


HANDBOOK

No. 10-11

DEC 09

Escalation of Force: Afghanistan



Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures



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Foreword

This escalation of force (EOF) handbook is tailored for Operation Enduring Freedom and is a must read for those deploying to the complex fight that is Afghanistan. In counterinsurgency operations, it is integral to sway the population toward support of coalition objectives. Protecting the civilian population from undue harm (injury and/or death) and unnecessary damage to property must be at the forefront during mission planning and execution. Small units are challenged daily during military operations to balance accomplishing the mission and mitigating collateral damage. To be successful, they must also engage with the civilian population to gain both valuable intelligence and to further promote the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Lethal force may be unavoidable during operations. With deliberate planning, training, effective mission execution, and communicating at all levels, the number of EOF incidents can be decreased and negative effects minimized. Application of force must be perceived by the people as judicious, appropriate, and proportional to the threat while protecting our Soldiers and units.

THOMAS R. CAPEL
Command Sergeant Major, US Army
Division Command Sergeant Major

CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI
Major General, US Army
Commanding

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Introduction

As a result of numerous civilian casualties incurred during military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (i.e., deaths and injuries caused from air strikes), General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), issued his Commander's Initial Guidance on 13 June 2009, with key emphasis on the necessity to prevent civilian casualties (see Chapter 1).¹ Since then the number of air strikes has steadily decreased with the goal of protecting the civilian population, as these recent examples attest:

- After taking repeated fire from Taliban fighters holed up in a building, a group of American Marines in southern Afghanistan called in airstrikes to wipe out the threat. The Navy F/A-18 fighter pilots [aboard the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in the gulf of Oman] who responded worried that bombing the militants could hurt civilians and suggested a different solution to the ground troops. The airmen then roared in low and fast, without firing a shot, in a deafening pass that frightened the militants into silence. "It used to be, where do you want the bomb?" said the commander of the air wing on the aircraft carrier, which provides about one-third of the combat support flights for American ground forces in Afghanistan. "Now, it's much more collaborative." The adjustment reflects orders . . . by General McChrystal, that sharply limit the use of airstrikes to try to reduce the civilian deaths that he and other top officers said were eroding support for the American-led mission. General McChrystal said the use of airstrikes during firefights would in most cases be limited to when American and other allied troops were in danger of being overrun.²
- Increasingly, in what pilots say is an effective tactic, jets swoop down low over the insurgents, causing them to break contact and scatter. Between 2006 and 2008, the number of bombs unleashed by U.S. fighter jets against insurgents in Afghanistan doubled—from 2,644 in 2006 to 5,051 last year. But in the first six months of 2009, 2,011 munitions were dropped, a 24 percent decrease from the same period a year ago. Meantime, American ground troops increasingly are coming under fire. In July, the U.S. command recorded 590 reports of "troops in contact" (TICs) with enemy forces, i.e., attacks and firefights. That was a 33 percent increase over the number in July 2008, when 445 TICs were reported. Despite that increase, the allied command reported dropping only 369 munitions in July—a decrease of 51 percent from July 2008. To recap: [July 2009] firefights went up 33 percent, bombing went down 51 percent.³

Since the Commander's Initial Guidance document was issued by General McChrystal in June 2009, civilian deaths have continued to decrease:

- According to the latest figures from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coalition forces were responsible for 19 civilian deaths from the beginning of July until Thursday [August 27, 2009] as opposed to 249 caused by insurgents. During roughly the same period a year earlier, Western forces caused 151 civilian deaths by their own count—not far short of the 210 deaths caused by militants.⁴

- In the past, large-scale civilian deaths were most often caused by airstrikes. But now, after the new directive, airstrikes are used much less frequently, said Brigadier General Eric Tremblay, a Canadian who serves as chief spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force. He said the use of “close air support”—fire from warplanes in support of ground troops—had fallen significantly. It had been an element in about 30 percent to 40 percent of major clashes, but that figure has dropped to about 10 percent, he estimated. The message of the tactical directive was that “force needs to be applied, but carefully,” Tremblay said.⁵

While renewed efforts to reduce civilian casualties indicate early signs of success, leaders and Soldiers at all levels must continue to reaffirm through their deliberate planning, training, and mission execution during operations that the protection of the indigenous population is the center of gravity—a key tenet of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine (Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*). The ISAF Commander’s COIN Guidance (issued in August 2009; the document applies to both COIN and stability operations in Afghanistan) states that “protecting the Afghan people is the mission.” (See Chapter 1 for the full text of the document.)

The forerunners and companion pieces to this publication include Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 06-15, *Traffic Control Point Operations OIF* (Operation Iraqi Freedom), which examined escalation of force (EOF) procedures at U.S.-controlled checkpoints in Iraq; and CALL Handbook 07-21, *Escalation of Force*, which extended analysis of EOF procedures beyond checkpoint operations to full spectrum operations. These products as well as this handbook contain operational-based vignettes that typify situations where EOF decisions (“shoot or don’t shoot”) are analyzed. Let’s revisit some key definitions at this point.

EOF-related definitions:

- EOF is defined as sequential actions that begin with nonlethal force measures (visual signals to include flags, spotlights, lasers, and pyrotechnics) and may graduate to lethal measures (direct action) to include warning, disabling, or deadly shots to defeat a threat and protect the force.
- Defensive actions are defined as EOF procedures that terminate with successful employment of nonlethal means (hand-and-arm signals, colored flags, spotlights, pyrotechnics, or any other available resource).
- EOF procedures are not a substitute for but are a part of the rules of engagement (ROE). EOF is an aspect of the ROE that helps commanders and Soldiers apply ROE principles for self-defense, use of force, military necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering. However, commanders and Soldiers must understand that ROE may limit EOF options. For example, warning shots may not be authorized by the ROE for a given operation.

The information below was initially published in CALL Handbook 07-21 and remains relevant for COIN and stability operations in Afghanistan, which is the primary focus of this product.

The focus of a COIN is the people, and nothing moves the population against one side or another as much as the indiscriminate use of force. Force may be unavoidable, but through planning, preparation, and training, the number of those incidents can be decreased and the lethality of the incidents reduced. Force must be perceived by the people as judicious, appropriate, and proportional to the threat while still protecting our Soldiers.

- Plan for both lethal and nonlethal means during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.
- Soldiers and leaders must know and rehearse EOF/ROE procedures.
- Detailed and innovative planning can extend reaction time.
- Develop contingencies for even routine missions.
- Staff planning and oversight can de-escalate situations.
- Consider available enablers in task organization—unmanned aircraft systems, counter improvised explosive device electronic warfare, quick reaction force, and biometrics—to mitigate risks and prevent potentially volatile events.
- Cultural sensitivities affect setup and operation of traffic control points, cordon and search, and convoys.
- Patterns kill; change routines to decrease the ability of the insurgents to attack, reducing the need for EOF.
- Plan for and employ force protection equipment to help increase reaction time and reduce unnecessary casualties.

Leaders must foster and maintain a command climate that preserves and protects not only the fighting force, but extends to the population—the strategic center of gravity. Leaders should do all they can to increase the time a Soldier has to make an EOF decision. Increased reaction time begins with recognizing situations likely to lead to an EOF event. Shaping the environment, anticipating follow-on effects, and developing contingencies with effective communications all facilitate the right response to a given situation.

Soldiers often must make split-second tactical decisions that may have unintended, far-reaching consequences with strategic implications. Rigorous, realistic, and innovative EOF predeployment training integrated into mission planning and execution will better prepare Soldiers and units to visualize upcoming challenges in a complex and often ambiguous COIN environment. The bottom line is that EOF is everyone's business—leaders and Soldiers alike.



Combined Joint Task Force-82
Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
June 3, 2009

Leaders of CJTF-82 and RC-E:


It is with great pride and honor that I assume the role of Commander, CJTF-82 and RC-E. The CJTF-101 staff and command achieved significant accomplishments over the last 15 months and made a positive and enduring impact across Afghanistan. It is our charter to compliment these efforts by continuing to build and reinforce the Afghan government's competence, capacity, and credibility. I look forward to working with each and every one of you in accomplishing this goal.

The next year promises to be a crucial year in the Afghanistan campaign. The increased troop presence in Afghanistan, coupled with a robust partnership program and a renewed focus on governance and development will bring visible gains in the expansion of essential services to the Afghan people. The historic and precedence setting elections later this summer represent a significant step for the Afghan people and, ultimately, the future of this country.

Remember always, we operate by, with and through our Afghan Partners; we protect the Afghan People; and we link them to their government.

The *All Americans* are honored to stand beside you as a coalition of nations, shoulder to shoulder with the Afghan people, unified in our effort, determined in our mission, and confident in our success.

All the Way!



Curtis M. Scaparotti
Major General, US Army
Commanding

Endnotes

1. "McChrystal Issues Directive on Civilian Casualties," Helen Hu, *Stars and Stripes*, 7 July 2009: "More than 2,100 civilians were killed in Afghanistan in 2008, according to a U.N. (United Nations) report released earlier this year. While militants were responsible for 55 percent of the deaths, 39 percent of the victims were killed by coalition and Afghan forces, the report stated."

2. “Mindful of Civilians, Pilots in Afghanistan Alter Tactics,” Eric Schmitt, *New York Times*, 14 July 2009.
3. “Afghan Air War: More Firefights, Few Airstrikes,” David Wood, *Afghanistan Journal* (PoliticsDaily.com), 23 August 2009.
4. “Afghan Civilian Deaths Decline Under New U.S. Tactics,” Laura King, *Los Angeles Times*, 28 August 2009.
5. Ibid.

Chapter 1

Protecting the Population


The operational environment (OE) in Afghanistan is complex and often ambiguous. The terrain varies widely from agricultural fields in lush green valleys to restrictive, mountainous terrain with limited and extended lines of communication on an expanded, distributive battlefield. Units must simultaneously plan for and execute full spectrum operations that include major combat operations, stability operations, and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations while deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Adaptability and flexibility are key tenets to achieve and maintain as conditions on the ground in areas of responsibility continually shift. The enemy is multifaceted and battle hardened from nearly 30 years of sustained fighting. Units must know the terrain and expect to face an enemy that fights effectively from platoon to battalion level.


Often tactical engagements have strategic consequences in the information age. Information spreads rapidly in near-real time whether or not it is grounded in truth. It is important for Soldiers to make the right decision on when to shoot or not, especially when the local population is intermingled in many circumstances. Rules of engagement and escalation of force procedures must be clearly understood and adhered to in the Afghanistan OE.

Achieving mission success during military operations in COIN extends beyond destroying the enemy's capacity to fight, while preserving friendly unit force protection. "Protection of the population is the mission." Protecting civilians from harm and preserving their property from collateral damage whenever possible should remain a paramount concern at all times.

The following three excerpts of documents—International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander's Initial Guidance, ISAF Commander's Tactical Directive, and ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance—outline General Stanley A. McChrystal's priorities on how to successfully conduct military operations and establish a blueprint for success.



**Commander
Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force
KABUL AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356**



Commander's Initial Guidance As of: 13 June 09

To the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of ISAF,

The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The outcome is important – and not yet decided. Our actions this year will be critical. We must, and will, succeed.

Success will be defined by the Afghan people's freedom to choose their future – freedom from coercion, extremists, malign foreign influence, or abusive government actions.

The outcome will be determined by our ability to understand and act with precision, the values we display, our unity of purpose, and our resolve.


The challenges to Afghanistan are complex and interrelated. Solutions will not be simple. The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that:

- Protects the Afghan people – allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of
- Provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency

This effort will be long and difficult – there is no single secret for success. As imperatives we must:

1. **Protect and Partner with the People.** We are fighting for the Afghan people – not against them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for success.
2. **Conduct a comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign.** Insurgencies fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential; but I believe our ultimate success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, partner nations, NGO's, and others to build the foundations of good government and economic development.
3. **Understand the Environment.** We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively demands a real appreciation for the positive and negative impact of everything we do – or fail to do. Understanding is a prerequisite for success.
4. **Ensure Values Underpin our Effort.** We must demonstrate thru our words and actions our commitment to fair play, our respect and sensitivity for the cultures and traditions of others, and an understanding that rule of law and humanity don't end when fighting starts. Both our goals and conduct must be admired.
5. **Listen Closely – Speak Clearly.** We must listen to understand – and speak clearly to be understood. Communicating our intentions and accurately reflecting our actions to all audiences is a critical responsibility – and necessity.
6. **Act as One Team.** We are an alliance of nations with different histories, cultures, and national objectives – united in our support for Afghanistan. We must be unified in purpose, forthright in communication, and committed to each other.
7. **Constantly Adapt.** This war is unique, and our ability to respond to even subtle changes in conditions will be decisive. I ask you to challenge conventional wisdom and abandon practices that are ingrained into many military cultures. And I ask you to push me to do the same.
8. **Act with Courage and Resolve.** Hard fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable losses will mark the days ahead. Each of us, from our most junior personnel to our senior leaders, must display physical, mental, and moral courage. Our partners must trust our commitment; enemies must not question our resolve.

You have my thanks for all that you have done, and will do. I promise to be the best partner I am able to be.



STANLEY A. McCHRISTAL
General, U.S. Army
Commander,
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/
International Security Assistance
Force, Afghanistan

Figure 1-1. ISAF Commander's Initial Guidance




Figure 1-2. ISAF Commander's Tactical Directive (page 1)

civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.

I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a complex battlefield will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and operate in accordance with my intent. Following this intent requires a cultural shift within our forces – and complete understanding at every level – down to the most junior soldiers. I expect leaders to ensure this is clearly communicated and continually reinforced.

The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security).

(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter the threat.

We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or execution of combat operations. Therefore:

Any entry into an Afghan house should always be accomplished by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and account for the unique cultural sensitivities toward local women.

No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, or fire into a mosque or any religious or historical site except in self-defense. All searches and entries for any other reason will be conducted by ANSF.

The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and counterinsurgencies are difficult to win. Nevertheless, we will win this war. I have every confidence in the dedication and competence of the members of our force to operate effectively within this challenging environment. Working together with our Afghan partners, we can overcome the enemy's influence and give the Afghan people what they deserve: a country at peace for the first time in three decades, foundations of good governance, and economic development.

Figure 1-2. ISAF Commander's Tactical Directive (page 2)



ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance¹
Protecting the people is the mission.
The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy.
ISAF will succeed when GIROA earns the support of the people.



ISAF's mission is to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) defeat the insurgency threatening their country. Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we (GIROA and ISAF) are in a struggle for their support. The effort to gain and maintain that support must inform every action we take. Essentially, we and the insurgents are presenting an argument for the future to the people of Afghanistan: they will decide which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success.

An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?

The Afghan people are a diverse mix of ethnicities and tribes with strong traditions and a fierce sense of independence. Their country has been scarred by 30 years of war, and the fabric of Afghan society has been badly damaged. Traditional tribal structures have been undermined deliberately by the insurgents; many communities have fractured. State weakness and corruption erode confidence in government. Nearly eight years of international presence has not brought the anticipated benefits. The Afghan people are skeptical and unwilling to commit active support to either side until convinced of a winning proposition.

We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their fears, frustrations, and expectations that we must address. We will not win simply by killing insurgents. We will help the Afghan people win by securing them, by protecting them from intimidation, violence, and abuse, and by operating in a way that respects their culture and religion. This means that we must change the way that we think, act, and operate. *We must get the people involved as active participants in the success of their communities.*

Every action we take must reflect this change: how we interact with people, how we drive or fly, how we patrol, how we use force, how we fund work programs and projects. This is their country, and we are their guests. We must think carefully about everything we do and understand the impact of our actions on the people we are here to partner with and protect. Security may not come from overwhelming firepower, and force protection may mean more personal interaction with the Afghan people, not less.

¹ This guidance applies to both counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan

Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 1)

How insurgents operate. Our task is complicated and threatened by a resilient, highly adaptive, and multifaceted insurgency. An insurgency is unlike a conventional military threat. The insurgent's attack is a secondary effort to discredit the government and provoke a counterinsurgent response that alienates the people. Corruption and abuse of power by government officials feeds into the insurgent narrative. Behind the smoke of battle, the insurgents are principally focused on political and social activities, to include information operations, designed to gain control over the population. In so doing, they displace the government's legitimacy.

We must understand how the insurgents compete in order to combat their strategy. They adapt to local conditions. They influence the population through both intimidation and attraction. In their propaganda they claim to protect Afghan culture and religion. They incite social strife and undermine traditional structures. In places, they control the roads, collect revenues, and mete out swift justice. They co-opt disenfranchised groups and pay young men to fight. They exploit ISAF mistakes and inappropriate actions to reinforce their argument.

Playing into their hands. A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador's cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent. This is predictable – the bull does what comes naturally. While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating.

First, an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply of fighters, and even leadership, is effectively endless. Roughly seventy percent of the Afghan population is under age 25. Vast unemployment, illiteracy, and widespread political and social disaffection create fertile ground for insurgent influence and recruiting.

The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turns "attrition math" on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: $10 - 2 = 8$. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: $10 \text{ minus } 2 \text{ equals } 20$ (or more) rather than 8. This is part of the reason why eight years of individually successful kinetic actions have resulted in more violence. The math works against an attrition mind-set. This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win we need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants.

Second, conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians

An ISAF unit in a relatively permissive area had a difficult time maneuvering large vehicles along a road because it was lined with fruit trees. To improve mobility, the unit had the trees cut down. Many people in the village had their livelihoods destroyed. IEDs began appearing along the road shortly thereafter.

Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 2)

die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them – we still failed to protect them from harm. Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family – and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our own demise.

Although disruption operations may be necessary at times, we must recognize their effects are temporary at best when the population is under insurgent influence or control. Sporadically moving into an area for a few hours or even a few days solely to search for the enemy and then leave does little good, and may do much harm. The local insurgents hide in plain sight and the people remain ambivalent. Once we depart, the militants re-emerge and life under insurgent control resumes. These operations are not only ineffectual, they can be counter-productive. In conducting them, we are not building relationships with people, and we are not helping Afghans solve Afghan problems.

In short, we don't have to be stupid or ineffective to fail – just misguided in our approach.

Changing our mindset. We need to think and act very differently to be successful. The will of the people is the Objective. An effective “offensive” operation in counterinsurgency, therefore, is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose – control of the population. We must think of offensive operations not simply as those that target militants, but ones that earn the trust and support of the people while denying influence and access to the insurgent. Holding routine *jirgas* with community leaders that build trust and solve problems is an offensive operation. So is using projects and work programs to bring communities together and meet their needs. Missions primarily designed to “disrupt” militants are not.

