



# HANDBOOK



No. 10-47

JUN 10



# UNIT



# RESET

# UPDATE

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**Observations, Insights, and Lessons**

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## Foreword

During the rush to leave theater, most Soldiers and leaders are focusing on getting home safely and reuniting families. This is rightly so. However, at some point block leave will end and the task of soldiering will resume. Units are then faced with what appears to be a large and at times a frustrating task—unit RESET.

Soldiers and leaders should remember that they are not alone in this task. During combat, the higher headquarters provided support. During RESET, that higher headquarters is not just the brigade or division but an enormous Army structure that includes Headquarters, Department of the Army; Training and Doctrine Command; Forces Command; Army Materiel Command; Installation Management Command; the Director of the Army National Guard; and the Chief of the Army Reserve. If you do not succeed, they do not succeed.

### Key Lessons

- Plan RESET as you would any combat operation and communicate clearly with all parties involved in unit RESET before, during, and after deployment. All staffs must work together toward the common goal—returning to combat readiness.
- Family members are part of the Army team. Do not leave them out of planning or execution.
- Do not forget about the families of wounded Soldiers and Soldiers killed in action. A visit from the unit will greatly help Soldiers and family members complete their own recovery processes.
- Rebuild your unit with personnel, equipment, and the systems in place for combat the way you think they should have built before you deployed.

The intent of this handbook is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons learned. The information is from leaders for leaders. We welcome your input to keep this handbook up to date.

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COL, FA  
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned



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## Introduction

As part of the changing and improving staff work and efforts in unit reconstruction and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), a clear distinction needs to be made between RESET (uppercase) and reset (lowercase) to avoid any confusion. When viewed in capital letters, RESET is the required actions that prepare forces for future deployments. RESET encompasses tasks required to reintegrate Soldiers and families and then organize, man, equip, and train a unit. When viewed in lowercase, reset is defined as a set of actions to restore equipment or personnel (exclusively) to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a unit's future mission. To eliminate confusion with the Chief of Staff of the Army's imperative on RESET, which is holistic in nature, equipping or personnel action are often referred to as "equipping reset" or "personnel reset."

For purposes of this handbook, unit RESET is the process a unit uses to plan and execute those critical tasks needed to restore the unit to combat readiness after redeployment. This process must be carefully planned and synchronized by all stakeholders, beginning with actions a unit sets in place before the unit deploys. The unit follows the RESET model published in Army RESET orders and executes RESET tasks while still in theater to redeploy and return the unit to collective training capability as quickly as possible. This enormous task is complex and requires detailed planning, clear communication and intent, and strong unit leadership not only from the unit conducting RESET but also from those supporting the mission (e.g., garrison, contractors, and other Department of Defense organizations). The goal is returning the unit to combat readiness quickly, efficiently, and—most importantly—*safely*.

Unit RESET, however, is not just about returning Soldiers and equipment. It also includes the reintegration of Soldiers with spouses, children, and other family members. Perhaps most importantly, it includes reintegrating wounded Soldiers and family members working through the recovery process at medical centers, and it necessitates attending to those families who paid the ultimate price through the loss of loved ones.

During deployment, every Soldier and leader considers ways he would have done things differently. What equipment did he bring? Did he assign the right people to the rear detachment? Do the same types of families have the same issues, and how can the unit better assist families while Soldiers lead in combat? Why did he not bring forward all the systems needed to administratively run the unit? Document issues through after-action reviews (AARs) and address those issues that could be done differently. RESET provides the opportunity to fix problems and leave the unit better for the next Soldier or leader.

The RESET process will continue to be more effective in implementation as changes occur within the institutional Army and information continues to be collected through the Army's RESET program, which involves a number of active and reserve units. The Army's institutional adaptation effort, begun in 2007, is a

gradual movement toward more efficient business practices using an enterprise approach that directly supports the ARFORGEN process; it plays a pivotal role in RESET operations. The RESET Pilot program has also greatly assisted the Department of the Army (DA) and ARFORGEN staff in quickly streamlining the RESET process, as well as returning units to combat readiness more efficiently. The overall key to the program's success has been and will continue to be your feedback on what worked and what did not work during RESET operations. Do not hesitate to conduct AARs on the process and forward results to the DA and the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

While key differences exist between reconstituting an active unit versus a reserve unit, the general guidelines are the same. This handbook will provide key concepts for a successful unit RESET, from an active unit supported by a division and a large Army installation to a small reserve unit located in a remote region of the nation.

This handbook is broken down into sections to provide information on ARFORGEN and the Army Enterprise program, changes in planning and executing RESET since its first publication in July of 2008, background information on the RESET process, and key considerations by staff functions, including predeployment. If you are reviewing this process or handbook while deployed, some of your success will depend upon the actions you took during predeployment. Use this information for future deployments and share it with units you know are preparing for deployment.



## **Chapter 1**

### **Unit RESET Overview**

In 2008, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed the force to make improvements to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process to more effectively reconstitute active and reserve redeploying units. Based on this directive, a RESET Pilot program was designed and implemented by the Department of the Army (DA).

To help units prepare for RESET actions, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) began to collect observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) from units conducting RESET actions under the RESET Pilot program. Over time the RESET Pilot program has changed into the standard RESET operations units experience today. The CALL RESET handbook is a compilation of collected OIL and TTP to help guide units with RESET planning. As RESET operations have been refined, the RESET handbook has been updated to capture changes. Consider timelines presented in this handbook as guidelines because changes in RESET operations will most likely occur over time.

### **RESET Program**

As defined by the execution order, RESET is the required actions that prepare forces for future deployments. It includes actions to rebuild readiness consumed in operations. RESET encompasses tasks required to reintegrate Soldiers and families and then moves on to the steps required to organize, man, equip, and train a unit. RESET is built on the concept of allowing Soldiers and families the opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of a sustained operational tempo. The CSA has directed a strong emphasis on establishing a normal duty day or routine as much as possible to allow Soldiers the maximum time to reintegrate with their families.

As currently designed, RESET has three main phases:

- Phase I: In theater (return minus 180 days until unit return) (Rtn-180 to Rtn).
- Phase II: Unit RESET (return to return plus 180 days) (Rtn to Rtn+180).
- Phase III: Train/Ready (return plus 180 days [Rtn+180] to projected availability date).

Units were tracked in each phase through five areas: family, manning, equipping, sustaining, and training. After a refinement of the RESET plan, a sixth area,

facilities, was added to the list. In the future each phase will align with and be supported by the Army core enterprise (CE) program as follows (refer to Chapter 2 for additional CE information):

- Family: Human capital.
- Manning: Human capital.
- Equipping: Materiel.
- Sustaining: Materiel.
- Training: Unit readiness.
- Facilities: Services and infrastructure.

In the past, under the RESET Pilot program, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) tracked all RESET actions and used the Army synchronization meeting and report to update the CSA on a quarterly basis. On 24 July 2009, the reporting process was revised under Fragmentary Order 2 to the HQDA, RESET Execution Order dated 31 March 2009, which migrates tracking and execution of RESET operations to U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). At the CSA's request, FORSCOM provides periodic updates to RESET operations. The tasks in this handbook and in the CSA version of the program remain relatively the same for the brigade combat team (BCT).

**(Note:** How FORSCOM, Army Materiel Command [AMC], Human Resources Command [HRC], Installation Management Command [IMCOM], and other proponents support future RESET planning in the near future will be dependent on the Army enterprise program. The Army enterprise program is currently under revision, with future potential changes occurring to enterprise concepts portrayed in this handbook. The Army enterprise program will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.)

Commanders and their staffs must be aware that unit RESET or reconstitution is significantly changing in how the process is planned and supported at division and above. At the BCT level and below, unit RESET includes all the normal tasks and procedures.

Unit RESET is a complex process with many players. While everyone agrees the unit is the priority, issues well beyond the commander's ability to influence will often drive the process. There is no simple or easy solution for these issues, and most Soldiers often do not have the patience to learn about them after 12 to 15 months of combat. As frustrating as it may seem at times, the commander and his staff must determine their capability and brief the senior commander by the end of the RESET phase (Rtn+180).

The goal of RESET is to resource every unit so that it can begin collective training at Rtn+181. However, depending upon the unit's priority, not all units will be resourced to the same level of capability. Priority is determined by what the unit will be resourced for, which is dependent on what the unit's future mission will be, which in turn contributes to its overall readiness rating (capability). Units that

have a known latest arrival date (LAD) upon return from deployment are known as deployment expeditionary forces (DEF). Under RESET business practices a DEF will have a higher priority than units that do not have a known LAD.

As the responsible drawdown continues in Iraq, less demand is being placed on units that have, in turn, continued to increase unit dwell times. This increase in dwell times has a direct effect on a unit's resourcing requirements as mission sets change. Upon its return from deployment, a unit may no longer have a definite LAD for future deployments, which places it in a contingency expeditionary force (CEF) status. Units identified as CEF do not have a future directed mission that requires specific resourcing. The lack of resourcing requirements may affect the unit's priority for RESET support until mission sets have been determined. However, under RESET business practices, all units at Rtn+180 will be resourced to begin collective training. CEF mission requirements are based on several criteria tied to global response missions, CTC rotational cycles, possible transitions from CEF to DEF missions, and other outside factors (refer to Figure 1-1 for further details). This will be covered in more detail under the ARFORGEN process in Chapter 2.




Figure 1-1

Commanders must determine at what point RESET is complete and preparation for combat begins. Some commanders may view RESET as the process by which the unit gets its equipment fixed and returned and replacements are on the ground to start training again. At this point a commander may decide RESET is complete and begin training. Other commanders view the process as spanning from the day they are back in garrison to the day they are leaving garrison for the next deployment. Regardless of which viewpoint he holds, the commander must define the process as it applies to his situation and determine the tasks to be completed.

The tasks and lessons learned presented in this handbook are keys to success identified by commanders and units. However, they are not the only solutions or tasks. While the CSA's streamlined program continues to develop, evolve, and fine-tune the process, a commander may wish to add or take away tasks.

### **Keys to Success**

The number one key to success is clear, concise communication. Clear and concise communication, predominantly face-to-face, is required to accomplish unit RESET. Personnel should consider email as a way to pass data and progress reports, but they should conduct all other unit RESET business in regular coordination meetings. If one person does not understand his role or tasks at a point in the process, then errors or misunderstandings may have a ripple effect throughout the entire process.

### **Personnel management**

It will be difficult to know when replacements will be arriving for projected losses. Units need to create a matrix by name, military occupational specialty (MOS), unit, and month of loss to track projected personnel changes. Use this document in conjunction with the other areas to determine gaps and shortfalls.

### **Equipping**

The equipping process for RESET begins in theater and may continue right up to the next deployment. Much like the personnel management matrix, it will be important to create a matrix to track each line item number by unit. Use this matrix in conjunction with the automatic return items process; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) process; new equipment fielding; lateral transfers; personnel matrix; and training matrix to synchronize all efforts.

### **Training**

Once a unit has a solid grasp of personnel and equipping projections and expected actions, the training plan can quickly come together. Training plans should be built upon the commander's vision, which aligns with future mission requirements and is supported by the primary staff's assessments. The most important lesson learned to date is to complete as much of the individual training in theater before redeployment (if combat operations permit). The biggest headache for the unit will be managing new equipment fielding and training in conjunction with individual and collective training once the unit arrives back at home station. As part of that

plan, successful units have identified those Soldiers in theater who need to attend schools and see to key individual and collective tasks. They use this plan to coordinate training for RESET before ever leaving theater.

### **Family**

While a commander and his staff may not control all the factors of personnel, equipping, and training in RESET, they do have direct control over how much time a Soldier spends with family, as well as the ability to offer the best support possible for family members. The key is to listen to the families. While you may have to make hard, unpopular decisions, it is important to remember that every family is in a different situation or at a different maturity level, emotionally and spiritually. Consistent, caring, and steady leadership is the key to success.

### **Division Reconstitution Operations Cell**

In most cases the brigade has a higher divisional headquarters at its location, and that division may establish a division reconstitution operations cell (DROC) or a cell similar in design and scope to synchronize installation RESET operations. The Army senior command is the primary integrator and synchronizer of ARFORGEN on the installation. Senior commanders (SCs) provide oversight, guidance, and direction, and determine installation priority for resources to support RESET based on ARFORGEN strategic synchronization priorities. The SC will ensure staff integration for mission units, units in RESET, the garrison, and affected tenant units. For garrison and installation support, the garrison commander will coordinate with mission support elements (MSEs), rear detachments, and affected tenants to meet SC priorities.

The DROC example used in Figure 1-2 is from 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. If the brigade resides off installation from its parent headquarters, it is the SC's responsibility to coordinate with the host installation to support the brigade. The host installation might establish its own RESET working group or cell to synchronize all RESET efforts. The DROC should synchronize the garrison and supporting agency staffs with the supported unit staff and provide real-time information pertaining to manning, equipping, and RESET, working closely with the assigned MSE. The information should include training and contingency requirements to augment orders, with a formal center for reconstitution operations. The DROC is a command information center for RESET. Refer to Figure 1-2 for more details.

Not all brigades will have divisional headquarters located at their home station installations and should coordinate with their senior commands for RESET support.




Figure 1-2

## **DROC Concept**

The DROC operates as the conduit to the staff and ensures property inputs from the HQDA/G8, 407th Army Field Support Brigade, and manning inputs from HRC are synched with G3 training requirements. The DROC provides an injection point for earliest arrival date (EAD) enablers and assets that assist in reconstitution. Moreover, as information is passed from EAD enablers, the DROC conducts a hasty military decisionmaking process and publishes daily FRAGOs providing instructions to units on equipment issue plans and personnel taskings. Finally, the DROC consolidates unit reports into the division tracking reports.

## **DROC Manning**

The DROC is manned or has representatives from the division or garrison as follows:

- G1 (manning).
- G2 (C4I [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence]/ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] representative).
- G3 (DROC officer in charge, DROC coordinator, chief of equipping); G3 training representative).
- G4 (DROC sergeant major, asset visibility representative, chief of RESET, sustainment/field RESET representative, aviation RESET representative, and G4 supply representative).
- G6 (C4I RESET representative).
- Medical RESET representative.
- Division chemical officer (unit status report representative).
- Division engineer (facilities representative).
- Other staff members as required.

The DROC would also have representative LNOs from the supported units, possible LNOs from supporting contracting offices, and communications with the brigade logistical support teams in theater with units that are preparing to redeploy.

