

ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN  
**AFGHANISTAN**



DECEMBER 2020



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# Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan



December 2020

Report to Congress

In Accordance With Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, as amended; Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017; Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note); and Section 1520 of the NDAA for FY 2020.

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*This report is submitted in accordance with and fulfills the reporting requirements of Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, as amended; Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017; Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note); and Section 1520 of the NDAA for FY 2020. The report also provides information on the requests contained in page 348 of House Report 116-84, the Committee on Appropriations Report to accompany H.R. 2968, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, and in page 264 of the Senate Report 116-48, the Committee on Armed Services Report to accompany S.1790, the NDAA for FY 2020. It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State's designee.*

*This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2020, through November 30, 2020. The data cutoff date for this report is October 31, 2020. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For two decades, the United States' primary strategic interest in Afghanistan has been to ensure that the country is never again used as a "safe haven" from which terrorists can launch attacks against the United States, its allies, or its interests abroad. As such, the United States continues to conduct two missions under Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA) efforts to obtain a durable political settlement to end the ongoing civil conflict, mitigate the threats posed by violent extremist organizations (VEO), and promote stability in Afghanistan. First, U.S. personnel participate in the NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission to train, advise, and assist the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI), including administering \$4 billion in annual Department of Defense (DOD) Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) security assistance. Second, they conduct a counterterrorism mission to counter threats from terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K.)

During this reporting period (June 1, 2020 – November 30, 2020), representatives from GIROA and the Taliban began Afghanistan Peace Negotiations (APN) in Doha, Qatar, in accordance with the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The start of APN represents a major milestone in pursuit of a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. Also during this reporting period, the United States continued to fulfill its obligations under the U.S.-Taliban agreement by implementing a conditions-based, phased reduction of troops (8,600 by July, 4,500 by November, and 2,500 by January 2021). On January 15, 2021, U.S. Force levels in Afghanistan have reached 2,500 as directed by President Trump and announced by Acting Secretary Christopher Miller on November 17, 2020.<sup>1</sup> Our strategy in Afghanistan is conditions-based; our commanders on the ground continually evaluate the current conditions and make recommendations on appropriate force levels.<sup>2</sup>

Over the last six months, violence levels in Afghanistan remained above seasonal norms. The Taliban conducted numerous direct fire attacks against Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) checkpoints and initiated many other destructive attacks on critical infrastructure across the country. The United States continues to emphasize the need for a reduction in violence. ISIS-K also demonstrated its ability to plan and execute high-profile attacks in urban areas, despite losing its territorial strongholds in 2019 and adopting a clandestine cell-based network across the country. Notably, however, attacks against U.S. and coalition personnel actually decreased during this period, largely as a result of stipulations in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The United States remains committed to addressing these security threats using both diplomatic and military mechanisms.

Other key developments during this reporting period include: the dissolution of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and subsequent transition of personnel to the Afghan National Police (ANP) or Afghan National Army Territorial Forces (ANA-TF); completion of the MoD's implementation

<sup>1</sup> Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan, January 15, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2473337/statement-by-acting-defense-secretary-christopher-miller-on-force-levels-in-afg/>.

<sup>2</sup> Current and projected U.S. force presence submission in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).

of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) to provide improved accountability for U.S. direct contributions of about \$750 million annually of ASFF for ANA payroll and the MoI's ongoing transition to APPS; and the ANDSF's execution of several new Joint Orders intended to reduce casualties at checkpoints and improve coordination among the various ANDSF components. The United States will continue to work with its Afghan partners to ensure that these plans and programs are implemented successfully and work to the benefit of the Afghan population.

## SECTION 1 – OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

### 1.1 U.S. STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The primary objective of the United States in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorist organizations intent on attacking the United States and its allies. The United States pursues this objective in Afghanistan through two complementary missions under Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS): counterterrorism (CT) and security force assistance for the Afghan MoD, MoI, and ANDSF. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) conducts CT operations to maintain pressure on al-Qa'ida (AQ), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan (ISIS-K), and other terrorist groups. USFOR-A partners with the ANDSF on the CT mission and provides combat enablers, including close air support in defense of the ANDSF. USFOR-A also participates in the NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANDSF and promote the long-term viability of the MoD and MoI.

Although the primary U.S. interests in Afghanistan have not changed, there have been several changes to the strategic environment during this reporting period. Most importantly, Afghan Peace Negotiations (APN) between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban began on September 12, 2020. The teams from the Islamic Republic and the Taliban have agreed on a code of conduct to govern the talks and have begun negotiations regarding the agenda items to be discussed. While the talks have not progressed significantly, these actions are promising first steps toward ending the 19-year war. The Department of State and U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, continues to lead the United States' government's efforts to facilitate Afghanistan Peace Negotiations (APN), with support from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other interagency and international partners.

In accordance with the U.S.-Taliban Agreement's stipulation for the reduction of U.S. troops within 135 days of signing the Agreement on February 29, 2020, USFOR-A reduced its military footprint to 8,600 uniformed personnel and 23 bases by mid-July 2020. This first phase of the reduction included the transfer of five bases to the Afghan government. During this period, non-U.S. coalition forces (CF) numbers also reduced from 7,700 to 6,700 military personnel. From June to November 2020, upon the direction of the President the RS mission underwent further optimization using a bottom-up, base-by-base review of capabilities and requirements. The RS structure reduced from 23 to 15 bases and from 6,700 to 5,700 coalition military personnel. USFOR-A reduced from 8,600 to 4,500 military personnel while retaining the capability to meet four core priorities: (1) maintaining a fighting force to protect the homeland, (2) administering security assistance and providing TAA for reliable partners at the point of need, (3) enabling partners and allies through the provision of key enablers, and (4) protecting the force. USFOR-A achieved this through preserving U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), aviation, medical, and fires capabilities at the right locations and in the correct numbers.

In November 2020, at the President's direction, the Acting Secretary of Defense announced a further reduction of U.S. military personnel deployed to Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500 by January 15, 2021. To meet this directive, RS has closed or transferred four primarily U.S.-led bases while maintaining 11 bases positioned throughout Afghanistan. U.S. and NATO

objectives remain unchanged, and the United States continues to conduct both the CT and TAA missions.

## **1.2 COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION**

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. USFOR-A executes unilateral and partnered CT operations against ISIS-K, AQ, and other terrorist groups that would seek to use Afghanistan as a safe haven from which to plan attacks against the United States or our allies and partners. These CT operations have helped preserve security gains and contributed to a maturing U.S.–Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) leads U.S. CT efforts by providing command and control for all non-Afghan special operations forces and advising and developing the capabilities of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The ASSF include the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW).

During this reporting period, the ASSF continued to demonstrate an ability to execute coherent, well-planned, and independent operations that sustained military pressure on the Taliban, prevented ISIS-K from regaining territory lost during the previous reporting period, and reduced the threat from high-profile attack (HPA) networks.

## **1.3 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION**

The RS mission consisted of 37 troop-contributing nations<sup>3</sup> training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to enable a credible, capable, and increasingly sustainable set of security forces and institutions<sup>4</sup>.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RS “framework nations,” each leading one or more regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) and Task Forces (TFs) that provide security force assistance to ANDSF elements within their respective areas of responsibility (AORs.) In addition, TAAC-Air advises the Afghan Air Force (AAF.) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is a multinational, U.S.-led command that provides security assistance and institutional capacity development to the MoD, MoI and the ANDSF. The Commanding General, CSTC-A is dual-hatted as the RS Deputy Chief of Staff-Security Assistance, which encompasses the broader effort to advise the MoD and MoI and manage the NATO-Afghan National Army Trust Fund. As of January 1, 2021, TAAC-Air is under the operational control of CSTC-A.

<sup>3</sup> As of November 2020

<sup>4</sup> Montenegro and Croatia ended their deployment during the reporting period.

<b>TAAC or TF/ Lead Nation</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Area of Responsibility (Provinces)</b>	<b>MoD Units Advised</b>	<b>MoI Units Advised</b>
TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C)/ Turkey	Kabul	Kabul (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201 <sup>st</sup> Corps area of responsibility)	111 <sup>th</sup> Capital Division, Afghan Border Force	Kabul City Police and Afghan National Civil Order Force elements operating in Kabul
TAAC-East (TAAC-E)/ United States	Nangarhar	Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Panshir Parwan, and Nuristan	201 <sup>st</sup> Corps	Select Provincial ANP HQs
TAAC-South (TAAC-S)/ United States	Kandahar	Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul	205 <sup>th</sup> Corps	
TAAC-West (TAAC-W)/Italy	Herat	Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat	207 <sup>th</sup> Corps	
TAAC-North (TAAC-N)/ Germany	Mazar-e Sharif	Badakshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar	209 <sup>th</sup> Corps	
TF Southwest (TF-SW)/ United States	Helmand Province	Helmand and Nimroz	215 <sup>th</sup> Corps	
No TF	Logar Province	Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak	203 <sup>rd</sup> Corps	
TAAC-Air (TAAC-A)/ United States	Kabul	N/A	AAF	N/A

As of November 2020, RS consisted of approximately 8,000 military personnel from 37 nations. The United States remains committed to consulting closely with the Government of Afghanistan, NATO allies, and regional partners regarding a collective strategy to support a stable, sovereign and secure future for Afghanistan.

## 1.4 TAA OVERVIEW

The RS mission is capable of conducting TAA at the Corps/Provincial Headquarters level and above at the “point of need”—that is, to support specific priority missions or capability gaps—through ANDSF reliable partners who demonstrate an ability to yield results. During this reporting period, the impacts of the SARS COVID-19 and reduction in troop numbers necessitated frequent advisor reliance on virtual meetings instead of in-person meetings with Afghan counterparts. RS focuses its security force assistance efforts in four primary areas:



Ministry Advising and Capacity Development. CSTC-A retains the ability to conduct ministerial level advising with the Ministerial Advisory Group-Defense (MAG-D), Ministerial Advisory Group-Interior (MAG-I), and Executive Advisory Group (EAG). These organizations conduct TAA to the Ministerial and General Staffs of the Afghan Security Institutions (ASIs).

Aviation Advising. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) remain integral to the ANDSF's ability to conduct operations and sustain its force. Two key focuses of aviation advisors are the reliance of the aviation fleet on contract logistics support (CLS) for maintenance and aircrew training conducted in Afghanistan and third party countries. During the reporting period, training of Afghan pilots in the United States ended, culminating an effort to conduct all such training outside the United States to address the previous high rates of absconding by trainees for U.S. locations.

ASSF Advising. NSOCC-A provides TAA to the ASSF, including oversight of contracted training of new commandos. Regional Targeting Teams (RTTs) are partnered with TAACs, and support the ANDSF, when needed, in defensive operations.

Operational-Level Advising. Maintaining the TAACs and TFs supports multi-echelon TAA to track and deconflict orders and requests for support from the ministerial level to the Corps and PHQ level.

## 1.5 SOUTH ASIA STRATEGY

The DoD approach to implementation of the South Asia strategy in Afghanistan has focused on the "R4+S" concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile and Sustain. During the reporting period, DoD's execution of the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan continued with the following highlights:

**Reinforce:** The training program at Moody Air Force Base for A-29 fixed wing pilots graduated its last four students in November, and they have returned to Afghanistan for combat operations. The six A-29 aircraft that were used for training at Moody are being shipped to Afghanistan, which will bring the fleet total to 24 aircraft.



*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Croci (kneeling, front left) and H.E. Roya Rahmani, Afghanistan's Ambassador to the United States (standing second from right), receiving a briefing from U.S. Air Force advisors on the capabilities of an Afghan Air Force A-29 during a visit to Moody Air Force Base.*

**Realign:** The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of United States military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan Government control. The strategy cites the proper alignment of United States and Afghan forces as key to improved security. During the first year of the South Asia Strategy, this realignment consisted chiefly of a United States shift in resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater. Beginning in the fall of 2019, however, this realignment increasingly took the form of force and materiel optimization towards locations and ANDSF personnel and units that can have the greatest impact on achieving campaign objectives. With the drawdown of U.S. forces to the 2,500 level, bases have been closed and some resources (lethal and non-lethal) have been moved out of Afghanistan. Commander, USFOR-A's operational authorities remain unchanged despite the drawdown, and those resources could be moved back into theater as required.

**Regionalize:** DoD continued to support SRAR's efforts to bolster regional support for the peace process. During this reporting period, DoD also supported State-led trilateral discussions with representatives of the United States, Afghanistan, and individual Central Asian states. These discussions included an Afghanistan-United States-Uzbekistan meeting in May and an Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-United States meeting in October. These meetings provided forums for participants to discuss political, security, and economic issues of mutual concern.

**Reconcile:** The U.S. continued to implement the U.S.-Taliban agreement while APN between the negotiating teams of the Islamic Republic and the Taliban began in Doha during the reporting period. The Afghan government and the Taliban conducted prisoner releases to pave the way for direct negotiations to begin. As part of this process, GIRoA held a *Loya Jirga*<sup>5</sup> in August that culminated in a presidential decree to authorize the release of the last few hundred Taliban prisoners toward the 5,000 total. The Afghan government and Taliban started the APN in September 2020 in Doha, with the goal of reaching a permanent ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement to end the war. The negotiating teams finalized a code of conduct for the APN on December 2, 2020 and moved to discussions regarding future agenda topics. Later in December, the teams decided to pause APN discussions for 20 days with a scheduled resumption of talks on January 6, 2021. Meanwhile, the Taliban's high violence level continues to pose a challenge for reconciliation efforts. With the exception of a brief ceasefire during Eid al-Adha, violence has remained consistently above seasonal norms during the reporting period despite repeated efforts to get the Taliban to reduce violence.

**Sustain:** The South Asia Strategy emphasizes achieving specific U.S. objectives at sustainable costs. The strategy seeks to maximize return on fiscal, military, and political investments. Because the Afghan government will continue to rely on substantial international security assistance funding after a peace agreement, the RS mission continued to focus on building the institutional viability of the MoD and MoI and their forces. During this reporting period, the President directed a U.S. force reduction to 2,500 military personnel, which will result in lower actual operational costs than were projected in development of the FY2021 budget while retaining the ability to provide some advising and combat enabler support at this lower force level.

<sup>5</sup> A special assembly to address a significant political issue.

## SECTION 2 – CURRENT SITUATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT

The Taliban, AQ and its regional affiliate al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), ISIS-K, violent extremist organizations, and organized criminal networks continue to threaten the stability and security of Afghanistan. These groups are sustained by revenue from a variety of sources, including drug trafficking, illegal taxation, extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support. Additionally, the Taliban continues to receive sanctuary and other support from Pakistan and other countries in the region.

The Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, remains the main threat to Afghan stability despite their participation in APN. The Taliban continued to focus its military operations on the ANDSF across the country. Al-Qa’ida and AQIS continue to maintain a presence in Afghanistan’s remote areas and rugged border regions. ISIS-K suffered setbacks when a combination of Taliban, Resolute Support, and ANDSF operations forced the loss of its remaining strongholds in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces in 2019; however, ISIS-K retained its ability to conduct HPAs and large-scale attacks in Kabul during this period even though the group’s operational capacity was severely degraded.

### 2.1 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The Taliban continued to apply pressure on the ANDSF by maintaining high levels of violence through its military campaign across Afghanistan, including a coordinated attack in October 2020 around Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province. The Taliban have deliberately maintained a high-volume of small-unit and indirect fire attacks against ANDSF checkpoints (CPs) and bases and have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target ANDSF convoys.

The Taliban periodically executed and claimed responsibility for larger attacks, including HPAs in Kandahar, Samangan, and Wardak provinces during the reporting period. The group claimed those high-profile attacks (HPAs) were in retaliation for Coalition and Afghan airstrikes and aggressive GIRoA rhetoric. The Taliban have attempted to overrun several district centers, including those in Balkh, Faryab, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Badakhshan provinces without success.

### Security Trends

The Taliban announced two three-day ceasefires during the *Eid al-Fitr* and *Eid al-Adha* holidays in late May and late July, respectively. It was the first *Eid al-Adha* ceasefire the Taliban have observed since the start of the war. During these periods, violence reduced significantly but returned to high levels immediately following the conclusion of the ceasefires.

Resolute Support relies on ANDSF reporting for all metrics of violence, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents.<sup>6</sup> Direct fire attacks against lightly manned Afghan outposts and CPs remained the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks; IED attacks and mine strikes were the next largest causes of casualties. Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remained the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes remained steady during the last 18 months.

In addition to smaller, harassing attacks, the Taliban conducted several major attacks across the country during the reporting period, including: an attack on the police headquarters in Shah Wali Kot District in Kandahar province on July 8, 2020; a complex attack against the National Director of Security (NDS) provincial headquarters in Aibak city, Samangan province on July 13, 2020; a suicide bomber attack on an ANDSF convoy transiting the main highway through Wardak province on July 21, 2020; and four HPAs in provincial capitals including a prolonged assault at a police headquarters building in Khost City, Khost in October 2020.

The largest and most concerning attack took place over the course of a week in October 2020. The Taliban conducted widespread attacks on ANDSF positions around Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province. Fighting throughout the city displaced as many as 35,000 residents, according to the United Nations (UN).