Think of counterinsurgency as an argument to earn the support of the people. It is a contest to influence the real and very practical calculations on the part of the people about which side to support. Every action, reaction, failure to act, and all that is said and done become part of the debate. The people in the audience watch, listen, and make rational choices based on who can better protect them, provide for their needs, respect their dignity and their community, and offer opportunities for the future. Ideology can influence the outcome, but is usually subordinate to the more practical considerations of survival and everyday life.

An ISAF unit was often taking rocket fire from nearby a certain village. Rather than raiding the village, the commander decided instead to find out more about them and the reasons for hostility. The ANA commander suggested an ANA patrol to learn more about the village. The patrol discovered the village was upset about a night raid that occurred over two years ago. He also learned education was important to the village but they had no school or supplies. The commanders sent another patrol to the village a few days with a truckload of school supplies. The next day, the village elders came to the base to meet with the ANA and ISAF commanders. They delivered over 100 thank-you notes from the children. Soon, several local projects were coordinated with the elders for the village – projects they owned. The rocket attacks stopped.

Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 3)

Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardless of how many militants are killed or captured.

We must undermine the insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative. Our argument must communicate – through word and deed – that we and GIRoA have the capability and commitment to protect and support the people. Together, we need to provide a convincing and sustainable sense of justice and well-being to a weary and skeptical populace. We must turn perceptions from fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence.

To be effective, therefore, we have to help change the local context so people are more attracted to building and protecting their communities than destroying them. Leverage economic initiatives and routine *jirgas* with community leaders to employ young men and develop peaceful means to resolve outstanding issues; create viable local alternatives to insurgency.

At the same time, it would be naïve to ignore the fact that the enemy often gets a vote on how we focus our time and energy. This is certainly the case in times of high kinetic activity as well as in the areas where the “shadow government” influences the population. There is clearly a role for precise operations that keep the insurgents off balance, take the fight to their sanctuaries, and prevent them from affecting the population. These operations are important, but, in and of themselves, are not necessarily decisive.

They *can* be effective when the insurgents have become so isolated from the population that they are no longer welcome, have been kicked out of their communities, and are reduced to hiding in remote areas and raiding from there. Setting these conditions throughout the year will enable kinetic operations to have an enduring impact rather than fleeting impact.

Keeping the right balance over time is critical and there is no mathematical formula for it. *Mobilizing the community* to participate actively for their own safety, stability, and success is the crux of counterinsurgency at local levels – and creates circumstances to end insurgent influence permanently.

We must know the people, their environment and aspirations, and work together with them to meet their needs. Strive to focus 95% of our energy on the 95% of the population that deserves and needs our support. Doing so will isolate the insurgents. Take action against the 5% – the insurgents – as

One ISAF unit and their partnered Afghan company were participating in a large shura in a previously hostile village. Over 500 people, to include former fighters, were in attendance. Nearly the entire village turned out. The unit had been working for months to build relationships with the elders and people. As the relationships strengthened and local projects began improving quality of life and employment opportunities, the village elders requested the meeting. During the meeting, two insurgents began firing shots at one of the unit’s observation posts. Knowing the stakes of the meeting, the young sergeant in charge of the OP told his men to hold their fire. He knew this was a provocative act designed to get him to over-react and ruin the meeting. He reported the incident. The shura continued. Later, the village elders found the two militants and punished them accordingly.

Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 4)

necessary or when the right opportunities present themselves. Do not let them distract you from your primary tasks:

Embrace the People. Build connections and be conscious of the need to pass them off to your successor. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation. Seek out the underprivileged, the disenfranchised, and the disaffected and bring them on the team. Understand the local grievances and problems that drive instability, and take action to redress them. Work with the children and students. Insist the ANSF and GIRoA officials support these efforts, and teach them to lead these efforts.

Use your relationships with the people, the ANSF, and the GIRoA officials to become an expert on the local situation. Get to know the neighborhood. Learn who is the most successful farmer and why, who feels excluded and why, and which families are the most powerful and who they are united to by marriage. Be a positive force in the community, shield the people from harm, and foster safety and security so people can work and raise their families in peace.

Carefully assess risk and project confidence – excessive force protection is distancing, not inspiring. Think of how you would expect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, among your families and your children, and act accordingly. The way you drive, your dress and gestures, with whom you eat lunch, the courage with which you fight, the way you respond to an Afghan’s grief or joy – this is all part of the argument.

Win the argument. Use localized development and economic support to bring community leaders and people together for their own success. Listen, share, and get buy-in. Build local ownership and capacity. Together with legitimate GIRoA leaders, work all local issues with the local shura and community. Foster ownership. As the Afghans say, “If you sweat for it, you will protect it.”

Partner with ANSF at all echelons. Our job is to hold them accountable for performance in serving the Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership – their success is our success. Live and train together, plan and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and information. Integrate your command and control structures. Put them in the lead and support them, even before they think they are ready. Coach them to excellence, and they will amaze you with how quickly they take charge.

Build Governance Capacity and Accountability. Developing good governance is everyone’s responsibility. Build capacity and accountability at all levels, down to local communities. Promote

A Police Mentor Team believed the District ANP Chief to be corrupt. After multiple attempts to facilitate a change in behavior, the PMT built a case to take to the Provincial leadership. The Provincial leadership conducted an operation that confirmed the evidence. They replaced the corrupt Police Chief with an honest, hard-working leader, and referred the removed Chief to the Afghan justice system. Although the process required many weeks, the PMT helped to empower Afghan leaders to take appropriate action to protect the population from this malign actor.


Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 5)

Afghan leadership that serves the people. Empower those who display competence, care, and commitment for their people. But be discerning and make distinctions. Confront self-serving officials who monopolize wealth and power and abuse the people's trust. Working alongside our Afghan counterparts, we must find incentives and mechanisms to change behavior, and demand Afghan leaders take appropriate action to hold corrupt officials accountable. Looking the other way or enabling government officials who fail to meet their obligations makes you part of the problem. Protecting the people not only requires protecting them from physical harm, but also from corruption and abuse of power.

Get better every day. Take action to improve stability in your area. Learn how to adapt, how to shape the environment, and how to be more effective with the community leaders and the people. Listen to our Afghan colleagues; talk with the Afghans you meet; ask questions about how we can improve and help them achieve their goals. Listen to their stories and what they want to tell you. You are authorized – indeed, it is your responsibility – to adjust your actions within the intent of this guidance to adapt to local conditions.

Over-communicate. Quickly share critical information and ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits -- be vigilant as the environment shifts and the enemy adapts. If you are comfortable, the enemy is probably ahead of you. To win, we must understand their strategy and learn from their successes and their failures – and from our own as well. Adapt faster than they are able to adjust.

We (GIROA and ISAF) will succeed by transforming the environment through local security, connecting responsive and credible governance to the community leaders and the people, and facilitating compelling alternatives to the insurgency. The people will decide the contest in GIROA's favor.


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Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 6)

ISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance: Key Points

The Afghan people are the Objective. Protecting them is the mission. Focus 95% of your time building relationships with them and, together with the Afghan government, meeting their needs.

Get rid of the conventional mind-set. Focus on the people, not the militants. By earning their trust and helping an accountable GIROA gain the support of the people, you take from the enemy what he cannot afford to lose – the control of the population.

Embrace the people

- Think before you act. Understand the consequences of your actions – how you drive, how you patrol, how you relate to people, how you help the community. View your actions through the eyes of the Afghans. If we harm Afghan civilians, we sow the seeds of our own defeat.
- Be an expert on the local situation. Build connections and hold routine *jirgas*. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Listen to the population and adjust accordingly. Earn their trust. Develop their ownership in the solution. If they sweat for it, they will protect it.
- Be a positive force in the community; shield the people from harm; foster stability. Use local economic initiatives to increase employment and give young men alternatives to insurgency. Demand that CERP, CIMIC and other capabilities support these efforts. Help Afghans solve Afghan problems.

Partner with ANSF

- Live, eat, and train together, plan and operate together, depend on one another, and hold each other accountable – at all echelons down to soldier level. Treat them as equal partners in success.
- Their success is our goal. Respect them; put them in the lead and coach them to excellence.

Build Governance Capacity and Accountability

- Facilitate and enable transparent and accountable governance from national to community level. Insist government officials serve the people; support those who do.
- Confront corrupt officials. Protecting the people requires protection from physical harm, corruption and abuse of power. With your Afghan counterparts work to change corrupt behavior that adversely affects the people and the mission. If the behavior does not change, demand the Afghan higher leadership take appropriate action.

Get Better Everyday

- Learn and adapt to the environment. Keep your skills sharp. Improve daily.
- Learn how to shape the environment, and how to achieve greater effects with the people more quickly. Listen to and learn from our Afghan colleagues.
- Communicate and share ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits – learn and adapt more quickly than the insurgent.

Figure 1-3. ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (page 7)

Chapter 2

Mission Planning

Predeployment training to support escalation of force (EOF) planning must be rigorous, realistic, and innovative. Results of well-thought-out EOF-integrated training will help prepare small units for the complex challenges they will face in counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. Detailed and innovative planning, staff oversight, and strong troop-leading procedures (TLPs) can extend EOF reaction time, allowing Soldiers to mitigate potentially volatile engagements. During intelligence preparation of the battlefield, both lethal and nonlethal means of force must be incorporated into mission planning, and follow-on effects must be weighed and adjusted during execution. Soldiers and leaders must know and rehearse rules of engagement (ROE) and EOF procedures, and units should develop contingencies for even routine missions. Planning for the emplacement of force protection equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase Soldier reaction time at potential EOF event areas.

Escalation of Force Mission Planning Considerations

Leaders at all levels should strive to constantly stay current on the area of operations (AO) and area of responsibility (AOR). Leaders gain and maintain situational understanding by using digital and analog communications to leverage information gathered from higher, lower, and adjacent units. Other sources of information include maps, intelligence summaries, situation reports, and reports from the local populace. The eight steps of TLP are the framework for small-unit EOF mission planning considerations. Integrate EOF into the eight TLP steps:

- Receive mission. Units must consider ROE/EOF implications of the mission.
- Issue warning order. Leaders must allocate time to integrate EOF procedures into preparation to include precombat checks (PCCs), precombat inspections (PCIs), rehearsals, and movement.
- Make a tentative plan:
 - Assess your training, equipment, and force protection capabilities (including nonlethal means) to counter threats.
 - Consider current and review past EOF incidents and locations in your AO and AOR.
 - Determine/assess if the civilian population is pro, anti, or neutral toward the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
 - Incorporate enemy pattern analysis into EOF planning.

- Consider enemy composition, disposition, strength, recent activities, ability to reinforce, and possible enemy courses of action, to include using civilians as cover.
- Assess the size, capabilities, and potential tactics within and outside the AO.
- Initiate movement. Be prepared to execute preplanned and rehearsed ROE/EOF procedures, including the effects of integrating enablers: fire support, explosive ordnance disposal, attack aviation, quick reaction forces, medical evacuation, and force protection equipment.
- Reconnoiter. Civil considerations that can affect ROE/EOF employment are:
 - Areas: urban or rural.
 - Structures: built up, battle damaged, religious, and so forth.
 - Local population disposition.
 - Local leaders' (tribal, religious, and civic) allegiance to the ISAF and influence on the local population.
- Complete the plan:
 - Provide clear ROE/EOF guidance in the commander's intent; develop contingencies that are adaptive to changing battlefield conditions.
 - Include information operations to get the message out, mitigate local population misunderstanding of events, and de-escalate volatile situations.
- Issue the operation order:
 - Include mission, risk management and safety considerations, and current ROE/EOF policies and procedures.
 - Adjust the plan based on updated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; troops to tasks; and available force protection equipment.
 - Make final coordination with adjacent units, ready-reaction forces, and higher headquarters prior to issuing the order.
 - Conduct an updated combined mission, safety, and ROE/EOF briefing, and backbrief to the commander or designated representative.

- Supervise. Leaders at all echelons must keep the higher headquarters command post informed of the unit's status, tactical situation, and force protection posture. Leaders and Soldiers must enforce ROE/EOF procedures during operations and report incidents.

Each EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. The lives of Soldiers and innocent civilians depend on the ability to be mentally and physically prepared to deal with each conceivable EOF situation that may arise. The mission comes first; however, judicious use of force is a proven combat multiplier supporting mission accomplishment. Lack of planning and rehearsing EOF-integrated scenarios during training may result in unnecessary casualties in operations. Effective EOF integration into predeployment training, mission planning, and execution reinforces ISAF force protection, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success.

Chapter 3

Training

The purpose of escalation of force (EOF) training is to improve leader and Soldier awareness when planning, preparing, and executing EOF methods to prevent unnecessary deaths of Soldiers and civilians. The desired end state is for Soldiers and leaders at all levels to understand and apply EOF procedures to lengthen response time and prevent unnecessary lethal force engagements. The following EOF-related tasks should be integrated into training:

- Soldiers at every level must understand EOF procedures before, during, and after an EOF event to include the possible second- and third-order effects and/or the strategic impact of EOF incidents that can lead to misperceptions by the local populace.
- Soldiers must continually train and rehearse EOF procedures at home station, during mobilization training and mission rehearsal exercises, and while deployed to a designated theater of operation.
- All Soldiers must understand EOF to prevent hesitation or second-guessing when making a decision to apply force.
- Units should be resourced with the correct force protection equipment to increase reaction time, reduce unnecessary EOF incidents resulting in the use of lethal force, and reduce casualties.

If these important EOF-related tasks are successfully integrated into training and Soldiers and leaders adhere to the training principles, unnecessary lethal force engagements can be reduced or eliminated. Adhering to EOF-trained principles also supports the goal of enhancing the partnership with local governments by reinforcing a positive image of coalition forces:

- EOF-trained Soldiers are able to make the right decision on what is a legitimate target.
- EOF training lengthens the preparation time to positively identify targets and apply force commensurate with the level of threat.
- EOF never limits a Soldier's inherent right to self-defense.

This chapter is organized for user convenience into three sections:

- Section I: Training for Potential Operations
- Section II: Training Checklists
- Section III: Joint Fires Training

Section I: Training for Potential Operations

This section provides military trainers with some common operational scenarios along with suggested reaction points and EOF considerations. The broad operational groupings include:

- Convoy operations
- Patrolling operations
- Traffic-related (checkpoint) operations
- Other operations

Convoy Operations

Night mission with suspected hostile activity

You are a gunner in a ten-vehicle night convoy. You are in an area where several attacks have occurred in the last few weeks. You see several flashes to the right, but you do not hear any gunshots. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You must have positive identification (PID) prior to engaging any target.
- You cannot engage the flashes of light at this point. The flashes could be anything from nonhostile civilian activity, to lateral friendly forces, to an attack.
- You must report the incident to higher headquarters.
- You must get “eyes on the target” prior to engaging.
- You should have been briefed if there are any friendly forces in the area.
- You must maintain and increase your situational awareness as it could be an attack.

Night mission with confirmed hostile activity

Assume the same facts as the above scenario, but now you have confirmed you are being engaged. You can see and hear the rounds impacting. You can identify the general direction from where they are originating, but you have not yet fixed the point of origin. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You cannot engage the target until you get PID (a reasonable certainty that the object of the attack is a legitimate military target). This is more difficult because it is nighttime.

- You must get a fix on the source of fire before you can engage the target. In this circumstance, you may engage the origin of the muzzle flashes.
- You do not need absolute certainty for PID; rather, you just need reasonable certainty.

Mission through a village with hostile activity

You are a gunner in a convoy heading southbound through a village. You are passing an outdoor market. There are visible coalition forces in the area as well as a number of local nationals in the market. You observe a number of young men with weapons, who begin to fire at your convoy. You can clearly identify them, but they are surrounded by a number of civilians who do not appear to be supporting them. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You clearly have hostile acts and PID.
- Under the ROE you can engage the target.
- In this scenario, the risk of collateral damage to both local national and coalition forces might be too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress safely.
- Your response should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude but still defeat the threat.
- Shoot? Maybe.
- Move? Definitely.
- Communicate? Absolutely.

Mission with suspected hostile activity

Your convoy is on the outskirts of a city approaching an overpass. A crowd is gathering in the area just beneath the overpass. You see a man with an AK-47 running in an alley toward the overpass. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.
- Use EOF to negate the potential threat.
- Remember that locals may legally have small arms for the protection of their homes.
- Attempt to identify the individual carrying the weapon.
- Do not engage unless there are further indications of hostile intent or a hostile act.

Mission along a highway with definite hostile activity

You are in the lead armored vehicle escorting a four-vehicle convoy along a highway. There is a flash behind you followed by a loud explosion as one of the nontactical vehicles in the convoy disappears in a cloud of dust and smoke. You then see two males 200 meters away from you mount a motorcycle and speed away. You also see an orange sedan back out of a driveway 150 meters south of your position and speed away. Three males standing 100 meters up the road run into a nearby house. You start taking small-arms fire from a different house 150 meters west of your position. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You should respond to the hostile fire coming from the house with deadly force.
- You should act on who and what is linked to the attack. The individuals may be fleeing for their own safety. Do not engage the motorcycle, car, or people running away from the attack as there is no evidence to conclude they possess hostile intent or have committed a hostile act.
- You may detain people fleeing in order to gather/collect intelligence.

Mission with hostile improvised explosive device (IED) attack

You are in a convoy on the outskirts of a city when the convoy suffers an IED attack. As you focus your attention on the location of the IED, you notice two individuals in civilian clothes and no weapons jump up out of hiding about 80 meters away from where the IED exploded and run away from you. You quickly ascertain the individuals were within command-detonation range of the IED. Command-detonation is a common method of detonation. What can you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You may engage the individuals with the necessary force, including deadly force, to prevent their escape if you are reasonably certain they command-detonated the IED.
- Whether you can engage depends on all of the circumstances and whether you are reasonably certain the fleeing individuals detonated the IED and are attempting to evade capture. If so, these individuals have committed a hostile act against coalition forces, and you may respond in self-defense with necessary and proportional force.

Patrolling Operations

Dismounted with suspected hostile activity

You are in a dismounted patrol, and your unit sees an individual digging on the side of a route frequently traveled by the unit. The individual sees the patrol approaching and flees from the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You have reasonable grounds to detain the individual for questioning. However, although the digging may seem suspicious, the activity of digging a hole by itself is not a demonstration of hostile intent. It is possible that there could be additional facts such as digging holes in a known red zone where U.S. forces are attacked with IEDs that would make the patrol believe the man is actually a threat to your unit.
- You should not use deadly force unless you feel the individual poses a threat. You can give chase and physically restrain the man, but you should not fire warning shots to stop the man or shoot at him unless there is a threat action against your unit.