## **DROC Key Tasks**

The DROC accomplishes the following key tasks:

- Monitors equipping to ensure unit meets each gate for no later than fielding.
- Monitors personnel to ensure unit meets each gate for manning.

- Reports to higher headquarters, FORSCOM, AMC, HRC, and any other higher echelon requiring reconstitution status.
- Collects BCT reconstitution reports and consolidates information into a single division tracking system.
- Provides BCTs with a single point of contact for all RESET, equipping, and personnel issues.
- Provides immediate identification of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and recommended solutions.
- Publishes daily FRAGO providing written orders for required equipping, RESET, and manning tasks (no verbal orders of the commander-only operations).
- Provides the commanding general enough reaction time to properly reclaim and/or action general officer-level issues to FORSCOM (copy to [cc] corps).

### **Commander's critical information requirements of the DROC**

Knowledge or information management is one of the keys to success for unit RESET, and to that end a DROC may want to consider the following as CCIR:

Any delays:

- In unit starting equipment transfer.
- Resulting in a unit not able to achieve 90 percent RESET or Phase II prior to gunnery.
- Resulting in a unit not able to achieve Phase I prior to its mission readiness exercise.
- In new equipment training and new equipment fielding.

Any changes in:

- LAD.
- RESET status.
- Unit certification/exercise dates.
- "Patch chart."
- BCT sourcing.



Measure of effectiveness (MOE) indicators:

- Equipping/personnel issues are remedied prior to impact on training.
- Low to zero number of false directives from EAD and of headquarters erroneously tasking the subordinate BCTs.

Measure of performance (MOP) indicators:

- BCTs call the DROC first for problem-solving assistance.
- All EAD enablers are passing information through the DROC and not directly contacting BCTs.

### **RESET Program Key Tasks by Phase and Category**

Phase I (in theater): The big players for the command group and staff in Phase I should be a strong rear detachment at home station and a heavy emphasis on S4 actions in theater (property management). The command group and staff should begin RESET planning operations starting at Rtn-180 days prior to redeployment. The unit should begin tracking each of the following areas:

- Family:
  - Plan homecoming ceremony with considerations of family reintegration as part of the ceremony.
  - Provide continuous support to family programs and services and develop an effective Army Soldier-family action plan (ASFAP).
  - Rear detachment prepares post facilities for family housing and school surges.
  - Rear detachment prepares for the return of single Soldiers (privately-owned vehicles [POVs], reunion training, and housing).
  - Conduct battle-minded (post-traumatic stress disorder/traumatic brain injury [PTSD/TBI]) reintegration for spouses training.
  - Expand employment/education assistance for spouses.
  - Provide Operation Ready reunion/reintegration communication with spouses and communication with children training.
  - Develop, enhance, and sustain survivor services.

- Manning:
  - Generate dispositions for Soldiers 9–10 months in the future:
    - \* Determine which Soldiers stay with unit.
    - \* Decide who leaves for professional development reasons.
    - \* Provide personnel list to and from unit by Rtn–3 months.
  - Generate list of Soldiers by grade and skill needed to reshape unit for reconstitution.
- Equip and sustain:
  - Identify all automatic reset induction equipment for RESET turn in.
  - Identify all stay-behind equipment and begin property transfer actions during relief in place and transfer of authority.
  - Conduct 100 percent property accountability before packing military-owned demountable containers.
  - 100 percent battle loss turn-in completed.
  - Theater provided equipment turn-in/transfer completed.
  - Unit equipment plan built-in automated reset management tool (ARMT) complete 45 days prior to redeployment.
  - Nonstandard equipment is identified.
  - The integrated RESET priorities list (IRPL) of equipment is identified for shipment from Operation Iraqi Freedom to support Operation Enduring Freedom operations.
  - The automated RESET priorities list (ARPL) of equipment is identified for movement to the continental U.S.
  - Army preposition stock is identified.

**Note:** the Army resourcing prioritization board generates the IRPL and ARPL.

- Train:
  - All unit personnel complete post-deployment health assessment to screen for medical/psychological issues that medical personnel must address upon redeployment.
  - Rtn–365 days: Units submits institutional training support plan (ITSP).

- Rtn–270 days: Army training assistance team (ARTAT) conducts initial meeting with unit (video teleconference).
- Rtn–180 RESET planning begins.
- Rtn–180 days: ARTAT meets with deployed unit to discuss training windows, determine training requirements, synchronize mobile training teams (MTTs) and identify potential training conflicts.
- Institutional training requirements resourced, which includes advanced leader course and MTTs.
- Rtn–150 days: HRC begins placing soldiers on assignments.
- Rtn–90 days: Unit updates training requirements.
- Rtn–90 days: Unit commanders confirm availability of eligible Soldiers for schools and receive an ARTAT visit, if necessary.
- Rtn–90 days: ARTAT meets with rear detachment and/or redeployed advance party to expedite how training will be accomplished.
- Redeployment medical briefing completed.
- Unit updates ITSP; unit reserves resident seats and coordinates MTTs' support for primary mission equipment/functional courses.
- Unit develops RESET order.
- Unit develops training plans.
- Rear detachment identifies and requests training resources.

Phase II (RESET): This phase begins when the unit arrives at home station and begins with Soldier-family reintegration and unit reconstitution. The first 30 days are critical for family reintegration and should be the primary focus for all other actions. In this phase, the rear detachment will ultimately transition and fold back into the unit. The S3 and S4 will be the key players. Units will be examined and nominated for the RESET Support and Resourcing Conference (RSRC), depending on future missions, and may have already been picked up for the RSRC.

- Family:
  - Execute welcome home activities and ceremonies.
  - Execute permanent change of station/end term of service requirements and POV/personal property delivery and housing.
  - Conduct battle-minded reintegration for spouses training.

- Conduct marriage enrichment/strong bonds courses.
- Prepare for morale, welfare, and recreation surge (trips and concerts).
- Sustain family programs and services (ASFAP).
- Mitigate child/spouse drug or alcohol abuse.
- Conduct PTSD/TBI recognition training.
- Meet demand for child youth services and care.
- Offer accessible and quality health care.
- Provide stress reduction care and supportive environment for caregivers.
- Manning:
  - Post-deployment stabilization period (first 30 days).
  - Conduct personnel asset inventory; reverse Soldier readiness processing within 14-30 days.
  - Block leave.
  - Other required family support activities.
  - Conduct brigade/battalion changes of commands.
  - New lifecycle manning begins at approximately return+90 days.
  - Intense return+90 to return+150 movement of inbound and outbound unit personnel.
- Equip and sustain:
  - Split property books (forward with rear detachment; modification table of organization and equipment versus installation) are inventoried and combined or split as appropriate.
  - Equipment received from depot and/or railhead operations.
  - Preventive maintenance checks and services on equipment; parts and shortages ordered.
  - Unit inventories and inducts equipment into RESET in accordance with unit's ARMT plan.

- Train:
  - Soldiers attend scheduled institutional training.
  - Soldiers attend troop schools.
  - Unit finalizes home station MTT support.
  - Unit identifies mission and LAD; deployment mission essential task list approved by higher headquarters.
  - Unit conducts individual/crew/squad level training; no Department of the Army directed training.
  - Units conduct constructive/virtual simulation/simulator training.
  - Units schedule resources for Phase III training (new equipment training and combat training center).
  - Unit begins functional MTT training (e.g., sniper and improvised explosive device-disposal).

Phase III (Train/Ready): Success here relies mainly on the S3 staff performing its normal operational mission. A unit is tracked in each of the following areas:

- Family:
  - Sustain quality family programs and services.
  - Coordinate for family readiness support assistance.
  - Rebuild family readiness groups (FRGs).
  - Conduct FRG mission rehearsal exercise (MRE).
  - Conduct strong bonds training, rear detachment training, FRG training.
  - Refer families who experience redeployment challenges to appropriate agencies.
  - Emphasize spouse education and employment opportunities.
  - Plan departure ceremony.
  - Assess family readiness.

- Manning:
  - Ensure unit stays on glide path to reach MRE-45 and LAD-90 manning gates.
  - Continue execution of cross-leveling.
  - Properly code and assign non-deployable population.
- Equip and sustain:
  - Continue to fill shortages in equipment and supplies, cross-leveling as appropriate.
  - Conduct new equipment fielding and training as needed.
- Train:
  - Unit conducts training in preparation for deployment.
  - Unit trains on full spectrum operations (FSO)-mission essential task list (METL).
  - Unit executes remaining functional courses and troop schools.
  - Rtn+180 Training Support and Resourcing Conference.
  - MRE-45 final equipment delivery date.
  - Unit conducts crawl, walk, run, multi-echelon training culminating with an MRE to validate combat readiness/proficiency.
  - Unit conducts retraining for new Soldiers and late arrival Soldiers.
  - Units use virtual/constructive simulator/simulation after ready-to-load date.

### **Active and Reserve Components in the RESET Program**

The RESET program focuses on both active and reserve units. One of the key differences is the timeline for implementing Phase II and Phase III. Phase II for active units is 180 days; for reserve units it is 12 months. Phase III for reserve units is 24 months. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9, Reserve Component Overview.


## Chapter 2

### Army Enterprise Program

Over time the Army is gravitating towards an enterprise approach under institutional adaptation, a concept designed to restore balance, where demand has exceeded sustainable supply, between the operating force and the generating force. This approach will result in an Army culture of organizations, systems, and processes that will more effectively and efficiently generate trained, ready, and modernized forces to conduct full spectrum operations from the strategic to the tactical level while preserving an all-volunteer force in an era of persistent conflict. The Army enterprise approach is designed to promote senior leader advisory (up) and integration (horizontal) functions to provide battle-ready forces for combatant commanders. The Army enterprise program will be comprised of four separate functional areas known as the core enterprises (human capital, materiel, readiness, and services and infrastructure). Figure 2-1 refers to the early development of the Army enterprise philosophy, which continues to evolve under the Department of the Army Office of Business Transformation (DA-OBT).







**Legend**

POM: Program objective memorandum  
 ISO: In support of  
 OA: Operational Army

GF: Generating force  
 Synch: Synchronization  
 DOTML-PF: Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities

**Note:** Diagrams and pictures with the term “For Reference Only” are based on the most up to date information available and used at the request of FORSCOM to emphasize the potential for future changes, but are not “draft” products.

**Figure 2-2**

**Four Core Enterprises**

To advance the enterprise approach, the Army plans to organize four functionally oriented areas known as the “core enterprises.” Each core enterprise will be focused on a specific area, supporting the Army’s approach to human capital, materiel, readiness, and services and infrastructure. The enterprise concept will advance the synchronizing of core enterprise outputs to support the ARFORGEN process by convening, connecting, and collaborating personnel and resources. The goal is to provide a trained and ready force for combatant commanders, using ARFORGEN as both a rotational model and a process to produce progressively ready forces for cyclical deployment. The generating force will be functionally aligned along the four core enterprises, which will provide outputs to the ARFORGEN process in support of RESET operations.

Each core enterprise is represented by the Army headquarters as follows:

- Readiness: FORSCOM.
- Human Capital: Training and Doctrine Command.
- Materiel: Army Materiel Command.
- Services and Infrastructure: Installation Management Command (IMCOM).

The enterprise approach supports the institutionalization of the ARFORGEN process, aligning core enterprise outputs to specific outcomes and RESET operations. See Figure 2-3 for more details.




Figure 2-3

## Core Enterprise Support Cycle

The transformation process is designed to change from a sequential to cyclical force generation model, going from tiered to progressive readiness and from a strategic reserve to a fully integrated operational force for the reserve component. The end goal is to transform the structure and processes of the functional areas to optimized integrated support for an operating force that is progressively readying and cyclically deploying modular units from across the components (i.e., synchronizing core enterprise outputs with the ARFORGEN process and priorities). Refer to Figure 2-4 for more details.




Figure 2-4

## Army Force Generation Model

The demands of conducting continuous operations over the past eight years have changed how the Army plans and manages the commitment of forces. In recognition of the uneven but continuous global demand for capabilities, the Army decided to adapt its force generation construct to one optimized to deploying trained and ready forces on a rotational basis. In 2005, the chief of staff of the Army approved the ARFORGEN model for concept development. One year later, the Secretary of the Army approved the implementation of ARFORGEN.

ARFORGEN is the Army’s evolution from the Cold War practices, with divisions as the center of gravity, to formations that are built around modular brigades and task organized to meet warfighting requirements.

Operational requirements drive the ARFORGEN training and readiness process, which supports the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to generate capabilities on a sustained, cyclic basis.

The ARFORGEN implementation plan was published as Annex F to the ACP and, in 2006, distributed as Change 4.

ARFORGEN involves a structured progression that builds unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained and ready, cohesive modular units. The modular units are prepared to meet both combatant command and Army requirements. Department of the Army views ARFORGEN as a supply-based model that informs a corporate approach to programmatic and provides a methodology to communicate force generation requirements. Refer to Figure 2-5 for further details.




Figure 2-5

FORSCOM, the Army's manager for ARFORGEN, views ARFORGEN as a demand-based process to systematically build unit readiness on requirements identified by both combatant commanders and the Army. Neither the ARFORGEN model nor the process has remained static. Through the first four years of implementation, the Army has matured the model and refined the process.

### **Army Force Generation and Mission Support Elements**

Corps headquarters are divested of their traditional geographical footprints of non-collocated division headquarters and installations. However, corps commanders, as senior commanders (SCs), retain authority and responsibility for providing administrative control/Title 10 support to all FORSCOM forces resident on their installations, unless otherwise directed. This includes responsibility for full administrative control/Title 10 (to include training and readiness authority [TRA]) of the collocated division headquarters (1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina). The 1st Cavalry Division and 82nd Airborne Division commanders report to the corps commander, the SC for administrative control/Title 10. (This includes TRA, tasking authority, and ARFORGEN execution.) The two division headquarters, however, have coordinating authority with FORSCOM headquarters for ARFORGEN planning and sourcing of attached units and when designated as expeditionary force package commanders. Corps and division commanders, as SCs, are responsible for preparing assigned or attached units for deployment and for executing ARFORGEN tasks. Refer to Figure 2-4 for details.

Since 2008, the Army has established and resourced critical new structures in support of the SC's central role with regard to ARFORGEN on Army installations. This structure is called the mission support element (MSE). The Army currently has eleven MSEs actively supporting SCs on continental U.S. installations, including the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. The MSE is the SC's staff for coordination, synchronization, and execution of administrative control/Title 10 support to assigned, attached, and tenant FORSCOM units. This includes support to battalions, companies, and detachments on installations that are attached for TRA to commanders located on other installations.

