadre, NVA training facilities, NVA unit advisors, some technically qualified NVA troop fillers, and a hook up to the well developed NVA logistical and control systems.

Using Mao/Giap's Protracted Warfare/Peoples Army organizational concepts, the KC laid the base for their regular army in the areas under NVA control. From initially formed village defense units came the personnel to fill territorial units during the next dry season, followed by graduation of the better qualified territorial survivors to regular units in the next campaign. This three step cycle in the creation of main force units is self perpetuating as long as the villages continue to produce an annual crop of healthy 15-16 year olds. The use of Sihanouk's name, still revered in the conservative countryside, the call to adventure, and a salutary display of brutality to recalcitrants brought in the crop. Once in, the location of the recruit's family in the NVA/KC controlled zone and harsh communist discipline insures compliance with orders. With such a system, the KC over the course of some four years have evolved from a small political/terrorist force to a relatively well equipped and disciplined military organization capable of fielding 175+ main force battalions.

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To what degree this organization will remain responsive to DRV strategic interests is an open question. What is clear is that the DRV has effected in Cambodia a compression in the normal development time of a communist "revolutionary" military force. The KC of 1972-74 are not the VC of 1963-65. They are not hit and run guerrilla bands equipped with an assortment of weapons. They are regular units equipped with the best infantry weapons in the Communist bloc inventory. They have proven themselves capable of engaging in sustained, coordinated military operations.

D. KC: Performance and Problems-

In the previously recounted series of battles throughout 1972/73, the KC wrested large areas of additional territory from the GKR, taking advantage of heavy NVA/VC combat assistance at the beginning. Having seized the initiative, they were operating at times and places of their own choosing against FANK forces stretched thin defending vital LOC's and population centers. Massive U.S. air support was required to prevent Phnom Penh itself from falling during the climactic days of August 1973. At this time KC personnel losses were heavy, and a weakness inherent in the manner of the KC's evolution as a fighting force surfaced. Lacking troop level ideological commitment to communism, some KC units began to question their participation in a fratricidal war. Debates occurred as to whether their sacrifices were not more beneficial to the Vietnamese than to themselves. These debates and other differences over rice distribution and population control led in some cases to open conflict with NVA units. The 15 August halt in U.S. air support however, inevitably raised the question of the degree of U.S. commitment to the GKR. The KC control apparatus was able to mute the dissent within their own ranks and by January 74 the KC had regrouped and were once again seriously threatening Phnom Penh. Thus, the KC are not without their own internal problems. In addition to the stigma of NVA parentage, they have demonstrated a certain doctrinal and operational rigidity that sometimes prevents them from exploiting tactical advantages.

E. Conclusion

The NVA training and logistics base, NVA advisors and specialists, and above all, the Cambodian cadre "un-Khmerized" through their long association with and immersion in the more aggressive Vietnamese culture, insure that as a military organization the KC is a relatively more disciplined, centralized, and responsive organization than FANK. They have to date demonstrated a more sophisticated ability than FANK to both enunciate strategic objectives and to organize the manpower and materiel resources available to them in pursuit of those objectives.

IV. U.S. POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS

A. Objectives

As stated, U.S. strategy in Cambodia envisioned three objectives: assisting the Vietnamization program in SVN by tying down


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NVA forces in Cambodia; promoting Cambodian neutrality; and improving FANK to the point where they could creditably contribute to the maintenance of that neutrality. Assistance to Cambodia in pursuit of these objectives would be provided within the parameters of the Nixon Doctrine. U.S. policy also envisioned that peace would automatically fall on Cambodia when the war in Vietnam was concluded.

B. Nixon Doctrine:

At Guam in June of 1969, President Nixon had detailed the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. The U.S. would participate in the defense and development of her friends and allies. We would not, however, conceive all the plans, elaborate all the programs, put in action all the decisions, or assume the total defense of the free world. As generally interpreted at the time, this meant that the U.S., as its national interests dictated, would assist other nations with military materiel, training, advisors, but would not commit its ground troops to another Vietnam. No direct mention was made of air support, but it was generally considered to be within the sphere of available assistance. Understandably, the specifics of the support to be rendered, except for the non-participation of ground troops, would be decided on a case by case basis.

C. Vietnamization



D. The Light Infantry Premise

Compounding this decision not to regard the Cambodian situation in its own right was the basic operating premise - that FANK

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was to be a light infantry force to combat indigenous guerrilla bands. That such a "light infantry force" would be incapable of standing up to NVA main force units or in later years to VC main force units, was either discounted because the threat, at least in the latter case, was not validated, or countered with the argument that U.S. air power would make up the difference.



E. Paris Peace Accords

In January 1973 the Paris Accords came and went. The war in Vietnam continued and in Cambodia it picked up. The reason was basic - nothing had yet been resolved on the battlefield. The immediate effect of the Accords was to force, in the midst of an ongoing war that was in the process of heating up, a relocation of the MEDTC logistical base from SVN to Thailand, and the termination of the training programs being conducted on behalf of FALK in SVN. A more detailed discussion of the adverse impact and method of coping with both these actions can be found in the appropriate annexes.

One salutary effect did accrue from the Accords. The Cambodian situation was brought more clearly into focus. The Accords did not bring a cessation of hostilities or a neutralization of Cambodia.

F. Congressional Restrictions

In January 1971, the Cooper-Church Amendment modified the Nixon Doctrine, at least in its application to Cambodia, by specifically prohibiting "advisors." The Symington-Case Amendment, passed in February 1972, ordered that the total number of official U.S. personnel in Cambodia should not exceed 200. The intent was "to prevent the further growth of a large American presence in Cambodia which would drag our nation even more deeply into that difficult situation."



G. Accelerated Delivery and the 15 August 1973 Bombing Halt

With equipment being the principal means by which the U.S. could influence the situation, 1973 saw an increase in equipment deliveries. The M16 rifle had begun arriving as replacement for the carbine during the latter half of 1972. Some M113 Armored Personnel Carriers had also been delivered. As the ground war intensified during the spring and summer of 73, steps were taken to increase the flow of this materiel, as well as to speed up the reorganization of independent FANK battalions into intervention brigades and divisions with appropriate supporting arms.

The need for such reorganization and force upgrading was given added emphasis with the Congressional decision to halt U.S. combat air support of Cambodia effective 15 August 1973. The one sacrosanct absolute in all U.S. force structure planning for FANK was now simply declared void. FANK, never designed to operate against main force units without U.S. air support, was told to do so in the middle of an ongoing battle for their capital. To offset the loss, they had to be provided an immediate means to increase their firepower. This was the reason for the accelerated delivery programs - code-named Nimble Thrust and Nimble Voyage - effected in the latter half of 1973. They delivered combat power in the form of artillery, M113's and heavy river craft.

It should be added that another important reason for these deliveries was psychological. In the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. air support the accelerated delivery of 157.55 artillery batteries,

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equipment for the headquarters and combat support elements of two divisions, and armored cavalry squadrons provided a positive indication to the GKR of continued U.S. support.

While the equipment delivered by these programs did increase FANK firepower, as well as impact politically, any long term attempt to offset the loss of U.S. air support must center on revamping the Khmer Air Force. The Tactical Air Improvement Plan instituted early in 1974 is a short term means for focusing on increased KAF tactical capabilities. If the war continues thru 1974, a long term improvement in those capabilities will become a major additional expense to the Military Assistance Program.

H. Fighting the War by CRA/MAP

The Military Assistance Program is not designed to provide the flexibility needed to fund a shooting war. Under normal MAP procedures, operations are sustained via receipt of materiel planned for and funded during prior year programming. The sudden unplanned delivery of 14 AU-24 and 8 C-123 aircraft in 1973 are but one example of the impossibility of predicting tactical requirements a year in advance. A more mundane example, though more significant in dollar terms, is the impossibility of predicting ammunition expenditure rates which fluctuate with the level of combat.

When the MAP is funded thru Continuing Resolution Authority, as in Cambodia, the problem is further compounded since not only is the level of funding restricted to the prior years, but the funds themselves are doled out in quarterly increments. The result is the loss of continuity in any planned program.

Prior to the beginning of each quarter it becomes necessary to evaluate the funds available and allocate for those items determined most critical. This means that long leadtime items, which are an integral part of the overall long term program, are often denied funding because day to day requirements for such items as ammunition have to come first. Attempts to give longer term investment items primary funding priority invariably founder when the quarterly costs of ammunition and Operations and Maintenance costs can not be met. The result is that the portion of the investment program that does not have a procurement request already begun is dropped into shortfall in order to free funds for ammunition costs. The O&M program lines may also be drastically reduced. Prior to or as the quarter ends funds are frequently depleted and the whole requisition cycle must slow down, and in some cases stop, while waiting for funds for the new quarter.

Effects on Force Planning are equally disruptive. The orderly rounding out of a planned force structure is not possible with funds committed at the beginning of a quarter, but transferred by the end of

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the quarter to fund more urgent requirements. In addition, it becomes difficult to program trained individuals for previously planned unit activations when the units are repeatedly placed back in shortfall.

Although all Departments and CINCPAC have effectively responded in delivering equipment, only limited relief is foreseen through normal MAP procedures for providing required materiel, services, and training on short notice. Accordingly, in order to preclude the exigencies of similar programs from constantly upsetting the orderly management of the worldwide MAP, the funding and management of such programs should be placed under the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program.

V. CAMBODIA TODAY

A. The KC

As this paper is being written the war in Cambodia is centered on Phnom Penh. The two armies facing each other around the Phnom Penh perimeter are both Cambodian. One is a well equipped Communist main force army. It is attacking. Its troops are cadred by seasoned veterans trained by the NVA. They are organized into battalions, regiments, and fronts. Their discipline is harsh and excellent, springing from their senior leaders who are a highly motivated, ideologically dedicated elite. They operate in a centralized, relatively impersonal and responsive command system. Promotions are based on accomplishment. The former Cambodian head of state, Prince Sihanouk, serves as the international progaganda front man for this army. He also exercises some charismatic influence with the peasant soldiers but little or none with the officers. Where necessary, technical positions within the army are occupied by NVA personnel. In addition, NVA military advisors are strategically placed throughout the upper reaches of the organization. Its logistical base is the NVA. As an army, it excels at the infantry assault as well as at quickly digging in and holding ground against superior fire power. Its major military weaknesses are that it has a logistical nose, having to provision a battlefield before committing itself to it, and, with a less than complete communications system and an excessive dependence on consensus leadership, it is an army that once committed lacks any great ability to take advantage of fleeting tactical opportunities. Its major political weakness is a too great association and identification with the Vietnamese, a feared and unloved entity in Cambodia.

B. FANK


The other army, the one upon which the U.S. government has staked a certain amount of its prestige, is a well armed light infantry force, but one gifted in addition with armored cavalry troops and a clear superiority in artillery. It is an army composed of a mixture of city boys and peasants. It is now basically defending. Its

[REDACTED]

regular intervention troops are relatively well trained, but the territorials are not. It is an army organized into battalions, brigades and divisions. Properly led, such units with their supporting arms and firepower superiority are a more than even match for the KC main force units. Discipline is mixed, dependent upon individual leadership, which is spotty. The officer corps reflects the traditionalist society from which it originates. It reacts slowly and only after high level approval and direct orders to unit commanders. Staff work and coordination while improving is still very basic. Promotion in the general officer ranks is still largely based on one's responsiveness and loyalty to the Marshal. It is an army whose base is a non-technical society that is seriously deficient in technical expertise. It has no U.S. military advisors within either its operational or its logistical structure. Despite its recent infusion of modern weapons, it therefore remains a relatively unsophisticated organization. As an army, it has excelled at only one thing - holding on and fighting desperately after enemy initiatives have cornered it. If its major military weakness is its officer corps and its uncoordinated command system, its major strength lies in the mass of its common soldiers and lower ranking officers who remain deeply committed to a Cambodian value system. They view the army facing them to be under the influence of their most hated traditional enemy - the Vietnamese.

C. Prospects

FANK has the ability to retain control of Phnom Penh and thereby insure the near term survival of the GKR. Whether it has the ability to follow up with a sustained, coordinated offensive on a national scale depends on many factors.



VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Provided below are the principal conclusions and recommendations of this report. Comments relating to specific aspects of MEDTC organization, activities, and programs are to be found in the appropriate annex.

B. Conclusions

1. The objective of assisting the "Vietnamization" program in SVN was accomplished.

5. The KC, despite inherent political and military problems, have within the parameters of the Cambodian war developed into a relatively effective main force communist army.

6. FANK has improved significantly in the critical organizational areas of personnel and financial management. The primary reason has been MEDTC "institution building" efforts to create centralized, impersonal management systems.

7. FANK has demonstrated great improvement in the employment of MAP equipment to include coordinated Mekong operations with "Monitor" gunboats; air/artillery fire coordination; and armored cavalry operations. The improvement is due to the capability and elan of individual FANK commanders and the impact of high visibility equipment items.

C. Recommendations

4. Military assistance funding of an active war should be via Military Assistance Service Funded vice Military Assistance Program.

Annex A

MEDTC ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. MISSION. Operating within the Congressionally approved Military Assistance Program to Cambodia, the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia has three specific missions:

a. To determine the needs of the Cambodian Military Forces.

b. To arrange for the shipment and delivery of equipment and materiel.

c. To observe and report on the utilization of U.S. materiel and Cambodian personnel trained by the United States and by third countries.

2. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS. See Appendix 1 - Organization Chart. MEDTC is organized into the Office of the Chief, the Comptroller, the Administrative Branch, the Joint Liaison Office, and four divisions; the Logistics Division, the Management Assurance Division, the Plans and Programs Division, and the Inspection and Analysis Division. These activities are all located in Phnom Penh with the exception of the Joint Liaison Office which is located in Thailand with its main office at Camp Samae San and liaison officers in Bangkok and at Udorn RTAFB.

3. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF. The Office of the Chief consists of the Chief, the Deputy, the Secretary of the Joint Staff and one secretary/steno. This section is responsible for directing the activities of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) Cambodia and the Cambodian Military Assistance Program.

4. THE COMPTROLLER. The Comptroller's major function is the management of the MAP Administrative Executive Funds (MAE). He is also charged with serving as the initial and principal contact point for and maintaining a file of all correspondence with General Accounting Office Auditors. Additionally, the Comptroller provides liaison and coordination with the Director of the Defense Budget for the FANK. He also works closely with the Economic Section of the U.S. Embassy in carrying out his responsibilities in this area.

5. THE ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH. The Administrative Branch is responsible for receipt, control, distribution and dispatch of all correspondence and electrical messages, and requisitioning supplies.

6. THE JOINT LIAISON OFFICE. The Joint Liaison Office maintains necessary coordination between Chief, MEDTC and supporting agencies and activities located in Thailand and performs administrative support functions which cannot practicably be performed in Cambodia. JLO functions are discussed in detail in Appendix 2.

7. THE LOGISTICS DIVISION. The Logistics Division provides logistics management for MAP Cambodia. It is organized in consonance with the JMD into three separate branches: Army, Navy and Air Force. The functions

of each of the three branches are essentially the same. The actual functions performed within the basic structure of the Logistics Division are:

a. Supply: requisitioning, delivery and title transfer of MAP-CB materiel and supplies; inventory control and end item utilization inspections to insure appropriate distribution of materiel to MAP supported units and proper utilization of equipment and supplies; technical assistance to the FANK thru Contract Third Country Nationals (TCN's) in all phases of supply activities; management of appropriate MAP funding lines.

b. Ammunition: management of MAP ammunition funding lines; computation of requirements; requisitioning and call forward of required ammunition; providing technical assistance to FANK thru TCN's to establish safe and efficient ammunition handling procedures; establishing appropriate ASR's for critical ammunition lines; ensuring that documentation, issue and expenditure procedures provide for a viable program with sufficient data available to perform accurate, responsive computations of supply levels on a daily basis.

c. Maintenance: provide technical assistance to FANK thru TCN's in developing maintenance programs for all types of equipment for each level of maintenance; monitoring the requisitioning and stockage of appropriate levels of spare parts to preclude excessive NORS rates; assisting FANK thru TCN's in establishing appropriate maintenance procedures for component and end item repair; managing repair and return program.

d. POL: POL is treated separately from other classes of supply in that it is purchased from commercial sources, delivered by purely commercial transport and commingled with civilian product in civilian storage facilities until issue to FANK. Log Division manages the POL funding lines and provides technical assistance to FANK thru TCN's for establishing a viable distribution and rationing system. Functions performed are maintaining inventory control and preparing calls forward of POL shipments from out-of-country sources to maintain desired stockage level; providing assistance in POL sample analysis at out-of-country laboratory facilities.

e. Airdrop: management of MAP funding lines for aerial delivery equipment and for USAF provided airdrop; providing technical assistance to FANK in rigging cargo for airdrop and in aerial delivery techniques thru out-of-country training; monitoring recovery and return of aerial delivery equipment utilized in airdrops in Cambodia; retrograding recovered materials to U.S. facilities in Thailand for salvage and reuse; monitoring the KAF aerial delivery program to stress efficient utilization and effectiveness and to assure eventual assumption of the total airdrop mission from USAF; monitoring airdrop requests from FANK for USAF C-130 airdrops to Khmer Republic locations; providing liaison with USAF AWADS units in Thailand.

f. Property Disposal: monitoring property disposal activities of FANK; arranging for collection and transportation of salvaged MAP materiel to U.S. property disposal facilities for resale; assuring that all salvaged MAP materiel is returned to U.S. control for disposition.

g. Signal: in addition to the supply and maintenance functions related above, the Logistics Division has significant operational signal functions directly supporting the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia. Logistics Division Signal Officer provides technical support and assistance to the U.S. Embassy for operation of its communication net. He manages the cryptographic account for operation of the secure voice terminal serving MEDTC, provides for construction and installation of equipment tying MEDTC to out-of-country U.S. headquarters, installs and maintains H.F. radio nets tying MEDTC headquarters with MEDTC transportation offices established in outlying locations, maintains and assists in operation of mission emergency evacuation radio nets.

h. Medical: managing MAP medical funding lines; providing technical assistance to FANK thru TCN's in developing medical programs for treatment and hospitalization; assisting in planning for upgrade of medical facilities; assisting physicians and pharmacists in determining the relationship between French medicines, which they are used to using, and American medicines provided by U.S. MAP; monitoring the organization and establishment of a medical maintenance school and a depot medical maintenance repair program.

i. Engineer: in addition to engineer supply and maintenance areas, the Logistics Division provides significant engineer functions to FANK and MEDTC operations. The Logistics Division Engineer Equipment Maintenance and Supply Officer functions as the MEDTC Engineer. He makes airfield surveys to assure adequacy for USAF airland operations; assists in securing needed repairs to facilities, such as airfields receiving U.S. aircraft and ports serving ships delivering MAP cargo; provides technical assistance in planning and constructing various military facilities such as ammo depots, POL tank farms, and harbor facilities; and monitors FANK contracted construction projects.

j. Transportation Activities: The Logistics Division Transportation Activity monitors delivery of MAP-CB material into Cambodian by all modes of transportation by providing technical assistance to FANK on operations of aerial ports, deep water ports, and hazardous cargo operations. Other functions are supervising off load of MAP cargo from U.S. ships and aircraft; monitoring of the Transportation School and Transportation Brigade; providing technical assistance to FANK for the development and operation of a Joint Transportation Board centralizing control of all FANK transportation assets.

k. Contract Monitoring: the Logistics Division monitors the conduct of several out-of-country contracts for repair, rebuild, and maintenance of KAF aircraft and associated components. In addition, the Logistics Division oversees contracts to provide technical assistance to GKR military forces with Vinnell, Air America, Avco-Lycoming, Bell, and Helio. Operation

and maintenance of the Embassy long haul communications system are provided through contract by FEC.

8. MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE DIVISION.

a. The Management Assurance Division is organized to perform a dual mission, first to monitor and oversee training to ensure that the Khmer Armed Forces could maintain and operate the military equipment being provided or planned to be provided, and second, to insure that MAP provided funding and equipment would be used for their intended purposes, i.e. to increase the combat capability of the Khmer Armed Forces.

b. The Management Assurance Division is organized into two Branches, the Training Assurance Branch and the Management Assurance Branch.

(1) The Training Assurance Branch is organized into Army, Navy, and Air Force Training Sections. The Army trainers are further designated as CONUS, third country or in-country trainers. A continuing aim of this section is the achievement of training self-sufficiency throughout the Khmer Armed Forces. To this end all FANK, KAF, and MNK in-country schools and training centers are closely monitored, first to determine if they are properly equipped and supported and second to endeavor to assure that trained instructors returning from CONUS and third country training are assigned in sufficient numbers and in appropriate billets to upgrade in-country training capability. This branch was required to shift its emphasis in 1973 from a large program of training of Khmer units at small cost in South Vietnam, to smaller programs at higher cost in Thailand, supplemented by an increased input to formal CONUS school training. The activities of TAB are described at length in Annex H.

(2) The Management Assurance Branch is designed specifically to meet the responsibility of CHMEDTC to see that MAP funds and equipment are properly used for intended purposes. It is further organized into financial management, personnel management, end item utilization inspection and NEMVAC sections. The activities of these sections are described in detail in Annexes E, F, G, and U.

c. Throughout the period of this report, MAD was both dynamic and reactive. It continues to be the organization through which MEDTC legally and properly monitors the utilization of funds and equipment made available to the Khmer Republic through CB MAP. It changes emphasis to meet new problem areas but continues to concentrate its efforts on the areas described above.

9. PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

a. The Plans and Programs Division is responsible for the development of the Military Assistance plans for Cambodia, developing and maintaining records of the MAP supported force structure; and managing the Military Assistance Program. It is organized into a Plans Branch and a Programs Branch.

(1) As part of the planning function, the Plans Branch is responsible for developing Military Assistance and force structure plans, for coordinating with FANK as to the organization of the units within the approved MAP supported force structure, submission of requests for approval for inclusion of units into the force structure; submission of Military Assistance Program Element (MAPEL) descriptions and coordinating the preparation of MEDTC inputs into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for Cambodia. The Plans Branch is primarily concerned with the authorization of units in the force structure and the determination of personnel and equipment requirements for those units. Once these organizations are planned and approved, it becomes the responsibility of the Programs Branch to fund the units and the responsibility of the Management Assurance Division to plan for the training of the personnel for the units. However, the Plans Branch monitors the time phasing of the funding of the units and the required delivery dates of the equipment, based on the funds available to CB MAP, the priorities set by CHMEDTC and Plans Branch, and the capability of the Khmer Armed Forces to absorb the units.

(2) The Programs Branch is charged with the day to day maintenance of the Military Assistance Program and all the detailed documentation necessary for support of the program. They develop, maintain, and refine the Formats X and Y and other detailed back-up documents; provide data base input manually in MASL detail to update funding priorities; submit frequent program change requests as a result of varying operational requirements combined with numerous changes to the force structure; coordinate with planners and logistical personnel in developing, maintaining and revising the Military Assistance Program.

b. In conjunction with the Programs Branch, the Plans Branch also administers the Military Assistance Program Equipment Authorization System (MAPEAS) which is a system of documents complementing the CINCPAC family of security assistance management documents. The MAPEAS as used by MEDTC is patterned after the system formerly used by MACV for the Vietnamese Armed Forces authorizations. Computer support for this project is provided by HQ, USSAG in NKP, Thailand. Recently the system has been expanded to include printouts of authorization information for FANK.

c. Because of the difficulties of planning and programming a MAP program for a force actively engaged in combat, the tasks for both planners and programmers have been somewhat altered from those envisioned in the job descriptions in the manning documents. In addition to mid-range and long range planning, planners often have to develop plans and submit justifications for immediate requirements which are generated as a result of combat experience or changes in the combat situation. Both the plan and the program have been in an almost constant state of flux. Priorities for introduction of the types of equipment or units change frequently because of the combat situation and the availability, or more accurately, the lack of funds. These changes have varying impacts on the

plans and programs. Some, however, have been of such magnitude as to require complete revision of the plan or the program. To illustrate this point, in addition to the regular JSOP submission, which is a major staff undertaking, the planners during the first half of FY 74 submitted two out-of-cycle JSOP's, which were almost as complete as the original submission. The fluctuations in the program have at times caused such turmoil that the programmers have had to make unscheduled (i.e. in addition to the normal SA/POM update) trips to CINCPAC to update the CINCPAC data base.

d. The Plans and Programs Division also has staff responsibility within MEDTC for several other projects among which are:


- (1) Monitoring the activities of the Tripartite Deputies to include providing a representative for the Air-Ground Operations Working Group.
- (2) Coordinating the interface between MAP and AID programs.
- (3) Monitoring the MAP construction program.
- (4) Submission of the Air Force Military Assistance Report (V-12).
- (5) Submission of the Measurement of Progress Report (MOP).

10. INSPECTION AND ANALYSIS DIVISION. The Inspection and Analysis Division, the newest component of MEDTC, is not listed in any of the official MEDTC manning documents. It is a temporary organization composed of the members of the MACTHAI Training and Logistics Detachment who are on temporary duty in Cambodia. While in Cambodia, they are under the operational control of CHMEDTC. Their primary function is to oversee the in-country implementation of the Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia. Specifically its members:

- a. Perform End Item Utilization Inspections.
- b. Coordinate expanded training associated with TAIP-C.
- c. Coordinate transfer of aircraft associated with TAIP-C.

11. EFFECTS OF PERSONNEL LIMITATIONS. The ceilings on personnel often impacted adversely on MEDTC organization. Because of these ceilings it was necessary to continuously adjust functions and organizations as some spaces were temporarily moved out of country to provide room for more urgently needed skills.

MEDTC ORGANIZATION CHART



JOINT LIAISON OFFICE

1. MISSION. The Joint Liaison Office (JLO) evolved from MEDTC Saigon. It was organized as a separate element in November 1972 and was relocated at Camp Samae San, Thailand in December 1972. The mission of the JLO is to act as a liaison/administrative activity for Chief MEDTC outside Cambodia performing support functions which cannot practicably be accomplished within the country due to geography, lack of communications or manning constraints. The major functions charged to the JLO are: Coordination as required between Chief MEDTC and supporting agencies and activities located outside Cambodia; personnel accounting, records maintenance, procurement, manpower control; morale and welfare; mail management and courier service; liaison to HQ MACTHAI and USARSUPTHAI; monitoring and reporting air and surface movements of MAP supplies and equipment as directed by the forward element; at direction of Chief MEDTC initiates action to expedite movement of priority cargo; and requesting and documenting movement of U.S. military and civilian personnel on official travel to and from Phnom Penh.

