

**Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery**

		United States		Russia		United Kingdom		France		China		
Missiles	ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles)	450 Minuteman III:	450	378 SS-18:	54	SS-19:	40	_____	_____	56 DF-5 (CSS-4):	20	
				SS-25:	160	SS-27:	78			DF-31 (CSS-10):	36	
				RS-24:	46							
	IRBM MRBM	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	132 DF-3 (CSS-2):	6	
										DF-4 (CSS-3):	10	
										DF-21 (CSS-5):	116	
	SLBM (submarine launched Ballistic missiles)	336 Trident D-5:	336	144 SS-N-18:	48	SS-N-23:	96	48 Trident D-5:	48	64 M-45:	32	
										M-51:	32	
										JL-1 (CSS-N-3):	12	
										JL-2 (CSS-NX-14):	36	
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles			14		12				4		4	
Aircraft		74 B-2:	20	78 Tu-95 (Bear):	62				63 Mirage2000N:	23	36 H-6K:	36
		B-52:	54	Tu-160 (Blackjack):	16				Rafale:	40		
Number of warheads		Approx. 4,785		Approx. 4,300 (including approx. 2,000 tactical)		Less than 225		Approx. 300		Approx. 250		

**Notes:**

- Data is based on Military Balance 2015, the SIPRI database, etc.
- In April 2015, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2015—the number of deployed strategic warheads for the United States was 1,597 and the delivery vehicles involved 785 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic warheads for Russia was 1,582 and the delivery vehicles involved 515 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2014, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 2,100 (including 184 tactical nuclear warheads).
- In October 2010, the U.K.'s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be fewer than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be fewer than 180.
- According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 90-110 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 100-120, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 6-8.

**Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)**

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
China	160	United States	624.3	949	United States	3,646
India	115	Russia	196.8	956	China	2,616
North Korea	102	China	147.0	871	Russia	1,407
Pakistan	55	United Kingdom	66.2	139	India	963
United States	54	India	47.2	223	Republic of Korea	622
Republic of Korea	52	France	41.1	298	Egypt	586
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	24.8	159	North Korea	563
Turkey	40	Turkey	22.3	212	Taiwan	501
Myanmar	38	Germany	21.3	140	Israel	482
Iran	35	Italy	21.2	184	Pakistan	456
Egypt	31	Taiwan	20.1	409	Turkey	411
Indonesia	30	Australia	20.0	97	France	363
Thailand	25	Republic of Korea	19.7	209	Iran	336
Colombia	24	Spain	19.1	224	Saudi Arabia	324
Russia	23	Brazil	17.5	112	United Kingdom	303
Japan	14	Japan	46.7	137	Japan	410

**Notes:**


- Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2015 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2014–2015 and other sources.
- Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2014, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
- Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

**Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)**

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)	Reserves (10,000 persons)	
United States	Volunteer	143	85	
Russia	Conscription / Volunteer	77	200	
United Kingdom	Volunteer	16	8	
France	Volunteer	22	3	
Germany	Volunteer	18	5	
Italy	Volunteer	18	2	
India	Volunteer	135	116	
China	Conscription	233	51	
North Korea	Conscription	119	60	
Republic of Korea	Conscription	66	450	
Egypt	Conscription	44	48	
Israel	Conscription	18	47	
Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14	3.1 (0.5)
		Maritime	4.2	0.06
		Air	4.3	0.06

**Notes:**

- Data taken is from Military Balance 2015 and other sources.
- Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces as of the end of FY2014. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.
- Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
- In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former.

**Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan****Reference 5 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on July 1, 2014) Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as an economic power through continuous efforts of its people and built a stable and affluent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify such a position.

During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and significant national security challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal "U.N. forces", an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capability.

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people's lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulfill its responsibility, the Government, first and foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving emphasis to the rule of law.

Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan's own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan's ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.

In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the May 15 press conference which took place after the report of

"the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" was submitted on the same day, discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance with the following basic policies:

1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack
  - (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), premised on the basic allocation of their roles.
  - (2) Specifically, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, which include enhancing the respective agency's response capabilities, strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing, examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training.
  - (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances.
  - (4) Moreover, for ensuring Japan's security, it is important for the SDF and the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed forces and referring to the concept of "use of weapons" for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited "use of weapons" to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or consent by the United States.

2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community
  - (1) So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force”
    - A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute a “use of force”. For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution, there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out legitimate “use of force” based on the resolution. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area”, etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ititaika with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ititaika with the use of force”) by other countries.
    - B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated its records of various support activities, and the expectations to and trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security environment, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play sufficient roles in wide-ranging support activities for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security to enable the carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance.
    - C. The Government, while premising on the theory of so-called “Ititaika with the use of force” itself, based on the accumulation of discussions related to the “ititaika with the use of force” and considering factors such as the SDF’s actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly limiting SDF’s activities to such areas as “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area” where the issue of “ititaika with the use of force” does not arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ititaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for peace and stability of the international community:
      - (a) Do not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support.
      - (b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation.
  - (2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities
    - A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities to so-called self-preservation type and protection of its own weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”
    - B. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs) sufficiently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescuing of Japanese nationals abroad by use of weapons
      - subject to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners who are within its territories.
    - C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that “a state or a quasi-state organization” does not appear as the adversary:
      - (a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since “consent by the State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong” and “consent by the parties to the conflict to activities conducted” are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has been demonstrated by Japan’s experience of U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of missions is expected to exceed self-preservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the parties to the conflict is stably maintained, especially because of the nature of the activities.
      - (b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.
      - (c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.
      - (d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar to the principle of police proportionality.
3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution
  - (1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government’s constitutional interpretation.
 

Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date.
  - (2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.



This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution

- (3) To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.

- (4) As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.
- (5) Moreover, even when “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution, since they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.
4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation
- When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council. Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

## Reference 6 Summary of the Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community

### I. Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law

(Article 1)

1. Tasks of the Self-Defense Forces
- The tasks of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) shall be amended, following the addition of situations for which defense operations may be ordered and the partial amendments to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.
2. Defense operations
- (1) With regard to the situations for which the Prime Minister may order the whole or part of the SDF into operation, the following situations shall be added: situations in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan

occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

- (2) The provisions, etc. pertaining to the establishment of defense facilities in Article 77-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, control over the Japan Coast Guard in Article 80 of the Law, powers to maintain public order during defense operations in Article 92 of the Law, emergency passage during defense operations in Article 92-2 of the Law, and appropriation of supplies during defense operations in Article 103 of the Law, etc. shall not apply to the operations pertaining to the situations in (1).
3. Protection of Japanese nationals overseas
- (1) When a request is received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the SDF to guard or rescue Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body in emergency situations in a foreign country, or to take other measures to protect the life or body of the aforementioned Japanese nationals (including transport; hereinafter referred to as “protection measures”), the Minister of Defense shall be able to allow SDF units, etc. to carry out said protection measures upon consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs and obtaining the consent of the Prime Minister.
- (2) In the case of having SDF units, etc. carry out protection measures pursuant to (1), the Minister of Defense shall be able to allow SDF units, etc. to take measures to protect the life or body of foreign nationals of whom the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested protection, as well as of others of whom it is deemed that protection is suitable in conjunction with the said protection measures (referred to as “other protected people” in (3)).
- (3) SDF personnel engaged in their duty of carrying out protection measures in foreign territories pursuant to (1) shall be able to, when executing their duty, use weapons to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary based on the situation, when there are sufficient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is inevitable to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of Japanese nationals to whom said protection measures apply, or those of other protected people, or to eliminate acts that interfere with their duty.
4. Use of weapons for the protection of weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other forces
- (1) SDF personnel shall be able to use weapons to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary based on the situation, when there are sufficient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is necessary to protect people or weapons, etc. under the SDF’s duty to protect the weapons, etc. of the military forces of the United States of America, the military forces of other countries, or other similar organizations (referred to as “U.S. Forces, etc.” in (2)), which are engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually being conducted) in collaboration with the SDF.
- (2) SDF personnel shall carry out the protection activity in (1) only when requested by the U.S. Forces, etc. and when the Minister of Defense considers it necessary.
5. Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces
- (1) The Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall be able to, when a request is received from the U.S. Forces (refers to the military forces of the United States of America) listed below, provide supplies belonging to the SDF to said U.S. Forces to the extent that it does not interfere with the execution of the SDF’s tasks:
- (i) U.S. Forces which are participating in exercises that are participated by both the SDF and the U.S. Forces;
- (ii) U.S. Forces which are located on the premises of the facilities and areas stated in Article 81-2, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, together with the SDF units, etc. that are conducting the protection activity in said paragraph, and which are protecting said facilities and areas;
- (iii) U.S. Forces which are located on site together with the SDF units, etc. that are carrying out protection measures or carrying out the counter-piracy operations in Article 82-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, actions needed to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. in Article 82-3, Paragraphs 1 or 3 of said Law, the elimination of mines and other dangerous objects in Article 84-2 of said Law, or activities to collect intelligence that contributes to the defense of Japan, and which are carrying out activities similar to these actions or activities; and
- (iv) U.S. Forces which are located on site together with the SDF units, etc. that have arrived by aircraft, ship, or motor vehicle and are temporarily staying at the facilities of the U.S. Forces to carry out exercises, liaison and coordination, or other daily activities, and which are carrying out exercises, liaison and coordination, or other daily activities.
- (2) The Minister of Defense shall be able to, when a request is received from the U.S. Forces listed in (1) (i) to (iv), have organizations or

units, etc. of the Ministry of Defense provide services to said U.S. Forces to the extent that it does not interfere with the execution of the SDF's tasks.

6. For some crimes, penal provisions shall also apply to those who committed said crimes outside of Japan, or shall be implemented in accordance with the examples in Article 2 of the Penal Code.
7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

## II. Partial Amendments to the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations

(Article 2)

### [PROVISIONAL TRANSLATION]

1. Addition of a type of operation and its modality
  - (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security shall be added to the definition of operations and contributions in kind to which international peace cooperation assignments are to be conducted under this Act. The said operations shall be defined as operations that are conducted based on resolutions, etc. of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, to respond to conflict situations and maintain international peace and security, by such means as ensuring the observance of agreements to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict among the parties to armed conflict, protecting populations under imminent threat of violence associated with disruption caused by conflicts, assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of the systems of governance by democratic means after the cessation of armed conflict, provided that such operations are implemented under the partnership of two or more countries, which are listed in the following:
    - (i) Operations that are conducted without partiality to any of the parties to the armed conflict, in cases where agreement to cease armed conflict and to maintain the cessation has been reached among the parties to the armed conflict and where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as from the parties to the armed conflict;
    - (ii) Operations that are conducted when the armed conflict has ceased and the Parties to Armed Conflict ceased to exist in the area where the operations are to be conducted and in case where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs; and
    - (iii) Operations that are conducted without partiality to any specific positions, aimed at primarily preventing the occurrence of armed conflicts, in cases where the armed conflict has not yet arisen but such possibility is developing, and where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs.
  - (2) The Minister of Defense may dispatch Self-Defense officials and have them engaged in the tasks of the United Nations and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of SDF, etc. or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, at the request of the United Nations, with consent of the Prime Minister.
  - (3) International election observation operations shall cover elections, etc. that are held in the process of eliminating the disruption caused by conflicts.
  - (4) Personnel of Corps engaged in international peace cooperation assignments pertaining to observation of election and other tasks shall be limited to those employed by selection and non-SDF personnel of relevant administrative organizations.
2. Addition of tasks to be implemented as international peace cooperation assignments
  - (1) The following tasks shall be added as international peace cooperation assignments:
    - (i) Monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspection at checkpoints and security escort and protection for the purpose of security of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and properties of local population, Afflicted People and other populations requiring protection.
    - (ii) Provision of advice or guidance and supervision related to correctional administrative work
    - (iii) Provision of advice or guidance related to legislative or judicial matters;
    - (iv) Provision of advice, guidance or education and training related to work for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the government relating to national defense or other organizations.
    - (v) Planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting the United Nations peacekeeping operations or internationally coordinated operations for peace and security,

for implementation of certain tasks.

- (vi) Protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in the United Nations peacekeeping organizations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, or international humanitarian operations, or providing support for these Operations in response to urgent request when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related Organization occur or are imminent, while implementing tasks, while implementing tasks other than certain tasks such as monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conflict, stationing in and patrol of buffer zones, etc.
  - (2) On the implementation of international peace cooperation assignments that are implemented for the United Nations peacekeeping operations or for internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, consent of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs, regarding such operations and the said assignments are deemed to be maintained consistently throughout the duration of such operations as well as the said assignments.
  - (3) The Prime Minister shall obtain the approval of the Diet for the implementation of assignments as specified in (1) (i) and certain international peace cooperation assignments such as monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conflict and stationing and patrol of buffer zones which are implemented for the United Nations peacekeeping operations or internationally coordinated operations for peace and security prior to the commencement of dispatch of units of SDF, etc. by attaching Implementation Plan.
  3. Use of weapons
    - (1) Self-Defense Officials engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignment may use weapons in case of attack against the camp stationing the unit of the Self-Defense Forces where the unit members of armed forces of foreign states engaged in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, or international humanitarian relief operations for the said Assignment are also stationing, jointly with the said members who will take measures to protect lives and bodies of individuals at the said camp.
    - (2) Self-Defense Officials engaged in the task outlined in 2.(1) (i), while engaging their duties, may use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior, for their duties.
    - (3) Self-Defense Officials engaged in the task outlined in 2.(1) (vi), while engaging their duties, may use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations that they intend to protect.
  4. Other measures
    - (1) The Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters shall give due consideration to ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps.
    - (2) Organizations shall be added to the appended table listing international organizations whose request can form basis of international humanitarian relief operations.
    - (3) Two organizations shall be added to the appended table listing international organizations to which contributions in kind under this Act can be extended in cases where there is no ceasefire agreement. The requirements for said contributions in kind shall be clarified.
    - (4) Upon participating in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, etc., if requested by participating states to waive its right of claim against participating states or their national personnel for damages arising from these operations, and if it is deemed necessary to do so when participating in the operation, the Government may stipulate to waive its right of claim against participating states or their national personnel for damages arising from these operations.
    - (5) When the armed forces of the United States of America or the Australian Defense Force that is located in the area together with the units of SDF, etc., where the units of SDF, etc. are undertaking International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., and is undertaking activities to cope with large scale disaster, request the units of SDF, etc., to provide supplies necessary for the activities of urgent nature to be undertaken in that area of activities, the Minister of Defense, etc., may provide them with the supplies belonging to SDF.
  5. Other necessary provisions shall be established.
- ## III. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
- (Article 3)
1. Title
 

The title of this Law shall be amended to "Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an

Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security.”

2. Purpose
 

The purpose of this Law shall state that collaboration will be strengthened with foreign countries that are addressing situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed (hereinafter referred to as “situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security”), whose core purpose is to contribute to the effective execution of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty through the implementation of logistics support and other activities for U.S. Forces, etc. in situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.
3. Basic principles of responses to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security
  - (1) Logistics support and search and rescue activities shall not be carried out in places where combat activities are actually being conducted; provided, however, that if lost people have already been found and SDF units, etc. have commenced their rescue work, the units, etc. may continue their search and rescue activities for said lost people as long as the safety of said units, etc. is ensured.
  - (2) Response measures shall be implemented in the territories of foreign countries only when said countries, etc. have given their consent to the implementation of said response measures.
4. Definitions
  - (1) In this Law, “U.S. Forces, etc.” shall refer to the military forces of the United States of America which conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty by addressing situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, other military forces of foreign countries which conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and other similar organizations.
  - (2) In this Law, “logistics support activities” shall refer to the provision of supplies, services, conveniences, and other support measures to the U.S. Forces, etc. which are provided by Japan.
  - (3) In this Law, “search and rescue activities” shall refer to the search or rescue of combat participants who have become lost due to combat activities conducted in situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security (including the transport of rescued individuals), which is carried out by Japan.
5. Basic plan
  - (1) The matters provided for in the basic plan shall include the following matters, etc. concerning situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security:
    - (i) Background of the situation and its impact on Japan's peace and security;
    - (ii) The reasons why it can be deemed that Japan needs to implement response measures; and
    - (iii) In the case that the SDF conduct logistics support activities, search and rescue activities, or logistics support activities associated with the implementation thereof in a foreign territory, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are conducting these activities in foreign territory.
  - (2) In the case of (1) (iii), the scope of the area of the implementation of activities shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign country, etc.
6. Use of weapons
  - (1) SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services or conduct search and rescue activities under logistics support activities shall be able to use weapons to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them, or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty.
  - (2) In the case of an attack against an encampment set up in a territory of a foreign country which accommodates the relevant units, etc. as well as the personnel of U.S. Forces, etc., and furthermore, there is no place to ensure the safety of SDF personnel, etc. in the vicinity other than said encampment, the SDF personnel in (1) shall be able to use weapons pursuant to (1) jointly with the personnel who are taking measures to protect the life or body of the people in said encampment.
7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

#### **IV. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan**

(Article 4)

1. Title
 

The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security and Other Situations.”
2. Purpose
 

The purpose of this Law shall be to provide for the mode, procedures, and other necessary matters concerning the ship inspection operations

that Japan conducts in response to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security or situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security, and to contribute to ensuring the peace and security of Japan and of the international community coupled with the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Law.