Administrative control/Title 10 functions for FORSCOM units are enabled by an attached MSE. MSEs are assigned to FORSCOM and attached to the designated FORSCOM SC having administrative control/Title 10 responsibilities. MSEs provide direct support for FORSCOM units attached to the SC for a standard set of functions, but may vary in size based on the number of attached units under the administrative control/Title 10 responsibility of the SC. For those installations where FORSCOM is not the SC, FORSCOM may provide MSE augmentation to that SC's mission support temporary duty assignment. IMCOM garrison commands (assigned to IMCOM) continue to perform current functions and common levels of support and work for the garrison commander. The IMCOM garrison command and the FORSCOM MSE work in complement and do not duplicate functions. Administrative control/Title 10 support for units currently known as FORSCOM major subordinate commands (32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 20th Support Command, First Army, combat training centers, and Air Traffic Services Command) will be provided by FORSCOM. Refer to Figure 2-6 for details.




Figure 2-6

When an SC deploys with his headquarters, the SC will designate an acting SC. The acting SC will provide oversight in the SC’s absence for daily management functions and for executing administrative control/Title 10 support and garrison support functions via the IMCOM garrison command and the FORSCOM MSE.

**Mission Support Element Support Functions**

The MSE facilitates the SC’s execution of administrative control/Title 10 support to FORSCOM units and provides seamless and continuous support to units in the absence of the SC. That is to say the MSE provides specific RESET support functions to deployed units that are synchronized with garrison command functions and warrior transition unit functions.

The MSE has a standard set of functions, but the size of the MSE varies based upon the number of attached units under the administrative control/Title 10 responsibility of the SC. Refer to Figure 2-7 for additional information on MSE support functions.






Figure 2-8

RESET is a cyclical process that restores previously deployed units to levels of personnel and equipment readiness that permit resumption of training for future missions.

The demands of RESET require the Army to repair, replace, and recapitalize equipment. As the Army RESETs equipment and units, it must also synchronize the timing of RESET with new requirements as defined by ARFORGEN and updated Army regulations. We must return units to predeployment levels of equipment readiness, but we must also equip them at the standards required of the modular Army or otherwise properly posture them for return to combat.



## Synchronizing RESET within the Army Force Generation Process

The RESET program must be synchronized to the ARFORGEN model as it is the Army's force generation concept for designing and filling future force structures. The RESET timeline is based on the deployed unit's return date, computed as the point when 51 percent of the unit's Soldiers arrive from theater back to the U.S. The unit should begin RESET support and resource planning at return minus 180 days (Rtn-180).

FORSCOM has established the RESET support and resourcing conference (RSRC) as an evolving forum to synchronize manning, equipping, and training metrics to actual unit progression throughout the ARFORGEN process. This conference will monitor the execution of RESET and may expand its focus as required or as resources permit. An RSRC should be conducted as part of the support and resource planning process. After 51 percent of the unit's soldiers have redeployed, the RESET clock starts ticking and the unit is required to complete RESET by return plus 180 days (Rtn+180). The unit will transition to a train/ready status by Rtn+180, when all equipment fills are completed or planned, Soldiers and family are reintegrated, and unit training plans are complete. The unit in the RESET period will participate in the RSRC and, after the transition to train/ready, begin the follow-on training support and resourcing conference (TSRC) process (see Figure 2-9). Once RESET is complete, the unit begins the next stage of readiness by implementing the unit training plan in preparation for the next deployment, which begins at Rtn+181 and ends with either deployment or movement to the available pool.

The following timeline uses the unit status reporting format outlined in Army Regulation 220-1. C is overall readiness on a 5-point scale; C1 is the highest rating. P is personnel readiness on a 4-point scale; P1 is the highest rating. S is equipment on hand rated on a 4-point scale; S1 is the highest. T is training proficiency on a 4-point scale; T1 is the highest.

- Rtn-180: RESET planning begins.
- Rtn-date: RESET phase begins when 51 percent of personnel have redeployed to home station; the unit reports an overall readiness rating of C5.
- Rtn+180: RESET phase is complete.
- Rtn+181: Train/Ready phase continues through the projected availability date; unit ratings are P3, S3, R2 and T3.
- Available: Unit rating are P1, S1, R1, and T1; overall unit rating is C1




Figure 2-9

The reserve component is provided 365 days to complete RESET based on the limited number of operating days in the year. This will be covered in more detail in Chapter 9, which addresses the reserve component RESET process.

### A Ready Army for the Future

Given the magnitude of this undertaking, every Soldier and Army civilian has a role to play in transforming the institution for an uncertain future. The Army must balance today’s combatant commander requirements and the effects that persistent conflict are having on the long-term health of the all-volunteer Army with the imperative to achieve sustainable, predictable tempo, and increased dwell. Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Army have provided our SCs a level of funding for Soldier and family readiness programs that is unprecedented in the Army’s history.

Today the Army continues to improve ARFORGEN within the construct foreseen by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army for Army transformation and institutional adaptation. Improving ARFORGEN ultimately means closing the gaps between the generating force and the operating force by making routine those adapted institutional processes and procedures needed to progressively and cyclically deploy, train and ready forces for full-spectrum operations.

## Chapter 3

### Personnel

Personnel (S1) actions involving RESET operations should begin no later than 60 days before the unit executes redeployment operations. The two biggest tasks for the S1 to consider for redeployment are completing personnel actions before leaving theater and conducting personnel management/future projections for RESET. To effectively oversee personnel actions, planning tools are essential to monitor and track progress throughout RESET operations. The Army continues to provide manpower support of Solider and Army civilian service through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the collaboration of the human capital enterprise. The key to success is clear and concise communications with unit commanders and Human Resources Command (HRC).

#### Tasks before Leaving Theater

The S1 shop will be extremely busy during unit RESET: the workload doubles because of permanent change of station (PCS) and end term of service (ETS) actions such as leave and awards. The activity increase coupled with the fact the S1 shop itself will probably lose personnel means that the S1 must develop a detailed plan for redeployment. The plan needs to address two areas: actions as a result of theater and actions as a result of RESET. It is essential for unit commanders to cooperate with the plan and ensure these actions are completed. The more actions completed in theater, the smoother RESET will be for everyone.

Make every attempt to complete the following actions before leaving theater:

- Combat awards.
- Promotable Soldiers annotated correctly (unit enlisted distribution assignment system Form C10 reviewed with the division promotions section).
- Emergency leave.
- Wounded in action/killed in action reports and other required paperwork.
- Updated flags and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) posted.
- Officer evaluation reports/noncommissioned officer evaluation reports.

Taking the following actions before leaving theater will also help to enable a smoother unit RESET:

- Create a personnel movement matrix by person, military occupational specialty, unit, and month prior to redeployment. Personnel availability is critical to the entire RESET process, especially for slating supply and senior leadership.
- Complete as many of the reverse Soldier readiness processing tasks as possible in theater (e.g., update DD 93, Service Members' Group Life Insurance Election and Certificate; address and fix finance issues; resolve promotion issues).
- Complete block leave forms in theater and hand off to rear detachment for execution upon redeployment.
- Ensure Soldiers update assignment preferences in Army Knowledge Online.
- Complete PCS and ETS awards (if applicable) and submit for approval. If this action cannot be finished in theater, bring back awards by hand or in to-accompany-troops boxes.
- Soldiers requiring professional development courses have been identified and loaded into the Army Training Requirements and Resources System.

### **Future Personnel Projections**

RESET of the brigade combat team (BCT) requires the right personnel are on hand no later than a specified time in the RESET. With the volume of turn-ins, inventories, and receipts of new equipment, supply personnel (including the commanding officer, supply sergeant/clerk, battalion S4 [logistics], S4 noncommissioned officer in charge, brigade property book officer, supply support activity warrant officer and supply support activity clerks) are essential to conducting RESET of the BCT's equipment. Personnel action Soldiers are also essential. Increased volume in awards, UCMJ actions, and in-processing and out-processing actions can quickly overwhelm an S1 section that is already short on personnel.

Lessons learned show that because of the number of waivers to 90-day stabilization, gaps form in critical personnel manning. Commanders must consider second-order effects before granting waivers and limit them as much as possible.

The S1 must ensure that HRC is aware of any waivers granted. HRC cannot plan and project for situations unless it is informed. Once the unit creates a personnel matrix, HRC should receive a copy of it for future personnel projections. Limit changes to prevent confusion later. If the S1 shop makes changes it should make them in batches. All staff sections in the Army are short of personnel, and sending HRC single changes every day will only makes matters worse.

## **Other Considerations**

Another consideration for the S1 is rebuilding the administrative systems that existed before deployment. Most garrisons will typically provide a staff assistance visit conducted by the inspector general (IG) office at some point during the RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists provided by the garrison IG office as guidelines to reestablishing systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the S1 will want to consider include:

- Duty rosters.
- Electronic military police office.
- Enlisted personnel utilization.
- Enlisted promotions.
- Family care plans.
- Evaluation report processing.
- Personnel asset inventory.
- Mailroom.
- Soldier readiness packets.
- Records management.
- Publications program.
- Informal funds.
- Legal program.
- Awards and decorations.
- Sponsorship program.
- Leave and pay program.
- Officer management.

In addition, the S1 should review and consolidate the unit commander's finance report in order to ensure Soldiers' deployment entitlements have stopped or have been changed correctly.

## **Warrior Care and Transition Program (Wounded Warrior)**

The Warrior Transition Command (WTC) provides strategic direction and develops, integrates, synchronizes, and assesses plans, policy, capabilities, and resources for warrior care initiatives and programs dedicated to the support,

care, and healing of wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers, their families and their caregivers with the goal of developing a balanced warrior transition unit structure and capability that is enduring, affordable, expandable, collapsible and responsive to the Army and the needs of the Warriors in Transition.

WTC is a one-star command implemented 1 April 2009 under U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) with a planned fully operational capability date of 1 October 2009. It serves as the organizational focal point for the Army's warrior care and transition program (WCTP). The WTC will have the following core competencies:

- Act as WCTP proponent.
- Execute and oversee the warrior care and Army wounded warrior programs for the MEDCOM commander.
- Coordinate and collaborate with MEDCOM, Department of the Army staff, other services, other departments and Congress.
- Prescribe standardization and evaluation.
- Coordinate and collaborate the movement of warriors in transition.
- Oversee, monitor and advise on reserve component issues.

The WTC consolidates three existing offices/agencies involved in Army warrior care: the warrior transition office (WTO), previously under MEDCOM; the Army wounded warrior program, previously under HRC; and the warrior care and transition office, previously under the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The WCTP represents a cultural and organizational shift in how the Army manages outpatient care and transition services for wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers. The WTC synchronizes and synergizes the WCTP and the many programs and initiatives that benefit wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers and their families. It helps sustain an integrated, comprehensive continuum of care and services that is consistent Army wide. The combining of these organizations will have a dynamic impact on the future success of the Army's warriors in transition, either back to the force or to the civilian community.

## Chapter 4

### Intelligence

During deployment, units operate in a more secure environment and do not perform certain administrative security tasks. Classified material is normally under direct guard rather than in a safe. Classified material is normally burned instead of shredded and, typically, hand-carried or transmitted over widely available secure communications.

Additionally, units modify personnel security requirements for the deployment (interim clearances) and grant continued access to Soldiers whose security clearances have expired while deployed. With the return to garrison, units must ensure personnel store all classified material in General Services Administration-approved security containers. In addition, units must update personnel security clearance actions and continue or reimplement security-oriented training.

During unit RESET, the intelligence officer and staff (S2) typically focus on reestablishing physical security measures and operations security (OPSEC), security issues of military-owned demountable containers (MILVANs) as they are opened, and training and security clearance investigation tracking and verifications. In order to conduct proper planning in advance of RESET operations, coordination between the brigade S2, each battalion S2, the brigade S6 (communications and signal), signal company, and military intelligence company needs to occur approximately 180 days prior to redeployment.

### Physical Security

Upon return, the rear detachment staff should have established all of the unit arms rooms as well as key and lock control. Well in advance of the unit's return, remind the rear detachment commander to ensure that the detachment completes this task and that the garrison directorate of security (DSEC) verifies its completion. Often in the rush to leave garrison and deploy, company commanders will lose or forget to give to the rear detachment the combinations to the arms rooms and safes. It is very expensive to have these items accessed and reset. Take a copy of the combinations forward with you as a backup. The garrison DSEC should maintain a copy of the combinations, but that does not always happen.

Ensure all key control paperwork is concise and complete during predeployment to avoid reports of survey for doors that must be rekeyed later. Weak key control procedures at the unit level will become immediately evident as barracks close out and are delayed because of paperwork and reports of surveys for lost keys and other issues. Delaying this process until the unit returns only compounds the problem.

Coordinate with garrison DSEC to confirm that all unit access rosters accurately reflect assigned personnel and the clearance status of each person. Work with the rear detachment in advance to save time on this task.

## Operations Security and Information Security

While deployed, it is very important that the S2 works closely with subordinate units to ensure that all classified material for redeployment is consolidated in the S2 shop and that the appropriate courier orders are created. Do not allow any classified material to be transported upon redeployment by those without courier orders—no exceptions, not even for the commander. As precautionary measures, ensure, at minimum, completion of the following:

- Identify—at least 90 days from redeployment—who, how, and by what method classified material will return to garrison.
- Conduct appropriate briefings on the importance of OPSEC and redeployment for every unit in your command.
- Conduct spot checks with customs inspectors (or other designated personnel) when MILVANS are inspected, loaded, and sealed.
- Ensure or establish procedures to ensure all communications security devices (automated net control devices, radios, and Force XXI battle command—brigade and below) are zeroed out.
- Conduct spot checks of all facilities and offices used by the unit to ensure personnel have not thrown any classified material in trash cans, left it in desks, or tossed it into dumpsters. This check includes not only classified material but also any media (e.g., maps, papers, briefings, flash drives, and compact discs) that may be useful to the enemy. When in doubt, destroy media appropriately (shredders or burn barrels). Turn equipment in to the S4 shop.
- Conduct spot checks, in coordination with commanders and first sergeants (1SGs), of Soldiers' personal media devices (e.g., laptops and cameras) to ensure no one is accidentally or intentionally returning with classified or inappropriate material.
- Review all classified material and ensure personnel destroy out-of-date and excess material before redeployment.
- Re-examine, if time permits, unit garrison standing operating procedures (SOPs) in regards to security measures and procedures. Often there is not enough time during RESET to conduct a detailed analysis of the SOPs.