ISIS-K also demonstrated its ability to plan and execute HPAs in urban areas during this period despite losing its territorial strongholds in 2019. ISIS-K conducted a complex attack on a maternity ward in Kabul in May 2020, killing more than two dozen civilians and wounding numerous others. That same day, ISIS-K also carried out a separate attack on a funeral in Nangarhar province, killing more than 30 people. In August 2020, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a multiday complex attack targeting Jalalabad Airfield and a co-located Afghan prison. ISIS-K fighters employed a suicide vehicle-borne IED along with fighters on foot to breach the prison's perimeter, killing more than two dozen people and enabling the escape of dozens of prisoners. On November 2, 2020, two ISIS-K gunmen stormed Kabul University, killing 18 students, one administrator, and one ANDSF member, and wounding 28 others.

Since the beginning of November 2020, the number of targeted assassinations in Kabul has dramatically increased, particularly against journalists and civil society leaders. Attributing these attacks is challenging given militant groups do not often claim responsibility. Although many of the killings were unclaimed, Afghan government officials believe the Taliban to be responsible. These attacks have targeted a range of Afghans, including some involved in peace efforts through civil society organizations. The most high-profile example of these attacks was the September 9, 2020 attempt by unknown militants to assassinate First Vice President Amrullah Saleh in Kabul. Although Vice President Saleh survived, the attack killed at least ten people, including some of Saleh's bodyguards and some civilian bystanders. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. Fawzia Kufi, a prominent member of the GIROA negotiating team,

<sup>6</sup> Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy actions, including those that do not cause casualties.

also survived an attack by unknown gunmen in Kabul on August 14, 2020, shortly before she traveled to Doha to participate in the opening of talks with the Taliban.

## **2.2 INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL ACTORS**

United States strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia by building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan. This strategy emphasizes regional economic integration and cooperation, international support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process, and holding countries accountable for using proxies or other efforts to undermine stability in Afghanistan.

### ***Russia***

Russia desires a complete but phased U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia positions itself for increased influence in Afghanistan and to address potential security challenges from instability. Russia continues to support the APN as the best means to form an interim government and facilitate the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Russia hedges by engaging with the central government, Afghan power brokers, regional influencers, and the Taliban. To date, the Department of Defense has no credible, corroborating evidence to validate allegations regarding malign activity by Russian personnel against U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan.

### ***Central Asia***

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan view stability and security in Afghanistan in the context of the wider Central Asian region. A top concern is expansion of ISIS-K into the region, creating the potential for destabilization in states bordering Afghanistan. Uzbekistan continues to play a constructive role in the APN as it seeks to position itself as a regional leader and economic link to Afghanistan.

### ***Pakistan***

Pakistan has provided key support to the peace negotiations as a way to end the conflict in Afghanistan and has helped advance important components of the peace process. Pakistan desires to exert influence around the region and sees itself as a key facilitator for the APN, particularly with the Taliban. Pakistan hedges against a potential Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, and in any circumstance seeks to avoid an Afghanistan aligned closely with India.

### ***Iran***

Iran provides calibrated support to the Taliban while trying to strengthen ties with GIRoA. Iran's interests include removing the U.S./NATO presence, eliminating ISIS, increasing economic and security ties to GIRoA, securing water rights, and improving border security. During the past year, Iran increased its outreach to both the Taliban Political Commission and to GIRoA. Iranian officials characterized the U.S.-Taliban agreement as illegitimate because it did not include GIRoA or Afghanistan's neighbors and demanded that U.S. Forces withdraw from the country.



***China***

The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages both the GIRoA and the Taliban in pursuit of regional stability. The PRC likely remains skeptical that the APN will lead to a comprehensive settlement between the Taliban and the GIRoA and therefore hedges against multiple outcomes. Afghanistan has not been a major economic partner of the PRC largely due to the internal instability and the security situation. The PRC has benefited from the security provided by the NATO presence in Afghanistan. A withdrawal, absent the necessary assurances of security, removes this benefit and the PRC will not replace NATO as a security guarantor. This places the PRC in a dilemma where engagement on both sides is necessary to protect PRC personnel and investments in Afghanistan, and secure China's western border from Uighur militants.

***India***

India works with other nations in the region, GIRoA, and Afghan power brokers to prevent transnational terrorist safe havens, and to maintain access to Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asian markets. India's paramount concern is for a stable Afghan security environment. India likely views the ongoing peace process as an opportunity to gain greater influence within Afghanistan, bypassing previous obstacles of Pakistani influence. By broadening their approach with regional counterparts, India could achieve greater growth and/or influence in Afghanistan as a Central Asian hub. The Indian government does not support the Taliban politically and continues to side with GIRoA. In early October 2020, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the head of the Afghan High Council of National Reconciliation (HCNR), met with several Indian leaders, including the Indian National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval, in New Delhi, and discussed the Afghan peace process and bilateral relations. The Indian NSA providing an assurance of India's full support for the peace efforts and any peace settlement acceptable to Afghans will have the support of the Indian Government. India has traditionally had strong ties with Afghanistan and remains the largest regional donor to the country (\$3 billion since 2001). The deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan, however, may adversely affect the ability of India to provide aid.

***The Gulf States***

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf (which include Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) seek a stable Afghanistan and support the international efforts to pursue a ceasefire and political settlement. Qatar hosts the Taliban Political Commission and provides a venue for relevant parties to engage in dialogue, including hosting the ongoing APN. Qatar's C-17 aircraft also provide airlift for NATO operations in Afghanistan.

**2.3 THREATS FROM INSURGENT AND TERRORIST GROUPS**

Terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghanistan, the United States, and coalition forces. Terrorist groups pose a threat to the stability of Afghanistan because of their capacity to conduct HPAs in Afghan cities and to undermine the legitimacy of GIRoA. None of these groups holds territory within Afghanistan; however, they benefit from freedom of movement, including across international borders. Rugged portions of the

Afghanistan-Pakistan border and remote areas within Afghanistan continue to shield various groups, including AQ, AQIS, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and various factions of ISIS groups. Most of these organizations focus their attacks in South Asia.

### ***The Taliban***

The Taliban and the Haqqani Network maintain the capability to conduct offensive operations and HPAs against ANDSF and CF. Since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement in February 2020, the Taliban reduced violence against U.S. and CF while increasing offensive operations against the ANDSF and GIRoA officials. The Taliban continue to pressure the ANDSF across the country through its military campaigns and increased violence levels. This is evident in continued attacks against ANDSF CPs and other vulnerable ANDSF positions in keeping with the “fight and talk” strategy. The Taliban is adjusting their use of violence to harass and undermine the ANDSF and GIRoA during APN, while remaining at a level it perceives is within the bounds of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. This is likely to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal and set favorable conditions for the Taliban in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

### ***ISIS***

Since late 2019, concurrent operations by CF and ANDSF degraded ISIS-K through the killing, capture, and surrender of ISIS-K fighters. The Taliban also conducted operations against ISIS during this reporting period. ISIS-K no longer holds territory in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces and the organization has transitioned to operate in smaller urban cells to evade detection. The Taliban, ANDSF, the United States, and Coalition Forces maintained pressure on ISIS-K to prevent the expansion of their operational capability, while ISIS-K maintained the ability to defend itself and conduct attacks.

Since mid-2019, ISIS-K has taken a less active role in the management of regional ISIS networks following the creation of ISIS-K branches in Pakistan and India. Its ability to enable or inspire external attacks outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan has been limited. Although ISIS continues to develop connections to other networks outside of Afghanistan, it is operationally limited to South and Central Asia. There has been no evidence that large numbers of Taliban have defected to ISIS-K in the aftermath of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.

### ***Al-Qa’ida (AQ)***

AQ’s regional affiliate, AQIS, poses a threat to U.S. personnel and allies in Afghanistan through its continued interaction with local Taliban commanders. By comparison, AQ’s remaining core leaders pose a limited threat to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan because the leaders focus primarily on survival. Some AQIS members support and works with low-level Taliban members in its efforts to undermine the GIRoA, and maintains an enduring interest in attacking U.S. Forces and Western targets in the region. AQIS faces continued coalition CT pressure and will focus on ensuring its safe havens remain viable. Additionally, AQIS has assisted low-level Taliban elements in attacks.


The few remaining AQ members in Afghanistan focus largely on survival, while AQIS represents the group’s regional presence in Afghanistan and across South Asia. AQIS continues to work toward its goals of freeing what is perceives as occupied Muslim lands and establishing an Islamic caliphate. AQIS’s interest in attacking U.S. Forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the region persists; however, continuing U.S. CT pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan without the support of the Taliban. The Taliban have maintained mutually beneficial relations with AQ-related organizations and are unlikely to take substantive action against these groups.

**Security Trends**


(U) **Key Violence Metrics.** Measuring violence in Afghanistan is complex and requires an analysis of trends across several metrics; many are directly reported by the ANDSF and have a wide variance in reliability. To mitigate these challenges, the DoD tracks several metrics to capture the broader picture of violence during the reporting period:

- (U) **Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIAs).** Compared to the previous reporting period, violence in Afghanistan, measured by enemy initiated attacks (EIAs), rose by 43% and was 45% higher compared with the 2019 seasonal average of 84 attacks daily. During this reporting period, the EIA daily average was 126 per day, which was 42 EIAs per day above seasonal norms. Most of the EIAs reported during this reporting period were direct fire (87%), followed by IEDs or Mine Strikes (9%), Indirect Fire (4%), and surface-to-air fire (0.3%), as shown in Figure 1.

*Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type (U)*



- (U) **Effective EIAs (EEIAs).** During this reporting period, effective enemy initiated attacks (EEIAs), were on average 40% above the previous reporting period and 9% above the seasonal averages in 2019. Most of the EEIAs during this reporting period were direct fire (73%), followed by IEDs or mine strikes (23%), indirect fire (4%), and surface-to-air fire (0.1%), as shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type (U)**

## 2.4 MITIGATING CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

### ANDSF Casualties

The number of ANDSF casualties from May 2020 to October 2020 was slightly higher than during the same period in 2019. Direct fire attacks at CPs continued to cause the majority of casualties. IED attacks and mine strikes also continued to cause some casualties.<sup>7</sup> The vulnerability of ANDSF checkpoints, particularly police checkpoints, continues to be a prime cause of ANDSF casualties (and opportunity for Taliban resupply) despite consistent guidance toward and pressure for reform from USFOR-A.

### U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks<sup>8</sup>

Since the beginning of U.S. operations in October 2001, 1,909 U.S. military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) in Afghanistan. During that same period, 20,722 were wounded in action (WIA). During this reporting period, there were no U.S. military deaths due to hostile actions; three U.S. personnel were wounded.

During this reporting period, there were no insider attacks against U.S. or coalition forces, known as “green-on-blue” attacks. USFOR-A and the GIRoA continue to prioritize their efforts to prevent insider attacks against U.S. or CF through enhanced screening techniques for ANDSF personnel and new recruits. There were 73 insider attacks against ANDSF service members, known as “green-on-green” attacks. This was a decrease in insider attacks within the ANDSF compared to the same period last year and also was a decrease compared to the previous reporting period. This reporting period saw a decrease in ANDSF deaths caused by insider attacks since the previous period and a decrease in ANDSF wounded compared to both the previous reporting period and the same period last year.

<sup>7</sup> Details of ANDSF casualties are classified by the Afghan government and are reported in the classified annex to this report.

<sup>8</sup> Data accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on October 2, 2020.

## **Civilian Casualties**

Protecting civilians continues to be a top priority for USFOR-A and coalition partners. USFOR-A is firmly committed to learning and refining its processes. USFOR-A continues to monitor reports of civilian casualties in Afghanistan from all reporting sources, and makes every effort to accomplish missions while preventing civilian injury and death.

### ***RS and USFOR-A Efforts to Prevent Civilian Casualties***

Coalition partners train their own forces on the law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, and tactical guidance, which form the basis of RS's civilian casualty mitigation and prevention efforts. The RS commander's Tactical Guidance directs RS personnel to use force only when required and to use tactical patience to mitigate civilian casualties when acting in self-defense or providing support to the ANDSF.

RS advisors work with the ANDSF at the tactical and operational levels to prevent civilian casualties. All forces in the ANDSF are trained in the fundamental skills and understanding required to prevent civilian casualties. At the operational level, TAACs maintain constant partnership and communication with the ANDSF and mentoring staff involved with planning and decision making.

USFOR-A personnel regularly engage with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) staff, and the International Committee of the Red Cross to discuss reports of civilian casualties and share the results of assessments. USFOR-A also works closely with the Afghan MoD and MoI on civilian casualty avoidance and mitigation, helping to shape policy and maintain accountability.

On November 3, 2020, GIRoA's Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) held its annual Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board meeting. Senior leaders from the ONSC, MoD, MoI, Afghan Air Force (AAF), and NDS, as well as the RS Deputy Commander, and other advisors, attended the meeting. The ONSC's Senior Legal Advisor chaired the meeting and reinforced the importance of preventing civilian casualties within the ANDSF security pillars. She advised the security pillar leadership to increase their efforts to mitigate and avoid toward civilian casualties, including establishing formal civilian casualty response teams at the ministerial and General Staff (GS) levels.

### ***DoD Efforts to Advance Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Policies and Procedures***

The Department of Defense continues to develop a new Department-wide policy on civilian harm mitigation and response, which is expected to be finalized in calendar year 2021. In addition to the development of this policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) has taken interim steps to advance the civilian casualties mitigation policy. For example, in June 2020, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (A/USD(P)) promulgated new Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy Payments to Friendly



Civilians for Injury and Loss That Is Incident to Military Operations.<sup>9,10</sup> In October 2020, OUSD(P) launched a new webpage that provides information to the public about how to submit to DoD information about civilian casualties that may have resulted from U.S. military operations.<sup>11</sup> In addition to publicizing this webpage, DoD also worked with the Department of State to ensure awareness of this webpage at all diplomatic posts. DoD is also working on developing standardized guidance for military commands to periodically report information to the public related to civilian casualty assessments.

OUSD(P) leadership continues to be actively engaged in this portfolio. In November 2020, the leadership visited United States Central Command to emphasize the importance it places on civilian harm mitigation and response, and to highlight forthcoming DoD policies.

Additionally, DoD continues to actively engage with civil society organizations. Recent engagements include two August 2020 roundtable events hosted by OUSD(P), which were attended by representatives from multiple non-governmental organizations. One event focused on civil society views on the recently released Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy Payments, while the second was a broad discussion of civilian harm in the context of large scale combat operations. These events support continued efforts to develop DoD policies related to civilian harm.

### ***RS and USFOR-A Civilian Casualty Data (May 1, 2020 – October 31, 2020)***

Total civilian casualties caused by all parties to the conflict decreased by 10 percent during this reporting period compared to the same period last year. Insurgent and terrorist attacks caused 85 percent of civilian casualties. USFOR-A ceased unilateral offensive operations against the Taliban to support political reconciliation efforts since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, reducing the opportunity for CF-caused civilian casualty incidents.


RS documented 5,561 civilian casualties from May 1, to October 31, 2020; of those, 1,905 were killed and 3,656 were injured, Figure 3 displays monthly civilian casualty counts and attribution of these casualties to different parties to the conflict. Of the 5,561 civilian casualties, USFOR-A attributed no civilian casualties to the United States or to CF. The ANDSF were responsible for 332 civilian casualties (151 killed and 181 injured); insurgents and terrorists caused 4,747 civilian casualties (1,551 killed and 3,196 injured); and other or unknown parties to the conflict accounted for 482 civilian casualties (203 killed and 279 injured).

<sup>9</sup> Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Memorandum, “Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy Payments to Friendly Civilians for Injury and Loss That Is Incident to Military Operations,” June 22, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/23/2002320314/-1/-1/1/INTERIM-REGULATIONS-FOR-CONDOLENCE-OR-SYMPATHY-PAYMENTS-TO-FRIENDLY-CIVILIANS-FOR-INJURY-OR-LOSS-THAT-IS-INCIDENT-TO-MILITARY-OPERATIONS.PDF>.

<sup>10</sup> DoD News, October 23, 2020, “DoD Posts Webpage to Aid in Reporting Civilian Casualties”

<sup>11</sup> <https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/Reporting-Civilian-Casualties/>

**Figure 3: Civilian Casualties from all Parties from May 1, to October 31, 2020**



**Comparison of RS and UNAMA Civilian Casualty Data (January 1, 2020 – December 31, 2020)**

UNAMA’s latest report assessed that there were 8,820 civilian casualties from January 1 to December 31, 2020, of which 3,035 were killed and 5,785 were injured. Table 1 below shows a comparison between the cases tracked by USFOR-A and those reported by UNAMA from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020.

**Table 1: USFOR-A and UNAMA Civilian Casualty Reporting (January 1 to December 31, 2020)**

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan, January 1 – December 31, 2020							
	Parties to the Conflict	USFOR-A Data			UNAMA Data		
		Killed	Injured	Total	Killed	Injured	Total
U.S.-led Coalition/ Afghan Forces	U.S.-led CF	20	5	25	89	31	120
	Afghan Security Forces	624	1,103	1,727	674	1,232	1,906
	Other/Unknown	69	58	127	78	127	205
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>1,166</b>	<b>1,879</b>	<b>841</b>	<b>1,390</b>	<b>2,231</b>
Terrorists and Insurgents	Taliban	1,294	2,444	3,738	1,470	2,490	3,960
	ISIS	233	416	649	213	460	673
	Unknown	1,065	2,367	3,432	202	624	826
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>2,592</b>	<b>5,227</b>	<b>7,819</b>	<b>1,885</b>	<b>3,574</b>	<b>5,459</b>
	<b>Crossfire/ Other/ Unknown</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>565</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>821</b>	<b>1,130</b>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3,516</b>	<b>6,747</b>	<b>10,263</b>	<b>3,035</b>	<b>5,785</b>	<b>8,820</b>

The difference between the numbers of casualties reported by USFOR-A and UNAMA stems from differing definitions of “civilian” or a “lawful combatant” under the law of war. The decision to classify a person as a lawful combatant or an innocent civilian is often aided by information sources not available outside of the pertinent military units. For example, U.S. forces collect intelligence and conduct reconnaissance on persons and locations prior to conducting attacks. Thus, USFOR-A has access to a wide range of information not available to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other agencies, often including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, and imagery.

