HANDBOOK

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OEF Embedded Training Team

First 100 Days

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)   http://call.army.mil
Combined Arms Center (CAC) ● Ft. Leavenworth, KS

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Foreword

This handbook is written for you, the embedded training team (ETT) member. Traditionally, this mission was reserved for Special Forces' units or teams. With the revision of Army Field Manual 3.0, *Operations*, this is now a mission for general purpose forces. The Army has not yet officially designated one organization or agency as the ETT proponent; therefore, information concerning TTs circulates at all levels. This handbook has been vetted by the Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance, 1st Infantry Division, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned Integration Network.

There are two key facts ETT members must consider:

- Your first 100 days in theater will set the tone for the rest of your tour.
- You will not have much time for professional reading while at the predeployment site. So, if you only read one handbook, we think it should be this one.

The subjects in this handbook are a compilation of the most important topics raised by your predecessors during in theater interviews and redeployment surveys.

Your success in this mission has greater impact than you may imagine. Your success means that the United States is one step closer to reducing its footprint in Afghanistan and bringing our Soldiers home.

Steven Mains
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned

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Introduction

"Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries."

–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

Congratulations on your assignment as an embedded training team (ETT) member. As the Afghanistan government continues to build its national security forces in a dynamic environment, the U.S. Army is focusing on ETTs. Because there is not a great deal of doctrine or materials written on ETTs, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is working to fill the gap until the Army can develop solid doctrine for this important mission.

In April and May of 2008, CALL surveyed ETT Soldiers returning from Afghanistan. The survey asked respondents to identify what information (or training) would have facilitated their first 100 days in theater. What Soldiers identified as important in training, skills, and knowledge for those first 100 days forms the basis for this handbook. This handbook passes that knowledge along to other Soldiers, especially those who have never been an ETT member.

This handbook is designed to complement a series of already published First 100 Days Handbooks (Soldiers', Leaders', and Commander and Staff). This handbook will not repeat subjects covered in other handbooks, nor address all topics of interest. CALL's intent is to address the most important topics based on historical data.

Keep in mind that information not covered in this handbook may be available in other CALL resources accessible from the CALL Web site, a one-stop-shop for any and all the information you may need. See the last page of this handbook for the CALL Products "Online."

Each section of the handbook begins with a quotation taken from the April/May 2008 survey.

Chapter 1

Establishing Relationships

"I would have liked to have had more training on interaction with host nation forces."

–MAJ, Corps G2 mentor

Advising and Mentoring

As an embedded training team (ETT) member, you can count on playing the roles of advisor and mentor. Some of you may also be trainers.

Definitions:

- Military advisor: Soldier sent to foreign nations to aid that nation with its military training, organization, and other military tasks.

- Mentor: A trusted friend, counselor, or teacher; usually a more experienced person.

Doctrinally, ETT members conduct an advisory mission; however, within Afghanistan, the use of the term mentor is more readily used by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (e.g., Afghan National Army [ANA], Afghan National Police [ANP], etc.).

An effective advisor performs not only the advisory role, but will be a mentor to his counterpart.

Mentor basics

The ANSF unit has much to gain from coalition advisors:

- Coalition funding and equipment (lethal and nonlethal)

- Coalition intelligence

- Coalition effects (lethal and nonlethal)

- Coalition training

- Operational and tactical advice

A great advisor can:

- See solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.

- Work from the commander's intent and guidance.

- Orchestrate events to ensure success from behind the scenes (focus on the mission versus seeking personal credit).

A great advisor must:

- Be part diplomat and part warrior.

- Stay aware of local power struggles and how they will affect his organization.

- Attempt to influence ANSF according to long-term interests rather than short-term gains.

A mediocre advisor:

- Does not understand the dynamics of rapport, credibility, and value.

- Is often reduced to liaison roles with counterparts, while liaison officers who understand these dynamics often achieve status similar to advisors or confidantes with counterparts.

Key Skill Areas for Mentoring

The ANA are skillful in:

- Dismounted patrolling

- Combined arms

- Branch-specific skills

The ANP are skillful in:

- Community-oriented policing

- Problem-oriented policing

- Evidence procedures

- Arrests

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) are skillful in:

- Search

- Border rules

- Border checkpoints

Everyone should be skillful in:

- Ethical training

- Combat lifesaver

- Targeting

- Communications

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield

- Human intelligence

- Planning

- Orders

- Leadership

- De-escalation of force

- Systems

- Civil-military operations

Missions of an ANA Advisor/PMT

Primary missions

Mentor ANA in:

- Leadership, staff, and support functions.

- Planning, assessing, supporting, and executing operations and training.

- Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Provide ANA access to combat enablers such as:

- Close air support/fires.

- Medical evacuation.

- Quick reaction force (QRF).

- Redundant command and control capability.

Sustain ANA units:

- Monitor ANA pay operations and personnel

- Contract or cash purchase ANA support/sustainment

- Assist ANA forces in forecasting requirements

- Assist ANA forces in planning, developing, and executing sustainment

Other ANA support missions

School house and doctrine (Training and Doctrine Command):

- Develop and execute institutional training programs.

- Synchronize Soldier, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and officer course programs of instruction.

- Update and translate doctrinal and training publications.

Logistical support (logistics task force): Maintain and sustain ANA forces (ANA depot-level support).

Partnership program: Participants with Combined Joint Task Force-101, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, and International Security Assistance Force.

Police mentor team missions

Afghan Uniformed Police PMT:

- Assist and mentor the provincial Community of Police (CoP) in operating, manning, and equipping the Joint Police Command Center.

- Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned provincial CoP efforts to conduct authorized Afghan National Auxiliary Police training, sustainment training, and opportunity training.

- Establish close coordination with the provincial reconstruction team/police technical assistance team within your area of responsibility.

Afghan Border Police PMT missions:

- Mentor ABP element in participating in the Joint Regional Command Center (JRCC) process for that headquarters (HQ).

- Mentor, coordinate, monitor, and support the assigned battalion or brigade commander efforts to conduct sustainment training and opportunity training.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) PMT missions:

- Mentor ANCOP element in participating in the JRCC process for that HQ.