2. ORGANIZATION. The Officer in Charge, JLO, is the primary administrative officer of the Team (Adjutant General) and is assisted by a joint staff of enlisted specialists in the personnel/administrative and supply/transportation fields. The manpower authorization of the JLO is austere in keeping with the manning of the Team: 3 officers and 4 enlisted personnel. Of these one officer and one enlisted man are colocated with the MACTHAI training office at Bangkok and one officer is located at Udorn RTAFB where he is the primary contact between MEDTC and MACTHAI training and logistical detachment personnel at that installation. In his plan for support of MEDTC, CINCPAC directed each of the Pacific unified commands to provide personnel service support to MEDTC. Thus, Navy and Air Force support is provided by a component service organization. While MACTHAI was designated the Army agent, Army personnel support is generally provided in-house by JLO personnel due to the fact that team staffing is primarily Army and the make up of the JLO is mostly of that service. Personnel and administrative support beyond the JLO capability is provided by USARSUPTHAI at the direction of MACTHAI. Awards support, at CINCPAC direction, is provided by MACTHAI if the award is within COMUSMACTHAI approval jurisdiction. Otherwise, awards recommendations are forwarded via CINCPAC through individual service channels.

3. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED. The movement of the JLO from RVN to Thailand was in anticipation of the cease-fire agreements of January 1973 and was governed by Operation SCOOT (Support Cambodia Out of Thailand). Initial concern was raised by AMEMB Bangkok regarding the establishment of yet another residual unit from RVN in Thailand due to Royal Thai Government sensitivity at becoming a "waste basket" for American units formerly stationed in RVN. Two alternatives were developed to cover the existence in Thailand of a MEDTC rear element. One was to create a MEDTC staff support element within USARSUPTHAI under the command jurisdiction of MACTHAI; the other was to assign through MACTHAI to

USARSUPTHAI the mission of providing complete and direct administrative support to MEDTC. Both alternatives were unacceptable to Chief MEDTC as the supporting activity would not be directly responsive to his requirements. The solution was the establishment of a small, low profile element, Joint Liaison Office, not directly associated by name to MEDTC, but an integral part of the Team and completely responsive to the Chief. With this matter resolved, thorough coordination with MACTHAI and USARSUPTHAI regarding personnel, administrative, supply, signal and billeting support resulted in a smooth transition from RVN to Thailand. Every area of support, however, had to be covered by advance party personnel in a memorandum of understanding with the host unit. Intra-service support agreements were necessary to provide for servicing and funding of local requirements.

a. A split configuration inherently creates problems in communications and understanding between the two parts. The establishment of the JLO at Camp Samae San with the main body at Phnom Penh slows many administrative actions due to the necessity of using couriers to carry correspondence between the two locations. As long as aircraft and good communications are available, however, the presence of JLO in Thailand facilitates more than hinders operations due to the ready access of MEDTC personnel to supporting activities. Frequent liaison trips between the JLO and HQ MEDTC assist in creating a spirit of understanding and cooperation.

b. The lack of support facilities in Cambodia necessitates a long supply line for personal comfort and supplemental food items. Consistent with aircraft availability and enemy action, PX personnel, operating on a prior ordering system, visit Phnom Penh on a bi-weekly basis.

c. As there is no operating APO at Phnom Penh personal and official mail delivery was a problem of long standing for no activity was specifically tasked to provide and insure ultimate delivery. Prior practice was to rely on an informal understanding with the servicing aerial port at U-Tapao RTNAB to ferry the mail aboard C-130 aircraft to Phnom Penh. This proved to be a hit and miss proposition. Recent action initiated by MEDTC through the USAF Postal and Courier Service and servicing aerial ports resulted in formal procedures to manifest and schedule mail aboard C-130 aircraft within Thailand and to Phnom Penh. By this method mail delivery has become more dependable and frequent.

4. PERSONNEL SUPPORT. Selection and assignment of only outstanding personnel to a mission such as MEDTC is of critical importance. Performance records, past experience in military assistance programming and training, language ability and personal appearance are key factors to a successful and effective organization. The services generally did well by MEDTC in both officer and enlisted assignments. However, future mission chiefs must be relentless in requiring only the best personnel.

Annex B

MEDTC RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

1. CINCPAC.

a. CHMEDTC serves under CINCPAC's military command and is immediately subordinate to CINCPAC.

b. As the next higher headquarters in the chain of command, CINCPAC is the medium through which MEDTC communicates with the outside world. Virtually all action traffic is addressed to CINCPAC which reviews and either approves it, disapproves it, acts on it or passes it with recommendations or directions to other headquarters and agencies.

c. Members of MEDTC coordinate with staff members at CINCPAC on an almost daily basis. This coordination is done primarily with the J8 section but also frequently with the J4 and J5 sections on matters of logistics or force structure.

d. The J8 section is responsible for monitoring the Military Assistance Program. Two action officers within this section monitor the Cambodian Program. Since they are the only officers within CINCPAC who have fulltime duties watching Cambodia and are quite familiar with the problems of the program, they are in frequent communications with members of MEDTC, particularly the programmers and certain of the logistical managers. Since they are personally known to many of the action officers at MEDTC, these staff officers also serve as the MEDTC point of contact with other CINCPAC agencies.

2. DOD, DSAA, JCS. MEDTC contacts with DOD and JCS are normally accomplished through CINCPAC. Quite often final action on MEDTC requests/program changes are accomplished at DOD level by DSAA which manages the Military Assistance Program worldwide for the Secretary of Defense. The actual data base for CB MAP is held at DSAA. It is the final approving authority on all program changes. There is little direct contact on a day-to-day basis between JCS, DSAA and MEDTC. There have, however, been several field visits by DOD personnel to Cambodia for coordination and update. JCS passes on force structure changes and is the approving authority on JSOP submissions. JCS also periodically becomes involved in capabilities studies, such as the late 1973 study on KAF self-sufficiency, which require CINCPAC and, ultimately, MEDTC input.

3. MACV. When it was first formed, MEDTC maintained extremely close ties with MACV. The original MEDTC terms of reference directed CHMEDTC to "closely coordinate all matters pertaining to U.S. and third country Military Assistance to Cambodia with COMUSMACV." COMUSMACV was designated as the coordinating authority to insure compatibility of U.S. Military Assistance to Cambodia with the Vietnamization Program. This coordinating authority included planning of force structure, programming of materiel, and storage and delivery of equipment, as well as all other actions which affected the planning and orderly execution of U.S. and third country military programs in the RVN and Cambodia.

4. USSAG. USSAG has been closely involved with the support of Cambodia since its formation. Prior to 15 August 1973 it was responsible for coordination of U.S. combat air support for the Khmer Armed Forces. It also provided other support and assistance, including conducting studies of problem areas in the Khmer Republic which, because of the limitations on its staff and mission, are beyond the capability of MEDTC. USSAG's role was expanded recently when it was recognized that the level and complexity of the support to Cambodia out of Thailand required that one single U.S. commander be assigned responsibility for planning and coordinating all support operations from Thailand. CINCPAC tasked USSAG with that responsibility.

5. USMACTHAI. Much of the support of Cambodia from Thailand is accomplished by USMACTHAI or its subordinate commands. MEDTC interfaces primarily with MACTHAI Headquarters in Bangkok on training matters and with USARSUPTHAI at Camp Samae San for administrative and logistical support. The MACTHAI Training and Logistical Detachment has begun to play a major role in the implementation of the Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia.

6. U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh.

a. CHMEDTC functions under the supervision of the Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia, as required by law and in accordance with executive orders and such other instructions as the President may from time to time promulgate. CHMEDTC cooperates closely with the Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia, and assures that he is kept fully informed concerning current and prospective Military Assistance Plans and Programs and MEDTC activities.

b. The relationship between the divisions of MEDTC and other sections of the U.S. Mission is primarily one of mutual assistance, coordination and information.

c. (1) The Economic Section of the Embassy and the MEDTC Plans and Programs Division work very closely on matters of MAP/AID interface. The MEDTC action officer serves as the focal point within MEDTC for development of counterpart funding projects and preparing them for approval by CHMEDTC, the Economic Counselor and the Chief of Mission. After they have been approved they are passed to FANK for inclusion in the GKR defense budget. Following this, the Comptroller, MEDTC drafts a Project Agreement between the two governments outlining the conditions of the agreement.

(2) MEDTC action officers also work closely with those in the Economic Section on matters such as rice, POL, construction, etc., which affect both the civil and military sectors.

d. The Political-Military Section: The Political-Military Section of the Embassy and elements of MEDTC coordinate very closely on matters that affect both the civilian and military spheres. Typical of such actions is the equipping of the auto-defense forces. The Political-Military Section is the primary action office for monitoring these forces. However, some of their equipment is provided by MAP and MEDTC assisted in determining the level of that support when the concept was being developed. Other areas in which there is a frequent exchange of

information are those concerning FANK personnel management.

e. DAO Phnom Penh.

(1) The relationship between MEDTC and the DAO is one of mutual cooperation and exchange of information. At the working level officers from the two agencies are often of great assistance to each other especially as sources of force structure information. The Plans Liaison Officers and officers on End Item Utilization Inspections also often develop information of interest to the members of the DAO staff.

(2) CHMEDTC and the DATT both report directly to the Chief, U.S. Mission. They are coequal members of the Coordinating Committee for Security and Military Affairs.

(3) The Naval Attache is charged by CINCPAC with responsibility for coordinating Mekong Convoys.

f. The Direction of Construction, Khmer Republic is responsible to the Officer in Charge of Construction Thailand for accomplishment of construction authorized in the Military Assistance Program. CHMEDTC as administrator of the Military Assistance Program in Cambodia is the customer for whom DIRCON and OICC perform the construction service.

g. Coordination of DOD Elements. In recent message traffic DOD and State have iterated the position that in each country, there should be one single authoritative individual to serve as the senior defense representative. According to CINCPACINST S3020.2E, 24 May 1971, CHMEDTC as the senior military officer in country is the Single Senior Military Representative. As such he is responsible for coordination of DOD elements attached to the U.S. Mission. There is, however, no designated senior defense representative in Cambodia. Other DOD agencies are not under operational or administrative control of CHMEDTC, their persons in charge are not rated by him; and they operate independently and/or report directly to the Ambassador. It is recognized that the term "single authoritative individual" is subject to interpretation. However, if single authoritative individual equates to command authority, the DOD is not represented to the U.S. Ambassador and to the host military departments by a single authoritative individual; nor is there a single authoritative point of control for common DOD personnel administration, operational and other local problems. In effect, the U.S. Ambassador and the host country military departments deal with the Department of Defense through multiple and equally authoritative points of contact. Close country team coordination and informal recognition of the role of CHMEDTC as SSMR here provide for a common effort but the fact remains there is no single responsible DOD point of contact/interface/coordination. Thus, while CHMEDTC is the Single Senior Military Representative, he does not have the authority or the responsibility to act as a single responsible DOD point of contact/interface/coordination in Cambodia.

FANK FORCE STRUCTURE

DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME

1. INTRODUCTION. On 18 March 1970, at the time of Prince Sihanouk's ouster and the establishment of the Republican government, the Khmer Armed Forces (FANK) consisted of approximately 35,000 men. This included: a 32,000 man Army, with 32 battalions, armed with mixed weapons; a 1,600 man Navy, with 11 boats; and a 1,300 man Air Force, with 15 aircraft.

a. The first Khmer officers had graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1946. From this meager force structure and leadership base, the growth of the MAP supported Khmer Armed Forces has been as follows:

End FY71. 68 BNS, 69 aircraft, 49 boats, 79,500 men.

End FY72. 117 BNS, 139 aircraft, 87 boats, 142,000 men.

End FY73. 166 BNS, 192 aircraft, 144 boats, 181,000 men.

FY74 to date. 186 BNS, 208 aircraft, 171 boats, 192,597 men.

b. The planned force structure objective is to achieve a balanced force of 220,000 MAP supported personnel, out of a total Force Structure of 253,000. (The remaining 33,000 personnel being in headquarters and operational units which receive payroll assistance only.) FANK development toward this planned force structure objective is described below as it relates to each of the three services. The discussion of the Army is essentially limited to force structure. The Army's performance is discussed in the basic report. The Navy and Air Force portions of this annex do contain qualitative assessments.

2. ARMY

a. Expansion. The Army's development since 1970 was not without turbulence, particularly in its initial stages. The survival of the Khmer Republic (GKR) during its first year of existence was to a great extent the result of emergency recruitment and massive rallying to a popular cause. U.S. equipment provided for newly formed units consisted of Soviet AK-47 rifles captured in RVN and cast off U.S. cal 30 carbines. Many infantry units literally sprang into existence during this time frame. Individually recruited by local commanders, themselves newly appointed, the units lacked both training and equipment. Uncontrolled strength increases occurred, reaching their zenith in December 1972 when FANK consisted of approximately 561 battalions subtended under a diverse array of "command" headquarters. Units were not standardized in either organization, strength, equipment or training. Uncontrolled personnel strength reporting and the "phantom" problem were an inevitable outgrowth of such turmoil.

[REDACTED]

b. Reorganization. Three directives were issued in December 1972 to correct the situation. They were issued by the newly appointed FANK Chief of Staff with the full support of MEDTC. The first limited FANK strength for 1973 to 250,000; suspended individual unit recruitment programs; and directed a manpower reapportionment. The second promulgated a standard TO&E for both intervention and territorial battalions. The third specifically spelled out how manpower was to be reapportioned and abolished all regiments, "brigade group" headquarters and numerous ineffectual brigades. The result was a paring down of the unwieldy FANK force structure and the reassignment of excess personnel to flesh out those FANK units within the approved MAP force structure.

(1) The Army MAP force structure had been previously worked out by a FANK/MEDTC Force Structure Coordinating Committee during July 1972. The plan designated the following number and type units to receive MAP support:

<u>Inf. Bde's</u>	<u>Inf. Bn's</u>	<u>Territorial Inf Co's</u>
32	202	465

(2) Within the above totals, 128 of the battalions formed the maneuver elements for the 32 brigades, of which 20 were independent and 12 were organized into 4 separate divisions with appropriate supporting arms, i.e. a 155 battery and an armored cavalry squadron. Each of the brigades is to have an organic 105 battery. In addition, a separate artillery and armored brigade rounded out the combat elements of the force structure. The bulk of the army's 202,000 man slice of the MAP approved FANK force structure of 220,000 personnel are located within the above units.

c. Problems. Implementation of the above force structure has not been without difficulties. The first problem was resistance within MAP itself as to the need for four divisions, the use of armored cavalry, and the inclusion of heavy artillery within the planned structure. The most telling argument in favor of such units proved to be the evolution of the enemy into a main force organization and the combat effectiveness of the units themselves. These factors prompted an initial increase in division bases from 2 to 4 and the accelerated formation through 1973 of both artillery and armored cavalry units. In addition, experience showed that the Territorial Companies did not fare well on the battlefield during 1973, often being isolated and overrun. FANK therefore began consolidating these companies into Territorial Battalions and a similar move to integrate some of these battalions into existing but incomplete brigade organizations may develop.

(1) A more difficult, and continuing problem with the implementation of the planned force structure, was the lack of staff coordination within EMG/FANK and its resulting inability to establish priorities and allocate materiel and manpower resources. Throughout the reporting period, brigades and battalions identified as being within the MAP approved force structure would be dissolved and their men and equipment

[REDACTED]

assembled into other units, some MAP designated, others not. Some of this could be attributable to the exigencies of combat and/or the shortcomings of CRA/MAP funding. Much of it however, was the result of political maneuvering on the part of "favorites" within the FANK officer corps and/or the almost total lack of middle level staff coordination between the FANK J1, J3, and J4. Even within the J3, coordination between the operations personnel and the force structure planners only occurred when MEDTC officers acted as the catalyst. While such "management by exception" proved adequate for forcing through a commonly agreed upon set of TO&E's and a definitized force structure, it was not and could not be an adequate replacement for competent, day to day middle management. "Capturing" the force structure in the sense of maintaining an accurate current estimate of the status of designated MAP supported units thus became a daily challenge.

d. Rounding Out the Force Structure. While the previously addressed combat units constitute the bulk of the Army force structure, additional combat support units to include an Engineer, a Signal and a Transportation Brigade were also formed, equipped and became operational during the reporting period.

(1) Logistical support units were given second priority to combat/combat support units during 1972 and the first part of 1973. Logistical support did receive increased emphasis in the latter half of 1973 however, with the equipping of an Ordnance Depot, two Ammunition Depots, a Quartermaster Depot, a POL storage facility, two ambulance companies, a 400 bed hospital, a Collection, Classification and Salvage Company, and a Terminal Service Company.

e. Summary. In summary, the Khmer Army, following the events of 15 March 1970, was first greatly and haphazardly expanded while being equipped with a varied assortment of obsolete and/or excess equipment immediately available to CB MAP. During 1972 and the first half of 1973, the emphasis was on the training and equipping of standardized infantry battalions, and the reorganization of the FANK force structure into four divisions comprising 12 brigades, 20 independent brigades, 74 separate territorial infantry battalions, and 465 territorial infantry companies. In early 1973, the emphasis was on accelerating the delivery of artillery and the introduction of armored cavalry troops into the force structure. Finally, in the latter part of 1973, increased emphasis was given to bringing in equipment for logistical units in order to maintain the large influx of equipment that had occurred in the past two years. (N.B. Increased and/or unprogrammed ammunition costs will necessitate significant slippage in the rounding out of this logistical portion of the Army force structure.) The end of 1973 thus saw the Army force structure 80% complete, with the primary deficiency being in some programmed but undelivered logistical units.

3. [REDACTED] NAVY

a. Expansion. At the commencement of the war against the KC, the Marine Nationale Khmer (MNK) had two primary missions. These were

[REDACTED]

surveillance and protection of the Khmer coastline and patrol and protection of the Tonle Sap-Mekong River axis. MNK did not have sufficient assets to effectively perform either mission and its primary efforts were restricted to the lower Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the RVN border. Occasionally MNK would make a show of force into the Tonle Sap River and the Great Lake. Like its sister services, MNK underwent a significant expansion following the events of 18 March 1970. From a base of approximately 1,600 men and 11 boats, MNK first increased to some 5,000 men and 69 boats by February 1972 and then, during the time frame 1972-1974, more than doubled its strength to 11,500 men and 171 boats. These increases were related directly to increased mission responsibilities as discussed below.

b. Maritime Coastal Zone Responsibility. In early 1972 MNK was ill equipped to execute the surveillance of the GKR's 400 kilometer coastline. The only craft available to prosecute this mission were two ancient PC's, one LSIL, one LCI and a few armed junks. Additionally the Ream Naval Base was in a run-down condition, boasted one small pier in decrepit condition, had little internal repair capability and completely lacked an effective logistical support system. Surveillance of the coastline from Ream to the border with RVN was consequently passed to the VNN on the recommendation of the Tripartite Deputies. The coast from Ream to the Thai frontier was patrolled haphazardly at best by the craft referred to above. Protection of the deep water port of Kompong Som and Ream Naval Base itself was largely ignored because of the unavailability of assets.

(1) This state of affairs has largely been corrected by implementation of the following actions: Procurement of 20 new construction, radar equipped PCF's; stationing of 4 PBR's in the Kompong Som port area; accomplishment of overhauls of all four of the heavy craft noted above; procurement of a newly overhauled floating drydock at the Ream Naval Base; substantial upgrade of the Ream Repair Facility equipments; installation of an effective supply support system; and the commencement and majority completion of a modern pier facility and support complex at Ream Naval Base. Three major improvements are still required. These are completion of the pier complex, completion of the Ream electricity generating project and procurement of a larger, fast, well-armed patrol craft with good sea keeping qualities to extend the seaward range of surveillance beyond that which can be performed by the smaller PCF's. The above actions are being actively prosecuted. In the interim the patrol and surveillance of the Khmer coastline has been effectively assumed by the MNK.

c. Riverine Responsibilities. Despite the importance of coastline surveillance it is protection and control of shipping within and on the 1800 kilometers of navigable rivers and upon the Tonle Sap Lake which represent the most critical mission of the MNK. There is no more important task than the escort and protection of merchant convoys carrying rice, petroleum, and ammunition up the Mekong River from the RVN border to Phnom Penh. The Mekong River LOC is the lifeline of the Khmer Republic and it is here that MNK has proven its combat effectiveness.

[REDACTED]

(1) Before February 1972 MNK was poorly equipped to provide the armed craft needed to escort convoys up the Mekong. They did have some prior U.S. MAP craft, a few, old French craft of varying description and approximately 35 MAP furnished PBR's. Prior to this time convoy escort was provided primarily by the VNN. An energetic procurement effort was launched to provide MNK with additional numbers of fast patrol craft and more importantly, with some heavily armed and armored assault craft which could provide the heavy direct fire support vital to effective convoy escort. Thirty-five heavies including 6-105 monitors, 17 ATC's, 5 MSM/MSR and 2 CCB's were procured to beef up the MNK firepower on the Mekong. An additional 25 new construction PBR's were also provided and 14 LCM6/8's were added to the MNK inventory to handle increased logistic support. Fifty-seven more craft of the same types will arrive shortly.

(2) In early 1972 a secondary support base was established at Kompong Chhnang at which the MNK stationed a small number of craft to expand its influence on the Tonle Sap River. From this base increased numbers of patrols were also launched into the Great Lake to interdict enemy troop movements and to deny this food-rich area to his uninterrupted use.

(3) During the early part of 1973, MNK was formally assigned the protection and defense of the waterborne approaches to Phnom Penh. To accomplish this mission MNK assigned approximately 15 craft of various types to the environs of Phnom Penh. Protection was provided to areas such as Prek Phnou (FANK petroleum reserve) Tak Mau and the Monivong Bridge.

(4) In late May of 1973 the largest mission expansion took place. At this time the FANK high command assigned the responsibility of the Mekong Special Zone to the MNK. MNK was tasked to provide physical security of the Mekong River banks to an average distance of eight kilometers on either side of the Mekong from Phnom Penh to the RVN border. MNK thus underwent another force structure expansion in order to establish a ground presence at key locations along the Mekong corridor. A total of 3,000 infantry troops from the Army were reassigned to MNK and organized into Naval Infantry Battalions (BFM). An eventual force of 30 such battalions is planned.

(5) The battle of Kompong Cham in September-October 1973 also resulted in an increase of MNK mission responsibility. The enemy attempt to seize this provincial capital was thwarted thanks in part to a MNK amphibious operation that transported a relief force from Phnom Penh to the besieged city. Following the battle, MNK was given the responsibility to keep the Mekong River open and to resupply the city on a year round basis. A relocation of MNK riverine assets was required with a concomitant reduction in the numbers of craft assigned to the lower Mekong.

(6) It was because of this increased riverine responsibility on both the Mekong and the Tonle Sap that the decision was made to achieve

[REDACTED]

a force level of 250 craft and to reorganize the MNK five riverine task forces of 50 craft each.

d. MNK Leadership. Prior to the war, the MNK was a small ill equipped organization. The MNK did have one important resource. MNK leadership is and has been the best in FANK.

(1) Headed by Commodore Von Sarendy, Chief of Naval Operations, MNK has a competent and well-trained cadre of officers who have been able to assume increased mission responsibilities without faltering.

(2) During this period the MNK trained all their own boat crews, provided their own logistical support, has increased logistical and naval gunfire support to the FANK, and upgraded their repair and supply capability at Chruï Chang War while maintaining a 65% or better operational status for all riverine craft. More importantly the MNK insured by thorough planning and aggressive execution that an uninterrupted supply of ammunition, oil and foodstuffs reached Phnom Penh despite determined enemy efforts to choke-off the Mekong LOC.

4. AIR FORCE

a. Background. Prior to the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in 1970 the Khmer Air Force (KAF) was aptly described as the Phnom Penh Royal Flying Club. It possessed a few Mig fighters and a varied assortment of other aircraft of all types and origins. Maintenance support of this aerial museum was a best haphazard. The pilots were drawn from the extensive branches of the royal family, the lesser nobility, and the wealthier families. Command of the air force was a political plum and was rewarded based upon personal loyalty. Inefficiency was tolerated, both because the air force lacked a real mission, and because an efficient air force could pose a threat to the palace.

b. Initial Problems. Following the events of 18 March 1970, the Khmer Air Force, unlike its sister services, was not called upon to play a decisive role in the unfolding battle for control of Cambodia. Air power, when and where needed, was provided by the U.S. Air Force. While KAF underwent some expansion, particularly in the development of a basic inventory of common type aircraft, its overall development as a self-sufficient military organization was not fully addressed. From the U.S. mission viewpoint, time and cost factors were prohibitive. U.S. airpower was more than adequate. In addition, the new Khmer government, like the old, viewed airpower as a potential direct threat to the head of state and treated any proposed reorganization of KAF and its command structure accordingly. KAF, to a greater degree than either of her sister services, has thus consistently suffered from inept leadership.

c. Situation - 1972. In February 1972 KAF consisted of 72 aircraft, only 19 having firepower capabilities. It possessed one squadron of prop driven fighter-bombers, one squadron of jet power transport helicopters on loan from MACV resources, and assorted transport aircraft. Total personnel, including trainees, numbered only 3,853 men to support

[REDACTED]

a headquarters, one operating base, and some forward operating detachments at civilian airports. Less than 100 active pilots were filling operational assignments. Heavy maintenance was accomplished out of country, restricting the number of sorties available for combat missions. Qualified maintenance personnel were few and had been educated by the former French Military Mission. They did not possess the required proficiency level in English necessary to learn the maintenance procedures for the U.S. aircraft then coming into the KAF inventory. In addition, neither adequate maintenance facilities nor a functioning supply system existed.

d. Development - February 1972 to August 1973.

(1) The original premise in the equipping of the Khmer Air Force was to provide it with the simplest, easiest to fly and maintain aircraft that could accomplish its missions of close air support for ground and naval forces and limited air transport. Accordingly, the T-28 was furnished as the basic fighter-bomber, the C-47 and AC-47 as the basic cargo aircraft and fixed wing gunship, and the O-1 as the FAC aircraft. Transport helicopters were included in the inventory with helicopter (XM93) gunships arriving in March 1973. Because of their availability, other aircraft have been added from time to time. A squadron of AU-24's were added when they were declared excess to U.S. needs during the phasedown of the U.S. Vietnam involvement.