## SECTION 3 – ASSESSMENT OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES<sup>12</sup>

During this reporting period, the ANDSF continued to provide security in Afghanistan's population centers and maintained an active defense posture in the face of increasing levels of Taliban violence and ISIS-K's HPAs. The ANDSF sought to counter the Taliban's effort to use violence to gain a negotiating advantage as the APN began in September 2020. As the Taliban increased the intensity of their attacks during this reporting period, the ANDSF conducted more operations defending their checkpoints (CPs) against enemy-initiated attacks. The high rate of Taliban attacks challenged the ANDSF in some population centers, most vividly demonstrated by the Taliban's HPAs in several cities and the coordinated attacks around Lashkar Gah in Helmand province in October 2020. The ANDSF continued to face the threat of ISIS-K attacks in Kabul.

The ANDSF published several Joint Orders to further their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. One Joint Order directed adjustments to the ANDSF's operational design intended to seize the tactical initiative and enhance their defense of CPs against the Taliban's attacks. Likewise, several other Joint Orders improved coordination among various security pillars in support of Strategic National Convoys (SNC), leading to a reduction in transit times across Afghanistan.

The ASSF and AAF remain the most capable forces within the ANDSF and continue to improve their combat capabilities. Adding sustainment brigades to the ASSF *tashkil*<sup>13</sup> addressed some previous ASSF sustainment challenges (e.g., competing priorities, long logistics trains, inconsistent support from ANA corps). The MoD and MoI also made improvements in implementing accountability systems over the last several months; in particular, the MoD fully implemented the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) while the MoI transition to APPS, which informs the Web-Enabled Payroll System (WEPS) is ongoing.<sup>14</sup>

During this reporting period, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) organization was dissolved and its personnel either transitioned into the ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF) or the ANP. Approximately 10,388 former ALP members transferred into the ANA-TF, another 11,549 transferred into the ANP and the rest opted for a release from service.

### 3.1 ANDSF STRUCTURE AND SIZE

The authorized ANDSF force structure funded by the international community remains 352,000 MoD and MoI personnel, including the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF. As of October 31, 2020, the APPS validates that approximately 298,000 ANDSF personnel were eligible for pay. Direct

<sup>12</sup> Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1520(d)(2)(C) and (D) of the NDAA for FY 2020.

<sup>13</sup> *Tashkil* is the Dari word for the ANDSF manning document, similar to the U.S. Table of Organization and Equipment.

<sup>14</sup> The Law and Order Trust Fund managed by the United Nations Development Program pays ANP salaries utilizing the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS).

contributions of ASFF to the Afghan Ministry of Finance funded the pay and incentives for 184,422 MoD personnel, validated in APPS as eligible for pay and predicated on their completion of the payroll process. Within the MoI, 113,320 personnel filled authorized billets in APPS and were eligible for base pay utilizing funds from the United Nations Development Program-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to which a number of donor nations contribute.

### **3.2 ANDSF OPERATIONAL CAMPAIGN**

The ANDSF campaign in 2020 focused on implementation of a series of Joint Orders rather than on the typical single campaign plan that guides ANDSF battle plans. These Joint Orders postured forces to respond to the dynamic political environment in Afghanistan following the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. In particular, in June 2020, the ANA Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) authorized a Joint Order in June 2020 that serves as the primary guidance for all ANDSF operations. This Joint Order, the product of a partnership between the President of Afghanistan (PoA) and RS leaders, emphasizes an “active defense” strategy and the consolidation of ANDSF CPs to reduce Afghan casualties and minimize the likelihood of ANDSF operational overreach. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation among Afghan and regional partners to support efforts to defeat ISIS. The Information Warfare Task Force–Afghanistan (IWTF-A) disseminated messages highlighting ANDSF operational successes, bolstered support for the GIRoA, and promoted the peace process.

### **3.3 DEVELOPING MINISTRY CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY: INDICATORS OF PROGRESS<sup>15</sup>**

To assess efforts to build the capacity of the MoD and MoI and their components, CSTC-A focused on the following “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities”:

- Leader development
- Reducing the number of vulnerable checkpoints
- Countering corruption
- Improving logistics
- Improving accountability of equipment
- Reducing attrition through better care of soldiers and police
- Standardization of training
- Improving MoD and MoI budget execution
- Improving processes for paying soldier and police salaries
- Improving ANDSF facilities

#### Leader Development

Leader development across the ANDSF remains focused on professionalizing the force and building a cadre of future leaders. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, all training at the ANA Command and Staff Academy (CSA) was paused for most of the reporting period. Brigade and

<sup>15</sup> This section addresses the request on page 348 of House Report 116-84, the Committee on Appropriations Report to accompany H.R. 2968, the DoD Appropriations Bill, 2020.

*kandak*<sup>16</sup> commanders typically attended the Pre-Command Course at CSA, with three courses per year and a 25-student capacity. The resumption of the Pre-Command Course remains a priority for continued leader development of the ANDSF. Improving the quality of leadership at all echelons remains the most challenging issue affecting the success and viability of the ANDSF.

### Reducing Vulnerable Checkpoints

Improving ANA and ANP ability to win tactical engagements at checkpoints (CPs) is central to efforts to reduce ANDSF casualties. A Joint Order synchronized national level resources across ANDSF organizations in support of CP reduction and reinforcement. The Combined Situational Awareness Room (CSAR) and Regional Targeting Teams (RTT) response times improved during this reporting period, in part because of increased availability of U.S. ISR. The fourth phase of the MoD's CP reduction and base development plan ended on June 20, 2020. The ANA closed 204 CPs, reinforced 21 CPs, and constructed 93 patrol bases. The MoD is executing a second round of CP reductions to eliminate 170 more CPs and construct 19 patrol bases by March 2021.

The MoI uses casualty data to prioritize its CP-reduction efforts and works in close coordination with the MoD and NDS to prevent security gaps. The MoI eliminated 197 of the 214 most casualty-producing CPs; however, the efforts stalled at the beginning of the reporting period due to COVID-19 restrictions. The MoI resumed its efforts to reduce or reinforce the most vulnerable CPs and identified 1,054 CPs for reduction or reinforcement in coordination with the Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoP). The MoI plan includes four phases to reduce or reinforce CPs: Phase I is complete with 96 CPs reduced and 129 reinforced across 12 provinces; Phase II is ongoing, with the ANP reinforcing 67 of the planned 256 CPs; Phase III will reduce or reinforce 280 CPs; and Phase IV will reduce or reinforce 295 CPs.

### Counter-Corruption<sup>17</sup>

During this reporting period, Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG)-Defense focused TAA efforts on reliable Afghan partners who demonstrated a propensity for action in both counter- and anti-corruption efforts. Examples of success in the counter-corruption arena include an 11 percent increase in the number of corruption cases investigated by the MoD since June 2019, MoI's reform of fuel management, the movement away from set resource allocations to operationally based requirements, and the enforcement of unit consumption tracking and reporting. Furthermore, several senior leaders under the investigation of MoD Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID) have retired or been reassigned since the Directorate's establishment in June 2019. Close coordination between CID and General Staff Legal during this reporting period also resulted in the disruption of a theft ring in the 209th Corps that was determined to be stealing tires and batteries. This led to the successful prosecution of a high-ranking officer and two junior officers.

<sup>16</sup> *Kandak* is the Dari word for battalion.

<sup>17</sup> Information on counter-corruption addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1520(d)(2)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2020.

Also during this reporting period, GIRoA stopped the appointment of a corrupt former PCoP under consideration for appointment as the Special Units Director providing oversight for all Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The Director had access to all narcotics intelligence, human intelligence and source-derived reporting, and wire intercept data throughout Afghanistan. The individual considered for the Director position was known to be involved in narcotics trafficking and multiple other criminal schemes, including extortion and embezzlement. He was also the target of previous ANDSF criminal investigations. Numerous coalition partners and their embassies reviewed intelligence concerns with senior GIRoA and MoI leaders and persuaded the GIRoA to withdraw the nomination

Despite these successful anti- and counter-corruption efforts, corruption within MoD and other Afghan public institutions remains a barrier to achieving a viable, sustainable ANDSF. The Afghan Supreme Court has significantly constrained the MoD's ability to combat serious crime and corruption through its narrow interpretation of the prosecutorial authority of military lawyers and the jurisdiction of military courts. The Afghan Supreme Court has limited the authorities of these bodies to "military crimes" that are specified in the penal-code annex pertaining to the military. Instead of adjudication through military courts and prosecutors, major crimes and corruption cases must be referred to other legal bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC). Following the Supreme Court's decision, there have been no meaningful ACJC prosecutions of senior MoD officials – an indication that the decision has hindered the ministry's response to corruption allegations.

### Improving Logistics

The most significant recent improvement in ANA and ANP distribution processes remains the AAF channel flight program with weekly flights from Kabul to Herat, Shorab, Khandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif to more reliably move critical supplies for distribution to ground units. This effort helps mitigate the impact of delays that Strategic National Convoys (SNC) face as a result of Taliban attacks along ground routes. In addition, a recent Joint Order and adoption of a weekly supply schedule improved coordination between the corps logistics officers, the AAF, and the National Logistics Battalion (NLB). This improved coordination led to a doubling of the average cargo load carried per flight. Personnel from the U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) currently deployed to Afghanistan advises the ANA Logistics Command on distribution operations. Within Logistics Command, the ANA's National Transportation Brigade executes SNCs.

The ANDSF have struggled at the national level to maintain visibility of its on-hand logistics, which has had an impact on ANDSF operations. To address national level visibility, prioritization of resources, and command and control, the ANDSF established the Administrative Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) on July 1, 2020. The ALOC eliminated unnecessary duplication of effort, established a common operating picture for logistics, and optimized logistics command and control and information flow.



### Improving Accountability of Equipment

Since 2008, CSTC-A has used Core-IMS to manage and track equipment, weapons, and vehicles provided to the GIRoA by DoD. Over a period of years, Core-IMS has evolved into the MoD's and MoI's system-of-record web-based property accountability system to track equipment and certain supplies, including materiel funded and procured by DoD. Upon transfer of the materiel to the MoD or MoI, Core-IMS assumes accountability for it from DoD systems. During the reporting period, the use of Core-IMS helped maintain accountability of property and equipment, streamline inventories, and reduce excess requests for certain classes of supply.

CSTC-A continued to provide training to improve ANDSF equipment accountability. The ANDSF continued to populate Core-IMS at the Corps level and above, allowing them to properly conduct inventory accounting and track inventory transactions. At the tactical level, the ANDSF continued to use paper forms to account for inventory transactions. The near-term goal is to increase transparency, maintain accountability, and decrease fraud by fully automating all inventory transactions. A longer-term goal is for ANA brigades to use automated systems, which requires additional infrastructure and training at lower-echelon on automated systems.

Local sites (i.e. *kandak* and below) are not the focus of Core-IMS; outfitting ANA Corps, brigades, and Provincial HQs (PHQ) with Core-IMS technology is the priority. Because local sites do not use Core-IMS, units provide manual inventories and accounting to property book officers. Units deliver these manual records to ANA brigade headquarters and PHQs for input into Core-IMS.

There was no substantial improvement made in Core-IMS during the reporting period; challenges to increase Core-IMS usage (e.g. automation support, network infrastructure, and training) across the ANDSF remain. The literacy rates of candidates selected to manage the program dictate the timeline and completion of certification. Continued TAA and infrastructure and automation investments are required to reach the Core-IMS usage goals. There are 109 ANDSF sites active in Core-IMS and 35 ANA sites active in Property Book Management, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: ANDSF Sites Using Inventory Management Software**

Sites	ANA Core-IMS	ANA Property Book Management	ANP Core-IMS
National	29	1	7
Regional (corps/region)	21	14	8
Local (brigades/PHQs)	15	11	23
Battalion (ANA only)	6	9	N/A

Afghan Logistics Specialists (ALS) serve throughout the ANA and ANP to TAA the ANDSF on Core-IMS and warehouse management. Additionally, the ALS occupy positions to provide system and database administration, help desk services, and support to the National Codification Bureau. The ALS program has been successful in assisting the ANDSF in sustainment operations as Afghans lead their training programs and provide continuity at the ANDSF sites.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Life Cycle Management<sup>18</sup>

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) is responsible for receiving and executing title transfers of all FMS materiel procured in support of the ANDSF. Most FMS materiel originates from the United States and arrives in theater via air or surface depending on the commodity type. From October 2019 through October 2020, CSTC-A implemented 83 new pseudo-FMS cases worth \$1.2 billion.

Upon receipt of all FMS weapons, ammunition, and aircraft, the SAO transfers title to the MoD or MoI for integration into the Afghan supply system. Once the SAO transfers materiel to GIRoA, the responsibility for oversight and lifecycle management transfers to the corresponding Coalition requirement owner. For example, TAAC-Air advisors maintain oversight and lifecycle management of all FMS-procured aircraft, while program managers in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army provide lifecycle management of the fixed-wing and rotary wing fleets, respectively. CSTC-A's Operational Sustainment Branch maintains similar oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured weapons, ammunition, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, repair parts, and Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), reaching back to program managers in the U.S. Army to manage the National Maintenance Strategy - Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) and procurement of tactical vehicles and ammunition.

When ANDSF units severely damage or lose items, the owning units properly account for the items by requesting approval from the corresponding ministry to demilitarize and dispose of the items. After demilitarizing the asset, the Defense Logistics Agency submits a demilitarization certificate to the SAO. Finally, the SAO updates the corresponding case in the Security Cooperation Information Portal, completing the life cycle of the FMS asset. Although equipment transferred to the GIRoA is not U.S. property, U.S. advisors and personnel continue to develop the ministries' logistics and distribution practices to ensure supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed, employed, and accounted for by the ANDSF in accordance with security assistance policies and laws. Core-IMS serves as the primary tool to maintain property accountability and oversight.

End-Use Monitoring

In accordance with statutory requirements, equipment provided to the ANDSF is subject to end-use monitoring (EUM). In Afghanistan, the DoD administers two types of EUM: routine and enhanced. The SAO conducts routine monitoring for non-sensitive equipment provided to the ANDSF in conjunction with other required security assistance duties. These duties include observations made during interactions with the ANDSF, visits to defense facilities, and Afghan reporting of on-hand equipment along with serial numbers of lost or damaged equipment. Enhanced EUM for sensitive articles and technologies requires more intensive and formal monitoring. Enhanced EUM requirements include updated equipment delivery records (including serial numbers), routine physical inventories of equipment by serial number, and quarterly ANDSF reporting on inventory results. In Afghanistan, there are over 12,000 enhanced EUM

<sup>18</sup> Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Sections 1520(d)(2)(D), (F), (G), (H), and (I) of the NDAA for FY 2020.

designated items, with the majority being night-vision devices. Additional enhanced EUM items include persistent surveillance equipment and precision-guided munitions components.

Security conditions and the COVID-19 restrictions have limited the ability to conduct both enhanced and routine EUM. SAO continues to meet routine EUM requirements through physical inspections, visits to maintenance sites, and reliance on U.S. military advisors. Restrictions caused by the fragile security situation and COVID-19 restrictions have stopped SAO from conducting the enhanced EUM site inspection and physical inventories required to meet enhanced EUM regulatory requirements. The SAO worked with the MoD and MoI to update their Night Vision Device Control Plan to ensure the ANDSF are meeting their security and accountability requirements for maintaining night vision devices.

### Reducing Attrition through Better Care of Soldiers and Police

Attrition continued to be a concern for institutional viability due to the high levels of violence and corresponding impacts on the force<sup>19</sup>. Although new recruit entry resulted in a stable “present for duty” rate, concerns remained over the average of 8,130 ANA and 2,505 ANP who are not available for mission any given week due to being Dropped from Rolls (DFR), Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL), KIA and/or WIA. COVID-19 restrictions affected recruitment efforts, with 16 percent fewer recruits during the reporting period.

### Standardization of Training

The MoD Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC) oversees the ANA training and education through three institutions: The Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), the Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) (formerly known as the Kabul Military Training Center), and the Afghan National Army Officers Academy (ANAOA). It also centralized training at the CATC, merging 13 branch schools into four, with only the Engineer School at Mazar-e Sharif. During this reporting period, more than 15,000 recruits either completed Basic Warrior Training (BWT) or are in training at the CATC or Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) despite the limitations from COVID-19 restrictions.

The MoI lacks an institutional training forum and training mechanisms to reinforce traditional policing procedures and skills and creation of a professional cadre of police. Initiatives like the UTEDC are absent within the MoI.

The ASSF School of Excellence (SoE), located at Camp Morehead, provides training for more than 10,000 students in 20 different courses per year. The largest initiative underway at the SoE during this reporting period is the merger of MoD (ANASOC) and MoI (GCPSU) students at the Special Operators Basic Course (SOBC). This provides a training foundation for all ASSF personnel and ensures commandos and GCPSU operators are able to begin at the same level of training, increasing interoperability.

<sup>19</sup> Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel DFR, KIA, separation, disappearance/capture, disability, non-combat death, retirement, exempted (e.g., AWOL or permanent medical issue), or transfer to the ANA/ANP. The attrition rate is the current month’s attrition (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength.