3. Ship inspection operations
  - (1) SDF units, etc. shall carry out ship inspection operations in situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security or situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security.
  - (2) In the case of conducting ship inspection operations or their associated logistics support activities or cooperation support activities in a foreign territory, the equipment and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are conducting these activities in a foreign territory shall be provided for in the basic plan prescribed in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security or the International Peace Support Law.
  - (3) In the case of (2), the scope of the area of the implementation of activities shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign country, etc.
4. Use of weapons
 

SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under ship inspection operations or their associated logistics support activities or cooperation support activities shall be able to use weapons to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them, or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty.
5. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

#### **V. Partial Amendments to the Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs**

(Article 5)

1. Title
 

The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Situations including Where an Armed Attack Against Japan Occurs and in Situations of an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan's Survival.”
2. Purpose
 

The purpose of this Law shall state that it provides for basic matters pertaining to responses to survival-threatening situations, and thereby, establishes readiness for responding to survival-threatening situations.
3. Definition
  - (1) In this Law, “survival-threatening situations” shall refer to situations in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.
  - (2) The definition of “response measures” shall include measures that are implemented based on the trends in survival-threatening situations.
4. Basic principles
 

Basic principles concerning responses to survival-threatening situations shall be provided.
5. Responsibilities of the state
  - (1) The state shall have the duty to respond to survival-threatening situations and ensure that the state as a whole can take all possible measures through an organization-wide approach that leverages all available functions.
  - (2) The state shall provide training to relevant organizations on responses to situations of an armed attack against Japan, etc. and an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival, as well as implement measures that contribute to ensuring close coordination and cooperation among other relevant organizations, in order to enable smooth and effective responses to such situations.
6. Basic Response Plan
  - (1) When there is a situation threatening Japan's survival, the Government shall set forth a Basic Response Plan.
  - (2) The matters provided for in the basic response plan shall include the following matters concerning situations that need to be dealt with:
    - (i) Background of the situation, recognition of the armed attack situation, the situation where an armed attack is anticipated, or the survival-threatening situation, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition; and
    - (ii) In the case that the situation is recognized as an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, the reasons why it can be deemed that there is no other appropriate means



available to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people and use of force is necessary to respond to the situation.

- (3) In the case of a situation threatening Japan's survival, when the Prime Minister requests the consent of the Diet outlined in (i) (when the House of Representatives is dissolved, the consent of the House of Councillors by convoking an emergency session provided for in Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan) or when the Prime Minister orders defense operations of the SDF outlined in (ii), the Basic Response Plan shall state to this effect.

(i) Request for the consent of the Diet pursuant to the provision of Article 76, Paragraph 1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law regarding the Prime Minister's order of defense operations

(ii) Defense operations that the Prime Minister orders pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law

7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

#### **VI. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Situations including where an Armed Attack Situations against Japan Occurs**

(Article 6)

##### **1. Title**

The title of this Act shall be amended to "Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries' Military Actions in Situations including Where an Armed Attack Against Japan Occurs and in Situations of an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan's Survival."

##### **2. Purpose**

The purpose of this Law shall state that it provides for measures, etc. aimed at the smooth and effective implementation of acts conducted by foreign military forces in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks against Japan or armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival.

##### **3. Definition**

(1) In this Law, "foreign military forces" shall refer to military forces of other countries that are conducting acts in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks against Japan or armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival (except for the U.S. Forces that are conducting acts needed to eliminate armed attacks in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc.).

(2) The definition of "action-related measures" shall include measures for the smooth and effective implementation of foreign military actions, as well as other measures conducted by Japan in line with foreign military actions, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival.

4. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

#### **VII. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs**

(Article 7)

The definition of "response measures, etc." shall include acts conducted by foreign military forces in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks.

#### **VIII. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Armed Attack Situations**

(Article 8)

1. The title of this Law shall be amended to "Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Situations of an Armed Attack Against Japan and an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan's Survival."

2. Necessary provisions shall be developed concerning the restriction of maritime transportation of foreign military supplies, etc. in situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival.

#### **IX. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations**

(Article 9)

1. The title of this Law shall be amended to "Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Situations of an Armed Attack Against Japan and an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan's Survival."

2. Necessary provisions shall be developed concerning the capture, internment, and other treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees in situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan's survival.

#### **X. Partial Amendments to the Act for Establishment of the National Security Council**

(Article 10)

1. The National Security Council shall carry out deliberations: the basic guidelines concerning responses to survival-threatening situations; important matters concerning responses to survival-threatening situations, situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, and situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security; important matters concerning the implementation of international peace cooperation assignments; and important matters concerning the activities of the SDF. The National Security Council shall state its opinions to the Prime Minister as necessary.

2. Matters on which the Prime Minister shall consult the National Security Council shall include the finalization of and changes to the implementation plan of international peace cooperation assignment pertaining to the implementation of activities outlined in II. 2. (1) (i) or (vi), matters concerning the dispatch of SDF personnel to the United Nations in II. 1. (2), and matters concerning the implementation of protection measures.

3. Other necessary provisions shall be developed.

#### **XI. Effective Date, etc. (Supplementary Provisions)**

1. This Act comes into effect as of the day specified by Cabinet Order within a period not exceeding six months from the date of promulgation.

2. In addition to establishing other necessary adjustment provisions, necessary revisions shall be made to the relevant Acts.

#### **Reference 7**

#### **Outline of the Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of Foreign Countries and Others in Situations Where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security**

##### **I. Purpose**

The purpose of this Law is to contribute to ensuring peace and security of the international community in situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community (hereinafter referred to as "situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security") by conducting cooperation and support activities and other activities to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. (Article 1)

##### **II. Basic Principles**

1. In situations where the international community is collectively addressing for international peace and security, the Government shall contribute to ensuring peace and security of the international community by appropriately and swiftly implementing the cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities in accordance with this Law, or the ship inspection operations prescribed in Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operation Act in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security and Other Situations (limited to operations implemented in situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security; simply referred to as "ship inspection operations" in IV. 2. (5)) (hereinafter referred to as "response measures"). (Article 2, Paragraph 1)

2. The implementation of response measures shall not involve the threat or use of force. (Article 2, Paragraph 2)

3. Cooperation and support activities and search and rescue activities shall not be implemented in the scene where combat operations (refer to operations that involve the killing or injuring of people or the destruction of properties conducted as part of international armed conflicts; hereinafter the same shall apply) are actually being conducted; provided, however, that this shall not apply to search and rescue activities carried out pursuant to the provision of VIII. 6. (Article 2, Paragraph 3)

4. Response measures in the territories of foreign countries shall be implemented provided that consent for the implementation of such response measures has been obtained from said countries (if there is an organization that governs said countries in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations, said organization). (Article 2, Paragraph 4)

5. In implementing the response measures, the Prime Minister shall direct and supervise administrative departments on behalf of the Cabinet, in accordance with the basic plan prescribed in IV. 1. (Article 2, Paragraph 5)

6. The heads of the relevant administrative organizations shall cooperate with the Minister of Defense on the implementation of the response measures to achieve the purpose in I.

(Article 2, Paragraph 6)

### III. Definitions and Other Matters

1. In this Law, the meanings of the terms set forth below shall be as prescribed respectively below:

(Article 3, Paragraph 1)

- (1) "Armed forces of foreign countries, etc." means the armed forces of foreign countries and other similar organizations addressing situations where peace and security of the international community is threatened when there exists either of the following resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations (except for those that conduct the United Nations peacekeeping operations prescribed in Article 3, Item 1 of the Law on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, internationally coordinated peace and security operations prescribed in Item 2 of said Article, or international humanitarian relief operations prescribed in Item 3 of said Article, and U.S. Forces, etc. prescribed in Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law Concerning the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security):
- (i) A resolution that decides, calls upon, recommends, or authorizes the foreign countries to conduct said operations
- (ii) Other than what is set forth in (i), a resolution that regards said situations as a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and calls on the United Nations member states to respond to said situations.
- (2) "Cooperation and support activities" means the provision of goods and services to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc., which is implemented by Japan.
- (3) "Search and rescue activities" means the search or rescue of combat participants who have become lost due to combat operations conducted during the activities of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. (including the transport of rescued personnel), which is implemented by Japan.
2. The provision of goods belonging to the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and provision of services by the SDF implemented under cooperation and support activities (except for those prescribed in 3.) shall consist of supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services, and construction. The provision of goods shall not include the provision of weapons. (Article 3, Paragraph 2)
3. Search and rescue activities shall be implemented by SDF units, etc. (referring to the units, etc. prescribed in Article 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply). In this case, the provision of goods belonging to the SDF and the provision of services by the SDF, implemented under cooperation and support activities along with the search and rescue activities implemented by the SDF units, etc. for the units of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. that are conducting activities equivalent to said activities, shall consist of supplies, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, lodging, and disinfection. The provision of goods shall not include the provision of weapons. (Article 3, Paragraph 3)

### IV. Basic Plan

1. When it is deemed that any one of the response measures needs to be implemented in situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security, the Prime Minister shall seek the approval of the Cabinet on the implementation of said response measure and on the proposal of the basic plan concerning said response measure (hereinafter referred to as the "basic plan"). (Article 4, Paragraph 1)
2. The matters provided for in the basic plan shall be as follows: (Article 4, Paragraph 2)
- (1) The following matters concerning situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security:
- (i) Background of the situation and its influence on the peace and security of the international community;
- (ii) The status of the responses by the international community; and
- (iii) The reasons why it can be deemed that Japan needs to implement response measures.
- (2) Other than what is set forth in (1), basic policies concerning the implementation of response measures.
- (3) The following matters in the case of implementing the cooperation and support activities in III. 2.:
- (i) Basic matters pertaining to said cooperation and support activities;
- (ii) Types and the contents of said cooperation and support activities;

- (iii) The scope of the area where said cooperation and support activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area;
- (iv) In cases where the SDF implement said cooperation and support activities in foreign territories, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are implementing said cooperation and support activities in foreign territories;
- (v) In cases where the SDF procure goods other than the ones they provide or had provided for their administrative work or duties, and transfer the goods to the military forces of foreign countries, etc. for free or at prices lower than the actual values, important matters pertaining to its implementation; and
- (vi) Other important matters concerning the implementation of said cooperation and support activities.
- (4) The following matters in the case of implementing search and rescue activities:
- (i) Basic matters pertaining to said search and rescue activities;
- (ii) The scope of the area where said search and rescue activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area;
- (iii) Important matters concerning the implementation of the cooperation and support activities in III. 3. accompanying the implementation of said search and rescue activities (including the scope of the area where said cooperation and support activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area);
- (iv) In cases where the SDF implement said search and rescue activities or its accompanying cooperation and support activities in III. 3. in foreign territories, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are implementing these activities in foreign territories; and
- (v) Other important matters concerning the implementation of said search and rescue activities.
- (5) Matters prescribed in Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Ship Inspection Operation Act in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security and Other Situations in the case of implementing ship inspection operations.
- (6) Matters concerning the liaison and coordination among relevant administrative organizations for the implementation of response measures.
3. In the case of implementing cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities in foreign territories, the scope of the area where the activities are implemented shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign countries (in the case of an organization prescribed in II. 4., said organization). (Article 4, Paragraph 3)
4. With regard to changes of the basic plan, the same shall apply as 1. and 3. (Article 4, Paragraph 4)

### V. Reporting to the Diet

When the basic plan is decided or changed, the Prime Minister shall report its content to the Diet without delay, and when the response measures provided for in the basic plan are completed, their results.

(Article 5)

### VI. Consent of the Diet

1. Before implementing the response measures, the Prime Minister shall obtain the approval of the Diet on the implementation of said response measures, attached with the basic plan. (Article 6, Paragraph 1)
2. In cases where the Prime Minister seeks the consent of the Diet pursuant to the provision in 1., efforts shall be made to take a vote at the House that first deliberates the measure, within seven days after the Prime Minister seeks the approval of the Diet, excluding the period that the Diet is not in session, and at the House that next deliberates the measure, within seven days after the measure is sent from the first House, excluding the period that the Diet is not in session. (Article 6, Paragraph 2)
3. If the response measures will continue to be implemented beyond the date on which two years have passed since the date of obtaining the approval of the Diet pursuant to the provision in 1., the Prime Minister shall, between 30 days prior to the said date and the said date, submit for Diet deliberations the matter of continuing to take said response measures, attached with the basic plan and a report describing the response measures taken until then, and seek the approval of the Diet; provided, however, that the Diet is not in session or the House of Representatives has been dissolved, the Prime Minister shall request the approval in the first Diet session that is convoked thereafter. (Article 6, Paragraph 3)
4. If the Diet votes not to approve in the case of 3., the Government shall terminate the response measures without delay. (Article 6, Paragraph 4)
5. In the case of continuing with the response measures upon obtaining the approval of the Diet and then attempting to continue with said



response measures after another two years have passed, the same shall apply as 3. and 4.

(Article 6, Paragraph 5)

### VII. Cooperation and Support Activities

1. The Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall provide the goods belonging to the SDF under the cooperation and support activities in III. 2. in accordance with the basic plan.

(Article 7, Paragraph 1)

2. With regard to the provision of services by the SDF under the cooperation and support activities in III. 2., the Minister of Defense shall, in accordance with the basic plan, set forth implementation details, obtain the approval of the Prime Minister thereof, and order its implementation to SDF units, etc.

(Article 7, Paragraph 2)

3. The Minister of Defense shall designate in the implementation details in 2. the area where said cooperation and support activities will be implemented (hereinafter referred to as the “implementation area” in VII.) for SDF units, etc. to be able to provide services smoothly and safely, taking into consideration the details of the services that need to be provided.

(Article 7, Paragraph 3)

4. If it is deemed that it is difficult for SDF units, etc. to implement the cooperation and support activities in III. 2. smoothly and safely in the entire or part of the implementation area, or if it is deemed that the consent in II. 4. no longer exists for said cooperation and support activities to be implemented in foreign territories, the Minister of Defense shall swiftly modify the designation of the implementation area or order the cessation of the activities that are implemented in said area.

(Article 7, Paragraph 4)

5. In cases where combat operations occur at the place where cooperation and support activities are being implemented or in its vicinity, or in cases where combat operations are anticipated to occur in light of the situation in nearby areas, etc., or in cases where it is deemed necessary for the purpose of ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc., the commanding officer of said units, etc. that have been ordered to implement said cooperation and support activities in III. 2. outside Japanese territory or the person designated by him/her shall avert danger, such as by temporarily suspending the implementation of said cooperation and support activities or by evacuating, and wait for the measures pursuant to the provision in 4.

(Article 7, Paragraph 5)

6. With regard to changes of the implementation details in 2. (except for changes that make the implementation area smaller pursuant to the provision in 4.), the same shall apply as 2.

(Article 7, Paragraph 6)

### VIII. Search and Rescue Activities

1. With regard to the search and rescue activities, the Minister of Defense shall, in accordance with the basic plan, set forth implementation details, obtain the approval of the Prime Minister thereof, and order its implementation to SDF units, etc.

(Article 8, Paragraph 1)

2. The Minister of Defense shall designate in the implementation details in 1. the area where said search and rescue activities will be implemented (hereinafter referred to as the “implementation area” in VIII.) for SDF units, etc. to be able to implement search and rescue activities smoothly and safely, taking into consideration the details of said activities that need to be implemented.

(Article 8, Paragraph 2)

3. In the case of implementing search and rescue activities, if there are non-combat participants who are lost, they shall be rescued.

(Article 8, Paragraph 3)

4. With regard to changes of the designation of the implementation area and cessation of activities, the same shall apply as VII. 4.

(Article 8, Paragraph 4)

5. In cases where combat operations occur at the place where search and rescue activities are being implemented or in its vicinity, or in cases where combat operations are anticipated to occur in light of the situation in nearby areas, etc., or in cases where it is deemed necessary for the purpose of ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc., the commanding officer of said units, etc. that have been ordered to implement said search and rescue activities outside Japanese territory or the person designated by him/her shall avert danger, such as by temporarily suspending the implementation of said search and rescue activities or evacuating, and wait for the measures pursuant to the provision in 4.