(2) KAF expansion and development as an effective force prior to 15 August 1973 was hampered. Reasons were the reliance on U.S. combat air support thus making a truly efficient KAF unnecessary, a shortage of skilled pilots and trained support personnel; lack of adequate airfields; a lack of effective leadership which was exacerbated by frequent changes in key personnel and KAF failure to organize itself.

(3) MEDTC and KAF had taken steps to correct many of the deficiencies prior to 15 August 1973. Training programs had been established in the Khmer Republic, Thailand, and the U.S. to train pilots and other personnel. An airfield construction program was launched to upgrade the airfields at Pochentong, Battambang, and Ream. The C-123 aircraft was introduced to increase the airlift capability and to add the ability to conduct airdrops as well. A DASC was established in Phnom Penh to facilitate control of airstrikes.

(4) In mid-1973, shortly before the cessation of U.S. combat air support, KAF had within its inventory the following aircraft:

T-28	32
O-1A/D	28
C-47	15
AC-47	12
C-123	8

[REDACTED]

UH-1H	30
UH-1H(G)	6
AU-24	14

e. Progress since August 1973.

(1) It was evident however that KAF was still a very poor substitute for U.S. combat air support. Steps were taken at several levels to improve KAF's capabilities. Additional aircraft were brought into country including seven UH-1H's under the accelerated delivery project Nimble Voyage. Studies were conducted as to means to increase KAF's abilities in the near term and to eventually make it self-sufficient. The outgrowth of one of those studies was the Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia (TAIP) which is designed to accelerate KAF development so that it can perform effectively in the 1973-74 dry season. This program encompasses expedited delivery of AC-47, T-28 and O-1 aircraft; accelerated training programs and expanded support maintenance arrangements.

(2) Prior to the implementation of TAIP, the assumption of command of KAF by BG Ea Chhong in November 1973 saw the varying efforts at improvement of KAF begin to bear fruit and created a fertile ground for further improvement. The sortie rates of T-28 aircraft, in particular, have increased markedly. There is much greater cooperation and coordination between air/ground and naval forces. This can be attributed to the improvement in leadership brought by the new commander.

(3) As of February 1974, the Khmer Air Force possessed the following numbers of aircraft:

T-28B/D	63
O-1A/D	35
C-47	13
AC-47	11
C-123	8
UH-1H	34
UH-1H(G)	10
AU-24	14

Personnel strength as of the same date was 9,684, of which 298 were pilots. This represents a 220% increase in qualified pilots since 1972.

Annex C - Appendix 1

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT BY SERVICE BY YEAR

<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>MONTH/YEAR</u>				
	<u>JAN 72</u>	<u>JUL 72</u>	<u>DEC 72</u>	<u>JUL 73</u>	<u>DEC 73</u>
1. <u>ARMY</u>					
Rifle M-16	41,351	53,619	69,224	112,346	158,115
Carbine, Cal 30	52,616	83,515	83,515	83,515	83,515
Machine Gun M-60	18	18	18	859	859
Machine Gun Cal 30	2,278	3,357	4,531	6,128	6,220
Mortar 60 mm	815	912	1,170	2,041	2,223
Mortar 81 mm	97	102	196	196	503
Grenade Launcher M-79	6,971	7,019	7,735	18,707	20,481
Recoilless Rifle 106 mm	7	7	33	61	304
Howitzer 75 mm	20	47	47	57	57
Howitzer 105 mm	69	69	134	164	208
Howitzer 155 mm	0	0	0	8	24
Ambulance 1/4T & 3/4T	41	42	139	338	360
Truck Dump 2 1/2T & 5T	0	0	24	34	76
Truck 2 1/2T Cargo	496	733	982	1,576	1,838
Truck 3/4T Cargo	0	108	441	676	758
Truck 1/4T Utility	220	527	647	1,239	1,264
Personnel Carrier M113	21	45	46	95	185
Personnel Carrier M106	3	6	7	11	17
Telephone TA1 & TA312	1,037	1,318	4,298	9,024	9,629
Radio AN/PRC 10	2,206	3,891	4,750	4,750	4,843
Radio AN/PRC 25	1,975	2,920	3,207	4,762	5,023
Radio AN/URC 46, 47	85	152	152	264	320



<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>MONTH/YEAR</u>		
	<u>FEB 72</u>	<u>FEB 73</u>	<u>FEB 74</u>
2. <u>NAVY</u>			
Patrol Boat River (PBR)	39	43	64
Armored Troop Carrier (ATC)	2	14	14
ATC (Refueler)	0	2	3
ATC (Recharger)	0	1	1
Command & Communications Boat (CCB)	0	1	2
Monitor with Flamethrower (ZIPPO)	0	1	1
Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB)	0	4	4
Minesweeper River (MSR/MSM)	0	6	5
Monitor	0	5	6
Landing Craft Medium (LCM6)	19	22	30
Landing Craft Medium (LCM8)	0	5	5
Combat Salvage Boat (CSB)	0	1	1
Landing Craft Utility (LCU/YFU)	1	4	4
Patrol Craft Fast (PCF)	0	4	20
Floating Crane (YD)	0	1	1
Mobile Support Base (MSB)	1	2	2
Infantry Landing Ship (LSIL/LCI)	2	2	2
Patrol Craft (YTL)	2	2	2
Yard Tug Light (YTL)	2	2	3
Drydock	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total Craft	69	123	171

<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>JAN 72</u>	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>
3. <u>AIR FORCE</u>			
T-28B/D	16	48	64
O-1D/A	17	31	37





<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>MONTH/YEAR</u>		
	<u>JAN 72</u>	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>
AU-24	0	14	14
AC-47	3	6	14
C-47	10	15	11
U-1A	16	7	1
C-123K	0	0	8
UH-1H	14	19	34
UH-1GS	0	0	10
T-41	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>18</u>
Total Aircraft	76	154	211



Annex D

RECEIPT, TRANSFER, AND DISTRIBUTION OF MAP EQUIPMENT

The interface of the United States MILSTRIP System with the FANK Logistics System is the Foreign Assistance Office (FAO) in Phnom Penh. To accomplish the actual handling of materiel and distribution of equipment to the various FANK technical services, KAF, and MNK, two warehouse operations are maintained. These warehouses are located at Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. In addition to providing interface between supply systems, the FAO performs fund control and accounting and prepares supply status reports. FAO in coordination with the FANK technical services prepares dollar line requisitions. This is accomplished by manual preparation of 80 column key punch worksheets which are sent to Camp Samae San, Thailand, for keypunching. The resulting cards are then transceived to the supply source. An automated supply system (KRASS) has been created to support the FANK supply system. The system provides fund control information and status of filled and unfilled requisitions. System output is available on both a weekly and monthly basis. Local input is compiled manually and machine support for the system is provided by USSAG at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Third country national (TCN) personnel, under contract with Vinnell Corporation, are assigned to the FAO office and warehouses. Besides monitoring title transfer of equipment, they have been instrumental in familiarizing FANK with the MILSTRIP System and insuring that proper and timely supply actions are accomplished.

Upon receipt of materiel and equipment at FAO warehouse locations, items are inventoried and quantities are verified utilizing appropriate shipping documents. Items are then title transferred to the FANK technical services for distribution to FANK units. As an exception, title transfer of bulk POL is performed at DAO, Saigon. Actual distribution of materiel (equipment) is done by applicable MAPEL and RCN and accomplished in response to a MEDTC supply directive issued on a weekly basis. All major items of equipment received by MAP-CB are reported monthly utilizing the monthly ABC Report. This report lists cumulative receipts of specific major items. Input is compiled manually by MEDTC supply personnel and forwarded to Camp Samae San, Thailand, for keypunching and transceiving to CINCPAC. CINCPAC in turn produces printed data which is returned to MEDTC for inclusion in accountability records.

Plans are being formulated to reorganize the technical services along commodity lines. FANK will align them according to MAP generic codes. This action will produce a single manager system within FANK and preclude multiple stockage of like items by the various technical services.

RELOCATING LOGISTIC BASE FROM RVN TO THAILAND

1. PARIS PEACE ACCORDS. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords signaled the virtual end of logistics support for FANK from bases in the Republic of Vietnam. By March of 1973, with few exceptions, all support functions had been shifted to Thailand. The bulk of this massive and complicated transformation was smoothly accomplished in the remarkably short time frame of sixty days. The effects of the shift were beneficial in some areas and detrimental in others. To gain a more thorough understanding of these effects, it is best to consider the impact on the various support functions involved.
2. EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES. Initially the shift of the logistics trail from RVN to Thailand caused some problems in equipment deliveries. In spite of the diversion of equipment already in shipping channels, some items still arrived in RVN after the shift was accomplished. Some pilferage of equipment awaiting transshipment in RVN occurred, and accountability of materiel became extremely difficult during this time. To reduce pilferage, supplies were packed in conex containers which were then welded shut. Airlift of general cargo at that time was through 8th APS at Tan Son Nhut. Early in 1972 cargo began to be delivered to the Khmer Port of Kompong Som. This proved to be very successful, and MEDTC supply and warehouse operations in RVN were terminated in June of 1973. In conjunction with receiving cargo at Kompong Som, procedures for documentation, title transfer, intransit storage and forward movement of cargo to Phnom Penh by land convoy using Route 4 were implemented and adopted by FANK. In addition to movement of MAP-CB cargo from Kompong Som, some items are off-loaded at Sattahip, Thailand, transshipped through Utapao and transported by C-130 aircraft to Phnom Penh. Other items are shipped by barge from Sattahip via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh.
3. TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES. The shifting of airlift support from Saigon to Utapao lengthened the air line of communication simply as a result of the greater distance from Phnom Penh. In comparison, support using the Mekong LOC was significantly altered.

Originally, the majority of MAP cargo arriving by sealift was processed and transshipped using the facilities at Newport. Likewise, retrograde cargo, particularly end items being routed to depots for repair and return, was processed through Newport, RVN. As of March 1973, the use of Newport by MEDTC was denied by the Paris Peace Accords.

Transshipping activities were subsequently established at Sattahip, Thailand, for both inbound and retrograde shipments of MAP-CB cargo. Items are transferred from deep draft vessels to barges for onward transportation to Phnom Penh via the Mekong River. Retrograde is presently accomplished by backloading barges for the return trip.

The retrograding of cargo from Kompong Som by deep draft vessel is hampered by the necessity to comply with sanitation and quarantine regulations. The Port of Kompong Som does not currently have the operational equipment, supporting facilities, and trained personnel to process retrograde in accordance with these regulations. Furthermore, the relative infrequency of American flag vessels calling at Kompong Som negates responsive approval of cargo offerings.

4. ENGINEER AND ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT. This operational shift caused few problems in the supply of airlifted programmed and dollar line engineer and ordnance support items. However, the shift did require the delivery of many large quantity, high volume equipment items, such as barrier materiel and vehicles to Kompong Som. The onward movement of this materiel to warehouses in Phnom Penh has become increasingly erratic and precarious because of the frequent enemy interdiction of Route 4, especially since November of 1973.

During 1972, large quantities of excess engineer materiel were made available from sources in RVN. These included items such as pre-fabricated buildings, barrier materiel, sand bags, and bailey bridging. The subsequent shift of supply operations to Thailand effectively decreased the access to such material during 1973.

The flow of repair parts for engineer and ordnance equipment was not materially affected by the shift.

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND SIGNAL. Although Phnom Penh's longhaul U.S. communications system continues to terminate in RVN, the effect of the ceasefire agreement has been to restrict options for upgrading the system by forbidding the introduction of even minor or temporary equipment into RVN and by limiting the movement of materiel from RVN to the Khmer Republic.

MEDTC has been denied the use of ARVN facilities previously established with U.S. aid to orient FANK soldiers now facing similar problems experienced in Vietnam. For example, the AN/TRC-1 rebuild program, the PRC-25 module repair facility, and the Vung Tau Signal School can no longer serve FANK needs.

Some difficulty has been encountered in coordinating repairs and calibration of signal equipment with communications maintenance facilities in Thailand because most of them are contractor operated. However, concentrated efforts are being made to obtain the desired support from these facilities to the extent possible.

6. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. The logistics trail for bulk POL has not been affected by the shift. The supply arrangements for bulk POL remain by ship or barge via the Mekong from Nha Be and Vung Tau in RVN.

Package products are now being provided by contract through USARSUPTHAI and by MILSTRIP from CONUS. These products are then hauled by SCOOT barges from Sattahip to Phnom Penh.

7. AMMUNITION. The shift of the logistical base for ammunition from RVN to Thailand was beneficial to the military forces of the GKR. Although the supply line, and hence, the order and ship time were lengthened, reliability, responsiveness, flexibility, and security were significantly enhanced.

Munitions are now delivered by barge to Kompong Som and Phnom Penh, by land convoy to Battambang, by airland to Phnom Penh, and by airdrop to isolated areas.

8. KAF AND MNK ACTIVITIES. The shift of logistics support from RVN to Thailand was extremely beneficial for KAF. The quality and responsiveness of third echelon maintenance support was noticeably improved. While one contract for the IRAN of O-1D aircraft at Air Vietnam in Saigon still remains to be completed, all other contract maintenance has been shifted to locations in Thailand.

The shift of the logistics trail resulted in no significant impact on Navy follow-on consumable and repair parts support. MEDTC began submitting requisitions directly to NAVILCO, Bayonne, New Jersey, vice Saigon. The receipt of air cargo via Utapao instead of Saigon, did not affect Navy support except, perhaps, to marginally speed up delivery.

END ITEM UTILIZATION INSPECTION PROGRAM

1. BACKGROUND. End Item Utilization Inspections (EIUI's) are both permitted and required by law under the legislation which authorizes and appropriates funds for the military assistance program. The purpose of EIUI's is to observe and report on the utilization of MAP provided materiel and training in order to insure that such materiel and training are being used for the intended purpose. Conduct of the EIUI program is a responsibility of the Management Assurance Division of the Military Equipment Delivery Team; however all officers attached to MEDTC participate in the program on a recurring basis.
2. EXECUTION OF END ITEM UTILIZATION INSPECTIONS BY MEDTC. The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia operates under a more limited Charter than a Military Assistance Advisory Group. The End Item Utilization Inspection Program was seen as an opportunity to increase the participation of the Khmer Armed Forces (FANK) in the identification and resolution of their own problems while remaining within Congressional limitations on the kinds of things that MEDTC personnel were permitted to do. In furtherance of this concept, the EIUI program was established as a joint activity, and FANK officers were included as members of each EIUI. The program included utilization of U.S. supplied aircraft and vehicular assets to transport inspection teams to various locations throughout the Khmer Republic. Combat units, training facilities and logistic activities were visited on a recurring basis, using both MEDTC officers and enlisted men, and FANK officers with particular expertise in the military unit to be visited. Checkoff lists were used to facilitate checking the proper use of equipment, completeness of issue, accuracy of records, and maintenance and security of equipment. The presence of members of the FANK general staff on the inspecting party resulted in corrective actions being instituted by the FANK without the necessity of MEDTC action, making the EIUI program a management tool for the FANK.
3. PLANNING, SCHEDULING, AND REPORTING. MAP supported combat units are required to be inspected once each fiscal year, and schools once a month. A weekly schedule is promulgated and coordinated both within MEDTC and FANK headquarters. Units and geographic locations are chosen to produce the maximum of raw data at the least expenditure of fuel and transportation assets. Special attention has been paid to the rapidly developing FANK Logistic Base, and the "Intervention Forces" and the four FANK Infantry Divisions charged with the responsibility of meeting the Communist main force threat. Results of EIUI's are reported in a dual reporting system, MEDTC inspectors reporting to Chief MEDTC and FANK inspectors reporting to their own headquarters.

4. EVALUATION OF THE EIUI PROGRAM. End Item Utilization Inspections are an absolutely essential function of MEDTC. With large portions of the countryside in the hands of the Khmer Communist forces, and the large population centers essentially in the hands of government forces in widely scattered locations it is difficult to monitor the use of MAP provided equipment. The limited size of the U.S. Mission, and the absolute restriction on advisors with units in the field produces a situation in which the EIUI becomes in effect the most effective way that the Chief of Military Equipment Delivery Team can monitor the progress of the U.S. effort in the Khmer Republic.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

1. HISTORY OF MILITARY PAY IN FANK.

a. The FANK Pay System as First Observed by the U.S. Mission

At the time of the proclamation of the Republic, the Military Pay System employed by the Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK) was a carbon copy of the French colonial pay system which was adopted first by the Sihanouk government, and continued unchanged into the Republican armed forces.

This French system was a decentralized method of financial administration which mixed personnel pay, procurement of supplies and food stuffs and personnel welfare actions, all under the direct jurisdiction of the unit commander, usually at battalion level. The Treasurer of the unit whose duties involved the AG and Bn SI in our service, prepared on a monthly basis a series of detailed justification documents (9 total) and submitted these to the Regional Military Intendant for verification and certification. Upon completion of the verification, the Military Intendant prepared a Money Order for the approved amount, and forwarded it together with all documents to the Regional Treasurer, a civilian functionary of the National Treasury, who performed essentially the same audit and then affixed his "visa" or certification on the Money Order, which then became a valid check against the National Treasury. The unit Treasurers would then draw cash and administer the pay of troops, purchase subsistence and supplies, make disbursements for health and comfort of troops, all at the unit level. In essence, each unit was a separate microcosm with its own total administration. Once the money was drawn from the Regional Trasury, the government considered the money spent, and required no further accounting of the unit commander, except for internal records which never left the unit and were intended for unit use only.

The cornerstone of the French system was the integrity and intelligence of the Unit Commander. Once the money was in his hands, it was difficult to stop any misappropriation. The troops were generally ignorant of the amounts due them and would sign in the unit pay book for receipt of funds regardless of amounts actually received. If there were no major pay problems prior to the large-scale mobilization, it was only because the small, largely ceremonial, army of 35,000 troops was led by a tiny elite group of officers, carefully chosen and apparently basically honest, whatever their other military attributes may have been.

For that small pre-war army, widely dispersed and with poor communications, the French pay system was not only adequate, but also perhaps the best under the circumstances.

[REDACTED]

b. The Problems Casued by Large-Scale Mobilization.

When the large scale, unrestricted and uncontrolled mobilization was ordered by Marshal Lon Nol immediately after the establishment of the Republic in 1970, the conditions which made the French system operate disintegrated rapidly and created the chaotic state of affairs enthusiastically described in the press and GAO reports. The basic factors in the collapse were as follows:

- Uncontrolled recruiting was conducted by individuals appointed to high military rank directly from civilian life and authorized to raise their own units.

- The small regional and central finance verification and audit staffs were overwhelmed by the 10-fold increase in the armed forces and the unfamiliarity of the new unit commanders with the payroll justification process. Advance justification was thus abandoned. Unit commanders were allowed to "estimate" their cash needs each month. They were allowed to draw that amount and were to produce signed payrolls after the fact. All control over payrolls and payroll strength ceased. The chaos produced almost immediate, large scale abuses and led to the large "Phantom Payroll" problems which received considerable public attention. The phantom payroll problem can be divided into two categories - the phantoms, or non-existent troops, and the personnel who exist, are on military payrolls, but perform non-military duties and are of no use to the war effort.

- True "phantoms" are names invented to allow the unit commander to draw pay for non-existent individuals and pocket it personally.

- The other category called "flower people" consists of house servants, personal bodyguards and friends and relatives who show up only on payday and have no mission in the unit other than to collect pay. This group is increased by the practice of using military labor for strictly private projects, such as home building, personal vehicle repair, and similar activities. Other abuses included non-payment of troops, payment of less than the amounts due and a myriad of familiar ploys for personal profit at the expense of the State.

After the initial euphoria of the Republic's birth, there were several disturbances caused by troops who did not receive their pay for extended periods of time. The payroll problems came to a climax in late 1972, when the Information Minister of the Khmer Republic stated that there may have been as many as 100,000 non-existent names, or "Phantoms" on the FANK rolls. While this was incorrect and exaggerated it brought the problem to a head.

[REDACTED]

c. Actions of the U.S. Mission to Insure Proper Use of Counterpart Funds in Support of FANK Payrolls.

(1) Early U.S. Efforts at Establishment of Payroll Control by FANK.

A decision was made in 1971 to extend the use of Counterpart funds generated under Public Law 480 to support a portion of the Military Payrolls of the FANK. Because the magnitude of the support was determined to be "substantial" within the scope of the definitions contained in the Military Assistance Manual, a system of review and observation was deemed necessary to insure proper use of U.S. funds as required by law.

The early U.S. Project Agreements with the GKR provided a procedure for a series of checks on the accounting for payrolls and a program of on-site observations. The mere existence of this program appeared to have a braking effect on the growth of the "phantom" paid strength of FANK. The procedure of pre-artification and pre-payment audit of payrolls was re-instituted as of September 1971. The reported payroll strength dropped from a high of 253,609 in August 1971 to a low of 229,896 in December of that year. However, as it became apparent that the controls were not truly effective, the payroll strength increased in 1972, reaching a record level of 300,090 in December 1972. More stringent controls were clearly called for in the face of this rampant increase and such steps were shortly thereafter approved by the GKR as part of the Project Agreement stipulation for continued U.S. support of FANK payrolls with counterpart funds.

(2) The Centralization of Military Pay Functions in FANK (Financial Reform). In August of 1972 Marshal Lon Nol was briefed by the U.S. Ambassador and Chief, MEDTC. The GKR was offered both continued funding and the services of U.S. personnel and finance specialists to facilitate reform. These services were accepted and proved to be the most effective means of purging the FANK of suspect soldiers and bringing some semblance of order and accuracy to FANK's chaotic personnel and financial accounting systems. The providing of U.S. specialists was in conformance to a congressional mandate requiring that funding provided by the USG to the GKR be used for the intended purpose and be properly accounted for. The assistance was provided within the framework of the existing End Item Utilization Inspection system. A monitoring of the payroll and financial accounting systems of FANK was thus begun. Recommendations for corrective actions followed soon thereafter.

In November 1972 the U.S. Mission informed the GKR that a payroll of some 300,090 men was more than the Khmer economy could support or the FANK command system effectively use. The U.S. Mission proposed, and the GKR accepted, that the FANK payroll strength be limited to 253,000. In December 1972 the FANK Chief of Staff formally established the 253,000 target. To emphasize the importance attached to this action, in January 1973 the U.S. Mission informed the highest

[REDACTED]

levels of the Khmer Government that in the absence of effective action to meet the payroll ceiling, further United States contributions to the Exchange Support Fund would be deprived of their effect, and a pending contribution of \$4 million would be withheld until effective action was taken. A detailed explanation of the Centralized Pay System is given in the succeeding section, however it should be noted here that the critical feature of the new system is the relieving of the unit commanders of pay and record keeping responsibility. This takes away the basic tools of payroll fraud from the hands of any unscrupulous individuals. The concept calls for roving pay agents to arrive at each unit and pay the troops based on payrolls prepared by the Regional Finance Service instead of unit administration of these functions.

The system was given a "live test" in Military Region II during the period February through April 1973. Based on the experience gained in this test, the application of the new system was extended to the other Regions until, in September 1973, the entire FANK was essentially paid through procedures of the first phase of the new centralized pay organization.

As expected, there was considerable resistance on the part of some unit commanders to this major departure from established routine where they controlled the pay directly in amounts and times of their own choosing. It can only be assumed that the commanders who oppose the procedural change are those who, during the earlier period of turbulence and lack of control, cheated on payrolls. There were some incidents, including overt acts of force and intimidation on the part of some commanders, but these have abated as acceptance of the new pay scheme grew in the higher echelons of the Armed Forces.

d. The FANK Centralized Pay System.

(1) Basic Concepts

The Centralized Pay System as conceived and adopted by FANK has the following basic features:

(a) Establishment of the FANK Finance Service, charged with the function of military pay as a separate entity from the Intendance Service which retained the other service and supply functions.

(b) Withdrawal of the Responsibility for Pay of Troops from the Unit Commander, to remove the opportunities for fraud and falsification of paid strength statistics and to place the function in the hands of specialized personnel.

(c) Centralization of Disbursing, Computation, and Record Keeping Functions first at the Military Region Finance Services and subsequently at the national level through mechanization of appropriate activities.

[REDACTED]

(d) Establishment of Individual Finance Files at a Central Location for each member of FANK to allow for positive identification and control of payees at individual and unit levels.

(2) Implementation of the Centralized System.

The implementation of the system is scheduled to take place in five phases, each intended to reach specific objectives in rationalizing the delivery of pay to the individual soldier and in effective control of pay strength. The five phases are:

Phase I - Semi-Centralize Payrolls.

Phase II - Issue New Pay Cards.

Phase III - Establish Individual Files.

Phase IV - Mechanize Payrolls.

Phase V - Validate Dependents of Military Personnel.

Phase I - Semi-Centralization of Payrolls is essentially complete. As of September 1973, all Military Regions transferred the troop payroll function to each regional Finance Service which sends pay teams to reach each unit and pay the troops independently of commander's control. The composition of each pay team is changed monthly to prevent a pay agent from paying the same unit on successive paydays.

Because of equipment and personnel shortages, many payrolls are still prepared at the unit, however, since they must be forwarded to the regional Finance Service for audit and actual payment, the essential feature of the concept is not being violated. The pay agents are required to pay each soldier individually. On occasion, unit commanders obtain the pay in bulk from the pay agent either through threats or by arrangement, however, this practice is not wide-spread and is actively repressed by the Finance Services. After-action reports are required from each team each month. Incidents of coercion and malfeasance have been reported and prosecuted on several occasions in recent months.

Phase II - Issue of New Pay Cards is a two-part process presently under implementation as of this date. The first part involves completion of an individual control document for each soldier, called the "Fiche de Controle de Solde." This document contains the basic personal data on each individual to include his military service number, photograph, thumb prints, and list of legal dependents to include relationship and date of birth. Once these control documents are collected at each regional Finance Service, they are validated through personnel channels. Once validated, each control document becomes a part of the individual file for the service member and serves as the authority for issue of the Individual Pay Card.

The issue of the Pay Card is the second part of the phase and provides the individual soldier with identification at the pay table which, together with his military ID Card, establishes his right

[REDACTED]

to pay. The Pay Card will also provide the individual with a means of receiving casual payments when away from his unit.