Most of the above checks and procedures fall squarely on the shoulders of the commanders and 1SGs. However, as a staff member, the commander expects you to support and coordinate appropriately with the commander to assist the redeployment effort.

Upon redeployment and during unit RESET, the work with OPSEC continues. Even though you inspected the MILVANS during load out, if your unit had subunits cross-attached to other commands and you did not personally inspect the MILVANS, you should be present during unloading. Garrison security measures are stricter than when deployed, so prepare now for compliance.



## **Training**

Undoubtedly, the S2 shop received new equipment training (NET) either immediately before or during deployment. However, units typically do not tell the NET team or the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) anything about the equipment. Document, through an after-action review, the lessons learned on this equipment and forward the lessons to the NET team and/or to CALL. Your input is valuable for fixing issues and preparing the next S2 shop for deployment.

Upon redeployment, you should update and retrain those perishable military intelligence skills and additional identifying skills. A variety of mobile training teams from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center are available to assist units. Work with the S3 during deployment at the unit RESET coordination meetings to provide input to the unit RESET training plan on possible required training. Depending upon the makeup of the unit, the training may include classes on the following:

- Language training.
- BCT S2 course.
- Tactical S2 course.
- Tactical site exploitation/sensitive site exploitation training.
- Biometrics training.

The other portion of training is reimplementing the unit security education programs. This includes the S2 as well as the Soldiers and leaders of the unit. If the S2 or other designated unit security manager has not attended the post security managers course, they should do so immediately. The S2 should work with the S3 to ensure that annual security education requirements are included in the unit's long range training plan. Suggested training includes but is not limited to the following:

- Information security (INFOSEC).
- OPSEC.
- Handling classified material.
- Subversion and espionage directed against the Army.

## **Security Clearance Investigations**

Before, during, and after deployment, security clearances are always major tasks and reportable items. However, during deployment, Soldiers and leaders often do not have time to complete the paperwork in a timely manner for reinvestigations. Now is the time to catch up before the major training events start later in unit RESET.

Review all personnel-granted interim clearances for the deployment and work with commanders to determine if that requirement will be retained upon redeployment. Work with the S1 to project any personnel security issues that may arise due to permanent change of station (PCS) and end term of service (ETS) requirements.

At this time, also work closely with the S3 and the new equipment fielding teams to determine if a new piece of equipment will require Soldiers and users to have a security clearance. Expect a possible surge of requests for interim clearances in order to meet requirements during unit RESET.

Another requirement is to report any unfavorable information disseminated about the unit during deployment or redeployment. Do not fall behind in your reporting procedures to the installation security division.

In some cases, the S2 shop may have to debrief personnel who were indoctrinated to sensitive compartmented information solely for the deployment and whose duties will no longer require this access. Coordinate for this briefing with your rear detachment before redeployment to ensure this requirement is completed immediately upon the unit's return.

### **Other Considerations**

Additional considerations for the S2 include rebuilding the administrative systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison inspector general (IG) offices will provide a staff assistance visit at some point during RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines for re-establishing these systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the S2 should consider include:

- Physical security of arms rooms and administration areas.
- Physical security of the motor pool.
- Intelligence oversight.
- Personnel security.
- Antiterrorism program.
- INFOSEC.
- Security education.
- OPSEC.

Review who has courier orders and determine if those individuals still need the cards/orders. Cancel all orders that are no longer required. In addition, project out based on the availability of personnel due to PCS and ETS.

## Chapter 5

### Training and Planning

For the training and planning officer (S3), redeployment is another mission in a long line of successful missions that started 18 months ago at a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). As part of the mission analysis and execution, the S3 will work in conjunction with the S4 (logistics) to coordinate the bulk of tasks for unit RESET. Two primary tasks are leaving theater quickly and efficiently and rebuilding combat power at home station. The Army continues to support the manning, training, and equipping of operational units through U.S. Forces Command's (FORSCOM's) management of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and the collaboration through the readiness core enterprise.

#### Tasks in Theater

There is no way to address what every S3 encounters in combat, certainly not in regard to balancing combat operations with planning to go home. Lessons learned show that successful unit RESETs begin by getting ahead of the curve in theater. Following are tasks to complete while in theater:

- Complete individual training requirements (e.g., Army physical fitness tests, weapon qualifications, and Army Regulation 350-1 mandated training).
- Conduct periodic RESET planning meetings, not only with the unit rear detachment but also with garrison organizations and other RESET agencies (Army Materiel Command).
- Ensure as many Soldiers as possible receive medical/dental checkups before leaving theater. At a minimum, each Soldier must have a post-deployment health assessment completed within 5 to 30 days before leaving theater. There will also be other required medical briefings before leaving theater as directed by your higher headquarters. Army National Guard and U. S. Army Reserve Soldiers will complete Department of Defense Form 2796 within five days prior to demobilization.
- Conduct company changes of command with enough time for all property book transactions to post before load out, if possible.
- If possible, schedule a visit by the Army training assistance team (ARTAT) at return minus 90 (Rtn-90) to assist in planning for critical functional schools and mobile training teams (MTTs).
- Ensure the master gunner maintains all bore sight and pull-over gauge readings. These records may become critical later for equipment turn-in.

- Develop a plan with the S2 (intelligence) to properly eliminate all unnecessary classified material (burn or shred materials). Carry as little as possible back to home station.
- Update or create (if not already done so) the institutional training support plan (ITSP) while in theater. See the following section for further details on the ITSP.

Ensure rear detachment coordinates the following items with the garrison:

- Motorcycle defensive drivers' training (ability to surge if Soldiers are to train prior to block leave or soon after leave).
- Required post deployment activities, not just reverse Soldier readiness processing.
- Ranges/land requests and initial ammunition management for post-deployment individual and unit training.
- Railhead operations. Rear detachment personnel may be required to execute this mission for the unit during block leave and work with the garrison to ensure that fuel is on hand to fuel vehicles coming off rail and that maintenance support and qualified drivers are available.

When developing the post-deployment training plan, consider the following factors during mission analysis:

- Do not pile on training events; spread them out and consolidate into other nontraining events when appropriate.
- Perhaps the biggest issue is scheduling new equipment training (NET) versus balancing available or appropriate personnel at other training. Keep the NET spread out, and do not permit changes (if possible) once the unit enters collective training requirements. Coordinate the scheduling with the S1 to ensure new arrivals of the appropriate military occupational specialty (MOS) are available for the training.
- Work to get MTTs for the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Education System and other traditional temporary duty courses at home station. This offers greater Soldier and family stability and results in less time lost for travel.
- A railhead operation will occur either right at the end of block leave or shortly thereafter. Ensure the proper personnel are available and have the correct training to execute. Direct commanders and subordinate units to pack military-owned demountable containers (MILVANS) accordingly to support these operations.
- Schedule time for unit leaders to visit wounded Soldiers at treatment facilities.

## **Kuwait**

While wrapping up combat operations and preparing for the relief in place/transfer of authority with the incoming unit, take time to work with the S4 to conduct a reconnaissance of required tasks in Kuwait. A team from the Army Field Support Brigade will visit the brigade combat team (BCT) around the 90-day mark before redeployment to lay out the required tasks and instructions for operations in Kuwait. These tasks will include but are not limited to:

- Retrograde operations.
- Wash rack operations.
- Automated RESET items turn-in.
- Port operations.

As before, the keys are early coordination and mission analysis of expected requirements. Verify that units take out all equipment as indicated by the instructions. Safety basic initial issue needs to remain with the vehicles. If equipment that is not authorized or may be pilfered is accidentally left in the vehicles, there will be no way for the unit to secure it once in Kuwait. All the MILVANS are sealed and shipped at this point. Verify everything before movement begins to Kuwait. While the main body movement of personnel is in Kuwait, finalize any mandated after-action reviews (AARs) to be sent to higher headquarters or to the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

## **Home Station and Building Combat Power**

Often in today's operating tempo, units will know their next deployment before they leave theater from the current deployment. Among the wide variety of goals and tasks the S3 must take into consideration, balancing family time with unit training activities may be the most important.

Using the plan developed in theater, make every attempt to stick to the schedule during return plus 180 (Rtn+180). The unit will, unfortunately, have to deal with changes from garrison, supporting agencies, and unscheduled NET. The primary training objectives during this time of RESET are executing institutional training (professional military education and functional courses), refining the training plans, building the leader teams consisting of the next deploying Soldiers, and setting the conditions to begin intensive individual and collective training at Rtn+180 days and beyond.

At this time, complete any coordination for any final MTTs and NETs to prepare for Rtn+180 collective training. The plan will require the S3 and command group to look at the future deployment and determine the deployed mission essential task list. The foundation of the plan resides in this document.

At first, the training plan includes section/team/squad/platoon training focused on theater/area of responsibility (AOR)-specific and required training. Use the crawl-walk-run philosophy to build the plan. Of course, gunnery exercises will culminate before the MRE. Consider these other training classes in your plan:

- Physical training and warrior fitness.
- Army Regulation 350-1 training.
- Counterinsurgency and counter-improvised explosive device seminars focusing on the AOR mission (if known).
- Driver's training.
- Sergeant's time training.
- Table of contents/battle staff training.
- Training for late arrival to units (institutional and functional).
- Combat lifesaver training.
- MOS-specific refresher training (e.g., S2 and a refresher All Source Analysis System class).
- Low-density MOS training.
- Family readiness training (not the rear detachment; family-oriented).
- Additional duty training (command finance NCO and range NCO).

### **Cultural and Language Training**

A consistent trend in unit AARs is inadequate cultural and language training. Make every attempt to ensure all training is appropriately geared towards the AOR mission and not just another theater-specific individual readiness task to be completed.

Cultural versus military cultural training is often overlooked. Sometimes different norms or standards exist within a country's military personal and social hierarchy as opposed to the civilian version and customs. These differences are critical to any unit with a foreign security force advisor mission. A variety of foreign officers attend U.S. Army professional schools, and they may be available to give briefings on their military customs and courtesies. Contact the Combined Arms Center for assistance.

Lessons learned have shown us that most units are still having personnel issues at Rtn+180. Generally, these issues involve obtaining the right mix of personnel (skill level versus quantity versus position filled). The second big issue is the availability of equipment.

## **Institutional Training Support Plan**

The key to a successful institutional training program for units in RESET is the development of a comprehensive and updated individual training support plan (ITSP) before and during deployment.

The ITSP represents unit institutional training seat requirements for courses during the RESET phase of the ARFORGEN process. The ITSP helps the Army resource and allocate training seat quotas to prepare for a future deployment. The plan is a compilation of professional military education, functional courses, and theater-specific training requirements identified by a unit, validated by the chain of command, and prioritized by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). An ITSP also identifies opportunities to use MTTs to conduct required training.

BCTs and other equivalent brigade-size units develop the ITSP. Divisions, corps, and Army service component commands (ASCCs); Army Command; and direct reporting units (DRU) of the active and reserve components have responsibilities in developing, refining, and validating subordinate unit ITSPs.

### **Developing and executing the ITSP**

Developing the ITSP begins prior to a unit's deployment into theater, which includes ARTAT coordination and submittal of ITSP at Rtn-360.

- Unit training managers or schools' NCOs begin planning for the next RESET/train phase before entering the available force pool (latest arrival date/deployment date). They build an ITSP template to support the next RESET based on historical data, the modification table of organization and equipment, lessons learned, and command guidance. At this point, the requirements are only estimates or placeholders that will be refined over time.
- Rtn-270: ARTAT conducts its initial meeting with the unit. This meeting can be accomplished through a video teleconference (VTC). ARTAT, with representatives from Human Resources Command (HRC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), are available to assist the unit in developing institutional training requirements.
- Rtn-180: Approximately 180 days prior to the unit's return from deployment or exit from the available force pool, the unit should update and further refine, if possible, its institutional training requirements. ARTAT (HRC- and TRADOC-specific) will begin to determine the availability of resident course seats and/or MTT support based on a validated ITSP by the ASCC, DRU, or Army Command. ARTATs, with representatives from the HRC and TRADOC, are available to assist the unit in developing institutional training requirements. This first refinement of the ITSP, along with those of other units across the Army, allows HRC and TRADOC to determine future training loads in the Army school system.

- Rtn-90: Approximately 90 days before the unit's return from deployment or exit from the available force pool, the unit should update training requirements again. This update takes into consideration the units refined plan based on data provided by G1 (personnel)/HRC and identifies which Soldiers will be staying with the unit for a consecutive operational cycle and which Soldiers will be leaving either by end term of service or permanent change of station to other assignments. ARTAT meets with the unit rear detachment or redeployed advance party to expedite how the unit will accomplish training (priority resident seats or by MTT).
- Rtn day: During the first several days of reintegration, the rear detachment training manager or school's NCO should perform a final check of Soldiers training requirements and, if necessary, prepare travel orders.
- Rtn+45: Following the reintegration period, Soldiers within the unit begin to attend courses and execute the ITSP. Course attendance completion can occur either through resident training, MTT instruction at home station, or distributed learning methods such as video teletraining or computer-based training. Commanders may make minor adjustments to the ITSP depending on the availability of Soldiers and the evolving situation regarding the unit's mission.
- Rtn+180: The majority of institutional training requirements should be completed before the unit begins its collective training program. However, commanders may make minor adjustments to the ITSP depending on the availability of Soldiers and the evolving situation regarding the unit's mission.

### **ITSP assistance**

ITSP assistance, requested through the TRADOC G3 (operations), is available through the ARFORGEN ARTAT. The mission of the ARTAT is to facilitate identifying, scheduling, and delivering a package of institutional training requirements tailored to the BCT/brigade and covering professional military training, functional courses, and theater-specific training requirements.

Ideally, the ARTAT includes representatives from TRADOC (lead), HQDA G1, HRC, FORSCOM G3, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and Installation Management Command. Mission requirements may force a tailoring of the team composition.

ARTAT is responsible for providing, at minimum, three assistance visits. During the assistance visits, ARTAT will provide ITSP assistance as follows:

- Rtn-270: Initial meeting with unit.
- Rtn-180: Meets with deployed unit to suggest training windows, determine training requirements, synchronize MTTs, and identify potential training conflicts.
- Rtn-90: Meets with the unit rear detachment or redeployed advance party to expedite how training will be accomplished (priority resident seats or MTT).