COVID-19 restrictions resulted in only a 25-50 percent fill rate for training at CATC. The MoD paused all non-frontline training in March 2020, which affected branch schools and all training for three months. Training resumed at 35 percent capacity for the second half of the reporting period and returned to full capacity at the end of November 2020. To mitigate pressure from Corps commanders to bypass branch schools in their efforts to assign ANA to units quicker, the UTEDC Commander is discussing with the CoGS a proposal for 50 percent of BWT graduates to move to branch school training.

### Improving MoD and MoI Budget Execution

Inefficient MoD and MoI budget processes have led to under-execution of funding. Both ministries must improve their Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution (PPBE) process. Though the ministries are making slow, steady improvements in PPBE, they continue to struggle in the programming and execution of funds. Specifically, both MoD and MoI must focus on the development of procurement plans using a bottom-up approach and awarding contracts in a timely manner for execution. The national procurement authority has struggled to process MoD and MoI contracts. CSTC-A continues to provide ministerial-level TAA and work with their ANDSF counterparts to drive improvements in budget execution.

The delegations of authority process utilized by the MAGs for procurement expenditures down to Corps and PHQ levels has bolstered efficiencies in accountability of end-user items. Within the MoD and MoI, contract award processes were improving before the COVID-19 restrictions were emplaced, but this improvement slowed during the reporting period. The MoI responded rapidly to the COVID-19 global pandemic but also slowed during this reporting period. In the MoD, ANA Corps Commanders were successful in procuring food items through the local markets while waiting for centralized food contracts to be awarded, demonstrating the flexibility to overcome obstacles to care for their members.

### Improving Processes for Paying Soldier and Police Salaries<sup>20</sup>


The implementation of APPS within the ministries was a key milestone in providing a mechanism for transparency, accountability, and auditability of the personnel and pay process. The MoD and MoI took additional steps to implement APPS within the reporting period, demonstrating continued ministerial-level buy-in and commitment to improved accountability of the ANDSF. APPS is the human resources and payroll system of record for MoD and the HR system of record for MoI; The MoI continued to use WEPS for payroll. In July 2020, the GIRoA made biometric enrollment a requirement for pay in the MoI. The government directive gave the MoI the necessary incentive to embrace the system and enrollment and slotting of MoI personnel has increased by 8 percent during this reporting period. The MoI required more “train-the-trainer” courses to fully incorporate and manage the system but they will achieve full implementation of APPS informing pay by the end of January 2021.

<sup>20</sup> Information on APPS addresses Section 1225(b) (8) of the NDAA for FY 2015, which Section 1215 of the NDAA for FY 2017 added.

CSTC-A noted a maturing of APPS usage, primarily in the MoD, during the reporting period, which improved accountability of ANA personnel. All APPS modules were in use; only minor software modifications continued to be required. The ANA were able to address the initial challenges of data cleaning and system baselining efforts to ensure the proper biometric enrollment of soldiers in APPS and assignment to the correct tashkil positions. A MoD assessment on August 24, 2020 highlighted the successful employment of APPS by reporting more than 99 percent completion of time and attendance, payroll documents, and unit roll up documents. The APPS maturation in the MoI may see similar success as biometric enrolling increases and the time and attendance process is baselined. APPS is accessible and in use at the MoD and MoI headquarters and at regional locations. Occasionally some personnel in remote or particularly hazardous locations that are difficult to reach by ANDSF mobile biometric enrollment teams are unable to biometrically enroll in a timely manner. In addition, updates and processing of records of personnel who are KIA and DFR remained a challenge across the ANDSF.

The transition from a paper-based process to an electronic process is continuing within the MoD and MoI. With the policy, programmatic, and technical advice from CSTC-A, the ministries continue to adopt the APPS as a system of record. The FY2020 NDAA funding restriction that requires personnel enrollment in APPS for ASFF-funded payroll continued to drive the use of APPS. Technical enhancements to the APPS have almost eliminated exceptions to paying soldiers outside of APPS, as shown in Figure 4. Three percent of the ANDSF do not have access to a banking institution and require use of the Trusted Agent process. CSTC-A also implemented control mechanisms including looking for discrepancies in rank and pay alignment and back pay to ensure good stewardship of ASFF funds. ASFF pays the ANA salaries while LOTFA funds the ANP salaries.<sup>21</sup>

**Figure 4: ANDSF Pay Process**



<sup>21</sup> CSTC-A contributes a small amount of ASFF funds to maintain voting board member status.



APPS implementation will continue with a phased transition to the GIRoA. Critical to this effort will be DoD contracting officer support to manage the estimated \$9.5 million APPS contracts, including sustainment and modernization efforts. The following conditions are required for CSTC-A to fully transition APPS sustainment and management to the GIRoA: (1) CSTC-A works with the MoI to reach an APPS Fully Operational Capable status; (2) the establishment of an Afghan APPS Program Management Office (PMO); (3) the completion of APPS train-the-trainer courses; and (4) the creation of an APPS sustainment contract managed by the GIRoA. CSTC-A will continue managing the current APPS contract until ASFF funding is no longer used for pay for the MoD (estimated through 2024), and LOTFA approves transition of APPS oversight and management to the MoI (date to be determined). To date, CSTC-A has successfully transitioned the following APPS capabilities to the GIRoA: (1) Fully operationally capable APPS system for MoD (October 2019), including reporting of time and attendance and APPS informing Payroll; (2) management and sustainment of the APPS identification card system to both MoI and MoD (March 2020); and (3) the establishment of the Afghan APPS Help Desk, with tiered support to MoI and MoD (April 2020)).

### Improving ANDSF Facilities

Limited local oversight and slow procurement processes hinder the ANDSF's ability to maintain facilities. In response, RS has focused on addressing several of the ANDSF's key infrastructure challenges: poor execution of operation and maintenance contracts, lack of connection to the commercial electric grid, and excessive focus on new construction rather than the optimization of existing infrastructure. DoD has also taken steps to improve its control and accountability processes for any completed projects later determined to require additional work, including hiring more engineers and changing its planning and oversight guidance. In some instances, DoD also elected to cancel, re-scope, or not pursue projects due to concerns about their sustainability, necessity, and long-term success.

## **3.4 SECURITY OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS<sup>22</sup>**

### *Overview*

The RS Gender Advisor (GENAD) office works for CSTC-A/DCOS-SA to assist the MoD and MoI in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. This resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflict, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian responses, and post-conflict reconstruction. It also stresses the importance of women's equal participation in all efforts related to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Finally, it advocates for special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual violence, during armed conflict. The MoD and MoI apply these principles through the Gender Integration and Participation Plan (GIPPA), which the GIRoA initiated in January 2020. CSTC-A continued to focus on implementing GIPPA programs, and

<sup>22</sup> Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017.



placed greater emphasis on addressing the barriers to full implementation of UNSCR 1325. The goal remains transitioning leadership of GIPPA activities to the ANDSF.

The greatest improvement in women's integration initiatives was made in education: the ANDSF increased their emphasis on education to develop sustainable, enduring skills to "level the playing field" for women and provide the foundation for increased female representation in leadership, regardless of future peace prospects in Afghanistan.

### ***Key Initiatives***

The GENAD office addresses the root causes of low female participation in the security sector, such as cultural and societal norms, high levels of illiteracy, and gender-based violence, while recognizing these are the long-term challenges. Key initiatives this reporting period included:

- Human Rights and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Seminar: Two Kabul-based 3-day seminars with approximately 400 attendees
- Finalization of a Sexual Harassment and Abuse Policy
- Finalization of a Female Accession Policy: Permits women to join the security sector without the consent of a father or husband
- Implementation of sexual assault and harassment complaints processes
- Approval/creation of five child-care centers for women in the ANA: Meant to improve the ability of women to participate in the security sector
- Procurement of COVID-19 medical supplies specifically designated for women in the ANA and ANP
- MoD and MoI Intensive English Language Program: Six-month program to prepare 20 talent-identified women for training at various international training institutions
- MoD and MoI Professional Scholarship Program: Provides 176 women in the MoD and MoI with funding to complete a three-year degree program
- Muslim Institute Program: 12-month program in Kabul offering 100 ANP positions for study in the English language and 100 ANP positions for computer skills training
- Gender Occupational Opportunity Development Program: Offers classes in Dari, Pashtu, and English literacy, computer use, and administrative skills across 14 sites
- Internship Program: Provides women with exposure to careers in the security sector
- MoD and ANA Gender Advisors: Creation of 34 funded positions within the ANA, ANASOC, ANA Recruiting Command and other bases throughout Afghanistan responsible for the implementation of UNSCR 1325

### ***Recruitment, Participation, and Retention***

Women's participation in the ANDSF has decreased slightly in both the MoD and MoI since the last reporting period. As of Oct 29, 2020, APPS enrollment showed 5,712 women serving in the ANDSF (1.9 percent of the total force). Of those women, 1,631 served in the ANA, AAF, or MoD ASSF (0.9 percent of the force); the remaining 4,081 served in the ANP or MoI ASSF (3.6 percent of the force). Of note, the Prison and Detention tashkil is no longer part of the MoI tashkil, as the Office of Prisons Administration is now an independent entity. Consequently, 358

female positions are no longer within the Prison ANP tashkil. These positions will return to the ANP in the near future.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the recruitment of female soldiers through the recruiting command was sporadic during the reporting period; however, RS GENAD forecasts female soldier recruitment for 2020 to be 400 recruits with 250-300 recruits awaiting call-up and assessment at the CATC. A lack of support facilities at corps-level and a lack of female staff members at recruiting centers contributed to low ANA recruitment of women. Recruitment for the ANP is predominantly reactionary and generated locally at the PHQs. Though ANP recruiting data and trend analysis is unavailable, Afghan planning is underway to analyze ANP female recruitment to identify indicators for success to inform strategic messaging.

Neither the MoD nor MoI have strategic-level recruiting plans directed towards women, but both the ANA and ANP have a goal of five percent female participation. In addition, the MoI has a goal of 10 percent female participation at the executive leadership level. These goals are captured in the GIRoA National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 – Women, Peace, and Security (2019-2022) and “Empowering the Women in Police: From Words to Action – Roadmap” (2020-2024).

Both ministries continue to implement recruitment and retention initiatives for women in the force, including financial incentives to encourage increased participation, capacity-building programs, such as language training or computing and office skills, professional development opportunities, and the ANDSF Perception Campaign. The Perception Campaign produces magazines and documentaries aimed at increasing female recruitment. Improved strategic communication at all levels will help the ANDSF increase female participation and improve cohesiveness within the force. CSTC-A continues to prioritize the TAA of female recruitment and retention.

### ***Training and Education***

ANA (MoD): During the 2020 training year, 60 female officer cadets either have trained or are in training at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) and another 34 have trained or are in training at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), as shown in Tables 3 and 4.

***Table 3: ANAOA Officer Cadet Training Numbers***

<b>Intake</b>	<b>Details</b>	<b>Male Trainees</b>	<b>Female Trainees</b>	<b>Total Trainees</b>
<b>17<sup>th</sup></b>	Commenced Apr 2019; Graduated Sep 2020	246	23 (9%)	269
<b>18<sup>th</sup></b>	Commenced Aug 2019; Graduating Dec 2020	284	16 (6%)	300
<b>19<sup>th</sup></b>	Commenced Dec 2019; Graduating Apr 2021 (COVID-19 delay)	228	21 (9%)	249
<b>Total</b>	Officer Cadets at ANAOA during 2020 Training Year	758	60 (8%)	818

**Table 4: NMAA Female Officer Cadet Training Numbers**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Details</b>	<b>Male Trainees</b>	<b>Female Trainees</b>	<b>Total Trainees</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Year</b>	Graduating in 2023	493	7 (1%)	500
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Year</b>	Graduating in 2022	454	8 (2%)	462
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Year</b>	Graduating in 2021	527	18 (3%)	545
<b>4<sup>th</sup> Year</b>	Graduating in 2020	429	1 (<1%)	430
<b>Total</b>	Officer Cadets at NMAA in 2020	1903	34 (2%)	1937

ANP (MoI):

As of November 5, 2020, 90 women graduated from the ANP Basic Patrolwomen course upon completion of training at the GIRoA's regional Recruit Training Centers during the reporting period. As of October 30, 2020, 152 ANP women were enrolled in training. COVID-19-related limitations do not appear to be affecting use of training facilities in the ANP, as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5: Women in ANP Undergoing Training**

<b>ANP Training Center</b>	<b>Capacity for Female Training</b>	<b>Number of Women in Training</b>	<b>Used Capacity</b>	<b>Course Description/Notes</b>
<b>ANP Academy</b>	-	42	-	Four year course (bachelor's degree)
<b>Female Training Center</b>	300	40	13%	NCO & Officer recruit training
<b>Central Training Centre – Kabul</b>	100	24	24%	Promotion & Basic Patrolwoman course
<b>RTC Nangarhar</b>	300	0	0%	Not in use - temporary conversion into COVID-19 hospital
<b>RTC Parwan</b>	100	4	4%	Basic Patrolwoman course
<b>RTC Wardak</b>	400	0	0%	
<b>RTC Gardez</b>	100	2	2%	Not defined
<b>RTC Kandahar</b>	50	3	6%	Basic Patrolwoman course
<b>RTC Herat</b>	100	52	52%	Rank promotion, Basic Patrolwoman course, and specialty course
<b>RTC Kunduz</b>	300	2	1%	Rank promotion
<b>RTC Helmand</b>	0	10	-	Basic Patrolwoman course & NCO course
<b>RTC Balkh</b>	60	17	28%	Security, rank promotion, and specialty course
<b>Total</b>	1810	196	10%	

### *Infrastructure and Facility Usage*

A number of facilities constructed for women on both ANA and ANP bases continue to be vacant or misused. Misuse occurs for several reasons, including changes in security situations that make areas unsecure for the employment of women and a lack of ANDSF focus on integrating women in certain areas. The ANDSF have temporarily repurposed some women's facilities for use as COVID-19 hospitals. The ministries have not yet developed a plan to rectify the misuse and/or lack of use of gender facilities.

### **3.5 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ON OBJECTIVES<sup>23</sup>**

Tables 6 and 7 present the elements of the assessment called for in section 1520(d) and key points for each assessment element, which are drawn from more detailed analysis presented elsewhere in this report. Section 1520(d)(4) of the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to determine whether the GIRoA is making sufficient progress toward shared security goals and to withhold \$480 million USD of ASFF if they are not doing so. No determination of insufficient progress was made during this reporting period.

During this reporting period, the GIRoA continued to improve at meeting shared security objectives. Nonetheless, the DoD remains concerned that corruption is a key vulnerability. The DoD will closely monitor whether the GIRoA continues to improve efforts to account for U.S.-funded equipment and materiel and payroll funding and to counter corruption. Absence of improvement on these issues could trigger DoD withholding ASFF in the next reporting period.

**Table 6: Overall Assessment of Progress on Objectives in Accordance with Section 1520(d)**

<b>Overall Assessment Areas</b>	<b>Key Points</b>
Progress of the GIRoA toward meeting shared security objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASSF operations effectively executed some military operations against the Taliban, thwarted ISIS territorial expansion, and mitigated the threat from HPA networks.</li> <li>• The ANDSF CSAR and RTTs are able to synchronize resources to respond adequately to threats across Afghanistan.</li> <li>• No provincial capitals were captured and minimal district centers seized by Taliban, though the ANDSF struggled to form an integrated, response to the Taliban's attack on Lashkar Gah in October.</li> </ul>
GIRoA efforts to manage, employ, and sustain the equipment and inventory provided using FY 2019 or FY 2020 ASFF.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving areas:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– AAF distribution slightly reduced SNCs transit times.</li> <li>– Core-IMS use continues across the ANDSF.</li> <li>– Air Line of Communication established to synchronize a logistics common operating picture at the national level.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>23</sup> This section responds to Section 1520(d) of the NDAA for FY 2020.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NMS-GVS share of work performed by ANA and ANP increased relative to contractor support. NMS-GVS has graduated 1,024 students in supply or maintenance and 537 ANP personnel in supply or maintenance.</li> <li>• Areas requiring long-term advisory support:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Counter-corruption efforts.</li> <li>- MoD and MoI capacity to execute institutional systems and processes consistently.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• The Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC) is training sufficient numbers of maintainers to create a more organic maintenance cadre; however, the SMW and AAF will realistically not be able to fully manage their fleets organically, just as the US military relies on CLS to sustain its aviation fleet.</li> </ul>
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**Table 7: Summary of Assessment of Each Matter Enumerated in Section 1520(d)**