- Provide coordination support to the ANCOP element during cross-boundary/QRF operations.

Other missions for advisor/mentors:

- Presence patrol (day and night)

- Village assessment

- Humanitarian aid

- Traffic checkpoint

- Eradication of suspected or known enemy positions

- Drug eradication

- Cordon and search for weapon cache

- High value target force protection and security escort

- Route/area security

- Joint operation

- Route/area reconnaissance

- Threat investigation

- Responding to improvised explosive device strikes

- Crowd control

- Troops in contact and reinforcement (QRF)

- Observation post

Traits of a Good Mentor

Good mentors are:

- Worthy of emulation.

- Mature.

- Professional.

- Knowledgeable.

- Confident.

- Culturally and situationally aware.

A good mentor:

- Lives, sleeps, and eats with his partnership unit, when possible.

- Makes his opinion valuable.

- Patiently but relentlessly enforces standards.

- Focuses on developing professional units:

    º Promotes based on merit.

º Helps build a professional NCO corps.

º Supports the political process.

º Defends the rights of citizens.

- Provides for the populace.

- Does not attempt to build a replica of his own armed forces.

- Realizes the ANSF are first and foremost counterinsurgency (COIN) forces.

- Knows professional competence coupled with demonstrated cultural awareness are the most effective means to establish and maintain rapport.

- Demonstrates technical and tactical proficiency.

- Conducts proper planning.

- Plans well thought-out support contingencies.

- Focuses training (COIN, shoot, move, communicate, medical, ethical training, police skills).

- Rehearses.

- Debriefs and conducts after action reviews.

Result: A confident ANSF unit

Build Rapport

Your individual success as an advisor (or mentor) hinges on building and maintaining rapport with your host nation counterpart. The quicker you can build a relationship and gain trust from your counterpart, the more effective you will be as an advisor/mentor.

Mentors must have a plan to establish and maintain rapport:

- Cross cultural communication skills
- Language skills and/or the ability to utilize an interpreter
- Respect for a counterpart's rank, age, status, and experience
- Negotiation skills
- Interpersonal skills
- Enthusiasm and a positive attitude
- Credibility
- Technical and tactical proficiency
- Combined activities (training, planning, recreation)

Mentoring recommendations:

- The mentor must be able to use tact not only on the battlefield, but also while mentoring the officers and NCOs.
- The mentor must be confident in his ability as a mentor and have tactical and technical knowledge in his field.
- The mentor must also remember that this is still Afghanistan and the Afghans' country. Mentors are here as advisors and not drill sergeants.

Mentors should remember the following:

- Intelligence is the basis for all COIN activities and the ANSF are the best source of intelligence.
- The objective is to enable the ANSF to be legitimate and clearly in charge.

- All operations have a psychological effect.

- Perception often is reality in COIN operations.

- The best defense is gaining the heart and minds of the local people.

- Strengthen the ANA logistical system.

- Train soldiers in vehicle maintenance and repair.

- When there is no pending mission, interact with your ANA counterpart.

- Make certain you are fully trained on all vehicles, communication equipment, and weaponry.

- Involve your ANA counterpart when planning a mission.

- The military is only one part of the overall program (80 percent political, 20 percent military).

- Help ANSF leaders facilitate interagency, intergovernmental, and interorganizational activities.

- Mentor on key principles to win the COIN fight.

- The most important counterinsurgents are the ANSF.

- Strive to strengthen the NCO channel, and strive to mentor the officer to let the NCO implement the tasking.

- Drink the *chai* (tea) when it is offered by the ANA.

- Respect counterparts' times of prayer in garrison, but use tact to influence an appropriate place and time of prayer during missions.

- When giving guidance or recommendations, tell your ANA counterpart the reason "why."

- Stop by to check on the soldiers and NCOs during their classes.

- Remember that training does not stop down range.

- Guide ANSF in developing multiple options.

- Minimize the coalition presence while maximizing the impact.

- "Afghan face" is not enough on operations; ANSF must conduct the operations.

- Above all, have patience.

Challenges

Previous ETTs encountered the following challenges:

- Understanding cultural differences.

- ANSF do not treat subordinates with dignity and respect.

- ANSF officers may be corrupt and steal money from soldiers' payments, and they may hoard supplies.

- Many ANSF officers perceive NCOs to be incompetent and unworthy to lead.

- Some ANSF officers feel they do not need to listen to their mentors.

- Over-coaching: mentors mistake differences from their way as the "wrong answer."

- The lack of hygiene increases the risk of disease.

- There is a lack of efficient medical care, supplies, and facilities.

- Operations security is a concern. There is always a possibility of enemy informants embedded in the ANSF ranks.

- The ANSF have not developed fire control discipline.

- The ANSF logistical support system is still in its infancy.

- There may be differences among the different tribes in the ranks of the ANSF.

Remember: It is a marathon.

Major causes of an advisor's failure:

- Frustration and the inability to maintain a good working relationship with his counterpart.

- Failure to understand why his counterpart does not feel the sense of urgency that he does.

- Inability to realize that his counterpart will remain and continue to fight the enemy long after his tour is over.

Chapter 2

Embedded Training Team Command and Control

"I wish I would have been told about the command structure for all the military transition teams in Afghanistan."

–MAJ, J6 Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-East (ARSIC-E)

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

The mission of the CSTC-A, in partnership with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, is to plan, program, and implement structural, organizational, institutional, and management reforms of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within its borders.

CSTC-A Command and Control Structure

CG CSTC-A (1)

DCG/CoS

CJ 1 · CJ 3 · CJ 5 · CJ 7 · CJ ENGR · SJAG · IG · Detainee Ops

CJ 2 · CJ 4 · CJ 6 · CJ 8 · Comd surg · PAO · Chaplain

(2)

ACG - AD · ACG - PD · ACG - ISC · ACG - PMA

CAPTF (3) · TF Phoenix · CTAG

-A.