Mounted with suspected IED installers

During a patrol, your unit sees two men digging on the side of a road frequently traveled by U.S. forces. You know there have been multiple attacks with buried IEDs on this stretch of road within the last 2 weeks, and the S2 has templated this particular area for possible IED attacks in the next 72 hours. You also know that farmers in this area do not dig at this particular time of day. The men see the patrol and flee.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- A determination of hostile intent is based on all the available facts and evidence. The threat may not be immediate or instantaneous. The facts known to the patrol make it reasonable to believe the individuals should be detained. There is also reason to believe the men pose a hostile threat to the patrol.
- You should use EOF measures to include warning shots and if necessary deadly force. If circumstances allow for it, less than lethal force should be used; however, you may immediately use the full range of EOF measures.

Mounted or dismounted with hostile activity

During a patrol, you see two adult men digging a hole beside a well-traveled route. You see one of them has an AK-47 and the other has a bundle of wires. Your patrol attempts to stop the men, who flee at the sight of the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Given the facts, there are reasonable grounds to detain the men for tactical questioning. Furthermore, there is evidence that the men are demonstrating hostile intent. Under the standing (ROE) definition of imminent use of force, the use of force does not necessarily have to be immediate, and based on all the facts, you could reasonably conclude U.S. forces were threatened with force.

- You may use force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the men from escaping. You should, if possible, use EOF measures to include firing warning shots. If at any time you feel a threat to your patrol's safety (for example, one of the men turns and points the AK-47 in the patrol's direction), you may immediately engage the men with deadly force.

Traffic-Related (Checkpoint) Operations

Mobile/hasty traffic control point (TCP)

Your squad/team is part of a security force in an IED clearing operation. A vehicle in your convoy is hit by an IED. You take immediate action by employing the "5 Cs": confirm, clear, check, cordon, and control.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Unmarked vehicle approaches the area and you are unable to identify the occupants.
- Unmarked vehicle approaches your position and does not heed warnings.
- Shots are fired at the convoy by an unknown assailant.

Fast approaching vehicle—unknown hostility

Your convoy/patrol reports a vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed from the rear. You use hand-and-arm signals to wave the vehicle off, but the vehicle continues. You fire a warning shot (nonlethal or lethal) and the vehicle stops. The two civilians in the vehicle jump out.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Vehicle's high-speed approach.
- Driver does not respond to warnings.
- The occupants' reaction (threatening or nonthreatening posture) after vehicle stops.
- Trigger point: safe separation.

Fast approaching vehicle that appears hostile

You are the lead vehicle in a 20-vehicle northbound convoy on a busy road. Your convoy has slowed to 10 miles per hour due to traffic and road conditions. You see a civilian vehicle driving southbound at a high rate of speed in the northbound lanes about 150 meters away. You attempt to wave the vehicle off, but it continues to approach. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You must maintain or increase situational awareness since civilian drivers often disregard traffic laws.
- A vehicle passing a convoy is not by itself a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. However, the vehicle is traveling in the wrong direction and has disregarded your attempts to wave it off. At this point the graduated use of force is authorized. Shouting will likely not have any effect. If you have other methods available to you such as green light lasers or flare pens, use them. Show your weapons. Consider other available measures to get the driver's attention.
- When you are reasonably certain that the driver's intent is hostile, engage to disable the vehicle and, if necessary, apply lethal force to kill the driver.

Other Operations

Securing incident site

Your squad/team is providing security in a built-up area when a vehicle explodes, killing two civilians and wounding several others. Civilians are trying to surround the vehicle while your squad/team tries to keep them back. People are observed moving on the rooftops (dense, urban environment). Shots are fired. Your squad/team reacts to the situation while still providing security.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Weapons observed in crowd or on top of roof.
- Suspicious personnel in crowd.
- Hostile and/or curious crowd.
- Crowd responds to instruction or does not respond favorably.
- Shots fired at coalition forces.

Cordon and search—suspected bomb builder

U.S. and coalition forces receive an intelligence report the suspected enemy has bomb-building devices in an apartment building. There is an extended family living there. Your squad's/team's task is to search and clear the building. You could receive light to heavy resistance when you enter the building.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Personnel with weapons in rooms.
- Discovery of bomb-building material.
- Separate and search occupants.

Cordon and search—suspicious individual

You are conducting a cordon and search of a neighborhood when you see an individual acting suspiciously. The on-scene commander decides to stop and temporarily detain the individual for tactical questioning. The individual flees from the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- The individual is not demonstrating hostile intent because there is no imminent threat of force against the unit. The unit does, however, have the authority to detain the individual based on the circumstances. The unit may at this point use proportionate force (give chase, tackle the individual, and restrain him) to stop the individual.
- Under these circumstances, lethal force would not be authorized under the ROE because it would not be proportionate to the threat the individual poses to the unit. If lethal force was not authorized, then a warning shot would not be authorized.

Section II: Training Checklists

This section provides military trainers with a set of four common checklists to assist with EOF training and/or prepare for actual operations. These checklists are not all inclusive. Trainers are urged to tailor training tasks to their particular requirements. The four checklists include:

- Troop leading
- Interpreter operations
- Checkpoint operations
- Vehicle search

Troop Leading Checklist

| Training Tasks | Go | No-Go |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| 1. Did unit leadership plan and prepare for EOF procedures before start of shift? | | |
| 2. Did unit leadership inspect necessary equipment prior to shift? | | |
| 3. Did unit rehearse EOF procedures? | | |
| 4. Did unit use audible warnings to warn (horn, air horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, and siren)? | | |
| 5. Did unit use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, and signs)? | | |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 6. Did unit show weapons and demonstrate intent to use them? | | |
| 7. Did unit attempt nonlethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio signal, and signs)? | | |
| 8. Did unit fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat)? | | |
| 9. Did unit use disabling fire (tires, engine block, and windows)? | | |
| 10. Did unit use proportional deadly force (if necessary)? | | |
| 11. At the conclusion of EOF, did leadership address ways to improve or sustain? | | |
| 12. If necessary, did unit skip EOF procedures to ensure the safety of the entry control point (ECP) and apply deadly force (if required)? | | |

Interpreter Operations Checklist

| Training Tasks | Go | No-Go |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| 1. Train the interpreter to perform duties in the manner you desire. | | |
| 2. Treat interpreters with respect and in a professional manner. | | |
| 3. Ensure interpreter’s safety and security at all times. | | |
| 4. Remember interpreters are not Soldiers (contractual and ROE limitations). | | |
| 5. Do not forget interpreter’s physical or emotional needs. Rotate interpreters when necessary (40–50 minute rule). | | |
| 6. Do not insult or make disparaging remarks about indigenous people. | | |
| 7. Look at the person you are conversing with (not the interpreter). | | |
| 8. Don’t talk to the translator but to the person you are addressing; avoid saying “Tell him that....” Speak naturally but slowly and distinctly. | | |
| 9. Watch your body language, intonation, and tone; convey openness (or at least directness). | | |

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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|--|--|--|
| 10. Use simple and concise language where possible. | | |
| 11. Monitor reaction of conversation partner. | | |
| 12. Be careful with terminology and acronyms (military language can be difficult for civilians). | | |
| 13. Ask questions of the conversation partner to ensure the interpreter correctly interpreted what you said (or even interpreted at all). | | |
| 14. Learn early about cultural and social norms. | | |
| 15. Choose an appropriate interpreter (a female or young person will not work in some situations). | | |
| 16. Ensure interpreter translates exactly what is said and suppresses personal feelings or opinions. When unsure, ask the interpreter to restate to you exactly what he/she just said. | | |
| 17. Avoid idioms (“pig in a poke”) or cultural allusions (“road runner”). | | |

Checkpoint Operations Checklist

| Training Tasks | Go | No-Go |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| 1. Leaders conduct reconnaissance of checkpoint and coordinate to execute a relief in place with occupying unit. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Assess any additional equipment required. b. Determine quality of barriers and protective measures. c. Account for number of weapons positions and any observation posts to be manned. d. Determine if civil police are available to conduct searches and methods are available to search females. | | |
| 2. Leaders brief personnel and task-organize to accomplish assigned task. | | |
| 3. Leaders coordinate for or request additional assets to accomplish improvements to checkpoint. | | |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| <p>4. Unit executes relief in place.</p> <p>a. Leader or designated representative accepts and acknowledges receipt of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed facilities and assets. • Ammunition stockpiles. <p>b. Outgoing unit personnel brief incoming personnel on specific duties.</p> <p>c. Incoming unit conducts on-site rehearsal of stop-and-search procedures under scrutiny of outgoing unit.</p> | | |
| <p>5. Unit commences checkpoint operations.</p> <p>a. Shifts established.</p> <p>b. Shift personnel inspected before assuming duties (similar to guard mount):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proper uniform • Proper equipment <p>c. Review ROE and checkpoint standing operating procedures.</p> | | |
| <p>6. Unit executes routine operations.</p> <p>a. Vehicle approaches and security reports.</p> <p>b. Barrier sentry moves into position to stop vehicle.</p> <p>c. Barrier sentry allows vehicle to pass forward into checkpoint on signal from checkpoint noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). No more than one vehicle is allowed into checkpoint at one time.</p> <p>d. NCOIC/designated sentinel inquires purpose of vehicle and examines papers, identification, registration, trip authorization, and so forth.</p> <p>e. Security elements cover NCOIC/designated sentinel while another guard looks into the interior of vehicle for suspicious objects.</p> <p>f. NCOIC/designated sentinel allows vehicle to pass.</p> | | |

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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| <p>7. Unit conducts a stop and search.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Occupants of vehicle (except driver) are moved to a personnel search area. b. Driver provides papers to NCOIC for examination. c. Driver asked to open all doors, trunk and engine covers, and other compartments as needed. d. Driver (covered by a guard) remains nearby to observe search of vehicle. e. Searcher (armed with pistol) uses mirror and flashlight to check vehicle undercarriage first. f. Searcher examines interior of vehicle. | | |
| <p>8. Search of personnel or vehicle identifies contraband or prohibited items.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Searcher announces discovery. b. NCOIC informs personnel they will be detained for questioning and any prohibited items will be confiscated. c. Detained persons move to detainee holding area until military or civil police arrive. d. Vehicle is moved out of search area and checkpoint but is kept in a place where it can be observed. | | |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| <p>9. Unit reacts to vehicle attempt to run through checkpoint. Unit executes EOF procedures in accordance with ROE.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Sentry normally cautious on approach of single-operator vehicle. b. Sentry shouts to halt vehicle. Vehicle fails to stop. Sentry alerts checkpoint personnel of run-through attempt. c. Leader orders driver or occupants to dismount and move away from vehicle. If driver is injured and unable to comply, leader keeps personnel in protective positions for at least 15 minutes in event of a delayed-action explosive device. d. Leader and medic or combat lifesaver (with security) move to vehicle. e. First aid administered. Leader surveys vehicle. f. Leader reports action to higher headquarters. g. Leader posts new shift. Shift on duty during incident prepares witness statements and waits for investigation team from higher headquarters. h. Checkpoint assault element engages in accordance with the ROE. | | |
|--|--|--|

Vehicle Search Checklist

| Training Tasks | Go | No-Go |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| <p>1. Leader task-organizes unit to accomplish assigned task. Task organization includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security elements • Sentries • Search teams • Reserve • Aids to conduct search: mirrors, lights, and dogs | | |
| <p>2. Unit executes vehicle search.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Vehicle approaches and security reports. b. Barrier sentry moves into position to stop vehicle. c. Barrier sentry allows vehicle to pass forward into checkpoint on signal from ECP NCOIC. No more than one vehicle allowed into the ECP at one time. d. NCOIC/designated sentinel inquires purpose of vehicle and examines papers, trip authorization, and identification. Security elements cover NCOIC/designated sentinel while another guard looks into interior of vehicle for suspicious object or hidden contents. e. NCOIC/designated sentinel allows vehicle to pass. | | |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| <p>3. Unit conducts a stop and search.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Repeat steps 2a through 2c above. b. NCOIC/designated sentinel directs vehicle into search area. c. Search team begins search. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Occupants of vehicle (except driver) moved to personnel search area. (2) Driver asked to open all doors, trunk and engine covers, and other compartments as needed. (3) Driver remains nearby (covered by guard) to observe search of vehicle. (4) Searcher uses mirrors and flashlight to check vehicle undercarriage first. Searcher looks for new electrical wiring, unusual configurations, and strapped-on or taped packages. (5) Searcher examines interior of vehicle. | | |
| <p>4. Unit conducts personnel search.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Unit provides security to individual conducting searches. b. Searcher conducts same-sex contact search. c. Searcher conducts different-sex noncontact search. | | |
| <p>5. Search of personnel or vehicle identifies contraband or prohibited items.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Searcher announces discovery. b. NCOIC informs personnel they will be detained for questioning and any prohibited items will be confiscated. c. Detained persons moved to detainee holding area until arrival of military or civil police. d. Vehicle is moved out of search area but is kept in a place where it can be observed. e. NCOIC reports action to higher headquarters. | | |

Section III: Joint Fires Training

Joint fires training—such as the partnership of the Operations Group at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA, with the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Green Flag West (GFW) at Nellis Air Force Base, NV—are providing U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and USAF fighter squadrons with joint air attack team (JAAT) training to prepare these units for the rigors of combat in Afghanistan. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) help support this joint training initiative.¹

The goal of the exercise is to synchronize USAF close air support (CAS) with U.S. Army attack helicopters, artillery, and mortar fires to provide decisive combat power at the right time and place to support the maneuver force’s ability to defeat a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy while limiting collateral damage. The NTC employs JAAT situational training exercises where BCTs and other joint assets gain the experience of planning, coordinating, and executing sequential fires with precision munitions under similar conditions they will face in Afghanistan.

This training helps educate and improve the visibility of joint fires observers (JFOs) within the U.S. Army on how they can be used by the BCT and integrated with joint terminal attack controllers so the ground commander is confident in using CAS assets to defeat the threat. The JFO helps speed up the targeting process and provides more accurate and timely fires that increase combat effectiveness while reducing the potential of friendly fire and collateral damage.² This type of joint training experience may prove invaluable for units deploying to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), where EOF considerations to safeguard civilian lives and property are central to mission success.

The GFW provides USAF fighter squadrons and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets with an opportunity to train in a live, robust JAAT environment with their U.S. Army counterparts before deployment to theater. It provides BCTs with the opportunity to integrate USAF CAS capabilities and execute missions employing precision munitions that help limit the loss of innocent civilians and their property on the battlefield. This promotes a better understanding of weapons effects for BCT commanders and staffs while replicating conditions that they will soon experience in the Afghanistan operational environment.

Not every U.S. Army brigade or BCT will have the opportunity to establish a habitual joint training relationship with USAF CAS assets prior to OEF deployment in joint exercises such as GFW. However, units must understand how to plan and effectively execute air-to-ground integration with joint forces in addition to employing organic U.S. Army CAS assets (attack aviation).

Chapter Summary

EOF procedures integrated into training are intended to replicate the operational environment that Soldiers face every day. EOF training has the primary goal of improving both leader and Soldier reactions when graduated response is necessary.

Demonstrating appropriate EOF procedures begins with a mindset that balances offensive and defensive operations. The ultimate benefit of EOF training is the prevention of unnecessary loss of life and injuries to Soldiers and noncombatants. The presence of perceived hostile action or demonstrated hostile intent only creates

the necessity to act or respond. The guidelines for proportionality mandate that the action or response be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude based on the totality of circumstances. Lethal force cannot be the default option. Other options to include military nonlethal weapons and capabilities must be available and used when appropriate.

Commanders report there is a direct correlation between increases in EOF incidents and the number of fratricide incidents. Everyone must maintain a heightened sense of situational awareness of the immediate environment, including visibility on elements that are not normally part of the organic task organization (contractors on the battlefield, nongovernmental organizations, interagency personnel, and multinational reconstruction personnel).

EOF incidents involving unwarranted lethal action negatively affect short- and long-term military objectives, adversely affect the ability to foster a strong partnership with the local population, and impede progress in establishing normalcy.

Endnotes

1. "NTC and Green Flag West Provide Joint Air Attack Team Training for 4th BCT, 1st Infantry Division," Casey Bain, JFIIT, USJFCOM, News Release 01-06-08, 15 June 2009.
2. Ibid.

Chapter 4

Actual Operations

Escalation of force (EOF) incidents remain a challenge in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On the one hand, units must provide for force protection. On the other hand, there is a perception that on occasion, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) engages in indiscriminant killing, which undermines information operations and public affairs campaigns. This chapter will examine actual missions and real-world vignettes from the Afghan theater of operations. The chapter is organized into two sections:

- Section I: Firefight Scenarios from Tangi Valley Tango, Afghanistan
- Section II: Best Practices Employed by a Military Police (MP) Battalion

Initial observations, insights, and lessons learned reveal:

- Contributing factors to EOF incidents include the following:
 - Incomplete guidance, training, and preparation.
 - Inadequate dissemination of information and training.
 - Lack of a public awareness campaign to educate the local populace on requirements at entry control points (ECPs) and checkpoints and during other operations where ISAF and the local populace interact.
- Every leader and Soldier must understand the following:
 - Convoy and combat patrol procedures
 - All means of available tactical-level communications
 - Checkpoint procedures
 - Actions at incident sites
 - Rules of engagement (ROE)/EOF procedures
 - Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of civilians (helicopter lift for urgent, life, limb, and eyesight)
 - EOF reporting procedures
 - Investigation of all EOF incidents
 - Evidence-collection procedures
 - Compensation and claims process for EOF incidents
 - Public awareness projects

- Convoy discipline and best practices:
 - * Road usage (convoys block road)
 - * Speed (convoys travel slowly)
 - * Procedures for overtaking/passing convoys

Section I: Firefight Scenarios from Tangi Valley Tango, Afghanistan

Introduction

The following three mission vignettes are first-person accounts of firefights from ambushes in the areas that illustrate enemy tactics, the range of responses available to allied forces, and the limitations on those responses. Protecting the civilian population from undue harm and unnecessary damage to property must remain at the forefront of mission planning and execution.