As of January 1974, approximately 30% of the control documents have been completed by the units and transmitted to the Regional Finance Services. There is considerable resistance to this phase because positive identification of each service member is being accomplished, making payroll fraud more difficult. Numerous reasons are cited for delays - lack of photographs, units on combat operations, lack of blank forms, etc. While some of the reasons are unquestionably legitimate, there has also been a considerable amount of ill will. Some units located in large urban areas are still delinquent, while some units isolated in the countryside manage to complete the documents and furnish photographs in record time.

Phase II was scheduled for completion by end of Decmeber 1973, however this optimistic estimate had to be revised. With recent increase in emphasis and support from the High Command, the program has shown considerable progress and could be complete by early fall 1974, given the present rate of progress.

Phase III - Establishment of Individual Pay Files at a central location in each Regional Finance Service has begun, concurrently with Phase II. The individual files will contain the "Fiche de Controle de Solde" and paid vouchers from each month's payroll as well as a record of any other casual payments received. The basic purpose of individual files is to provide an audit trail and assist in individual pay problems. Additionally, these files will provide a means of strength control for comparison with personnel records, and lastly, facilitate mechanization of payroll operations.

The Regional Finance Services are in process of preparing individual folders, however, the completion of this project is contingent on progress of Phase II.

Phase IV - Mechanization of Payrolls. As any repetitive function, payroll operations are adaptable to mechanization with considerable benefits to be realized in terms of speed, economy and accuracy. Once the first 3 phases of the program are complete, a data base for mechanization will be available. A computer center will be in operation in 1974 for personnel administration purposes and sufficient capacity is being reserved for eventual inclusion of the Military Pay System. The time of actual implementation of this phase will depend on the successful completion of the first three phases of the Centralized Pay System, the availability of the computer and the military situation in the country.

Phase V - Validation of Dependents of Military Personnel. Validation of dependency status of the individual is a forward-looking project which anticipates future problems and provides for a solution in advance. It provides for a census and verification of military

[REDACTED]

dependents against the control documents in the individual pay files. No scheduled completion date has been set for this phase.

Its basic advantage will be the regularization of pay and allowances connected with dependency status and represents the final refinement of the system as presently conceived. While the other four phases dealt primarily with the control of numbers of personnel on payrolls, this phase has as its goal the purification of pay and allowances. The dependency-connected allowances represent a greater share of the total pay of the eligible married soldier than his basic salary. At the present time, a large majority of the Khmer troops have less than 18 months service and are not entitled to dependency allowances. Dependency allowances, however, will become an increasingly larger portion of the military pay budget and Phase V provides in advance for a form of effective control of this anticipated problem area.

2. ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY PAY MANAGEMENT IN FANK.

a. Impact of the Centralized Pay System on FANK.

The implementation of the Centralized Military Pay System has shown itself to be a major force in restructuring of the administrative network of FANK. The most striking fact which can be attributed in large measure to this new pay procedure is the reduction in the number of the so-called "Phantom" troops. Since the acceptance and implementation of the system, the payroll strength of FANK was reduced from a high point of 300,090 in November 1972 to 235,914 in October 1973. Subsequent increases can be traced to documented recruiting efforts.

Payment of units by pay teams was alleged to slow down the delivery of cash to the individual as compared with the previous method where the unit commander took care of this function. This allegation is not borne out by facts. Before the advent of the present system there had been riots involving whole units who failed to receive their pay. Late payment or non-payment in the last 6 months tend to affect small groups, normally involving new troops for whom personnel documents are not available to prove their membership in the Armed Forces. These cases are generally handled expeditiously and the record deficiencies speedily corrected.

Transportation remains a problem for pay teams dispatched to remote locations with priorities reserved for tactical uses, however, the delay is no greater than under the old system. Pressure from individual commanders to take control of pay away from pay agents and "pay" some non-existent troops is still in evidence, but is generally reported and receives prompt command attention.

As in indication of increased support from the top, a letter was recently signed personally by Marshal Lon Nol and distributed down to company-level. It directed wholehearted support for the new pay measures and promised swift and severe punishment to all obstructionists.

[REDACTED]

b. Other Finance Actions.

In addition to routine cost-of-living increases in certain allowances and in hazardous duty pay (i.e. parachute duty) other significant actions were taken to provide economic incentives associated with the objectives of building a stable military force.

An advance of 1/2 month's pay is provided to draftees and recruits as they process into service. In addition, students, who are exempt from the draft, but who volunteer receive an Enlistment Bonus of 5000 Riels (approximately \$13, a paltry sum in American eyes, but an amount equivalent to 1 month's pay for a Cambodian Private).

Members of Intervention Units - the reaction forces of FANK-as well as designated Aircraft and Watercraft crews, receive a "Prime d'Intervention" of 1500 Riels per month. This is one of several incentives offered to induce personnel to volunteer for the Intervention units as opposed to the Territorial forces which have a relatively static defense mission. While the effectiveness of this measure in obtaining additional volunteers has not been assessed, it has shown some positive effect on the morale of the personnel already in the Intervention units.

c. MEDTC Position and Role.

The position of MEDTC with respect to management of FANK Military Pay has been to safeguard the interests of the United States with respect to counterpart funds expended in support of FANK Military Payrolls. To safeguard these interests, qualified MEDTC personnel have performed continued appraisals of the status of controls and proper execution of the Military Pay functions by the Finance Service, FANK. Whenever conditions not consistent with good control procedures are discovered, they are brought to the attention of Chief MEDTC who determines the appropriate response. In accordance with Project Agreements, objections are made to the GKR for a resolution satisfactory to both parties. The current Centralized Military Pay System is a GZR response to objections voiced, through proper channels, by Chief MEDTC regarding the lack of controls in expenditures of U.S. Funds provided in support of a GKR project.

d. General Impression and Prognosis.

The administration of Military Pay in the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic is a story of considerable success in spite of substantial opposition from the corrupt elements at all echelons of command. A super-structure of a modern system rests on the ingrown foundation of an obsolete one. There are strong tendencies and pressures toward the return of the cumbersome and uncontrollable system of the past. Progress made to date could easily be erased by inattention and relaxation of effort on the part of MEDTC and the progressive elements in the FANK Finance Service. As the Centralized System progresses into each

[REDACTED]

succeeding phase, the "new" system becomes more and more a part of the administrative routine and becomes more firmly fixed in the organizational framework.

It would be fair to say that, were the efforts to modernize pay to cease, the present hierarchy would quickly return to the old way of doing things. As each new phase of the Centralized System is completed, such a return becomes more and more difficult. Once the stage of mechanization is reached, a return to the "old way" will no longer be feasible. The FANK military pay system will then become locked-in with the new administrative structure firmly in place.

The direction of effort should remain as it is presently-encouragement of progress toward positive control of pay operations within the Armed Forces and enhancement of morale through prompt, accurate, timely and reliable disbursement of pay and allowances at all levels.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

The Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) did not recognize the need for a national mobilization system following the establishment of the republic on 18 March 1970. That the ensuing conflict with the NVA and KC might be a protracted one was apparently only vaguely realized. Accordingly, the mobilizing of the nation's manpower assets was done haphazardly. The almost ten fold expansion of the armed forces was accomplished through a spontaneous response to the colors and by individual unit recruiting. Charismatic local civilian leaders would be granted a military title and would thereupon fashion military units of various types from the volunteers they were able to attract within their local region. Local unit recruiting, with little regard for national military priorities, thus became and to a considerable extent remains, the basis of the GKR's mobilization "system." The operational, organization, and fiscal problems inherent in such an individualistic approach to the task of mobilizing manpower assets are discussed elsewhere. The impact on personnel management was both fundamental and highly debilitating. The lack of a centralized, national, mobilization system was perhaps an affordable luxury in the heady, early days of the republic when patriotic fervor was running high and volunteers were commandeering civilian buses to get them to the front. In the face of a bitter, protracted conflict, this lack of an effective mobilization and personnel management system means that the government's national intervention forces, the combat or front line units, are constantly understrength. In addition, the "system" of individual unit recruitment, coupled with the lack of a centralized personnel or finance system, gave birth to the phenomenon of the "Phantoms" and "Flower People". The former are non-existent soldiers created by the imagination and cupidity of local commanders who pocket the Phantom's pay. The latter are personnel who actually exist, who generally wear some form of uniform, but who do not perform any function associated with a unit's military mission. They are instead personal servants, or perhaps manpower loaned out to local contractors, or even family members. They do show up at the unit on payday. Correcting this situation and creating a centralized personnel management system on a national scale became a primary MEDTC objective.

2. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

In August 1972 Marshal Lon Nol was briefed by the Ambassador and Chief MEDTC. He was offered both funding assistance and the services of a personnel expert to facilitate reform of the existing personnel system. This action on the part of the US Mission and MEDTC was mandated by the fact that massive financial assistance was being furnished to the GKR to meet military payrolls. The U.S. Mission and MEDTC were responsible for insuring that these funds were properly utilized, and the provision of a personnel expert to conduct the appropriate end item utilization inspection fulfilled the requirement for monitoring the personnel accounting system of the Khmer Armed Forces. It was made clear in the August 1972 briefing that reforms in the FANK

[REDACTED]

personnel accounting system were imperative if US Government funding support were to continue. The provision of a U.S. personnel expert to monitor changes, reforms, and improvements in the accounting system was not viewed as violating US Congressional constraints on permissible MEDTC activity, but rather as being in furtherance of Congressional insistence that US funds be properly expended only for intended purposes. The Lon Nol briefing of 12 August 1972 represented a turning point in the modernization of the FANK personnel system. The first effective steps to create a modern and well organized military force can be traced to the fallout and followup which resulted from that briefing. Completely accurate and honest personnel accounting remains a goal, not a current reality, but coupled with the controls achieved in financial management and the establishment of a centralized pay system described in Annex F, significant progress has been made.

During the period August 1972 to January 1973 the entire problem of recruiting, conscription and the organization of a personnel procurement command in the FANK was reviewed. In March of 1973, the National Assembly passed the Conscription Act, which was signed into law in April and finally approved for implementation in July of 1973. Unfortunately, the first attempts to draft 16,000 men in the Phnom Penh area were badly handled with conscripts being rounded up at gunpoint and resistance on the part of the populace apparent. The conscription effort in the Phnom Penh area ceased and the official in charge of the initial effort was fired. Draft calls in Battambang and Svay Rieng met with mixed success and the actual number of conscripts realized was in dispute.

The GKR was informed that it was mandatory for the Republic's survival to find a way to solve the conscription problem in order to fill up the under strength intervention force units. In October 1973, having taken the time to improve their organization the conscription effort began again in the Phnom Penh area, utilizing the 8 Khand (district) organizations to identify potential conscripts. The age group 18 to 25 became the target of this effort with a goal of either recruiting or conscripting 16,000 men by 15 December 1973 for an average daily figure of 250 men. The effort was successful in October, November and early December but diminished in effectiveness by the end of December so that at present almost all entry in to the FANK is again via the volunteer route. An increase in volunteers resulting from the imperfect implementation of the draft law has been realized but has not yet resulted in filling up the front line combat units. Territorial units and non combat units continue to receive the lion's share of the volunteers because of the Khmer's traditional desire to live, work, and even fight in close proximity to their families and their home ground. The national leadership has not kept up the necessary pressure and emphasis on the conscription program, and without the necessary pressure from above the effort has once again become moribund. A new law, designed to reduce draft deferments and to punish draft evaders was passed but has not been effectively implemented. Various provinces report varying degrees of success in recruiting, however, the determination of the GKR to rely on volunteers when their personnel needs are

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urgent and their front line combat units are understrength remains a source of frustration for the U.S. mission personnel assigned to monitor the situation. The laws are on the books and the system can be made to work if the GKR has the will to make it work.

The GKR recently commenced a national census using forms furnished by the U.S. Government. The purpose is to provide a data base for equitable distribution of rice, but other benefits will accrue if the census taking is successful. The new prime minister, Long Boret, has been effectively pushing the census program.

3. STRENGTH ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING.

At the root of many of FANK's problems has been the lack of a centralized system of personnel accounting. No responsible person has ever been certain of either the overall total strength of FANK, nor the effective strength of its major units. Efforts to achieve such a system met with resistance at all levels since the inaccurate figures provided the best means for collecting pay for non-existent soldiers. The existing system provided personal gain for the commander involved, or at best allowed the commander additional funds to better equip, feed and provide for the troops under his command.

The FANK has suffered from a succession of inefficient/corrupt assistant chiefs of staff for personnel (ACPER). The position entailed a thankless job in which the incumbent would have received little recognition had he succeeded in bringing order out of the existing personnel accounting situation. Limited progress was made until the appointment of the current ACPER, Brigadier General Kim An Dore. His reputation for personal honesty and integrity remains unblemished. In addition, his experience in the personnel field makes him the first truly qualified ACPER in the history of FANK.

The need for accurate unit strength reporting was recognized and emphasized as early as October of 1972. After a series of promising beginnings the reporting systems faltered due to resistance on the unit level and lack of support or emphasis by the ACPER and other high officials of the FANK. A new strength reporting system was installed in April of 1973 but it soon became sporadic due to lack of interest at the top and overt resistance at the reporting level. Junior officers attempting to make the system work experienced considerable frustration.

Strength reporting received renewed emphasis in October 1973 following a model report used in the Vietnamese Army. The usual resistance was met, but with the accession of BGEN Kim An Dore, the pressure on delinquent units was constant and uniform and December of 1973 saw receipt of the first complete strength report prepared solely on the basis of information submitted to ACPER by field units. The report was compared with records of the Finance Branch, developed as a result of reforms in the FANK Centralized Pay System (discussed in Annex F).

[REDACTED]

The figures developed were found to be in essential agreement. A double edged tool for purging suspect soldiers (i.e. "Phantoms" and "Flower People") from the rolls of FANK has thus been developed and appears to be working.

Additional reforms and revised procedures and techniques are being implemented. Strength reports are to be programmed into a computer making comparison and analysis possible on a real time basis. With sufficient information being requested for a data base, and the technical capability and equipment already on hand at ACPER, including key punch verifiers and sorters, and computer time available, the problem of accurately counting the FANK is being brought under control.

In addition, FANK is instituting two new controls to improve their personnel accounting. They have requested and received U.S. support for the issuance of American type identity cards and tags (i.e. "dog tags"). The blank I.D. card forms were printed out of country to prevent compromise before strictly controlled in-country issuance. Photography and laminating equipment is on order and procedures to insure the proper identification of each receipt appears to have attention at the highest level. While full implementation may take as much as an entire year, the program represents a major step forward in personnel accounting procedure.

The issue of identity tags has proceeded more rapidly than the new I.D. cards due to the more immediate availability of equipment for their production. Over 11,000 were manufactured prior to 1 January 1974. They provide an effective identification system, particularly for new troops being added to unit rolls.

It is anticipated that the American type I.D. cards which will include thumb prints and photographs, if issued under planned controls, will constitute an effective means for controlling FANK's continuing problem with suspect soldiers.

4. (U) MILITARY PRINTING.

A military printing capability was achieved in October of 1973 after a year of sustained effort. The FANK chose an aggressive officer as Director of their planned printing facility. He has accomplished the renovation of a building to house the MAP provided printing equipment, programmed his personnel for OJT at the U.S. Navy Printing Plant at Subic Bay, supervised the installation of the equipment, and accomplished the ordering of supplies in a timely manner.

5. [REDACTED] DATA SERVICES.

FANK was an obvious candidate for data services in order to improve their shaky personnel accounting system. The program for data service began with the acquisition of sufficient equipment to keypunch input for a 360/20 computer and to sort for the computer. The computer time is to be rented from the local IBM France office in Phnom Penh. As


[REDACTED]

late as November 1973 the program was delayed for lack of funds to purchase the necessary equipment. The Bank of Cambodia advanced the funding in November of 1973 with delivery of equipment anticipated by February 1974. Coding for the personnel data commenced in November. Key punch verification commenced in January 1973, however, with a personnel strength of approximately 230,000 men it is anticipated that at least one year will be required before a complete roster with requisite data will be available for all of FANK.

6. (U) CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT.

FANK has published a coding manual for MOS identification and requests for information on all personnel assigned within FANK have gone out to all units. While the information to be gained from the current survey will not produce MOS information as such, i.e., individual soldiers will not be identified as carrying a particular MOS, the survey will list the job title of each man assigned and this information will form the basis after automation is achieved for developing a complete MOS classification system within FANK. While assignments based on MOS cannot presently be made on the basis of the incomplete data available, such assignment remains one of the principal goals to be achieved by the MOS program.

7. [REDACTED] CONCLUSION.



TRAINING

At the beginning of the reporting period, the GKR in-country training base was embryonic in nature, consisting of twelve operational but inadequate service schools and two small basic training centers. At that time an extensive unit/individual training program was in full swing in RVN where no cost-training (except for subsistence) was underway. Company and battalion size units were being trained in a realistic combat environment by RVNAF and US trainers. In addition, an extensive program of individual/crew training was on-going in RVN for all services. As 1972 progressed and US Forces continued to draw down in Vietnam, it became evident that RVN, faced with providing its own military defense, would require full use of the Vietnamese training facilities in support of their own armed forces. Consequently in anticipation of a drastic reduction in Khmer training in SVN, GKR with MEDTC support and assistance developed and began execution of a plan to expand the Khmer in-country recruit and unit training capability. The result was the expansion and improvement of the two existing training centers, & the establishment of four additional training centers. A realignment of training center missions was accomplished to provide for basic combat training for Khmer recruits, NCO upgrade training and unit training for battalions and regional infantry companies. Construction of new facilities was underway by mid-1972, however, progress was slow as the wet season began and FANK command emphasis waned somewhat. As it turned out, this first step toward enhancing in-country capability was a fortunate move. By the time the cease fire agreement in Vietnam (Jan 1973) precluded all Khmer training in that country, GKR individual and unit training capability had been established and was expanding, although slowly.

By late 1972, minimal progress in service school and training facility improvement had been achieved, when negotiations underway to establish a Vietnam cease fire indicated that successful conclusion of these negotiations was dependent in part, on the cessation of Khmer training in RVN. With only a rudimentary training base in-country, it became obvious that GKR would require another source for an extensive out-of-country training program. Consequently, GKR successfully negotiated with RTG for a drastic increase in training to be accomplished in Thailand. Prior to this time, some unit training (non-MAP supported) had been underway in Thailand, but now MAP supported Thai training would become the primary source of quality individual training. Because the Thai training would require extensive MAP funding, the number of units/individuals to be trained would be drastically reduced from that programmed for training in RVN. Thai training would be subject to course costs, ammunition costs, living allowances, and, in the case of KAF training, provision of aircraft and associated equipment. Training would be conducted by the Thai's in their own service schools, or by U.S. MTT's/units in Thailand. Decision as to who would conduct training and where,

would be the responsibility of RTG. Normally, if the training capability for a specific skill was available in the Thai training base, training would be conducted by the Thais and paid for by MAP-CB. If the Thais did not have the capability to provide requested training, or if the numbers to be trained were so small that it would be uneconomically feasible to conduct a course in the Thai training base, training would then be conducted by U.S. MTT's, formed or called forward for a specific program, or by U.S. units in Thailand through OJT programs. Costs for U.S. conducted training would be supported by MAP-CB, but would be less costly than Thai conducted training. For KAF pilot training, Det 1, 56 SOWG at Udorn, MAP-CB/KAF would provide aircraft, and pay associated maintenance and logistics support costs in addition to student living allowances.

The Thai training program started in earnest in early 1973 as training initially programmed for RVN was diverted to Thailand. Twenty-nine courses in one or more increments were scheduled in the Thai service schools. An extensive program of T-28 pilot and aircraft maintenance skills was started at Udorn. USARSUPTHAI scheduled an OJT program for small groups of students in various logistic and maintenance skills. Two USAF MTT's in Thailand provided combat crew training for UH-1H gunship crews and crew and maintenance training for AU-24 crews and maintenance personnel. A third USAF MTT was called forward to provide air crew and maintenance training for the C-123K aircraft which were programmed into the KAF inventory. This MTT would train the KAF crews on their own aircraft, then provide C-123K transition training for the RTAF. The USARPACINTA MTT, located in Bangkok would provide intelligence training in four different skills. Due to the scheduled Thai student load at the Thai artillery school and the small number of Khmer students to be trained, a U.S. MTT from Fort Sill was called forward to provide training for 12 FANK 105 Howitzer MTT's and the cadre for 2 FANK 155 Howitzer batteries. The Khmer 105 Howitzer MTT's would return to GKR and provide upgrade/refresher training for 105 Howitzer batteries in their combat positions. The 155 Howitzer cadres would provide the nucleus for newly formed artillery batteries programmed for accelerated delivery later in the year as the much talked about USAF bombing halt became a reality.

The CONUS training program paralleled the rapid expansion of the Thai program in 1973 and will maintain the 1973 level during the years 1974 and 1975. This program was originally designed as a source of high quality personnel to provide badly needed leadership and to assist in upgrading the in-country training base. As a result of an increasing level of hostilities and the infusion of additional equipment to replace firepower lost with the cessation of U.S. Air Force support, most of the CONUS students returning from the FY 72 and early FY 73 programs were diverted to fill operational positions in committed units. This trend has begun to subside and as of late 1973, increasing numbers of CONUS trained officers are being assigned to positions where they can effectively contribute to the in-country training program.

The CONUS program is keyed to three critical functions: Planning, Selection of the Best Qualified Candidates, and Language Training. All three areas have shown significant improvement during the past two years. A major breakthrough was achieved in the planning function by increasing the role of MEDTC liaison officers to FANK in-country branch oriented schools and technical support activities. These officers were actively initiated into the training program as an additional channel to that between the MEDTC training branch and the Director General of Instruction of FANK. This overcame the greatest obstacle in both the accurate determination of training requirements and the selection of the most professionally qualified officers, the lack of communications between the DGI and the various branch and activity coordinators. As activity chiefs became more aware of the quality and variety of training available, they increased communications and put pressure on the DGI to react to the "needs of the users." Three major benefits have evolved from this concept. (1) The DGI is becoming more effective in dealing with MEDTC, in that it is receiving sufficient information from FANK to develop effective programs. (2) The DGI is becoming more effective in dealing with FANK as closer ties are established with each activity in working out training requirements and (3) The renewed interest of branch and activity coordinators in the training program has resulted in a more careful selection of professionally qualified candidates.

English language qualification has remained a key function in the CONUS training program and rapid progress is being made toward the goal of achieving a complete in-country capability for candidates in all services. Since the establishment of a 40 position language laboratory in 1972, the Defense Language Institute has developed the capability of bringing candidates to ECL 80. The two branch 20 position language laboratories at Khmer Navy Headquarters and at the Air Force Training Facility at Battambang, established in the middle of calendar year 1973, should achieve this level with the completion of the FY 75 language instructor training program at Lackland AFB. Two additional 20 position language laboratories are due in country in late spring calendar year 1974. These will alleviate the current problem of insufficient capacity of the Language Institute and its branches, and will finalize materiel needs for the institute less books and maintenance. To insure this goal is maintained, once achieved, a continued program of CONUS training in the Language Instructor and the Instructor Refresher Courses must be pursued.

As 1973 progressed, the enemy threat increased and the advent of a USAF bombing halt loomed on the horizon, it became obvious that FANK forces would require increased combat power to fill the void created by the cessation of USAF firepower. Accelerated deliveries of equipment programmed for entry into the Khmer inventory were requested and approved. The impending arrival of this equipment required an intense effort to accelerate the supporting training programs. Det 1, 56 SOWG at Udorn increased input to their on-going T-28 combat crew and maintenance training programs. The US Army 70th Aviation Detachment at Don Muang

RTAFB, Bangkok, provided combat upgrade training for UH-1H pilots and crews. The 105 Howitzer MTT (US) in Thailand suddenly shifted gears and became a 155 Howitzer MTT, as previously mentioned.

In the meantime, in-country schools geared up to provide training within their capabilities so that FANK could absorb this new equipment with the least possible delay in making it operational in the field. Accelerated deliveries of aircraft, M113 armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, vehicles, and river craft for the Khmer Navy in addition to increasing combat losses strained the in-country training base.

With the onset of the wet season, immediately following the bombing halt in mid-August, FANK enjoyed a slight battlefield breather. However, it was obvious that the following dry season starting about mid-December, would require FANK to make preparations. Attempts to increase recruiting were not enjoying success and after one false start, a national conscription program finally got underway in October. In order to cope with the expected influx of new troops some emphasis was placed on upgrading facilities at the six national basic training centers in operation by this time. The new troops faced primitive living conditions, lackadaisical cadre at some training centers and a lack of command interest. However, as the AWOL and sickness rates in some training centers increased, the GKR finally realized that the training centers were the key to the survivability of the GKR and that something had to be done. Money previously allocated for training center construction was released, security forces at some training centers were increased, barrier materiel was provided (not to keep the enemy out, but to assist in keeping the recruits in), medical support improved, two camp commanders were changed and a reorganization of the office of the Director General of Instruction with attendant removal of certain ineffective personalities resulted in improvements in training center facilities and operation. By December the training centers were operating at near capacity, in some cases AWOL and sickness rates had reduced, and quality of training had improved. Some new barracks, mess facilities and training support facilities had been completed or were underway.

On the other hand, progress at service schools was much slower. Most schools, of necessity, are located within the Phnom Penh perimeter in more or less temporary facilities. Classrooms are make-shift in many cases, but serviceable. Equipment to support training many times is diverted to combat units to replace combat losses. Cadre improvement is slow, but as personnel complete training in CONUS and Thailand, small numbers are provided to service schools as instructor personnel. The impact of these personnel on the quality of training is beginning to become apparent as the qualifications of school graduates are beginning to show improvement. Training management at the service schools and training centers continues to improve as more experience is gained in scheduling, conducting and supporting a variety of courses at the schools.

Unfortunately, training management at the national level (Director General of Instruction) shows little improvement. The Khmer personnel in DGI do not understand the principles of projecting and programming training requirements. One of the most important aspects of training management, a system of skill identification of trained assets, is completely lacking. Without a skill identifier (MOS) system centrally controlled at national level, projecting training requirements is extremely difficult, if not impossible. There is currently no method to identify trained personnel by skill category or to insure that personnel are performing in the skill for which trained. To compound the problem, a system of mandatory quotas or "levies" was being used to fill school courses, both in and out of country. Within this system little attention was given to the needs of the unit and personnel were being trained in skills that their parent units did not need. However, personnel completing training were being returned to their parent units whether the newly acquired skills could be utilized or not. This system has finally been abolished and personnel levied for training are being drawn from and returned to units requiring the skills to be learned.