<b>Matters Assessed</b>	<b>Key Points</b>
<p>(A) The extent to which the GIRoA has a strategy for, and has taken steps toward, increased accountability and the reduction of corruption within the MoD and MoI.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• June 2020 marks one year of operations for the independent MoD CID. Although it has not reached full operational capacity, it increased the percentage of corruption cases it investigates monthly from 9% to 20%. MoD chose to retire or reassign several senior leaders under CID investigation. MoD and MoI continue to implement directives and undertake efforts to address corruption.</li> <li>• On July 25, 2020, the use of APPS to inform all salary payments made to MoI via the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s WEPS.</li> <li>• MoI’s fuel management reform has saved more than \$4.8 million.</li> <li>• These and other initiatives ongoing in both MoD and MoI reflect a commitment to addressing corruption; however, corruption remains a threat to the viability of the ANDSF.</li> </ul>
<p>(B) The extent to which the capability and capacity of the ANDSF have improved because of ASFF investment, including through training, and an articulation of the metrics used to assess such improvements.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training of A-29 fixed wing strike aircraft pilots in the United States was completed during this reporting period. The six A-29 aircraft that were used for training at Moody are being shipped to Afghanistan to conduct combat operations, which will bring the fleet to a total of 24 aircraft.</li> <li>• The Afghans independently conduct Aircraft Qualification Training for MD-530, C-208, AC-208 and A-29 pilots.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MD-530s are able to operate independently from remote locations and use integrated ISR to provide focused fires in direct support of ground forces. Recent mentor focus on integrated operations and the establishment of the joint operations planning center has resulted in an increase in joint operations and increase mission effectiveness.</li> <li>• The AAF is now capable of independently planning and executing day and night strikes using both laser guided and unguided munitions in close coordination with supported forces. The SMW is fully capable of independently planning and coordinating helicopter assault missions and providing ISR support for all mission sets.</li> </ul>
<p>(C) The extent to which the ANDSF have been able to increase pressure on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations, including by re-taking territory, defending territory, and disrupting attacks.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GIRoA maintains control of Kabul, provincial capitals, major population centers, most district centers, and most portions of major ground lines of communications.</li> <li>• The ANDSF remain capable of maintaining pressure on the Taliban while a multi-front focus detracts from their ability to address the existential Taliban threat. As such, the Taliban threat will continue to drive ANDSF actions and decision-making. Some independent U.S. shaping fires and Taliban direct actions contributed to the degradation of ISIS in Afghanistan.</li> </ul>
<p>(D) Distribution practices of the ANDSF and whether the GIRoA is ensuring supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the U.S. are appropriately distributed to, and employed by, security forces charged with fighting the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AAF channel flight program remains a success. The weekly flights provide critical supplies and reduce ground convoys.</li> <li>• During the reporting period, a weekly air order directive led to doubling the average cargo carried per C-130 flight.</li> <li>• MoI distributed almost 2,800 tons of supplies during reporting period via air and ground.</li> <li>• Joint Order issued to synchronize enablers in support of distribution of supplies across Afghanistan.</li> <li>• CSTC-A's SAO EUM section works effectively and directly with MoD &amp; MoI Commodity Manager leadership for all equipment EUM and divestment or loss.</li> </ul>
<p>(F) The extent to which the GIRoA has designated the appropriate staff, prioritized the development of relevant processes, and provided or requested the allocation of resources necessary to support a peace and reconciliation process.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GIRoA held a secure and successful <i>Loya Jirga</i> to decide on remaining prisoner releases, to make progress towards starting APN. The GIRoA executed the presidential decree resulting from the Loya Jirga, which called for the release of certain Taliban prisoners. APN between the GIRoA and the Taliban began in Doha in September 2020.</li> <li>• GIRoA finalized its negotiating team, who have traveled to Doha to negotiate with the Taliban team at APN. The</li> </ul>




	<p>GIRoA also established the HCNr to support reconciliation efforts. Additionally, the ONSC has reorganized and begun to optimize their staff to address reconciliation and other governmental issues.</p>
<p>(G) A description of the ability of the MoD and MoI to manage and account for previously divested equipment, including a description of any vulnerabilities or weaknesses the MoD and MoI and any plan in place to address shortfalls.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANDSF use of Core-IMS continued to improve; the MoD and MoI continue to use Core-IMS at all national warehouses and regional depots.</li> <li>• An additional component of logistics improvement is the addition of the Administrative Logistic Operations Center, established to track and prioritize logistic efforts across Afghanistan. It generates combat power and enables commander decisions by applying priorities and delivery method, with mechanisms to arbitrate between competing demands.</li> <li>• Corruption remains a critical challenge. Although MoD and MoI Inspector Generals have grown in capability and ministry leaders are emphasizing stewardship, a low percentage of alleged corrupt actors are actually prosecuted.</li> </ul>
<p>(H) A description of any significant irregularities in the divestment of equipment to the ANDSF during the period beginning on May 1, 2020, and ending on October 31, 2020, including any major losses of such equipment or any inability on the part of the ANDSF to account for it.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ANDSF continue to face challenges with equipment loss because of combat operations. Replacement efforts slowed during the reporting period.</li> <li>• The ANDSF received 673 vehicles and only 29 vehicles turned into Defense Logistics Agency for estimated cost of damages and demilitarization. There are an additional 441 pending since March due to COVID-19.</li> <li>• CSTC-A’s SAO EUM section works effectively and directly with MoD &amp; MoI Commodity Manager leadership for all equipment EUM and divestment or loss.</li> </ul>
<p>(K) The extent to which the Government of Afghanistan has made progress in achieving security sector benchmarks as outlined by the U.S.-Afghan Compact (commonly known as the “Kabul Compact”) and a description of any other documents, plans, or agreements used by the U.S. to measure security sector progress.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSTC-A no longer uses the Kabul Compact to assess progress.</li> <li>• CSTC-A now uses its “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities” framework to assess effectiveness of its efforts in five priority areas: (1) Generate Combat Power, (2) Generate Police Power, (3) Future Force, (4) Stewardship and Accountability, and (5) Logistics Reform.</li> </ul>

# SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES

## 4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

Figure 5: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart



The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF (SMW and ANASOC), as shown in Figure 5. All relevant security and operations functions executed under the ANA GS fall under the direct supervision of the CoGS, including directing Corps commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. The MoD continued to execute missions at the operational and tactical levels independently. The MoD also continued to make incremental gains towards institutional viability with continued TAA. A key change made during this reporting period was the appointment of two leaders – the ANA CoGS and First Deputy Minister of Defense. Both are strong, reliable partners leading positive change within the MoD and ANA. The CoGS’ ability to communicate clear priorities and hold operational commanders and staff accountable has increased effectiveness across the ANA. The First Deputy Minister has also

addressed chronic institutional challenges associated with pay, food, facilities, counter-corruption, and logistics. During this reporting period, TAA efforts shifted to the headquarters of key directorates across the MoD. The closure of Coalition bases Qargha and Camp Taylor led to MAG-Defense ceasing tactical level TAA at the CATC and MFNDU. MAG-Defense training advisors focused TAA on the long-term institutional viability of the UTEDC and its key leaders and staff.

### ***Resource Management and Procurement***

The MoD's inefficient budgeting process led to the under-execution of funding; improvement in its PPBE process is required. The MoD's ASFF budget for Afghan Fiscal Year<sup>24</sup> (AFY) 1399 was roughly \$780 million dollars with a majority going towards ANA salaries. As of October 31, 2020, the MoD executed 67 percent of this budget and awarded 139 contracts (valued at \$136 million dollars), which represented 71 percent of the total GIRoA and ASFF procurement budget. These execution numbers were below historical execution rates. The National Procurement Authority struggled to process MoD contracts, which often took more than six months to complete.

MoD Budget and Finance was proactive with funding realignments and completed several requests prior to funds depletion. The MoD improved its PPBE process, but continued to underperform in the awarding, funding, executing, and invoicing of contracts. Many contracts required extension into the following FY to complete execution and invoicing. Consequently, these extensions reduced MoD's current-year procurement budget.

### ***Personnel Management***

Personnel management remained a challenge for the ANA, particularly because the COVID-19 pandemic delayed any substantive improvement for human resource and career path management within the MoD and ANA. Human resources oversight ensured all promotions were compliant with the Inherent Law (which provides for skills-based promotion) during the reporting period. Since June 2020, 26 ANA personnel retired because of Article 59 of the Inherent Law. Overall, the MoD designated 1,500 officers in APPS for retirement during the reporting period. The retirement incentive plan was widely embraced: 1,954 out of 2,174 (88%) eligible senior officers accepted the incentive. The GIRoA successfully assumed responsibility for this process.

### ***Institutional Training***

The Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) is the foundational military training pillar of the ANA Training and Education Landscape and served as the MoD's primary facility for BWT and Advanced Combat Training. During the last reporting period, CATC came under scrutiny after the facility delayed classes and advisors received reports of unsatisfactory training. COVID-19 affected training during this reporting period as the facility was only employed to 25-50 percent

<sup>24</sup> The GIRoA operates on the Solar Hijri calendar, which starts on 20 or 21 March of the Gregorian calendar. The AFY is similar to U.S. FY and starts 3 months before the Solar Year, on 21 or 20 December of the Gregorian calendar. 21 December 2021 will be the start of AFY 1400.

of its capacity. The ministry stopped all non-front line training in March 2020, which affected branch schools and all training for three months. Training partially resumed at a reduced rate and is now at 35 percent of capacity.

The Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) help advance recruitment and retention in provinces where success is heavily reliant on local recruitment and training to incentivize soldiers. RMTCs suffered from a lack of equipment and inconsistent or substandard curriculum and training cadre. RMTCs remain under the command of the Corps and provide decentralized training locations for major efforts such as local recruiting and ALP transition. With a reduction of travel requirements, RMTCs offered unit-level training opportunities and flexibility for Corps commanders. The RMTCs facilitated local recruiting and training efforts to produce 3,000 soldiers since June 2020. The transition of the ALP into the ANA-TF could also result in up to 10,800 new recruits conducting BWT in RMTCs through the spring of 2021. RMTCs also provided the training facilities required to conduct the recent Route Clearance Company training packages for an additional 700 qualified route clearance specialists across the ANA.

### ***Logistics and Maintenance***

MoD maintenance capacity continues to mature; however, challenges remained for MoD to become more effective in enhancing unit readiness, including prioritizing classes of supply during replenishment, distribution, and supply-chain management. MoD had the appropriate levels of spare parts; inventory management improved through use of Core-IMS.

CSTC-A measures the ANDSF's maintenance capability using the split of maintenance between contractors and the ANDSF. COVID-19 restrictions affected the ability of the contractors to work closely with their partners and limited the ability of the contracts to assess the maintenance being conducted by the ANDSF. Option year 3 of the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Strategy (NMS-GVS) contract began on August 31, 2020, and nine contractor-run sites commenced transition to the MoD and no longer provide CLS through contracted facilities.

Workshare split is calculated by visually observing ANA soldiers performing maintenance on equipment. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the contract observers were unable to verify ANA performance. Stabilization of COVID-19 infections allowed for contractors to return to maintenance areas, but with the increase in violence, some ANA mechanics were diverted to security missions. Table 8 shows the percentage of observed workshare, but confidence in this assessment is limited due to the limited opportunity to observe during this reporting period.

***Table 8: Percentage of ANA – NMS-GVS Workshare Responsibility as of October 31, 2020***

Month	Percent Goal for ANA	Actual percent of ANA Workshare
May	70%	20.5%
June	70%	15.6%
July	70%	12.4%
August	70%	7.2%
September	80%	27.2%
October	80%	29.4%

### ***Strategic and Operational Planning***

The MoD has the appropriate organizational structure and capacity but struggled to develop strategic plans. The Assistant Minister of Defense Strategy and Policy annually publishes the National Military Strategy, the Operational Planning Guidance, and the Defense Capability Planning Guidance. The GS operationalizes the strategy through the General Staff Planning Guidance, which produces the annual Campaign Plan. The current political and security environment affected the MoD's ability to develop both strategic and operational plans, and resulted in the publication delay of planning guidance during the reporting period.

At the ministerial level, the MoD struggled to maintain a common operating picture of current operations. The National Military Command Center (NMCC)<sup>25</sup> provided a platform to coordinate and oversee near-term operations and managed the distribution of assets and tasks based on ministerial-level guidance and priorities. The MoD continued to improve its common operating picture and coordination efforts with the establishment of the Administrative Logistics Operations Center and continued process and system refinements of NMCC operations.

The ANA continued to focus short-term planning on the implementation of the AFY 1400 tashkil, winterization, and the annual campaign plan.

### ***Intelligence***

The CoGS and GSG2 continued to encourage the integration of the full spectrum of intelligence capabilities: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment towers, and ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Systems. Advisors continued to assist efforts to improve integration of intelligence with operations through development of assessments and priority intelligence requirements.

## **4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)**

The ANA General Staff C2s all of Afghanistan's ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, the ANASOC, the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), and the Afghan Border Force (ABF). In total, the ANA consists of 27 combat brigades, three combat air wings, four branch and basic training schools, seven ANCOF brigades, seven ABF brigades, and additional support facilities such as depots and hospitals.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Afghan National Army Strength***

The authorized MoD tashkil (AFY 1399v2) is 232,610. During this reporting period, there were 184,422 MoD personnel slotted in the APPS and were eligible for pay. CSTC-A reported that from June 1 to November 3, 2020, the ANA, AAF, and ANASOC slotted or processed 3,250 promotions, 52,452 reassignments, 10,922 initial assignments, and 15,069 separations in APPS.

<sup>25</sup> The GIRoA has established a national level coordination center for the MoD and MoI, modeled after the United States National Military Command Center Concept.

<sup>26</sup> ANCOF Brigades began dissolution in June 2020.




The large number of soldiers Dropped From Rolls (DFR) for being AWOL for more than thirty consecutive days was the primary driver of attrition. During the reporting period, MoD continued to implement APPS, which led to improved accountability and contributed to an increase in separations, retirements, and reliable APPS data. Soldiers leaving the ANA at the end of the contracted service accounted for approximately a quarter of the monthly losses. Combat casualties accounted for only a small percentage of monthly losses, but recruitment and retention have offset the losses.

***Afghan National Army Structure***

The largest ANA elements are the seven regional Corps. Each Corps is typically composed of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, 215th Corps, and 217th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions following the provincial boundaries. The ANDSF divided the 209th’s previous sector to incorporate the 217th Corps. The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.

***Figure 6: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries***



***ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF)***

The ANA-TF is comprised of locally recruited ANA units intended to serve as a hold force in permissive security environments. ANA-TF units exist only where there is political alignment between the provincial, district, and local leadership. This accountability ensures that the central government has adequate oversight of and accountability for local forces and is adequately supporting the units with training, supplies, and reinforcements. The three pillars of accountability are the elders of the community, government representatives, and the ANA Corps commanders. The purpose of the ANA-TF is to provide security within strategic districts with permissive security environments. The ANA-TF’s provision of security enables the GIRoA to



counter the insurgents' ability to provide ad-hoc government structures. The ONSC identifies the districts considered politically, socially, or economically important and provides the guidance and direction to the MoD on the use of the ANA-TF.

There are 105 authorized ANA-TF companies, of which 97 are operational, an increase of 14 since the previous reporting period. Three more are in training, and five are planned with recruiting efforts ongoing. Operational tolays<sup>27</sup> by Corps are five in the 111th Capital Division, 24 in the 201st Corps, 20 in the 203rd Corps, 7 in the 205th Corps, 11 in the 207th Corps, 16 in the 209th Corps, and 14 in the 217th Corps. As the ANA-TF program grows, the ANA, largely because of the emphasis from the MoD leadership, is beginning to demonstrate increased integration and acceptance of the program. When supported and integrated into the kandak, brigade, and corps, the ANA-TF demonstrated that they are proficient at their key task of holding and defending terrain, mostly through fixed site security. Notably, as the ANA-TF relied on ANA organic sustainment systems, the ANA-TF largely experiences the same challenges as its assigned Corps.

The most notable change of the ANA-TF during this period was the national level order, which created up to 10,800 additional tashkil positions to facilitate ALP dissolution. The growth of the ANA-TF allows former ALP personnel to integrate into the ANA-TF after completion of BWT. The ONSC and MoD are still reviewing the exact locations of the additional ANA-TF tolays.

### ***Afghan Border Force (ABF)***

The ABF consists of seven brigades under the operational control of the seven ANA Corps. The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30 miles into the interior of Afghanistan. Operations in this zone deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers from entering the country. The ABF also supports ANA operations against insurgents and terrorists.

### ***Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF)***

The ANCOF consists of five brigades under the operational control of ANA Corps. ANCOF missions include responding to civil unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban areas. The MoD inactivated the ANDCOF brigades from the 215<sup>th</sup> and 203<sup>rd</sup> Corps in June 2020. The MoD will inactivate the remaining five ANCOF brigades in the AFY 1400 tashkil. Former ANCOF personnel will integrate into unfilled tashkil positions within their respective ANA Corps.

## **4.3 MOD SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES**

### ***Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)***

The ANASOC is a corps-level component of the MoD. The ANASOC conducts precision short-duration, military special operations beyond the range, scope, and capability of conventional ANA units across Afghanistan. Consequently, when properly resourced and employed,

<sup>27</sup> Tolay is the Dari word for a company-sized element.

ANASOC sits at the forefront of ANA capability in securing national sovereignty and countering terrorist groups seeking to exploit territory that may be considered “under-governed” or “ill-governed” within Afghanistan. Positioned at key locations across the country, ANASOC units are the MoD arm of a cross-pillar security apparatus responsible for the disruption of, and reaction to, a range of violent terrorist and insurgent groups. ANASOC Liaison Officers that are embedded within the CSAR and RTTs coordinate future operations planning and deliberate targeting efforts with other ASSF elements and ANDSF pillars to support these disruption and response efforts.

The ANASOC consists of four Special Operations Brigades (SOBs) and a National Mission Brigade (NMB). Distributed within the Corps are ten battalion-sized ANA Commando Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs), which are transitioning to Combined Arms Kandaks (CAKs), six Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSKs), two Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSKs), three new Special Operations Forces Maneuver Kandaks (SOFMKs), and seven support elements. The MSKs, CSKs, and SOFMKs are equipped with variants of the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV), a vehicle based on the U.S. M1117 Armored Security Vehicle (ASV). MSFVs are armored, mine-resistant, four-wheeled fighting vehicles equipped with a variety of heavy weapons. The MSKs were previously trained in conventional mounted infantry tactics and assigned to the ANA Corps. In early 2017, the MSKs were reassigned to ANASOC to begin transition into CSKs. MSK personnel are required to attend the Commando Qualification Course (CDOQC) followed by the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) to complete the conversion process into CSKs and ensure proper integration into ANASOC. The mission of the SOFMKs is to provide maneuver and heavy weapons capabilities to the NMB.