Operational Environment

Afghanistan's Tangi Valley is a region in the Wardak and Logar Provinces south of Kabul where the *mujahideen* notoriously defeated a Soviet Army division during the 1980s. The region is not known for poppy cultivation but has revenue streams from orchards and fields of winter wheat and summer fruits and vegetables, livestock, and illicit copper and chromite mines. Currently, the region is bracketed by roads that are plagued by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct-fire attacks (small arms and shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher [RPG] rockets) against allied forces, the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Mission 1: Direct support route clearance

Our unit was returning eastbound in the direction of Baraki Barach. The reception from villagers as we cleared at 10–15 kilometers per hour was chilly—no one responded to waves; no one smiled. In the mid-afternoon, groups of approximately 5 to 20 men gathered on doorsteps along the route to watch us. After reaching the turnaround point, we returned through the same village. This time, we noticed one or two men smiling at us as we drove through the village. We linked up with an allied unit that was accompanied by a small number of ANA personnel at the outskirts of the village. The units were linearly arrayed along the route and were going to conduct a search of a house. We provided some dismounts to watch for people trying to escape from the back of the house. After the unit finished the ANA-led search, we continued to move on. By this time it was late afternoon, and we had been on the route since early in the morning.

At approximately 1800 hours, with the sun beginning to set at our 5 o'clock position relative to the direction of travel, we entered an S curve. There was a small ridge on our left and a drop down to a creek on our right. I was in the third vehicle in the convoy (an RG-31 mine-resistant ambush-protected [MRAP] vehicle with an arm but no crew-served turret gun). As our vehicle entered the convex part of the curve, an RPG rocket fired from the 3 o'clock position in the valley and exploded at the surface of the road less than 10 meters to our front. The vehicle commander (TC) yelled a warning as he saw an RPG rocket fire from our right. We had just

enough time to brace. I was on the bench seat staring out the window directly at the 3 o'clock position, and the RPG rocket was followed shortly by AK-47 fire. The yellowish muzzle flash of the AK-47 was visible in the setting sun at a position in the valley approximately 300 meters to our right. The enemy had chosen a good position. In addition to the creek at the bottom of the five-meter drop to our right there was a clear valley floor and another wider creek. They were just on the other side, with a village above the creek bed to their rear.

I observed the shooter at the 3 o'clock position on the other side of the creek in the valley floor. The TC squeezed back to take a look. He confirmed this as the direction of the RPG rocket, and we returned fire through the firing ports while the TC squeezed through the roof turret with an M203.

As we began to return fire, another RPG rocket impacted and exploded just to the rear of our vehicle, which because of the curve in the road was the closest to the enemy's firing position and offered a broadside view of the MRAP vehicle. Suddenly, the insurgents opened fire from several positions at the 3 and 4 o'clock positions (positions from atop the creek bank). Our crew-served weapons opened up, and our vehicle TC tried to redirect the .50-caliber machine gun on the vehicle to our rear onto the RPG rocket-firing site.

With the sun setting rapidly behind the mountains on the other side of the valley, the ambient light conditions were too bright for night-vision devices and were less than optimal. In these conditions, the signature blue smoke cloud of an RPG rocket launch was difficult to detect with the naked eye, and we were dependent on first sightings and good communication to direct gunners. Targeting was further impaired because the signature glow of armor-piercing incendiary rounds from the .50-caliber machine gun burn bright on impact and can appear as a muzzle flash to the untrained eye.

As we sought to direct the fire of turret gunners, dismounts from our vehicle found themselves in two very different predicaments. Dismounts from the rear of the convoy were trying to flank the enemy from our 6 o'clock position. Dismounts from the front of the convoy had moved down the embankment to the closest creek bed, only to find themselves pinned flat on the ground behind a pancake-shaped boulder as AK-47 fire pummeled the bank a meter behind them and in the dirt around them.

As we returned fire from the vehicle, we noticed the muzzle flashes from the enemy at the 3 and 4 o'clock positions moving away from us towards a village, which would align our return fires with the flanking friendly dismounts. We lifted fires as the fleeing enemy ran headlong into our dismounts and squirted into the village beside them. When the pinned dismounts crossed the first and second creeks and climbed atop the creek bed on the other side of the valley, they linked up with the flanking dismounts and searched the village to no avail. We closed the troops in contact after two hours and continued back to our forward operating base (FOB) without further incident. Upon return to the FOB, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources reported two enemies killed in action and enemy fighters dragging their wounded from the valley.

Lessons learned:

- The enemy effectively uses the terrain to his advantage:
 - Hitting us in the curve meant we did not have visibility on all vehicles; therefore, we never saw the RPG rocket impact in the vicinity of the platoon sergeant's vehicle at the rear of the convoy.
 - Firing from the other side of the valley floor offered two obstacles (the creeks) for our dismounts to traverse, a clear field of fire to repel our frontal assault, and a village for the enemy to use as an egress route and as cover and concealment by mixing in with the population.
 - The setting sun behind the mountains to the enemy's rear prevented our use of night-vision devices, but the ambient light conditions were poor. With the setting sun at their backs, they had the advantage in visually identifying their targets.
- We did not make effective use of indirect fires. When the shooters were in the valley floor by the creek, they offered themselves as a suitable artillery target. Furthermore, illumination rounds from the M777s that were within range would have eliminated the optical/visual advantage the ambient light conditions offered the enemy.
- Dismounted flanking maneuver by elements to the rear of the convoy no doubt surprised the enemy as they tried to escape.
- Extended duration of the dismounted operations (greater than two hours) increased the risk of the enemy having time to emplace an IED on our previously-cleared return route.
- Dismounted movement across the valley floor (approaching one kilometer) and into the villages eliminated the possibility of supporting fires from the crew-served weapons on the vehicles.
- Boldness of the dismounted maneuver was probably unexpected and may have had some benefits in eliminating the enemy and relieving fire on the pinned dismounts and vehicles or in the emplacement of IEDs further down the route. However, the enemy could exploit repeated use of this technique to pull the dismounts into a fire-sack ambush.

EOF considerations:

- Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.
- You cannot engage the target until you get positive identification (PID) (a reasonable certainty that the object of the attack is a legitimate military target) according to the ROE. This is made more difficult because of the time of day.

- In this mission, the risk of collateral damage to civilians in the nearby village might be too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress safely.

Mission 2: General support route clearance

Our unit was clearing westbound in the direction of Wardak Province and Highway (Hwy) 1. The time was approximately midday, and our convoy was traveling at 10 kph as we scanned for IEDs. The villages along the route in the valley were uncharacteristically deserted, and the reception from those villagers we did see was restrained. No one responded to waves, and there were no smiles. The TC of the lead vehicle commented over the radio, “I have a bad feeling about this.” The feeling was shared by the Buffalo TC and me. The rest of the Buffalo crew consisted of four privates who were on their first mission.

Shortly thereafter, as the convoy entered an S curve, an RPG rocket was launched from the valley floor, again on the other side of a creek but in a recently plowed field on the far side of the valley. The RPG rocket’s trajectory took it behind the Buffalo, which was the fourth vehicle in the convoy behind an MRAP vehicle with a mine roller and two Husky mine-detecting vehicles. The Buffalo TC immediately called an “all stop” over the radio and called a direction and distance to the signature blue smoke cloud that marked the origin of the fire. In the daylight conditions, the smoke cloud was clearly visible against the light dirt of the creek bank behind it (about 300 meters away at our vehicle’s 9 o’clock position).

The TC and I exited the roof hatches of the Buffalo to return fire as the enemy directed small-arms fire toward our element from fighting positions to the right of the RPG rocket’s origin. As we returned fire, the crew-served .50-caliber machine guns and MK-19 grenade launchers directed fire toward the enemy positions. During the fray, fixed-wing close air support (CAS) in the form of F-15s called the combat observation and lasing team (COLT) and said they could not engage because they saw our rounds impacting in multiple locations (including MK-19 overshooting the target and impacting on the hillside on the other side of the village).

A second RPG rocket launched from a position approaching our vehicle’s 10 o’clock position crossed over the hood of our Buffalo while the TC and I returned fire. As our gunners consolidated fire of the crew-served weapons on an orchard that bordered the field where the shooters had originated, enemy firing ceased, and the F-15s, after a dazzling aerobatic display of force, radioed there were no longer enemy fighters in the area. We ceased fire after the 5–10 minute engagement and continued to clear westbound. As we continued on our way, the Buffalo TC commented that the engagement was not all the enemy had planned for the day. It was an ominous comment.

Lessons learned:

- The enemy effectively uses the terrain to his advantage:
 - Hitting us in the curve again meant that we did not have visibility on all vehicles.

- Firing from the other side of the valley floor with a village to their immediate rear would, under normal conditions, restrict the fires of our crew-served weapons and limit the use of fixed-wing CAS. It also afforded the enemy an egress route, as they no doubt slipped into the village and disappeared among the local nationals.
- Inexperienced gunners were firing in the general direction of the enemy, but they were unable to localize the target because everyone else, except the platoon leader who just lacked combat experience, were inexperienced privates. The platoon had only five combat veterans: the platoon sergeant, two squad leaders, and two sergeants. Part of this disorientation of fires might have been because the clockwise direction called over the radio was relative to the Buffalo vehicle that was, again, in the convex portion of the S curve relative to the enemy's position. Inexperience with the RPG rocket weapons system meant the gunners were unable to identify the characteristic smoke signal.
- Because of the scattered fires and proximity of the village, fixed-wing CAS could not engage targets and was effectively useless other than as a nonlethal display of force, no doubt tempered by the enemy's perception of allied ROE. It should be noted that the direct support route clearance patrol (RCP) had previously reported that whereas the visible presence of rotary-wing aircraft was a deterrent to enemy attacks, visible fixed-wing aircraft offered no such deterrent.
- Other direct-fire engagements on this road were all at sunset at approximately 1800 hours. Even though this was the first time the RCP had operated in this area of operations, the Buffalo TC's omen that this event was a precursor to things to come would prove accurate. Other than the gut instinct of a seasoned combat veteran (two tours in Iraq, one with the initial invasion and a second tour with a route clearance platoon), other indicators included the brief engagement, limited small-arms fire and only two RPG rockets, and the midday timing under excellent weather conditions. All suggested that this engagement fulfilled the enemy's intent to gauge our response, slow us in preparation for a subsequent engagement, and/or signal other insurgent elements further west in our direction of travel to our approach.

EOF considerations:

- Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.
- Use EOF to negate the potential threat.
- Your response should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude but still defeat the threat.
- Under the ROE you can engage the target.
- You cannot engage the target until you get PID (a reasonable certainty that the object of the attack is a legitimate military target).

- In this mission, the risk of collateral damage to civilians in the nearby village might be too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress safely.

Mission 3: General support route clearance

After the first engagement, our unit continued clearing westbound, crossing over the provincial border into Wardak Province headed towards Hwy 1. As we continued, we noticed little in the way of pedestrian traffic along the hardball road that traipsed through several villages. Shortly before 1600 hours, we passed from Logar to Wardak Province. Crossing this boundary was significant because each had its own operational commander.

As we passed through a village, our lead MRAP vehicle's mine roller hit an IED (homemade bulk explosive) dug under the asphalt of the narrow two-lane road. The MRAP vehicle was blown into the air. Soldiers in vehicles behind the Buffalo later testified they saw the MRAP vehicle above the Buffalo, the fourth vehicle in the convoy. The blast jack-knifed the MRAP vehicle and mine roller on its right side against a sheer cliff that bordered the road on the right.

In the Buffalo, the TC called forward three times with no response before he and I dismounted to move towards the downed vehicle. Two civilian contractors from Task Force Paladin, counter-IED (C-IED), one of whom was a retired special forces medic, dismounted at the rear of the convoy and moved forward to join the Buffalo TC and myself in evaluating casualties. While one C-IED contractor assumed a defensive position oriented towards the valley, the medic, Buffalo TC, and I began assessing casualties.

The MRAP vehicle TC and squad leader was suffering from a head injury, and he and his driver appeared to be out of sorts. The passenger in the back, who had been sitting on the bench directly over the blast (which had blown apart the axle assembly of the vehicle) was suffering from a head injury and complained of pain but appeared mobile. We gently pulled the turret gunner from the turret, which was approximately 18 inches from the cliff. He was complaining of abdominal pain, appeared to have a broken leg, and was bleeding from the mouth and left eye socket. As we eased him onto the stretcher and evaluated him, an RPG rocket detonated against the cliff wall about 10 feet above our heads. This initiated a vicious firefight that lasted for about 45 minutes. AK-47 and RPG rocket fire hit vehicles and ricocheted off the cliff to our rear.

During the firefight, we noticed that the ground surrounding us was beginning to saturate with fuel from the leaking tanks of the MRAP vehicle. The fire was originating from the valley floor at the convoy's 9 o'clock position, meaning that our right flank was exposed. Moving dismounts from the rear of the convoy would have exposed them to fire, and with two Huskies and a Buffalo, there was no crew-served weapon on the right flank. We took the 240B machine gun and ammunition off the turret of the overturned vehicle and set up a gun position on our right flank as we began to plan the movement of the casualties to vehicles at the rear. The Buffalo TC left the safety of the overturned MRAP vehicle to run back down the length of the convoy to move vehicles out of the way and to bring two MRAP vehicles forward to retrieve casualties.

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This task complete, he returned with an aid and litter team in tow to the overturned vehicle under fire. Informed that we were going to move the litter-borne casualty, dismounts and gunners now laid a blistering volume of fire on targets on the valley floor, aided by a sergeant operating a Gyrocam in the rear of the convoy who was localizing targets and directing gunners onto them.

On command, we lifted the litter and started carrying the casualty around the underside of the vehicle. The cliff prevented carrying him behind the vehicle, so a Soldier ran alongside the litter, between it and the enemy, to shield the casualty as we moved. When we got him to another MRAP vehicle, lifting the litter and casualty into the vehicle proved difficult. Only the tallest of us was able to support the head of the stretcher as we tried to lift it into the vehicle. It would not fit. Faced with this, we had the casualty slide off the litter and into a supported, reclined position in the floor of the MRAP vehicle, as its turret gunner returned fire. The other three casualties were ambulatory, but as one began to move, he complained of extreme back pain. We were under fire, and since he could move, we were already committed to this course of action. We supported him, but he had to run to another MRAP vehicle. He had no choice but to move on foot. He would be diagnosed later with a compression fracture of the L1 lumbar vertebrae.

The platoon leader tasked the attached COLT team to move back with the platoon sergeant's vehicle and to establish a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) for casualty evacuation. During the engagement, the COLT team had been communicating with F-15 fixed-wing CAS, which had localized enemy personnel in the valley. Soon thereafter, Apache gunships arrived on the scene, and the F-15s passed their targets on to the Apaches. However, the F-15s did not engage the targets because of their close proximity to civilians. When the MEDEVAC UH-60 helicopters came in to pick up the casualties, the HLZ was still under fire, so one of the Apaches made a strafing run down the valley floor to suppress enemy fires.

After loading the casualties onto vehicles and moving them back toward the HLZ, the dismounts moved back to the front of the convoy to reinforce our right flank and to secure sensitive items from the overturned vehicle. In the meantime, the Buffalo TC had arranged the vehicles so that dismounts could move with minimal risk under fire along the sheer rock wall on the right side of the road with the vehicles between them and the enemy in the valley.

After casualties were evacuated and enemy fire had subsided, the quick reaction force (QRF) from the operational environment's owner arrived and launched dismounts with C-IED team members into the valley floor. The command wire was traced, and the explosive ordnance disposal and C-IED teams processed the site and accounted for sensitive items from the overturned vehicles. That night, RCP wreckers dragged the overturned MRAP vehicle and mine roller back to the center of their position within the village, and the vehicle was secured in the center of the perimeter overnight. The next day, as the vehicle was set upright and prepared for towing by a crane brought in by the QRF, a special forces team with an ANA commando company swept the valley floor again. The Gyrocam operator said he saw three enemy dead with his camera; however, HUMINT reports suggested only two enemies killed in action. Of the four U.S. casualties, only the turret gunner and the Soldier with the compressed vertebrae were evacuated out of the theater. The other two casualties were hospitalized for observation and returned to duty within a week.

Lessons learned:

- The lead vehicle hit an IED dug into the side of an embankment on the left side of the road relative to the direction of travel. The command wire was buried for over ten meters before emerging and running several hundred meters. Detection might have been possible with a Husky; however, the IED was a homemade explosive packed tightly into a hole without metal, so unless the Husky could detect the presence of the wire or the detonator, it is unclear if it would have detected the IED.
- The two-ton weight of the mine roller probably prevented complete inversion of the MRAP vehicle. If the vehicle had been moving in the opposite direction, it likely would have rolled down the embankment.
- The enemy was patient and waited for us to move forward to assess casualties before opening fire, which indicates their understanding that MRAP vehicles and armored security vehicles are impermeable to their small-arms and RPG rocket fire.
- Narrowness of the road made it very difficult to bring vehicles forward to evacuate casualties. MRAP vehicles with room for casualties had to pass by a Buffalo and two Huskies.
- Once the litter-borne casualty was taken to the MRAP vehicle, the stretcher had to be lifted overhead by a 6' 6" Soldier to get it in a clear plane for insertion. Even then, the stretcher did not fit. The casualty had to slide off the stretcher and into a sitting position. (The rapid equipping force has new stretchers that are compatible with the constrained space of the MRAP vehicle's interior. Units should order these stretchers and make sure they are included in their casualty evacuation plans. Vehicles designated for casualties have enough room to quickly accommodate them. Prior to a mission, units should rehearse with all personnel the insertion of litters into an MRAP vehicle. Medics and noncommissioned officers [NCOs] should train to supervise this action under fire.)
- The COLT team proved invaluable in coordinating fixed- and rotary-wing CAS, establishing the HLZ, and coordinating the inbound MEDEVAC UH-60 helicopter.

EOF considerations:

- Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.
- Use EOF to negate the potential threat.
- Your response should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude but still defeat the threat.
- Under the ROE you can engage the target.
- In this mission, the risk of collateral damage to civilians in the nearby village might be too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress safely.

- You may engage individuals with the necessary force, including deadly force, to prevent their escape if you are reasonably certain they are manning a command-detonated IED.

Analysis

These three missions clearly demonstrate the EOF challenges small units encounter during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Of paramount importance is the protection of the civilian population from undue harm and unnecessary damage to property. The challenge to small-unit leaders remains balancing that consideration with the need to defend and protect Soldiers. Application of force must be perceived by the local populace as judicious, appropriate, and proportional to the threat.