Contributing to the problem of skill training is the lack of a program of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) following basic combat training. The training centers are not presently staffed to conduct AIT, therefore basic skill training must be provided by the service schools, unit OJT or through third country training. Since there is no system of aptitude testing, and no way at national level to identify training requirements by skill, personnel received by the units are basic combat soldiers only. Advanced individual training is a unit responsibility through OJT or service school courses. The establishment of an AIT program would relieve unit commanders of this responsibility and enhance unit effectiveness by providing the units with personnel trained in a needed basic skill. However, establishment of such a system is complicated and time consuming and should be deferred until the intensity of hostilities decreases significantly. To function properly, such a system would require a program of skill identification, aptitude testing, personnel resource inventory by skill and improved force structure planning. The Khmers are not ready for this degree of sophistication at the present time.

Prior to the VN peace accords, MEDTC staff maintained an element in RVN and a forward element in GKR to effect coordination of activities associated with RVN training. When training was moved to Thailand, the RVN element was dissolved and a MEDTC Liaison Office (one OFF; one EM) under the staff supervision of CHMAD was established with MACTHAI (J-34) in Bangkok. Primary mission of this office is to coordinate all Khmer training in Thailand with MACTHAI, FANK Liaison Office in Bangkok, and the Thai Supreme Command. This office also is responsible for accomplishing twice-a-month living allowance payments to all Khmer students and Khmer support personnel (interpreters, translators, clerks, etc.) in Thailand. In addition, this office coordinates all administrative support and provides assistance to Khmer students going to or returning from CONUS or other third country (Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, etc.) training sites as they pass through Bangkok. As the

Thai program built up and the CONUS program increased, it became obvious that this office was understaffed. Consequently, a JTD position for an additional liaison officer (USAF) at Udorn was established and a temporary-hire civilian secretary was hired for the LNO office in Bangkok. These four individuals supported by one Thai driver and one vehicle and augmented by one Khmer/English/Thai interpreter are capable of accomplishing their assigned missions.

At MEDTC Headquarters, the staff element responsible for effecting all necessary coordination and administration associated with the MAP-CB training program is the Training Assurance Branch of the Management Assurance Division. This Branch consists of a Branch Chief (Army) three Army, one Air Force and one Navy training officer. It is responsible for monitoring all in-country training and training facilities, coordinating and administering all out-of-country training supported by MAP-CB and effecting direct coordination with the office of the training officials of the separate Khmer services. In addition this Branch must coordinate constantly with appropriate elements of MEDTC-LOG and MEDTC-P&P concerning equipment deliveries (school and training center support equipment as well as unit equipment), force structure actions and MAP-CB training program funds, all impacting on Khmer training. At present the Branch is augmented by training visits by other MEDTC staff officers responsible for monitoring the activities of their comparable Khmer basic branch service school. A statistical recap of GKR training completed under MAP Cambodia since 1970 is at Appendix 1.

Annex H - Appendix 1

TRAINING RECAPITULATION

Following is a recapitulation of GKR training completed under MAP Cambodia since 1970:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO. PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>
Kmer Republic	18,611	37 Bn Size Units *
	23,001	146 Co Size Units *
	37,797	Specialist
	22,051	Basic Combat
South Vietnam	39,975	85 Bn Size Units *
	31,441	262 Co Size Units *
	12,118	Specialist
Thailand	2,460	20 Co Size Units *
	4,224	Specialist
Philippine Republic	102	Specialist
Republic of China	10	Specialist
CONUS	<u>197</u>	Specialist/Professional Development
	191,987	

* Training included basic combat training.

TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOC'S

1. (U) MOVEMENT CONTROL. Movement control functions of MEDTC encompass movement of MAP-CB cargo into the GKR ports of entry from CONUS, other countries, and U.S. bases of supply located in the Pacific area. In addition, MEDTC monitors the operation of aerial and water ports and arranges for movement of retrograde cargo from the GKR. The movement of MAP-CB cargo into GKR ports of entry is initiated by the supply activity within MEDTC by designating the mode of delivery based on required delivery dates. The transportation activity of MEDTC assures that MAP-CB cargo delivery is made to the desired port of entry once cargo has arrived in the theater. The transportation activity maintains liaison with Military Sealift Command, Thailand, and USARSUPHAI to coordinate desired surface mode of transport and appropriate destination within the Khmer Republic of cargo transshipped from Thailand. Transportation coordinates surface movement of cargo transshipped in the Republic of Vietnam by coordination with DAO Saigon. Aerial movement by USAF aircraft of MAP-CB cargo into the GKR is accomplished through coordination with PATMA, Thai, Utapao RTNAB, Thailand. Onward movement within the GKR from ports of entry to warehouses, depots and ultimate user units is a function of the FANK J-4.

In an effort to develop a viable, centralized control of transportation movements to successfully support combat operations, FANK established a Joint Transportation Board at the J-4 level in January 1971. The JTB consists of members of the Army, Navy and Air Force who commit portions of their respective fleets to accomplish movements requested by the services. The functions of transportation movements are then accomplished by the Director of Transportation acting for the JTB and J-4. The Director issues orders to all modes to move cargo within the guidance of the JTB and priorities established by the FANK J-3. The JTB is currently operating with limited success.

2. AIR. Air delivery of MAP-CB cargo is performed primarily by USAF C-130 aircraft operating from Utapao RTNAB, Thailand. This service moved to Thailand in July 1972 when support for MAP-CB began to shift from the Republic of Vietnam. Historically, the air line of communication has been utilized to provide rapid delivery of vitally needed ammunition and military equipment to the GKR. The short response time, or order and ship time, for air delivery makes air particularly responsive to the logisticians' needs when managing rapidly changing stock levels of critical supplies such as ammunition. The employment of air delivery to the Khmer Republic has fluctuated in accordance with the level of combat intensity and its corresponding changes in ammo expenditure rates and loss and damage rates for military equipment. During the past year it was necessary to bring in massive amounts of military ammo and equipment during July and August to offset the loss of firepower after cessation of U.S. bombing on 15 August 1973. The stockage levels for all supplies were increased and

[REDACTED]

additional artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, and fighter bombers were brought in to increase Khmer firepower. This in turn created greater expenditures of ammunition and spare parts because of a much greater density of aircraft, weapons, and vehicles. Again in November and December of 1973, it was necessary to increase the stockage level for supplies and bring in additional equipment to meet the enemy's expected dry season offensive estimated to begin 15 December 1973. As combat intensity increased and the enemy showed his capability to attack the air line of communication by striking at Pochentong AB with attacks by fire, it became obvious that airland delivery of cargo to Phnom Penh must be reduced and a greater reliance placed on surface movement of MAP-CB cargo. Consequently, aircraft sortie rates were reduced from a high of 34 sorties per day during October to the current average of 6 to 10 daily sorties. Only the most critical cargo is now moved by air.

3. (U) WATER. Waterborne transportation has traditionally been the lifeblood of Cambodia with the Mekong River being the lifeline. The bulk of all general cargo imported into Cambodia has historically been delivered via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh. This LOC continues to be of utmost importance for the delivery of MAP-CB supplies and ammunition. With the move of MAP-CB supply support from RVN to Thailand in late 1972, the SCOOT (Support Cambodia out of Thailand) tug and barge contract was negotiated by MSCFE to provide for ammunition barges loaded at Vayama, Thailand, to be towed to Vung Tau, RVN, and then via the Mekong River to the Port of Phnom Penh. Due to lead time for acquiring tug and barge assets, it became necessary to reestablish the supply of ammunition from Cat Lai, RVN, until March of 1973 when the SCOOT contract became fully operational with convoys plying the Mekong every 10 days. As the intensity of combat increased, with correspondingly higher expenditures of ammunition, it became necessary to renegotiate the SCOOT contract to provide for increased assets with greater reliability. Additional tug and barge assets reduced the requirement for air delivery of munitions except for emergencies and helped to prevent ammo stocks from dropping below the safety level.

The second water LOC for Cambodia is by surface ship to Kompong Som and via RN4 highway to Phnom Penh. Kompong Som, Cambodia's only deep water port, was developed under the regime of Prince Sihanouk. During the period of the late 1960's until 1970, it was used by Communist Bloc countries to ship war materials direct to NVA forces occupying Cambodian soil and fighting against the RVN along the Cambodia/Vietnamese border. As the base of supply was shifted from RVN, ammo vessels were diverted from Vietnamese ports to Sattahip/Vayama, Thailand. MAP-CB cargo vessels were calling at Kompong Som on a trial basis by May of 1972. On 10 June 1972, the SS Seatrain Maryland became the first US flag vessel to deliver MAP cargo to Kompong Som on a regular basis after sailing from a CONUS port. By August 1972, the Kompong Som - RN4 LOC was operating. The arrival of ships at Kompong Som continued at a regular pace of two to three ships per month. Plans formulated in 1972 to include fuel delivery capabilities along the Kompong Som - RN4 LOC were continued with construction

[REDACTED]

of a fuel bladder farm at the port in November 1973 and acquisition of 208 tank and pump units to be mounted on standard 2 1/2 ton trucks to provide highway tanker support up RN4. Limited ammo shipments were made into Kompong Som by SCOOT tug and barge assets to support the maritime provinces' ammo requirements. These shipments were limited by the ammo storage capacity as well as the availability of SCOOT assets.

Additional internal water LOC's were developed by GKR forces operating on the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers. MNK riverine convoys played an important, if not vital, role in the defense of Kompong Cham by running convoys under fire up the Mekong after the city was cut off to further highway or aerial deliveries by enemy action. MNK also operates convoys as far up the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) as Kompong Chhnang and Siem Reap when water levels permit.

4. (C) HIGHWAY. Highway transport was used by MEDTC to deliver MAP-CB cargo into Cambodia only for ammunition delivered via RN5 from Thailand to Battambang. Ammunition was moved by Thai contractors thru US-Thai agreement beginning 4 July 1973 and with continuing shipments moving each month from ammo depots in Thailand for resupply of ammo to the northwestern provinces of the GKR. After closure of RN5 in September 1973 from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang, it became necessary to increase the tonnage moved by this means since Kompong Chhnang was then supplied from Battambang vice Phnom Penh. The two most vital road links to Phnom Penh, RN4 and 5, were interdicted in the fall of 1973. RN5 remains closed denying FANK any highway link between its two major population centers of Phnom Penh and the "Rice Bowl" area of Battambang. The closure stopped flow of rice from the major rice producing area to the major population center of Phnom Penh. This forced greater reliance on the Mekong River LOC for rice delivery to the capital. Closure of RN4 for the greater part of October, November and December 1973 caused additional shift of movement to the Mekong River LOC. Ships due to call at Kompong Som Port with MAP cargo were diverted to Sattahip, Thailand, and Newport, RVN, for transshipment by barge to Phnom Penh via the Mekong or by C-130 via Utapao RTNAB. RN4 was opened by a (concentrated) FANK effort in January 1974 and convoys began to move immediately to relieve the backlog of equipment in Kompong Som. However, the use of RN4 was short lived since FANK had to withdraw its security forces for the second defense of Phnom Penh later that month.

5. (U) SUMMARY. It is clear that FANK's concept of adequate movement control planning and scheduling is only beginning to take shape. To date, the enemy has shown it has the capability to influence the availability of LOC's supplying the Khmer Republic. A continuing requirement will thus exist for USAF air transport support for the delivery of high priority MAP cargo and for the administrative support of MEDTC. The bulk of MAP cargo will continue to be delivered via the Mekong River, the Khmer Republic's most vital supply line. Detailed statistics showing MAP-CB cargo transported over all LOC's are attached as Appendix 1.

[REDACTED]

Annex I - Appendix 1

MAP-CB CARGO TOTALS TRANSPORTED OVER CAMBODIAN LOC'S

1. AIR.

a. 1972

- (1) Average Sorties per month: 24
- (2) Average per month in S/T: 305
- (3) Total S/T Aug-Dec 72: 4118

NOTE: Statistics maintained only after air LOC shifted from RVN to Thailand.

b. 1973

(1) Deliveries to Phnom Penh

- (a) Average Sorties per month: 290
- (b) Average per month in S/T: 4305
- (c) Total in S/T: 51,656

(2) Deliveries USAID Rice - (2 Oct-1 Nov) Battambang to Phnom Penh.

- (a) Average Sorties per day: 8
- (b) Average S/T per day: 110
- (c) Total in S/T: 3,309

c. 1974

(1) January

- (a) Average Sorties per day: 12
- (b) Average S/T per day: 210
- (c) Total in S/T: 6,507

(2) February

- (a) Average Sorties per day: 9
- (b) Average S/T per day: 138

[REDACTED]

(c) Total in S/T through 13 February: 1,794

2. WATER.

a. 1972

(1) Kompong Som/RN4. First MAP-CB cargo delivery May 1972.

(a) Average S/T per month: 6,184

(b) Total S/T: 49,472

(2) Mekong LOC. Statistics available only for May-Dec.

(a) Average S/T per month: 3,601

(b) Total S/T: 28,809

(c) No MAP-CB cargo lost to enemy action

b. 1973

(1) Kompong Som/RN4

(a) Average S/T per month: 1,982

(b) Total S/T: 23,786

(2) Mekong LOC

(a) Average S/T per month: 3,118

(b) Total S/T: 37,418

(c) Three MAP-CB ammo barges lost to enemy action, 16 Feb, 15 Apr, and 11 Aug.

c. 1974

(1) Kompong Som (RN4 closed except for one convoy in Jan)

(a) January: 1,685

(b) February: None to date

(2) Mekong LOC

(a) January: 7,648

(b) February: 5,689 through 14 Feb

(c) One MAP-CB ammo barge lost to enemy action, 18 Feb.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] HIGHWAY. First shipment of MAP-CB ammo over RN5 from Thailand to Battambang July 1973

a. 1973

(1) Total convoys: 6

(2) Total S/T: 1,796

(3) Average S/T per month: 299

b. 1974. One convoy in January (250 S/T ammo)

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

1. SITUATION.

The rapid expansion of FANK during the reporting period generated requirements for many major construction programs. These programs were necessarily very basic in nature due to the limited civil engineering capability in design and construction. Lack of skilled personnel, heavy equipment and materiel constituted additional limiting factors. FANK had to develop programs, specifications, and budgets in coordination with MEDTC, USAID and various Cambodian government agencies. Civilian contractor potential had to be nurtured and integrated into efforts to develop an overall viable program. The funding of contracts to be accomplished by civilian firms required USAID support.

2. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS.

Construction projects have been promoted by both FANK and the U.S. FANK has pursued construction of military projects by both civilian contractor and by organic military assets. The lack of well-equipped military construction units has limited its capability, but the FANK engineers have produced some significant accomplishments by augmenting their non-MAP supported construction units with the operational loan of equipment from MAP supported units. Such action has been limited to high priority projects, such as brigade base camp construction and ammunition storage depots. Until the construction units are better equipped, heavy construction will continue to be limited.

In the area of contractor construction, FANK has accomplished some important projects, the most significant of which has been the construction of temporary and permanent housing for military troops and their dependents. Funds for these projects were provided by the US-GKR controlled counterpart account. The reserving of quantities of these funds for projects of specific interest to the MEDTC mission has provided much incentive for the definition of projects of this type. In recent months MEDTC has worked closely with the FANK budget planners to definitize requirements for logistical support construction generated by the need for maintenance and support of MAP equipment received.

3. MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

A basic objective of the enemy has been to interdict lines of communication between populated areas. To counter this threat, a program was initiated to upgrade three of Cambodia's major airfields and the Ream Naval Base guarding access to the only deep water port in the country, Kompong Som.

The airfields are the one at Ream, the one at Battambang, and Pochentong, serving Phnom Penh. Through the Director of Construction (DIRCON), the airfield projects were conceived/planned and funded

under a collective project agreement entitled "Airfield upgrading - GKR FY 72 (CY 72)". Funds were programmed from MAP, USAID and GKR assets to accomplish these projects. Funds were allocated for the airfield upgrade as follows: MAP \$1,856,000, AID \$403,300 and GKR \$752,000 for foreign exchange cost and 517,981,921 riels (to be paid from the counterpart special account) for local costs. The GKR entirely funded a security lighting and fencing project at Pochentong of 38,699,810 riels. Unlike the airfield projects, the Ream Naval Base contract was exclusively funded from CB MAP assets for \$1,050,000. A brief description of each project is presented for information and background.

a. Battambang: Contract was awarded 22 February 1973. Completion date is June 1974. Contract calls for (1) construction of a runway extension, (2) overlay of existing runway and parking apron and (3) construction of a new concrete parking apron and taxiway. Completion date is approximate due to closure of Route 5 and fuel shortages.

b. Pochentong Airfield: Contract was awarded 24 April 1973 and final completion estimated to be the end of 1974. A security lighting and fencing contract was completed in October 1973. Improvements in progress include (1) construction of an aircraft parking apron on both the civilian and military side of the airfield, (2) removal and reconstruction of the existing military parking apron, (3) construction of an access taxiway on the military side of the airfield, (4) performance of minor repairs to the existing runway, (5) construction of a sod landing strip for STOL aircraft, and (6) construction of a heliport landing and maintenance area for 38 aircraft. A future project is programmed for construction of a parallel taxiway for use by both civilian and military aircraft.

c. Ream Airfield: Contract awarded 6 February 1973, and estimated final completion is in late fall 1974. Contract calls for (1) construction of new aircraft parking aprons and taxiway, (2) repaving of existing taxiway and parking apron, (3) construction of a runway extension, (4) construction of over-runs at both ends of the runway and (5) resealing of the existing runway.

d. Ream Naval Base: Contract for phase one construction was awarded 27 October 1972 with completion scheduled for June 1974. Contract calls for construction of (1) a pier, (2) electrical power station with generator and electrical distribution system, (3) minor road improvement to support the pier and power plant and (4) a fresh water distribution system for the pier complex. The planned, but not as yet funded, second phase will include (1) construction of general purpose warehouse, (2) water treatment plant, (3) water storage tanks, (4) POL system and (5) supporting construction.

4. PROBLEMS.

DIRCON administered construction has proceeded slowly. The high and steady rate of inflation within the local economy has continually eroded contractor's profit margins. A severe shortage of construction equipment,

repair parts, and the under developed nature of the transportation system are further limiting factors. Extension of project completion dates is inevitable as long as such instability persists within the GKR economy.

The manpower ceiling imposed by the Symington-Case amendment has also impacted on the progress of the construction programs. These projects require a good deal of technical skill and expertise. When funded through MAP or other U.S. government monies, however, the provisions of the Symington-Case amendment apply in that any Americans or TCN's who work on the projects must be counted against the 200 man ceiling imposed on the number of official Americans or the 85 man ceiling imposed on TCN's allowed in country. The advantage of having the contract in dollars, i.e. protecting the contractor from inflation, is thus negated. Large out of country contractors, precluded by the amendment from bringing in a sufficient nucleus of trained personnel to do an effective job, will not bid on the contracts. Bidding is thus limited to local Khmer contractors who have proven to be marginal performers.

5. SUMMARY.

The FANK possess minimal heavy construction capability and what they have is centered on operational engineering support to units. Consequently, major construction of a logistical nature is being accomplished by civilian contractors under FANK administered government contracts. MEDTC has assisted in defining certain projects and by reserving counterpart funds for contract construction. Extremely large construction projects, particularly upgrade of major airfields, have been accomplished directly by U.S. contract under supervision of the DIRCON Khmer Republic.

Continued MEDTC support is required in major construction by defining counterpart funds for essential projects and by programming a FANK heavy construction capability.

Annex J - Appendix 1

CURRENT COST FIGURES

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Assigned Amount</u>	<u>Obligate/ Committed</u>	<u>Contingency</u>	<u>Balance Available</u>
<u>Pochentong</u>				
GKR	R348,623,313	R310,482,009	R17,135,279	R21,006,025
GKR	\$ 440,500	\$ 400,454	\$ 40,046	-0-
AID	\$ 259,290	\$ 257,210	\$ 2,080	-0-
MAP	\$ 1,020,000	\$ 915,000	\$ 105,000	-0-
MAP (US GOVT COST)	\$ 237,000	\$ 237,000	-0-	-0-
<u>Ream</u>				
GKR	R110,256,535	R103,591,603	R 6,664,932	-0-
GKR	\$ 144,700	\$ 131,545	\$ 13,155	-0-
AID	\$ 76,280	\$ 65,104	\$ 11,176	-0-
MAP (US GOVT COST)	\$ 87,000	\$ 87,000	-0-	-0-
<u>Battambang</u>				
GKR	R 59,120,152	R 49,385,651	R 9,734,501	-0-
GKR	\$ 166,800	\$ 151,734	\$ 15,066	-0-
AID	\$ 67,730	\$ 43,595	\$ 24,135	-0-
MAP (US GOVT COST)	\$ 136,000	\$ 100,000	\$ 36,000	-0-
MAP	\$ 130,000	\$ 126,040	\$ 3,960	-0-

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Assigned Amount</u>	<u>Obligate/ Committed</u>	<u>Contingency</u>	<u>Balance Available</u>
<u>Ream Navy Base</u>				
MAP	\$ 1,050,000	\$ 980,846	\$ 69,154	-0-
<hr/>				
MAP DESIGN COST*	\$ 350,000	\$ 242,363	-0-	\$ 108,637

* Includes design costs for all projects.

MAINTENANCE

1. DEVELOPMENT

There is no one single follow-on logistical support problem which bears more significantly on overall FANK readiness than maintenance. During the past two years the total density of major equipments delivered to FANK under MAP increased by 173% from 107,497 items in February 1972 to 293,281 in February 1974. Density increases occurred as follows: Weapons 170%; vehicles 557%; heavy automotive 136%; signal 197%; aircraft 177%; and navy craft 148%. See Appendix 1 for details.

The necessity for having adequate maintenance performed on these equipments has taken on increased importance corresponding to the increase in density. MEDTC has realized the need for a responsive maintenance system within the Khmer Armed Forces, and has placed emphasis accordingly. However, two factors have made the most significant impact on FANK capability to develop a responsive maintenance system. These are a shortage of trained personnel and a constantly changing tactical situation.

The rapid expansion of the force structure from 68 BNS to 186, and total FANK strength from 79,500 to 192,597 over the past two years, has brought about an associated increase in unskilled manpower under arms. The necessity to accelerate equipment deliveries to meet the enemy threat created rapid build-up of military hardware requiring maintenance by skilled mechanics. The resulting situation was a shortage of trained maintenance personnel since the lead time for training exceeded that for equipment deliveries. It is emphasized that this situation developed due to tactical necessity. In turn, the tactical situation has strongly impacted on FANK's capability to collect and transport end items to a higher level repair facility. Frequent enemy interdiction of roads requires heavy reliance on airlifts or waterborne transportation. The difficulty of moving large repairable assets to air heads or ports on navigable waterways and the lack of sufficient air assets cause long delays in retrograde operations. The frequent interdiction of LOC's poses additional problems, although to a lesser extent, in the timely distribution of repair parts and the development of mobile maintenance teams.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force have been encouraged to develop and refine a functioning maintenance system - from preventive maintenance at the operator level through depot level overhaul and rebuild. This has proven to be a challenge to the Khmer Armed Forces. Shortfalls in organic capabilities have been partially overcome by the institution of several out-of-country programs. These include repair and return programs

[REDACTED]

at PACOM and CONUS rebuild facilities, a calibration program in Thailand, out-of-country overhauls for MNK craft, and several maintenance contracts in WESTPAC countries. The GKR military establishment has been encouraged to work toward maintenance self-sufficiency. However, this has proven by experience to be a long, slow process for many reasons, such as the general lack of maintenance personnel and only a rudimentary GS/depot maintenance capability. Although the latter has been supplemented by repair and return programs and out-of-country contracts, it is difficult to maintain programmed schedules with the various repair facilities due to problems encountered by FANK in the collection and shipment of repairables.

A shortage of tools and test equipment is often detected at the working level. For various reasons, the military services, particularly the Army, are reluctant to issue sufficient quantities of tools to the organizations and shops which are tasked with maintenance support responsibility. Furthermore, tools and test equipment become highly desirable items for pilferage and sale once they reach the operator level. Property accountability and control within FANK can be greatly improved.

The shortage of trained personnel has had a far-reaching impact in the maintenance and maintenance management areas. This is particularly true at the unit level. The lack of sufficient preventive maintenance by operators has tended to turn minor problems into major ones. In-country, third-country, and CONUS training programs are making headway toward relieving the shortage. However, the get-well point will not be reached over the short term. Within KAF, for example, in early 1972 training of maintenance personnel was achieved through OJT in-country, and 10% of total training out-of-country. At present formal basic and advanced training is accomplished in-country with OJT supplement, but 10% continues to be achieved through out-of-country resources.

During the past two years, MEDTC, working through third country nationals, has encouraged the military services of the GKR to eliminate common practices which seriously undermine the maintenance system. For example, some equipment is used without performing preventive maintenance until it fails. When an item of equipment becomes non-operational, it is occasionally abandoned or discarded in favor of a new replacement article, and the unserviceable item is not turned-in for repair. When parts are needed, established supply sources are often not contacted before routine cannibalization is accomplished from another piece of equipment. Supply personnel often "ration" repair parts because units are in the habit of requesting quantities in excess of needs. Supply personnel have been known to "save" parts for friends, regardless of urgency of need, and to offer for sale MAP provided supplies and equipment. In addition, FANK supply organizations often wait until an out-of-stock condition occurs before requesting replenishment. In this regard, DIRMAT is probably the greatest offender, and exemplifies within FANK the greatest lack of inventory management which impacts adversely on maintenance efforts.

[REDACTED]

Maintenance problems caused by U.S. procurement and delivery procedures have been significant only in the engineer equipment area. The variety of engineer equipment end items, some non-standard, which have been provided to the Khmer Armed Forces has created special problems in both the supply and maintenance fields. FANK must presently support several makes and models of heavy equipment, particularly bulldozers, at low density levels which precludes the practicality of comprehensive stocks of repair parts. Some of this equipment is left over from prior MAP. As a result, equipment operational rates suffer, and long lead times are encountered in obtaining parts from a wide variety of manufacturers. As an example, in early 1972 FANK had a total of 45 bulldozers and experienced at that time a 52% operational readiness rate. Correspondingly, at present, FANK has a total of 36 bulldozers and is realizing an average 47% operational readiness rate. By far, the cause of deadlined bulldozers is directly attributable to the lack of replacement parts and accessories to effect repair. However, other equipment of more standard makes and more recent manufacture, such as graders, loaders and cranes are experiencing a current operational readiness rate of 86%, 82% and 83% respectively. Maintenance of heavy engineering equipment is exacerbated due to the fact that training of operators and maintenance personnel becomes increasingly complicated and time-consuming when a variety of makes and models of one specific end item is contained in the inventory.