### ***Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) and Combined Arms Kandaks (CAKs)***

Across ANASOC, all SOKs are in the process of transitioning to CAKs. This transition will be complete prior to the end of 2021. The special operations mission of the SOKs will not change with this new force structure. The primary ANASOC tactical force element is the SOK. SOKs conduct special operations tasks against insurgent networks to support regional ANA Corps’ counter-insurgency operations. They provide a response capability against terrorist and insurgent threats and can forward-deploy mission command packages in support of planned offensive and contingency operations. All ten SOKs, both CSKs, the six MSKs, and the three new SOFMKs, support regional SOBs and have the ability to complement the ANA Corps’ conventional response, using ciphers<sup>28</sup> to guide complementary actions. The 6th SOK, assigned to the NMB and located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national-level mission unit.

### ***MSK, CSK, and SOFMK***

MSKs, CSKs, and SOFMKs use combined arms maneuver to provide a rapidly deployable strike capability that delivers mobile precision lethality and the ability to respond quickly to emerging crises. Originally, MSKs were designed to provide the ANA with a quick reaction force capability during periods of daylight. The CSKs addressed a capability gap associated with MSKs by employing a combination of mounted and dismounted combat maneuver tactics to conduct patrols and engage in urban warfare. CSKs also operate at night with sophisticated night

<sup>28</sup> A cipher is an order issued within the MoD or MoI.

vision equipment mounted on their MSFVs to enhance combat effectiveness. The CSK capability enhanced ANASOC's firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield. The recent addition of three new SOF MKs added a heavy weapon and maneuver capability to ANASOC's arsenal.

### ***National Mission Brigade (NMB)***

The NMB provides the President of Afghanistan and the MoD with rapidly deployable special operations force capability to conduct short-notice, nation-wide direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, and counter-insurgency tasks. The NMB has a deployable mission-command package, including the 6th SOK/CAK, *Ktah Khas* (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks (SFK). The NMB routinely integrates a range of ANDSF ISR capabilities into its mission profiles. Within the ANA, this ability to plan, coordinate, and integrate a range of tactical enablers into tactical operations is unique. MoI and NDS Liaison Officers serve in the NMB Headquarters to coordinate resourcing of special operations missions between the ANA and ANP. The SMW and the AAF provide priority ISR over-watch and strike support to the NMB. During this fighting season, the NMB maintained 75 percent of their assigned strength on duty. The NMB maintained an offensive posture and high OPTEMPO to exert pressure on the Taliban and other terrorist threats. Notwithstanding this challenge, the NMB managed to generate prepared force packages when and where required.

### ***Special Forces Kandaks (SFK)***

SFKs are the ANASOC's premier small-team special operations capability. SFKs engage with security personnel across the ANDSF and the civilian population. SFK units also maintain regional expertise to support SOBs and operate anywhere within the nation, supporting mission requirements directed by the MoD.

### ***Ktah Khas (KKA)***

The KKA is a light infantry special operations *kandak* assigned to ANASOC's NMB. The KKA is comprised of eight companies assigned to nearly full strength, including three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. The additional companies support the KKA training cycle and operations, including transportation for the KKA strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED operations, and the supporting female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. KKA platoons and companies conduct intelligence-led direct action assaults against high-value individuals. The KKA is also able to conduct vehicle interdictions using ground and air mobility platforms. The KKAs were not subject to the same misuse as other elements of the ASSF.

### ***General Support Kandaks (GSK)***

GSKs conduct emergency resupply and facilitate delivery of special operations-specific equipment and supplies to ANASOC units based in Kabul. ANASOC's suite of capabilities expands the GIRoA options beyond those offered by the conventional ANA. GSKs support the

GIRoA's ability to neutralize a threat early before local forces are overwhelmed, reinforce ANA conventional force success, and rapidly reinforce the defense of key terrain, including provincial and district centers.

### ***Recent Trends***

ANASOC growth met planned milestones and contributed to increased combat availability and force utilization. Additionally, ANASOC remained a high-demand unit because of their ability to respond quickly with direct support air mobility and enhanced training. High demand of ANASOC led to continued instances of misuse, conducting missions not aligned with their mission set. Increased OPTEMPO coupled with instances of misuse directly affected the ORC and integrity of ANASOC units; however, ANASOC also experienced growth in conducting well-planned and coherent independent operations during this reporting period. ANASOC saw growing effectiveness on the battlefield as well as with coordinating and sharing information with external units such as the SMW.

The ANASOC Corps Headquarters is the sole proponent for all ANASOC programs, policies, and procedures within the MoD and internally to ANASOC. Coalition advisors continue to use concepts of employment developed last reporting period to guide ANASOC Commanders and corps staff in the employment of ANASOC units in accordance with authorized roles and tasks. The CoGS is responsible for the C2 of all ANASOC elements through the ANASOC Corps Commander. The resourcing, planning, and executing authority remains at the ANASOC Corps Command level and may be retained or delegated to subordinate ANASOC headquarters. The ANASOC Corps Commander is responsible for assessing whether an assigned task or mission is consistent with the mandated roles and task of the Corps and if the ORC can accommodate the mission. The ANASOC capabilities are dependent on the preservation of the ORC, which specifically provides time for required maintenance, refit, and rest. Despite the measures described above, ANASOC misuse levels remained similar during this reporting period compared to last reporting period.

NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan's (NSOCC-A) ANASOC Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) maintained a TAA relationship, among other tasks, supporting the ANASOC Corps Commander and subordinate Kandak Commanders to manage the competitive tension between the demand for operational support and the requirement to maintain programmed ORC downtime. NSOCC-A Advisors did this by determining the validity of ciphers and adjusting the level of coalition support provided based on appropriateness of force employment and the assessed operational imperative.

### ***Training***

The ANASOC School of Excellence (SoE) trains and develops newly recruited ANASOC Commandos and SF leaders. Nearly half of ANASOC recruits had prior experience within the ANDSF. This experience typically translated into a higher success rate among recruits drawn directly from initial training at CATC and RMTCs. The SoE selected qualified recruits through the 14-week CDOQC. The SoE delivered specialized training in communications, engineering, mortar, sniper, and combat first aid. The SoE also delivered leadership and advanced skills

training, including courses in English, officer and non-commissioned officer leadership, and advanced courses such as master driver and advanced special forces medical skills.

The SoE, located at Camp Morehead, teaches more than 20 different classes and trains over 10,000 students per year. The largest initiative underway at the SoE during this reporting period was the merger of MoD (ANASOC) and MoI (GCPSU) students at the SOBC. This allowed a baseline of training for all ASSF and ensured commandos and GCPSU operators were able to begin at the same level of training, which ultimately increased interoperability. Despite delays due to COVID-19 restrictions, the first merged course began on July 11, 2020. There were 366 GCPSU students in the course at the end of this reporting period; it started with 389. Mentors for the GCPSU students identified lessons learned and will implement changes in preparation for the next merged course. Overall, the merger of training pathways increased the capabilities and effectiveness of both GCPSU and ANASOC operators.

The Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) trains MSKs, following successful completion of CDOQC, to become CSKs. The CSMC is a 12-week advanced course covering topics including dismounted infantry collective training, vehicle commander training, gunnery skills training, MSFV platoon collective training, and battalion senior leader and staff training. High demand for maneuver strike capabilities affected ANASOC's ability to place remaining MSKs into the CSMC. Once all MSKs convert into CSKs, the ANASOC will transition the CSMC to a platform for proficiency training. This transition was scheduled to occur in the fall of 2020, however, COVID-19 training restrictions have delayed the transition. ANASOC and NSOCC-A Advisors are working to develop a new schedule.

The SoE also employs mobile training teams (MTT) to conduct on-site training and refresher courses for deployed SOKs, MSKs, CSKs, and SOFMKs. MTTs provide tailored training at the request of the ANASOC units.

The Afghan Female Tactical Platoon (FTP) is an all-female Afghan Special Operations unit within the ANA and ANP enabling Afghan Special Operations units in missions across the country. U.S. Army Cultural Support Team members train FTPs in search and tactical questioning techniques, first responder medical procedures, basic and advanced rifle marksmanship, communications, and land navigation. New FTPs are assessed several times annually and consistently train while assigned to the program to maintain proficiency and expertise. FTPs also have the opportunity to assess into staff and leadership roles within the ANA and ANP.

### ***Sustainment***

Sustainment is a critical issue that limits ANASOC's capability. Without a capable sustainment system, the ORC of the ANASOC reduces unit operational capability. ANASOC units routinely report sustainment concerns. Although shortfalls in what is a maturing ANDSF sustainment system cause many of these concerns, ultimate responsibility for logistic planning rests with the individual units. ANASOC's organic logistical support extends for 72 hours when Commandos deploy in support of conventional ANA forces, after which the unit or company returns for refit and resupply. In cases where the ANASOC deploys beyond this timeframe, units rely on

logistical support from the ANA Corps and MoD for rations, OCIE, and ammunition. This logistical dependency upon the ANA Corps subjects the ANASOC to the ANA's competing priorities, long logistics trains, and inconsistent ANA Corps support. This shortfall compounded the effects of misuse.

#### **4.4 AFGHAN AIR FORCE (AAF)**

The AAF serves as the primary air enabler for ANDSF ground forces by providing air-to-ground fires and special operations forces and lift support to ground forces across Afghanistan. The AAF Headquarters in Kabul provides command and control of 18 detachments and three wings: the Kabul Air Wing; the Kandahar Air Wing; and the Shindand Air Wing.

The AAF pilot skill, ground crew proficiency, and air-to-ground integration continued to improve. The AAF independently planned and provided air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), casualty evacuation (CASEVAC),<sup>29</sup> non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed over watch, and aerial escort missions. Despite COVID-19 related restrictions that limited advisor interactions, the AAF proved itself capable of conducting these operations with little to no mentor support and successfully executed routine air operations.

AAF aerial strike capabilities continued to improve during the last year with now-routine delivery of laser-guided munitions by A-29s and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rockets by AC-208 Eliminator gunships. Afghan crews continued to demonstrate proficiency in their ability to estimate collateral damage and have shown impressive restraint and ability to minimize civilian casualties.

AAF advisors are primarily based in Kabul. When issues were identified outside of Kabul, mentorship teams composed of TAAC-Air and AAF personnel traveled to the "points of need" and focused on specific areas in which mentorship was required at the AAF Headquarters, wing, group, and squadron levels. The co-location of TAAC-Air and the AAF Headquarters at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) allowed for strong coordination and regular interaction between advisors and AAF personnel; however, COVID-19 restrictions and the reduction in TAAC-Air strength limited such interactions. The AAF Commander attended weekly security meetings with COMRS and the TAAC-Air Commander, which considerably improved synchronization of RS and MoD activities and objectives.

#### ***Human Resource Management***

Over the past quarter, the AAF human resource management improved, demonstrating the capacity to operate independently and self-sustain. Remaining human resources challenges include excess personnel on the *tashkil*, the inability to place Transient, Training, Holding, and

<sup>29</sup> MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have transit care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.



Schools (TTHS) personnel into APPS, and persistent issues with AWOL personnel who either depart the formation permanently or returning extremely late from leave.

Excess personnel exist in the AAF due to successful recruiting efforts in 2019, which were based on the 2016 Afghan Aviation Modernization Program requirements for 10,193 personnel. Subsequent adjustments to the size of the fleet programmed as a result of the 2016 plan reduced the AAF required end strength to 7,960 personnel. This left the AAF with a large number of personnel in a “Reserve” status without training dates. The AAF is endeavoring to determine which of these personnel are required to meet the current plan of record and will then work to separate or transfer the remaining individuals to the ANA.

Personnel in a TTHS status continued to be a challenge that limited both AAF growth and fighting capability. The lack of training at the General Staff G1 level on how to develop initial course builds and complete slotting actions for students in APPS caused a delay in building and loading AAF courses. To date, no AAF courses are aligned to a TTHS status, which may lead to pay problems for members who are in or between training. If the AAF is unable to pay students while in training, its ability to grow, regenerate, and sustain combat air power will be negatively impacted.

### *Airframes*

The AAF fleet consists of 163 aircraft: 142 are in Afghanistan and available or in short-term maintenance; six are in transit from the United States to Afghanistan; four are out of country undergoing modifications or heavy repairs. The AAF’s fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s; its rotary-wing platforms include MD-530s, Mi-17s, UH-60A+s, and Mi-35s. Understaffed crew positions, such as flight engineers, present limitations for some platforms.

**Table 9: Summary of AAF Airframes and Aircrews**

	Type of Aircraft	Current Inventory	In-Country Available or in Short-term Maintenance <sup>30</sup>	Number of Qualified Aircrew (Pilots and Co-Pilots)
<b>Fixed Wing</b>	C-130	4	2	9
	C-208	24	23	63
	AC-208	10	10	31
	A-29	24	18	26
<b>Rotary Wing</b>	Mi-17	13	10 <sup>31</sup>	65 <sup>32</sup>
	MD-530	47	38	73
	UH-60A+	41	41	72
	<b>Total</b>	<b>163<sup>33</sup></b>	<b>142<sup>34</sup></b>	<b>339</b>

<sup>30</sup>Aircraft counts are as of November 8, 2020 and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.

<sup>31</sup> This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.

<sup>32</sup> Advising mission ended in June 2019.

<sup>33</sup> SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

<sup>34</sup> SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

### C-130 Transport Aircraft

The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium-airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conducted operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields, providing a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements, CASEVAC operations, and fuel deliveries to austere locations. C-130Hs transported cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and stocks of repair parts. Additionally, the C-130 was the primary mode of transportation for munitions between the AAF Wing locations.



Small fleet size, aircraft availability, and aircrew availability limited C-130H operations. As part of the normal C-130H maintenance rotation, two of the four AAF C-130Hs were available while the other two were in depot level maintenance in Europe.

In early 2020, the AAF Commander designated a new GS G3-Air Director who reviewed and revised the air mobility tasking processes. The new process, combined with better leadership and management of the C-130s by the AAF, resulted in a 42 percent increase in cargo moved. The AAF's small fleet became more effective and efficient. TAAC-Air anticipates continued process improvements for the wider air mobility fleet over the coming year.

The AAF has eleven trained C-130 pilots; however, the command pilots are senior officers who have other duties, limiting the number of pilots available for missions and overburdening the AAF's small cadre of available C-130 pilots. The AAF developed a plan to transition some C-208 pilots to C-130s at a third country location and to bring contracted pilots to Afghanistan to provide command pilot training to the junior C-130 pilots. COVID-19 restrictions delayed the instructors deployments to Afghanistan and interrupted C-130 transition training.

The AAF has nine C-130 trained maintenance personnel. COVID-19 restrictions delayed training of additional C-130 maintainers. The AAF relies on DoD contracted logistics support to sustain C-130H operations.

### C-208 Aircraft

C-208s provide fixed-wing light lift for personnel and cargo movements, including airdrop capability for payloads of up to 1,200 pounds, and for CASEVAC and human remains recovery. During this reporting period, AAF C-208 instructor pilots trained new co-pilots and aircraft commanders without advisor support.



Integrated airdrop training with other platforms proved successful. During missions in contested environments, C-208s often received armed ISR support from AC-208s and integrated defensive strikes from MD-530s to enable successful airdrops. AAF C-208 airdrop crews routinely flew airdrops in up to three-ship formations to resupply ANA and ASSF. Increased success and capability resulted in increased demand but missions are still limited due to risks associated with low-altitude daytime drops with the enemy in close proximity. To mitigate risk, AAF began qualifying aircrews to use night vision to airdrop at night, reducing the risk of enemy fire. The AAF worked to improve integration of airdrop requests and execution with the Regional Operations Intelligence Centers (ROIC), established a robust supply chain to fulfill airdrop requests, and upgraded an airdrop evaluator pilot to sustain aircrew training and upgrades.

C-208 AAF maintenance capability improved, with 18 of 24 required Level-1 maintainers, 24 of 34 Level-2s and 30 Level-3s now on duty.

### AC-208 Eliminator

The AC-208 Eliminator aircraft provides a range of both ISR and strike capabilities in support of ANDSF ground and air operations. The AC-208 is a C-208 airframe modified with a more powerful engine and the ability to employ precision-guided munitions



using the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) modification to the 2.75-inch Hydra rocket. The AAF's AC-208 combat capability increased steadily and pilots routinely used the aircraft's laser-designator feature to buddy-lase, or guide a laser-guided bomb from an A-29, on partnered missions. Demand for AC-208 support rapidly increased as the ANDSF leadership became more familiar with its ability to employ munitions accurately.

### A-29 Super Tucano

The AAF employs the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to strike strategic targets and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb. bombs, Mk-82 500-lb.



bombs, a GBU-58 250-lb. laser-guided bomb, and a GBU-12 500-lb. laser-guided bomb. The aircraft can also fire 2.75 in. rockets and has two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. The AAF is able to employ full-spectrum Air Weapons Teams in the southeast, south, and southwest of the country. Currently, 18 A-29s are in Afghanistan and the six that remained in the United States for training that concluded in November 2020 are in transit to Afghanistan to commence combat operations.