Additionally, ARTAT conducts a monthly VTC to further refine and synchronize short-term (8 to 12 week) training requirements. The focus for the VTC is to review functional training and professional military training that MTTs cannot support and to address training requirements of units that will reach Rtn-90 before the next monthly VTC.

Refer to Figure 5-1 for a general timeline of events.




Figure 5-1

**ITSP accountability**

The goal of a successful ITSP execution is for a unit to fill at least 90 percent of its institutional training seat quotas throughout the RESET/train and ready phases.

During the monthly VTC, units are evaluated by filled seat quotas versus planned seat quotas from the ITSP. To determine the status of the unit's ability to execute the ITSP, it is graded as follows: green (more than 90 percent of seat quotas filled), amber (60 to 90 percent of seat quotas filled), or red (less than 60 percent of seat quotas filled).

### **Other Considerations**

Another consideration for the S3 is rebuilding the administrative systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison inspector general (IG) offices will provide a staff assistance visit at some point during the RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines to re-establish these systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the S3 should consider are:

- Armament and weapon systems.
- Fire safety.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive training and maintenance.
- Training management.
- Training records.
- Driver's training program.
- Unit status report.

## Chapter 6

### Sustainment

The RESET process for the sustainment officer (S4) begins before predeployment at the mission readiness exercise. Tracking sustainment tasks and efforts in support of RESET operations require close coordination with the operations (S3) and executive officer (XO), while working closely with the Army Materiel Command (AMC). The Army continues to support the equipping and sustaining of operational units through the AMC and the collaboration of the materiel enterprise.

The two biggest considerations for the S4 are communications and property books. At times, last-minute tasks appear. The S4 can plan ahead and conduct pre turn-in checks of paperwork and equipment to ensure they are prepared for required tasks.

Most unit after-action reviews reported that inaccurate property books and related paperwork transactions caused numerous issues with unit RESET. Financial liability investigation of property loss (FLIPL) forms were not completed before leaving theater because of combat losses or in-theater changes of commands, because commanders did not scrub property books with the property book officer (PBO) to verify posted transactions, and because of poor command supply discipline.

While the tasks listed below are not all inclusive, they are tasks noted by other S4s as critical in theater and in garrison. While some tasks will be directed by higher headquarters, the key is how well all tasks are planned, communicated, and executed.

#### Tasks in Theater

While still in theater, a representative or team from the Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB), in coordination with the team chief of the brigade logistical support team (BLST), will contact the brigade combat team (BCT) commander and staff on required tasks and procedures to clear theater. Here are the key areas:

- **The plan.** Conduct an early coordination meeting with the AFSB, BLST, and AMC to develop the unit RESET plan. Once the unit identifies the plan by pieces of equipment (with components of end items) and instructions, it should enter the plan into the Army RESET management tool (ARMT) for tracking purposes. Units often complain of short- or no-notice suspense to turn in equipment in theater and especially in garrison. The brigade XO and S4 must be the only people allowed to change the plan both in theater and in garrison. Publish a fragmentary order to the plan immediately before block leave for situational awareness and, if required, last minute updates. There should be no reason a unit, already short on patience after 12–15 months of combat, should make

last-minute coordination for tasks someone else should have planned. The issue normally arises during garrison activities and requires commander influence with garrison and other agencies to protect the plan and keep RESET tasks on an efficient and manageable path.

- **100 percent equipment inspection.** Ensure commanders conduct a 100 percent technical inspection of all equipment identified for turn-in while in theater. While the 100 percent inspection is not required, doing the work in theater will save time and effort later. Ensure the technical inspection roll-up of needed replacement parts, especially regarding small arms and the small arms repair team, are submitted to the AFSB as well as the rear detachment for report to the garrison directorate of logistics (DOL). The DOL can then have enough parts on hand during equipment turn-in.
- **Changes of command.** Ultimately it is the BCT commander's call whether to conduct company changes of command in theater or later. Pros and cons exist for either course of action. If the changes of command are in theater, they are early enough for all property book paperwork transactions to be processed well before military-owned demountable container (MILVAN) load-out operations. This is critical if the commander has weak property accountability procedures that may take extra time to sort out. Waiting until RESET in garrison will only make a poor situation worse as more property book transactions are required.
- **Battle damage or loss.** The unit may not be able to avoid the resulting FLIPLs for battle damage and loss right before or during relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). However, the unit must attempt to complete them in a timely and efficient manner. Ensure that all FLIPLs in theater include the components of end item.
- **Coordination with AFSB or BLSTs.** The team members from the AFSB and BLSTs have assisted numerous BCTs in redeployment out of theater and have well-documented procedures. Following their guidelines is critical. Many reports have come in that the ARMT is not useful and that it is broken. Further research shows that most units had faulty property book records. No system is perfect; however, garbage in results in garbage out.
- **100 percent inventories.** Theater-provided equipment versus stay-behind equipment versus modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) versus installation—where does it all go, what stays, and what goes home? Plan early and stick to it.
- **Automatic return item (ARI) turn-in.** The AFSB or AMC representative will provide the final list of equipment on the ARI. Ensure all equipment on the list is turned in to standard. Ensure the commander reviews the list

with the S3 to determine whether the unit needs items on the list sooner than normal during unit RESET. Work with the AFSB if the commander wishes to make exceptions to certain items.

- **Kuwait.** Conduct a reconnaissance of the wash racks and turn-in sites as well as other facilities in Kuwait no later than 60 days before RIP/TOA. This reconnaissance will allow the S1 to better plan main body flight versus skill sets required for Kuwait operations.
- **Paperwork.** Ensure commanders and the PBO keep scanned copies of all property book transaction paperwork/hand receipts. This procedure may seem an enormous and tedious task, but the ability to open a compact disc and print a copy of a transaction later in garrison will save a lot of time and effort on FLIPLs and research of transactions.

### Tasks in Garrison

The key tasks in garrison include the following:

- **Changes of command.** If company changes of command did not occur in theater, a surge will occur during unit RESET. Make every attempt to freeze property books for the commanders, including new equipment fielding or turn-ins.
- **Equipment turn-in and issue.** Validate all supply paperwork the day before turn-in. This procedure will save time at a turn-in point. Delays will clog the entire system for everyone. Conduct update meetings and coordinations, daily if necessary, to cover the 5Ws (who, what, when, where, why). All players should be present down to company supply sergeants, and the meeting should address personnel, equipment, and standard paperwork; location/time; and transportation. For turn-ins, both the supply person and the subject matter expert who uses the equipment should be present.
- **New equipment fielding.** The S4 must also work closely with the S3 in order to track new equipment training (NET) and fielding. Often the NET will conflict with the turn-ins, the availability of qualified supply personnel (because of training at NET and permanent change of station [PCS]), and the availability of haul assets. Other issues with NET include clear and concise instructions and component lists. New equipment often does not include technical manuals that list and illustrate the components. Work to ensure the NET provides written component documentation to the

unit and PBO and then save a copy; it will come in handy later. Whenever possible, coordinate to have a representative of the S4 shop or PBO at the issue site in order to prevent confusion and aid in better situational awareness.

- **Left behind equipment (LBE).** LBE is equipment left at home station. Some garrisons and PBOs have consolidated the equipment and redistributed it based on other units' needs. Others have left the equipment to the unit rear detachments. Well before redeployment, ensure the rear detachment is tracking which equipment is returning to the unit and what state it is in (e.g., components of end items and maintenance status). Have an equipment storage/distribution plan. In theory, if the rear detachment signed for all the equipment from deploying units, then 100 percent accountability has occurred. Often, this is not the case and rear detachments have to break open sealed containers to search for missing property.
- **Stay behind equipment (SBE).** Your unit may be provided a list of equipment which will remain in theater to support ongoing operations, known as the SBE list. The SBE list is generated by AMC and will be transferred off your unit property book before redeployment. As the S4, you will need to track and verify that all SBE has been transferred in accordance with Army regulations.
- **Integrated RESET priorities list (IRPL).** The IRPL is a list of all equipment that will remain as SBE to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The IRPL list is generated by AMC and will be transferred off your unit property book before redeployment. As the S4, you will need to track and verify that all IRPL equipment has been transferred in accordance with Army regulations.
- **Automated RESET priorities list (ARPL).** The ARPL is a list of all equipment that will be returning with the unit to the U.S. As the S4, you will need to track and verify that all ARPL equipment has been located and properly packed for movement.
- **Army Prepositioned Stock (APS).** Your unit may receive an APL list from AMC requiring certain equipment be transferred to the APL program. The APL program is materiel amassed to meet military requirements at the outbreak of war. APS remains set at the minimum level of stocks to sustain and equip the approved forces as outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance.
- **Haul assets.** During RESET, haul assets will become critical. In normal circumstances, vehicles and materials handling equipment will arrive one or two months after the unit returns to home station. However, this

may not occur. Coordinate with rear detachment to ensure that required vehicles and equipment are on hand. If there is a large number of units deployed from a garrison, there will be equipment shortages, so give the rear detachment plenty of time to resource the unit's needs.

- **MILVANS.** During RESET, MILVANS will become problematic if not closely tracked. Work with rear detachment to ensure there is a plan to position MILVANS only once during RESET. The location should be large enough for vehicles to pull up to for unloading, should be central to equipment storage areas, and should allow empty containers to be easily removed by DOL. Once a MILVAN is empty, put a padlock on it. Empty and unsecured MILVANS can quickly becoming dumping grounds for unwanted problems. Turn in MILVANS to DOL as soon as possible.
- **Automation (supply and installation/directorate of information management).** Sometimes units will take automation (laptops and printers) from their installation property books forward to theater. The unit adds this equipment to the MTOE property book before deployment. It should be a simple task to laterally transfer the property back to installation. Sometimes, however, units forget to bring back broken automation or witness statements for destroyed automation. Remind commanders of this upcoming task.
- **Combining split property books.** Combining split property books should be a relatively easy process. Ensure all property book transactions are posted beforehand and that units conduct 100 percent inventories.
- **Supply personnel issues.** Supply personnel issues will probably be some of the hardest to address. You want to take care of your personnel, but the mission, from deployment, has not stopped. The unit will have to constantly balance PCS/end term of service/temporary duty actions against available supply personnel versus supply actions for RESET. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution other than to plan the equipment part of RESET.
- **Consolidated issue facility (CIF) hand receipts.** One overlooked area of RESET involves garrison CIF. Sometimes a unit supply will draw extra equipment from CIF to fill shortages in "just in case" situations for its Soldiers. This extra equipment is often forgotten because the PBO is not tracking hand receipts. Usually the new company commander of a unit discovers a problem when he finds out his Soldiers' CIF records are frozen because of outstanding CIF hand receipts or reports of survey. Other reports of survey that may be at CIF are those concerning wounded or dead Soldiers or deserters. Work with CIF before deployment to close out all reports of survey and ensure the rear detachment coordinates with CIF before the unit returns for situational awareness of all outstanding CIF actions.

Figure 6-1 shows further details of garrison- and theater-specific tasks.




Figure 6-1



## Other Considerations

Other considerations for the S4 include rebuilding administrative systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison inspector general (IG) offices will provide a staff assistance visit at some point during the RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines to re-establish these systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the S4 should consider are:

- Government travel card.
- Government purchase card.
- Historical property file.
- Feeding equipment maintenance.
- Unit Level Logistics System–Ground and Standard Army Maintenance Systems–Enhanced.
- Financial management procedures.
- Arms room small arms maintenance.
- Ammunition storage.
- Ammunition management.
- Installation consolidated property book.
- Supply management.
- Meal cards.
- Self-help maintenance program.
- Energy awareness–conservation program.
- Unit movement plan.

## Battalion Maintenance Officer

The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is primarily concerned with following four main things. Where is my motor pool? How many mechanics do I have left? When is the equipment going to arrive? What do you want me to do with it?

During RESET, the BMO should keep the following issues in mind:

- **The motor pool.** More often than not, units do not return to the same motor pool they left. Garrisons have started but not completed upgrades to facilities or other units have moved into the motor pools. Your rear

detachment commander will be able to provide updates as you get closer to redeployment so that you can plan how you want to re-establish your motor pool operations.

- **The maintenance personnel.** Plan on end term of service and PCS actions taking away a portion of the available work force you will need to re-establish your motor pool and administrative systems. Fortunately, most garrisons are now providing contract maintenance support personnel to assist units with turn-in inspections, to maintain equipment left with rear detachment, and to address overall maintenance issues as they arise. Often these personnel are already established when units return.
- **The equipment.** When the equipment arrives—and the dates will vary depending upon a wide variety of issues including port operations, weather, and available haul assets—the first order of business will be two operations: (1) a railhead operation (to get the unit's vehicles), and (2) an operation where MILVANs will be positioned (to get to your tools). There is not a lot you can do about the railhead operation; just be prepared to surge at times to fix vehicles that will not start on the rail cars or for other issues. Ensure the rear-detachment commander is tracking this issue and informs the garrison of required maintenance support. You can plan for retrieving your tools when you load the MILVAN in theater. Pack your MILVANs so required tools and required parts are easily accessible.
- **Guidance for the equipment.** In addition to whatever guidance you may receive from your commander, be aware that the AMC, working in conjunction with the garrison DOL and other agencies, will coordinate the schedule for equipment turn-ins for recapitalization, rebuilding, overhaul, and repair. This process includes equipment issue or reissue to address shortages once the appropriate level of maintenance is conducted.

AMC is the Army's overall lead for RESET maintenance activities and monitors the status of RESET maintenance efforts. AMC accomplishes this task through AMC depots and arsenals or through contracts to repair equipment. To track the entire process, AMC uses the ARMT.

ARMT is a Web-based logistical application that can provide near real-time situational awareness of the end-to-end RESET process. This application allows leaders to make decisions with the best information for the overall RESET process and overall disposition status of a unit's equipment. It also allows a direct property book, unit supply enhanced feed from the unit property book into the tracking system to provide better data integrity and less manual manipulation. ARMT, however, is not a property accountability tool, does not move material, and does not replace nor is intended to duplicate the functions of the Standard Army Management Information System.


AMC's current guidance is that it will handle the sustainment level of RESET (requires turn-in by you), and your unit will conduct field-level RESET, where possible, in your motor pool to the 10/20 standard of maintenance of redeploying equipment. Success depends on the early identification of equipment that will need sustainment-level RESET repairs. The unit should identify this equipment while still in theater.