Experience with using excess program equipments to fill requirements in FANK has been mixed. Essentially, excess programs have been a responsive and economical source of equipment, providing that the equipment arrives in the same condition as advertised or that necessary repairs are arranged and accomplished before arrival. Many aircraft have been delivered to the KAF in this manner with successful results. However, the availability of associated support equipment, both from excess programs and other sources, has left much to be desired. This is especially true of the C-123 and AU-24 aircraft. The Khmer Navy, on the other hand, has been provided several boats through excess programs with good results.

A number of factors have combined to pose follow-on maintenance problems resulting from equipment delivery scheduling. The acceleration of equipment deliveries, though necessary for tactical reasons, has often impeded follow-on support. Long lead times normally required to gear-up third country training often becomes a restricting factor. The inherent slowness with which FANK operates in identifying personnel for training, and in providing sufficient maintenance facilities to support the package, created substantial stumbling blocks which MEDTC could do little to overcome in its non-advisory role.

Despite the foregoing difficulties, since February 1972 FANK has made some encouraging progress in the maintenance area. From an organization point of view, improvement has been realized by the extension of the logistical system to the military regions by the creation of regional logistics centers (CLR). These CLR's, though

[REDACTED]

not yet fully operational, are intended to provide a logistical bridge between the requiring units and the technical services. However, it is apparent that many units do not understand the system for submitting requisitions to the CLR, and consequently many requirements are presented directly, in an informal manner, to the technical service or G-4 levels. To overcome this difficulty, FANK J-4 has instituted a program for explaining the supply system down to the unit level, and is sending teams into the field to conduct on-site seminars. This effort, if prosecuted to completion, should assist in strengthening the position of the CLR in the logistical chain. Other improvements over the past two years, by specific area addressed, are as follows.

2. ORDNANCE. Procurement action began in October 1972 for obtaining a one year supply of repair parts for trucks previously purchased from Australia under SECDEF authorization of February 1971 to take advantage of price, quick delivery and assurance of technical support for operation and maintenance in the Khmer Republic. Initial stocks of repair parts received with the vehicles were exhausted in 1972, to the point that in November a total of 52 of the 350 vehicles provided to FANK were dead-lined due to parts. Subsequently, MEDTC requested and obtained approval for procurement of additional spares. These parts began to arrive in June 1973. The final shipment was received in February 1974. It is anticipated that these follow-on spares will substantially increase operational rates of Australian trucks allocated to the Transportation Brigade.

The Base de Transit, located near Kompong Som, serves as a transient maintenance facility for preparing vehicles received at the port for convoy up RN4 to Phnom Penh. FANK has been encouraged repeatedly to upgrade this important facility to a DS level capability and task it to support all vehicles in the Kompong Som/Ream area. Unfortunately, this upgrade has not materialized.

The Ordnance Maintenance Activity in Tuol Kauk, northwest sector of Phnom Penh, has developed the capability to repair all small arms and most artillery optical items through depot level. The excellent physical facilities at Lovek remain to be fully exploited. Efforts at this facility continue to be hampered by difficulty encountered in providing adequate security, sufficient trained personnel, and the fact that access roads are often interdicted by the enemy for long intervals.

Beginning in August 1972, MEDTC has placed most of its maintenance emphasis on tracked vehicles and artillery pieces. By December 1973, FANK had relocated the Armored Regiment's headquarters and supply and maintenance activities from the Municipal Stadium to the excellent facilities of a former railroad maintenance building. The maintenance activity was then elevated to the DS level, complete with repair part stocks, sufficient number of mechanics, and a mobile maintenance contact team. As a result, the operational ready rate of M113's has increased from 85% in 1972 for the 99 in inventory at that time to 90% for the total 192 now authorized.

[REDACTED]

Emphasis on field artillery weapons has been primarily toward the establishment of on-site inspection and repair and the expansion of rebuild capabilities. FANK artillery and mortar mechanics now accompany MEDTC EIUI teams to inspect and repair equipment in the field and identify items to be evacuated to the depot for major repair. Complimenting this program, FANK has developed the capability to rebuild 105MM howitzers in-country. As a consequence, average operational rates for artillery weapons have consistently been above 95%.

Concurrent with these improvements, MEDTC initiated a program of intensive management of repair parts required for deadlined tracked vehicles and artillery equipment. Due to the slowness of the FANK requisitioning system, all NORS parts requirements were submitted by priority message as soon as they were identified, and aggressive follow-up action was taken on all outstanding NORS requisitions.

The net result of primary emphasis on armor and artillery was to provide FANK with a decisive measure of firepower over the enemy subsequent to the US bombing halt, and during the siege at Kompong Cham in September and the Dry Season Offensive beginning in December 1973.

3. (U) ENGINEER. Follow-on maintenance of engineer equipment must be addressed in two areas: operator/using unit level and third echelon to depot level operation. FANK has experienced many difficulties with operator and unit level maintenance. Heavy engineer equipment is both sophisticated and complex, and although it may be reasonably well cared for by operators, trained mechanics and supervisors are essential for ensuring full-range maintenance. FANK lacks knowledge and experience among using unit personnel serving in supervisory capacities. These problems have been compounded by the continued use of equipment requiring maintenance in areas remote from Phnom Penh. Provision of running spares, such as filters, has become difficult. Consequently, engine and major component life have suffered. Equipment used in the Phnom Penh area has shown a much improved operational record because of the availability of parts and technical expertise.

At depot level FANK has developed a good capability to accomplish major overhauls. Under the direction of TCN personnel the FANK depot is integrating its supply and maintenance operations well. The machine shop capability provides substantial capacity to manufacture and maintain parts which normally require long lead times for procurement. Its operation should continue to be supported. A major problem has been the lack of heavy repair capability at the regional logistics centers to support operations away from Phnom Penh.

Despite shortcomings, graders, loaders and cranes are now experiencing an 82% - 86% operational readiness rate, while the rate for bulldozers remains at 47%, slightly less than the 52% rate of early 1972.

4. (U) SIGNAL. Due to the enemy threat, FANK began relocating the Signal Depot and Signal Direct Support Company from Ang Snoul in June 1973. The maintenance facility was re-established at Tuol Kauk in September 1973. A

[REDACTED]

large backlog of equipment awaiting repair developed through the summer months because technicians were retained in a defensive role at Ang Snuol for approximately 60 days.

Through repairman training in Thailand and the Khmer Republic, FANK has become adept at repair of all common field signal equipment in their inventory. Areas where proficiency needs improvement include the newly-received TRC-24 VHF equipment for which a 52 week training course is presently in progress in Thailand. Interim qualifications will be accomplished through an abbreviated course featuring supervised OJT.

Most electronic test equipment items have been received for outfitting the Signal Depot and the military region logistic centers. Training is being established in the operation and repair of new test sets. A calibration program for FANK electronic test equipment was begun in April 1973 at USARSUPTHAI.

The repair and return program for PRC-25 modules, which is coordinated with U.S. Army Electronics Command and Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot, was established in December 1971 and floundered for approximately one year due to excessive turn-around time. By 1973, with increased density of PRC-25's in field use, the quantity of modules exchanged under this program increased significantly. Recent procedural improvements include direct requisitioning from the Khmer Republic of replacement modules and increased frequency of shipments to CONUS repair and return facility. The primary problem remaining is the inability to acquire and retain a stock of modules for use while awaiting return of R&R items.

5. **KAF.** The lack of an in-depth follow-on maintenance capability is one of the most pressing problems in the Khmer Air Force. KAF's record with maintenance management supports providing unsophisticated aircraft under the Military Assistance Program. However, the only available ground support equipment proved to be sophisticated compared to KAF level of technical maturity. At present the 67 pieces of ground support equipment experience a 50-55% operational ready rate, as compared to a rate of 60% in early 1972 for the 23 pieces on hand at that time. Extensive out-of-country training programs continue to produce better qualified mechanics in an effort to raise the overall level of technical capability.

The general lack of responsibility engendered by multiple and conflicting command and control lines has served to adversely affect progress in the maintenance area. This was particularly true in the support of equipment other than aircraft, such as motor vehicles. However, in November 1973, some significant personnel changes were made coupled with some shifting of lines of responsibility. This action, coupled with an increase in repair parts stocked in KAF warehouses from 15,000 items in early 1972 to approximately 30,000 items at present has resulted in a noticeable improvement in both the quantity and quality of maintenance being performed on aircraft and ground support equipment.

[REDACTED]

Overall, the result of KAF maintenance efforts is the achievement of a fluctuating 62 - 68% operational readiness rate, which is marginal improvement over the representative rate of 58% in April 1973, for example. However, it is significant to note that during this same period sorties increased drastically from 2,711 in April 1973 to 4,660 in December 1973 and to 5,432 in January 1974, with a corresponding increase in flying hours from 3,159 in April 1973 to 5,162 and 5,400 in December 1973 and January 1974, respectively. These figures indicate that the improvement in operational readiness has been achieved in the face of significantly greater aircraft utilization which has impacted heavily on KAF in-country and out-of-country maintenance programs.

6. (C) MNK. U.S. supply system support for follow-on maintenance has been generally responsive. As a measure of support success in the maintenance area, the Khmer Navy reports an average of five craft, or 3% of a total of 171, out of commission awaiting parts. Overall, Khmer Navy maintenance facilities have succeeded in sustaining a 65 - 75% craft operational rate, with an average of 17% of the boats laid up for repair, 1% out of country for major overhaul, and the balance out of commission due to: technical problems not related to materiel support, occasional design problems, awaiting dry dock facilities, and the lack of sufficient trained maintenance personnel to accommodate the workload, especially in peak/crisis periods.

7. (U) SUMMARY. Although FANK continues to experience a number of problems frustrating efforts to improve and extend the maintenance system, significant progress has been made since February 1972. With increased command emphasis on maintenance, especially preventive maintenance, at all echelons of command, and with the implementation of improved inventory management practices, particularly in DIRMAT, significant advances can be made in effecting further improvement in FANK maintenance programs. The critical need for maintenance training must be accentuated, the mobile inspection/repair team concept should be exploited, repair and return programs in the WESTPAC area should be vigorously pursued until the GKR military forces develop a more extensive organic DS/depot repair capability, and FANK should exploit the full capabilities of the Lovek depot as soon as the tactical situation permits.

Annex K - Appendix 1

FANK EQUIPMENT DENSITY

FEBRUARY 1972 VS FEBRUARY 1974

	<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>FANK</u>		<u>MNK</u>		<u>KAF</u>	
	<u>72</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>74</u>
Weapons	104,518	281,438	104,351	274,357	167	2,740	-	4,341
Vehicles	802	5,269	802	5,212	-	20	-	37
Heavy Automotive	7	165	6	89	--	25	1	51
Signal	2,025	6,027	2,007	5,769	18	192	-	66
Aircraft	76	211	-	-	-	-	76	211
Navy Craft	69	171	-	-	69	171	-	-
Totals	107,497	293,281	107,166	285,427	254	3,148	77	4,706

Source: ABC Report

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Technical assistance is provided to MEDTC and the military forces of the GKR by contract and by temporary duty personnel. Due to the Congressional limitations which preclude advising by US personnel, third country nationals under contract serve as the eyes and ears of MEDTC performing direct assistance to FANK at logistical operating levels. These restrictions further limit the number of US personnel authorized to be present in Cambodia. Consequently, MEDTC is staffed at a rather austere level, and technical experts are brought in on a periodic basis to advise MEDTC on projects of specific interest.
2. CONTRACTUAL ASSISTANCE. The Vinnell Corporation began providing technical assistance under contract in April 1972 with 40 third country nationals. The team was reduced to 34 personnel in September 1973 because of an urgent need to expand the LMAT contract for upgrading KAF maintenance operations.

Vinnell provides experts in many fields of logistics. In general, these highly qualified technical experts provide on-the-job training in the areas of supply and inventory management, production control, maintenance performance and supervision, and depot operating procedures in the functional areas of equipment delivery and accountability; ammunition; POL; ordnance, engineer, medical and signal maintenance and supply; port operations; and maintenance and supply of naval craft and equipment. They furnish timely assessments of potential problems in all areas of equipment support. They are used extensively to perform on-site inspection and reporting concerning FANK logistics operations.

An important ingredient to the logistical support provided to the Khmer Air Force is the technical assistance furnished through four separate contracts. Air America Co, contractor for the Logistics Management Assistance Team (LMAT), began supporting KAF in October 1971 and initially included 4 U.S. citizens and 11 third country nationals. These personnel are experts in aircraft maintenance, support equipment, and supply and training disciplines. Even constrained by (Symington/Case) their presence and constant assistance is an invaluable help to the maintenance effort. In September 1973, the team was increased by six additional members, mostly in aircraft maintenance shop disciplines. Again, in January 1974 the team was expanded by 12 local Khmers, all trained in vehicular and stationary motor maintenance.

Three additional companies are represented: Bell Aircraft Co, AVCO-Lycoming Aircraft, and Helio Aircraft Corporation. This specialist group provides technical assistance on aircraft and engines produced by their companies.

[REDACTED]

Rapport between contract and Khmer Air Force personnel is excellent. The primary reason for the KAF ability to keep aircraft flying thru the first sixteen months covered in this report was the presence of these highly skilled technicians. It was evident by June of 1973, that their persistent and fulsome repetitions of maintenance instructions were beginning to show results. At this point in time, the Khmer Air Force had been expanded to include over 200 aircraft. Although not very obvious at first, KAF maintenance quality and quantity began to improve. In the month of January 1974, KAF was flying more sorties than ever before and their logistics were keeping with the added pressure. This was an excellent indication that self-sufficiency is a realizable goal rather than an undated milestone.

Other technical assistance is provided by Air America, for operation of the TACAN equipment at Pochentong Air Base, and by Federal Electric Corporation, for operation and maintenance of MEDTC and Embassy communications systems.

3. TDY PERSONNEL. Numerous officers, NCO's, and civilians from the Pacific area and CONUS were called upon to augment the knowledge and experience organic to the MEDTC staff to provide technical advice and assistance in a variety of projects in virtually all functional areas. Some of these projects include maintenance and supply procedures for tracked vehicles, artillery, and engineer equipment (primarily bulldozers); ammo depot construction and storage safety; signal upgrade projects; inland waterway and deep water port surveys; and an evaluation of in-country clothing manufacturing capabilities.

Two of the more extensive studies were a survey of the port at Kompong Som and a review of the KAF logstics system. COMNAVFORV provided technical assistance for a harbor defense survey of the Kompong Som port in February 1972 and a subsequent mobile training team (MTT) to train Khmer Navy officers and enlisted men in harbor defense activities. Training was conducted by this MTT at Vung Tau, RVN, 27 March to 9 April 72. USSAG provided a 2 man survey team in September 1973 to review KAF logistics efficiency. The resulting report amounted to an indexed document listing all logistics management deficiencies reported by MEDTC to KAF. The sheer size of the report listing every conceivable logistics deficiency was awesome. It was extremely useful in that it provided a cataloged listing of deficiencies recorded by an outside expert source. This report favorably impressed the KAF Chief of Staff and his logistics staff. The presentation of this report definitely increased the pace of logistics management improvements. Call order specialists were provided by Air America to survey KAF fire fighting capability and scheduling of KAF cargo aircraft. Although positive results have not been achieved in these areas, initial programming actions and organizational/functional changes are being made.

4. (U) SUMMARY. It is clear that technical assistance by third country nationals under contract supplementing the MEDTC mission has contributed immeasurably to the operation of the Khmer Armed Forces' logistical system

[REDACTED]

and the quality of the support derived from technical experts on temporary duty to MEDTC significantly assisted MEDTC in the accomplishment of its mission.

[REDACTED]

Annex M

AMMUNITION

1. BACKGROUND.

Ammunition is a vital dimension of the combat power of a military force. Firepower constitutes the most significant advantage which the military forces of the GKR have over the enemy. The FANK depends on firepower to win. Seldom has FANK outmaneuvered the enemy - he has outgunned him. The provision of sufficient ammunition in support of that firepower is now one of the most vital logistical tasks confronting MEDTC.

2. THE AMMUNITION PROGRAM.

Ammunition requirements vary in direct ratio with the size of the force involved and the intensity of combat. The growth of the ammunition portion of the MAP Program over the past two years reflects both factors. In Fiscal 72 ammunition costs comprised about 37% of the total MAP budget. In Fiscal 73 the proportion rose to 65% and for the current fiscal year it stands at 87%. Dramatic increases in weapons density/force structure (See Appendix 1) and the level of combat over the past two years however, are only two of the factors bearing directly on CB MAP ammunition requirements. A third was the 15 August 1973 cessation of U.S. combat air support. The USAF had been delivering massive firepower in support of FANK. Following 15 August, FANK had to make up as much of the difference as possible through increased use of its own firepower capability. Ammunition issues rose from slightly less than 200 short tons a day in July 1973 to slightly more than 600 short tons a day in January 1974 (see Appendix 2). The cost in MAP dollars is accordingly up and, with increases in the cost of ammunition itself, will rise further. The problem now is:

FANK must be able to expend enough ammunition to break any developing enemy offensive.

FANK must have sufficient ammunition available to allow major units to take the offensive.

FANK must have sufficient ammunition at its disposal in sufficient quantities throughout the country so that individual positions do not fall because of lack of ammunition.

But at the same time:

Total MAP-Cambodia funding must remain within established ceilings.

[REDACTED]

A solution satisfying all four conditions may not be possible. However in an effort to approach it, MEDTC took the following actions in addition to field visits and inspections:

-Established an allocation control system based on ASR's to limit consumption of all critical lines.

-Emphasized - at all command levels - the need for fire discipline and control.

-Continually encouraged improvements in accounting, receipt, issue and storage procedures - to include extensive use of Third Country National contract personnel.

FANK has responded by:

-Establishing a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) for control of Phnom Penh area artillery.

-Training personnel from military regions to expand the FSCC concept to all artillery.

-Completing conversion from the French to the U.S. system of ammunition resupply.

-Improving allocation controls on the expenditures of all critical munitions.

In the wake of these measures the following occurred:

-The daily consumption rate initially decreased by approximately 15% in November and early December 1973, reflecting a lull in the fighting as well as improvements in logistics management and tactical command and control by the Khmer. However, during periods of heavy fighting as were experienced in late December and January 74 FANK had its back against the nation's capital and under these last ditch conditions, as could be expected, expenditures reached an all-time high.

-FANK ammunition management and accounting procedures developed sufficiently to give a close fix on receipts and issues at the Kantauk Depot and at the Military Region Logistic Centers - as well as on artillery expenditures at major units. Expenditure data obtained from the FSCC are compared and correlated with issue data. Records maintained at the Kantauk Depot on the turn in of 105MM expended cartridge cases are also correlated with issues. Ammo accounting at the unit level is much more uneven and presents a particular problem in the case of units manning enclaves under pressure (Kompong Cham and Takeo in particular). MEDTC continued to monitor ammunition use at the unit level by announced and unannounced end item utilization inspections, reviewing airdrop

[REDACTED]

requirements and intelligence sources. Without advisors in the field however, consumption at the unit level is not subject to the degree of control exercised over large caliber artillery weapons or the KAF. A proposal has been prepared for an additional TCN complement to be hired by the GKR under a contractual arrangement with the Vinnell Corporation. This would provide TCN's under MEDTC/Vinnell control to assist at critical management positions in the Pnom Penh, Military Region and Division areas, and would materially assist efforts to encourage the development of logistical and fire discipline at all military echelons.

The increased expenditure rates discussed previously have placed extraordinary demands on the entire logistical system - U.S. and Khmer alike. They have resulted in:

-Depletion of world-wide stocks of certain items with resultant requirement for increased production schedules.

-Increased requirement for transportation assets (both airland and tug/barge) to deliver ammunition to Cambodia (See Appendix 3).

-Increased requirements for ammunition storage capacity in the U.S. depot complex in Thailand as well as in the main FANK depot of Kantauk just outside Pnom Penh. In this regard, expansion of the storage facility at Kantauk was accomplished through a major construction effort on the part of the FANK. Construction continues to improve that storage facility to provide it with a true all weather capability. At the same time plans are currently under way to construct an additional 7,500 ton FANK depot near Pnom Penh.


In addition to the logistical impact of escalating expenditures, there has also been a significant fiscal impact on the entire MAP-CB Program. Ammunition costs now dominate the program. Estimates of the degree of dominance vary from 87% to 95% depending upon whether or not it will be necessary to fund a portion of the July 74 ammunition requirements from the FY74 program. (See Appendix 4).

In either case in order to attempt to meet funding requirements for ammunition it was necessary to shortfall most investment, attrition, and O&M items. The current operating funds other than ammunition are below minimum essential required to keep FANK operational. Some form of emergency assistance will be required to offset the shortfall caused by ammunition requirements.

3. SUMMARY.





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
The above recommendations are made in the interest of improving the responsiveness and quality of the support provided by the U.S.G. - this while simultaneously reducing costs.



Annex M - Appendix 1

REPRESENTATIVE WEAPONS DENSITY INCREASES

	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>
M-60 MG	545	1,578
M79 Grenade Launcher	12,638	22,373
81 mm Mortar	250	1,192
4.2" Mortar	7	37
105 mm Howitzer	110	227
106 mm Recoilless Rifle	41	121
155 mm Howitzer	0	24



[REDACTED]

M-2-1

18,000

15,000

12,000

9,000

6,000

3,000

J

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M

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M

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
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1973

1974



MAP-CB AMMUNITION ISSUES (TONS)

Annex M - Appendix 2

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AMMUNITION TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

The rapidly increasing consumption rate required a substantial increase in transportation assets. The attached chart lists the amount of ammunition delivered to Cambodia by all modes. Despite a significant increase in the number of tug and barge assets available, during January 1974 it was still necessary to transport more than 5,200 tons of ammunition from Thailand by air. During February 1974, it is estimated that about 23,000 short tons will be delivered by barge with an additional 3,000 tons transported by air. During March requirements for airland deliveries may be reduced even more, however, it appears that there will remain a continuing requirement for airland delivery of certain ammunition, either because of a lack of sufficient tug and barge assets or because of an immediate requirement which would preclude lengthy shipping times.


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Inclosure 1 to Appendix 3 to Annex M

AMMO DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA

FY 74 TO DATE

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AIRLAND</u>	<u>AIRDROP</u>	<u>MEKONG</u>	<u>HIGHWAY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JUL	3687	1371	3050	103	8211
AUG	8737	1331	1844	265	12177
SEP	5527	1345	2372	224	9468
OCT	6366	688	4924	138	12116
NOV	4051	419	5005	371	9846
DEC	4827	761	8683	411	14682
JAN	5225	567	7648	0	14615
TOTAL	38420	6482	34701	1512	81115



Annex M - Appendix 4

MAP-CB PROGRAM EVOLUTION

	<u>TOTAL PROGRAM</u> (1)	<u>AMMO</u> (1)	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
OCT 73	181.2	141.2	78%
DEC 73	325.0	302 (2)	93%
PRESENT	325.0	311 (2)(3)(4)	95.6%

NOTES:

- (1) Figures in millions of dollars.
- (2) Requirement includes provision for Jul 74 consumption.
- (3) Increase due to price changes.
- (4) If Jul 74 requirements are eliminated 311 million figure is revised to 283 million. This latter amount represents 87% of the total program.



[REDACTED]

Annex N

PROPERTY DISPOSAL

[REDACTED] The FANK Collection, Classification and Salvage Company (CC&S) was conceived in 1972 and programmed for activation and receipt of equipment in December 1973. A PDO agreement was unilaterally drafted by MEDTC in August 1972 and was approved by SECSTATE and SECDEF followed by final GKR signature in March 1973. The CC&S Company was originally assigned to the FANK Director of Military Domain. Further assessment of unit mission resulted in reassignment to the Director of Material (DIRMAT) in January 74.

DIRMAT has a skeleton CC&S Company in operation at Pochentong. They have on hand 150 off-shore procurement, Japan (OSPJ) unserviceable vehicles from prior MAP and 148 vehicles of other national origins. There is little, if any, demand for ferrous scrap in Cambodia. It has been determined economically feasible to retrograde unserviceable materiel to Thailand for sale through US PDO channels. Backhaul to Thailand on barges is being planned for the prior MAP materiel. Future retrograde materiel will be moved in the same manner since the SCOOT transportation allows 50 tons per barge free backhaul.

Although much of its equipment is available and operational procedures have been established, the CC&S Company lacks essential leadership and personnel to become a positive force in ridding the FANK supply and maintenance systems of unserviceable materiel. Efforts are underway to achieve a functional manning level and begin productive operations.

Despite these limitations, the FANK CC&S Company assisted in retrograding brass which was confiscated as a result of a concerted three month effort. Reports received in late October 1973 from reliable sources in the Phnom Penh and Battambang areas concerning illegal trafficking of brass casings keyed a major investigation by CHMEDTC and FANK. Results revealed that both civilian and military personnel were involved in transporting expended casings for personal profit to Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Such actions were in direct violation of the USG/GKR PDO agreement and Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act which specify return to the USG of all MAP provided materiel or scrap when no longer required for its original purpose.

Areas of the illegal trafficking centered around Phnom Penh, Battambang, Kampot, and Kompong Som. In mid-December, the GKR issued a declaration revealing their efforts to curb this activity and listed several actions which included the arrests of numerous people and the relief from duty of three general officers. This was followed by a news release from Miss Elizabeth Becker representing the Washington Post. Further, CLINCFANK, in a Note de Service, ordered all casings returned to ammunition supply points when new ammo is drawn.

[REDACTED]

During December, 355 tons of brass were confiscated, which included a planned single shipment of 200 tons to Hong Kong valued at approximately \$400,000. Procedures have been established and are in effect utilizing the FANK CC&S Company to retrograde brass to US PDO facilities in Thailand. By mid-January 1974, the level of illegal brass traffic had sharply decreased, thus indicating that steps instituted by GKR/FANK were in fact working.