(Article 8, Paragraph 5)

6. Notwithstanding the provision in 5., if lost personnel have already been found and SDF units, etc. have commenced the rescue operations, the units, etc. may continue their search and rescue activities for said lost personnel as long as the safety of said units, etc. is ensured.

(Article 8, Paragraph 6)

7. With regard to changes to the implementation details in 1. (except for

changes that make the implementation area smaller pursuant to the provision in 4.), the same shall apply as 1.

(Article 8, Paragraph 7)

8. With regard to the cooperation and support activities in III. 3. accompanying the implementation of search and rescue activities, the same shall apply as VII.

(Article 8, Paragraph 8)

### IX. Ensuring the Safety of SDF Units, etc.

In implementing the response measures, the Minister of Defense shall work to implement them smoothly and effectively and give consideration to ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc.

(Article 9)

### X. Cooperation of Relevant Administrative Organizations

1. When it is deemed necessary for the implementation of response measures, the Minister of Defense shall be able to request heads of relevant administrative organizations to provide cooperation such as transferring control of goods belonging to them.

(Article 10, Paragraph 1)

2. When the request pursuant to the provision in 1. is made, the heads of relevant administrative organizations shall provide the cooperation in 1. to the extent that it does not interfere with the affairs under their jurisdiction.

(Article 10, Paragraph 2)

### XI. Use of Weapons

1. SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. shall be able to use weapons (in cases where the SDF are implementing said cooperation and support activities or said search and rescue activities in foreign territories, weapons shall be limited to those that fall under equipment provided for in the basic plan pursuant to the provision in IV. 2. (3) (iv) or (4) (iv); hereinafter the same shall apply in XI.) to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in proportions as the situation, when there are sufficient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is inevitable to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them (referring to personnel prescribed in Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law; the same shall apply in 6.), or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty.

(Article 11, Paragraph 1)

2. When a senior officer is present at the site, the use of weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. shall adhere to his/her order; provided, however, that this shall not apply when there is imminent aggression or danger to life or body and there is no time to receive the order.

(Article 11, Paragraph 2)

3. In the case of 1., said senior officer at the site shall give the necessary orders to prevent causing any danger to life or body or confusion to the situation as a result of using weapons in the absence of disciplines, and to ensure that the use of weapons is conducted appropriately within the scope of its purpose in accordance with the provisions in 1. and 4.

(Article 11, Paragraph 3)

4. The use of weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. shall not cause any harm to people, except for cases that fall under the provisions in Article 36 or Article 37 of the Penal Code.

(Article 11, Paragraph 4)

5. SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. shall be able to use weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. in the case of an attack against an encampment set up in a territory of a foreign country which accommodates the said units, etc. (referring to an area which is used for accommodation and which is distinguished from other areas through the installation of a fence; hereinafter the same shall apply in 5.) as well as the personnel of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc., and furthermore, there is no place to ensure the safety of SDF personnel, etc. in the vicinity other than said encampment, jointly with the personnel who are taking measures to protect the life or body of the people in said encampment. In this case, the application of the provisions in 1. to 3. and 6. shall take into account the status of the measures taken by said personnel.

(Article 11, Paragraph 5)

6. With regard to SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 (limited to services outside Japanese territory) or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. (limited to activities outside Japanese territory), the provision in Article 96, Paragraph 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Act shall not

apply to crimes committed by non-SDF personnel.  
(Article 11, Paragraph 6)

## XII. Transfer and Free Loan of Supplies

In the case that during the implementation of cooperation and support activities, the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. that are beneficiaries of the cooperation and support activities request the transfer or free loan of supplies belonging to the SDF (except for weapons) to provide for the activities prescribed in III. 1. (1) (hereinafter referred to as “activities to address the situation”), the Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall be able to transfer to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. for free or at prices lower than the actual values, or loan for free, the goods pertaining to said request to the extent that it does not interfere with the affairs under their jurisdiction, when it is deemed necessary for the smooth implementation of said activities to address the situation.

(Article 12)

## XIII. Cooperation by Non-State Actors

1. When it is deemed that response measures cannot be adequately implemented with only the measures pursuant to the provisions in IV. to XI., the Minister of Defense shall be able to request the cooperation of non-state actors on the transfer or loan of goods or the provision of services, with the cooperation of the heads of relevant administrative organizations.

(Article 13, Paragraph 1)

2. The Government shall pay a proper price to the non-state actor whose cooperation was requested pursuant to the provision in 1. In cases where said actor incurred losses as a result of said cooperation, the Government shall take the necessary financial measures concerning such losses.

(Article 13, Paragraph 2)

## XIV. Waiver of Right to Claim

In cases where the SDF are implementing cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities (hereinafter referred to as “cooperation and support activities, etc.” in XIV.) and foreign countries with which the armed forces, of foreign countries, etc are affiliated request commitment to mutually waiving their right to claim damages for losses attributed to the activities to address the situation that are conducted by said armed forces, etc. of foreign countries or cooperation and support activities, etc., the Government shall be able to commit to waiving Japan’s right to claim damages for losses attributed to activities to address the situation to said foreign countries and their personnel, when it is deemed that agreeing to the request is necessary for the smooth implementation of the respective activities while ensuring mutual collaboration.

(Article 14)

## XV. Delegation to Cabinet Order

In addition to the matters provided for in this Law, the procedures for implementing this Law and other necessary matters concerning the enforcement of this Law shall be prescribed by cabinet order.

(Article 15)

## XVI. Supplementary Provisions

This Law shall come into effect as from the date of enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Laws to Contribute to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community.

(Supplementary Provisions)

### Reference 8 Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law

(Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015)

When a foreign naval vessel carries out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows.

If the foreign naval vessel is a foreign submarine carrying out submerged navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan, the Government shall take responses pursuant to “Responses to Foreign Submarines Carrying Out Submerged Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan” (approved by the Cabinet on December 24, 1996).

1. Accurately gauge the situation

If a foreign naval vessel may carry out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense that gauges the situation shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet

Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Prime Minister and others”) through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. In addition, the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense shall promptly notify this effect to the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant ministries and agencies. The parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation.

This shall not preclude the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel.

2. Deal with the situation

The Government shall immediately take measures pursuant to international law against foreign naval vessels that carry out navigation through the territorial sea and the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, such as calling on the vessels to leave Japan’s territorial sea. In order to ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts, said measures shall, in principle, be carried out by Self-Defense Force units through the issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japan Coast Guard shall share intelligence, coordinate, and cooperate with each other closely and swiftly.

3. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures

(1) When, for responding to foreign naval vessels deemed to be carrying out navigation through the territorial sea and the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, due to special circumstances requiring the protection of lives or property or the maintenance of order at sea, a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister’s authorization on the issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact.

(2) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the order in (1) above may be held by telephone or other means.

4. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events

In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall share their recognition on responses to foreign naval vessels that carry out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with said navigation through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur.

### Reference 9 The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group

(Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015)

If there is a high risk of an armed group or a group with a high probability of being armed landing illegally, or if it lands illegally on a remote island or its surrounding seas (hereinafter referred to as “remote island or its surrounding seas”) (hereinafter referred to as “illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group”), the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows:

1. Accurately gauge the situation

When any illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group takes place, the relevant ministries and agencies listed in Annex 1 that gauge the situation (hereinafter referred to as “relevant ministries and agencies”) shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Prime Minister and others”) through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. In addition, the parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation.

This shall not preclude the relevant ministries and agencies from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel.

2. Establish Response Headquarters

If an illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an

armed group takes place and the Government's responses need to be implemented comprehensively and robustly, the Government shall, at the decision of the Prime Minister, promptly establish within the Cabinet a Response Headquarters, in which the Prime Minister serves as Chair and in which the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and if necessary, any other person the Chair designates from among the Minister of State members of the Headquarters, serve as Deputy Chairs. The members of the Response Headquarters shall be those listed in Annex 2. The rules of operation shall be equivalent to those for the Response Headquarters pursuant to "Initial Measures of the Government in Case of a Serious Terrorist Attack" (approved by the Cabinet on April 10, 1998).

3. Responses when the situation intensifies

If the situation intensifies and the issuance of a maritime security operations (maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) order or a public security operation (public security operation pursuant to the order provided for in Article 78 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) order is anticipated, the parties – primarily the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, the National Police Agency, and the Ministry of Defense, under the Response Headquarters, shall cooperate with each other in advance to the maximum extent on the issuance of the maritime security operations order or the public security operation order in: reviewing the response policy; dividing the roles among and confirming coordination between the Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Coast Guard, the police, among other actors; confirming consistency with international law; and sharing the necessary information. The parties shall stand ready to promptly take robust responses when the maritime security operations order or the public security operation order is issued.

4. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures

(1) Maritime security operations

When it is deemed that the situation cannot be addressed by the Japan Coast Guard alone and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister's authorization on the issuance of the maritime security operations order or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact.

(2) Public security operation

When the situation cannot be addressed swiftly by police agencies, and furthermore, the situation intensifies, and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister's authorization on the public security operation standby order as well as the order concerning information gathering by weapons-carrying Self-Defense Force units that the Minister of Defense issues if the issuance of the public security operation order is anticipated, as well as to issue a public security operation order by the Prime Minister when a situation arises in which it is deemed that public security cannot be maintained by general police forces, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact.

(3) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the order in (1) or (2) above may be held by telephone or other means.

5. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events

In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall collect and exchange information on cases that may evolve into cases of illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group, and share their recognition on responses to such events, and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with events through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur.

Annex 1

<Relevant Ministries and Agencies>

National Police Agency

Ministry of Justice

Public Security Intelligence Agency

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Japan Coast Guard

Ministry of Defense

Other ministries and agencies deemed necessary by the Chair

Annex 2

<Members of the Response Headquarters>

Ministers of State who head the relevant ministries and agencies (including Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission)

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management

Secretary General of National Security Secretariat

Commissioner General of National Police Agency

Commandant of Japan Coast Guard

Others deemed necessary by the Chair

**Reference 10 Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas**

(Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015)

When a foreign ship that is committing an illegal act of violence or detention, or an act of depredation (hereinafter simply referred to as "acts of infringement") against a Japanese private ship (a private ship registered in Japan) on the high seas, which does not fall under piracy or any other armed attack against Japan by an external party, is detected while a Self-Defense Force ship or aircraft is conducting surveillance or other activities, the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of dealing with this situation, safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan, and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows:

1. Accurately gauge the situation

When foreign ships that are or may be committing said acts of infringement are detected, the Ministry of Defense that gauges the situation shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Prime Minister and others") through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. In addition, the Ministry of Defense shall promptly notify this effect to the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant ministries and agencies. The parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation.

This shall not preclude the Ministry of Defense from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel.

2. Deal with the situation

The Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, the Ministry of Defense, and other relevant ministries and agencies shall deal with the acts of infringement by sharing intelligence, coordinating, and cooperating with each other closely and swiftly.

3. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures

(1) When it is deemed that the ongoing act of infringement cannot be addressed by the Japan Coast Guard alone and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister's authorization on A or B below or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact.

A. Issuance of an order concerning counter-piracy actions provided for in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Act concerning the Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy (provided, however, that this shall be limited to cases provided for in the proviso of Paragraph 2 of said article); or

B. Issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act.

(2) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the orders in (1) A or B above may be held by telephone or other means.

4. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events

In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall share their recognition on the responses to acts of infringement and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with said acts through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur.



**Reference 11 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces**

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense)</li> <li>○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)</li> <li>○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)</li> </ul>
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup> (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Establishment of positions and defense purpose facilities in the intended deployment area</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person — delegated authority by the Minister; services — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies — not required; services — required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law</li> <li>○ Provision of services as an action measure</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents provided for in the Civil Protection Law, emergent measures, traffic control, etc.</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law use of weapons<sup>2</sup></li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> <li>○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard</li> </ul>
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters <sup>3</sup>	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation)</li> <li>○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)</li> </ul>
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> </ul>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Nuclear disaster relief Dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Same as in disaster dispatch
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	○ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) <sup>4</sup>
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspections Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (in accordance with the implementation guidelines formulated based on the Basic Plan)	○ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	○ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement so-called core operations of the peacekeeping force (prior consent required in principle) (3) Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes:

1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.
3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.
4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

## Reference 12 Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense Facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security Operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations. If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of Territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan. <sup>1</sup>
Transportation of Japanese National Oversea	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Panel Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Notes: 1. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

### Reference 13 Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2014)

Types of Exercise	Date	Location
Field exercise	October 1, 2014	Toyama Prefecture
	November 10, 2014	Tochigi Prefecture
	November 12, 2014	Oita Prefecture
Simulation exercise	January 20, 2015	Fukuoka Prefecture
	November 18, 2014	Ibaraki Prefecture
	January 13, 2015	Fukui Prefecture
	January 15, 2015	Yamagata Prefecture
	January 23, 2015	Gifu Prefecture
	January 26, 2015	Miyazaki Prefecture
	January 28, 2015	Ehime Prefecture
	January 29, 2015	Shiga Prefecture
	February 4, 2015	Tokushima Prefecture
	February 6, 2015	Saga Prefecture

Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007.  
 Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.  
 Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.  
 Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.  
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.  
 Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.  
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013.

### Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once

Number of Times Conducted	Location
Twice	Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011), Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009), Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba Prefecture(2007, 2013), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013), Mie Prefecture (2008,2012), Kyoto Prefecture(2007, 2010), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012)
Three times	Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2013), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011, 2014), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2014), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2014), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)
Four times	Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014)
Five times	Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014)
Seven times	Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)
Nine times	Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)

### Reference 14 National Security Strategy

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

#### I. Purpose

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival are the primary responsibilities of the Government of Japan. As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify

its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.

Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.

Based on such a recognition, the Government of Japan hereby sets



forth this National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as “the Strategy”) in order to set out Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national security.

The Strategy first elaborates on Japan’s peaceful orientation to date and the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, the Strategy identifies national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner.

The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security, including sea, outer space, cyberspace, official development assistance (ODA) and energy.

Pursuant to the Strategy, and with the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.

In addition, when implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.

The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. Should any major changes in the situation occur, the NSC will review this Strategy in consideration of the security environment at the time, and make necessary revisions.

## II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

### 1. Principles Japan Upholds

Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system.

Surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime state has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.”

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

In addition, Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.) with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Moreover, Japan has contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. In particular, Japan’s cooperation contributed to realizing stability, economic growth and democratization in many countries, especially those in Asia, including the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Furthermore, as a peace-loving nation, complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. In particular, Japan has continuously participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), as the role of military forces diversified after the end of the Cold War. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further consolidate such a position.

At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security

challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.

Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

### 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives

In order to achieve the fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the Government of Japan needs to define our national interests and national security objectives, examine them in the context of the constantly evolving security environment, and mobilize all possible means.

Japan’s national interests are, first of all, to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded on freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition.

In addition, Japan’s national interests are to achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security. To this end, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that Japan, as a maritime state, strengthens the free trade regime for accomplishing economic development through free trade and competition, and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability.

Similarly, the maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, are likewise in Japan’s national interests.

In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulfill our responsibility in the international community, Japan, adopting the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation as a fundamental principle, will seek to achieve the following national security objectives.

The first objective is to strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining its peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.

The second objective is to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.

The third objective is to improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

## III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

### 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

#### (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation

Since the beginning of the twenty first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale, and this has substantially influenced the dynamics of international politics.

The primary drivers of this change in the balance of power are the emerging countries, including China and India. In particular, China is further increasing its presence in the international community. On the other hand, though its relative influence in the international community is changing, the U.S. remains the country that has the world’s largest power as a whole, composed of its soft power originating from its values and culture, on top of its military and economic power. Furthermore, the U.S. has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (the “rebalance” policy).

While the change in the balance of power has encouraged the shift of the center of gravity of world politics and economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it has also been a reason for a weakening leadership in global governance, as exemplified by the stalled negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and

of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In addition, while the rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has deepened interdependence among states, it has also invited a change in the relative influence between states and non-state actors, and brought about a complex impact on the global security environment.

Sovereign states remain the principal actors in the international community, and conflict and coordination between states continue to be the most significant factors affecting global stability. However, as cross-border flow of people, goods, capital, information and other items have been facilitated more easily by the advancement of globalization, non-state actors are beginning to play a more important role in decision-making in the international community.

In addition, the advancement of globalization and technological innovation bears negative impact. Terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors are posing serious threats to the security of any country. Today, these threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have a direct influence on the security of Japan.

(2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan best understands the tragedy of the use of nuclear weapons and shoulders the responsibility to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC), and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, remain major threats to Japan and the international community. In particular, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea and the nuclear issue of Iran continue to pose grave threats to peace and stability, not only in each region but also in the entire international community. Moreover, there remain concerns over the acquisition and the use of WMD and related items by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which traditional deterrence may not function effectively.