Notes:
1. CG CSTC-A is supported by executive officer and Commander's Action Group.
2. ACG-ISC to be cut to DATES at ISAF.
3. CAPTF is OPCON to AFCENT, TACON to CSTC

ISC - International Securities Cooperation
ACG-AD - Assistant Commanding General-Army Development
PD - Police Development
PMA - Political Military Affairs
SJAG - Staff Judge Advocate
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
CAPTF - Combined Air Power Transition Force
CTAG - Combined Training Assistance Group
DCG - Deputy commanding general
CG - Commanding general
CoS - Chief of Staff

IG - Inspector General
PAO - Public affairs officer
AFCENT - Allied Forces Central Europe
OPCON - Operational control
TACON - Tactical control

Figure 2-1

Within the CSTC-A structure, there are mentors and advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.

Combined Joint Task Force-Phoenix

CJTF-P, composed of over 6,000 personnel, trains and mentors the ANSF to conduct independent, self-sustained counterinsurgency (COIN) and security operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan, in order to defeat terrorism and provide a secure, stable environment within the borders of Afghanistan. As needed, facilitates in-extremis support for ANSF.

The end state of the CJTF-P mission is a trained, self-generating ANSF that are well respected, multi-ethnic, sustainable, capable of effectively conducting law enforcement, COIN, all mission essential task list tasks, and of securing inside and along their nation's borders with an end strength of 70,000 for the Afghan National Army and 82,000 for the Afghan National Police by December 2008.

Figure 2-2: CJTF-P organizational chart

Afghan Regional Security Integration Command

ARSIC functions:

- Translates higher and flanking headquarters guidance

- Exercises command of Regional Corps Advisory Command (RCAC) and Regional Police Advisory Command (RPAC)

- Exercises command less operational control of provisional and below embedded training teams (ETTs)/police mentor teams during tactical operations

- Receives "ground truth" from RPAC/RCAC

- Develops direction and guidance to RPAC/RCAC

- Synchronizes RPAC/RCAC efforts

- Balances resources between RPAC/RCAC

- Develops mentoring standards

- Plans mentoring deployments/employments

ARSIC Organization

Figure 2-3: ARSIC organizational chart

Chapter 3

Languages

"You need to teach Pashtu to units going to Pastun areas."

–1LT, police mentor team S3/S4

Major Ethnic Groups

The map on the following page shows the complexity of the tribal affiliation. Notice how much of the country is Pashtun.

Figure 3-1: Tribal regions in Afghanistan

Dari versus Pashtu

If you have done any research or heard from other previous embedded training teams (ETTs), Afghanistan is divided by tribal regions. Pashtun is one of the predominant tribal cultures, and many ETT members wished they had received Pashtu language training, rather than Dari, the national language decreed by the Afghan government. If possible, find a program that will teach you Pashtu. Keep in mind there are some commonalities in Dari and Pashtu.

Basic Dari [1]

Common terms	
Hello	Sa-laam
Goodbye	baa-maa-ne khu-daa
Help me	ku-ma-kem ko
Do you need help?	too ba ku-mak za-roo-rat daa-ree?
Thank you	Ta-shak-kur
Yes/No/Ok	Ba-ley/ney/Du-rust
Please	Lut-fan
Excuse me	Bu-bakh-sheyn
My name is . . .	na-me ma…as
What is your name?	naa-met chees?

How are you?	che-tor has-tee?
I am fine, thanks and you?	khoob has-tum, ta-shak-kur, too che-tor has-tee?
Good/bad	khoob/bad
We are Americans	Maa am-ree-kaa-yee has-teym
Do you speak English?	Eng-lee-see yaad-daa-ree?
Left/Right	Chap/du-rust or raast
North/South/East/West	sha-maal/ju-noob/sharq/gharb
Stop/Come here	es-taad sho/een-ja be-yaa
Stay where you are	da jaa-yet baash
Put your weapon down	sa-laa-he-ta ba za-meen baan
Lie on your stomach	roo-ye she-kam da-raaz be-kash
Do not move	shor na-kho

Basic Pashtu [1]

Common terms	
Hello	Salaam-alay-kum
Goodbye	khu-die-pa-amaan
Help!	ma-ras-ta
Thank you	mo-te-shak-ker-am
Yes/no/ok	ba-le/ nah/ sa-hee
Please	meh-ra-baa-ne
Excuse me/I'm sorry	wo-bakha
My name is . . .	z-maa noom
What is your name?	staa num tsa de?
How are you?	tsenga-ye?
I'm fine, thanks, and you?	za-xa-yum, ma-na-na, te-tsenga-ye?
Good/Bad	xa/bad
We are Americans	mung-Amrikaa-yan-yu

Do you speak English?	ta lng-li-si sha-ba-ri ka-wo-lie she?
Do you need help?	maa sara marasta wuka
Left/Right	chap/raast-ta
North/South/East/West	sha-maal/ju-nub/sharq/gharb
Stop/Come here	wo-d'a-ri-ga/del-ta raa-sha
Stay where you are	pa dzai de wo-da-ri-ga
Put your weapon down	topak de-par-mi-dzaka ki-xiz-de
Lie on your stomach	par makh pre-wo-za
Do not move	har-kat ma-ka-wa

[1] Based on *Defense Language Institute's Language Survival Guide*.

Chapter 4

Afghan National Security Forces

"I wish we would have had a better understanding of the composition of the Afghan National Army."

–SGM, embedded training team (ETT) mentor

Most of the previous ETTs focused on building the Afghan National Army (ANA), and that has remained the focus for the past five years. Now the focus is shifting towards the Afghan National Police (ANP). Some ETTs will work directly with the ANP. Because this is a new program, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures are still being developed. Some Soldiers will work with the ANA, others will work with the ANP, and some may work with both.

Organizations

The ANSF is comprised of the following organizations:

- Ministry of Defense (MoD)
- Ministry of the Interior (MoI)
- ANA
- Afghan Air Force
- ANP
- National Directorate for Security (NDS)

Ministry of Defense

The Afghan MoD is an organization of the central government of Afghanistan, overseeing the entire military of Afghanistan.

Ministry of the Interior

The Interior Minister of Afghanistan is responsible for Afghanistan's police forces, other internal security forces, and Afghanistan's counter-narcotics force.

The Minister is also the cabinet member responsible for the administration of Afghanistan's provinces.