A-29 pilots continued to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs and routinely conducted night strikes and integrated with AC-208 and SMW PC-12 ISR and laser target designators. Advisors noted the increased accuracy provided by precision munitions allowed AAF A-29 pilots to avoid accidental civilian casualties while continuing to show disciplined restraint and tactical proficiency during weapons employment. As a result, they accomplished their missions while minimizing the possibility of civilian casualties.

The AAF A-29 formation focused on single-seat sensor operations after the acquisition of new software. This will eliminate the need for dual cockpit operations and allow the AAF to attain required crew ratios more rapidly. In-country A-29 training was set to begin in 2020 but COVID-19 related restrictions delayed this effort. Afghan instructor pilots began conducting in-country Initial Qualification Training (IQT) in September 2020, and the AAF is rapidly developing its ability to independently run its A-29 schoolhouse. A-29 advisors and contract instructor pilots are currently supplementing the organic instructor cadre to meet training needs.

COVID-19 restrictions also caused delays in the maintainer training pipeline. The AAF A-29 maintainers are staffed with 19 Level-1s, eight Level-2s, and 34 Level-3s. The AAF continues to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain the combat capability of its A-29 fleet as its maintainer cadre develops.

### Mi-17 Helicopter

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.



TAAC-Air's flying advisory mission with AAF's Mi-17s ended in June 2019. The AAF's Mi-17 fleet decreased this year from 45 to 13 as the AAF's UH-60 fleet matured and assumed the lift mission and Mi-17s attrite from the inventory. Mi-17 AAF maintenance capability continues to mature. Organic maintainers accomplished all maintenance with mentorship and oversight provided by CLS.

### MD-530 Helicopter

The MD-530 helicopter provides close-air attack and aerial escort to the ANDSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets.



The AAF trained its MD-530 senior pilot corps by upgrading co-pilots to aircraft commanders, instructors, and evaluators. Earlier this year, the



AAF focused on generating pilots for the UH-60 program by diverting Initial-Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) training graduates designated for MD-530s to UH-60 training. The AAF has since stopped diverting IERW graduates and 15 new MD-530 pilots were mission qualified in June 2020. This allowed the AAF to generate additional SWTs and MD-530s to expand westward, now staging in Herat.

Although to delays in the training pipeline caused by COVID-19 restriction hampered development of the AAF's overall organic maintenance capability, MD-530 AAF maintenance capability grew. The AAF has 18 Level-1s, 20 Level-2s, and 28 Level-3s. The AAF's capability to support MD-530 operations at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence was limited to rearming and refueling. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term and long-term. TAAC-Air continues to work with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet. reporting period as planned due to delays in the training pipeline caused by COVID-19 restrictions. However, MD-530 AAF maintenance capability grew. There are 18 Level-1s (10 Avionics, 20 Engine Body and 10 Weapons Level-1s still required); 20 Level-2s (25 Avionics, 59 Engine Body and 40 weapons Level-2s still required); and 28 Level-3s (16 Avionics, 27 Engine Body and 16 Weapons Level-3s still required). The AAF's capability to support MD-530 operations at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence was limited to rearming and refueling. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term and long-term. TAAC-A continues to work with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet.

### UH-60 Helicopter

UH-60A+ Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter with the ability to operate throughout Afghanistan. The DoD provided the AAF with mission-configured UH-60As refurbished and upgraded to an A+ variant with the UH-60L model engine. These helicopters perform personnel transport, resupply, patient and human remains transfer, and other lift missions during both daylight and nighttime conditions using night vision devices.



AAF UH-60 pilots receive 15 months of IERW followed by a 12-week Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT) course in the UH-60 in Europe. Upon graduation, aircrew attend Mission Qualification Training (MQT) at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, a six-week contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course graduating pilots as mission-certified "co-pilots." The AAF took steps to develop their initial cadre of instructors with two instructor pilots trained and two additional instructor pilots attending training to become evaluator pilots. This training was accomplished through contractor-led training courses. Upon completion of this effort, the AAF will become capable of organically training and certifying UH-60 aircraft commanders. Aircraft

commanders are selected to undergo local in-squadron qualification training after they have demonstrated ability and judgement and have sufficient mission and training flight experience.

UH-60 AAF maintenance capability improved with Aircraft Maintenance Training (AMT) and Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC). AAF graduated 36 Level 3 UH-60 maintainers through these programs this year. Additionally, under the mentorship of Contract Logistics Support (CLS) personnel, more experienced UH-60 maintainers formed Downed Aircraft Recovery Teams (DART) who are able to make repairs (particularly starter replacement) on downed UH-60s away from established CLS maintenance hubs. This capability dramatically reduced the risk of operating the UH-60 at extended ranges.

### ***Training***

COVID-19 related restrictions caused a pause in the training pipeline resulting in a gap in pilot and maintainer production. The scope and effect of this break will not become clear for a year or more. However, the AAF has mitigated COVID-19 associated risks and most training has resumed.

The AMDC in Kabul paused the training of its first students in March due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Training resumed in September 2020 and the first class will graduate in February 2021. The AMDC trains maintainers for both rotary and fixed wing aircraft and is capable of supporting multiple classes of up to 40 students. Each course lasts five months and an overlap in classes allows for training 120 to 160 students per year depending on class start dates. Efforts to train a maintainer cadre will develop over time and are still at the initial stages of development. Third country locations still host maintainer training. COVID-19 restrictions prevent instructors from entering Afghanistan. This has caused an indefinite delay in the instructor development process.

Initial-Entry Fixed and Rotary Wing training occurs at three third country-contracted training sites. Aircraft Qualification Training occurs in Afghanistan or a third country depending on the airframe. MQT occurs in Afghanistan for all aircraft except C-130s.

### ***Sustainment***

The AAF relies on CLS to ensure the sustainability of its fleet. CLS remains critical to platform sustainment. Even for the Mi-17 fleet, for which the AAF and SMW can perform 90 percent of flight-line maintenance, the AAF and SMW are unable to perform overhauls required every three to four years at a cost of about \$6 million each. Instead, the U.S. Army's Multinational Aviation Program Support Office manages these overhauls, and various contractors with expertise in Mi-17 systems (mainly in Europe) perform them.

With the exception of third-country initial-entry flight training and C-130H training, the AAF continued to train new aircrews at or above planned rates to meet their sustainment goal of independent aircrew production. The AAF's ability to meet their operational flying requirements as well as their training requirements to train new aircrews continued to mature during this reporting period.



AAF maintainer sustainment continued to improve. Similar to aircrew training, the AAF is working towards building an organic and sustainable maintenance pipeline to produce enough maintainers to meet the needs of their fleet. As more maintainers are trained, CLS will begin to soft-transition tasks to the AAF while remaining in place to ensure safe work is performed. Once CLS validates enough Afghan maintainers are available to perform specific maintenance tasks, they will hard-transition, and the contractor will not be required to continue to train that task.

The AAF Commander highlighted Afghan Maintenance as one of his primary concerns, which is impeding their overall sustainment efforts. He identified three primary challenges facing the AAF Maintenance enterprise: accountability, standardized procedures, and leadership. The AAF instituted a Procedure Improvement Plan (PIP) with the assistance of TAAC-Air advisors to build procedures, accountability, and leadership into the AAF maintenance enterprise. Building sustainability into this enterprise will take several months and is a high priority effort for TAAC-Air and the AAF.

**Table 10: Percentage of AAF Organic Maintenance and CLS Maintenance<sup>35</sup>**

	Aircraft	%Organic	%CLS
Fixed Wing	C-130	0	100
	C-208	40	60
	A-29	30	70
Rotary Wing	Mi-17	85	15
	MD-530	20	80
	UH-60A	0	100

*\*Mi-17 data does not include heavy repair or overhauls since the MoD does not possess the organic capability required to accomplish this level maintenance.*

## **Operations**

The AAF supported various elements within the MoD, the NDS, and the MoI. Persistent advising of the AAF's targeting process increased the quantity and impact of AAF targeting packages, although target package quality remained inconsistent. Issues included outdated imagery, clear target descriptions, and stale targets without enemy activity that decreased target package quality. In the second half of the reporting period, advising efforts focused on removing old, outdated target packages from the system while refreshing the relevant pending targets with updated intelligence and imagery. The AAF was able to create, staff, validate, and execute target packages from all ANA Corps. The overall targeting process and enterprise of strike packages improved over the past six months. More target packages were submitted than the AAF had the capacity to support. The AAF no longer reported the total number of target packages submitted, completed, or pending and as a result, TAAC-Air was no longer able to monitor the number of packages.

<sup>35</sup> Organic maintenance data are averages due to fluctuations in OPTEMPO, phased maintenance, and the degree of maintenance needs.

Ultimately, intelligence informed decision making on strategic priorities of the MoD, NDS, and MoI. These priorities then drove the CoGS' Operational Design; the Operational Design guided the GSG3's ground scheme of maneuver, which then informed COM AAF's weekly priorities. Due to this strategic alignment, the AAF was able to provide a weekly force offering based on daily aircraft availability, maintenance status, asset locations, numbers of current and qualified crews, munitions and fuel availability, weather impacts and threats to air operations. The AAF priorities and the force offering together established a strategic apportionment in support of the various stakeholders, and the apportionment served as foundation for operational-level asset allocations. Consequently, the MoD was better able to balance the needs of all strategic partners and established a unified priority scheme. All echelons of command must continue to adhere to these priorities to establish apportionment for credible planning and asset allocations for effective mission execution across the ANDSF.

AAF aircrews received training on civilian casualty mitigation throughout their training as well as from platform advisors. Following the receipt of allegations of civilian casualties from the MoD of AAF partners, TAAC-Air conducted an exhaustive review of all applicable pre-mission planning materials, in-flight Full Motion Video, and post-mission battle damage assessments and situation reports in accordance with the RS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 00-345, "Civilian Casualty Reporting" dated February 19, 2019. In the event of a confirmed civilian casualty event, TAAC-Air worked with its AAF partners to identify the root cause and advised accordingly to mitigate the risk of a recurrence.

AAF Corps Liaison Officers (CLOs) have enabled RTTs to generate better and more detailed requests, resulting in some locations in a 90 percent increase in approved air mission requests and a 500 percent increase in enemy KIA.

The training provided by MTTs increased the ability of ANA ground commanders to request and engage targets with attack aviation assets. So far, only the 209th Corps at Mazar-e Sharif has requested MTT support; however, we expect this to expand. There have been two MTT training events since February 2020. The AGI team has encouraged other Corps to submit requests for MTT, although none of the Corps have requested MTT support yet.



During this reporting period, the Acting Minister and the Deputy Minister for Security remained capable and reliable partners through implementation of improvements recommended by Coalition advisors.

### ***Resource Management and Procurement***

The MoI's portion of the ASFF budget for this FY is \$148.1 million and as of November 2, 2020, the MoI had executed 35.4 percent of its budget, mostly on ALP salary payments. During this reporting period, the MoI awarded 38 contracts valued at 16.3 million U.S. dollars and 12 more contracts are pending award, valued at \$4.8 million. These contracts represent 37 percent of MoI's \$57 million procurement budget. There are also 29 projects in processing valued at \$30.7 million (54 percent of the procurement budget). Based on the rate of the execution, advisors focused on engaging their Afghan partners to accelerate the contract review and award process to meet MoI's annual procurement requirement. However, the MoI was able to execute procurement packages for medical and personal protective equipment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The MoI has a current total FY budget of approximately \$360 million, of which ASFF provides approximately \$148 million and the LOTFA provides approximately \$209 million.

### ***Personnel Management***

The MoI lacks human resource and career management capability. The majority of the MoI's personnel management activities for this reporting period consisted of enrolling and slotting ANP personnel in the APPS system. Maintaining a clear picture of the ANP force size and ensuring police are paid is a fundamental service the MoI must accomplish before it can develop additional human resource management tools. The MoI continued to struggle with an inadequate promotion process and a career path structure. The low literacy level of police officers in the organization remains a major challenge.

One element of MoI optimization was to "civilianize" part of its workforce. This move emphasized strong civilian leadership, leveraged subject matter expertise, and built continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MoI Strategic Plan and MoI optimization efforts. The MoI civil servant Subject Matter Expert program was extended in September to integrate specialized civilian talent with managing critical ministerial programs and building civilian capacity. The program was not able to civilianize positions and attract new recruits to the original level intended. The process of civilization also stalled due to competing priorities such as conducting operations, fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, providing security, and countering corruption. As of Oct 29, 2020, there were 4,674 civilian employees at the MoI.

### ***Institutional Training***

The MoI continued working on training reforms to consolidate recruiting and training under one directorate. The MoI also worked on reforming the ANP curriculum to ensure training aligned with Future Force changes. Initiatives like the MoD's UTEDC were notably absent within the MoI. The MoI also lacked human resource expertise and career management. Over time,

Coalition advisors shifted efforts from combat training for the ANP towards community policing. Advisors continued to focus at the ministerial level to assist the MoI as it transitions its force to become a professional police force focused on community policing and enforcing the rule of law.

There were four HR management initiatives at MoI including: (1) restructuring the ANP training and education, (2) synchronization and alignment of recruiting, training, and operations, (3) development of ANP Future Force curriculum focused on serving the Afghan community and law enforcement, and (4) improving and evaluating quality of Regional Training Center (RTC) instructors. The ANP recruited locally at each of the 34 Provincial Recruiting Stations and sent new recruits to one of the 10 RTCs for police training. Police training consists of an 8-week training course and 4-week literacy course. New curriculum development is ongoing with targeted completion in February 2021. ANP is planning to change officer training to a one-year program for candidates with college degrees and planning to phase out the 4-year program at the Police Academy. Beyond early training, the ANP still lacked an institutionalized leadership development program at all levels. Furthermore, mid-level ANP leaders lacked leadership development opportunities.

### ***Logistics and Maintenance***

Similar to last reporting period, the MoI maintained sufficient supplies, while struggling with distribution. Changes in leadership and the establishment of the Provincial Coordination Command to steward logistics requirements and reporting were key developments in the supply distribution process during the reporting period. The developments also included reform of fuel management to identify operational requirements and enforce the consumption reporting by each unit. The security environment continued negatively affecting distribution operations. The MoI distributed nearly 2,800 tons of supplies during the reporting period via air and ground transportation.

Additionally, asset visibility at the Regional Logistics Centers improved to ensure delivery of the correct requirements to points of need in a timely manner. The project to introduce Core-IMS to PHQs will improve asset visibility to the provincial-level leading to a better distribution of supplies at all levels.

ANP PHQs did not have facilities, tools, or spare parts, and this hindered maintenance capabilities. The Regional Logistic Centers did not distribute tools and repair parts to the PHQs. Funding was approved to establish semi-permanent facilities with tools and 45 days of supply for each of the 34 PHQs with expected completion by August 2021. This project will allow PHQs to perform internal maintenance.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A focused on institutional viability including monitoring the ANP logistics and maintenance, and when necessary, assisting the organization. One of CSTC-A's priorities during the reporting period was logistics reform.

The NMS-GVS continues to enable the transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANP. The ANP's workshare split declined to approximately nine percent during this reporting period.

**Table 11: Percentage of ANP - NMS Workshare Responsibility**

Month	Percent Goal for ANP	Actual Percent of ANP Workshare
May	25%	4.3%
June	25%	6.6%
July	25%	4.7%
August	25%	5.3%
September	45%	10.8%
October	45%	9.3%

\*Data as of October 31, 2020

### ***Strategic and Operational Planning***

The MoI is capable of strategic planning with limited assistance from Coalition advisors. MoI started developing two strategic documents, the ANP Strategic Plan 2021-2024 and the Roadmap for Institutional development and Efficiency. These documents align with broader security reforms assuming an uneasy peace condition in the country. The documents focus on protection of people, providing essential services, gaining the trust of the population, and internal institutional reforms at the ministry and ANP.

## **5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE**

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although ANP work with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the ANP are underequipped to fight against an insurgency as formidable as the Taliban. The ANP's focus on and employment in counterinsurgency military functions have hindered the development of anti-crime and other community policing capabilities.

The ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement and policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefining ANP roles and responsibilities, assigning ANP pillar responsibilities, and establishing training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

### ***Afghan National Police Strength***

The MoI has slotted 118,057 ANP and input them into the APPS as of November 3, 2020. Separately, the ANP processed 3,416 promotions, 23,893 reassignments, 20,626 initial assignments, and 1,042 separations in APPS. As with the ANA, the number of ANP personnel DFR continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote CPs with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of attacks contribute to the high ANP attrition.



### ***Afghan National Police Structure***

The ANP is composed of Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Public Security Police (PSP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and General Directorate for Intelligence and Counter Crime (GDICC). The ANP also contains two sub-pillars, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of A. The GCPSU is the MoI's component of the ASSF. International donors pay the majority of ANP personnel costs through the UNDP's LOTFA. The continued support and contributions to LOTFA is essential for the long-term viability of the ANP.

#### ***Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)***

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a PHQ in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects for prosecution in the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or manmade disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies; senior MoI and AUP leaders generally do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

#### ***Public Security Police (PSP)***

The PSP provide urban and metropolitan security, including anti-riot security, for major gatherings and can act as a medium-level response force for situations exceeding the capabilities of the regular uniformed police. The PSP consist of seven reserve support battalions subordinate to the PSP directorate in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kunduz. RS advisors no longer TAA the PSP.

#### ***Afghan Border Police (ABP)***

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan's international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP HQ is located in Kabul. RS advisors no longer TAA the ABP.