The structure for a functional FANK PDO activity is available and has been implemented for one commodity. FANK must take decisive action to fully activate, staff and equip the CC&S Company to create a responsive PDO activity capable of maximizing cannibalization and ridding the logistical system of unserviceable excess materiel.

ADP SUPPORT OF MEDTC

1. INTRODUCTION. A varied amount of ADP support is in existence and planned for augmenting the managerial operations within MEDTC. Current support is furnished by USARSUPTHAI, IBM Corporation in Phnom Penh, USSAG, and CINCPAC. While the support is primarily topical in nature, a system is planned to provide sufficient flexibility for its use in many functional areas. All division within MEDTC utilize ADP Support.

2. LOGISTICS DIVISION. ADP support of logistics operations is by functional area.

a. Supply. Support of supply functions is furnished by varied sources. USARSUPTHAI provides keypunch and transceiver support for the monthly ABC report and for requisitions passed to CONUS supply activities. IBM Corporation provides keypunch support under contract, but it is available only one day per week and is limited to 2000 cards. This source of ADP support is used solely for the KRASS supply system. Cards keypunched by IBM are then sent to USARSUPTHAI for transceiving to USSAG. USSAG maintains the computer program for KRASS and provides system printout to MEDTC and FAO. ADP support provided by CINCPAC consists of computer program and printout support for the monthly ABC item receipt report and other allied reports.

Existing ADP support arrangements for MEDTC supply requirements do not provide timely response because of the dispersion of and relative inaccessibility to hardware. As a result, it is only with a great deal of difficulty that MEDTC is able to keep pace with MILSTRIP generated ADP receipt documents. Furthermore, ADP output is often of limited value for making timely management decisions since it is not up-to-date.

Efforts are currently underway to automate portions of the existing Khmer Air Force manual supply system. These efforts include the possible provisioning of an organic keypunch capability and a pony transceiver circuit at Pochentong Air Base to handle requisitions for 30,000 lines. The availability of a similar capability is being studied for the Khmer Navy.

b. Property Accountability. In an effort to account for their equipment, FANK published a regulation requiring each unit to report quarterly on the status of MAP equipment in their possession. This Major Item Equipment Report includes FSN; nomenclature; quantities authorized, received, turned-in, lost in combat, and on-hand; and the condition of each item. Reports received represented numerous formats and the vast amounts of data accumulated was unmanageable. In order to render this information useable, it was decided to automate the reports. Coordination has been effected with MACTHAI through CINCPAC to provide ADP services. A report format was established from which key punch operators could prepare cards for input into ADP equipment. An agreement has been completed whereby MACTHAI will process the reports and

return them to MEDTC for use by FANK and MEDTC in identifying attrition requirements, monitoring equipment distribution, and managing maintenance and support requirements. The first automated printouts are expected to be available in April 1974.

c. Ammunition. Currently ADP support for ammunition management is provided by the computer resources of USSAG. Reports are generated monthly, data input is via punched cards which are handcarried to USSAG, and output is printed. The following reports comprise the current system:

(1) Individual Item Detail Report. This report contains information on individual ammunition characteristics by line item (DODIC) to include: funding, inventory balances (quantities and dollar values); deliveries to Cambodia during the period and their mode of transport, i.e. surface (water), land, airland or airdrop; in-country depot issues for the period; and cumulative deliveries to MAP-CB for the fiscal year.

(2) Summary Data Report. This report presents information accumulated for each individual item (DODIC) as the detail report discussed above is generated. It contains information such as the total short tons received in-country for the period by delivery mode, the total cumulative short tons received for the fiscal year by delivery mode, inventory total balances, and total program dollar information.

(3) Projection of Total Program Requirements. This report reflects the projected total program requirements expressed in rounds and dollars for each item.

Though useful, the frequency with which these reports can be obtained (monthly) limits their value as managerial documents and relegates them to the class of historical records. What is needed is the capability to access the data base on a real time basis. Only then can the multitude of dynamic parameters involved in the management of a wartime ammunition system be analyzed and evaluated with sufficient speed to allow for active rather than reactive decision making.

Preliminary steps have been taken toward this end and planning is now in progress to establish a remote input/output terminal with online access to the USSAG computer facility. It is planned to locate the terminal at MEDTC in Phnom Penh with a dedicated secure line communications link to the central processor. The implications that such a capability would provide are far-reaching and transcend the management of the ammunition supply system. Clearly, all of MEDTC could conceivably benefit from this type of ADP support.

3. PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION. ADP support of the Plans and Programs Division operations is through the MACV developed G05 System currently supported by USSAG.

The G05 System is a computer program documenting unit and equipment authorizations by means of a time-phased force structure listing. The

listing is updated as force structure changes occur, either in terms of units added or deleted or in terms of the year in which the unit is to be MAP equipped. The program also provides a printout of TO&E's for all MAP force structure units, with the capability of readily changing the TO&E data at FANK or MEDTC request. Copies of these printouts are widely used by all personnel in MEDTC and have been provided to the FANK G-4 as a management tool for controlling the distribution of equipment to FANK units.

In addition to the above documents, the GO-5 System produces summary documents from the unit force structure listing and TO&E's which permit MEDTC and FANK to more effectively manage the planning and distribution of MAP equipment.

The one problem the Plans and Programs Division has had with its computer support was with the time lag between input of the data to USARSUPHAI for keypunch and transceiving to USSAG, and receipt of the out puts. The problem was compounded by the requirement to run an interim error listing in order to make necessary corrections prior to running the complete set of outputs. Efforts currently underway to establish a remote input/output terminal within the Logistics Division of MEDTC with online access to the USSAG computer should eliminate this problem.

4. MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE DIVISION. Within MAD, the End Item Utilization Inspection Program is provided ADP support by USSAG. Monthly listings are provided MEDTC which contain synopses of combat unit inspection results. Displayed in this listing are: unit, next higher headquarters, coordinates, month of inspection, reported strengths (authorized, assigned and present), status of equipment issue, status of equipment maintenance, status of ammunition maintenance, location and completion date of unit training under MAP, and a narrative summary of the inspected unit. These listings are normally produced monthly in two forms: those units inspected during the previous month and a history file of all such inspections conducted during CY 1973 and 1974.

The NEMVAC Program is also supported with an ADP application by USSAG. This application is an as-required listing of all potential evacuees within the Khmer Republic, for use by members of the NEMVAC control mechanism, notably wardens. The listing displays names, wards, category of evacuee, house address, embassy house number, business and home telephones, employer (if not the American Mission) and remarks.

5. SUMMARY.



Annex 4

AIRDROP OPERATIONS

FANK aerial delivery capability was essentially non-existent prior to 15 August 1973. A parachute packing and rigging platoon had been assigned with the FANK parachute brigade and was capable of preparing only door bundles for C-47 aircraft. All emergency airdrop resupply was being provided by USAF C-130's from U-Tapao. Rigging was accomplished by USARSUPHAI personnel.

Training programs were instituted in Thailand during May, June and July 1973 by USAF MTF's and USARSUPHAI riggers to prepare FANK to conduct high velocity airdrops from newly acquired C-123 aircraft. Simultaneous efforts were successful in activating the FANK Base Aeroportée. The new unit took combined responsibility for aerial delivery operations and conduct of basic airborne training for parachutists. A rigging area was established at Pochentong and prefabricated metal buildings were erected to house parachute storage, packing and aerial delivery item maintenance activities. FANK began C-123 airdrops on 17 August 1973 and has averaged nearly 100 tons weekly with a peak output of 200 tons. The C-123 is now the backbone of FANK airdrop resupply to isolated areas.

The Base Aeroportée is also tasked with retrograding airdrop equipment from Phnom Penh to Thailand for repair and reuse in continuing US airdrop support. Although significant quantities of parachutes and containers have been returned, other components are not being returned and all retrograded items require extensive maintenance or must be salvaged. A program for control of both quantity and quality of retrograded ADE is being implemented by FANK to reduce current high costs for airdrop operations.

MAP/AID INTERFACE

1. DESCRIPTION OF AID PROGRAMS AND THE GENERATION OF COUNTERPART FUNDS.

The Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) programs provide a level of imports to the private sector that are required to sustain the Cambodia economy. The present program as authorized by Congress provides for financing only the minimum essential commodities. Standard commercial procedures are utilized in these import transactions, the only difference being that A.I.D. and the USDA provide the foreign exchange rather than the GKR. The importers must purchase this foreign exchange in riels, the riels then becoming so-called counterpart funds. The importer uses funds realized from previous business transactions -- or credit -- to purchase this foreign exchange. Although the levels of the CIP and P.L. 480 programs are based upon civilian import requirements, FANK can in limited instances purchase certain imports from local importers. To the extent this is possible scarce MAP funds may be utilized for other purposes. Also to the extent that FANK may have purchased from importers in the past or might in the future, FANK contributes to the importers' ability to finance additional imports and, full circle, some of FANK's disbursements will therefore become counterpart. Counterpart funds generated by the process described above are deposited in either U.S. or U.S.-GKR jointly controlled accounts. These counterpart funds may be used in support of mutually agreed upon activities in both the civilian and military sectors of the economy.

2. AID/MAP INTERFACE. MAP Cambodia never had adequate funds to purchase all of the commodities required under the U.S. Military Assistance Program. There are, however, many segments of the economy in which both the military and civilian populace reap equal benefit from the utilization of facilities constructed and/or improved using commodities purchased. This is particularly true in the Public Works and Transportation Sectors. These are areas in which the mutual sharing of costs provides real benefit to all concerned. Increasingly scarce MAP monies have been required to support rapidly expanding ammunition requirements and less and less funds have thus been available to promote GKR self-sufficiency in the development of its economic/military infrastructure. Consequently the mutual sharing of the costs of common use items by MAP and AID must be promoted as a matter of the utmost importance. A logical and thoroughly coordinated inter-face between the Cambodia MAP and AID programs can contribute substantially to the promotion of GKR self-sufficiency. It can also result in the most cost effective approach to the elimination of wasteful duplication, thereby benefiting both AID and MAP equally and the Khmer Republic as a whole.

3. OBSTACLES. Several major obstacles continue to retard substantial achievement. The prime determinant has been the low level of security supporting assistance funds authorized by Congress. Second, strong Congressional criticism against any USAID involvement in project type assistance has made USAID reluctant to fund much of anything in the way

of common-use items of benefit to both the MAP and AID programs. Third, the development of many projects has occurred within and been constrained by the wartime environment. Proposals which surface under circumstances such as these are often a reaction to externally imposed factors and consequently the planning process is curtailed and the interface with the routine development of the Khmer budget is difficult since any new high priority project may have to be funded at the expense of other already funded proposals.

4. AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT. There has been one important program where AID/MAP have jointly funded common-use items, i.e., the airport improvement program. This program provided for the priority accomplishment of major improvements at the airfields of Pochentong, Battambang and Ream. MEDTC provided the overall analysis of requirements, planning, procurement, delivery of materials and monitoring of the program thus eliminating the requirement for AID to assign its scarce personnel assets (a major AID concern). Construction of facilities under this program has been prosecuted under the managership of the Director of Construction, Khmer Republic. Construction has been hampered by the Congressional limitation on numbers of third country nationals which can be brought into the country to assist in the supervision of various facets of construction. Although somewhat behind scheduled completion dates, significant improvements (particularly at Pochentong) have already been completed.

5. OTHER PROJECTS. Several important military projects have been completed utilizing counterpart funds generated by importation and use of U.S. produced commodities under the Congressional approved PL-480 program. Specific projects have been completed improving dependent housing, military training centers, prisoner of war facilities, data service center, printing plant and English language training.

6. COUNTERPART PROJECT PLANNING. In the past accomplishment of worthwhile projects using counterpart funds has been severely restricted by the sudden and sometimes unexpected development of requirements. One of MEDTC's prime goals has been to eliminate development of counterpart requirements within this "crisis management" environment. In this regard a major planning effort was successfully concluded with the inclusion of important and rationally developed counterpart projects in the FY 1974 GKR budget. This effort marked the first occasion in which the projects were identified and planned prior to the finalization of the Khmer budget. It is anticipated that handling counterpart funded projects in this manner will result in a quantum improvement in this important area.

Annex P - Appendix 1

SUMMARY OF COUNTERPART AUTHORIZATIONS AND RELEASES

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<u>Funds Released</u>	<u>Funds Reserved</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1972	Training Centers		59,070,000 riels	GKR has not requested
1972	Dependent Housing	\$188,253		
1973	Airfield Upgrading	\$1,438,849		
1973	Airfield Upgrading	\$1,342,210		
1973	Dependent Housing	\$138,799		
1973	Temporary Housing	\$138,799		
1973	POW Facilities	\$37,114		
1973	Dependent Housing	\$199,733		
1973	Temporary Housing		120,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG
1973	Data Services Center		19,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG
1973	Printing Plant		30,000,000 riels	GKR has not requested
1973	English Language Training		6,000,000 riels	GKR has not requested
1973	Free Rice for Intervention Forces		311,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG
1973	Uniforms for FANK		369,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG.
1973	Typewriters for FANK Finance Service		1,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG
1973	400 Bed Hospital		21,000,000 riels	To be released IAW PROAG.
1974	MNK Ammunition Depot		39,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<u>Funds Released</u>	<u>Funds Reserved</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1974	Neak Leoung Airfield		30,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Temporary Housing		35,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Recruit Center		40,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Interrogation Center		50,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Artillery School		67,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Armor School		3,000,000 riels	Proposed for GKR 1974 budget
1974	Pochentong Heliport	\$266,312		

Annex R

THE FREE RICE PROGRAM

If there has been any one single element that has boosted the morale of the FANK combat units, it has been the authorization of free rice for the intervention units. The problem of availability of rice to the military in the field had previously plagued commanders. Before the free rice program was instituted, every soldier had to pay for his quota of rice. Under the old system, the unit commander was issued a small revolving fund with which he would purchase the rice and then sell it to his troops. He would collect from the men on payday for the rice issued during the month. If monthly pay was late, the revolving fund would be out of cash to purchase new rice and the troops and their families would go hungry. The same problem would arise in case of loss of rice or funds on operations or due to fraudulent activities of the commander or his treasurer. Also, when the soldier had not yet been paid or had used his pay for other purposes, there would be little or no rice for himself or his family. In order to eradicate these detriments to combat effectiveness and at the same time provide an incentive to persuade troops to join the ranks of intervention units, the free rice program was conceived by MEDTC.

All troops of the intervention units are now provided free rice regardless of pay or pay related problems. Free rice is allocated to each unit on a basis of 700 grams per man per day. The source of this rice is from the normal FANK quota of 211 M/T/day which is provided through USAID, not MAP-CB. Free rice deliveries began on 1 December 1973.

The rice situation is very important to the war effort because rice is the basic diet for the Khmers. DIRINTENDANCE is responsible for the distribution and delivery of rice to the intervention units. The cost of this rice is funded in the GKR defense budget. DIRINTENDANCE buys all rice from a commercial source (SONEXIM). Free rice has had such overwhelming results with the intervention units, it is envisioned that this program will continue indefinitely. To insure that the commanders or soldiers have a means of recourse in cases where there is a complaint, the FANK Rice Committee was formed to resolve with positive action any alleged injustices. A Log Staff Officer from MEDTC is a permanent observer to this committee.

Annex S

TRIPARTITE DEPUTIES' WORKING GROUP

The Tripartite Deputies' Working Group was convened for the first time on 15 January 1971. Its purpose was to promote cooperation between RVNAF and FANK. This high level group was originally staffed by the Deputy Commanders of RVNAF, FANK, and MACV. Prior to the Vietnam cease fire meetings were held in Saigon. Effective with the cease fire, however, Deputy COMUSSAG/7th AF was nominated to lead the delegation and the location of the meetings was shifted to Phnom Penh. CHMEDTC is a participant at all Deputies' meetings and reports and minutes are forwarded through MEDTC for comments prior to implementation.

With the passage of time cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Khmer within the framework of the Tripartite Deputies' Working Group and associated study groups has increased significantly. This close cooperation has repeatedly been evidenced by the solution of difficult problems, occasionally having international ramifications, in such areas as coordination in border areas, communications security and in the planning and management of the vitally important Mekong River convoys. Convoy planning, administration, protection and control requires the interface of the two countries at all levels from senior cabinet officials and military officers to customs officials, civilian and military river pilots, province chiefs and military officers of all three services. The fact that the Mekong River LOC has been strongly contested by the enemy but never denied to the GKR is an important achievement and represents proof of the success of Tripartite. This is particularly important when one considers that the cessation of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam was followed soon after by the termination of U.S. air support for the Khmer Armed Forces on 15 August 1973. Nevertheless, vitally needed military and civilian products have continued to reach Phnom Penh without serious interruption, largely because of the close coordination and mutual cooperation between RVN and the GKR.


It is important to point out that the role of the U.S. in Tripartite activities has gradually shifted from that of leader to that of active participant. This has been consistent with the desires of both the Departments of State and Defense. It is one more indication of the success of the Tripartite forum.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN (NEMVAC)

1. BACKGROUND.



2. NEMVAC PLANNING.



3. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. United States Air Force assets stationed in Thailand were tasked to provide airlift in the event that the Emergency Evacuation Plan was executed. Since Air Force Helicopter assets were insufficient to provide a single lift capability, Commander Seventh Fleet was tasked with providing an Amphibious Ready Group with integral Marine Aviation Unit to assume various reaction times, dictated by the tactical situation, in order to provide both Landing Zone Security and the desired single lift capability. The decision to reduce the reaction time of the ARG/MAU to conform to the military situation in the Khmer Republic was a continuing problem since it limited the freedom of action and scope of the training activities of the forces designated for, and dedicated to, the Emergency Evacuation Plan.

[REDACTED]

4. COORDINATION AND EXECUTION. Members of prospective assisting agencies were brought into Phnom Penh on a continuing basis to conduct liaison, familiarize themselves with the landing zones, communication facilities, and the command and control organization. CPX's were scheduled to coincide with liaison visits so that the organization could be evaluated realistically and all participants would have an understanding of capabilities and limitations. Each CPX was modified to reflect a growing degree of realism, the later exercises being conducted in what was anticipated to be a real time situation.

5. PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Counting Noses: The most significant problem area developed during the evaluation of the Emergency Evacuation Plan was the instability of the personnel anticipated to be on board at the time of evacuation. Both MEDTC and the U.S. Mission were characterized by short tour personnel, the one year unaccompanied tour at MEDTC being a recognized problem and the use of short tour temporary personnel by the Embassy a similar consideration.

b. Outlying Areas. An additional area of concern has been the immediate notification of potential evacuees located in the Khmer Republic but not in Phnom Penh proper, i.e. such areas are Ream/Kompong Som and Battambang. Additional HF Radios were installed at each location thereby establishing a means of communication at the work site and residence of the personnel located there. However these radios are not monitored on a continuous basis and prior coordination is required to establish times of actual communication by HF equipment.

c. Communications For Notification. A 100% guarantee of notification continues to be a problem area, especially for personnel not possessing the necessary radios (Unofficial Americans). A suitable means of alerting unofficial Americans was accomplished by using the FM rebroadcast from Saigon. Potential evacuees were advised to monitor this station and frequency and to listen for pre-arranged coded information which would alert them to the commencement of Emergency Evacuation Proceedings.

Annex U

MEDTC ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

1. GENERAL.

a. Support arrangements utilized by MEDTC were in large part shaped by existent circumstances, some of which were unique to the situation in Phnom Penh and some which would apply to other MAAG-type activities. For an overview of the environment as of the close of 1973, several factors are highlighted in the following:

(1) MEDTC offices were physically located on the American Embassy compound at Phnom Penh in two Pasco buildings - i.e., single story pre-engineered structures with metal siding and roofing. Duty activities of most MEDTC personnel required daily travel to various locations in the Phnom Penh area (especially the FANK General Staff Headquarters, Service Headquarters, Chruai Chang War Naval Base, Pochentong AFB, and the Ministry of National Defense), and frequent travel to units/locations throughout the Khmer Republic for conducting end item utilization inspections.

(2) The security situation impacted on support activities. The environment in which MEDTC operated was a country within which a bitter military struggle was taking place and MEDTC personnel were subject to the ever present possibility of terrorist attack. The primary consideration in responding to the security environment was the full performance of the MEDTC mission - i.e., actions to insure maximum effectiveness of the team effort. Off-duty activities were of necessity restricted to preclude needless exposure, inasmuch as a possible consequence of a MEDTC member becoming a casualty to enemy action would have been the imposition of political or other restrictions, which would have hampered the effectiveness of mission accomplishment.

(3) Another element of the environmental framework within which MEDTC operated was the need to maintain a low profile. An overly conspicuous presence would inevitably have provided a base for enemy propaganda concerning direct U.S. military involvement, and may further have led to exaggerated news reports in some elements of the American press. Accordingly the duty uniform for the Phnom Penh area was civilian clothes, conservative and in good taste; for trips to units in the field, however, a fatigue uniform was found to be most effective. The vehicles of the MEDTC motor fleet were painted various different colors, rather than the official black. Support arrangements reflected CHMEDTC's policy to avoid projection of an unfavorable overbearing image.

b. Specific areas of support arrangements discussed below are as follows:

(1) Organization for support

(2) Housing

(3) Transportation

(4) Funding of Support

2. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT. Major sources of support were the MEDTC Joint Liaison Office, Military Service, Embassy Phnom Penh Administrative Office, and MEDTC (Forward).

a. MEDTC Joint Liaison Office (JLO). A factor of paramount importance is shaping MEDTC organization for support was the Congressional (Symington/Case) limitations on the maximum number of U.S. personnel of the Executive Branch of the Government permitted to be in country. The severe restrictions on "headspace" required that organic support elements be located out of country, if feasible. These elements were grouped within the MEDTC Joint Liaison Office (JLO), physically separated from the main body and stationed in Thailand, where they were co-located with such military service support activities as finance and personnel.

b. Military Services. Military Service organizations provided administrative/logistical support to MEDTC in the areas of finance, personnel, and local procurement. This support was provided by activities of U.S. Army Support Activity, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) thru the MEDTC Joint Liaison Office. Airlift support between Phnom Penh and Thailand was provided on a reimbursable basis by the USAF for C-130 cargo aircraft and by the USA 70th Aviation Company for light fixed wing aircraft (U-21's).

c. Embassy Phnom Penh Administrative Office. The Administrative Office of the local Embassy provided administrative support to MEDTC and other elements of the U.S. Mission at Phnom Penh. Such support was furnished on a full cost reimbursement basis (indirect costs as well as direct costs) under the Department of State Shared Administrative Support (SAS) program. The following types of support were furnished to MEDTC: teletype communications (the dispatch of outgoing and the receipt of incoming messages); intra embassy telephone service; maintenance of the MEDTC administrative motor vehicle fleet; maintenance of quarters and office buildings; procurement of supplies and equipment (utilizing MEDTC MAP Administrative Expense (MAE) funds; disbursing and check-cashing services; office supplies (other than those supplies obtained through military supply channels in Thailand by the MEDTC Joint Liaison Office, and shipped to Phnom Penh); other services (typewriter repair, etc.).

d. MEDTC (Forward). The main body of MEDTC (i.e. all of the team except for the JLO), severely restricted in size by the Congressional personnel ceiling for Cambodia, was heavily committed to the performance of CHMEDTC's operational missions. Nevertheless, some administrative support functions were required to be performed by MEDTC at Phnom Penh on a "Self-Help" basis. A motor officer and a housing assignment officer were appointed on an additional duty basis. The JMP billet for a supply officer was deleted, but the function could not be eliminated; accordingly, a property book officer was appointed as an additional duty to maintain

the property hand receipt records, and the remaining supply functions (determination of requirements, making arrangements for the procurement, follow-up, and issuance to the requestor after receipt) were absorbed as additional duties by the MEDTC Comptroller.

3. HOUSING.

a. For security and other reasons, MEDTC personnel were billeted in several locations. The housing requirement was satisfied as follows:

(1) Officers were billeted in rental houses of the villa type, with several officers assigned to each house. The number assigned varied depending upon the number of bedrooms available, and average four to a house. Each house had its servant staff, and provided for its own messing and security. The costs of food and servants' salaries were borne by the house members. To assist in providing security, the FANK assigned members of its Prevote Militaire (Military Police) and the Embassy Administrative Office furnished civilian guards for each house.

(2) Enlisted men were billeted in a large multistory masonry-type building furnished by the Khmer government and similar to structures in which the national governmental ministries were located. The enlisted quarters (BEQ) were subdivided into eleven (11) apartments and a central messing area with a bar and recreation room. Each apartment accommodated an average of two to three enlisted personnel.

b. The officer team houses were leased by the Embassy Administrative Office from private lessors. All costs of rental and utilities were charged as a direct cost to DOD under the Dept of State SAS program. The BEQ was provided by the Government of Khmer Republic (GKR). A small token payment of rent was scheduled to start in 1973. However, as of the end of that year no request for payment had been received from the GKR.

c. The notable factor concerning the officer team house concept utilized by MEDTC was that it differed from other elements of the U.S. Mission. The policy of CHMEDTC was to assign to each house the full number of people which it could suitably accommodate -- normally four. This contrasted with the practice of the other agencies, military as well as civilian, to assign individuals one to a house (a maximum of two to a house) for even relatively junior personnel. CHMEDTC's policy was found to have the following advantages:

(1) It provided quarters, completely adequate and suitable, without the wasted space and excess costs of leasing individual houses for each individual.

(2) It resulted in a material reduction in the indirect costs to the Government, such as utilities, maintenance, cooking gas, and civilian guard service.

(3) Additional personnel in the house provided a greatly increased capability for planning house defense. Further, the fewer number of houses required reduced the demand for FANK security guard personnel, thus freeing additional troops for combat or other duties.

(4) The additional house members permitted a pro-rating of servant salaries and the workload of supervising the mess, purchase of food, and other house administrative duties.

(5) Billeting of several officers of varied backgrounds in a team house enhanced the utility of the representation/entertainment function. It was found that the presence of several officers during the entertainment of FANK associates generally led to a greater cross-fertilization of ideas than would be possible with a single officer.

(6) By the policy of billeting several officers in each team house, MEDTC was able to avoid projecting the image of overly luxurious living by Americans. As in many countries of the Orient, the importance to Cambodians of saving face should not be underestimated; the conclusions which may have been drawn by a Khmer Officer, visiting his U.S. associate, grade O5 and O4, and billeted in a private villa, are obvious.