Analysis of these firefights suggests many anti-Afghan force (AAF) best practices, including their use of terrain, how they target certain units, and their ad hoc communication techniques against allied electronic warfare. Detailed analyses of firefights, especially those that reoccur in the same geographical area, reveal emergent trends in enemy best practices.

Often, units conduct after action reviews (AARs) quickly after a mission and do not compile and analyze detailed accounts of the firefights (except for sworn statements for awards) at the company, platoon, and squad levels. Asking training Soldiers, NCOs, and officers to write accounts of engagements with the enemy is an effective way to make them think analytically about the engagements and develop new, creative ways to defeat the enemy in future engagements.

Section II: Best Practices Employed by a Military Police Battalion

MP are trained on EOF measures when dealing with the indigenous population during potentially volatile situations. Their training includes integration of nonlethal and lethal best practices and equipment. It is imperative that MP and all Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty, understand and correctly apply EOF procedures that enable alternatives to the use of lethal force.

Of equal importance is recognizing that a large percentage of the Afghan population cannot read, write, or understand the English language. This lack of basic communication skills with the indigenous population could make Soldier-directed written signs, hand signals and audible statements ineffective.

Apply the EOF measures below when responding to a hostile act or hostile intent.

Defensive procedures to employ during EOF incidents

- Use audible communications to warn (horn, air horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, and siren).
- Use hand-and-arm signals.
- Use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, and signs).
- Show weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.

- Attempt nonlethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio signal, and signs).
- Fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat).
- Use disabling fire (tires, engine block, windshield and/or windows).
- Use deadly force as a last resort (proportional to threat).

EOF incident actions:

- Physically restrain, block access, or detain.
- Fire a warning shot into the ground in the direction of the threat.
- Use the lowest caliber weapon assigned (a non-crew-served weapon); if possible, the first round should be a tracer.
- Fire into the engine block or windshield to help reduce or eliminate the threat.

Unnecessary deadly force engagements

Contributing factors:

- Predeployment training did not use current in-theater EOF policy and procedures.
- Training scenarios did not replicate the complex and often ambiguous environment in Afghanistan.
- Training did not include “what if” vignette drills to train best and worst case scenarios.
- Higher headquarters did not provide detailed EOF guidance to lower units.
- Leaders are not enforcing EOF standards.
- Leaders are not talking to Soldiers; Soldiers are not talking to each other.
- Units are not making EOF part of mission analysis before establishing traffic control points (TCPs) or conducting combat patrols.
- Units are not adjusting their standing operating procedures (SOPs) or battle drills to prevent excessive use of force incidents.
- Units are not integrating EOF into precombat inspections and precombat checks, actions on contact, battle drills, and AARs.
- Units are not meeting local leaders to make them aware of EOF procedures, which results in a lack of local community understanding of TCP operations.

- Units are not interacting with the Afghan population.
- Soldiers are not aware of Afghan calendar events that may significantly increase vehicle traffic.
- Soldiers are not aware of local business locations and operating hours in the vicinity of their TCP area of operations and coalition force combat patrols.
- Soldiers are not exercising positive control or muzzle awareness on weapons systems.
- Units are not consistently reporting EOF incidents in a timely manner.
- Units are not conducting constant reviews of EOF procedures.

Information required to prevent potential fratricide incidents:

- Location of adjacent units and TCPs.
- Coalition force movement control plan to include coalition forces scheduled movement credits, planned Afghan movements, and contractor movements.
- ANA and ANP movements and interagency and nongovernmental movements, if known.
- Aviation reconnaissance plan.
- QRF plan.
- ANA/ANP support at TCPs and/or their patrol patterns.
- MEDEVAC support (air, ground, military, and civilian).
- Vehicle recovery plan.
- Detainee transportation assets supporting evacuation plan.
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.

Escalation of Force Best Practices

Patrols traveling against the flow of traffic

Note: All distances are approximate and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]-dependent.

- Inform all elements in the convoy of the change in the direction of travel.

- Look approximately 100 meters ahead and assess a safe point to cross. If available, position an M1117 as the lead vehicle of the convoy to block traffic when crossing over.
- Alert oncoming traffic, and ensure the traffic comes to a complete halt.
 - Ensure all elements in the convoy are aware of the crossing point.
 - Ensure oncoming traffic is at a complete halt and the lane is clear where the convoy will travel.
 - Slowly cross the median and proceed in the new direction of travel.
- Lead vehicle should have a siren or use of a siren from within the element. Position siren so it is audible.
- Rear vehicle(s) of the convoy are positioned to provide security to allow the convoy to cross.
- Once all vehicles have crossed the median, rear security vehicles are positioned back in the convoy.
- Convoy continues mission at a reduced and safe speed, maintaining the ability to avoid oncoming traffic.
- If the patrol encounters an oncoming local national vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed:
 - Use siren, blow horn, flash lights, and use hand-and-arm signals.
 - Use proper EOF procedures if you fire a warning shot.
 - The driver must reduce speed and look for a safe location to maneuver the vehicle, if possible.
- Night and limited visibility movement best practices may be adjusted, but EOF procedures must be followed.

Warning shots, if permitted by ROE

- Warning shots should be used as a last resort immediately prior to the use of deadly force.
- 75 meters: Fire warning shots in the vicinity of the vehicle; be alert to the possibility of injuring innocent civilians; take prudent, necessary measures to avoid and/or mitigate collateral damage.
- 50 meters: Fire at the engine block of the vehicle to disable it.
- 25 meters: Fire aimed shots at the driver to stop the vehicle; fire no more rounds than necessary; stop firing as soon as the situation permits.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

- Establish and maintain 360-degree security; scan close in and out, high and low, around vehicle, and around the convoy.
- If situation permits, approach the vehicle and question the occupants.
- Present occupants with a preprinted claim card of instructions, and explain why warning shots were fired.
- Search the vehicle and occupants if you suspect or determine them to be a threat.
- If necessary, separate, restrain, and detain occupants.
- Maintain separate area for occupants during search.
- Do not allow anyone to enter the search area except authorized personnel; if possible or available, allow ANA or APA to search emergency vehicles and personnel who may arrive on site.
- Plan for the transport of detained and wounded individuals or individuals who were killed.
- Secure the vehicle at the scene; if security situation permits, employ biometrics to include digital photographs.
- Take statements from local nationals on the scene and from patrols once they return to the coalition outpost.

Dismounted troops in contact encountering IEDs

- Maintain 360-degree security; be prepared for multiple IEDs and follow-on attacks.
- Move away to an established safe distance (300 meters).
- Attempt to confirm suspected IEDs.
- Cordon off the area:
 - Direct personnel out of the danger area.
 - Do not allow anyone to enter the area except EOD.
 - Question, search, and detain suspects.
 - If security situation permits, employ biometrics to include digital photographs.
- Treat or evacuate casualties, and assess battle damage to the extent possible.
- Report situation using a 9-line IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO) format.

- Before engaging any target, you must have PID, defined as a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a legitimate military target.
- The convoy commander will determine if the vehicle forward of the IED will proceed to the rally point established during the battle drill or will consolidate 300 meters in front of the IED and establish a fighting position.

Mounted troops in contact encountering IEDs

- Move out of the kill zone.
 - Drivers who cannot brake quickly enough to avoid coming within 100 meters of the kill zone (IED) should speed up and move through the kill zone.
 - Drivers who can stop before entering the kill zone should back up 300 meters immediately without breaking contact with the forward element.
- Maintain 360-degree security; scan close in and far out, up high, and down low.
- While staying as far back as possible, scan the immediate sector using optics for more IEDs.
 - Move away at an established safe distance.
 - Plan for 300 meters safe distance.
- Cordon off the area.
 - Direct people out of the danger area.
 - Do not allow anyone to enter the area except EOD.
 - Question, search, and detain suspects.
 - If security situation permits, take digital photographs.
- Treat or evacuate casualties, and assess battle damage to the extent possible.
- Report situation using a 9-line IED/UXO format.
- Before engaging any target, you must have PID.
- The convoy commander will determine if the vehicle forward of the IED will proceed to the established rally point or will consolidate 300 meters in front of the IED and establish a fighting position.

Analysis

Leaders must continue to ensure increased emphasis on EOF measures by providing in-depth training down to the user level and by providing nonlethal equipment to convoys. Convoy commanders traveling throughout Afghanistan are faced with the difficult decision on when to apply lethal force. Integration and application of EOF-related best practices along with the use of nonlethal equipment must be continually and vigilantly reinforced during actual operations. EOF-related best practices should be emphasized during relief in place/transfer of authority from one unit to another in the Afghan area of operations.

Chapter 5

Tools and Equipment

Section I: Nonlethal Munitions and Tools

The use of nonlethal weapons and munitions provides a safer, less-than-lethal alternative to warn and deter individuals during potential escalation of force (EOF) incidents. Units should use nonlethal munitions and tools whenever possible during EOF incidents. Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors should conduct proper training, familiarization, and certification with each type of nonlethal munitions and tools prior to their use.

Nonlethal Paint Gun



Figure 5-1. FN303 nonlethal launcher (nonlethal paint gun)

The FN303 is a rifle-mounted, rapid fire, multi-shot, pneumatic-powered “paint ball”- type nonlethal weapon system with high accuracy against personnel targets out to 80 to 100 meters and area targets out to 150 meters. Recommend units employ either washable and/or training round ammunition.

40-mm Nonlethal Munitions



Figure 5-2. M1006, 40-mm nonlethal cartridge (sponge grenade)

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Sponge grenades have greater than 85 percent accuracy at 30 meters (E-silhouette) and greater than 60 percent accuracy at 50 meters (E-silhouette) when fired from an M16A2/M203 or an M4/M203. Engagement range is 10 to 50 meters.

Considerations

- Fatal injuries are possible at employment distances of less than 32.8 feet (10 meters).
- At distances of 10 meters to 50 meters, target area should be center of mass.
- Training must reinforce that head shots are not acceptable.
- Do not skip fire this round. Round becomes unpredictable upon striking the ground.
- Round is most effective against individually selected targets (point round).

| Department of Defense Identification Code for 40-mm Munitions | |
|--|---|
| BA06 | CTG, 40-mm M1006 nonlethal (N-L) |
| BA07 | CTG, 40-mm rubber baton (N-L) |
| BA08 | CTG, 40-mm rubber ball (N-L) |
| BA09 | CTG, 40-mm wooden baton (N-L) |
| BA13 | CTG, 40-mm crowd dispersion M1029 (N-L) |

Training requirements for 40-mm nonlethal ammunition

- Pretraining:
 - M203 qualification.
 - Capabilities briefing on all types of 40-mm nonlethal ammunition being used (specifications and lethal limitations).
- Familiarization fire:
 - Engage stationary truck (4' x 8' panel) at 25 meters from standing position (1 round).
 - Engage stationary truck at 50 meters from standing position (1 round).
 - Engage stationary truck from a stationary M1114 at 25 to 50 meters (1 round).

- EOF exercise:
 - Individual basic load consists of six M1006 rounds.
 - Fire 1 round at a truck target at 50 meters from a stationary M1114.
 - Escalate force to M4/M6 to engage truck target at 25 meters from a stationary M1114.

Green Light Lasers

Z-Bolt BTG-2/10 (laser pointer): Output power is less than 5 milliwatt (mW) (Class IIIa laser). Eye safe distance is 10 meters.

B.E. Meyers Mini-Green: Output power is 125 mW (Class IIIb laser). Eye safe distance is 18 meters (unaided viewing) and 12 meters (with magnifying optics).



Figure 5-3a. Green light laser



Figure 5-3b. Green light laser



Figure 5-3c. Green light laser

Green light laser control measures and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)

The following TTP provide general guidance to prevent misuse of the green light laser systems. Maximum exposure times should be calculated for the device at the intended ranges and briefed to operators. Commanders must ensure that Soldiers are aware of the warnings and hazards for each type of laser.

Employ laser systems as an EOF tool when:

- Lethal force is not appropriate.
- Lethal force is justified and available for backup, but lesser force may subdue the aggressor.
- Lethal force is justified but could cause collateral effects such as injury to bystanders or damage to property and the environment.
- Otherwise justified by unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and/or rules of engagement (ROE).

Users should never attempt to blind an individual with a laser. Lasers can only be used to gain a suspect individual's or group's attention and/or as a visible alert and warning that the individual is a target.

Green light laser control measures:

- The laser is a nonlethal weapon; keep the laser on safe (batteries removed and safe cable disconnected) when not in use, and never intentionally point the laser at anyone except an aggressor.
- Never point the laser in anyone's face for longer than five seconds.

- Include proper laser use and safety precautions when briefing ROE and EOF procedures during patrol and convoy briefs.
- Units should include in their safety SOP information on laser hazards and provide control measures to mitigate those hazards.
- Ensure laser operators are trained on the proper use and are familiar with the hazards and control measures to mitigate them as listed in the operator's manual; ensure Soldiers use proper eye protection during use.
- Preferred method of use is mounted on the individual or crew-served weapon:
 - Primary use is for EOF purposes.
 - Secondary use is for team chiefs and patrol leaders to positively identify enemy targets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or designated sectors of fire.

Small laser TTP

- Never shine the laser at someone's face if they are closer than 50 meters.
- Never point the laser in anyone's face for longer than five seconds to get their attention.
- Once you have their attention, place the beam on their chest if still needed.
- Patrols and convoys:
 - Shine the laser at the center of the hood or windshield of the vehicle when the approaching vehicle is head on. Start this procedure at 300 meters to get the attention of the vehicle driver and at 5-second intervals until the vehicle driver acknowledges your presence by pulling over to the side of the road.
 - When approaching vehicles from the rear, shine the laser at five-second intervals at the back window or in the driver's side rear view mirror to get the attention of the vehicle driver or until the vehicle driver acknowledges your presence by pulling over to the side of the road.
- Traffic control points (TCPs) and static positions:
 - Laser can be used effectively in the 50 to 300 meters range in conjunction with audible warnings and physical barriers to slow or stop the subject.
 - At the alert line (300 meters), the laser should be pointed at the hood of the vehicle.

- At the warning line (200 meters), the laser should be pointed at the center of the windshield of the vehicle.
- At the stop line (100 meters), point the laser at the individual, avoiding his face if possible.

**Section II: Escalation of Force Kit Concept of Operations
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Rapid Equipping Force)**

Standard Escalation of Force Procedure Kit Employment Options

- Give audible warning to halt (siren and translator).
- Show your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it (spotlight, weapon-mounted flashlight, and green light laser).
- Block access or detain (spike strips and speed bumps).
- Fire a warning shot (green light laser).
- Shoot to kill (weapon M4/M16 and M249/M240B/M2).

Convoy Kit Concept of Operations

Units moving by vehicle convoy—which can consist of vehicles from coalition forces, local nationals, or third country nationals—employ the convoy kit to facilitate secure movement, increase convoy security, and reduce noncombatant casualties. The items found in the kit could be allocated as follows:

| | Convoy Kit | Allocation |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Sirens | 2 | Lead vehicle and convoy commander |
| Translators | 1 | Convoy commander |
| Green light lasers | 4 | All |
| Weapon-mounted flashlights | 4 | One per vehicle |
| Spotlights | 2 | Lead and trail vehicles |
| Graphic training aid cards | 8 | 2 per vehicle |
| The number of items found in the kit is based on a 4+-vehicle convoy. | | |

The components of an EOF kit can notionally be used in the following manner:

- The lead vehicle uses a siren to clear a path through civilian traffic while the convoy commander uses a siren to facilitate his own vehicle movement as necessary.
- Each gunner uses a green light laser to warn approaching vehicles that maneuver too closely to the convoy (rendering warning shots as a near-last resort).
- The weapon-mounted flashlights provide illumination for aiming weapons at night.
- The spotlight mounted on the vehicle enables illumination of overpasses (one of the most dangerous areas on a convoy route) and provides general illumination to the flanks and rear (outside of the headlight fan). The other spotlight provides general illumination.

Traffic Control Point Kit Concept of Operations

The TCP kit is designed to allow small-unit leaders and Soldiers to rapidly, temporarily, and effectively control the flow of vehicular traffic in a given area during daylight or darkness.

The reasons and operating conditions for establishing a TCP to temporarily control the flow of civilian or military vehicle traffic will vary depending on the situation. For example, a TCP could be employed at a hasty roadside checkpoint for the purpose of spot-checking civilian vehicles for contraband or other illegal activities or during severe weather that causes hazardous driving conditions. A TCP could also be used to assist with traffic control near a road hazard or construction, re-route traffic in the vicinity of a civilian or military vehicle accident, or isolate an area in the event of an IED incident.

A single TCP kit is best employed on a 1- or 2-lane road with a straight section of at least 200 meters in length and at a location where vehicles cannot readily bypass the TCP.

While the TCP kit is capable of independent use, its contents can also be used as part of a more substantial traffic control operation. Figure 5-4 outlines a notional TCP using a kit.




Figure 5-4

EOF kit components



Figure 5-5a. Speaker/Siren combo



Figure 5-5b. Voice response translator



Figure 5-5c. Mini-green laser



Figure 5-5d. Handheld green laser



Figure 5-5e. Weapon-mounted flashlight



Figure 5-5f. Spike strips




Figure 5-5g. Traffic cones with power flares



Figure 5-5h. Traffic paddles

The EOF convoy kit contains the tools needed in appropriate quantities to outfit a 4+-vehicle convoy. Concept of operations for EOF kits call for a 3-to-1 ratio of convoy to TCP kits for a 4+ vehicle convoy. Each kit includes the following:

| | Convoy Kit | TCP Kit |
|--|------------|---------|
| Sirens | 2 each | |
| Laser pointers | 4 each | |
| Green lasers | 1 each | 1 each |
| Traffic signs | | 2 sets |
| Traffic cones/power flares | | 6 each |
| Spike strips | | 1 each |
| Speed bumps | | 2 each |
| Weapon-mounted flashlights | 4 each | |
| Spotlights | 2 each | |
| GTA cards | 8 each | 8 each |
| Traffic paddles | | 2 each |
| Nonstandard line item number (NSLIN): FA959P 5895 01C029738 (Convoy kit) NSLIN: MB409Y 4940 01C038678 (TCP kit) | | |
| All items in the kit are commercial off the shelf; all items on Government Services Administration schedule for direct purchase from the vendor. | | |

Speaker/Siren combo

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|---|----------|---|
| (Option A) 690000-EOF—Siren 8567079A-EOF—Mount MS100-EOF—Speaker | 2 | Vehicle mounted, vehicle powered. Siren device has loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject. Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside the vehicle. |
| (Option B) SK147-EOF—Siren/Speaker System, Vehicle Mounted | 2 | Vehicle mounted, vehicle powered. Siren device has loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject. Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside the vehicle. |

The speaker/siren combo is used to alert civilian and nonmilitary traffic of a patrol and/or convey presence, especially at times of limited visibility. The system is also used to prevent unnecessary EOF measures from being used and to reduce the number of warning shot incidents.