(3) Threat of International Terrorism

Terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world, and the threat of terrorism by international terrorist organizations remains serious. The advancement of globalization has made it easier for those organizations to share information and conspire within their own organizations and with other groups, and to secure geographical access and acquire arms.

International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms. International terrorist organizations are utilizing politically unstable and weakly governed countries and regions as bases for operation and training for terror activities. The ideologies of such terrorist organizations are also motivating other groups and individuals to commit terrorist acts.

Some international terrorist organizations designate Japan as their target. Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad.

Diversity of nationality of the perpetrators and victims in recent international terrorism cases has underscored the increasing importance of combating terrorism through international cooperation.

(4) Risks to Global Commons

In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.

While the seas are governed by international maritime law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. With regard to outer space and cyberspace, applicable norms remain to be developed due to the different positions among relevant countries.

Against such a backdrop, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has therefore become even more important to promote appropriate international rule-making over global commons and to make concerted efforts by the international community while respecting such rules.

“Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

However, in recent years, the number of cases of conflict of

interests between or among states over natural resources and the security of respective states is increasing. As a result, there is a growing risk of incidents at sea, and of possible escalation into unexpected situations.

In the South China Sea in particular, disputes that have arisen over sovereignty between coastal states and China cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In addition, vulnerability is also increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources, due to various problems including regional conflicts and international terrorism in and around the coastal states, as well as piracy. Therefore, advancing efforts to address these issues is also important for securing the sea lanes.

Furthermore, the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.

While outer space has been utilized for civil purposes, from security perspective, the importance of outer space has dramatically increased in recent years, given its use for the reinforcement of capabilities for information gathering and surveillance, as well as for securing communication means for military purposes.

On the other hand, the congestion of outer space has heightened as more countries utilize outer space. There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space with an increasing amount of space debris caused by anti-satellite tests and satellite collisions amongst others, as well as with the development of counter-space weapons.

Cyberspace, a global domain comprised of information systems, telecommunications networks and others, provides a foundation for social, economic, military and other activities.

Meanwhile, risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to steal classified information, disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems, are becoming more serious.

In Japan, with an increasing level of connecting networks of social systems and various other elements, cyberspace is necessary for promoting both economic growth and innovation through the free flow of information in cyberspace. Protecting cyberspace from the above-mentioned risks is vital to secure national security.

(5) Challenges to Human Security

Globalization has enabled people, goods, capital, and information to instantaneously move across borders in large quantities. As a result, international economic activities have expanded, thereby bringing prosperity to the international community.

In contrast, global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters – are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), common goals in the development field to be achieved by the international community, are not likely to be achieved in some regions and sectors. In addition, the increasing demand for energy, food, and water resources due to the population growth in developing countries and the expansion of economic scale could cause new conflicts.

These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community; therefore, Japan needs to promote necessary measures based on the principle of human security.

(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks

In today’s global economy, no economy is self-sufficient and isolated from the world economy; thus the risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. While this trend is conspicuous in the financial economy, today, it is also witnessed in the real economy, as value chains and supply chains are established across borders with increasing international specialization.

Under these circumstances, there are concerns over fiscal problems and the slowdown in the growth of emerging economies. In some emerging economies and developing countries, visible signs of protectionism as well as reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules have been observed.

Furthermore, in recent years, with the advancement of technological innovation in energy sector, one has seen the rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries and growing global demand, especially in emerging economies, for energy and mineral resources, followed by the intensified competition for the acquisition of such resources. In addition, given the aggravating

environmental problems arising from climate change, there are risks of crunches in global supply and demand as well as temporary shortages of supply in food and water.

## 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

### (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

The shift in the global power balance has elevated the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the international community. While this shift provides opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions.

In particular, the region of Northeast Asia is home to a host of actors, such as countries with large-scale military forces, or those possessing nuclear weapons or continuing with nuclear development. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. Countries in the region have contrasting political, economic, and social systems, and thus their security views are diverse, which constitutes another characteristic of the strategic environment of this region.

In this context, in addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.

On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region is also witnessing a rise in opportunities for bilateral exchanges and cooperation among countries in the region. In addition, there have been multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. These initiatives are contributing to the development of mutual understanding and enhancement of joint response capabilities. Therefore, it is important to further promote and develop these multilayered initiatives for regional stability.

### (2) North Korea's Military Buildup and Provocative Actions

In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea confront each other. While North Korea continues to face serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation, North Korea heavily allocates its resources on military affairs today.

In addition, North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions in the Korean Peninsula including the use of provocative rhetoric, some of which are directed at Japan, thereby increasing the tension in the region.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missiles development, including those with ranges covering the mainland of the U.S., along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons for warheads and equipping them to ballistic missiles, substantially aggravate the threat to the security of the region, including Japan. These concerns pose a serious challenge to the entire international community from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials.

As Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has been making efforts to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.

Furthermore, North Korea's abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan's sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility and a universal issue for the international community to address as a violation of fundamental human rights.

### (3) China's Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. On the other hand, China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas through its continued increase in its military budget without sufficient transparency. In addition, China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China has shown the move that appears to unduly infringe the freedom of overflight above the high seas by establishing its own “Air Defense Identification Zone” over the East China Sea.

Such an external stance and military activities by China, coupled with a lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy, have become an issue of concern to the international community including Japan; therefore, the Government of Japan needs to pay

careful attention to this situation.

The relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has deepened in recent years, primarily in economic areas. Meanwhile, the military balance between the two sides has been changing. Thus, the cross-strait relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

## IV. Japan's Strategic Approaches to National Security

To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.

Enhancing Japan's resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. This belief forms the core of the strategic approaches in the Strategy.

Moreover, in order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

In light of this, Japan will take the following concrete strategic approaches, centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy.

### 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles

#### (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment

The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

This strategic approach first requires the capability to analyze the constantly changing security environment and the course that the international community is taking. On top of this, Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests, without being confined to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred. In doing so, it is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan's position in the international community, through effectively utilizing all strengths and features of the nation. In addition, by highlighting Japan's attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” to make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. In order to advance such vibrant diplomacy, Japan will strengthen the institutional capabilities through which it undertakes diplomacy. Such overall strengthening of diplomatic capability is critical to ensure the security of Japan.

#### (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan

Japan's defense force is the final guarantee of its national security which deters direct threats from reaching Japan and defeats any threat that reaches it. Japan will steadily develop its defense force.

To ensure peace and security in Japan amid the severe security environment surrounding the country, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power and the political, economic, and social situations; and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also advance not only the coordination within the government, but also coordination with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.

In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in the above-mentioned efforts, Japan will develop a streamlined planning and programming process, which includes the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium Term Defense Program, based on the Strategy to enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.



In addition, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial Integrity

To fully protect its territories, in addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.

Japan will also make a constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of its territories, and take effective measures.

In addition, Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders. Furthermore, from a national security viewpoint, Japan will study the situation of land ownership in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities, and review issues related to the use of such land.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law. More concretely, Japan will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including anti-piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries.

Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities that are necessary for the above-mentioned measures, in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. At the same time, Japan will strive to enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises.

In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East. In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

(5) Strengthening Cyber Security

Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts in comprehensively promoting cross-cutting measures to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities threatening cyber security; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard its critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.

To this end, Japan will strengthen public-private partnership in the areas of system design, development and operations based on risk assessment, as well as identifying incidents, minimizing damages and their expansion, and analyzing the causes of and preventing similar incidents. In addition, Japan will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, protection of control systems, and response to the issues of supply chain risk.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen inter-agency cooperation and define the roles of relevant agencies so that it can reinforce its capability to protect cyberspace and respond to incidents as a nation at large. At the same time, Japan will promote a range of measures, including enhancing the ability and function to oversee, assess, apprehend, analyze, and internationally coordinate on cyber incidents, as well as reinforcing relevant agencies in charge of those tasks.

In promoting these measures, strengthening international partnership in a wide range of areas is essential. For this, Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation. Japan will also strengthen information sharing and promote cyber defense cooperation with relevant countries.

(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism

Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as building a network where risk information held by private sectors can be shared more effectively and efficiently; and reinforcing the structure for analyzing the situation of international terrorism and overseas information-collecting capabilities.

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

In order to appropriately support decision-making on national security policies, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In addition, Japan will promote the utilization of geospatial intelligence with which various types of intelligence are combined.

Moreover, Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities by bolstering its human resources, including developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. Japan will thereby promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government's disposal.

Furthermore, Japan will operate the intelligence cycle more effectively through the timely provision of materials and intelligence to the NSC, which serves as the control tower of foreign and security policy, and through the appropriate utilization of intelligence in policy formulation.

In addition, under the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (\*provisional English translation), Japan will strengthen its counter intelligence functions by developing such intelligence protection system in order to facilitate intelligence functions throughout the Government.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In cases that contribute to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner, including through the utilization and provision of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to disaster-stricken countries and sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment, while dealing with the rising costs of defense equipment. In this context, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes

The stable use of outer space is not only fundamental to the lives of the people and the economy, but is also crucial for national security. Japan will therefore maintain and improve the foundation of science, technology and industry that supports the development and utilization of outer space, and promote the utilization of outer space from a security perspective.

In particular, Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites, including ones Japan possesses for the operation of the SDF units, information-gathering and analysis, maritime domain awareness, telecommunication, positioning, navigation and timing. In addition, Japan will enhance a system for space situational awareness.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies such as satellite manufacturing.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

The advanced technology of Japan constitutes the foundation of its economic strength and defense forces, and is also a valuable resource that the international community strongly seeks from Japan. Therefore, Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening

Japan's technological capabilities.

In promoting measures for strengthening its technological capabilities from a national security viewpoint, Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, including information on technology development. Japan will also make effective use of technology in the area of security, by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.

Furthermore, Japan's outstanding energy-saving and other environment-related technologies play an important role in Japan's efforts to tackle global issues together with the international community. Therefore, Japan will proactively utilize these technologies in diplomacy as well.

## 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

For more than 60 years, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, has played an indispensable role for peace and security in Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Alliance has also played a more critical role for peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's security. Likewise, for the U.S., the Alliance has served as the core of its alliance network with countries in the region, including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

In this context, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been serving as a foundation for the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Such close alliance between Japan and the U.S. is underpinned by various factors, including that the two countries share common strategic interests and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Furthermore, Japan's geostrategic importance in supporting the U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region underlies the close alliance of the two countries.

With the above-mentioned Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation, the two countries have been working closely at various levels, including at the summit and ministerial levels. The two countries address not only bilateral issues, but also the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea, as well as global security issues, including counterterrorism measures and non-proliferation of WMD.

In the area of economy, Japan and the U.S. aim to achieve economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in a rules-based and transparent manner, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which will be mentioned later in this document.

Thus, Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.

As Japan strengthens its efforts in security as elaborated above, the U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.

In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on this recognition, Japan will undertake the following initiatives:

### (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

Japan ensures its national security by enhancing deterrence through the strengthening of its own defense capability, as well as by the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the extended deterrence provided by the U.S.

Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.

In addition, Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the following efforts: advancing joint training, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces; working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy; strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response operations.

Moreover, in order to strengthen the foundation of the Alliance, including enhanced interoperability, Japan will advance multilayered initiatives with the U.S. such as defense equipment and technology cooperation and personnel exchanges.

### (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces

To maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important for Japan to cooperate proactively with the U.S. to realize the optimal force posture of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, it is also important for Japan to reduce the impact of the U.S. forces in Japan on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

As part of this effort, while firmly supporting the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan including the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements. In addition, Japan will further promote the joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces, while taking into consideration relations with local communities.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement measures to reduce the impact on people living near the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan. In particular, Okinawa Prefecture is situated in a critically important location in terms of national security, and the stationing of the U.S. forces there significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In the meantime, as a large part of the facilities and areas for the exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in the prefecture, Japan will make utmost efforts to reduce the impact on Okinawa, including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

### 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

As elaborated above, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance in all its aspects, including in political, economic and security areas is indispensable to improve the security environment surrounding Japan. On top of that, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the Asia-Pacific region through the following approaches, as it plays an important role in enhancing Japan's security environment.

(1) Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, such as the ROK, Australia, the countries of ASEAN, and India:

— The ROK is a neighboring country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of Japan. Close cooperation with the ROK is of great significance for peace and stability of the region, including in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, Japan will construct future-oriented and multilayered relations and strengthen the foundation for security cooperation with the ROK. In particular, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK is a key framework in realizing peace and stability in East Asia. Japan will strengthen this trilateral framework, including in cooperation on North Korean nuclear and missile issues. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with international law.

— Australia is an important regional partner that shares not only universal values but also strategic interests with Japan. In addition to strengthening the mutually complementary economic relations between the two countries, Japan will also strengthen its strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. Japan will also promote a wide range of cooperation with Australia in its efforts to shape a regional order in the Asia-Pacific and to maintain and reinforce peace and stability in the international community. In so doing, Japan will utilize the trilateral framework among Japan, the U.S. and Australia, as necessary.

— The countries of ASEAN, where economic growth and democratization have been progressing and which embraces great cultural diversity, are located in the critical areas of sea lanes of communication of Japan. Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors, including politics and security based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Given the influence ASEAN has on peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, Japan will provide further assistance to their efforts towards maintaining and strengthening the unity of ASEAN. Furthermore, Japan appreciates the efforts by the countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea not by force, but in accordance with the law and rules, as shown in their efforts towards the formulation of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China. Japan will support these efforts so that an effective and legally binding code of conduct is formulated.

— India is becoming increasingly influential, due to what is projected to become the world's largest population, and to high economic

growth and potential. India is also geopolitically important for Japan, as it is positioned in the center of sea lanes of communication. Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.

- (2) Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan will strive to construct and enhance a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China in all areas, including politics, economy, finance, security, culture and personal exchanges. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its advancing military capabilities through its rapidly increasing military budget. As a part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense cooperation, Japan will seek to urge improvement in transparency of China's military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. Furthermore, with regard to China's recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on its unique assertion in its relations with neighboring countries, including Japan, Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalating the situation.
- (3) With regard to the issues of North Korea, Japan will cooperate closely with relevant countries to urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards its denuclearization and other goals, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abduction issue. Japan will make every effort to realize the safety and prompt return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions.
- (4) Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to ensure its security. Based on this recognition, Japan will cooperate with Russia in securing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the issue of the Northern Territories, the most important pending issue between the two countries, Japan will vigorously negotiate with Russia under a consistent policy of resolving the issue of the attribution of the four islands and concluding a peace treaty.
- (5) In promoting the efforts mentioned above, Japan will actively utilize and engage in the further development of functional and multilayered frameworks for regional cooperation, starting from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and trilateral frameworks, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.-Australia and Japan-U.S.-India, as well as Japan-China-ROK, a grouping of three large neighboring economic powers. In addition, Japan will appropriately contribute to the creation of a more institutional security framework in East Asia in the future.
- (6) Japan will also cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. These partners include Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Southwest Asian nations, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. In particular, Japan will deepen its cooperation with the PICs, which possess vast exclusive economic zones and abundant maritime resources in the Pacific Ocean, in many areas including maritime cooperation, through such fora as the Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting (PALM).
- (7) Furthermore, Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries outside the Asia-Pacific region that play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the international community.
  - Europe has the influence to formulate international public opinions, the capacity to develop norms in major international frameworks and a large economy. Japan and European countries, especially the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, share universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and principles such as market economy. They are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At a time when the power balance of the international community is changing, in order to establish an international order

based on universal values and rules, to effectively address global challenges, and to accomplish Japan's initiatives for a peaceful and prosperous international community, Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Japan has contributed to the democratization of East European countries and Baltic countries, and will engage in strengthening relations with them, as well as the Caucasus countries.

- Emerging countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa have been increasing their presence not only in the international economy, but also in international politics. Japan will therefore endeavor to further develop relations with such countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges.
  - Stability in the Middle East is an issue that is inseparably linked to the stable supply of energy, and therefore Japan's very survival and prosperity. Given that the Gulf States are the largest source of crude oil for Japan, in order to ensure the stability of the Middle East, Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with these countries, encompassing wide-ranging economic cooperation beyond resources and energy, as well as politics and security. In this context, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East, including the issue of democratization in Arab countries that stems from the "Arab Spring," the situation in Syria, Iran's nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. In the same vein, Japan will also collaborate with other countries that play important roles in the Middle East, such as the U.S., European countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
  - Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth. In addition, Africa has been increasing its influence in the international community. Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and promote cooperation in international fora.
4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community
 

As a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

    - (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations
 

The U.N. was established with the UNSC as the core of a collective security system for maintaining international peace and security. However, the system has not fully functioned as originally anticipated.