4. TRANSPORTATION. Two types of transportation are discussed in this section -- i.e., surface transportation in the Phnom Penh are provided by the MEDTC administrative motor vehicle fleet, and air transportation for end item utilization inspections (EIUI's) in Cambodia, provided by various sources.

a. MEDTC Administrative Motor Vehicle Fleet. The reliance on the MEDTC fleet of vehicles can readily be seen when it is understood that there were no alternative means of transportation for either duty travel in the Phnom Penh area or for travel between the MEDTC team houses and office location. Private automobiles or motor cycles were prohibited for MEDTC personnel; travel by bicycle was prohibited due to security considerations; taxi service, other than the cycle (rickshaw) type, was not available. Arrangements made and lessons learned with respect to use of the motor vehicle fleet are summarized in the following:

(1) There was a pressure for continuous increases to the fleet, above the minimum number of vehicles needed for efficient operations. Basis of this pressure was the fact that for any number of vehicles less than one vehicle for each person necessarily required some compromises/consolidations of transportation, and entailed occasional slight personal inconveniences. To prevent the motor vehicle fleet from "growing like topsy", it was necessary to insure that the number of vehicles were strictly controlled in accordance with TDA authorizations reflecting only minimum essential requirements.

(2) It was necessary to establish a basis of allocation of the vehicles, to insure that competing requirements for the vehicles were

fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. It was found that an effective basis of allocation required that the number of vehicles assigned on a "sole user" basis be held to a minimum. The policy of CHMEDTC was that only Colonels (O6) and above, the Secretary of the Joint Staff (SJS), and the Sergeant Major (SGM) be assigned vehicles on an individual basis. The remaining vehicles were assigned to team houses and the BEQ, thus making them available for both duty travel in Phnom Penh and travel to and from the quarters locations at morning, evening, and meal times; conflicting transportation requirements were readily resolved by the senior occupants of the respective team houses.

(3) Main types of vehicles in the MEDTC fleet were sedans, scouts, and jeeps. Sedans provided a suitable means of transportation for senior MEDTC officers and visiting VIP's. For the remainder of MEDTC personnel, jeeps were found to be preferable to the scouts (and to the station wagons for which the scouts were substituted) in almost all instances.

(4) Military drivers were made available by the FANK for use by MEDTC, in general, each senior officer and each team house was assigned a driver. The policy of CHMEDTC was that the drivers be utilized for a maximum number of missions, thus minimizing miles driven by MEDTC personnel. Driving on the streets of Phnom Penh involved an ever-present hazard of striking one of the numerous motorbikes, bicycles, cyclos, or pedestrians. For obvious reasons, it was preferable that an American not be the driver when such an accident occurred.

b. Air Transportation for Travel in Cambodia. The primary reason for in-country air travel was for purpose of conducting End Item Utilization Inspections (EIUI's), as required by Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Other purposes for such air travel in Cambodia included periodic trips to Kompong Som, the deepwater port, in order to supervise the offloading of MAP cargo from ocean freighters. The following subparagraphs discuss the use of commercial charter aircraft, the sources of charter aircraft, and the use of commercial airliners.

(1) The utilization of commercial contract air (Air America) to meet the major portion of the need for in-country travel was a mandatory one. The establishment of a U.S. military air activity in the Khmer Republic was not authorized due to the various political restraints placed on U.S. Forces activities in SE Asia. Investigation by CINCPAC established that PACOM assets in Thailand and RVN were not available to meet the MEDTC requirement. Accordingly, CINCPAC concurred in the use of contract aircraft to support MEDTC administrative airlift requirements (CINCPAC 030604Z June 72). Authority to utilize MAP Administrative Expense (T-20) funds allotted to CHMEDTC for costs of this contract administrative airlift support was granted by SECDEF 2924/231915Z June 72.

(2) Types of charter aircraft utilized were light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters (for locations where fixed wing craft could not

land). Sole source of this charter airlift support as of the end of 1973 was Saigon-based Air America aircraft, pursuant to an existing contract administered by the U.S. Embassy Saigon. The disadvantage of this arrangement was the costs incurred for the "deadhead" flying time from Saigon to Phnom Penh before the mission, and return from Phnom Penh to Saigon after the mission had been concluded. In early 1974 an alternative source of support became available, in that a U.S. firm operating aircraft in Cambodia (Southeast Asia Air Transport) acquired a small fixed wing aircraft, suitable for the fixed wing portion of MEDTC's charter air needs. As of Feb 1974, CHMEDTC was exploring all aspects of feasibility of using this alternative source for fixed wing support, which would have the advantage of significant cost savings.

(3) Commercial airlines operating in the Khmer Republic offered flights connecting Phnom Penh with Kompong Som and Battambang. Due to the cost savings, these commercial flights were used in lieu of charter aircraft when suitable for missions to the aforementioned locations.

4. FUNDING. The two primary sources of funding for administrative support were MAP Administrative Expense (MAP T-20) funds and State Dept Shared Administrative Support (SAS) funds.

a. MAP Administrative Expense (MAE) Funds. CINCPAC allotted these MAE funds (budget project T-20) to CHMEDTC to provide for the administrative expenses of MEDTC. Major uses of these funds included paying costs of administrative air support, temporary duty travel, contractual services of many types, supplies and materials, equipment, rental, and civilian labor costs (primarily local national drivers in Thailand).

b. State Department Shared Administrative Support (SAS) Funds. Pursuant to Department of State regulations, the full costs of operating the Administrative Office of the Embassy was prorated to the various agencies of the U.S. Mission Phnom Penh. Under the formula provided in State Department manuals, one-third of these costs were charged by State to DOD for support of MEDTC (SAS 5 and SAS 6 percentages). In addition to the percentage charges, SAS charges to DOD further included as direct costs the lease costs and utilities of the MEDTC team houses.

POLITICAL EVENTS IN CAMBODIA 1972 - 1974

1. ANALYSIS.

Major political events of 1972 centered on the new Republican Constitution, political party formation and the elections for President, National Assembly and Senate. Economic and military setbacks, the uproar and maneuvering behind the national elections and complete split among the men who deposed Sihanouk combined to drive governmental efficiency, both civilian and military, and popular confidence to a nadir from which they have only partially recovered. Sosthene Fernandez's September 1972 rise to Chief of Staff was the most prominent politico-military event; it marked a clear challenge to (then) Colonel Lon Nol's ambitions and a tacit admission from President Lon Nol that he must share military authority.

Efforts to reunite the major figures who deposed Sihanouk had several false starts beginning in late 1972 and finally succeeded in April 1973. Departure of the Marshal's brother, Lon Non, and suspension of the one-party Parliament was the price for participation of Cheng Heng, Sirik Matak and In Tam, who also took the Prime Ministry in a collegial High Political Council. Although caught up in mutual suspicion and political ineptness, the new institution saw the country through the end of US bombing, made some economic reforms, instituted nation conscription, and stayed together until a serious diplomatic challenge to the Khmer Republic's UN seat lost by being postponed to the next General Assembly session. In Tam then retired leaving a triumvirate in the High Political Council with Lon Nol still the dominating figure. Long Boret, an able diplomat, led a more compact and better qualified cabinet at the end of 1973, but he lacks a political base and his performance will depend on the Marshal's continued willingness to share power.

The new government enters 1974 facing a critical test in dealing with teacher and student activism. These groups base their unhappiness in more than two years of declining economic performance and increasing corruption and by now have gained enough experience in confrontation to pose a real challenge to the new government.

2. KEY DATES AND EVENTS.

1972 Mar 10 Chief of State Cheng Heng resigned under pressure transferring his powers to Prime Minister Lon Nol. Lon Nol accepted and immediately dissolved the Constituent Assembly expressing disagreement with the Assembly's amendments to the first draft of the new constitution. The Cabinet immediately resigned.

- [REDACTED]
- 1972 Mar 12 Lon Nol assumed the title President and the functions of Prime Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces.
- Mar 16 Under fire from protesting students, Sirik Matak announced that he would not take part in the new government under formation and said he sought to leave public life.
- Mar 21 Lon Nol announced the formation of a new government presided over by Son Ngoc Thanh as "First Minister."
- Apr 27 Bullets hit about 20 students as military police fired when rock-throwing, armed students tried to break through a police cordon to join other students harboring agitator Koy Pech. Mass demonstrations resulted; the government denied any fatalities had occurred.
- Apr 30 Voters resoundingly approved the draft constitution of the Khmer Republic. Opponents had criticized the new draft for giving excessive power to the executive at the expense of the legislative branch.
- Jun 4 Lon Nol, with the support of the newly formed Socio-Republican party, defeated former National Assembly President In Tam running under the banner of the revived Democratic Party, and law faculty dean Keo An in the Republic's first presidential election. The Marshal received 55% of the 1.1 million votes; In Tam got 24% and Keo An 21%. Keo An capitalized on his student and teacher support gained in an earlier confrontation with Prime Minister Delegate Sirik Matak; he also used pro-Sihanouk sentiment by announcing at one point that he would allow the deposed leader to return as a private citizen. The Provisional Constitutional Court approved the election and rejected the losers' appeals. Although the Court admitted some irregularities took place; it argued they did not materially affect the result.
- Jun 14 The Republican Party was informally launched; it later elected Sirik Matak Secretary General.
- Jul 2 The Democratic Party Congress elected a 21-member National Committee with In Tam as president and marxist-oriented Chau Sau of the National Bank as Secretary-General.
- Jul 9 The Socio-Republican Congress elected a 20-man Central Committee. Hang Thun Hak was later elected Secretary-General. The party central committee was divided

- [REDACTED]
- 1972 Jul 9 between old associates of Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh and a new group close to the Marshal's brother Colonel Lon Non. The party placed itself under President Lon Nol's patronage and accepted six men of the Marshal's choice to "sit with" the Central Committee. Lon Non was among the six.
- Jul 21 Civil Service and military salaries of those earning less than 3,500 riels were raised.
- Aug 2 Republican party Secretary-General Sirik Matak explained his party's failure to file for the Sep 3 legislative election by denouncing the electoral law and use of state machinery to support "a particular party." He declared, "the Republican party withdraws its confidence in the present government."
- Aug 5 The Democratic Party withdrew its candidates as well denouncing "violation of fundamental democratic principles...by the authorities." Only minor parties remained to oppose the Socio-Republicans.
- Sep 3 The Socio-Republican party swept all 126 National Assembly seats.
- Week of
Sep 5 In Tam resigned as president of the opposition Democratic party. Chau Sau succeeded him as president and Mrs. Tip Mam became party Secretary-General. The party fell under the control of uncompromising, doctrinaire Marxists and, although losing the broad appeal based on In Tam's personality, retained a certain currency among intellectuals.
- Sep 7-9 Rice shortages and rising prices prompted an incautious government broadcast which troops interpreted as giving them the right to monitor prices. Heavy-handed control over prices led to looting and rioting Sep 8 by troops and civilians. The riot eclipsed a demonstration by the para brigade who marched on the Presidential palace demanding long overdue pay.
- Sep 17 The Socio-Republican party swept the Senate election against minor opposition.
- Sosthene Fernandez became FANK Chief of Staff. The move defused growing criticism of Lon Nol's handling of military affairs and especially of Lon Non's influence and ambitions.

- [REDACTED]
- 1972 Sep 30 A decree created the State Council, the last of the Republican institutions provided for by the new Constitution. (The decree was not released until the middle of October.) Only the Vice-Presidency remained to be filled. In theory completion of the institution-building ended rule by decree and inaugurated Parliamentary process.
- Oct 15 Hang Thun Hak, Socio-Republican party Secretary-General led Lon Nol's choices for a new government to replace Son Ngoc Thanh's. Lon Non as Minister attached to the Interior for Liberation and Nation-Building assumed a position of undefined but potentially broad power.
- Nov 3 President Lon Nol created a National Committee of Peace and Concord with Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Sosthene Fernandez, the Cabinet and all political parties except the Democrats. Former Democratic President In Tam attended the second meeting but announced his intention to stay aloof. The organization soon lapsed into torpor.
- 1973 Jan 13 Gasoline rationing began in Phnom Penh.
- Jan 16 The press reported that Sisowath Sirik Matak, offered the Vice-Presidency, replied he would accept only if the Assembly, the senior military commanders and the Socio-Republican party agreed. The nomination fell afoul of Lon Non-led opposition as Assembly Deputies voted 107 to 126 to oppose the nomination.
- Jan 27 US, DRV, PRG and GVN sign Paris Accords on Vietnam. Article 20 requires withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia.
- Jan 28 Marshal Lon Nol ordered a unilateral suspension of FANK offensive operations pending NVA/VC withdrawal from Cambodia, at the same time he reserved the right of self-defense and of reoccupation of territory held by the NVA/VC.
- Feb 5-6 The Phnom Penh General Strike, which closed 16 major industries ended as abruptly as it began. The GKR dissolved the "Workers and Peasants" which called the strike.
- Feb 7 In Tam became Special Adviser to the President for Rallying. He resigned 16 days later citing failure of the government to specify his authority to negotiate with the insurgents and noted that he had been assigned to the Ministry of the Interior where he would have been under Lon Non's orders.

- [REDACTED]
- 1973 Feb 15 GKR decided to raise prices of gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil.
- Feb 20 Teachers and students struck, closing all schools. They demanded rollback of prices and measures to strengthen the economy and end corruption.
- Mar 17 An Air Force pilot relieved for indiscipline who had a liaison with one of Sihanouk's daughters bombed the Presidential palace compound, missing Lon Nol but killing many family members of the palace guards. In the wake of the bombing the President proclaimed a state of siege and had royal family members and associates arrested.
- Three men forced their way into a meeting of striking teachers and students and assailed a speaker; they were forcibly restrained, but an estimated fifty others reportedly forced their way in, throwing hand grenades which killed two. Gendarmerie Nationale troops merely looked on. Suspicion fell on Lon Non.
- Apr 23 Parliament voted its approval of: the creation of a High Political Council of Lon Nol, Cheng Heng, Sirik Matak and In Tam; enlargement of the government; and authorized the new government to rule by decree for six months while Parliament suspended itself. The High Political Council would operate by majority vote and all affairs of state must be submitted to it.
- Apr 30 Brigadier General Lon Non left for an extended visit to the United States.
- May 15 In Tam led a new government portfolio divided among followers of the four High Political Council members.
- Jun 13 Sosthene Fernandez named Commander-in-Chief responsible for the conduct of the war before the government. Lon Nol remained Supreme Commander.
- Jun 15 In what was to prove the chief of only two significant decisions during In Tam's tenure, the GKR announced a package of stern economy measures including price rises of rice, water and electricity rate and gasoline. Civil servants and military received an allowance increase.
- Jul 6 Foreign Minister Long Boret issued a six-point peace plan calling for an immediate ceasefire, talks with Khmer from the other side, implementation of the Paris Accords requiring withdrawal of foreign forces, reactivation of the ICC. He neither affirmed nor excluded the possibility of negotiating with Sihanouk

1973 Jul 6

[REDACTED]

or his representatives. Sihanouk predictably rejected the plan.

Jul 16

President Lon Nol signed a decree instituting compulsory military service. All males from 18-35 are required to spend 18 months on active duty. Students, civil servants and those with heavy family responsibilities are eligible for deferment. Conscription got off to a bad start two weeks later by incautious use of force to round-up recruits. The PM Commander ultimately resigned after wide-spread criticism of his handling of the operation.

Oct 9

The Soviet Union climaxed three months of moving close to Sihanouk in a meeting between the Prince and the Russian ambassador in Peking. The Russians left recognition a fuzzy issue but shortly withdrew its Embassy staff from Phnom Penh except for three "caretakers." Other Eastern European embassies followed suit.

Oct 10

Draftees reported to their boards as the GKR's revised and better organized conscription campaign began under Major General Thappana Nginn's leadership. The campaign produced more than 11,000 men by year end; most, however, were volunteers, and no effort went to arresting draft-dodgers.

Oct 21

Imminent reconvening of the suspended Parliament prompted a reshuffling and expansion of the In Tam government which saw more Sirik Matak and Cheng Heng supporters brought in. In Tam, vocally unhappy about his lot, agreed to stay on to see a developing Sihanouk challenge at the UN to conclusion.

Nov 19

A KAF T-28 conducted a one-man operation to assassinate President Lon Nol by bombing Chamkar Mon palace. Three were killed; Lon Nol was unhurt. Government reaction was relaxed.

Dec 5

The UN General Assembly approved by a vote 53 to 50 a motion to postpone the Khmer representation issue until the 1974 session. Later in the month the Assembly approved the credentials committee report thus leaving the GKR in the Cambodian seat and ratifying its participation in the 1973 UNGA.

Dec 9

GKR announced increased prices for petroleum products.

Dec 10

The In Tam government resigned but assumed a caretaker status pending selection of a new cabinet.

[REDACTED]

1973 Dec 12

Teachers at all but two of the capital's secondary schools struck mainly citing economic grievances.

Dec 26

Long Boret as "First Minister" headed a new, more compact government with somewhat greater talent than the four previous cabinets. He faced immediate challenge from teachers and increasing student radical activism.

1974 Jan 14

Respected former Prime Minister Son Sann publically urged Lon Nol to go abroad for medical treatment in the interest of restoring peace in Cambodia. The move excited great attention throughout Cambodia and the GKR speedily riposted, reaffirming the Marshal's worth, reiterating the efforts the GKR has made to begin talks and pointing out that peace will not come until the other side agrees to talk.

CAMBODIA'S ECONOMY 1972-1974

Cambodia's essentially agricultural economy was fairly self-sufficient prior to the war. Exports of agricultural commodities, mostly rice and rubber, paid for necessary imports. With the advent of war, agricultural production decreased drastically due to loss of land and insecurity of the countryside. Foreign exchange earnings were reduced to almost nothing. Another compounding factor was a decrease of production in the small industrial sector brought about by damage inflicted by the enemy and also lack of raw materials. With production in both agriculture and industry sharply reduced, the need for imports mounted correspondingly. Foreign exchange reserves were not sufficient to finance these imports. The result was a spiralling inflation that increased prices 472 percent between January 1, 1972 and January 1, 1974.

To bridge this gap, American economic assistance agreements were signed in the Spring of 1971. The purpose of this assistance was to finance essential imports. In keeping with a low profile policy more traditional aid, in the form of technical assistance and development programs, was avoided. A minimum number of AID staff was brought into Cambodia to administer the program. As an adjunct of the import program the local currency generations were used mostly to support the GKR military budget. The economic program made no pretext of balancing the budget, of countering inflation, or of rendering economic advice to any degree. The advisory role was left largely to the IMF.

In 1972-1973, the U.S. role in Cambodia began to change. The military budget continued to increase and domestic revenues decreased. The Cambodians looked more to AID-generated counterpart funds as a budget resource. As the harvest of rice decreased each year, the Cambodians turned to the U.S. to find a source of supply. As the need for foreign exchange grew, the U.S. became the principal proponent of a realistic exchange rate. We also supported the establishment of a multilateral exchange support fund which made more foreign exchange available for imports. The refugee problem became more acute and we responded with our first project to provide immediate and urgent assistance to refugees.

By the end of 1973, the U.S. became the principal economic advisor to the Government. We were committed to supply all of the rice imported into the country at a cost of over \$150 million. Our AID-financed program originally projected for FY-74 at \$75 million could exceed \$90 million. The U.S. is now taking an active role in such diverse activities as the National Rice Committee concerned with all aspects of supply and distribution of rice and the National Petroleum Committee formed to play a similar role for POL. The Economic Section along with MEDTC played a major role in the review and revision of the 1974 budget.

Notwithstanding the substantial American economic assistance, supporting a war over a sustained period has placed a severe economic strain

on Cambodia. The cost of living has increased 280% in the past year and money supply has increased 39%. Salaries have lagged behind prices contributing in part to the recent teacher unrest. Supply has also been a major problem. The dramatic decrease in rice production in Cambodia coupled with a periodic and often extended interdiction of Route 5 from Battambang has made Cambodia dependent on imports of its food staple. In late 1972 and 1973, extraordinary efforts were necessary to find rice in neighboring countries. Rice was purchased from Thailand and in late 1973, rice loans were made from Vietnam and Korea. By the end of 1973, rice was arriving from the United States and security stocks were being developed. Another major problem has been POL supplies which have been both difficult to locate and expensive to purchase.

In late 1973, a four part program was undertaken to remedy the most serious economic problems confronting the GKR. The first part of the program was an anti-inflationary GKR economic policy that calls for realistic valuation of the riel, an austere wartime budget, control of expenditures, fight against corruption, assistance to refugees, and reduction in rice prices though increasing Government stocks and distribution.

The second part of the program was the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee staffed by both Khmer and Americans. When fully operational, it is expected that this group will have a catalytic effect on economic planning and decision making.

The third part of the program was geared to assist refugees who now number in excess of one million or 20% of the Government controlled population. The U.S. has proposed, and the Khmer are in the process of designing, a resettlement and development foundation. The purpose of the foundation will be to resettle refugees with the view to transforming economic liabilities to assets by increasing agricultural production, while at the same time making refugees economically independent. The goal for 1974 will be to resettle 20,000 families.

The fourth part of the program was to continue to supply essential commodities to the country through the AID-financed CIP Program, the PL 480 Program, and through the U.S. contribution to the exchange support fund.

Annex X

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC Report	A cumulative listing of receipts of specified major items.
ADE	Aerial delivery equipment.
AID	Aid for International Development.
AMEMB	American Embassy.
APS	Aerial Port Squadron.
ARG/MAU	Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Aviation Unit.
ARVN	South Vietnamese Army.
ASR	Available Supply Rate.
ATD	Armored Troop Carrier.
AWADS	All weather air delivery system.
BFM	"Battalion Fusiler Marine" i.e. Naval Infantry Battalion, Cambodian Navy.
CB	Cambodia.
CCB	Command and Communications Boat.
CHMEDTC	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific.
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief, Pacific Instruction.
CIP	Commodity Import Program.
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations.
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
CONUS	Continental United States.

CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority.
DAO	Defense Attache Office.
DASC	Direct Air Support Center.
DATT	Defense Attache.
DIRCON	Director of Construction.
DIRINTENDANCE	Director of Intendance (Quartermaster).
DIRMAT	Director of Materiel.
DOD	Department of Defense.
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Code.
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam i.e. North Vietnam.
DS	Direct Support.
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency.
ECL	English comprehension level.
EIUI	End Item Utilization Inspection.
EMG	"Etat Major General" i.e. Cambodian General Staff.
FANK	"Forces Armées Nationales Khmeres" i.e. Cambodian Armed Forces, to include Army, Navy, Air Force. Term commonly used however, when referring only to the Army.
FAO	Foreign Assistance Office.
FEC	Federal Electric Company.
FSN	Federal Stock Number.
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic.
GS	General Support.
HF	High Frequency.
IAW	In accordance with.
ICC	International Control Commission.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
INTENDANT	Quartermaster.

IRAN	Inspect, repair as needed.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JLO	Joint Liaison Office.
JMP	Joint Manpower Program.
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.
KAF	Cambodian Air Force.
KC	Khmer Communists.
KI	Khmer Insurgents.
KRASS	Khmer Republic Automated Supply System.
LCI	Infantry Landing Ship.
LCM	Landing Craft Medium.
LMAT	Logistics Management Assistance Team.
LNO	Liaison Officer.
LOC	Line of Communication.
LOG	Logistics.
LSIL	Infantry Landing Ship.
MAB	Management Assurance Branch.
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MAD	Management Assurance Division.
MAE	MAP Administrative Executive Funds.
MAP	Military Assistance Program.
MAP-CB	Military Assistance Program, Cambodia.
MAPEL	Military Assistance Program Element.
MAPEAS	Military Assistance Program Equipment Authorization System.

MASL	Military Articles Service List.
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team.
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issuance Procedure.
MNK	Cambodian Navy.
MOP	Measurement of Progress. A quarterly report.
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty.
MSCFE	Military Sealift Command, Far East.
MSM/MSR	Minesweeper, River.
M/T/DAY	Metric Ton per day.
MTT	Mobile Training Team.
NAVILCO	Naval International Logistics Center.
NEMVAC	Emergency Evacuation Plan.
NOA	<i>New Obligational Arrangement</i>
NORS	Not operationally ready for supply.
NKP	Nakhon Phanom, town located NE Thailand. Also, airbase located same site.
NOTE DE SERVICE	Administrative notice/general order within Cambodian Armed Forces.
NVA	North Vietnamese Army.
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction.
OJT	On the job training.
PACOM	Pacific Command.
PARA	Paratroop/Parachute.
PATMA	Pacific Command Transportation Movement Agency.
PBR	Patrol Boat River.
PC	Patrol Craft.

PCF	Patrol Craft Fast.
PDO	Property Disposal Office(r).
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
POL MIL	Political Military.
POM	Program Objective Memorandum.
P&P	Plans & Programs.
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government, i.e. the Viet Cong.
PROAG	Project Agreement.
RCN	Record control number.
RDD	Required delivery date.
RIEL	Basic unit of Cambodian currency.
RN	National Route.
R&R	Repair and Return.
RSR	Required Supply Rate.
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base.
RTG	Royal Thai Government.
RTNAB	Royal Thai Naval Air Base.
RVN	Republic of Vietnam.
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
SA/POM	Security Assistance/Program Objective Memorandum.
SCOOT	Support Cambodia out of Thailand.
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.
SONEXIM	Society Nationale Export/Import.
SONG	Special Operations Wing.
SSMR	Single Senior Military Representative.

S/T	Short ton.
STOL	Short Take Off and Landing.
SVN	South Vietnam.
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation.
TAB	Training Assurance Branch.
TAIP	Tactical Air Improvement Plan.
TAIP-C	Tactical Air Improvement Plan - Cambodia.
TCN	Third Country National.
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment.
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly.
UNOFFICIAL AMERICANS	U.S. citizens not employed by the U.S. Mission.
USAAAT	United States Army Ammunition Activity Thailand.
USAF	United States Air Force.
USARPACINTA	United States Army Pacific Intelligence Agency.
USARSUPTHAI	United States Army Support, Thailand.
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture.
USG	United States Government.
USN	United States Navy.
USSAG	United States Security Assistance Group.
VNAF	South Vietnamese Air Force.
VNN	South Vietnamese Navy.
WESTPAC	Western Pacific.