Figure 4-1

Afghan National Army

The ANA is a service branch of the military of Afghanistan that is currently being trained by the coalition forces to ultimately take the lead in land-based military operations.

The ANA is task organized into six corps. Five corps serve as regional commands for the ANA: the 201st Corps based in Kabul, the 203rd Corps based in Gardez, the 205th Corps based in Kandahar, the 207th Corps in Herat, and the 209th Corps in Mazar-e-Sharif. The sixth corps is the "Air Corps," which is the old Afghan Air Force. Plans exist to separate this corps again and reclaim the old Afghan Air Force role as a separate branch of the Afghan military.

The basic unit in the ANA is the Kandak Battalion, consisting of 600 troops. Although the vast majority is infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank battalion have been formed; more may be planned. Every ANA corps will eventually be assigned a commando battalion that will have advanced infantry training and U.S. equipment.

The roles of ANA include the following:

- Secure the borders and deter external threats.

- Defeat terrorist forces.

- Disband, reintegrate, or imprison anti-government forces.

- Manage internal security threats and emergencies in cooperation with the ANP.

The key principles of building the ANA include the following:

- Soldiers loyal to the government of Afghanistan.

- Soldiers who are disciplined and professional.

- An organization that is ethnically diverse.

- Planning for a multi-year process.

- Ensuring an affordable and sustainable force.

ANA task organization and garrison locations

ANA Task Organization (End State)

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense

Kabul   Central   Gardez   Kandahar   Herat   MeS

(*) = Sustainment   (FLE) Forward Logistics Element   (MeS) Mazar-e-Sharif
(ETT) Embedded training team   (SECFOR) Security forces

4th BDE OPCON to 205th

Figure 4-2

Figure 4-3

ANA Ranks

	Field Marshal		Lieutenant General
	General		Major
	Lieutenant General		Captain
	Major General		1st Lieutenant
	Brigadier General		2nd Lieutenant
	Colonel		3rd Lieutenant
	Command Sergeant Major Sergeant Major		Staff Sergeant
	First Sergeant Master Sergeant		Sergeant
	Platoon Sergeant Sergeant First Class		

Figure 4-4: ANA rank structure

ANA soldiers

Qualities of ANA soldiers:

- Multi-ethnic

- Literacy higher than national average (+50 percent)

- Loyal

- Young, average age 18-25

- Perform well with proper leadership

Figure 4-5

Qualities of ANA NCOs:

- Combat veterans

- Literacy higher than national average (+50 percent)

- Leadership skills vary from weak to very strong

- Professional military experience with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)[1] or Mujahidin

- Capable of performing NCO duties in Western model, if empowered to do so by their officers

[1] DRA is the communist regime that ruled Afghanistan between 1978 and 1992.

Figure 4-6

Qualities of ANA officers:

- Combat veterans

- Literacy higher than national average

- Leadership skills vary from weak to very strong

- Professional military experience with DRA or Mujahidin

- May have received formal professional military education

- Willing to learn new ideas; hamstrung by Soviet era mindset

"Information on the police structure and focused district development would have made a big difference."

–SFC, ANP mentor

Afghan National Police

The ANP consists of the following organizations:

- Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)

- Afghan National Auxiliary Police

- Afghan Border Police

- Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

- Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)

Figure 4-7: ANP organizational structure

ANP Ranks

Corporal	1st Corporal	Sergeant	Staff Sergeant

2nd Lieutenant	Lieutenant	1st Lieutenant	Captain	Staff Captain

Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel

Brigadier	General Major	General Lieutenant	General Colonel

Figure 4-8: ANP rank structure

Focused District Development (FDD)

The goals of FDD include the following:

- Enhance ANP capabilities, starting with the AUP.

- Transform the AUP into a service loyal to the Afghan people and Afghan national interests.

- Build a "prosecutor-driven justice system" and the rule of law (ROL).

- Strengthen the AUP linkage to provincial, regional, and national leaders and staff.

- Develop MoI capabilities by mentoring its leadership of this initiative.

- Enable the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and MoI to project success by improving the lives of Afghan citizens at the local level.

Six phases of reform:

- Phase I: District Assessment

- Phase II: Relief-in-place (RIP)/Transfer of authority (TOA) with ANCOP

- Phase III: AUP Reconstitution at the Regional Training Center

- Phase IV: ANCOP RIP/TOA with AUP (on order)

- Phase V: Focused Mentoring and Validation

- Phase VI: Police Mentor Team Overwatch and Sustainment Training

The district reform team (DRT) consists of the following:

- MoI office/chief of uniformed police representative (leader)

- Regional and/or provincial police chief representative

- Attorney general office representative

- Afghan local leadership representative

- MoI recruiting team

- ANCOP liaison

- ISAF regional command (RC) and/or Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Afghan Regional Security Integration Command representative

- European Union Police representative (ROL specialist)

- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan representative

- Afghan RC representative

- Linguists

- Appropriate security forces to protect and move the team

- Potential observers

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

The CNPA is in charge of counter narcotics operations in Afghanistan and operates under the control of the Afghan MoI.

National Directorate of Security

The NDS is Afghanistan's version of a combined CIA and FBI.

Chapter 5

Afghan Counterinsurgency Training

"[We need] more, more, and still more counterinsurgency training for the trigger pullers. We ran into multiple conflicts where task force commanders, not understanding the police mentor team mission, wanted to utilize Afghan National Police in a kinetic role, not a police role."

–MAJ, police mentor team chief

Afghan COIN Training

Afghanistan is not Iraq, but it is in a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Though the principles of COIN operations can be used anywhere in the world, units must take cultural factors into consideration and how the principles are applied. Most newly-arriving Soldiers will receive the basic COIN indoctrination while in-processing at Camp Phoenix; however, to truly understand the Afghan COIN environment, Soldiers should take the week-long course at the Afghan COIN Academy at Camp Dahrulaman in Kabul. This course is open to U.S., coalition, host nation, and other governmental agencies. Soldiers will participate in discussions and problem-solving scenarios with Afghan soldiers, police, and ministry-level members.