- The system is designed for easy operation under the stress associated with possible EOF measures.
- Siren functions are accessible with one simple motion, without repetitive activation of switches or automatic timed switching that can interfere with desired operation.
- Siren device has a loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject.
- Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside a vehicle.

Option A operation:

General: All controls utilized during normal operation of the Model PA300 are located on the front panel (see Figure 5-6).

The optional MNCT-SB plug-in microphone provides high-quality voice reproduction in the public address mode. The microphone push-to-talk switch will override all siren functions except radio rebroadcast for instant public address use.




Figure 5-6

GAIN control: The GAIN control is used to turn the siren on and off. It is also used to control the volume when the siren is used for public address or radio amplification. Clockwise rotation of the knob increases voice volume in the public address or radio amplification mode. The GAIN control does not control the volume of the siren signals.

The maximum clockwise setting of the control will be determined in most cases by the point at which feedback or “squeal” occurs. This point will depend on the microphone gain, open windows, speaker placement, proximity of reflecting surfaces (building or other vehicles), and so forth. Adjust the GAIN control to a position just below the point at which feedback occurs or as desired.

Selector switch (SW2): The selector switch is a five-position rotary switch used to select the mode of operation. The following are positions on the selector switch:

- **RADIO:** In this position, incoming radio messages are amplified by the siren and rebroadcast over the outside speaker.
- **MANUAL:** In this position, it is possible to operate the siren by activating the HORN/SIREN switch. The siren can also be activated by means of an auxiliary switch, such as the horn ring button (refer to press and hold functions below).
- **WAIL:** In this position, the siren produces a continuous “wailing” sound, up and down in frequency.
- **YELP:** In this position, a continuous, rapid, “warbled” tone is generated.
- **HI-LO:** In this position, a two-tone sound will be heard. This distinctive tone may be reserved for any special indication or situation.
- **HORN/SIREN switch:** Located on the left side of the front panel, the switch activates the electronic air horn sound (up) or peak-and-hold sound (down) in any siren mode except radio.

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- TAP II functions: Tap II allows the driver to change the siren sound via the vehicle's horn ring. This feature is especially effective for clearing traffic.
- PRESS AND HOLD functions: Additional alternate sounds can be activated in two other selector switch positions by depressing and holding the horn ring for as long as the alternate sound is desired.

Option B operation:



Figure 5-7

| With rotary switch in this position: | Pressing the MANUAL rocker switch does this: |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| THUNDER | Toggles the output to TWO-TONE |
| YELP | Toggles the output to THUNDER |
| WAIL | Toggles the output to YELP |
| HF (hands free) | Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that sweeps down when the button is released. |
| MAN (manual) | Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that sweeps down when the button is released. |
| PA (public address) | Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that stops immediately when the button is released. |
| AIR HORN | Pressing the right side of rocker switch provides an air-horn tone while pressed. |

Voice response translator

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|-----------------------------------|----------|---|
| VRT-IWT-EOF Translation Device | 1 | Hands-free, eyes-free device; allows operator to maintain situational awareness. Translates preprogrammed English commands into Iraqi Arabic. Can be used dismounted with megaphone or in conjunction with the EOF convoy kit vehicle mounted siren/speaker system to broadcast message from vehicle. |

Handheld green laser

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|---|----------|---|
| (Option A) BTMK-10-EOF Green Laser, Individual Weapon (with Weapon Mount and Remote Switch) | 4 | Bright green laser used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on individual weapon. Remote wire allows operator to maintain weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger. |
| (Option B) Green Beam 1000 Green Laser, Individual Weapon | 4 | Bright green laser used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on individual weapon. |

Option A operation:

The green laser designator is a multifunction laser illuminator/target designator designed for handheld and crew-served weapons use.

The green laser is used at operational checkpoints and roadblocks as a disorienting device for stopping vehicles and identifying potential vehicle-borne suicide bomber attackers.

The green laser can be used for less than lethal/active denial purposes to temporarily blind or disorient/confuse groups or individuals and to augment lead and trail vehicle weapons systems on convoys to warn local nationals to maintain a safe distance from the convoy.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The green laser can be used to illuminate potential IEDs found on convoy routes and provides a visual aid so all Soldiers in the convoy will have an understanding of where the potential IED is located.

The green laser can illuminate hostile enemy targets and identify the location of friendly forces.

Mini-green lasers

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|--|-----------------|--|
| 532P-M-EOF Green Laser, Crew-Served Weapon | 1 | Powerful, long-range green laser with a large beam used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on crew-served weapon. Remote wire allows operator to maintain weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger. |

- The primary use of the mini-green laser is a warning device for convoy and control point protection.
- The mini-green laser can be used for less than lethal/active denial purposes when utilizing the holographic diffusers to temporarily blind, disorient, or confuse groups or individuals. This laser can also augment lead and trail vehicle weapons systems on convoys to warn local nationals to maintain a safe distance from the convoy.
- The mini-green laser can be used at operational checkpoints and roadblocks as a disorienting device for stopping vehicles and identifying potential suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks.

Major components:

- **Housing:** The housing contains the electronics and controls for the laser. A built-in battery compartment is also inside the housing, accessible through the battery cap. There are no user serviceable parts inside the housing. Do not attempt to open the housing.
- **Battery cap:** This cap provides access to the battery compartment to replace batteries.
- **Safety flip cap:** This is a cap on the front of the laser that covers the laser lens. It protects the lens from being scratched and prevents accidental emission from the laser. The safety flip cap must always be closed when the laser is not in use.

- Interlock plug and receptacle: These components are located on the side of the laser. When the interlock plug is removed from the interlock plug receptacle, the laser is disabled and will not emit optical radiation. The interlock plug must always be removed from the interlock plug receptacle when the laser is not in use.




Figure 5-8. Major components

Controls:

- Power switch: This switch selects the power setting for the laser: OFF, HIGH, SLOW (3 to 5 pulses per second), and FAST (7 to 9 pulses per second). The switch must always be in the OFF position when the laser is not in use.
- Momentary fire switch: This switch is used to activate the laser. The switch is “momentary” and will only activate the laser when pressed. It will not turn on the laser in a “continuous on” mode.
- Armed indicator light-emitting diode (LED): This LED is located to the left of the momentary fire switch. The amber-armed indicator LED is lit when the interlock plug is inserted and the power switch is not in the OFF position.
- Emission indicator LED: This LED is located to the right of the momentary fire switch. The green emission indicator LED is lit when the laser is emitting green radiation.




Figure 5-9. Controls

Operation: (**Caution:** The use of controls, procedures, or adjustments to the unit other than those specified may result in hazardous radiation exposure.)

- Inserting batteries: (**Caution:** Prior to inserting batteries, close the safety flip cap and verify that the power switch is in the OFF position.)
 - Unplug the interlock plug from the interlock plug receptacle.
 - Unscrew the battery cap and remove the batteries.
 - Insert new batteries with the positive (+) end in first (only use 3.0 volt CR123 cells), and screw the battery cap back into place.
- Activating laser: The laser is equipped with four activation devices: interlock plug, safety flip cap, power switch, and momentary switch. All four must be enabled before the unit will emit visible radiation. (**Note:** A remote activation cord is available from B. E. Meyers for remote activation of the laser through the interlock plug. Various lengths up to 30 centimeters are available.)
 - Insert the interlock plug into the interlock plug receptacle. (**Note:** The interlock plug must always be removed from the interlock plug receptacle when the laser is not in use.)
 - With the laser pointed down range, open the safety flip cap. (**Note:** The safety flip cap must always be closed when the laser is not in use.)
 - Turn the power switch to HIGH, SLOW, or FAST setting, as desired. (**Note:** The power switch must always be turned OFF when the laser is not in use.)

Warning and safety:

WARNING: OPTICAL DENSITY SAFETY GLASSES OF 2.3 REQUIRED



Figure 5-10

WARNING

IF USED INCORRECTLY, THIS UNIT CAN DAMAGE THE UNAIDED EYE. FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY.

Weapon-mounted flashlight

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|---|-----------------|---|
| M600A-EOF High Power Flashlight, Weapon Mount | 4 | Weapon-mounted, high-powered, durable flashlight with remote on/off switch. Used to grab a subject's attention. |

The scout light attaches to Picatinny Rail interface-equipped shoulder-fired weapons via an included dual thumbscrew mount. Switching is controlled with a tail cap-mounted momentary push button. Components are interchangeable, allowing the operator to configure light output and switch configuration to mission-specific applications.

Operation:

- Partially depress tail cap push button or apply pressure to tape switch for momentary light.
- Fully depress tail cap push button to the click-on position for constant light.
- For incandescent light, unscrew the infrared filter and expose the lamp module

Vehicle-mounted high-power spotlight



Figure 5-11

The vehicle-mounted, high-power spotlight, 24 volt system is powered by the vehicle and controlled by the gunner. The spotlight mounted on the lead vehicle enables illumination of overpasses (one of the most dangerous areas on a convoy route) as well as provides general illumination to the flanks and rear of the convoy.

Spike strips (Stinger)

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|---------------------------|----------|--|
| 90200-EOF Spike Strips | 1 | Used as a barrier in a TCP to stop vehicles. |

Curbside deployment method: May be used when traffic is heavy or time is limited. This deployment requires the Soldier have a position of extra visibility for prompt deployment and retrieval. The following steps show how to activate the spike strips using curbside deployment:

- Step 1. Pick up the unit from the case by the rocker arms. Position yourself in a stance that permits a clear view of the approaching vehicle.
- Step 2. When you see the suspect vehicle, hold the unit by the rocker arms at about ankle height above the pavement. Swing the unit and slide it out onto the roadway.
- Step 3. Confirm your escape route. As you take cover, drop the handle and let the cord slide through your hand until it is unwound from the spool, then grasp the handle.
- Step 4. Once the suspect vehicle has run over the unit, remove it from the road with one hard pull on the handle towards you. (**Note:** The handle glows for easy spotting at night.)

Pull deployment method: When time permits, the spike strips can be pulled across a lane of traffic using an attached cord. This method requires the Soldier to cross lanes of traffic. Therefore, caution should be used at all times! The following steps show how to activate the spike strips using the pull deployment method:

- Step 1. Place the unit on the roadside with the cord side facing the road.
- Step 2. Hold the cord with one hand, drop the spool, and walk across the road. Allow the cord to slide through your hand as it unwinds from the spool.
- Step 3. Pull the cord taut so that it lies flat on the pavement. Position yourself in a stance to have a clear view of the vehicle, the Stinger, and behind you.
- Step 4. Once traffic is clear and before the suspect vehicle arrives, pull the unit across the road, take cover while pulling the cord until there is no slack, then grasp the handle.
- Step 5. Advise the lead pursuit unit to back off a sufficient distance to allow the deploying Soldier time to retrieve the system. Once the spike unit is hit, remove it from traffic with one quick, hard pull on the handle.

Traffic cones with power flares



Figure 5-12

| Part Number/Tool | Quantity | Concept of Operations |
|---|----------|--|
| CSP36-EOF- Traffic Cones; PF-PF200-R-Y-EOF Power Flares; PF-BAG6-0-EOF Power Flare Bag | 6 | Traffic cones with power flares underneath to visibly block a lane/direct traffic. |

Activation and operation:

- To activate, push the button located on the face of the unit. The power flare has nine built-in flash patterns that are selected each time the button is pushed.
- To turn the light off, hold the button down or simply click until the OFF position is reached. If you hold the button down to turn it off, the unit will come back on in the last pattern you used.
- To use, place the units on the road surface or other area to be marked. Avoid placing the units on gravel or sharp objects, as such debris could puncture or crack the unit if it is run over by a heavy vehicle. Wedge a flare unit inside a standard traffic cone to illuminate the cone.

Appendix A

Collateral Damage Awareness Training Support Package

The following training support package (TSP) developed by the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence is an abridged version extracted from the original. This TSP helps familiarize Soldiers, leaders, and units preparing for upcoming deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with collateral damage awareness that conforms to the current standing rules of engagement (ROE) and escalation of force (EOF) procedures. Although the TSP is formatted for a classroom setting, it could be adapted at home station or other training settings by units for professional development classes, be read individually, or be read in a group setting followed by discussion to gain valuable insight and lessons. The entire TSP, which includes an animated video produced by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager–Gaming, is based on actual operations in OEF. The video and complete TSP is available from the Army Training Network Web site at:

<<https://atn.army.mil/unprotected/login.fcc?TYPE=33554433&REALMOID=06-0b896d66-59fb-1039-b5bf->>

Access to this Web site is restricted to Department of Defense personnel with protected identification/password and/or a common access card.

**Tactical Decision Making: Achieving the Mission,
Minimizing Collateral Damage, and
Winning the Strategic Information Battle**

**Training Support Package
and
Facilitator's Guide
July 22, 2009**

Subject: Tactical Decision Making

Facilitator Materials

- a. Facilitator guide (Unclassified/For Official Use Only)
- b. Collateral damage training video produced by TRADOC Capability Manager–Gaming (Unclassified/For Official Use Only)
- c. Whiteboard and/or turn-charts with stands
- d. Whiteboard and/or turn-chart markers

Student Materials

- a. USCENTCOM Unclassified Executive Summary: U.S. Central Command's Investigation into Civilian Casualties in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 4 May 2009, dated 18 June 2009 (Unclassified/For Official Use Only)
- b. James Warden, "Anatomy of an Airstrike," May 31, 2009, *Stars and Stripes* Mideast edition
- c. "Afghan Probe Finds 140 Civilians Killed in US Airstrike," May 16, 2009, Afghanistan News.net
- d. "US Airstrikes Kill Dozens in Afghanistan," May 07, 2009, *China Daily*
- e. "Afghans: US Bombing Run Kills Dozens of Civilians," May 6, 2009, *Samoa News*
- f. Whiteboard and/or turn-chart with stand for each group of four to six Soldiers

Target Audience

- a. Brigade and battalion staff members at the ranks of master sergeant, sergeant major, chief warrant officer 3 and 4, captain, and major.
- b. Company-level leaders such as platoon sergeants, first sergeants, warrant officers 1 and 2, lieutenants, and captains.

Facilitator Requirements

- a. Recommended rank of first sergeant, chief warrant officer 4, and major or above.
- b. Extensive operational experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF.
- c. Comprehensive knowledge in the topics addressed within the stated objectives and goals of this TSP.

References

- a. USCENTCOM'S Unclassified Executive Summary: U.S. Central Command Investigation into Civilian Casualties in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 4 May 2009, dated 18 June 2009 (Unclassified/For Official Use Only).
- b. Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 13 April 2007.

Objectives

- a. Given an operational scenario, determine a proportional course of action (COA) that is consistent with ROE, achieves the mission, and supports the strategic information battle.
- b. Given an operational scenario and a selected COA, identify and mitigate intended and unintended consequences to support the strategic information battle.

Goals

- a. Reinforce the necessity to minimize collateral damage.
- b. Reinforce the necessity for consideration of the inherent consequences and risks to the indigenous population associated with tactical action.
- c. Reinforce consideration of the ROE in the decision-making process.
- d. Reinforce the necessity for proportionality in determining a COA or response appropriate to the threat and risk to friendly and noncombatant personnel.
- e. Reinforce the importance of achieving positive identification (PID) in making engagement decisions.
- f. Reinforce the importance of conducting timely battle damage assessment (BDA) and in assessing unintended as well as intended effects.
- g. Reinforce and explore the potential and possible consequences for employing various lethal and nonlethal options.

- h. Reinforce the importance of considering culture and language in the decision-making process.
- i. Reinforce the strategic information operations implications of intended and unintended effects.
- j. Reinforce methods to mitigate intended and unintended consequences to support the strategic information operations battle (i.e., public affairs/media operations, infrastructure implications, restitution/solatia [payment settlement], local and nation government implications, local and regional religious implications, culture and language implications, etc.).

Gain Attention

On 4 May 2009 in the province of Farah in the vicinity of the Gerani Village, Afghanistan, the Independent Human Rights Commission concluded that 97 civilians were killed, including 65 children and 21 women, as a result of lethal U.S. actions. Early Afghanistan government estimates rose to as high as 140 civilian casualties. How might this and future unintended incidents have been avoided or mitigated?

Stimulate Recall of Prior Knowledge

Many, if not all of you, have recent combat experience and have first-hand knowledge of the tactics of the adversary. The intent of this experience is to explore an actual situation that occurred recently in Afghanistan, along with other realistic situations, and apply what we learn to how we will conduct future operations. During our discussion and decision-making exercises, please share your operational experiences and apply what you have learned from those experiences to improve the quality of the class.

Lesson Body

1. View and discuss the collateral damage training video. (Guided discussion)
 - a. Provide context for the video. In response to the Farah incident during OEF and the resulting lessons learned, the Combined Arms Center in collaboration with the U.S Army's Fires Center of Excellence has developed this TSP to reinforce specific decision-making considerations regarding the use of force and the avoidance of unnecessary collateral damage. This TSP utilizes the actual Farah, Gerani Village situation and other scenarios based upon actual situations to stress the importance of effective decision making and reinforce critical decision-making points such as minimizing collateral damage, ROE, PID, timely BDA, proportionality, strategic information operations (IO), consequence management of intended and unintended effects, lethal and nonlethal options, and IO implications. This lesson is student-centered. Please share your experiences and expertise as we discuss considerations and assess the best approach to addressing each of the situations.

b. The following specific considerations and principles are the focus of the TSP and should be specifically addressed when examining the situations:

- (1) Consider the necessity to minimize collateral damage. Unnecessary collateral damage provides the enemy the opportunity to shape the information battle against us and does not reinforce our primary mission of stabilizing and rebuilding.
- (2) Consider the inherent consequences and risks to the indigenous population associated with tactical action. Sustaining the trust of the local civilian population makes it more difficult for the enemy to operate and supports the success of the strategic information battle.
- (3) Consider the ROE in the decision-making process. ROE are designed to prevent the inadvertent escalation of a situation and strive to follow general precepts of law. In all cases, ROE do not preclude a service member's right to defend himself if engaged.
- (4) Consider the necessity for proportionality in determining a COA or response appropriate to the threat and risk to friendly and noncombatant personnel. Proportionality prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force that exceeds that needed to accomplish the military objective. Proportionality compares the military advantage gained to the harm inflicted while gaining this advantage. Proportionality requires a balancing test between the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by attacking a legitimate military target and the expected incidental civilian injury or damage. Proportionality seeks to prevent an attack in situations where civilian casualties would clearly outweigh military gains.
- (5) Consider the importance and ability of achieving PID in making engagement decisions. PID of the threat and assessment of the potential for collateral damage are paramount components of making a decision to use or escalate lethal force. If time and the situation permit, use all available means to achieve PID.
- (6) Consider the importance and ability of conducting timely BDA and in assessing unintended as well as intended effects. Timely and thorough BDA minimizes the ability of the enemy to shape the IO battle. As you will see in the video scenario that we are about to watch, lack of timely, sufficient BDA has a significant effect.
- (7) Consider the lethal and nonlethal options available, and employ a response or combination of responses most appropriate to the situation.
- (8) Consider the importance of culture and language to the situation. Assess the availability and/or necessity for interpreters, female search teams, and so forth when making tactical decisions.