In most cases, the unit will receive disposition instructions in theater that identifies equipment for turn-in, as well as the automatic RESET induction list. The division S4 shop, a representative from an AFSB, or AMC personnel coordinating with your brigade will issue this information. If you are a separate company or battalion in theater, work with your supporting higher headquarters to receive the required information.

Within the last 60 days of the unit being in theater, these are the tasks that you must complete or tasks you may want to complete:

- 100 percent turn-in of all equipment not going to depot-level maintenance but to home station. Balance this turn-in with combat missions.
- Identify proposed equipment washout with the S4.
- Finalize the RESET plan for redeployment.

As a planning factor, consider that within the first two months of redeployment (not when block leave ends) the equipment from theater will arrive for unpacking. For the next two or three months, stay-behind equipment left at garrison as well as some of the equipment immediately turned in to DOL will start to return to the unit. Inevitably, the unit will have to complete more turn-ins as directives change and lateral transfers address shortages with other units. This situation will put a strain on the unit parts load list (PLL) clerks to keep up with all the changes and associated paperwork. Unit PLL clerks should work closely with unit supply sergeants and company maintenance officers to keep the appropriate automation up-to-date and paperwork in order.



**Figure 6-2. Sustainment Level RESET and Supporting Army Depots**

Another consideration for the BMO is rebuilding the motor pool systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison IG offices will provide a staff assistance visit at some point during the RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines to re-establish these systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the BMO should consider are:

- Maintenance management.
- Packaged fuel management.
- Tool room test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment procedures.
- Bulk petroleum management.
- Preventive maintenance checks and services.

## Chapter 7

### Command and Control

The command group has an incredible number of tasks to complete during unit RESET. The key considerations listed below are seen time and again in after-action reviews (AARs) and lessons learned reports. The considerations are broken down by individual categories to help manage the tasks.

#### Commander

A commander is responsible for everything his unit does and does not do. Obviously, a commander cannot do everything; the staff will focus on the main parts of unit RESET. The commander should focus on command issues and ensure the unit meets suspense dates. Issues that the commander needs to address include:

- **The calendar and plan.** The commander must fight to keep the calendar and plan as intact as possible with no last-minute changes. Unit RESET is a complicated operation, and it is better to add steps at the end of the plan than permit unplanned activities to be added somewhere in the middle. The ripple effect on limited key personnel and resources makes the entire process extremely frustrating for Soldiers.
- **Officer evaluation reports (OERs) and noncommissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOERs).** This area has continually frustrated commanders and has the potential to cause havoc with subordinate leaders' careers if not managed correctly. Write the required OERs/NCOERs in advance before leaving theater or plan on writing a lot of them upon returning. There is no magic bullet to fix this issue—just good time management.
- **Families and Soldiers.** The commander has the most influence in this area. The commander controls the duty day, and there must be as much balance in a regular duty day as possible. Attempt to have the garrison morale, welfare, and recreation office coordinate for extra events and activities during the first 30 days upon arrival. This keeps Soldiers and families close for any support issues, requires less travel, and helps Soldiers unwind in a semi-controlled setting. Also, family readiness groups (FRGs) do not cease to exist but may have to be rebuilt because of permanent change of station (PCS) and end term of service (ETS) personnel actions.
- **Wounded Soldiers and Families.** The unit more than likely took casualties while deployed. Make time on the calendar for yourself and the command sergeant major (CSM) to visit wounded Soldiers and their families and subordinate leaders. A single visit will boost the morale of a Soldier going through intense physical therapy and reassure the Soldier that he is not forgotten. This duty includes visiting the families of Soldiers killed in action.

- **Lessons learned.** Ensure the unit conducts AARs and submits them to higher headquarters and the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The Army cannot improve if it does not know what is and what is not working correctly. Ensure each AAR follows the issue, discussion, and recommendation format.
- **Company changes of command.** There are two schools of thought on this topic: conduct them all in theater or all during RESET. Each has pros and cons, and the commander must carefully consider the secondary effects. Conducting all the company changes of command in theater allows the unit to start setting up the companies for success during RESET and future operations after RESET. All the property is present, and there are no personnel distractions. However, this may significantly disrupt ongoing combat operations, depending on the type of unit. Conducting all the company changes of command during RESET significantly disrupts the equipment process of RESET but keeps a steady pace for the unit during combat operations.
- **Rear detachment.** True success starts in predeployment. If you are reading this handbook before deployment or at the end of RESET and preparing for the future, consider these issues: the two top matters that will cause brigade and battalion command groups the biggest headaches during deployment and RESET are property accountability and family support issues. There will be other difficult issues to tackle, but these two present continuous problems. Commanders can significantly negate the issues in the predeployment phase if the correct personnel are selected to be on the brigade and battalion rear detachments. For the best chance of success, select mature and dependable leaders who will be with the unit well after the RESET is complete. These personnel will be the team that integrates your unit back into garrison life and conducts the planning for the unit RESET with garrison agencies. Fail here and you can expect a much more difficult RESET. Family issues cannot be solved by rear detachment personnel, but a good rear detachment commander and team can greatly assist forward commanders with reducing the effects on personnel availability during and after deployment. Key issues that will probably need attention are financial/child support, counseling of various types, legal coordination, death or serious injury of personnel in theater, and family support. Before redeploying, ensure the rear detachment clearly understands your intent as you progress closer to returning, and consider that the rear detachment may not have the rank to fix all the issues you want addressed. They are working hard to support you, as well as working with garrison and the families to ensure a smooth transition. Ensure there is a clear and rehearsed plan for the sensitive items and the to accompany troops (TAT) items upon redeployment with the rear detachment. This single issue can stop a redeployment ceremony in its tracks.

- **Public affairs.** Every Soldier wants to feel proud of his or her accomplishments. Communicate potential story lines to the garrison public affairs officer (PAO) in advance of redeployment. For example, have valor awards narratives sent to the rear with storyboards, so the PAO can effectively market stories. Further, if a unit expects very important person (VIP) or general officer visits that could draw public attention, they can inform rear detachment personnel in advance for public affairs support. Give Soldiers the chance to tell their stories.
- **Taskers.** Fight to delete or reclaim all external taskers that do not concern unit RESET. They usually come at the last minute and always delay the RESET plan. This includes excessive VIP visits. The commander may not have much choice on some taskers, but he can still fight for what he can.
- **Waiver of 90-day stabilization.** Commanders must carefully consider each waiver of the 90-day stabilization policy for the secondary and tertiary effects on the entire RESET process.

## Command Sergeant Major

Issues the CSM will need to address include:

- **Personnel movements.** Tracking the movements of personnel, mainly enlisted personnel, in the battalion is critical to the overall unit success during RESET. While most would place this in the S1's lane, it is very important that CSMs and first sergeants (1SGs) talk to Soldiers about their intentions. Reenlistment decisions, ETS/PCS options, and spouse and dependent relations with the potential of causing unintended Uniform Code of Military Justice actions are all critical events that only noncommissioned officers (NCOs) have the ability to watch and address. NCOs must monitor this pulse within the unit.
- **Appointments.** Just like before deployment, medical appointments must be tracked. There are only so many garrison support agencies available, and every missed appointment by a Soldier, especially those resulting from Soldier readiness processing (SRP), takes away from services available to another Soldier. Ensure 1SGs and NCOs understand this.
- **Noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES).** Preparing deserving young Soldiers and junior NCOs for professional development is second in importance only to Soldier safety. After a year or more of hard work in combat, they deserve the best support you can give. Try to coordinate NCOES mobile training teams to come to your location. This practice balances taking care of the Soldiers with looking after their families.

- **Safety.** At the heart of every CSM is Soldier safety. While company commanders and ISGs are the executors of safety programs and measures, it is critical that the CSMs take on this role to instill in Soldiers the importance of their personal safety at home station. To lose a Soldier now because of carelessness would be a shame. The common areas where Soldiers might have issues are:
  - Anger management.
  - Alcohol management.
  - Vehicle motor safety issues (e.g., speeding, driving under the influence, and motorcycle safety).
  - Spousal relations.

### Executive Officer

The executive officer's (XO's) primary focus should be logistics. There is more than enough work with equipment, maintenance, motor pools, budgets, and managing the staff. Here are some key points to consider:

- **Fight for a central directorate of logistics (DOL) turn-in and issue point.** Attempt to coordinate for the agencies responsible for turn-in and fielding to come to one central point or your motor pool. There is a chance that not all of the unit's transportation assets have returned.
- **Provide clear and defined turn-in and issue standards and instructions.** There must be clear and defined turn-in and issue standards and coordination instructions. While it may seem redundant, it is better to spell out the standard in detail and disseminate it well beforehand. At some point, tempers will likely flare, and Soldiers will lose patience during the RESET process. Spelling out and disseminating standards will head this off. Within the standards and instructions issued, ensure unit personnel identify components of end items (COEI) with detailed instructions. Some end items have multiple COEI, which are end items on the property book. Do the homework and avoid a financial liability investigation of property loss.
- **Plan for railhead operations and moving equipment.** Do the DOL and the unit have enough materials handling equipment (e.g., all-terrain lifter Army system [ATLAS], rough terrain container handler [RTCH], wreckers, maintenance trucks, and fuelers for railhead operations) on hand during all of phases of RESET?
- **Develop a container download plan.** This plan should not just include where the containers will fit but also inventories in relation to changes of command. Plan and drop only once; do not keep moving containers around. As soon as containers are empty, get rid of them—turn them back in. Otherwise, trash and unwanted problems will mysteriously appear in empty containers.



- Establish a brigade RESET synchronization meeting or cell.** Use the meetings to track each action by line item on the property book (lateral transfer, equipment turn-in, equipment receipt, and new equipment training). Required personnel at this meeting are the battalion XO's, S4s, property book officers, battalion maintenance officers, S3s, and any other key players. Whenever possible, ensure units do not send representatives to stand in. During RESET, decisions and actions often need to happen fast, and units waste precious time going back to find a key staff member who holds a vital piece of information or to wait on a decision. The brigade and battalion commanders must delegate authority to execute to their staffs. This practice requires traditional strong, in-person staff work—e-mail will not suffice for coordination. Communication is key to this entire process.




Figure 7-1

- Personnel.** Develop a list of key leaders at the company to brigade level and establish focused manning and assignment matrices for redeployment. One option is to assign unit leaders squad and up (key NCOs in administrative and logistic roles, commanders, and 1SGs) as soon as possible after redeployment so that leader teams who will deploy with the unit on the next deployment are in place and train together. The other

option is to wait for the unit to download all equipment, inventory the equipment, and put shortages on order before moving any key personnel. Focused manning matrices made in theater will greatly assist in mission analysis for RESET. It may be beneficial to have inbound Soldiers and leaders remain at garrison and attend all required and professional training instead of coming forward. Your situation may not allow this; however, you will have trained replacements for key personnel lost during RESET. Unit RESET can continue. If possible, ensure Human Resources Command (HRC) has continual updates on the unit RESET plan. HRC cannot plan personnel actions for the unit if it does not know what is happening.

- **Actions in theater.** Units have reported that they were successful in theater because they conducted reconnaissance of sites in Kuwait before movement, as well as ensured they had multiple unit movement officers (UMOs) trained. Conduct the reconnaissance early, and if necessary and possible, ensure the UMOs receive refresher training.
- **Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS).** Units should carry STAMIS from theater as TAT and turn it in for RESET as soon as it comes off the plane, so it is available for use immediately after block leave.

### Key Equipment Issues for the Command Group

Some equipment issues in the RESET process extend beyond the scope of the S4 and battalion maintenance officer, either by rank or position, and will require command attention. Units have reported issues in these areas:

- **Lack of sufficient small arms repair parts.** A technical inspection in country could help identify the quantity of repair parts required, thus decreasing lag time for parts. In addition, units should carefully inspect every weapon returned to the unit to ensure the repair work is correct and annotated properly. There are also other repair teams that focus on communications and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment.
- **Condition of vehicles upon return/issue to unit.** While it is generally accepted that no one transfers anything in a 10/20 condition anymore, fully mission capable, with at least safety basic initial issue should be the minimum standard for equipment units turn-in or transfer. Units should not move arctic-fitted equipment around the Army. Units in Alaska should be issued arctic-capable equipment.
- **Equipment turn-in and issue.** Units cannot turn in and receive back every piece of equipment at the same time. Make every attempt to spread this process out evenly within the allocated time frame. If possible, coordinate for the rear detachment to turn in weapons and night vision devices for RESET during the unit's block leave. If possible, work to ensure that units turn in equipment systems for RESET at the same time

and not just components (e.g., command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with vehicles). If done correctly, units should turn in the entire system and get ready for training. This practice will save downtime on vehicles later because of various installs during training.

### **Other Considerations**

Other considerations for the command group include rebuilding administrative systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison inspector general (IG) offices will provide a staff assistance visit (SAV) at some point during the RESET.

Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines to re-establishing these systems. Some, but not all, of the systems the command group will want to consider or that fall within its immediate responsibility are the following:

- FRGs.
- Family advocacy.
- Army substance abuse programs.
- Counseling programs.
- Chaplain's program.
- Legal program.
- Sponsorship program.
- Safety occupational health.
- Retention program.
- Medical readiness.
- Informal funds—FRG.
- Weight control program.
- Equal opportunity program.

This SAV is a valuable tool to provide feedback to commanders on the status of their units during RESET. For honest feedback, the SAV should be non-attributable unless the IG suspects gross negligence.

### **Signal**

The main tasks and considerations for the S6 when conducting redeployment planning are identification and turn-in of equipment, reestablishing installation accounts, connecting to the local area network (LAN), baselining computers, and

reestablishing system architecture. The goal is to have unit leaders arrive at their offices, sit down, and conduct business as usual. While this does not occur 100 percent of the time, the following measures will assist in keeping the work flowing steadily and with as little interruption as possible. The Army continues to provide essential services, operational and infrastructure support through the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) and the collaboration of the services infrastructure core enterprise (SICE).

To conduct proper planning in advance of RESET operations, coordination between the brigade S6, each battalion S6, the brigade S2, signal company, and military intelligence company (MICO) needs to occur approximately 180 days before redeployment. Issues to be discussed and resolved will include, but not be limited to:

- Who will return advanced operational node (ADVON) to oversee signal RESET operations as the unit redeploys?
- Who will capture and transport documents needed for initial operations upon redeployment to home station?
- When will courier training occur and who will conduct the certification process?
- What type of media will be used for document transport (flash cards, CDs, DVDs, etc.)?
- Has reissue of left behind communications equipment, Force XXI battle command—brigade and below (FBCB2) and other communications equipment been accomplished for each role player in the unit?
- Who will conduct oversight of left-behind communications equipment?
- Who will manage left-behind communications equipment install?
- When will the SECRET Internet protocol router (SIPR) and nonsecure Internet protocol router (NIPR) be re-established at home station?
- Has a priority list been developed for those who require immediate SIPR access upon redeployment to home station?
- Will a communications security (COMSEC) vault have to be re-established?