COIN Academy Vision

The Afghanistan COIN Academy marries U.S. COIN doctrine to Afghan application and fosters an Afghan-specific COIN mindset across all stakeholders in country to achieve common Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and coalition strategic goals. The academy acts as the focal point for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned; best practices; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) elements in theater, COIN proponents in the continental United States, and International Security Assistance Force allies. Finally, the academy serves as a COIN advisory tool for commanders at all levels in theater.

COIN Academy as the Fusion Center

MOI

NDS

ISAF

CSTC-A

Is Rep of Afghanistan

UNAMA

Afghanistan COIN Academy

MOD

ANATC

ANSF

Coalition Services

International Community

ANA

ANP

UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
ANATC - Afghan National Army Training Command
NDS - National Directorate of Security

- Afghanistan COIN Academy becomes fusion center for COIN
- Conduit between all government, military, non-military agencies/organizations
- Unity of effort in application of COIN principles along multiple lines of operation
- Trained counterinsurgents applying COIN throughout Afghanistan
- Distillation of effective COIN practices in Afghanistan

Figure 5-1

COIN Academy Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Objectives

Strategic:

- Advise/educate Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials to implement COIN across all aspects of national power.

- Advise and educate coalition/United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan civilian and military officials on integrating political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information.

- Support doctrinal development across ANSF.

- Facilitate lessons learned collection and integration at the doctrinal level.

- Provide a COIN strategic-level clearinghouse, a Web-based collaborative-forum that includes experts across the political, military, social, and economic spectrums.

Operational:

- Provide combined training through national curricula targeting brigade/battalion staffs, company commanders, and embedded training team leaders in ANSF and coalition forces and civilian equivalents.

- Provide in situ tailored training targeting COIN deficiencies or to support operational planning at the command level.

- Incorporate COIN into ANSF training and education continua/curricula by supporting ANSF training centers.

- Facilitate lessons learned collection and integration at the operational level.

Tactical:

- Facilitate lessons learned collection and integration at the tactical level with best practices, TTP, Smartbooks, etc.

- Provide COIN Leaders' Course, ETT/OMLT training, and military transition teams; disseminate COIN information down-range.

"Our Soldiers are faced with an incredible challenge not only in the environment, but just making sense of their area of operations. Every valley is different from the next. The local tribes all present unique challenges. Almost to a person, everyone agreed that any COIN instruction they got was what helped them the most. They just need more of it."

–MAJ David Hanselman, theater historian, 305th Military History Detachment, Combined Joint Task Force-82, CJ1
(who just returned from 3 weeks forward in the Bayonet area of responsibility)

Chapter 6

Afghan National Security Forces Logistics

"[We need] more emphasis on logistics requirements and procedures in Afghanistan."

–LTC, Corps G4 mentor

Ministry of Defense Form 14

To be an effective mentor/advisor, one must understand what his counterpart must go through to request logistics support. When the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Form 14 was introduced, it required over 20 signatures (mostly of those who had no need to sign), which was never the intent of the Afghan logistics process. As a result of this bureaucracy, some advisors/mentors thought it was easier to order supplies through the U.S. or coalition system. **Do not do this**. The Afghan Nation Security Forces (ANSF) have a system. They must learn to use it, embrace it, and take ownership of it. That is the only way this system will work. It may be a slow and painful process now, but the more the Afghans understand and use their process, the faster they will get their supplies.

Afghan National Security Forces Logistics

Although getting better, logistics continues to be a challenge for the ANSF. Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics is better off than the Afghan National Police (ANP), but still remains a challenge. The Ministry of Interior's (MoI) logistical system for the ANP mirrors the MoD's system.

Mentors play a critical role in enforcing the logistics standards. Mentors must:

- Know and understand the MoD Form 14 process.

- Ensure that Afghans go through their channels—generate the request (even for items that are not readily available in the Afghan system).

- Track and verify requests.

- Use operational funds only when the ANSF logistics systems has been utilized/exhausted.

MoD forms:

- MoD ANA Form 2 (Stock Accounting Record)

- MoD ANA Form 3 (Register of Supply Actions)

- MoD ANA Form 4 (Document Control Register)

- MoD ANA Form 9 (Item Materiel Issue Order)

- * MoD ANA Form 14 (Request for Issue or Turn-In)

- MoD ANA Form 1298 (Due out Record)

* Key form for ANSF logistics

Figure 6-1

MoD 14 Flow from Kandaks

- Kandaks Originate MoD 14
- Bde S4 Approving Authority
- Originating Kandak Assigns Doc #
- Sustainment Kandak — In Stock — MoD 9 & Issued Items
- Fwd Sup Depots — In Stock — MoD 9 & Issued Items
- Class II,IV,VI-IX And Out of Stock Class I,III,V
- Log Cmd Support Operations
- National Depots — In Stock — MoD 9 & Issued Items
- Copy of the MoD 9 is also sent to Log Cmd Support Operations, Distribution Division

Figure 6-2

Figure 6-3

MoD 14 Flow from Units Above Corps

MoD 14

Units Above Corps

Class II,IV,VI-IX
And out of Stock
Class I,III,V

Fwd Sup Depots
In Stock

MoD 9
& Issued Items

MoD 14

Log Cmd Spt Ops

MoD 14

National Depots
In Stock

MoD 9
& Issued Items

Copy of the MoD 9 is also
sent to Log Cmd Support
Operations, Distribution
Division

Figure 6-4

Figure 6-5

In-depth instruction of the ANA supply system and property accountability is available from defense contractor instructors in Kabul.

Chapter 7

Coalition Units

"I wish I had a better understanding of the command relationship between embedded training teams and the International Security Assistance Force."

–LTC, TAG mentor in Kabul

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Each coalition force is under the command of ISAF. See Figure 7-1 on the following page for ISAF's organizational chart and mission.

Afghanistan Command and Control

Figure 7-1

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–ISAF [1]

Through the United Nations-mandated ISAF, NATO is assisting the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction.

ISAF's key military tasks include assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan Nation Security Forces, mentoring and supporting the Afghan National Army (ANA), and supporting Afghan government programs to disarm illegally armed groups.