Nevertheless, the U.N. has taken the lead on various efforts for peace and security of the world, backed by its legitimacy through universal participation by the Member States and its expertise. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the role played by the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security has continued to grow.

Building on the invaluable experiences of having served on numerous occasions as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.

Moreover, Japan will actively contribute to diverse U.N.-led efforts, including U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and collective security measures; diplomatic efforts such as preventive diplomacy and mediation; seamless assistance efforts from the phase of post-conflict emergency humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction, as well as assistance through the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.

At the same time, one must be mindful that realizing the enhancement of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the U.N., including the strengthening of collective security functions, is an urgent challenge. Therefore, Japan will continue to strive to achieve the UNSC reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.
    - (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law
 

Japan will continue to faithfully comply with international law as a guardian of the rule of law. In addition, in order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan's principles and positions based on fairness, transparency and reciprocity are duly reflected.

Furthermore, Japan will actively support international judicial organs in terms of both human capital and finance. In addition, Japan will actively engage in assistance for the development of legal



systems in other countries.

In particular, Japan will involve itself in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace. While advancing policy coordination with countries with shared interests, Japan will contribute proactively to the development of international rules in the above-mentioned areas, and to the promotion of confidence building measures among countries of mutual interest. In addition, Japan will further strengthen capacity building efforts for developing countries in these fields. More concretely:

- With regard to the sea, Japan will promote regional efforts and play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of the maritime order governed by law and rules and not by coercion is indispensable for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole.
- With regard to outer space, emphasizing the concept of ensuring freedom of access and utilization of space, Japan will participate proactively in the efforts to formulate an international code of conduct that aims to prevent experiments of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and avoid collision of satellites, and consequently strive to ensure safe and stable use of outer space.
- With regard to cyberspace, based on the recognition of ensuring the free flow of information in cyberspace, Japan will actively cooperate with like-minded countries in the development of international rules on the premise that existing international law applies to cyberspace. Japan will also vigorously support the capacity building efforts of developing countries in this area.

- (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation  
Japan, as the only country in the world to have suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue its vigorous efforts to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

In view of the threat posed by progress in nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and being mindful of future trends in the balance of nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacific region together with the rapid advancement of military technologies, Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement export control measures from a security perspective, including active participation in the discussions in the international export control regime, in coordination with other relevant countries, to prevent the proliferation of arms, as well as dual use items or technologies to countries of proliferation concern. In addition, Japan will engage in international efforts on conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons, and anti-personnel mines.

- (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation  
Over the course of more than 20 years, Japan has dispatched SDF units and other personnel to various regions on international peace cooperation assignments, including in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan. These contributions have been deeply appreciated both in Japan and by the international community.

Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities with its determination to contribute even more proactively to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, taking into account the appreciation and expectation Japan receives from the international community. In addition, when participating in PKO, Japan will endeavor to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.

Moreover, in order to implement seamless assistance in security-related areas, including through further strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance, as well as coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Japan will develop a system that enables assistance to potential recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan’s assistance under the current schemes.

Furthermore, Japan as a whole will proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries. When engaging in such efforts, Japan will consult closely with countries or organizations that have experience in the same fields, including the U.S., Australia and European countries.

- (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism  
Acts of terrorism are unjustifiable regardless of their motivation and must be firmly condemned. It is important for the international community as a whole to take a firm position against them.

Japan will promote international counter-terrorism efforts with the international community for national security. Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation; reinforcement of the international

legal framework to stringently punish terrorists; and assistance to developing countries which do not have sufficient capacity for counter-terrorism and other measures.

Furthermore, Japan must be aware that terrorism and transnational organized crime are closely linked in light of the situation whereby the proceeds of organized crime, such as illicit trafficking, the trade of arms and drugs, and kidnapping, form an important source of funding for terrorists. Therefore, Japan will enhance international cooperation and assistance for developing countries to prevent and combat transnational organized crime.

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community, such as poverty, energy issues, widening disparity, climate change, natural disasters, and food-related issues, through the active and strategic utilization of ODA, as necessary.

- (1) Sharing Universal Values

Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights including women’s rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.

The wave of democratization that began in the countries of Eastern Europe and ASEAN in the 1990s and spread to the countries of the Arab world at the beginning of the 2010s has become an irreversible tide, coupled with the rapid development of globalization and market-oriented economic reforms.

On the other hand, as was observed in the “Arab Spring,” the process of democratization does not always proceed smoothly. As an advanced, liberal and democratic nation, based on the principle of human security, Japan will actively utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights, and contribute to the enhancement of the growing international trend towards the protection of human rights, including through dialogues in the area of human rights.

Japan will also engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women, cooperating with the international community to implement measures to empower women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and promote their social advancement.

- (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security

Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

Against this backdrop, in order to contribute to the realization of human security, Japan will utilize its ODA in a strategic and effective manner. Japan will also strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, in areas such as poverty eradication, global health, education and water, in cooperation with diverse stakeholders, including international organizations and NGOs.

In addition, Japan will play a leading role in the formulation of new international development goals, namely the post-2015 development agenda. In this context, Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community, building on our initiatives on this agenda to date.

Moreover, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced, including the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Given the expanding scale, impact and frequency of disasters globally, Japan will take the lead in international cooperation on disaster management and ensure that communities around the world have a high degree of resilience to disasters.

- (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries

Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including eminent students and administrative officials who are expected to become future leaders. Japan will make use of such opportunities to learn from their knowledge and experience, as well as providing them with opportunities to be familiarized with Japanese systems, technologies and expertise. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to enhance mutual understanding with Japan, and ensure that these personnel can contribute to sustainable economic and social development in their home countries.

Japan will engage in efforts to maintain and develop such human networks to expand and reinforce the foundations of cooperation.

(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System

The expansion of the open and rule-based international economic system, where Japan continues to be a major player, is essential for the world economy and Japan's economic prosperity.

In this regard, Japan will promote economic partnership, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), so as to achieve comprehensive and high-level trade agreements. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the growth of the global economy, which in turn, will also bring economic growth to Japan.

In addition, rule-making for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region through the above-mentioned efforts strengthens the vigor and prosperity in the region, and has a strategic importance of strengthening the foundation for a stable security environment in the region.

It is expected that the conclusion of such 21st-century economic partnership agreements will set new and attractive precedents of trade liberalization, and promote global-scale trade liberalization in the multilateral trade regime based on the WTO.

(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues

The stable supply of energy and other resources is essential for a vibrant Japanese economy and thus constitutes a challenge to national security. Promoting measures such as the diversification of supply sources is necessary for securing stable and low-cost resource supply. Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools to gain the understanding of countries concerned in this course.

In the area of climate change, Japan will increase its engagements towards emission reduction. Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming (the Actions for Cool Earth (ACE)) that utilizes its strengths in outstanding technologies on environment and energy, and its assistance to developing countries. At the same time, Japan will engage in establishing a fair and effective international framework with participation by all countries. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the achievement of emission reduction by the international community as a whole and to the resolution of climate change issues.

(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges

People-to-people exchanges are significant as they enhance mutual understanding and friendship between countries and solidify national ties, while also helping to develop a stable and friendly security environment by deepening an appropriate understanding towards Japan in the international community.

In particular, Japan will implement measures to expand two-way youth exchanges and will seek to strengthen relations with various countries into the future. For example, Japan has recently marked 40 years of friendship and cooperation with ASEAN, where regional integration is advancing while maintaining cultural diversity. By further vitalizing exchange programs with ASEAN, Japan will further promote mutual understanding.

Moreover, through events of interest for the world, such as the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo, Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture, and will work to construct and deepen friendly relations at the individual level.

6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

In order to fully ensure national security, in addition to strengthening key capabilities with diplomatic power and defense force at their core, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for these capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.

Furthermore, considering the importance of seeking a deeper understanding for Japan's security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security, Japan will advance the following measures.

(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases

Defense production and technological bases are one of the important factors that support defense forces through research, development, production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. In order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability steadily with limited resources in the medium- to long-term, Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.

(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities

In order to promote its security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people, and increase transparency. In this regard, it is necessary to deepen the understanding among the people of Japan regarding security policy

and build cooperative relations and trust with other countries.

To this end, with the Prime Minister's office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.

In addition, the Government as a whole will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks. In doing so, Japan will promote Japanese language education overseas, and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.

At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conflicting interests. However, by precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan's position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the forum of international opinion, and contribute to the stability of the international community.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base

In order to support national security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity. In addition, it is also essential that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.

To that end, the Government of Japan will promote the following measures: foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region; raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty; and ensure the understanding and cooperation of residents around defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for the activities of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan, through advancing measures that widen the understanding of the general public about the current status of such activities.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base

In order to invigorate a national discussion and debate and contribute to high-quality policymaking on national security, Japan will seek to enhance and strengthen education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education, including through the dispatch of officials of relevant ministries. In addition, Japan will promote practical research on national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the Government, higher education institutions and think tanks, thereby promoting the sharing of insight and knowledge.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the creation of experts and government officials that can make practical and constructive contributions to national security policy, thus broadening the pool of experts on national security.

**Reference 15 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference.

Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013. (Additional reference)

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond

**I. NDPG's Objective**

In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond" as new guidelines for Japan's national defense, based on "Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013" (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the "National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

**II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan**

1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it

retains the largest national power.

There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges.

In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.

Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities.

North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.

In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved.

In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an “Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas.

China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan.

As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise

concerns over regional and global security.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners.

3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity.

Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters.

4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

### III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

#### 1. Basic Policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.

When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

#### 2. Japan’s Own Efforts

Recognizing that a country’s security depends first and foremost on



its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.

#### (1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises.

#### (2) Japan's defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan's will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan.

In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force's (SDF's) total functions and capabilities against various situations.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including "gray zone" situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter "ISR") activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace.

Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

At the same time, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force.

From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense

Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

#### 3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan's security to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective.

##### (1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to ensure Japan's national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance's contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations.

To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

##### (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.

##### (3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there.

#### 4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

##### (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the

atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia.

Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia.

As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop confidence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.

Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability.

Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities.

As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including the Official Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus.

#### (2) Cooperation with the international community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace but also in supporting post-conflict reconstruction, building peace and promoting confidence-building and friendly relationships.

Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community.

Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which it shares security interests and with international organizations and other relevant bodies.

In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European

countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries and organizations.

In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries.

With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.

#### IV. Future Defense Forces

##### 1. The Role of the Defense Force

Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

##### (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations

In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage.

Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular:

##### a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan

In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan.

##### b. Response to an attack on remote islands

In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately.

##### c. Response to ballistic missile attacks

Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units.

##### d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation

arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society's growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF's capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.

e. Responses to major disasters

Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood support.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security environments

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan.

Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulfilling its key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and strengthening of intra-regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives.

a. Holding training and exercises

As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation's resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace.

c. Promoting capacity building assistance

Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

d. Ensuring maritime security

As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an "Open and Stable Seas" order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country.

e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities

Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of

a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment.

f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF's knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.

2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces

(1) Basic approach

The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized

From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

a. ISR capabilities

In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

b. Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis.

c. Transport capability

In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics.

d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense



Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF's units such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures.

Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services.

e. Response to an attack on remote islands

In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc.

Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan's remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

f. Response to ballistic missile attacks

To counter North Korea's improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan's own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S.

As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities.

h. Responses to major disasters, etc.

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach.

i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation.

From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for

Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti.

Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities.

3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace cooperation activities.

Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training environment there.

The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.

b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan's remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible.

c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below.

d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.

(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)

a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and international peace cooperation activities etc.

Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile attacks.

b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.

c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.

d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning, surveillance and control in the air over long periods in the event

of “gray zone” situations.

- b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan.
- c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace cooperation activities etc.
- d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above.

## V. Basic Foundations for SDF

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows.

### 1. Training and Exercises

Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises.

### 2. Operational Infrastructure

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.

Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition.

### 3. Personnel and Education

Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan's security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government.

In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting

from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations.

In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

### 4. Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians.

The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities.

### 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan's defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry.

In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

### 6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it

will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment.

7. Research and Development

The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.

In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan's technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend in science and technology including information related to technological development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government, industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dual-use technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies.

The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.

8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them.

Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF's joint operation functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

VI. Additional Points

- These Guidelines set out the form of Japan's defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through validations based

on joint operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner.

- When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately.

- In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan's defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

Category		Present (as of the end of FY2013)	Future	
GSDF	Authorized Number of personnel	approx. 159,000	159,000	
	Active-Duty Personnel	approx. 151,000	151,000	
	Reserve-Ready Personnel	approx. 8,000	8,000	
	Major units	Rapid Deployment Units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units		5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	
Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions
		Submarine Units	5 divisions	6 divisions
		Minesweeping Units Patrol aircraft Units	1 flotilla 9 squadrons	1 flotilla 9 squadrons
ASDF	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups	13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups
ASDF	Major equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	47 (6)	54 (8)
		Submarines Combat Aircraft	16 approx. 170	22 approx. 170
ASDF	Major equipment	Combat aircraft	approx. 340	approx. 360
		Fighters	approx. 260	approx. 280

Notes: The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.

**Reference 16 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)**

(December 17, 2013 Approved by National Security Council and the Cabinet)

The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document. (Attachment)

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

**I. Program Guidelines**

In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter "NDPG2013"), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force



will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF's overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios.

Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program guidelines:

1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities.
2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan's southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.

At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities.

3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.
4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF's strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.
5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan's public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

## II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an armored division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and

nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies.

2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued.
3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base.

To prevent the relative decline of Japan's air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills.

4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.

## III. Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

### (1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft, and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate ground-based aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF.

### (2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands

#### (a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure

With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and

establish one squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture will be maintained.

(b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority

For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

(c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service-extension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship guided missiles.

(d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose helicopters that will succeed the existing multipurpose helicopters (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units' amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF's transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel.

Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct

maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range.

(e) Development of C3I

From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting efficiency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some regional army headquarters.

With regard to the information and communications capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link functions among the three services, upgrade the field communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its communications systems.

(3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Given North Korea's improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles.

For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems.

Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack.

The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan's own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

(4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace

(a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space

The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites

equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in the area of personnel development with such organizations.

(b) Response to Cyber Attacks

To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies.

Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts.

To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises.

(5) Response to Large-scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people's lives. In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector's efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF's disaster and deployment operations is affected.

(6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence.

With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will also reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information

from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information.

In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its cross-organizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period in the policy departments and operational sides.

Considering the importance of information security, under the current severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing between those who need to know, including relevant government agencies.

2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments

From the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly important to these efforts:

(1) Holding Training and Exercises

In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation's resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace.

(3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance

By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in capacity building.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

For the purpose of maintaining "Open and Stable Seas", which serve as the cornerstone of Japan's peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan's goal of maintaining maritime security.

(5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities

To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are highly appreciated at the SDF's activity areas, the SDF will work to facilitate international peace cooperation activities that



more effectively meet the needs of the SDF's activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such operations.

### (6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

## 3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

### (1) Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, the SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-trained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the SDF's southwestern region, where only limited space is available for SDF training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner.

### (2) Operational Infrastructure

Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment and response to various contingencies as well as for ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance.

## (3) Personnel and Education

Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

### (a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution

Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman.

To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel's physical strength so as to maintain SDF's strength.

### (b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF's strength.

To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program.

In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan's security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations.

### (c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support

In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment.

### (d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector's transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The SDF will also encourage the

appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.

(4) Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the field of defense medical science.

(5) Defense Production and Technology Base

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan's intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technology base as a whole.

With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan's defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses.

The MOD will promote international joint development and production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit both manufacturers and the government.

(6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts, the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector's knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs.

To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such

as, the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, globally competitive companies.

(7) Research and Development (R&D)

Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan's severe fiscal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF.

In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in view of replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft.

With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment.

From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities.

In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures.

(8) Collaboration with Local Communities

As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders.

(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities

Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of its English web site.

## (10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base

To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD's headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner.

## (11) Promoting Reform of the MOD

The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.

**IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

## 1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan's national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

## 2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).

**V. Quantities of Major Procurement**

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment.