### **Communications Security Equipment Turn-In**

Approximately 120 days before redeployment the brigade S6 should begin identifying equipment that will remain in theater for turn-in and equipment that will be returning with the unit back to home station. The Army RESET management tool (ARMT) will be used to identify automated reset induction communications equipment for turn in to Army Materiel Command (AMC). Several units and sections will have COMSEC equipment, but it is a brigade S6 responsibility to manage and provide oversight for all unit COMSEC equipment

and RESET operations. The signal company will be the major approving authority for equipment turn-in before redeployment. To conduct proper planning, coordination needs to occur between the brigade S6, each battalion S6, the brigade S2, the signal company, and MICO. The brigade S6 shop has direct oversight in ensuring all brigade headquarters joint network node (JNN), global broadcast service (GBS) and command post node (CPN) equipment is turned in before redeployment. Each battalion will have a CPN at the command post that must be turned in before redeployment. As part of equipment turn-in planning, questions to consider include:

- Who owns the equipment identified for required turn-in?
- Who will verify sensitive equipment has been zeroed before turn-in?
- When will JNN, CPN, GBS, battlefield video display terminal (BVTC) and other equipment be dismantled and turned in?
- When will other communications equipment be turned in (automatic network control device [ANCD], secure telephone units [STU], secure terminal equipment [STE], simple key loader [SKL], etc.)?
- Will communications equipment be turned in as a maintenance or supply transaction?

### **Re-establishing Accounts**

Once the unit has deployed, the installation directorate of information management office will either put deployed Soldiers' user accounts into a dormant status or completely delete them from the system; minus rear detachment user accounts. In either case, installation user accounts for all Soldiers in the unit will need to be re-established before redeployment. The keys to success in re-establishing user accounts will be a combination of rear detachment work and redeploying an information management officer (IMO) with the advance party on redeployment. Determine who will need accounts before redeployment, compare and verify this personnel list against the upcoming changes of command list, permanent changes of stations list, and end terms of services list. The battalion S6s will have the responsibility of providing an accurate e-mail account requirements list for battalion personnel. Based on the user list generated, computer user training and certification can be conducted before redeployment. Once the user needs are determined, the rear detachment can initiate work to ensure offices have the required drops, etc. This step also assists in determining the priority of work regarding baselining computers upon redeployment. When possible, units can accomplish user training (e.g., information assurance certification) for a particular garrison in theater. Have the rear detachment forward the user requirements, as well as the status of all automation on rear detachment. If possible, also send Department of Defense personal identifiers (10 digit) to the rear detachment IMO so he can register common access cards.

Often the IMO on the rear detachment is trained as an additional duty. It is imperative that at least one experienced IMO per battalion be on the redeployment advance party. The IMO's sole purpose should be to work with the directorate of information management to re-establish accounts and connectivity.

## **Local Area Network Connectivity and Baselining Computers**

The rear detachment will conduct a lot of this work for the S6 before redeployment. Ensure that the unit clearly establishes local area network (LAN) and automation requirements early enough for the rear detachment to react accordingly.

Often the rear detachment will receive new computers as either designated lifecycle replacements or as preplanned purchases because of the expected code-outs required after a long deployment. The rear detachment will have these baselined and ready for issue upon the unit's redeployment. This procedure greatly assists unit IMOs in re-establishing accounts and having computers available while the computers from the deployment are being rebaselined.

## **System Architecture**

After a long deployment, computers and other automation must be replaced. If possible, submit a list of process capability requests to the rear detachment so it can make purchases well in advance of redeployment.

Another consideration will be the merging of the forward and rear detachment automation into one system architecture that meets the commander's needs for his unit. The unit must balance this process with scheduled lifecycle replacements, as well as any lateral transfer directives from higher headquarters or garrison.

Units are also accustomed to having ready SIPR access. While it is not possible to have the robust SIPR architecture that existed in theater, work with the rear detachment to coordinate for the command group to maintain SIPR connectivity as conveniently as possible. The unit that replaces your unit in theater will still have requests for information that will need to be transmitted on SIPR. Reliable SIPR access will also assist the unit during RESET for future mission requirements and deployments.

Another consideration for the S6 includes rebuilding administrative systems that existed before deployment. Typically, most garrison IG offices will provide a staff assistance visit at some point during the RESET. Use the IG inspection checklists as guidelines to re-establish systems. Some systems the S6 should consider are communication equipment maintenance and information assurance security.

## **Other Considerations**

The S6 needs to review the ARFORGEN process and doctrine to ensure flow synchronization between the RESET plan and future mission requirements that meet the commander's intent and training guidance. If the brigade S6 arrived during the previous RESET time frame, it is likely it will leave shortly upon arrival back at home station. It is imperative that the incoming brigade S6 is aware of all training requirements and timeframes that meet the operational training timeline.

Before initial deployment occurs, the S6 needs to identify a minimum of two personnel who will provide rear detachment communication operations support while the unit is deployed. Soldiers selected should hold the grade of E-4 or higher and have a 25B series military occupational specialty (MOS). The soldiers who serve in these positions will need to understand that, approximately halfway through the unit's deployment, they will be deployed forward. There will be a brief hand-over training process between the soldiers deploying forward and the two incoming soldiers who will remain in the rear detachment to provide uninterrupted and continued communication support.

Finally, work with the S2 to ensure all of the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) components, as well as automated net control devices, are zeroed out for COMSEC before redeployment from theater begins. If a subordinate unit redeploys separately from the main body, verify that the unit addresses the correct operations security and COMSEC measures. Ensure all requirements and information are directed in the brigade redeployment order (REDEPORD) under Annex H. The information that is placed in the REDEPORD will provide a sound checklist for ensuring all procedures are followed with the equipment being RESET in a timely manner in preparation for the training phase of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

The S6 will also need to develop a training plan that addresses soldier training internal to the section and for all downline C2 elements by return minus 45 days. The training plan should consider the following:

- When will soldiers return from block leave?
- When will NET training occur?
- When will RESET equipment arrive back to home station?





## Chapter 8

### Rear Detachment

Rear detachment commanders (RDCs) often find themselves in the tenuous position of not having enough rank to get the big missions accomplished and issues fixed while also answering to two higher commanders.

Over the deployment, most RDCs focus primarily on taking care of families and legal/paperwork actions of Soldiers (e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice actions for deserters and medical evaluation board for wounded Soldiers). The most important and unfortunate situation is casualty assistance. It is also important to set the stage for unit RESET and successful reintegration of the Soldiers with their families and garrisons.

Regardless of the situations or relationships RDCs and first sergeants may have with their units, families, and garrisons, key tasks must be accomplished to successfully complete unit RESET. The tasks listed below are not all inclusive, but they are the most critical and the tasks noted by other RDCs who have gone through RESET.

One task requires special attention. In some cases, spouses and family members of Soldiers killed in action want to know when the unit returns. Make every effort to include them in notifications of flights, ceremonies, and preparations—they have earned it. Some families will not want to be involved, but for others, involvement offers them closure and healing. It is a difficult and sometimes emotional task to ask spouses or family members if they want to participate, but caring for a fallen Soldier's family is always worth the effort.

#### Tasks in Theater

There will be a buzz of activity as the unit comes closer to redeployment, and communication is key to the entire process. When feasible, ensure the following tasks are complete and that information on the tasks has been sent forward to the unit no later than 60 days from the unit's return:

- Reverse Soldier readiness processing (SRP) schedule set.
- Arms room certified and ready.
- Armorers trained and ready.
- Mail room certified and ready (with plan to distribute hold mail).
- Point-of-view lot plan established.
- Motorcycle training coordinated.
- Offices and supply rooms established.

- Motor pool established.
- All left-behind equipment issues resolved with the property book officer.
- Legal actions (as many as possible) completed.
- Automation (computers, phones, etc.) plan established.
- Training plan received by unit forward and land/ranges and ammunition requests submitted.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities for block leave time (if required) coordinated.
- RESET plan from unit received by garrison directorate of logistics (DOL).
- Plan to receive and accompany troop boxes spelled out.
- Plan to receive and store classified information spelled out.
- Technical inspections of night vision devices and weapons sent (if possible) from unit to rear detachment.

### **Key Lessons Learned**

#### **Night-vision goggles/weapons turn-in**

If possible, coordinate to have all night-vision equipment and individual weapon systems turned in to DOL as soon as possible upon arrival. Soldiers will need this equipment during individual training and it may take time for calibrations and other maintenance.

#### **Family readiness support assistants**

Family readiness support assistants (FRSAs) are a component of the commander's unit family readiness program. This program is supervised by the unit commander or his designee and provides paid administrative assistance and logistical support to the family readiness group (FRG) leader and the RDC. It decreases volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between family assistance and family support programs. The FRSAs are not replacements for the FRG leaders; they provide administrative/logistical assistance to the volunteer leaders, allowing volunteers to concentrate on assisting families.

The director of force management approved the concept plan to place 1,029 FRSAs in deployable active, guard and reserve battalions. In July 2007, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army authorized and approved \$45 million to fund FRSAs for all components. In addition to these positions, supplemental funding has been authorized for FRSA positions to support active, guard and reserve units. Commands will be centrally funded with supplemental global war on terrorism dollars until the requirements and authorizations compete in the program objective memorandum (FY 10).

The Army's deployment posture has overwhelmed the resources of RDCs and FRG leaders. Although spouse volunteer leaders have used a variety of strategies to share the workload, the nature of the expeditionary Army makes running FRGs a daunting task. The FRSAs have proven to be an overwhelming success in the administrative and logistical burden of volunteer FRG leaders. The FRSA lends consistency to the unit FRG and rear detachment team.

In addition to FRSAs, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) has implemented a mission support element (MSE) effort at each division post headquarters, e.g. 3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and 101st Airborne Division. In addition to these primary post headquarters MSE positions, each corps headquarters has a separate MSE position where one or more division coexists. Divisions situated on installations with a corps headquarters have no MSE, only their collocated corps (e.g., 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and 4th Infantry Division).

Divisions collocated with corps have no MSEs and must generally man their rear detachments. Divisions that own their assigned installations, such as 3rd Infantry Division, have MSEs and man their rear detachment division headquarters staff as austere as possible.

MSEs (currently about 100 strong for 3rd Infantry Division) pick up the slack for headquarters staffs that a division would normally leave back. In 3rd Infantry Division, MSE strength level authorized is around 120 people, about 85 percent civilian and 15 percent Soldiers who wear the FORSCOM patch. MSEs are an integral part of the rear detachment effort to support the division and prepare for its return. Because of this, Phase 1 of the RESET operational order is managed by an MSE and rear detachment collaborative effort (schools, left-behind equipment, etc.).

### **Family communications**

Establish a hotline for families to call (brigade-level rear detachment) to check on flight status and ceremonies. Coordinate with the public affairs officer (PAO) for preplanned PAO periods for the press.

### **Garrison transportation and morale, welfare, and recreation**

Coordinate with the garrison to enhance on-post transportation during and after hours for the reintegration period. On-post transportation enhances Soldiers' well-being by encouraging them to make use of on-post facilities instead of venturing off post during the reintegration period.

Provide detailed MWR briefs during reintegration to encourage Soldiers to use post facilities and activities. Ask MWR to coordinate more activities for Soldiers and families on post. These activities enhance safety and prevent driving under the influence incidents or accidents from long travel times.

Units should draw vehicles from left behind equipment or garrison (e.g., short beds, high mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles, buses, and vans). In addition, units should ensure that the rear detachments have certified drivers for the vehicles.

Haul assets should be available not only immediately after redeployment but well into RESET in case unit vehicles are delayed.

### **Coordinating with others**

Key folks to coordinate with during RESET planning include:

- Unit command group and staff.
- Higher units staffs.
- Garrison agencies.
- Army Materiel Command (AMC).
- Project managers for equipment (Stryker vehicles and XM777s howitzers).

Develop a point of contact list for each office. Become part of the garrison working group of RESET and you will meet all the personnel listed above.

### **Training**

Work with DOL to track new equipment fielding and training, and coordinate with forward unit S1/S4 to synchronize personnel and timelines. The S3 should be able to send the RESET training plan a few months before returning. Use this plan to coordinate land and ammunition requests

### **Reverse Soldier readiness processing**

The rear detachment should be able to provide all required support. Be prepared to assist, if necessary, with controlling accountability. The 39th Brigade Combat Team (Arkansas Army National Guard) uses a bar code system to keep track of Soldiers and paperwork.

### **Administrative functions**

One of the biggest paperwork tasks for the unit during RESET is establishing administrative systems that existed before deployment. The best way to assist the unit before it returns is to contact the garrison inspector general office. Ask specifically for the staff assistance visit checklists. Most garrisons are requiring—or at least offering—a staff assistance visit roughly 90 to 120 days after a unit returns to help the unit get back on track.

Take the checklists and collect records, order required publications, conduct inspections, and do anything required to help the unit pass inspection later.

## Chapter 9

### Reserve Component Overview

#### Synchronizing Reserve Component RESET to Army Force Generation Model


The intent of the reserve component RESET program is to return unit equipment to readiness standards within 365 days of returning from deployment. This allows 185 days more than the active Army's RESET timeline. The reserve component RESET timeline begins with the deployed unit's return date, when 51 percent of the unit has returned to home station. However, there is a discussion that RESET for the reserve component should in fact begin when 51 percent of the unit's Soldiers reach the demobilization station. Reserve component units will follow the timeline displayed in Chapter 5 (Figure 5-1), with a few caveats. Unlike the active component, certain Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment will be RESET at the state level under the field-level RESET program.

Approximately 180 days prior to redeployment, a unit assessment of materiel and personnel should be conducted in theater to support RESET planning and programming. As part of the RESET planning process, reserve component units must be prepared to discuss actions involving family, manning, equipping, sustaining, and institutional training. Refer to Chapter 1, RESET for more information about these actions.