Two groups that are key to ISAF efforts are operational mentor and liaison teams (OMLTs) and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs).

In order to accomplish its mission, ISAF has divided Afghanistan into 5 regional commands (RCs). Certain nations have constraints placed on their operational employment.

[1] Based on <http://www.nato.int/isaf>

26 NATO Nations						11 Non-NATO Nations			
BE	🇧🇪	HU	🇭🇺	PO	🇵🇹	ALB	🇦🇱	MAC	🇲🇰
BU	🇧🇬	IC	🇮🇸	RO	🇷🇴	AUS	🇦🇺	IRL	🇮🇪
CA	🇨🇦	IT	🇮🇹	SK	🇸🇰	AUT	🇦🇹	NZL	🇳🇿
CZ	🇨🇿	LA	🇱🇻	SN	🇸🇮	AZE	🇦🇿	SWE	🇸🇪
DA	🇩🇰	LI	🇱🇹	SP	🇪🇸	HRV	🇭🇷	CHE	🇨🇭
ES	🇪🇪	LU	🇱🇺	TU	🇹🇷	FIN	🇫🇮		
FR	🇫🇷	NL	🇳🇱	UK	🇬🇧				
GE	🇩🇪	NO	🇳🇴	US	🇺🇸				
GR	🇬🇷	PL	🇵🇱						

Figure 7-2: NATO and non-NATO nations

Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams

Overview [1]

The OMLT program is a key contribution by NATO's ISAF mission towards developing the ANA:

- OMLTs are embedded in ANA battalions (Kandaks), brigades, garrisons, and corps headquarters (HQ)

- OMLTs provide training and mentoring to support ANA units' operational deployments

- OMLTs also provide a liaison capability between ANA and the ISAF, coordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the ANA units receive enabling support

- Corps HQ and garrison OMLTs do not deploy from their assigned locations

- Brigade and Kandak OMLTs deploy throughout Afghanistan with their ANA partner units

- OMLTs are composed of 12-19 personnel, depending on the type of partner unit

- OMLT personnel deploy for periods of at least six months in order to build enduring relationships with the ANA and maximize the mentoring effect

- OMLT training is a three-phase process, consisting of national training, NATO predeployment training, and in-theater training

OMLT nations [1] (as of Sep 07)

Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States have contributed full OMLTs/embedded training teams (ETTs).

Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have contributed personnel to multinational OMLTs/ETTs.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Overview [1]

PRTs are small teams of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to provide security for aid workers and help reconstruction work.

In addition to regular patrols and security operations, NATO-ISAF PRTs also assist in rehabilitating schools and medical facilities, restoring water supplies, providing agricultural technical assistance, and many other civil-military projects.

Currently, there are 25 PRTs operating throughout the country.

[1] Based on <http://www.nato.int/isaf>

Figure 7-3

Chapter 8

Field Ordering Officers and Commander's Emergency Response Program

"[We need more] training on Commander's Emergency Response Program and field ordering officers. A lot of teams did not know about these programs until about 2-3 months after being assigned to their forward operating bases."

–SFC, Afghan Regional Security Integration Command South J9 noncommissioned officer in charge

As an embedded training team member, you may be required to obtain new skills, such as handing field ordering officer (FOO) money or managing Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Basically these programs are normally developed and run by each major command. You should receive additional training prior to executing these duties.

Field Ordering Officers

FOOs are Department of Defense (DOD) personnel authorized to expend operating funds for mission-essential operating expenses valued at $3,000 or less under a contracting officer's supervision. FOOs allow deployed units to purchase mission-critical requirements that cannot be obtained by the unit through military supply systems or higher headquarters. A FOO cannot be a finance and accounting officer, disbursing officer, pay agent (PA), property book officer, acquisition staff officer, or contracting officer's representative, unless an exception is made at the discretion of the contracting office.

Remember the following:

- FOO authority may **not** be delegated.

- FOOs and PAs are teams and both must be present at time of purchase.

- FOOs cannot purchase recurring requirements with operating funds.

- Expenses >$3000 are not allowed. Only a warranted contracting officer can exceed this limit.

- Operating funds are for mission-critical needs, no luxuries!

Nomination:

- Commander (0-5 and above) nominates (not appoints) a Soldier to be a FOO.

- FOO should also have a DD 577 (Signature Card) signed by commander.

- Soldiers (E-5 and above) can be nominated by the unit commander.

- Note: The FOO appointment letter will be issued from the contracting office. Neither the unit nomination letter nor the DD Form 577 will authorize a FOO to make purchases using SF 44s.

- Finance office will not issue funds to PA without a copy of the FOO's appointment letter from contracting and DD Form 577 from unit.

A FOO can purchase or pay for:

- Consumable, expendable supplies.

- Basic office supplies.

- Non-standard supplies.

- General equipment repair.

- Office machine repair.

- Information technology (IT) equipment repair.

- IT accessories—flash drives, USB hubs, cables, keyboard, mouse, battery packs, cartridges, toner (1 at a time).

- Film processing critical to mission.

- Firewood (if no contract available).

- Sanitation services not on contract.

- Live animals for training aids.

- Cargo/personnel transportation.

- Class 3 items-fuel, oil, brake fluid.

- Class 4-lumber, plywood, 2x4s.

- Class 9-oil filters, spark plugs, tires.

- Minor vehicle repair.

- Minor roadside repair.

- Batteries.

- Basic cleaning supplies.

- Safe or backpack to secure FOO money.

- Weather-proofing supplies.

- Training aid material.

- Temporary service < 30 days.

- Rental of cars, trucks, boats, cranes (requires prior approval of battalion commander).

FOOs should never use operating funds to purchase:

- Items available from military supply systems or from contracts/blanket purchase agreements.

- Recurring requirements; leases/rentals over 30 days.

- Copying/printing costs.

- Any IT hardware (e.g., printers, internal computer parts, or any item that can be plugged into the Internet).

- Food and drinks, other than bottled water.

- Carpet, curtains/rods, drapes, similar furnishings.

- Permanent construction; large DOD supplies or equipment.

- Digital cameras, cell phones, radios, communication equipment, celebration items (flowers, coins, patches, flags, etc.), and morale, welfare, and recreation items, such as TV/DVDs, weights, and sports equipment.