#### ***General Directorate for Intelligence and Counter Crime (GDICC)***

The Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) was renamed and restructured during this reporting period, the new organization is the GDICC. The GDICC retained most of the AACP functions, while changing the sizes and functions of some departments such as the Network Targeting Exploitation Center and its Counterterrorism Police. AACP used to provide specialized police

expertise, CT, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts used to work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP's forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations.<sup>38</sup> GDICC personnel will continue to work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The GDICC organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the CID, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force.

### ***Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)***

The GIRoA created the APPF in 2010 as a state-sponsored alternative to private security companies. APPF is a state owned enterprise funded from the budgets of the ministries and government agencies for which it provides security. Members of the APPF are not on the MoI tashkil, although the MoI supervises them. APPF guards have no mandate to investigate crimes or arrest suspects. RS advisors do not TAA the APPF.

### ***Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)***

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counter-narcotics efforts with regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit, the National Interdiction Unit, and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The MoI's National Interdiction and Sensitive Investigation Units conduct interdiction operations targeting senior narcotics traffickers. RS advisors no longer TAA the CNPA.

### ***Afghan Local Police (ALP)***

During the reporting period, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree to dissolve the ALP and integrate it into the rest of the ANDSF. The United States ceased funding the ALP on September 30, 2020. The MoI accounted for approximately 23,000 ALP and biometrically enrolled them in APPS, and created approximately 11,000 positions to transition some of the ALP into the ANP. The ALP who are willing to transition into the ANP will go through vetting and an additional 4-week training course on human rights, gender, and basic policing tasks. The rest of the ALP may join the ANA-TF after going through vetting and the ANA training process.

## **5.3 MOI SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES: GENERAL COMMAND OF POLICE SPECIAL UNITS (GCPSU)**

The MoI GCPSU commands and controls Police Special Units (PSU) established and authorized by the GIRoA to conduct high-risk CT, counter-narcotics, and counter-organized crime missions. The GCPSU provides advice to the ONSC and NSA through the Deputy Minister of Security, the MoI, and other organizations on the proper employment of special police capabilities. GCPSU's special policing functions include warrant-based high-risk arrests, hostage recovery operations, crisis response, and time-sensitive operations requiring precision, increased skill, and unique

<sup>38</sup> Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.

capabilities not suited to the conventional ANP and CNPA. A key element of GCPSU operations is the collection of evidence to support the prosecution of suspects.

GCPSU is a high-demand, low-density MoI law enforcement capability with military like structures and capabilities resulting from the nature of Afghanistan's internal security situation. Like the MoD and NDS, the MoI assigns LNOs to the CSAR and RTTs to support deliberate targeting, operations, and crisis response across the country. The LNOs use the CRG to coordinate and facilitate GCPSU operations to support the CSAR and RTTs as required. GCPSU's warrant-based targeting reinforces the importance and primacy of the rule of law, and counters terrorist groups exploiting Afghanistan as a safe haven from which to launch external operations against U.S. and CF homelands.

### ***GCPSU Components***

The GCPSU is composed of a HQ responsible for command and control of six National Mission Units (NMU), 33 Provincial PSUs, and 25 Intelligence Detachments. GCPSU responds to emerging crises and terrorist threats throughout Afghanistan.

NMUs have a mandate to operate throughout Afghanistan to conduct a range of policing functions from CT to high-risk arrests and hostage recovery; they also possess surveillance and reconnaissance teams. NMUs provide security to regions and cities assessed to be vital to national stability. They have the ability to conduct missions unilaterally and in support of joint ANDSF operations. NMUs often train personnel, plan and execute operations independently while relying on coalition enablers such as intelligence, aviation, and fire support.

Crisis Response Unit (CRU)-222 and Commando Force-333 remain the premier tactical force in the ANDSF and provide crisis response and high-risk arrest support in Kabul. Coalition forces coordinate with units in Kabul to enhance security measures for Western embassies.

A Provincial PSU is a quick reaction capability and special investigative element within a province and holds broad responsibilities for high-risk arrests, evidence-based policing operations, and other policing functions not suited to the conventional ANP, within the rule of law construct. PSUs directly support the PCoP in their assigned province, while remaining under operational control of the GCPSU HQ. The GCPSU HQ maintains responsibility for the provision of labor, training, and equipment of the PSUs, while the PCoP sustains the units through provisions of ammunition, food, pay, and other material. The PSUs consist of three Special Response Teams and an intelligence detachment providing localized human intelligence. There are only 33 PSUs in Afghanistan due to CRU-222 being responsible for Kabul Province.

Intelligence Detachments provide a proactive investigation and surveillance capability, with a focus on CT and criminal networks seeking to destabilize the GIROA. Intelligence Detachments also develop actionable intelligence on warranted targets. The PSU Intelligence Detachments primarily use HUMINT to conduct evidence-based operations. Intelligence Detachments are now integral to each PSU, NMU, and RTT, providing tactical level intelligence. They conduct operations under the PCoP while reporting directly to the head intelligence officer and GCPSU Deputy Commander in Kabul, often acting on targets identified by GCPSU HQ.

MoI liaison officers embedded within the CSAR and RTTs coordinate future operations planning and deliberate targeting efforts with other ASSF elements and ANDSF pillars. The realignment of NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A TAA during this reporting period aided GCPSU's ability to conduct crisis response and to support regional level contingencies.

### ***Training***

GCPSU trainees initially attend the SOBC at the SoE at Camp Morehead alongside their ANASOC colleagues. GCPSU recruits then attend the Special Police Training Center in Kabul for basic police training. The top 200 recruits earmarked for NMUs then proceed to Special Police Advanced Training Wing in Mazar-e Sharif for the Advanced Operators course, while the remainder go directly to serve with PSUs.

### ***Sustainment***

Sustainment continues to affect GCPSU operations. Major sustainment challenges for GCPSU include logistics, personnel movement, and obtaining budgetary independence. The MoI does not differentiate between the ANP and GCPSU for logistic support. Due to their small scale in the provincial centers, the GCPSU struggles with routine distribution and is partially reliant on Coalition partners for logistics. Additionally, there is no reliable way to move GCPSU units via air around Afghanistan without the support of the MoD, although this has improved with MoI gaining higher priority, along with MoD for airlift. The NMUs rely on local MoI logistics depots, often run by the ANP, and do not have budgetary independence through secondary budgetary unit status, to manage their own logistics.

## SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The GIRoA and the ANDSF receive funding through multiple unilateral and multi-national funding mechanisms managed by the United States, NATO, and the United Nations. Looking forward, Afghanistan will continue to rely on foreign aid to fund its security forces even in a post-APN era. At the 2020, Afghanistan Donors’ Conference in Geneva, NATO and other donor nations pledged to continue funding the ANDSF through 2024, although at a lower level than previous commitments. Many nations conditioned their commitments on outcomes of the APN and on solidifying human rights gains made since 2001. Three main funding mechanisms support the ANDSF: the U.S. ASFF, the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (NATF), and the UNDP LOTFA.

### 6.1 U.S. AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

The United States provides the majority of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the GIRoA receives the remainder directly, primarily to fund ANDSF pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. ASFF appropriations since FY 2005 total \$84 billion U.S. dollars.

In many cases, DoD contractors employ Afghan nationals to support U.S. forces or DoD sustainment contracts supporting Afghan forces. Table 12 shows the number of Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from June 1, 2020 through November 1, 2020.<sup>39</sup> The DoD projects U.S. forces in Afghanistan will continue employing approximately 5,000 Afghan nationals until the next reporting period.

**Table 12: Afghan Nationals Employed by or on Behalf of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan<sup>40</sup>**

Personnel	June	July	August	September	October	November
Afghan Nationals	5,373	5,711	4,959	1,846*	5,067	4,627

\* This reduction in contractor personnel numbers are attributed to one contract, which ended in late August and restarted in September.


<sup>39</sup> DoD provides numbers of contractor personnel in Afghanistan employed by U.S. forces in a quarterly report to Congress in accordance with Section 1267 of the NDAA for FY18. DoD also publishes quarterly data of contractor employees in Afghanistan on its website at [https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM\\_reports.html](https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM_reports.html) for public viewing. The next contractor quarterly census report will be in April 2020.

<sup>40</sup> The number of Afghan national contractor personnel employed by U.S. forces during the previous six months and the projected number of such personnel who U.S. forces employ is submitted in response to Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1101 note).

## 6.2 NATO AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY TRUST FUND (NATF)

The primary objective of the NATF is to provide a mechanism for allied and partner nations to support the sustainment and capacity of the ANA. Since NATF’s conception in 2006, 36 donor nations have contributed approximately \$3.2 billion U.S. dollars to the fund. At the 2020 plenary meeting, an overwhelming majority of donor nations expressed continued commitment to funding the ANDSF, despite the uncertainty of APN and the economic hardship stemming from COVID-19 effects and restrictions. Twenty-four of the 28 nations expressed intentions to continue donations in 2021, with 13 of those nations intending a donation commensurate with previous contributions. Three nations (Belgium, Kazakhstan, and Japan) were not able to commit financial support at the Plenary due to uncertainty with their country’s budgeting approval. Australia will not pledge an amount for 2021 although it will consider high priority projects on a case-by-case basis. Figure 8 provides an overview of the evolution of the NATF since its formation.

**Figure 8: NATF Timeline (2006-2020)**




Examples of programs and activities the NATF support include: (1) enhancement of operational and strategic planning; (2) provision of expert technical assistance and advisors; (3) procurement of essential supplies, including medical equipment; (4) improvement of the integration and professional development of women; (5) construction of vital infrastructure; and (6) provision of training to and professional development of senior leaders and administrators of the ANA. Of note, new business rules adopted by donor nations in July 2020 require the in-theater NATF




Board to approve only projects that are severable in nature and scheduled for completion in twelve months or less. Consequently, new projects are shifting away from long-term infrastructure projects and moving towards shorter-term activities, primarily medical, as shown in Figures 9 and 10.

**Figure 9: NATF Projects by Category - 2019 Implementation Plan (IP)**



**Figure 10: NATF Projects by Category - 2020 Implementation Plan**



Activities funded through the NATF are directly linked to mission requirements generated, reviewed, and endorsed by CSTC-A. Ultimate approval authority, however, lies with the NATF Board, which meets quarterly to review and approve the annual project Implementation Plan and oversee the cost effectiveness, financial integrity, and accountability of the NATF. In 2019, the NATF Office also implemented the GIRoA and MoD review of proposed projects to ensure programs meet the needs of the ANDSF.

After approval by the NATF Board and endorsement by CSTC-A and the GIRoA, NATF-funded projects are executed primarily through DoD or NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts rather than as direct contributions to the GIRoA. A NATF Office Project Officer monitors all NATF projects through completion. Any residual balances following execution return to donor accounts for future projects.

In October 2020, representatives of 36 NATO and RS operational partner donor nations met virtually for the 2020 NATF Plenary. The meeting provided an opportunity to highlight NATO’s

continued commitment to the longer-term financial sustainment of the ANA through 2024 and obtain pledges for 2021. The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and the Commanding General, CSTC-A reassured donor nations that the United States intends to steward international funding for the NATF. Most donor nations offered specific pledges or committed to maintaining their current funding levels to support the ANDSF through 2021.

In 2020, nations pledged \$380 million U.S. dollars to the NATF; to date, the NATF has received \$223 million U.S. dollars. NATF expects the remaining contributions to meet or exceed pledged contributions and arrive primarily in December, at the end of many donor nations' fiscal years.

Future contributions will depend largely on the planned ANDSF force size and structure, the expected ANDSF mission post-2021 and advancement reached during APN. Improvements made in NATF transparency and accountability mechanisms, and the confidence of donor nations in future management of the fund will have an impact.

### **6.3 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP) LAW AND ORDER TRUST FUND FOR AFGHANISTAN (LOTFA)**

In addition to the NATF, international donors fund programs and activities in Afghanistan through the UNDP LOTFA. Since the LOTFA's conception in 2002, 24 donor nations have contributed approximately \$6.05 billion U.S. dollars to the fund. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of the LOTFA funds, and donor nations provide oversight of LOTFA-funded activities by participating in the LOTFA Steering Committee and donor meetings.

The UNDP established the LOTFA exclusively to pay the salaries of the ANP. In 2018, however, the fund's scope increased with the creation of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF). Contributions through the LOTFA continue to pay the salaries of up to 125,000 members of the ANP.

Since its establishment in 2018, donor nations have contributed \$236 million U.S. dollars to the MPTF. In 2020, nations contributed \$124 million U.S. dollars to LOTFA, with more donations expected by the end of the year. To meet the funding requirements of these strategic objectives (particularly ANP payroll), unallocated funds contributed prior to 2018 have been used to augment more recent donations. Without an increase in contributions over the next year, LOTFA funds will run out during 2021.

**Figure 11: LOTFA Strategic Objectives**

## 6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FUNDING

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, participants agreed that the GIRoA's annual share of the cost of the ANDSF will increase progressively from \$500 million in 2015 (about 25 billion *Afghani*<sup>41</sup>), with the aim that the GIRoA assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. Given the persistence of the insurgency and slow growth of the Afghan economy, self-sufficiency by 2024 is unrealistic, even if the level of violence allows the GIRoA to reduce the ANDSF force structure. The DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayers' funds.

### *Efforts to Increase the GIRoA's Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF*

The GIRoA remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the GIRoA to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues, while countering corruption and increasing accountability. Donors will base continued support for economic development on the GIRoA's economic and social reforms; these reforms are necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.

Afghanistan will rely on the international community to fund its forces, even in a post-reconciliation environment. GIRoA funding for its MoD and MoI forces—about \$500 million per year—is equivalent to approximately two percent of its Gross Domestic Product and about one fourth of total government revenues. It will be years before the Afghan economy can fully finance a peacetime force through government revenues, even if the risk of terrorist groups using Afghanistan as a safe haven disappears.

<sup>41</sup> The *Afghani* is the Afghan currency.

## ANNEX A – ACRONYMS

AACP	Afghan Anti-Crime Police
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ABF	Afghan Border Force
AFY	Afghan Fiscal Year
AGI	Air-Ground Integration
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AMDC	Afghan Maintenance Development Center
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANA-TF	ANA Territorial Force
ANCOF	Afghan National Civil Order Force
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
APN	Afghanistan Peace Negotiations
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APPS	Afghan Personnel and Pay System
AQ	Al-Qa'ida
AQIS	Al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent
ASFF	Afghan Security Forces Fund
ASSF	Afghan Special Security Forces
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
AWOL	Absent Without Official Leave
BWT	Basic Warrior Training
CAK	Combined Arms <i>Kandaks</i>
CATC	Combined Arms Training Center
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CDOQC	Commando Qualifications Course
CID	Criminal Investigation Directorate
CF	Coalition Forces
CLO	Corps Liaison Officer
CLS	Contract Logistics Support
CNPA	Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CoGS	Chief of the General Staff
COMRS	Commander, Resolute Support
Core-IMS	Core-Information Management System
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease - 2019
CP	Checkpoint
CRG	Crisis Response Group
CRU	Crisis Response Unit
CSAR	Combined Situation Awareness Room
CSK	Cobra Strike <i>Kandak</i>
CSMC	Cobra Strike Maneuver Course
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

CT	Counterterrorism
DFR	Dropped From Rolls
DoD	Department of Defense
EUM	End-Use Monitoring
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FTP	Female Tactical Platoon
FY	Fiscal Year
GCPSU	General Command of Police Special Units
GDICC	General Directorate for Intelligence and Counter Crime
GENAD	Gender Advisor
GIPPA	Gender Integration and Participation Plan
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GS	General Staff
GSK	General Support Kandak
HCNR	High Council of National Reconciliation
HPA	High-Profile Attack
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IERW	Initial-Entry Rotary Wing
IP	Implementation Plan
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS-K	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan Province
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
KIA	Killed In Action
KKA	Ktah Khas
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MAG	Ministerial Advisory Group
MFNDU	Marshal Fahim National Defense University
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MSFV	Mobile Strike Force Vehicle
MSK	Mobile Strike Kandak
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NATF	NATO ANA Trust Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NIMS	National Information Management System
NMB	National Mission Brigade
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMS	National Maintenance Strategy
NMS-GVS	National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support
NMU	National Mission Unit (ASSF portion of GCPSU)
NSA	National Security Advisor

NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan
OFS	Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL
ONSC	Office of the National Security Council
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
ORC	Operational Readiness Cycle
PCoP	Provincial Chief of Police
PHQ	Provincial Headquarters
PPBE	Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution
PSP	Public Security Police
PSU	Police Special Unit
PoA	President of Afghanistan
RMTC	Regional Military Training Center
ROIC	Regional Operations Intelligence Center
RS	Resolute Support
RTC	Regional Training Center
RTT	Regional Targeting Team
SAO	Security Assistance Office
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SFK	Special Forces Kandak
SMW	Special Mission Wing
SNC	Strategic National Convoy
SOB	Special Operations Brigade
SOBC	Special Operators Basic Course
SoE	ASSF School of Excellence
SOFMK	Special Operations Forces Maneuver Kandak
SOJTF-A	Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan
SOK	Special Operations Kandaks
SRAR	Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
SWT	Scout Weapons Team
TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
TAAC	Train, Advise, and Assist Command
TF	Task Force
TTHS	Training, Transient, Holding, and Students
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.	United States
USFOR-A	United States Forces – Afghanistan
UTEDC	Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command
WEPS	Web Enabled Pay System
WIA	Wounded in Action