**VI. Expenditures**

1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY2013 prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,970 billion over the next five years.
3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

**VII. Other**

While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily

implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Service	Equipment	Quantity
GSDF	Mobile Combat Vehicles	99
	Armored Vehicles	24
	Amphibious Vehicles	52
	Tilt-Rotor Aircraft	17
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	6
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	9 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Tanks	44
	Howitzers (expect mortars)	31
MSDF	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	5 (2)
	Submarines	5
	Other Ships	5
	Total (Tonnage)	15 (approx. 52,000 t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	23
	Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K)	23
	Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)	9
ASDF	New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft	4
	Fighters (F-35A)	28
	Fighter Modernization (F-15)	26
	New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft	3
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	10
	Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)	2 groups & education
Joint units	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

**Reference 17 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government's existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.



An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

### 1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

- 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
- 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

### 2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

### 3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228

of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

## Reference 18 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)

### I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines”. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

### II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

- A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.
- B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.
- C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

### III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure

seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

#### A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

#### B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

#### C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

### IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan's Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan's peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan's peace and security.

#### A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan's peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

##### 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan's peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan's peace and security.

##### 2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

##### 3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

##### 4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other's assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

##### 5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

##### 6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

##### 7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

#### B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot

be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

#### 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country's capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

#### 2. Maritime Security

Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

#### 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees

If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan's peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

#### 4. Search and Rescue

The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

#### 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

#### 6. Logistic Support

The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

#### 7. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

#### C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two

governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

##### 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.

##### 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

###### a. Principles for Coordinated Actions

If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other's forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

###### b. Concept of Operations

###### i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

###### ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary



responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces' special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed

Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan's request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan's survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

## 5. Logistics Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

## E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan's peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan's activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces' cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

## V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

### A. Cooperation in International Activities

The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include:

#### 1. Peacekeeping Operations

When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.

#### 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.

#### 3. Maritime Security

When the two governments conduct activities for maritime

security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.

#### 4. Partner Capacity Building

Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.

#### 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.

#### 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.

#### 7. Training and Exercises

In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.

#### 8. Logistic support

When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

### B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

## VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

### A. Cooperation on Space

Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

### B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The

two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

## VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

### A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

### B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.

In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information.

The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

### C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side's research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

## VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

## Reference 19 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

### Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March

2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

### Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

### Key Implementation Details

#### 1. Realignment on Okinawa

##### (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

##### (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makimino Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

##### (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.



- Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
  - All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
  - While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
  - Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
  - ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.
- (d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
  - Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
  - The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
  - Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
  - In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
    - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
    - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
    - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
  - A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
  - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
    - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
    - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
    - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
    - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
  - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
    - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
    - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
  - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
  - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
  - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
  - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
  - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
  - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
  - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
  - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
  - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
  - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
  - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
  - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
  - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
  - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
  - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. (Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

**Reference 20** Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2012)

**Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)**

**Preamble**

- (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap.
- (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.
- (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan's defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

**I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa**

- (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia.
- (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.
- (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.
- (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.
- (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is \$8.6 billion. Japan's financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to \$2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized. Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment.

**II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity**

- (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan

will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats).

- (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012.

**III. Land Returns in Okinawa**

- (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5)
- (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1
- (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps' relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area
- (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.

**IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma**

- (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.
- (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment.

(END)

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html>)

**Reference 21** Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2012)

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
Aug. 3, 2012	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreed on the importance of future research and discussion on the Guidelines</li> <li>• Agreed to accelerate deliberations on Japan-U.S. dynamic defense cooperation</li> <li>• Exchanged opinions on cooperation in equipment and technology, and BMD</li> <li>• Agreed to implement agreements in the "2+2" joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>• Exchanged opinions on Ospreys</li> </ul>
Sep. 17, 2012	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirmed Japan-U.S. collaboration on dynamic defense cooperation</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the importance of research and discussion on the Guidelines</li> <li>• Agreed to continue Japan-U.S. adjustments concerning X-Band radars (TPY-2 radar)</li> <li>• Exchanged opinions on Ospreys</li> <li>• Agreed to make every effort to implement agreements in the "2+2" joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
Apr. 29, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreed on the significance of taking the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship up to the next step</li> <li>• Confirmed from the U.S that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and statement against unilateral actions forcefully trying to change the status quo on it</li> <li>• Welcomed the progress of discussion on perceptions of strategic environment, which were presupposed for reviewing the Guidelines, and agreed to continue intensive discussions</li> <li>• Confirmed the establishment of defense ISR working group and confirmed progress in deliberation on joint warning and surveillance activities from peacetime</li> <li>• Agreed to accelerate the works toward early deployment of TPY-2 radar to Japan</li> <li>• Agreed to steadily make progress on the USFJ realignment</li> </ul>
Aug. 28, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Brunei	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>• Confirmed the importance of further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the area of cyber security</li> <li>• Welcomed the progress of bilateral discussions on strategic environment perspective, which serve as a basis for the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and agreed to vigorously continue their discussion</li> <li>• Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>• Following the crash accident of an HH-60 helicopter, Japan requested the U.S. to pay due consideration for public safety, take safety measures and investigate the cause of the accident. Secretary Hagel stated that he will ensure utmost safety of local areas</li> <li>• Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey.</li> </ul>
Oct. 3, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>• Confirmed to develop trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK</li> <li>• Welcomed the establishment of the "Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)" as a framework between Japanese and U.S. defense officials</li> <li>• Agreed to vigorously continue their discussion on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>• Agreed to accelerate work for the early deployment of a TPY-2 radar system</li> <li>• Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>• Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey</li> </ul>
Oct. 3, 2013	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Onodera Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Hagel Secretary of State Kerry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance</li> <li>• Welcomed Japanese efforts to prepare to establish its National Security Council (NSC) and issue its National Security Strategy (NSS), to reexamine the legal basis for its security, to expand its defense budget, to review its National Defense Program Guidelines, and to strengthen its capability to defend its sovereign territory</li> <li>• Directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to complete work on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation before the end of 2014</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and space</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK</li> <li>• Confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma</li> <li>• Announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement</li> <li>• Confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan, such as U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aircraft, has strategic significance</li> </ul>

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
Apr. 6, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas</li> <li>Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017</li> <li>Minister Onodera explained the gist of "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," and secretary welcomed Japan's effort in this area</li> <li>Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specific cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa</li> <li>Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
May. 31, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas</li> <li>Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan</li> <li>Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries</li> <li>Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan's defense policy. The U.S. welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility</li> <li>Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specific cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa</li> </ul>
Jul. 11, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas</li> <li>Agreed in addition to close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to advance trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK and Japan, the U.S., and Australia</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the purport of the Cabinet decision on the development of a new security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort.</li> <li>Agreed to release an interim report on the work to revise the Guidelines at an appropriate timing</li> <li>Agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology</li> <li>Agreed to proceed swiftly and steadily with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab</li> <li>Welcomed the relocation of KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni</li> <li>The Japanese side raised the issue of noise caused by the flight of transient aircrafts at MCAS Futenma, among other matters. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.</li> </ul>
Apr. 8, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea</li> <li>Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort.</li> <li>Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries</li> <li>Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology</li> <li>Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</li> <li>The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.</li> </ul>
Apr. 27, 2015	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") Meeting/ New York	Minister of Defense Nakatani Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Carter Secretary of State Kerry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance</li> <li>Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement)</li> <li>Shared recognition on the importance of "rule of law," including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts</li> <li>Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</li> <li>The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact.</li> <li>Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a supplementary Agreement on cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible</li> </ul>
Apr. 28, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries</li> <li>Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation</li> <li>Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan's efforts in this regard.</li> <li>Welcomed the establishment of the "Space Cooperation Working Group" as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities</li> <li>Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base consolidation in Okinawa.</li> <li>Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.</li> </ul>
May 30, 2015	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas</li> <li>Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation</li> <li>Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Peace and Security Legislation and the commencement of Diet deliberations. Confirmed that the legislation would lead to ensuring the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.</li> <li>Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expediting negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement</li> <li>Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace</li> <li>The Japanese side explained that it will continue to make every effort to realize the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Camp Schwab as quickly as possible, and stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</li> <li>The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa.</li> <li>The Japanese side stated that it is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. However, in light of the accident in Hawaii, the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information focused on ensuring safety, including information on the accident. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.</li> </ul>



(October 3, 2013)

## Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities

## (Outline)

## I. Overview

## (1) Strategic vision of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

- The United States and Japan resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance.
- The two countries will reflect their shared values of democracy, among others. They will promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the region.
- Basic initiatives: (i) Revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation; (ii) Expanding security and defense cooperation; and (iii) New measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

## (2) The Ministers reiterated the United States' continued implementation of its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and their commitment towards the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

## (3) Japan's security policy

- Japan will make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community.
- Japan will continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
- Concrete efforts: (i) Prepare to establish the National Security Council (NSC) and to issue the National Security Strategy (NSS); (ii) Re-examine the legal basis for Japan's security including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense; (iii) Expand the defense budget; (iv) Review the National Defense Program Guidelines; (v) Strengthen defense capability; and (vi) Broaden regional contributions.
- The United States welcomed these efforts and reiterated its commitment to collaborate closely with Japan.

## (4) Recognition of the regional situation

- Threats to peace and security and challenges to international norms: (i) North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; (ii) Coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; (iii) Disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; and (iv) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others. The Ministers continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.

## II. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

## (1) Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

- The two countries will revise the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
- Objectives include: (i) Ensuring the capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, which is a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation; (ii) Expanding the scope of cooperation to reflect the global nature of the Alliance; (iii) Promoting deeper security cooperation with regional partners; (iv) Enhancing mechanisms for consultation and coordination; (v) Describing appropriate role-sharing based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities; (vi) Evaluating the concepts that guide defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless response; and (vii) Exploring additional ways in which the Alliance can be strengthened.
- The Ministers directed that this task for the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) be completed before the end of 2014.

## (2) BMD cooperation: The Ministers confirmed their intention to designate the base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second TPY-2 radar.

## (3) Cooperation in cyberspace: The Ministers stressed the need for close coordination with the private sector. The two countries will promote a whole-of-government approach. The Ministers welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a Cyber Defense Policy Working Group.

## (4) Cooperation in space: The Ministers welcomed the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan space situational awareness (SSA) Sharing Agreement and an early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States.

## (5) Joint ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance): The Ministers welcomed the establishment of a Defense ISR Working Group.

## (6) Joint/shared use of facilities: In order to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including the southwestern islands, among other objectives, the Ministers welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group. Progress on the joint/shared use

strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities.

## (7) Planning: The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward refining the plans.

## (8) Defense equipment and technology cooperation: The Ministers welcomed the linkage between discussions on equipment and technology cooperation and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. Through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, cooperation should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

## (9) Extended Deterrence Dialogue: The Ministers noted with satisfaction the outcome of Extended Deterrence Dialogues. The dialogue will be held on a regular basis.

## (10) Information security: The SCC members welcomed the serious efforts by Japan in establishing a legal framework for information security.

## (11) Joint training and exercises: The Ministers decided to take advantage of various opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa. They include Osprey's participation in operations in mainland Japan and elsewhere to reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa.

## (12) Host Nation Support (HNS): The Ministers affirmed the importance of HNS.

## III. Regional Engagement

## (1) Capacity building: The SCC members resolved to collaborate on capacity building. The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan.

## (2) Maritime security: The Ministers affirmed their intent to cooperate further in maritime security and counter-piracy.

## (3) Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief: The two countries will extend bilateral cooperation. The Ministers encouraged efforts to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination.

## (4) Trilateral cooperation: The Ministers noted the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the Republic of Korea.

## (5) Multilateral cooperation: The Ministers noted the importance of efforts to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation.

## IV. Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

## (1) Realignment on Okinawa

- Land returns: The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the April 2013 Consolidation Plan.
- Relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma: The Ministers confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids its continued use. The SCC members reaffirmed the strong commitment of both governments. The United States welcomed recent developments including the submission of the request for approval of public water reclamation permit to Okinawa Prefecture by the government of Japan in March 2013.
- Hotel-Hotel training area: The Ministers gave directions to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of said area by the end of November 2013. The two countries will continue to consult on other possible measures.
- Environment: The Ministers decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating planning of land use prior to its return.

## (2) Iwakuni

- The Ministers confirmed that the consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated.
- The SCC Members affirmed that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni.
- The Ministers acknowledged that the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017.

## (3) Guam

- The Ministers confirmed the importance of relocating U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to locations outside of Japan (mitigates the impact on Okinawa, sustains the forward presence of U.S. forces, and facilitates the development of Guam as a strategic hub).
- The Ministers announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement.
- The Ministers noted the significance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benefit the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces.
- The Ministers completed work reflecting the breakdown of costs

associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure.

- The Ministers announced that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam will begin in the first half of the 2020s.

#### (4) Advanced capabilities

- The Ministers confirmed the importance of deploying and utilizing more advanced capabilities in Japan: (i) MV-22; (ii) P-8 (after December 2013); (iii) Global Hawk (after spring 2014); and (iv) F-35B (2017).

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website.

([http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20131003\\_e.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20131003_e.html))

### Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2015)

#### A STRONGER ALLIANCE FOR A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

##### The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

#### 1. OVERVIEW

Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York on April 27, 2015. In light of the evolving security environment, the Ministers reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" (the Guidelines), which update the roles and missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The Ministers discussed a variety of regional and global challenges, initiatives to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in various areas, promotion of enhanced regional cooperation, and moving forward on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Central to this is the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. Japan highly values U.S. engagement in the region. In this context, the Ministers reaffirmed the indispensable role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity.

As Japan continues its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace," based on the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports Japan's recent monumental achievements. Among these are: the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; the new Basic Plan on Space Policy; and the Development Cooperation Charter.

The Ministers affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new Guidelines and the two countries' respective security and defense policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment.

The Ministers also reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands.

#### 2. THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION

The Guidelines, which were first approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on September 23, 1997, have provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. At the SCC meeting in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, the Ministers shared views on the evolving security environment and directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security.

Today, the SCC approved the SDC's recommended new Guidelines, which accomplishes the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the new Guidelines and Japan's efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new Guidelines more effective. The United States welcomes and

supports the ongoing efforts to develop the legislation, which is to reflect Japan's policy of "Proactive Contributions to Peace" and its July 2014 cabinet decision.

The core of the Guidelines continues to be the steadfast commitment to Japan's peace and security. The new Guidelines detail the ways and means through which the two governments continue to strengthen their ability to fulfill that commitment through seamless, robust, flexible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding bilateral cooperation across a range of other areas, such as:

**Alliance Coordination Mechanism:** Under the new Guidelines the two countries are establishing a standing, whole-of-government mechanism for Alliance coordination, enabling a seamless response in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

**Regional and Global Cooperation:** The new Guidelines enable the Alliance to make greater contributions to international security initiatives wherever appropriate in a way consistent with Japanese laws and regulations, such as peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and logistic support. The Ministers reiterated the importance of cooperating with regional and other partners as well as with international organizations.

**New Strategic Cooperation:** A dynamic world requires a modern Alliance, and the new Guidelines lay a foundation for the two countries to cooperate in space and cyberspace and in conducting operations intended to have effects across domains.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief:** The new Guidelines describe ways the two governments can work together to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in responding to a large-scale disaster in Japan or around the world.

**A Strong Foundation:** The new Guidelines also describe programs and activities that pay dividends in every aspect of bilateral cooperation, including defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security, and educational and research exchanges.

The Ministers confirmed their intention to start bilateral work under the new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral planning. The Ministers also expressed their intention to negotiate expeditiously an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines.

#### 3. BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities by enhancing bilateral security and defense cooperation in a variety of areas. The Ministers:

- confirmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced U.S. capabilities to Japan, which enhances Alliance deterrence and contributes to the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base, the deployment of the USS Green Bay, an upgraded amphibious transport ship, and U.S. plans to deploy Marine Corps F-35B aircraft to Japan in 2017. In addition, the Ministers welcomed U.S. plans to deploy additional Aegis ships to Yokosuka Naval Base by 2017, as well as the swap-out of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington with the more advanced USS Ronald Reagan later this year;
- committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussion of nuclear and conventional capabilities;
- stressed the importance of sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned deployment of two additional BMD-capable destroyers to Japan by 2017. Working in concert, these assets are to directly contribute to the defense of Japan and the United States;
- highlighted enhanced collaboration on space security, particularly in the areas of resiliency and developing capabilities, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and the Space Security Dialogue. The Ministers also highlighted increased cooperation resulting from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's provision of space situational awareness (SSA) information to the United States, as well as the establishment of a new framework to discuss space-related issues between the two defense authorities;
- called for continued progress in cooperation on cyberspace issues, particularly in the areas of threat information sharing, mission assurance, and critical infrastructure protection, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group;
- lauded enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation, particularly the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force

Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base and Japan's plans to procure advanced ISR platforms;

- praised expanded logistics and defense equipment cooperation, as reflected by Japan's new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the recent U.S. decision to establish an F-35 regional maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade capability in Japan. The Ministers highlighted strengthened defense equipment cooperation through the linkage of the Systems and Technology Forum and the Alliance Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, which facilitates joint research and development of advanced capabilities; and
- affirmed the importance of enhanced information security cooperation, as reflected by continued progress through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations and by Japan's implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets. As a result of this legislation, the Government of Japan has put in place the policies, practices, and procedures necessary to facilitate the secure exchange of sensitive information in peacetime and during contingencies.