- Medicine.

- Newspapers/magazine subscriptions.

- Luxury items.

- Religious items.

- Taxes, bribes, consultant fees.

- Payroll, overtime, extra duty.

- Personal or labor services with foreign government employees.

- Burial costs.

- Intelligence/surveillance.

- Guns/ammunition/explosives.

- Phone cards.

Basic FOO rules:

- Determine if item is available from military supply channels.

- If the item is non-expendable (durable) require a hand-receipt to ensure accountability; a Letter of Justification must be approved by the contracting office prior to purchase.

- The FOO holds all hand receipt responsibility.

- Cash and carry only: FOO cannot pick up items or have them delivered later.

- No partial payments; payment in full is required. For short-term leases/rentals <30 days (generators, vehicles, other transportation needs) pay vendor at end of lease/rental. For everything else require payment in full.

- The limit for the total requirement is $3,000.

    ° Do not split into multiple requirements to stay under ceiling.

    ° Examples of split requirements—$2900 purchases for same item from same vendor on separate days.

- Avoid any appearance of impropriety; do not do anything that might adversely affect public confidence in the integrity of the government acquisition system; do not accept gifts or play favorites with vendors.

Commander's Emergency Relief Program

The purpose of the CERP is to enable local commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their operating areas of responsibility (AORs) by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Afghan people and capacity-building across the Regional Command-East lines of operation. The Afghanistan Combined/Joint Operational Area (CJOA) continues to mature; CERP projects are shifting from basic needs to more complex reconstruction and development, institutional, and economic capacity building projects.

CERP funds are U.S. appropriated funds available for use during the fiscal year for which they were appropriated by Congress. CJTF-101 receives CERP funding from higher headquarters in allotments at various times throughout the year based on obligation rates.

The CERP utilizes project purchasing officers (PPOs) and PAs to purchase supplies and contract services. The PPO and PA for any given project cannot be the same person.

Task force (TF) commanders appoint PPOs in writing. It is highly recommended that PPOs be grade E-7 or higher. PPOs receive general procedural training from their TF CERP manager prior to executing CERP responsibilities. PPOs are also strongly encouraged to seek additional training on contracting specifics from the regional contracting offices. A record of the training must be maintained at the TF level. PPOs must complete a DD Form 577, Appointment/Termination Record–Authorized Signature (i.e., Signature Card), and provide the original to the servicing finance office and a copy to the Regional Management (RM) office. Also, PPOs will complete an OGE Form 450 within 30 days of initial appointment. A copy of this form will be sent to the CJTF-101 staff judge advocate (SJA) administrative law chief.

TF commanders appoint PAs in writing with a designated spending authority limit. PAs must be grade E-6 or above. If it is not possible to appoint a PA in the grade of at least E-6, the commander must request a waiver from the 726th Finance Battalion commander. The maximum dollar amount PAs may draw (total out at one time) from the finance office must be specified prior to the TF commander's appointment. This amount will be annotated on the appointment orders.

Each unit's commander is responsible for ensuring adequate security for funds in the custody of the PA. PAs receive CERP procedural training from the TF CERP manager and training on financial transaction procedures from the finance office disbursing officer. A record of the training must be maintained at the TF level. PAs must complete a DD Form 577, and provide the original to the servicing finance office and a copy to the RM office. Additional duties include overall project management and quality assurance/quality control. Payments to contractors will be made if the contractor has executed to standard in accordance with the project construction specifications and drawings included in the contract. The PA reports weekly to the PPO on percentage complete and estimated completion date.

The CERP may be used to assist the Afghan people in the following representative areas:

- Water and sanitation.

- Food production and distribution.

- Agriculture.

- Electricity.

- Healthcare.

- Education.

- Telecommunications.

- Economic, financial, and management improvements.

- Transpiration.

- Rule of law and governance.

- Irrigation.

- Civic cleanup activities.

- Civic support vehicles.

- Repair of civic and cultural faculties.

- Repair or payment for repair of property damage that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations and is not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act.

- Condolence payments to individual civilians for death or physical injury resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Condolence payments may include payments (sometimes referred to as 'martyr payments') made to the surviving spouse or next of kin of defense or police personnel who were killed as a result of U.S. coalition or supporting military operations.

- Payments to individuals upon release from detention.

- Protective measures, such as fencing, lights, barrier materials, berming over pipelines, guard towers, temporary civilian guards, etc. to enhance the durability and survivability of a critical infrastructure site (oil pipelines, electric lines, etc.).

- Other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.

CERP Approval Authority Levels and Commander Approval Authorities

Only a U.S. military commander may serve as an approving authority:

- Project nominations over $200 thousand (K): commanding general (CG) or designated representative.

- Project nominations between $25K–$200K: O-6 level commander (TF commander).

- Project nominations up to $25K: O-5 level commander (battalion/provincial reconstruction team commander).

- Project nominations over $500K are to be approved by the CG only. Following approval, all documentation included in the project nomination must be forwarded to the Army Central Command Concept of Operations for review before funds can be certified.

Steps to complete a CERP project (flowchart)

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                                       │
│   Project purchasing officer (PPO) prepares Afghan Development Report  │
│           (ADR) in Combined Information Data Network Exchange,         │
│      which assigns unique project number. PPO submits to CERP manager. │
│                                                                       │
│                                                                       │
│              ╱ Is project ╲   no    Battalion or Provencial           │
│              ╲   >$25K    ╱────────  Reconstruction Team (PRT)         │
│                                      commander approves project        │
│                  yes                                                   │
│                                                                       │
│              ╱ >$200K or use ╲  no    Task force (TF)                  │
│              ╲   CG funds?    ╱─────  commander approves               │
│                                       project                          │
│                  yes                                                   │
│                                                                       │
│              TF commander reviews ADRs/forwards                        │
│                his approved projects to                               │
│                CJTF-101 CJ9 CERP manager                              │
│                                                                       │
│   Submit for staff   Yes   ╱ Is project ╲                            │
│   section review    ─────── ╲   >$200K   ╱                            │
│                                                                       │
│                                  no                                   │
│                                                                       │
│                            Project to CERP                            │
│                             review board                              │
│                                                                       │
│   PPO enters project into their CERP checkbook, then prepares         │
│   DA Form 3953, Purchase, Request & Commitment (PR&C) & submits to    │
│                   TF CERP manager.                                    │
│                                                                       │
│                                                                       │
│              TF CERP manager submits PR&C to                           │
│                Resource Management (RM)                               │
│           for funds to be committed (one project per                   │
│              PR&C); PPO enters commitment on                          │
│                    CERP checkbook.                                    │
│                                                                       │
│                        Go to                                          │
│                      next page                                        │
│                                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 8-1