(9) Consider the strategic information battle implications of intended and unintended effects. With the advances in technology, our enemies can easily wage an information war against us and diminish the trust of host nation personnel necessary for success. Even the mere presence of U.S. forces has implications, so mitigating these implications is critical to continued and future mission success.

(10) Consider methods to mitigate intended and unintended consequences to support the strategic information battle (i.e., public affairs/media operations, infrastructure implications, restitution/solatia, local and nation government implications, local and regional religious implications, culture and language implications, etc.).

c. Play the video from beginning to end for the class.

d. Ask the class the following questions. (Ask individuals and/or the class to qualify and provide a specific rationale for their responses. What is the basis for your response? What principle or consideration does it support? Was the action taken consistent with the immediate threat?)

(1) How might the casualties taken by the ground force have influenced the commander's decisions?

(2) Was the collateral damage from the F-18 strikes proportional to the situation? Why?

(3) Was the collateral damage from the B1B strikes proportional to the situation? Why?

(4) Did the immediacy of the threat warrant the F-18 strikes? Why?

(5) Did the immediacy of the threat warrant the B1B strikes? Why?

(6) Were the ROE complied with throughout the incident? If any, with what specific ROE did the commander not comply?

(7) Was sufficient PID of the target(s) achieved for the F-18 strikes? If so, how was PID achieved? What makes PID sufficient or insufficient in this instance?

(8) Was sufficient PID of the target(s) achieved for the B1B strikes? If so, how was PID achieved? What makes PID sufficient or insufficient in this instance?

(9) What is the importance of conducting timely BDA? In this instance, how did the absence of timely BDA affect the situation? Specifically, how did it affect the strategic information battle?

(10) Realistically considering the ground force's situation, what measures might have been taken to have conducted timely BDA? Was timely BDA in this situation realistic?

(11) How did the outcome of this situation affect the strategic information battle? What specific aspect of the situation most adversely affected the strategic information battle?

(12) What approaches might have been employed to mitigate intended and unintended consequences of the situation on the strategic information battle? For example, how might public affairs or the media have been used? (Prompt the class to consider the following as appropriate or necessary: infrastructure implications, restitution/solatia, local and nation government implications, local and regional religious implications, culture and language implications, etc.)

e. Provide the Soldiers with approximately five minutes to review the collection of news articles reporting on the unintended effects of the Gerani Village incident.

(1) Ask individual Soldiers to share their thoughts about what they read in the articles.

(2) Reinforce to the Soldiers the significant public scrutiny over our actions, and we must be very mindful of the consequences of the decisions we make in the execution of conflict.

f. Ask the Soldiers if there are any questions or comments about the Gerani Village incident before summarizing the situation and examining additional scenarios.

g. Summarize the Farah, Gerani Village incident as follows:

(1) In each case, the totality of the circumstances—the identified number of enemy fighters, the enemy’s assessed intent as validated by multiple forms of real-time intelligence, continuous direct-fire engagements, and the threat of enemy forces massing to re-attack—validated the lawful military nature of the air strikes. However, the inability to discern the presence of civilians and assess the potential collateral damage of those strikes is inconsistent with the U.S. government’s objective of providing security and safety for the Afghan people.

(2) The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and coalition forces also sustained casualties during this engagement. Two U.S. personnel, five Afghan National Police (ANP), and two Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers were wounded in the fighting. Additionally, five ANP were killed in the direct firefight with the enemy. While the ANA lost no Soldiers during this engagement, a U.S. Navy Corpsman, wounded in the most violent of the ground fighting, is credited with saving the life of the senior ANA noncommissioned officer (NCO), who was hit by gunshot to the shoulder. The United States ultimately medically evacuated the ANA NCO and Navy Corpsman and both recovered. Additionally, CENTCOM’s investigation report estimates that at least 78 Taliban fighters were killed.

(3) While the CENTCOM investigation assessed approximately 26 civilian casualties based upon information from various sources and on new graves in the Gerani area in early May 2009, no one will ever be able conclusively to determine the number of civilian casualties that occurred on May 4, 2009. The CENTCOM investigation does not discount the possibility that more than 26 civilians were killed in this engagement. Additionally, the investigation team noted that the report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, published on May 26, 2009, represents a balanced, thorough investigation into the incident, citing as many as 86 civilian casualties, with approximately lessons learned for all involved in the fighting on May 4th—U.S., Afghan, and Taliban.

(4) U.S. leaders at all levels have expressed their deep regret over the May 4, 2009 incident in Farah near the Gerani Village area, noting that the unnecessary loss of even one innocent life is too many. As the Afghans and their coalition partners continue to engage an enemy force that deliberately chooses to fight from within inhabited areas, placing innocent civilians at risk, the United States/coalition must adapt their tactical approach and techniques in a way that prioritizes avoidance of civilian casualties as a fundamental aspect of mission success.

2. Facilitate all or a sampling of the additional scenarios contained in Annexes A through G to provide Soldiers with further opportunities to apply relevant considerations and principles associated with proportional decision making that minimizes collateral damage and supports the strategic information battle.

- a. Separate Soldiers into groups of three to six.
- b. Ensure that each group is provided with a whiteboard and markers, turn-chart with stand and markers, or another means to capture the group's considerations and recommendations.
- c. Provide each group with instructions to analyze the given scenario and select the most proportional option that minimizes collateral damage and supports the strategic information battle. Additionally, ask the group to address the relevant principles and considerations listed below in the rationale for choosing a specific option.

(1) Consider the necessity to minimize collateral damage. Unnecessary collateral damage provides the enemy the opportunity to shape the information battle against us and does not reinforce our primary mission of stabilizing and rebuilding.

(2) Consider the inherent consequences and risks to the indigenous population associated with tactical action.

(3) Consider the rules of engagement in the decision-making process.

- (4) Consider the necessity for proportionality in determining a course of action or response appropriate to the threat and risk to friendly and noncombatant personnel.
- (5) Consider the importance and ability of achieving PID in making engagement decisions.
- (6) Consider the importance and ability of conducting timely BDA and in assessing unintended as well as intended effects.
- (7) Consider the lethal and nonlethal options available, and employ a response or combination of responses most appropriate to the situation.
- (8) Consider the importance of culture and language to the situation. Assess the availability and/or necessity for interpreters, female search teams, and so forth when making tactical decisions.
- (9) Consider the strategic information battle implications of intended and unintended effects.
- (10) Consider methods to mitigate intended and unintended consequences to support the strategic information battle (i.e., public affairs/media operations, infrastructure implications, restitution/solatia, local and nation government implications, local and regional religious implications, culture and language implications, etc.).

d. Ask each group to have a representative to present its most preferred option along with the associated rationale for selecting the option. Ask probing questions to ensure the group representative addresses relevant principles and considerations.

e. Once each group has presented its preferred option and rationale, reinforce the most proportional option and summarize the key considerations and IO implications for each situation.

3. Ask the Soldiers if there are any questions or if they have any comments that they would like to share with regard to the learning objectives or goals prior to summarizing and closing the lesson.

Summary

The unfortunate circumstances of the Gerani Village incident are a reminder of the complexities of the strategic information battle. The decisions and actions of every service member pose implications that contribute to either a setback or continued success toward the strategic objective. None of these decisions and resultant actions are more significant than the decision to use lethal force. Collateral damage cannot always be avoided. However, the application of the considerations presented in this lesson will help you in making decisions that are proportional to the threat and mitigate unintended consequences.

Annex A

Situation 1: Urban Ambush

Scenario



Figure A-1

Situation

A combat patrol exits a forward operating base (FOB) along Route Gold and contacts an improvised explosive device (IED)-initiated ambush with a shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher (RPG).

- a. The civilian population suffers six casualties before ten insurgents fall back into the village. The village is heavily populated with civilians. A local medical clinic also operates in the general area.
- b. Insurgents are utilizing the populace, residences, and rooftops for concealment as they continue to engage the patrol with fire. In the crossfire, insurgents have killed two civilians and risk wounding or killing others.
- c. Relationships with the local sheik and other key personnel are good.

Options for Force

- a. Employ the quick reaction force (QRF), which includes civil affairs personnel, interpreters, and female search teams. The QRF can be employed in 20 minutes.
- b. Employ close air support (CAS)—2 Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons with 500 pound (lb) bombs. The F-16s can be available within 30 minutes for a strike.
- c. Employ indirect fire from 4 155-mm howitzers capable of delivering high explosive (HE) or Excalibur precision-guided extended range artillery projectile munitions. Indirect fires from the howitzers can be available within 20 minutes.
- d. Employ indirect fire from 4 60-mm mortars capable of delivering HE or smoke munitions. Indirect fires from the mortars can be available within 15 minutes.
- e. Request host nation security forces to support the situation. Host nation security forces can be on station within 50 minutes.

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. The situation affords some time to deliberately choose a course of action (COA).
- b. Even with troops in contact, proportionality must still be considered before using lethal means.
- c. Tactical air control is available for control of CAS. Insurgents can no longer easily be tracked, although a team is entrenched in a group of four houses (highlighted in red in Figure A-1).
- d. Both cannon and mortar fires are within range. Target location and mensuration are critical in determining the appropriateness for using indirect fire.
- e. Relationships with local government and religious leaders are key factors in determining the level of cooperation likely from the population. Engage key local personnel if the situation permits.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. The QRF neutralized the insurgents, but the lethal actions taken led to seven civilian casualties from the crossfire with insurgents. Most of the civilian casualties were a result of insurgent small-arms and RPG fire. Some damage was caused to residences during the battle.
- b. The use of CAS led to extensive structural damage and caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Water, sewer, and electrical service was damaged for a significant portion of the village.

c. The use of howitzer or mortar indirect fire required U.S. personnel to fire and maneuver to achieve PID on the target. Five civilian casualties resulted from the crossfire with insurgents. Substantial damage to residences occurred along with isolated damage to electrical services.

d. The use of host nation forces to support U.S. personnel in clearing out civilian personnel prior to employment of lethal action led to the prevention of further civilian casualties and caused minor damage to residences in a contained portion of the village.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

a. Insurgents may likely blame the civilian deaths from small-arms fire on U.S. forces.

b. Any civilian wounded should be immediately treated by U.S. or host nation personnel.

c. Lives saved through lethal or nonlethal actions should be reported and presented as media coverage.

d. Solatia payments must be made for deaths, injuries, or property destruction, regardless of the source.

e. Damage to infrastructure may require initiation of construction, water, sewage, electric, telecommunications, and other projects in the event of any extensive damage.

f. If a decision is made to clear out civilian personnel, ensure female search teams are available to support the operation and avoid insult to legitimate noncombatant personnel.

Annex B

Situation 2: School Days

Scenario



Figure A-2

Situation

An unmanned aerial vehicle identifies four males in a pickup truck in the vicinity of a local school. The school location is (1) in Figure A-2. The individuals are burying what appears to be a mortar in the ground up to the weapon’s muzzle. The mortar and insurgents are in a field 60 meters from the school at location (2) in Figure A-2. During your relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA), you identified this location as a historical point of origin for harassing mortar fires. These fires have increased recently and resulted in the deaths of three civilian contractors.

Options for Force

- a. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) unitary munition is available. The brigade combat team (BCT) tactical operations center (TOC) is not precision strike suite–special operation force (PSS–SOF) capable.
- b. CAS is available through an F-16 with 500 lb munitions. The F-16 can be on station within 30 minutes.

- c. A 155-mm howitzer section with Excalibur munitions is available. There are no preplanned ballistic impact points (BIPs) for Excalibur.
- d. A platoon-size combat patrol is in the vicinity and can be in the area with 15 minutes.

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. Any use of lethal force must be proportional to the threat.
- b. The insurgents appear to be preparing for a future attack.
- c. Coordinate-seeking munitions such as GMLRS and Excalibur are only as precise as the mensuration tools available.
- d. While the elimination of four insurgents and one mortar may constitute retribution for the contractor deaths, the higher payoff target likely exists in the planning cell, which can only be identified through continued tracking.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. Use of CAS is late, and six children are killed during the attack on a displacing target.
- b. Use of GMLRS unitary is inaccurate due to ellipsoid errors, resulting in four dead.
- c. The Excalibur mission is delayed due to lack of preplanned BIPs. The mission kills one insurgent and causes collateral damage to the school building.
- d. The ground force neutralizes the insurgents and gathers partial intelligence.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. Any use of lethal force will require the payment of solatia.
- b. Damage to the school will require an extensive IO campaign to rebuild trust in the community.
- c. Public affairs should be leveraged to reduce the insurgent's ability to exaggerate the incident.

Annex C

Situation 3: Counterstrike (Operation Iraqi Freedom)

Scenario




Figure A-3

Situation

Sectarian groups wish to incite tribal and religious violence. The groups are willing to cause civilian casualties and are working with outside groups (Hamas). They are well funded and equipped but poorly trained. The groups use one Sunni village as a base to fire against a Shia village and a FOB. The groups use the “hugging” technique to mitigate U.S. counterfire and to intimidate locals. There is a history of high indirect-fire incidents in the area, and casualties are frequent and increasing over time. A significant number of civilian casualties have occurred as a result of these events. The groups have used U.S. counterfire to incite the local population. An Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 (*Investigation Guide for Informal Investigations*)

investigation is being conducted, but a U.S. counter-strike operation is authorized to continue.

Options for Force

a. Immediate response options:

- (1) Armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are available (Predator, Reaper, etc.).
- (2) Fixed-wing CAS is available and is also capable of conducting ISR with a targeting pod.
- (3) Indirect fires from 120-mm mortars are available.
- (4) Direct fire through a C-RAM engagement is available.
- (5) Fixed site ISR via RAID system cameras and J-LENS is available.

b. Intermediate response options:

- (1) Conduct a maneuver platoon patrol to secure the site (point of impact).
- (2) Conduct a leader engagement with village and tribal leaders.
- (3) Utilize an additional maneuver platoon dedicated to consequence management, sensitive site exploitation, and evidence collection.
- (4) Modified response to indirect fire in the engagement area.

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. What will be the Sunni response in the near term and long term?
- b. What will be the Shia response in the near term and long term?
- c. What will be the U.S. response in the near term and long term? Will the United States treat casualties? Will the United States pay claims to the victims of the Sunni attack?
- d. What nonlethal targets will emerge from this incident? What nonlethal methods of engagement are indicated?
- e. What does the consequence management response include?
- f. How will the immediate and long-term employment of counter-strike operations be affected?
- g. What modifications to battle drills are required?
- h. Will the ROE change as a result?

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. Lethal immediate responses give the insurgents a basis for the support of their IO campaign. Collateral damage from counter-fire operations are exaggerated and used against coalition forces.
- b. In every case, with the exception of C-RAM, collateral damage results from the use of lethal action.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. The ground commander is the most important presence on scene.
- b. Leverage the local political leader (council chairman), local tribal leader (sheik), and local religious leader (imam).
- c. Use a combat camera to document the incident for future engagements.
- d. Conduct tactical psychological operations team and civil affairs team assessments.
- e. Utilize public affairs to leverage the local media (print, radio, television, and Internet) and international media (print, television, and Internet).
- f. Conduct sensitive site exploitation and evidence collection.
- g. Ensure legal documentation is included such as AR 15-6 investigation and target folders.
- h. Include incident evaluation and analysis.

Annex D

Situation 4: The Bazaar

Scenario



Figure A-4

Situation

Following contested elections, insurgents hang posters in a bazaar (location [1] in Figure A-4) claiming U.S. tampering and general anti-coalition sentiment. The insurgents are inciting violence among the younger portion of a crowd of 200, and the crowd is becoming restless. Small fights have already erupted. As violence seems more imminent, the host nation police ask for U.S. support in repelling the violence and apprehending the insurgents.

Options for Force

- a. Employ a QRF with civil affairs, interpreters, and female search (Tigress) teams. The QRF can be available in 20 minutes.
- b. CAS is available through 2 F-16s with 500 lb munitions. CAS can be available within 30 minutes.

- c. An Apache with a 30-mm chain gun is available.
- d. Host nation security forces can be available within 15 minutes.

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. With respect to proportionality, the threat is against the IO campaign but just as devastating.
- b. It is possible to use lethal platforms in nonlethal methods.
- c. An F-16 fly-by has been used successfully in dispersing crowds.
- d. The host nation's police force is not proficient in using anything other than heavy-handed tactics.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. Use of CAS or Apache for strafing runs or delivery of ordinance causes severe casualties. Although the dead amount to 23, anti-coalition forces claim, video tape, and broadcast hundreds of deaths.
- b. Use of the QRF in conjunction with host nation forces causes seven civilian deaths, although three of them were incited by the insurgents.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. Any use of lethal force will require the payment of solatia and will include payments for damaged businesses.
- b. Publicity of the incident will require an extensive IO campaign to highlight the request for U.S support and the partnership with host nation forces.
- c. Public affairs must be leveraged to reduce the insurgent's ability to exaggerate the incident.

Annex E

Situation 5: Blowing the Roof Off

Scenario



Figure A-5

Situation

A house-born improvised explosive device (HBIED) is found during a deliberate concept of operations (CONOP) to a safe house.

Options for Force

- a. On-call close air support (XCAS) is 15 minutes away.
- b. GMLRS is available and within range.
- c. Predator is 10 minutes away.
- d. Excalibur is unavailable and out of range.