The unit must be prepared to enter training programs, or Train/Ready 1, by return plus 365 (Rtn+365), when all equipment fills—including new equipment training/new equipment fielding—are complete, Soldiers and families are reintegrated, and unit training plans are complete. Once RESET is complete, the unit moves into the next stage of its readiness training, beginning at Rtn+365 and ending at Year 4, by implementing the unit training plan for the next deployment. At Year 5, the unit is placed back in the available pool for deployment and should have reached an S2 and R2 status. (Equipment on hand [S] and equipment readiness [R] ratings are at the second levels of the unit status reporting scales outlined by Army Regulation 220-1. S1 and R1 are the highest ratings on the 4-point scales.) Refer to Figures 9-1 and 9-2 for more details.

- Return minus 180 (Rtn-180): RESET planning begins (RESET support and resourcing conference)
- Return date: 51 percent of the unit returns to home station
- Rtn+365: RESET Complete
- Rtn+365 through Year 4: Train/Ready (1, 2, and 3)
- Year 5: Available
- End state: Unit at deployment or contingency force readiness level

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED



**Legend**

REFRAD: Release from active duty  
 TNG: Training  
 DMSOQ: Duty military occupation specialty qualification  
 NOS: Notification of sourced  
 CONF: Conference  
 FSO: Full-spectrum operations  
 DEF: Deploying expeditionary force  
 CEF: Contingency expeditionary force  
 MRE: Mission rehearsal exercise  
 CS: Combat support  
 CSS: Combat service support  
 USARTC: United States Army Reserve Training Center  
 RTC: Regional training center  
 AWT: Army warrior tasks  
 DMETL: Deployment mission essential task list  
 TSRT: Theater-specific required training (Army Reserve)  
 MOBSAD: Mobilization station arrival date

SPTG: Supporting  
 BOG: Boots on Ground  
 REF: Ready expeditionary force  
 CMETL: Core mission essential tasks  
 PME: Professional military education  
 ITP: Institutional training plan  
 BCST: Battle command and staff training  
 LDR: Leader  
 MDMP: Military decisionmaking process  
 PCC: Precombat checks  
 CTA: Commander's training assessment  
 I-C-S-T: Individual, crew, squad, and team  
 U/P/T: Untrained/needs practice/training  
 REF: Ready expeditionary force  
 EXEVAL: Exercise evaluation  
 WAREX: Warfighter exercise  
 CSTC: Combat support training center  
 MOB'd: Mobilized

Figure 9-1




Figure 9-2

## Key Considerations for U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard Units

The Army Reserve consists of two distinct components (COMPOs). The Army National Guard falls under COMPO 2 and the Army Reserve falls under COMPO 3. Each is a force provider to the Army Service Component Commands and managed in Army Force Generation. Each reserve component has a separate chain of command and must be mobilized to active duty. The units remain in their components when mobilized and their activities and operations are funded by the active Army (COMPO 1), the operations and maintenance Army (OMA). OMA monies also pay to replenish, repair, or recapitalize the reserve component equipment and materiel used during the mobilization before it is returned to its owning component.

The reserve forces differ from the active force. National Guard units (COMPO 2) belong to state governors under Title 32 of the U.S. Code and are mobilized by the President of the United States for national emergencies outside the United States. COMPO 2 units can be mobilized for emergencies within the nation with the consent of the governor. The Army Reserve (COMPO 3) is a direct reporting unit to the Chief of Staff of the Army and its units can be mobilized by the President for national emergencies.

Several common challenges affect the RESET of both reserve component forces:

- Dispersed units: Forces Command has less than a dozen installations on which its units reside, train, and deploy. Synergy of location is key to quickly and efficiently configuring forces for a mission. Reserve component units operate from “virtual installations.”
- There are 54 states and territories with COMPO 2 units operating from numerous installations.
- COMPO 3 units are commanded, trained, and operationally and functionally organized under four continental U.S. regional commands with over 3,200 reserve centers, four OMA-funded installations, and in Europe and across the Pacific Ocean.
- Families of deployed Soldiers may not have access to facilities, support, or assistance that would be readily available on post. During the RESET year, Soldier training time is approximately 12 days, a large portion of which is dedicated to Soldier and family reintegration activities.
- During the RESET phase, medical readiness issues of reserve component Soldiers become increasingly apparent because medical and dental care programs are limited.
- Employer/business reintegration is critical to populating reserve component. No income means no citizen Soldier to fill the slot.



- **Changing demographics:** Active duty units are on posts for efficiency. Reserve component units are scattered and must shift with economic and skill centers to attract people with the skills to support missions.
- **Constrained training time:** An active Army training year might be considered 365 days long, but based on practicality (allowing for weekends, holiday, and a few days off) it is more in the range of 220–240 days. A reserve component training year is 38 days (14 days for annual training and 24 days for 12 weekend assemblies). Six reserve component training years, therefore, have about the same number of days as one active Army training year (38 times 6 is 228). When holidays, family functions, and certain required reserve component activities are factored in, the number of reserve component training days is further diminished.
- **Equipment:** As mentioned above, equipment RESET is an OMA-funded program. Reserve component units depend on external command production and shipping schedules to replenish damaged or consumed stocks. Achieving RESET goals in a specific unit depends on the aggregate reserve component fleet/equipment set.

### Three Reserve Component Key Tasks

Three key reserve component tasks require special mention—families, medical support to returning Soldiers, and communicating with Department of Defense (DOD) agencies.

- **Families:** While families located on or near active duty bases have ready access to support agencies (e.g., Army Community Service, commissaries, and medical facilities), those distant from active duty bases often feel they are left to their own remedies. Each state and unit has its own procedures for establishing and supporting family readiness groups. Reserve component families should, however, receive the same reunion-oriented counseling and training offered to active duty component families. This training should include family sensing sessions and training in signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), both before the unit redeploys and at the 90-day mark after the unit redeploys. Typically, Soldiers who have integration issues start to display behaviors around the 90-day mark. Commanders should consider coordinating with supporting state agencies or higher headquarters in the continental United States to ensure Army families receive adequate support.
- **Medical support for returning Soldiers:** Reserve component Soldiers coming off active duty face unique challenges to receiving appropriate medical care. Often reserve component Soldiers are in a rush to leave active duty and return to reserve status, and this situation can create significant problems regarding line of duty investigations. If a reserve component Soldier is hurt in theater and no line of duty is completed, it becomes impossible for that Soldier to quickly receive proper medical

care after returning home. This is a critical part of caring for the force. The key consideration is location and availability of medical support services for the Soldiers. Commanders must ensure their Soldiers are medically screened (physical, dental, hearing, vision, and mental health) before they leave theater. Commanders should also ensure the unit documents and addresses medical issues before the Soldiers transition from active to reserve status at the demobilization site.

- **Communicating with DOD agencies:** Lines of communications between state and DOD agencies must be addressed by reserve component units. While active duty units have ready access to supporting agencies at garrison, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units often stand alone and, in many instances, are located in remote areas of the U.S. Communicating and working with DOD agencies can sometimes be difficult. If the unit is composed of subordinate units from multiple states, the unit may need to coordinate over hundreds of miles or through several state organizations. Commanders must ensure their state or higher headquarters (in the U.S.) has provided a clear, detailed plan on what is to occur in unit RESET. Multiple points of contact (POCs) are required for each action. The POCs must be available when the unit is conducting actual RESET tasks, which is more than likely on weekends.

### Army Directive 1225.6

Army Directive 1225.6, established April 7, 2005, reissues and reinstates DOD Directive 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces*, dated November 2, 1992. Army Directive 1225.6 also updates policies and responsibilities for procuring and distributing items of new and combat-serviceable equipment to the reserve components of the Armed Forces in accordance with Sections 153, 163, 12301, 12302, 12304, 18501, and 18502 of Title 10, U.S. Code and DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, dated May 12, 2003. The directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense agencies, DOD field activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense.

As stated in Army Directive 1225.6:

“The Reserve components of each Military Department shall be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions and shall have an equipment procurement and distribution program that is responsive to the Combatant Commanders’ mission requirements and sustainable on those joint and other missions, including homeland defense. The Department of Defense’s goal is to fill the mission equipment requirements of the Reserve components in accordance with the Total Force Policy.”

The directive was initiated in response to the loss of Army Reserve equipment to sustain units in the combat zone for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result of equipment losses, Army Reserve units across the nation were becoming ineffective and requiring direct intervention at the

Department of the Army level. Since the inception of Army Directive 1225.6, Army Reserve units have been reconstituted to current states of operational readiness.

### **Army Payback Program**

Reserve component units under the Army RESET program must comply with the automatic RESET induction list (ARI). Army Materiel Command (AMC) provides oversight of the ARI program, with payback of turned in equipment occurring within 365 days of the unit's return date as specified in the Army Directive 1225.6 and Army Execution Order, *RESET* (Fiscal Year [FY] 09), dated 22 December 2008. Reserve units have experienced institutional gaps and automated systems that do not file equipment requirements based on visibility challenges when equipment has been turned in to the depot before leaving theater. Reserve units need to build an ARI equipment tracking document in order to keep visibility of all ARI equipment. The ARI program is supported by contractor Toby Hanna with oversight provided by AMC. Army National Guard FY09 instructions require deployed units to bring copies of 1348-1 documents back to the home station RESET manager for filing in the unit folder. The 1348-1 documents are used as proof of transfer of equipment from the National Guard property book to AMC for sustainment reset.

### **Component 2: The Army National Guard**

The Army National Guard is a dual-purpose force of approximately 350,000 citizen Soldiers. Although the Guard is considered part of the reserve component of the U.S. military, it also operates under state control, a status that generally exempts it from Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions on military involvement in domestic missions.

National Guard units conduct both federal and state missions, from major combat operations overseas to domestic emergency response. Since 9/11, National Guard units have served in major combat operations, including Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously conducting domestic missions, such as Operation Noble Eagle, border security, counter-drug operations, civil support teams and disaster preparedness and response, including responding to Hurricane Katrina. In addition to overseeing troops in both state and federal missions, 23 of the state adjutants general also serve as state directors for emergency management or homeland security departments.

Army National Guard units' state higher headquarters, known as state joint forces headquarters (JFHQ), provide coordination and instructions to support the largest and most difficult tasks in RESET for equipment maintenance and issues. Every state differs on procedures and ability to support (e.g., funding procedures, state facilities, and reconstitution of equipment). However, depending on the distance of units from active duty bases and state support agencies, units can use several options as discussed in previous chapters of this handbook, based on guidelines provided from companies to brigades on how to conduct unit RESET.

### **Component 3: Army Reserve RESET Program**

The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command, commands, controls, and supports all Army Reserve troop units in the continental United States, with the exception of psychological operations and civil affairs units. The USARC also ensures the readiness of its forces and prepares the nearly 1,700 units under its command to mobilize and deploy to a wartime theater of operation.

To succeed in current and future operations, the Army Reserve must take deliberate steps to ensure that its force is RESET as a result of repeated deployments, and that families and employers are revitalized between Soldiers' deployments so they can sustain the continuous state of mobilization the Army Reserve now experiences. The higher headquarters U.S. Army Reserve will provide coordination and instructions to support the largest and most difficult tasks in RESET for reserve component equipment maintenance and issues.

In response to the Army Force Generation process, the Army Reserve has built pools of equipment to support the mobilization of Army Reserve units in Year 5 (available) at strategic deployment sites, where equipment is maintained in controlled humidity storage. If there are no Army Reserve units mobilized for contingency operations either foreign or domestic, the equipment will remain ready for the next cycle. The equipment in the hands of reserve component units will remain with the units, be inducted into national sustainment programs, or be redistributed to meet the needs of the Army Reserve units as they enter the RESET/Train phase (Year 1). The Army Reserve does not budget for unplanned requirements. Therefore, should any Army Reserve units be mobilized, additional funds will be required to reset the equipment assigned to the mobilized units when they demobilize. These funds will prevent an adverse impact on the Army Reserve's ability to sustain the Army Force Generation process.

A critical enabler for the Army Reserve during RESET is an array of standard Army management information systems, such as the automated reset management tool (ARMT) and supplementary logistics information and management systems developed and fielded by the Army Reserve.

### **Equipment RESET: Field- and Sustainment-Level RESET Operations**

All states and most territories have an Army National Guard combined support maintenance shop (CSMS) that is supervised by a CSMS foreman. The CSMS program is supported by full-time civilian technicians and is under the direct control of each state JFHQ. The CSMS foreman reports directly to the surface maintenance manager (SMM), who is generally located at the state JFHQ within the deputy chief of staff logistics (DCSLOG) branch. As part of RESET planning procedures, approximately three to six months before the return date, the unit S4 should begin coordination with the state DCSLOG, SMM, National Guard Bureau (NGB), Army logistics, and AMC for field-level RESET support. Field-level RESET coordination begins with the identification of equipment returning with the unit to the U.S.

The equipment RESET of all Army National Guard units will be classified and segregated as either field (lower level repair) or sustainment (depot level repair). This classification process is completed by using the ARMT. The ARMT will provide a disposition as to where the unit's equipment will be shipped to in order to begin RESET. Units are responsible for completing all required ARMT planning no later than 90 days before anticipated mobilization for movement back to the U.S. Unit personnel should be trained in the operation of ARMT several months before mobilization to expedite the RESET planning process. It is imperative that states and territories assess their training needs and contact logistics support activity (LOGSA) at <logsa.helpdesk@conus.army.mil> or by calling 1-866-211-3367 if unit training is required.

**Field-level RESET:** Field-level RESET will be conducted and managed by the parent state or territory of the National Guard unit. All equipment classified as field-level RESET will be inspected and repaired as indicated by applicable regulations, bringing the equipment to "like-new" condition. Field-level RESET will be accomplished at a designated source of repair within the National Guard unit's home state. The field-level RESET of the unit's equipment must be complete no later than 365 days after the unit has declared a return date.

**Sustainment-level RESET:** Equipment identified as requiring a sustainment-level RESET will be inducted into depot maintenance, either automatically in theater (ARI) before the unit leaves or through immediate induction after it has returned home. AMC is responsible for RESET and return of any equipment that is classified as sustainment-level RESET. AMC is required to return sustainment-level RESET equipment as early as 180 days after induction but no later than 365 days after induction.

**Special repair teams (SRTs):** The Army National Guard DCSLOG and/or SMM have the option to leverage SRTs in order to expedite the field-level RESET of select equipment. Doing so allows a state or territory to provide equipment for state missions and/or next deploying units in a more expedient fashion. These SRTs are employed by AMC.



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