In addition, the Ministers affirmed that host nation support has demonstrated continued Japanese support for the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, which contributes to Japan's peace and security in an increasingly complex security environment. The Ministers, noting that the current host nation support commitment, as stipulated in June 2011 SCC documents, expires in March 2016, expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host nation support.

Recognizing the expanding scope of bilateral activities, the Ministers affirmed their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation framework that would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Alliance management processes.

#### **4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the following areas:

- Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations, as reflected by close coordination in responding to the November 2013 typhoon in the Philippines;
- Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other maritime security capacity building endeavors; and
- Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Ministers highlighted the recent signing of a trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, and resolved to utilize the framework as the foundation for expanded trilateral cooperation into the future. The Ministers also affirmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia on capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum.

#### **5. REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN**

The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments' continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the relocation of the KC-130 squadron from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni and confirmed their commitment to continue aviation training relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa, through efforts such as the development of training areas and facilities.

As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments' unwavering commitment to the plan and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomes the steady and continuing progress of FRF construction projects.

The Ministers also reconfirmed the importance of land returns south of Kadena Air Base based on the 2006 "Roadmap" and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan, and reiterated the two governments' determination to work continuously on the implementation of the plan and anticipated the update of the plan by Spring 2016. The Ministers highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran on March 31 of this year, which marked the most significant land return completed to date in accordance with the plan.

The Ministers confirmed that the two governments are steadily implementing the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. To that end, the Ministers welcomed progress on a supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and confirmed their intention to continue negotiating the ancillary documents of the Agreement as expeditiously as possible.



**Reference 24 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2014**
**Joint Training**

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (field exercise)	Nov. 8–19, 2014	Japan's surrounding seas and airspace, bases of the SDF and U.S. Forces, etc.	Joint Staff Office of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Defense Intelligence Headquarters; District Armies; Central Readiness Force (CRF); Self Defense Fleet; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command, etc. Totaling approximately 30,700 personnel	Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Seventh Fleet; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; III Marine Expeditionary Force, etc. Totaling approximately 10,000 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination

**Ground Self-Defense Force**

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. joint District Army command post exercise (YS-66)	Jun. 17–28, 2014	Fort Shafter	Eastern Army, Ground Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 130 personnel	First Army; U.S. Army, Pacific Command, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S.	Aug. 29–Sep. 28, 2014	Yakima Training Center, Washington	Twelfth Brigade Totaling approximately 350 personnel	2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 4-23 Infantry Battalion Approximately 300 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 1	Dec. 1–12, 2014	Oyanohara training area, Camp Takayubarū	Eighth Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel	Major units of 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Japan-U.S. joint District Army field training (YS-67)	Dec. 2–15, 2014	Camp Asaka, etc.	Eastern Army, etc. Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel	First Army; U.S. Army, Pacific Command; U.S. Army, Japan; III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), etc. Totaling approximately 2,000 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Army in Japan Part 1	Oct. 27–Nov. 7, 2014	Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area	Seventh Division Totaling approximately 900 personnel	Seventh Division, 2-2 Brigade Totaling approximately 850 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.	Jan. 19–Mar. 7, 2015	Camp Pendleton, California, etc.	Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 270 personnel	I Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 2	Jan. 28–Feb. 8, 2015	Iwatesan training area, Camp Iwate, etc.	Ninth Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel	1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approx 270 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Army in Japan Part 2	Feb. 9–22, 2015	Yausubetsu training area	Fifth Brigade Totaling approximately 150 personnel	1-501 Infantry Battalion, 4-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 50 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination

**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

Training Design	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Minesweeping special training	Jul. 18–30, 2014	Mutsu Bay	22 vessels, 13 aircraft	One vessel, two aircraft, approximately eight underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Antisubmarine special training	Aug. 20–24, 2014	Sea areas surrounding Okinawa	Two vessels, several aircraft	Four vessels, several aircraft	Antisubmarine training
Sanitation special training	Oct. 8, 2014	Areas managed by units and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka	Yokosuka District, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel	U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel	Sanitation training
Minesweeping special training	Nov. 20–30, 2014	Hyuga-nada	23 vessels, 3 aircraft	Approximately six underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Base security special training	Dec. 8–12, 2014	U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka and Yokosuka Port	Yokosuka District, etc. Totaling approximately 170 personnel	U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka Military Police Totaling approximately 40 personnel	Japan-U.S. coordination in base security, etc.
Antisubmarine special training	Feb. 8–16, 2015	Sea areas from off the Shikoku region to southern Kyushu	Seven vessels, several aircraft	One vessel	Antisubmarine training
BMD special training	Feb. 24–27, 2015	U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka and premises of U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo, etc.	Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, two vessels, etc.	Seventh Fleet Headquarters, several vessels, etc.	BMD training
Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise	Mar. 2–12, 2015	U.S. Naval Academy	Maritime Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 30 personnel	U.S. Navy, Japan, Headquarters, etc. Totaling approximately 40 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination

**Air Self-Defense Force**

Training Design	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Air defense combat training	Apr. 4 2014	Airspace around Okinawa	Aircraft	6 Aircraft	6 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training Aerial fueling training	May 30 2014	Airspace around Okinawa	Aircraft	10 Aircraft	11 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training Aerial fueling training	Jun. 5 2014	Airspace off Komatsu	Aircraft	10 Aircraft	1 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training Air-to-surface shooting training	Jun. 12–24, 2014	Airspace east of Misawa, airspace west of Akita, and Misawa Firing Range	Aircraft	6 Aircraft	10 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training Aerial refueling training Tactical air transport training	Jun. 17–28, 2014	Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, as well as surrounding airspace, etc.	Aircraft	12 Aircraft	– Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Oct. 18–31, 2014	Airspace off Shikoku and airspace west of Kyushu	Aircraft	12 Aircraft	12 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Nov. 7–20, 2014	Airspace off Komatsu	Aircraft	16 Aircraft	8 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Mar. 9–21, 2015	Airspace off Hyakuri	Aircraft	8 Aircraft	5 Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills

**Reference 25 Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects**

Item	Summary	Time the intergovernmental agreement was concluded to implement joint research and development	Time of completion
Ducted Rocket Engine, Advanced Steel Technology, Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials, Eye-Safe Laser Radar, Ejection Seat, Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology, Shallow Water Acoustic Technology, Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery, Avionics Aboard the Follow on Aircraft to the P-3C, Software Radio, Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology, Sea-Based Radar System, Combat System for Ship, Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, Human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, Image gyro for airborne applications		Completed	
SM-3 Block IIA	Development of advanced missile interceptor	June 2006	Ongoing
Hybrid electric propulsion	Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor	November 2012	Ongoing
High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization	Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area	March 2014	Ongoing

**Reference 26 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ**

Item	Outline	Ground
Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) <sup>1</sup>	Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor costs	Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987	Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)
	Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Utilities costs	Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001	Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)
	The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010	Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)
	The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ, will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Training relocation costs	Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Government of Japan have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996	Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)

Notes: 1. Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the "Criteria for adopting FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:  
 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others).

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on November 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62					Returned on September 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
	16 facilities, 19 issues	811	6	7	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
Futenma Air Station	21. Lands along eastern side	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on September 5, 2013
	4 facilities, 4 issues	210	3	1	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

## Reference 28 The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was

scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force



protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

#### Return Land:

- Futenma Air Station — See attached.
- Northern Training Area  
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
  - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
  - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area  
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area  
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site  
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield  
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae  
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station  
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area  
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)  
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

#### Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104  
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training  
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads  
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

#### Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station  
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft  
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base  
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base  
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station  
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

#### Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

- Accident reports  
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements  
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas  
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles  
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
- Supplemental automobile insurance  
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
- Payment for claims  
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
  - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
  - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims

by U.S. authorities.

- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
- Quarantine procedures  
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen  
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
- Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

**The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station  
(an integral part of the SACO Final Report)**

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction

- a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

- a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
- b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
- c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
- d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
- e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

- a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
- b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities

and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.

- c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
  - d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
  - e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
  - f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
- Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
- a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
  - b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
  - c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
- a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
  - b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
  - c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

**Reference 29 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report**

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completed in December 1998 (cancellation of joint use)</li> </ul>
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen</li> <li>July 2011: Totally returned (approximately 60 ha)</li> </ul>
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen</li> <li>June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m<sup>2</sup>) was returned</li> <li>December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha])</li> </ul>
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the return of the Sobe Communication Site</li> <li>July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha)</li> <li>December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191 ha])</li> </ul>
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station</li> <li>September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion)</li> <li>October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station</li> </ul>
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and others</li> <li>December 1998–March 2000: Environmental survey (past year survey)</li> <li>November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey)</li> <li>February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the change of agreement in April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)</li> <li>February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined</li> <li>March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (three out of six)</li> <li>January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (the remaining three)</li> <li>January 2015: HLZs (two sites) were furnished</li> </ul>
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2002: Youth center was furnished</li> <li>March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)</li> <li>January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities</li> <li>December 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>February 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (HLZ, etc.) of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>May 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BEQ, etc.)</li> <li>October 2009, The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (First water tank facility)</li> <li>October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (Second water tank facility)</li> <li>September 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.)</li> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	<p>(Phase I: Golf Range Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>July 2002: Two high rises were furnished</li> <li>July 2006: An underpass was furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase II: Sada Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished</li> <li>* May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997</li> </ul>
Parachute Drop Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000</li> </ul>
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2000: Furnished</li> </ul>
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished</li> <li>February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp</li> <li>October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on site preparation, implementation of construction of parking apron and taxiway.</li> <li>April 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of parking and utilities.</li> </ul>
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational bases for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.</li> <li>* August 2014: Relocation of all 15 aircraft from MCAS Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base was completed</li> </ul>



**Reference 30** Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

List of Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas

Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2014 or later
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2019 or later <sup>1</sup>
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement of Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later <sup>2,3</sup>
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1	JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later
Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later <sup>4</sup>

Note:

- 1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.
- 2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
- 3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.
- 4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

**Reference 31** Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

(Signed on February 17, 2009)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives,

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance,

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar (\$10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars (\$6,090,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year

2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly,

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam—estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars (\$3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars (\$1,000,000,000) for a road,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.
2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”).

Article 2

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement.

## Article 3

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

## Article 4

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

## Article 5

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

## Article 6

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1. (a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

## Article 7

1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.
2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars).
3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3. (b) of this Article.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

## Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United

States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

## Article 9

1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
2. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

## Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

## Article 11

This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

**Reference 32 Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam**

(Signed on October 3, 2013)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows:

## Article 1

The fifth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted, and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth paragraph:

"Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as "III MEF") personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Statement"),

Recognizing that the Joint Statement confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan,

Reaffirming that the Joint Statement confirmed that, of the preliminarily estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars (\$8,600,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion, one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred fifty-five United States dollars (\$3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible,

Reaffirming further that the Joint Statement confirmed that the United States is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam,

Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

as shared-use facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces,

Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa,

and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on Japan's direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United States of America,"

#### Article 2

The phrase "approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents" in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "the III MEF personnel and their dependents".

#### Article 3

The phrase "facilities and infrastructure on Guam" in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands".

#### Article 4

Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted.

#### Article 5

The phrase "facilities and infrastructure on Guam" in Article 4 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands", and the following sentence shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement:

"Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands."

#### Article 6

Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3:

##### "Article 4

The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest."

#### Article 7

Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"2. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1) United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement."

#### Article 8

It is confirmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash contributions.

#### Article 9

This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement.

### Reference 33 Direction of the MOD Reform

August 30, 2013  
Ministry of Defense

#### 1. Regarding the Previous MOD Reform (2007–2009)

##### 1. Details

In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD and the SDF, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established in the Prime Minister's Office in December 2007. The Council engaged in repeated discussions, and in July 2008, compiled a report which detailed the analysis of scandals and the direction of reform (hereinafter, the "Report by the Council for Reforming the

Ministry of Defense")

In August of that year, the Ministry of defense decided upon the "Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense" and the "Basic Policy for Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense," based on the direction for reform presented by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with these, efforts were made to prevent the recurrence of scandals through the execution of reforms in the three areas of ensuring thorough observance of rules and regulations, establishment of professionalism, and establishment of operational management in a form that focused on the execution of duties, with the aim of optimization across the board. At the same time, in an effort to advance drastic realignment of the central organization in two stages, the Defense Council was first to be established in law as of FY2009, the post of the Director of Defense was abolished and the post of the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense newly created.

Furthermore, incorporated into the FY2010 budget request of the end of August 2009 as the second stage of reorganization, was a reorganization proposal detailing plans to unify defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization, into the Internal Bureau, and to unify the operational departments into the Joint Staff (hereinafter the "2010 Reorganization Proposal"). However, due to the administrative changeover to the Democratic Party in September of that year, the proposal was relinquished after the budget request scheduled in October had been suspended.

#### 2. Ministry of Defense Central Reorganization Proposal Scheduled for FY2010

The contents of the 2010 Reorganization Proposal included (1) establishment of permanent posts for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, (2) reorganization of the Bureau of Defense Policy and strengthening of its functions, (3) creation of a new Build-up Plan Bureau (provisional title) in the Internal Bureau, through the fusion of the Internal Bureau and the departments involved in defense capabilities build-up in each of the Staff Offices, in order to achieve optimization across the whole of defense capabilities build-up, which had been optimized individually for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and (4) abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy and the incorporation of its work into the Joint Staff, to eliminate the de facto duplication of duties of operational departments.

Meanwhile, the Proposal thoroughly mixed the civilian officials and uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, and established their positions appropriated according to expertise. The main point was to facilitate the construction of a system that would allow civilian officials and uniformed personnel to work together. With this in mind, the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense was to undergo a large-scale review, which resulted in many points needing further examination regarding considerations and detailed planning.

Two specific shortcomings in the 2010 Reform Proposal with respect to the unification of defense capabilities build-up, were the fact that the system had not necessarily reflected the viewpoint of joint operation fully, on which defense capabilities build-up is predicated, and that considerations had yet to reach the point of actual reform of departments involved in equipment acquisition, which hold an important role in defense capabilities build-up.

In regard to the unification of operational functions into the Joint Staff, the fact was that the 2010 Reform Proposal required further consideration of the specific scopes of the duties that were to be concentrated into the Joint Staff. For example, no conclusion had been reached, despite deliberations taking place, about whether it was appropriate to transfer all of the duties of the Bureau of Operational Policy into the Joint Staff after its abolition, even including the duty of planning and drafting laws and regulations pertaining to SDF operation.

Moreover, during the validation of the 2010 Reform Proposal in its recent deliberations, the point was raised that if the jurisdiction of the Joint Staff extended to duties relating to operational policy and dealing with the Diet, then it was possible that the attribute of the Minister as "top-level specialist adviser" in "military matters" would undergo change.

#### 2. Considerations in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform

##### 1. Minister of Defense instructions

Due to the changeover in administration to a Liberal Democratic Party-New Komeito coalition, in February of this year, the Minister of Defense's instructions to accelerate deliberations regarding the MOD reform were issued. Subsequently, it was determined in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform, headed by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (hereinafter, the "Committee"), that (1) from the perspective not only of preventing the recurrence of scandals, but of making the SDF operate more actively and efficiently through



the effective use of human resources, and accomplishing the civilian control over the SDF under the severe security environment facing Japan, (2)with regard to the business operation and structure of the central organization, the Committee is giving necessary consideration, taking into account the lessons learned from handling recent incidents such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the launch of missiles by North Korea, and in tandem with the discussion to strengthen the commanding function of the Prime Minister's Office concerning national security such as the establishment of the Japanese National Security Council, and (3) that a report would be made to the Defense Council, with its target time being the period when the FY2014 budget request is made.

## 2. Situation regarding considerations

### (1) System of consideration

The Committee is composed of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, the Vice-Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister's Secretariat, the various other director generals and the Chiefs of Staff, with the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense as chairman. Under this is a board of executives composed of the Vice-Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister's secretariat and the various Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, as forums for conducting practical, cross-organizational considerations regarding the matters of "defense capabilities build-up," "operations," "policy-planning" and "public relations," project teams, composed of members at the level of deputy director general, Assistant Vice-Minister of the Minister's secretariat, and the directors of the Staff Offices, and work team composed of members at the level of Internal Bureau and Staff Office manager were established.