Figure A-6

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. Any use of lethal force must be proportional to the threat.
- b. Attempting to disarm the HBIED can result in the loss of numerous key coalition personnel.
- c. Precision-guided munitions are only as precise as the mensuration tools available at the BCT level (i.e., PSS–SOF).
- d. Snap traffic control points (TCPs) can re-route traffic, thus minimizing collateral damage during daylight hours.
- e. The elimination of the HBIED in a timely manner would reopen this key main supply route (MSR) for civilian traffic as well as restore freedom of movement to coalition forces and indigenous security forces.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. Use of GMLRS will destroy the structure, thus eliminating the threat.
- b. Use of Predator (precision-guided munition) will destroy the structure, thus eliminating the threat.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. In any use of lethal force, solatia payments must be prepositioned.
- b. The BCT must have prepared generic messages to be broadcasted over radio within 30 minutes and handbills passed out within 2 hours at the site to limit enemy IO effectiveness.
- c. A battle drill must be in place for indigenous civil leadership (city mayor and provincial governor) and security force leadership (chief of police) to inform the populace.
- d. Indigenous governance and security officials must be at the forefront of all incidents involving use of lethal force.

Annex F

Situation 6: The Mosque

Scenario



Figure A-7

Situation

A troops-in-contact unit reports several casualties. Insurgents take refuge in a category 1 structure (mosque) and continue to engage coalition forces.

Options for Force

- a. CAS is on station.
- b. All surface-to-surface weapon systems are unavailable or out of range.
- c. Close combat attack (CCA) is 30 minutes away.




Figure A-8

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. Any use of lethal force must be proportional to the threat.
- b. Insurgents occupied the mosque to prevent capture by coalition forces.
- c. Precision-guided munitions are only as precise as the mensuration tools available (PSS–SOF).
- d. The CDE can only account for an average of civilian traffic around the mosque.
- e. While the elimination of three to five insurgents would temporarily reduce small-arms fire attacks along this MSR, the United States would only temporarily regain freedom of movement while losing public trust and confidence.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

Use of CAS (precision-guided munitions) will destroy the structure. If done during daylight hours, we will remove three to five high-value individuals, but ten civilian casualties are almost a certainty.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. Any use of lethal force will require the payment of solatia.
- b. Damage to the mosque will require an extensive IO campaign to rebuild trust in the community.
- c. Public affairs must be leveraged to reduce the insurgent's ability to exaggerate the incident.

Annex G

Situation 7: Not So Safe House

Scenario



Figure A-9

Situation

A safe house and an explosively formed projectile (EFP) cache are found. It is 50 meters from a category 1 facility (bazaar). A night engagement is recommended for the CONOP due to CDE level 5 during daytime and CDE level 3 at night.

Options for Force

- a. CAS is available. A CAS request has been approved.
- b. GMLRS is available and within range.
- c. Excalibur is available and within range.




Figure A-10

Considerations and Potential Consequences

- a. Insurgent EFP IED cell members routinely occupy these structures.
- b. The safe house appears to be used as a staging area to prepare EFPs for emplacing along a nearby MSR.
- c. Precision-guided munitions are only as precise as the mensuration tools available (PSS–SOF) and the skill of the operator.
- d. The CDE estimate can only account for an average of civilian traffic and occupation of the surrounding structures.
- e. While the elimination of the cache and the safe house would temporarily reduce IEDs along this MSR, coalition forces would only temporarily gain freedom of movement until the IED network relocates. Additionally, it would take coalition forces two to three weeks to sort out the new leadership who fill in the void.

Consequences for Selected Use of Force

- a. Use of CAS (precision-guided munitions) will destroy both structures and severely damage surrounding structures.

- b. If done during daylight hours, we will eliminate 3 to 5 high-value individuals but also incur 15 to 25 civilian casualties.
- c. If we wait until nighttime, we will destroy both structures and minimize expected collateral damage to three to five civilian casualties.

Information Operations Impact and Mitigation

- a. Any use of lethal force will require the payment of solatia.
- b. Damage to the school will require an extensive IO campaign to rebuild trust in the community.
- c. Public affairs should be leveraged to reduce the insurgent's ability to exaggerate the incident.

Appendix B

Force Escalation Guidance for the International Security Assistance Force

Escalation of Force Guidance

It is imperative to provide as much visible and physical warning as possible to persons approaching vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), cordons, and convoys and incorporate as many nonlethal measures as possible without incurring risk to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel conducting the mission.

- **Step 1 (initial warning)** helps increase the safety of the ISAF and local nationals (LNs). Early warning through the use of “slow down” signs and physical indicators such as speed bumps at VCPs and highly visible vehicle signs on convoy vehicles—together with use of lights, torches, and hand signs—will give a good early indication of ISAF intentions and provide LNs with an early opportunity to slow down and comply or maintain separation from the convoy. Any speed bumps should be nonpermanent in nature and removed with other VCP-related equipment. If Step 1 is effective, any further escalation of force (EOF) ramifications are eliminated.
- **Step 2 (enhanced warning)** can be the most difficult for ISAF troops to effectively execute.
 - There is a limited time period between the initial warning and whether or not a Soldier faces an approaching imminent threat.
 - Soldiers in VCPs, cordons, and convoys must use nonlethal impairment and/or nonlethal engagement before using warning shots whenever possible.
 - Warning shots associated with Step 2 carry a high risk of collateral damage.
 - As a measure to enhance the visibility of the warning shot, commanders should order personnel employed on VCP, convoy top cover, or sentry duties to front-load weapon magazines with tracer rounds so those initial rounds used as warning shots are potentially more visible.
 - An incident report must be filed whenever force escalation measures result in shots fired, regardless of whether or not civilian casualties occurred. (See an example EOF/rules of engagement [ROE] incident report at the end of this chapter.)
 - Apply military judgment appropriate to the prevailing tactical situation. All commanders should establish best practices for EOF to include during day, night, and bad weather conditions.

- VCPs, cordon positions, and patrol routes will be planned to gain maximum protection from available terrain and infrastructure.
- Local commanders should make the effort to engage with local Afghan cultural advisors and security forces to ensure that best practices will deliver the required warnings to LNs.
- **Step 3 (lethal force).** It is intended that the application of earlier, more visible warnings and nonlethal engagement options would reduce the number of occasions requiring lethal force.
 - There is no intent to ever deny a U.S. Soldier the inherent right of self defense; if the tactical situation demands a rapid response to an emerging threat, lethal force may be the only available option to the Soldier.
 - Only apply Step 3 after all other nonlethal options are exhausted or not feasible according to the tactical situation at hand or level of threat.

Situations will arise where, because of the imminent threat, not all of the graduated levels of EOF can be applied. However, in all cases, levels applied must be reasonable and proportionate to the perceived threat level and conform to the standing ROE.

Figures B-1 and B-2 depict the three-step EOF process and force escalation flow.




Figure B-1. Three-step EOF process




Figure B-2. Force escalation flow

EOF/ROE Report Example

(Completed by incident commander)

1. What was the unit's task?

To run a combat logistics patrol from the FOB to pick up Class V (ammunition) and return to the unit combat outpost.

2. Summary of events leading up to EOF/ROE incident.

While conducting a combat logistics patrol from FOB X to XX, the platoon traveled east-southeast along Route Red and was involved in an EOF incident. Prior to entering Kabul at the link-up point, the convoy commander confirmed there were no Afghan National Police (ANP) escorts, at which time the battalion commander directed them to proceed. The convoy continued east-southeast along Route Red farther into the city. The convoy slowed down to prepare to make a left turn into a traffic circle.

The convoy used a spotlight to signal LN traffic to pull off to the side of the road, at which time a jingle truck readily complied. Immediately thereafter, a four-door, white, Toyota sedan traveling northwest on the same route exited out of the traffic circle, passed the jingle truck, and approached the convoy in the opposite lane at a high rate of speed.

The lead military vehicle driven by SGT Rock used a spotlight to deter the vehicle. The Toyota did not comply and continued onward at a high rate of speed, at which time it struck a local national vendor stand on its right side (the sedan) and continued onward. SGT Rock then used a green laser to again attempt to deter the vehicle, which had no effect. The convoy commander, 2LT Smith, authorized the lead vehicle to fire a warning shot, at which point the gunner, PV2 Doe, fired one warning shot (tracer round) to the left of the passenger side tire with his M4.

The Toyota continued at a high rate of speed, and PV2 Doe fired five disabling shots (two into the passenger side front tire and three into the engine block). The Toyota still continued onward and eventually passed the lead vehicle of the convoy in its proper lane. At this time, 2LT Smith, who was in the second vehicle, authorized his gunner, PFC Goodman, to fire disabling shots using his M4. PFC Goodman fired six disabling shots, five into the engine block and one into the windshield. It was at this time the Toyota moved off to the right side of the road.

3. Describe sequence of EOF measures employed.

Step 1. Initial warning: Use of vehicle convoy sign.

Step 2. Enhanced warning:

- Spotlight from lead MRAP
- Use of green laser
- One warning shot to the left of oncoming vehicle from an M4 in lead convoy vehicle (tracer round)

Step 3. Lethal force:

- Two rounds fired into front passenger side tire (M4)
- Three rounds fired into engine block (M4)
- Five rounds fired into engine block (M4) from second vehicle in convoy
- One round fired into windshield from second vehicle in convoy

4. Was your unit equipped with adequate EOF equipment?

The unit had a convoy kit on hand (four green lasers, one Class III laser [green], camera, etc.).

5. What actions were taken after the incident?

The convoy immediately stopped and pulled a security halt. The second to the last vehicle moved to the site of the disabled vehicle and escorted the medic, PFC Star, on foot to the injured LN. PFC Star immediately assessed the damage to be a gunshot to the right hand (entering on the palm side) between the index finger and thumb with a clean exit wound and proceeded to provide appropriate medical care. PFC Star also noted at this time the LN appeared sluggish and possibly under the influence of hashish. When 2LT Smith questioned him as to why he was speeding, he stated that his son was fleeing to Iran and he was attempting to catch up with him to stop him. After receiving medical treatment from the medic and completing the questioning from 2LT Smith, the LN was escorted by the passenger in the Toyota (not injured) to the medical facility approximately 200 meters away to receive further treatment. Approximately 15 minutes following the convoy's security halt, ANP arrived on scene and entered the medical facility to question the injured LN at the request of 2LT Smith. The information the LN provided the ANP corroborated with the information provided to 2LT Smith. Prior to receiving authorization to depart the scene, 2LT Smith took digital photos of the Toyota to include the license plate with the #51233 from Kabul.

6. Was use of force conducted under national standards and in self-defense?

Yes. The vehicle showed no signs of slowing down or moving out of the oncoming lane of the convoy, nor did it respond to any of the EOF steps outlined above.

Appendix C

To See, Hear, and Understand: The Civilian's Stake in Escalation of Force

Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director, Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC)

Ahmed,¹ a young Afghan, was riding his motorcycle home near Jalalabad in the middle of winter 2008. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Soldiers flashed a laser to slow him down near a checkpoint, but he didn't notice it at first through the snow and then couldn't make out what he was seeing. He recalled later that military forces usually honk when they want drivers to slow down. Ahmed was shot in the legs. After much appreciated emergency medical care from ISAF personnel, it was generally agreed that what happened was half his mistake, half theirs. Since Ahmed could no longer work, his brother began driving a taxi to support the family, but the medical bills crippled what little income they had. Ahmed's life was spared but he'll never be the same.

In Afghanistan, I've met men and women whose loved ones were taken in the blink of an eye. I've also talked with American Soldiers who tell me of the split-second decisions they make every day—sometimes ending in tragedy and guilt. What strikes me is how often Soldiers and Afghans want the same two things: a stable country and to stay alive.

Afghans must negotiate complicated terrain to stay alive. Years ago in Iraq, the questions civilians asked me centered on how to make one safer in the midst of U.S. and coalition forces. They didn't know Soldiers were shouting "slow down" to them at checkpoints; they didn't understand what to do if a convoy came tearing through their street. Afghans have a leg up on their Iraqi counterparts after three decades of conflict; they have adapted to a constant military presence. Yet last year marked the deadliest for Afghan civilians since the U.S. invasion. They are killed, maimed, and left with little help after deadly airstrikes, raids, suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) explosions, escalation of force (EOF) misunderstandings, and kidnappings. The most dangerous areas for U.S. and ISAF troops are also the most dangerous for the average Afghan.

No matter where civilian sympathies lie, the Taliban's tactic of hiding out among the people means that their homes, their children, and their schools and hospitals could all be taken from them without warning. If they try to push the insurgents away, they risk being killed. If they arm themselves in defense, they may be mistaken as combatants threatening international forces. If they stay quiet, they'll be consistently used by anti-government forces and intentionally placed in harm's way. The strategy of anti-government forces is to induce the United States to take self-defeating actions, including the killing of civilians. Whenever anti-government forces hide among civilians, they are setting a trap that smart U.S. counterinsurgency practices must try to avoid.

That's why a central theme of General Stanley A. McChrystal's new directive in Afghanistan is the civilian as the center of gravity. In principle this is good news for Afghans with whom I've spoken, but EOF is where the rubber meets the road. When tensions run high, even the best strategy can fall apart. The directive, for

example, instructs convoys to obey Afghan traffic laws. That will help matters on Ring Road, but it doesn't give the civilian any further information on what to expect or do when traffic is backed up through Kabul or on a single lane of passable highway in the provinces. Staying one's distance from the convoys is nearly impossible, and even I have been fearful at such times of unintentionally making a wrong move.

In any EOF situation, three cognitive abilities are imperative: to see, to hear, and to understand. War, however, is confusing and uncertain. Threats are not always clear, people are not always who they say they are, and the rules for each side are not always well understood. Afghans who have lived through war for 30 years are encountering 18-year old American Soldiers stationed at a checkpoint for the first time. To meet under the pressure of life and death, both Soldiers and civilians need better understanding of the other and more practice.

The Soldier and the Afghan are making similar decisions. At what point does one or the other come into the line of view? What is their intent? At what point does intent become a threat? As a civilian or as a Soldier, do you make yourself known or hide? For the civilian, to try to blend in is to look as though you have something to hide—for example, that you are planting an IED instead of tying your shoe or hoeing a field with small, inconspicuous movements. To exaggerate movements so that you are a known entity is to attract attention, undesirable for most Afghans. Many Soldiers can understand this dilemma as similar to their own, particularly those on their third or fourth tour. They know those questions inside and out from their own military training.

When I was out at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, several years ago, I participated in an EOF training scenario in a mock Iraqi village. A tremendous program, it's one that has been replicated since at bases across the country. Now that we have the ability to get our servicemen and women familiar with a combat environment, it's imperative to ensure the training is correct. A fast car, for example, has a fairly straightforward EOF response. Signal, signal again, fire warning shots, and then resort to lethal force. But from the civilian side, do I understand the signals and warnings? If they've recently changed, have I been notified? Are hasty checkpoints being set up in areas that before were free and clear? Can I see the signs in the snow, and can I see the lasers in the sunlight? And when it comes time for that warning shot, could the tires be taken out rather than discharging into the engine block where the bullet has a far greater chance of killing the car's occupants? War requires constant assessment, planning, and reassessment. Civilians, rest assured, are doing the same thing.

Evolving EOF standards press insurgents to self-identify while keeping innocents from being mistaken for a threat. The following basic recommendations take that into account and may help ensure split-second decisions made don't cost unnecessary loss of life on either side:

- Someone else's shoes: Consider approaching a checkpoint. You're not sure what nationality that Soldier is, but he looks anxious, and a suicide bomber detonated near this base earlier in the week. Considering the civilian view in a situation like this can help explain a lot of seemingly erratic and hostile behavior. If you miss a warning sign and a soldier begins shooting near you, would you run away or stop? For most civilians, the human instinct to flee will take over, making them look all the more guilty.

- Learn from the past, plan for the present: Some lessons should be applied from theater to theater while others can't. It's critical to know the difference. For example, in rural Iraq, civilians had room to avoid convoys; in Afghanistan, one road typically leads in and out and around a village, and there is no other way for civilians to travel. The lessons learned are specific to the environment in that case. On the other hand, in 2005, new EOF procedures at checkpoints resulted in a dramatic drop in civilian casualties. Soldiers were not using less force on the whole, but rather used an escalation of force more skillfully to distinguish between a potential and an actual threat. Innocent lives were saved, and the lesson should be applied to Afghanistan: keep statistics on civilian casualties, assess the problem if the numbers are high, and adapt procedures and circle back to assess again.
- What the situation is not: A single vehicle driving through a city at night after curfew and with its lights on is probably not a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) but a husband taking his pregnant wife to the hospital. Yet a man driving a vehicle from town that approaches a checkpoint and asks for water for his pregnant wife is probably not really looking for water. Understanding the difference saves lives and not only the civilian's. Understanding the difference comes through understanding the people, being on the ground for a while, and taking time to chart patterns. Every day is a lesson learned for the next.
- Public relations: The Afghan people won't be won solely by mitigating harm. How military and civilian leaders engage with the population prior to combat and then respond to unintentional tragedies matters greatly. When procedures are changed, it's important to tell the population—with as much detail and foresight as is practical to the mission. When procedures are improved for the benefit of civilians, it's important to tell the population. When harm occurs nonetheless, it is important for the population to hear condolences, not denials; to know that investigations will be conducted, not overlooked; to know that humanity and compassion will rise above internal disputes.
- Respect suffering: Improving procedures will often reduce the death toll, but to those suffering losses, less death is still more than no death at all. Mohammad was passing a checkpoint with his brother in Kunduz in 2008 some hours after an IED explosion. Afghan and U.S. Soldiers checked the two brothers and found nothing suspicious. With everyone on edge, something went wrong—a miscommunication had the Americans firing into the car. Both men were seriously injured. Mohammed's brother was shot in the back of the head. When they went to the provincial reconstruction team for help after recovering at the hospital, they were turned away and told, "This is war." Mohammad now says, "I do have a lot of anger toward the Americans because they shoot without reason and they don't care what happens. [They] offered me no reason for what they did, they offered me no help, no excuse... not even an apology." U.S. forces have the ability to offer tangible condolences (often called "solatia") when a civilian is unintentionally harmed during lethal operations. Ensuring that all ISAF troops understand the importance of paying condolences and do it the same way is essential to mitigating anger when EOF turns tragic.

Hindsight is 20/20, but in a war for the hearts and minds of the people, foresight has to be even better.

Endnote

1. Names of Afghan people have been changed.

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