Figure 8-2

**Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
Projects >$200K Development Process**

CJ7 CJ8 SJA OTHER

CJTF - CJ9 → CERP REVIEW BOARD → CJTF - CJ8

PROJECT NOMINATION

PROJECT REFINEMENT

Resource Management

$

Battalion (BN)/
Provencial Reconstruction Team (PRT)/
Task Force (TF)

BN/PRT/TF

CERP Review Board: CoS, CJ3, CJ5, CJ7, CJ8, CJ9, SJA

Figure 8-3

CERP review board

The CERP Review Board will convene weekly, or as needed, to verify that all project nominations are legitimate and advisable uses of CERP funds. The board will be chaired by the CJTF-101 chief of staff with voting members from the CJ5, CJ7, CJ8, CJ9, and CJTF-101 SJA. Although the TFs are not voting members of the board, their attendance and participation are essential to ensuring the most detailed justifications and accurate information regarding the project nominations are presented.

CERP relief-in-place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) procedures

Prior to a unit leaving theater, the outgoing unit will complete a TOA document with the incoming unit. The outgoing unit commander will ensure that the necessary documentation is updated on all projects. This includes projects that have been nominated; submitted for approval; approved; or are active, completed, or cancelled. The incoming unit commander will ensure appropriate personnel have received a thorough briefing from the outgoing unit on all transferred projects executed within their area of operation (AO) and that PPOs/PAs have received initial training. Upon completion of information exchange and satisfactory training, the outgoing and incoming commander and PPO will sign the TOA document.

Incoming units assume responsibility for maintaining all CERP project records and for representing CERP operations during any audit or investigation. However, outgoing units remain pecuniarily liable and administratively responsible for all CERP operations conducted. The TOA document does not relieve outgoing unit personnel (including the commander, PPOs, and PAs) of any pecuniary liability or administrative/disciplinary action for actions conducted during the course of CERP operations, including instances of theft, fraud, waste, and abuse.

Outgoing units will transfer all closed project records to the incoming unit. Project records must be retained at the unit for five years after project completion. The outgoing unit must ensure all records are present and complete. Any deficiencies should be identified and corrected prior to the arrival of the incoming unit. Minor deficiencies and/or missing documents that cannot be corrected or replaced on the spot should be listed on the TOA documentation. Memorandums for records documenting the deficiencies, attempts made to fix them, and the circumstances in which they occurred should be prepared and included in the project records. Incoming CERP personnel will review closed project records and be prepared to represent closed projects executed by predecessors during audits or inquiries.

Incoming and outgoing PPOs must review all ongoing contracts together. Outgoing PPOs will explain all terms of each contract, specified tasks directed to the vendor, and payment terms. Incoming PPOs should be introduced to vendors or vendors'

representatives who have the authority to negotiate changes to contract terms. Incoming PPOs should also be introduced to any agents of the vendor authorized to receive payment.

Outgoing PPOs must provide incoming PPOs all details pertaining to payments made to date and payments due for each open project.

Units will schedule on-site visits for all open projects during the RIP/TOA process. Outgoing PPOs should coordinate with the vendor to ensure they are present at the time of the visit.

Units redeploying without follow-on U.S. forces or who are being replaced by a coalition or International Security Assistance Force nation should initiate a plan to complete all projects already in progress. However, it may be necessary to designate stay-behind personnel or assign U.S. liaison officers to inspect projects and/or make payments. Designated personnel must be trained CERP PPOs/PAs on appointment orders.

Stowage of all funds must be in accordance with Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 5, Chapter 3, paragraph 30304 (pp. 47-48). In alignment with this regulation, CERP PAs must have the capability to store $50K or more. Therefore, they will have a burglary-resistant safe or vault carrying at least an Underwriters' Laboratories classification of Tool-Resistant Safe, TL-30, and having a Group 1R combination lock. Generally, safes must meet General Services Administration specifications or be certified as an "Underwriter's Listed device." Weight requirements and security regulations must be in compliance with the FMR.

The PPO is responsible for keeping a complete file of all CERP project documentation for five years after project completion, including the documents listed in Enclosure 2. When an AOR transfers from U.S. to another coalition nation's control, the unit's PPO must ship all CERP project files to the TF CERP manager. The TF CERP manager is then responsible for keeping those files for the remainder of the five year period. Likewise, when a region transfers from U.S. to ISAF control, the TF CERP manager must ship all TF CERP project files to the CJTF-101 CJ9 CERP manager. The CJTF-101 CJ9 CERP manager is then responsible for keeping those files for the remainder of the five years.

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If your unit has identified lessons learned or TTP or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

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Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

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Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.

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BCKS supports the online generation, application, management, and exploitation of Army knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in order to share expertise and experience, facilitate leader development and intuitive decision making, and support the development of organizations and teams. Find BCKS at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/bcks/index.asp>.

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CAL/index.asp>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history "think tank" that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Center-Training: **The Road to Deployment**

This site provides brigade combat teams, divisions, and support brigades the latest road to deployment information. This site also includes U.S. Forces Command's latest training guidance and most current Battle Command Training Program Counterinsurgency Seminars. Find The Road to Deployment at <http://rtd.leavenworth.army.smil.mil>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/recent.htm> or <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>
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United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP)

USAIOP is responsible for developing and documenting all IO requirements for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; managing the eight personnel lifecycles for officers in the IO functional area; and coordinating and teaching the qualification course for information operations officers. Find USAIOP at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/usaiop.asp>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>.

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