### (2) Course of considerations

At the establishment of the Committee in February, seven preliminary discussions were held under the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. Then from February through March, the points for discussion were determined by the Committee, regarding which, since April of this year, earnest discussions and deliberations have been carried out by each of the project teams and work teams. Specifically, a number of discussions and deliberations at a variety of levels were carried out, through the staging of six meetings by the Committee, four by the board of executives, 12 by the project teams and 21 by the work teams.

Moreover, although a certain degree of success was achieved through the solid implementation of the efforts to prevent the recurrence of scandals proposed in the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, incidents still occurred in some cases regarding procurement. It was therefore determined that, measures to prevent recurrence would be considered and the related efforts checked, at forums for deliberations established separately of the Committee (expert committees such as the Committee for Investigation of Incidents and Consideration of Recurrence Prevention in the Selection of Companies to Carry Out a Development Project for the New GSDF Multi-Use Helicopter (UH-X), and the Committee for Investigation and Consideration of Incidents of Overcharging, etc.).

Based on the above discussions and deliberations, the seventh Committee meeting was held on August 29 of this year, the direction for the MOD reform was compiled, and reported to the Defense Council on the 30th of the month.

## 3. Basic Concept and Direction of Reform

The security environment surrounding Japan has increasingly grown severe; China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplified by its instruction into Japan's territorial waters and airspace; North Korea has been such provocative actions as its launch of the missile and its nuclear test. Above all else, so-called gray zone situations relating to territorial land and economic interests are becoming evident and long-term, and the possibility is feared that the situation will get more acute and serious, leading to more serious incidents. Through the handling of recent incidents, exemplified by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the lessons learned in relation to the use of units have been recognized. Furthermore, changes have been occurring in the political environment, such as the move toward establishing the NSC, and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

These various changes in the situation pertaining to the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces served as a basis for the recent considerations regarding MOD reform, during which the points of optimization of defense capabilities build-up across the board, rationalization of duplicated work regarding operations, and strengthening the functions of planning, proposing and transmitting defense policies, as highlighted in the advice of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense were taken into adequate account, in the determination that the ideal format for the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces' duties would be reviewed from the perspective of how to ensure their

functions are executed effectively, and the ideal format of the organization would be reviewed, including the viewpoint of making it more efficient and rational.

The direction of the full-fledged reform, including reorganization, is as follows.

### (1) Remove the barriers to civilian officials and uniformed personnel

It is essential to prompt decision-making to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel in the MOD central organization. For this reason, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in each of the Staff Offices and major commands.

### (2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up)

In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and ensure that the build-up is instead conducted through total optimization, a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up, emphasizing the assessment of the performance of defense capabilities based on joint operations, which has not necessarily been given adequate attention in the past, while further efficiency and optimization in equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across the life-cycle of the equipment, and the organization that contributes to total optimization of defense capabilities realigned.

### (3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations)

In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff office as well as efficient coordination body for situation response will be established under the Defense Council.

### (4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability

The enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy has made certain progress since the 2010 Reform Proposal. Going forward, the systems will be enhanced further still, to respond to the drastic increase in international affairs-related work recently in the Ministry of Defense, such as the expansion of the Cabinet-Level Discussion on Foreign Affairs and Defense ("2+2"). At the same time, the enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy will be advanced, in response to the enhancement of the strategic functions of the Prime Minister's Office (resulting from the founding of the NSC). Together with this, efforts will be made to enhance the public relations capability of the Ministry of Defense.

In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the mentality of each and every member of both the civilian officials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore, in the present serious security environment, it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff offices equally support the Minister of Defense. Reform is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and improvement.

## 4. Specific reform efforts

The matters addressed as a part of the MOD reform are, specifically, as follows (including, in addition to items (1) to (4) of 3. above, matters newly derived in relation to the progress of recent considerations). "Short-term (FY2014)," "Medium-term" and "Long-term" time schedules will be established for these, and implemented steadily and gradually.

### (1) Mutual assignment of civilian officials and uniformed personnel

- By the revision of the relevant articles of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (1954 Law No. 164), permanent posts within the Internal Bureau for uniformed personnel, mainly Lieutenant Colonel and Major will be established while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in the Joint Staff and major SDF commands. (FY2014)
- Subsequently, permanent posts for uniformed personnel and civilian officials will be mutually established in high-ranked staffs of the Internal Bureau and the respective Staff Office and major command. (Medium-long term)

### (2) Total optimization of defense capabilities build-up and strengthening of equipment acquisition functions

- Based on the results of implementing optimization method across the board for defense capabilities build-up, in considerations of a review of approaches to defense capabilities which is currently undergoing progress, new procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up. (FY2014)

<Image of new procedure (under consideration)>

Rigorous mutual cooperation is being undertaken between the Internal Bureau and each of the Staff Offices, and in the following

step, defense capabilities build-up will be advanced.

- 1) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy and the Chief of Joint Staff will implement a unified assessment of the performance of defense capabilities from the perspective not of the Ground, Maritime and Air Defense Forces separately, but the needs of joint operation, based on envisioned contingencies.
  - 2) The Chief of Joint Staff will present the matters which are to be emphasized in defense capabilities build-up from the perspective of the needs of joint operation, based on the results of 1).
  - 3) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy will clarify the priority matters in defense capabilities build-up from a more comprehensive perspective including attitude and policy, in reference to 2).
- b. In addition to a procedure reform for the purpose of the above total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, the following measures will be taken so that equipment acquisition duties can be carried out in a form that is more fair, efficient and optimized.
- (a) In regard to projects for the improvement of equipment and supplies, the establishment of cross-functional Integrated Project Teams (IPT), headed by a Project Manager (PM) responsible for summarizing the project in question and ensuring its consistent advance, will be increased, and project management strengthened throughout the life-cycle of the equipment, from acquisition including its research and development through to disposal. (FY2014–)
  - (b) In order that project management across the entire life-cycle, as mentioned above, can be implemented organizationally and appropriately, and can even contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, as well as the total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, departments involved in equipment acquisition in the Internal Bureau, various Staff Offices, Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office shall be integrated in accordance with future discussions, and reorganization that keeps the establishment of the “Defense Equipment Agency” (provisional title) in mind carried out. At that time, the strengthening of surveillance functions will also be considered, in order that procurement is conducted with greater fairness. (Medium-term)
- (3) Strengthening of joint operation functions
- a. In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, first for fostering a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established. (FY2014–) [Reposted]
  - b. In order to increase swiftness and efficiency of operations, affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff office. Meanwhile, because functions such as the planning and proposal of laws and regulations pertaining to operations are administrative and institutional works, they will continue to come under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. Due to this, the de facto duplication of duties between the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, resulting from accountability to the Diet, regarding the duties associated with actual force operations, will be eliminated. With these points in mind, the Bureau of Operational Policy will be reviewed its organization based on new challenges as for response to cyber attacks and externally-related tasks referring in (4). (Medium-term)
  - c. When responding to emergency events, since the Defense Council headed by the Minister of Defense and the Emergency Headquarter are functioning effectively, an organization for efficient coordination will be constructed under the Defense Council, to deal with emergencies consisting of relevant top officials among the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff, in order to ensure the further acceleration of decision-making procedures pertaining to emergencies. (Medium-term)
  - d. Based on the lessons learned at the time that the Self-Defense Forces were mobilized in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, that duties relating to supporting the Minister of Defense from an expert military perspective in the Joint Staff, and relating to the enforcement of orders from the Minister of Defense became strained, and that the burden on the Joint Staff suddenly increased, cooperation and collaboration will be pursued in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities, as it relates to ensuring effective command and control in the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (including considerations regarding the establishment of a central command organization in the Ground Self-Defense Force and the ideal format of relations between the relevant organizations and regional unites of GSDF), as well as verification of the functions and roles of organizations

such as the Joint Staff, thereby raising the effectiveness of joint operations further. (Medium-long term)

- (4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relation capability
  - a. In order to enhance strategic discussions and dialog with partner countries, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be newly established to provide general arrangements for the international affairs-related work in the Ministry of Defense. (FY2014)
  - b. In order to form a strong connection with the soon-to-be-established NSC, and contribute to the drafting of Japanese security strategies, as well as draft and execute defense policies in their response, the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy to draft strategies will be enhanced based, amongst other things, on the situation regarding the activity of the NSC after its establishment. (FY2014–)
  - c. Implementing the following measures to enhance reporting capability
    - (a) A mechanism will be established for the unified coordination of information gathering and public relations in urgent operations, the SDF’s growing international tension and conducting other crisis management by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, when the latter is mobilized, the international situation becomes strained, and other crisis management is required (Reporting Center). (FY2014)
    - (b) As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes ever more serious, in order that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces can transmit information strategically and effectively the reporting organization will be reviewed, so that spokespersons of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Joint Staff, that have been assigned as specialists to deal with reporting requirements can wield their knowhow to the maximum level and function as a key position in the transmission of information by the Ministry of Defense. (Medium-term)
- (5) Enhancement of collaboration with the local community  
In order to promote understanding of the local area with camps and bases and to enhance the functions of liaison and coordination with local governments in a state of emergency such as large-scale disasters, efforts will be made to cooperate and collaborate in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities as it pertains to the format of the relevant regional organizations that can, at all times, collaborate closely with local governments and relevant ministries and agencies (Regional Defense Bureaus, Provincial Cooperation Offices, GSDF Headquarters, MSDF District Headquarters, etc.). (Medium-long term)
- (6) Thorough management of information  
In order to prevent leaks of, not only confidential information, but information of any kind that is not to be disclosed externally, and thereby maintain the reliability of the MOD as an organization that protects the safety of Japan, and ensure that no obstruction to the execution of its duties arises, efforts are to be made to ensure the thorough management of information at all levels including a review of the specific scope of management, and methods and systems are to be established for investigation when leaks occur. (FY2014–)
- (7) Enhancement of the general coordination function of the Minister’s Secretariat  
A continuous review will be made regarding the business operation, from the perspective of ensuring the accuracy of decision-making by the Ministry, and the Minister’s secretariat-centered assistant system for political appointee, will be enhanced so that reports for political appointee are made promptly and appropriately by the relevant bureau at all times. (FY2014)

## 5. Summary

As previously stated, the MOD reform must be implemented soundly, in a manner that brings with it, a reform of the mentality of each and every member. With this in mind, discussions are to be continually pursued in earnest, mainly in the Committee, regarding the specific efforts of the MOD reform described in section 4, so that they may be made concrete. The problem of scandals in procurement is to be eagerly considered in the relevant committees, and the thoroughness of measures to prevent recurrence ensured.

**Reference 34 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned**
**Number**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Type	Recoilless Guns	Mortars	Field Artillery	Rocket Launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft Machine Guns	Tanks	Armored Vehicles
Approximate number owned	2,500	1,100	500	100	50	690	970

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

**Reference 35 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	1	290	2(5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	7	300	2(8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	60	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	48	140	1(3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	38	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H /J	Utility	131	120	2(11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	55	150/140	3(55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	36	150	2(12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
AH-64D	Combat	11	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines		
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-1	Patrol	9	450	11	38	35	Turbofan, quadruple-engine
		P-3C	Patrol	69	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	42	150	3	20/15	16/3	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		SH-60K	Patrol	44	140	4	20/16	16/3	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	5	150	8	30/22	24/8	Turboshaft, triple engine
MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	6	150	4	23/20	19/5	Turboshaft, triple engine		
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Fighter	201	mach 2.5	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-4EJ	Fighter	55	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	92	mach 2	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	13	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		C-1	Transport	24	440	5(60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	15	340	6(92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling Transport	4	460	4-8(200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-130H	Addition of aerial refueling functions	1	340	6(92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engine
	E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine	
Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	150	3(55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engine	

Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2015.

2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.

3. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

**Reference 36 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service**
**Number of Ships**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Category	Destroyer	Submarine	Mine warfare ship	Patrol combatant craft	Amphibious ship	Auxiliary ship
Number (vessels)	47	16	27	6	11	30
Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)	240	45	26	1	28	126

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.



**Reference 37 Guided Missile Specifications**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Antiballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx.300	Approx.5.2	Approx.26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx.1,500	Approx.6.6	Approx.35	Command + IR image homing
Antiaircraft and antimissile	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx.900	Approx.5.3	Approx.41	Program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx.640	Approx.5.0	Approx.36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx.570	Approx.4.9	Approx.32	Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)		Approx.100	Approx.2.7/2.9	Approx.16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ ASDF	Approx.100	Approx.2.7	Approx.16	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)		Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)	GSDF	Approx.13	Approx.1.5	Approx.8	IR image homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile		Approx.100	Approx.2.9	Approx.16	Active radar homing
	Surface-to-air missile for base air defense	ASDF	Approx.100	Approx.2.9	Approx.16	Active radar homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx.590	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx.710	Approx.4.7	Approx.30	Command + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx.300	Approx.3.8	Approx.25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	RAM (RIM-116)		Approx.73	Approx.2.8	Approx.13	Passive radar homing + IR homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx.89	Approx.2.9	Approx.13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx.91	Approx.3.0	Approx.13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx.220	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)		Approx.220	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)		Approx.95	Approx.3.1	Approx.13	IR homing	
Antiship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-12 surface-to-ship missile		Approx.700	Approx.5.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx.530	Approx.3.8	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)	ASDF	Approx.510	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)		Approx.600	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx.540	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)	Approx.530		Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS	
Antitank	Type-87 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.12	Approx.1.1	Approx.11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx.11	Approx.0.9	Approx.12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx.18	Approx.1.2	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Antiland craft and antitank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.33	Approx.1.6	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx.59	Approx.2.0	Approx.16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Middle range multi-purpose missile		Approx.26	Approx.1.4	Approx.14	IR image homing Laser homing
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx.47	Approx.1.6	Approx.18	Laser homing
	Maverick		Approx.300	Approx.2.5	Approx.31	IR image homing

**Reference 38 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)**

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	△0.8	8,107	△2.8	1,349	△3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
2007	5,219,000	829,088	4.0	469,784	1.3	47,818 48,016	△0.2 △0.3	0.916 0.916	5.77 5.79	10.2 10.2
2008	5,269,000	830,613	0.2	472,845	0.7	47,426 47,796	△0.8 △0.5	0.900 0.907	5.71 5.75	10.0 10.1
2009	5,102,000	885,480	6.6	517,310	9.4	47,028 47,741	△0.8 △0.1	0.922 0.936	5.31 5.39	9.1 9.2
2010	4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826 47,903	△0.4 0.3	0.985 1.008	5.07 5.19	8.76 8.96
2011	4,838,000	924,116	0.1	540,780	1.2	46,625 47,752	△0.4 △0.3	0.964 0.987	5.05 5.17	8.62 8.83
2012	4,796,000	903,339	△2.2	512,450	△5.2	46,453 47,138	△0.4 △1.3	0.969 0.983	5.14 5.22	9.06 9.20
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	527,311	2.9	46,804 47,538	0.8 0.8	0.975	5.05 5.13	8.88 9.02
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	7.1	47,838 48,848	2.2 2.8	0.956 0.976	4.99 5.09	8.47 8.65
2015	5,049,000	963,420	0.5	573,555	1.6	48,221 49,801	0.8 2.0	0.955 0.986	5.01 5.17	8.41 8.68

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2007 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 39 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)**

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal year	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
2007	829,088	47,818 48,016	5.8 5.8	211,409	25.5	52,743	6.4	69,473	8.4
2008	830,613	47,426 47,796	5.7 5.8	217,824	26.2	53,122	6.4	67,352	8.1
2009	885,480	47,028 47,741	5.3 5.4	248,344	28.0	53,104	6.0	70,701	8.0
2010	922,992	46,826 47,903	5.1 5.2	272,686	29.5	55,872	6.1	57,731	6.3
2011	924,116	46,625 47,752	5.0 5.2	287,079	31.1	55,100	6.0	49,743	5.4
2012	903,339	46,453 47,138	5.1 5.2	263,901	29.2	54,057	6.0	45,734	5.1
2013	926,115	46,804 47,538	5.1 5.1	291,224	31.4	53,687	5.8	52,853	5.7
2014	958,823	47,838 48,848	5.0 5.1	305,175	31.8	54,421	5.7	59,685	6.2
2015	963,420	48,221 49,801	5.0 5.2	315,297	32.7	53,613	5.6	59,711	6.2

Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul figures.

2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 40** Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	20,916	44.9 43.8	20,701	44.6 43.9	19,896	42.5 41.9	20,930	43.8 42.8	21,121	43.8 42.4
Materials	25,709 26,836	55.1 56.2	25,751 26,437	55.4 56.1	26,908 27,642	57.5 58.1	26,909 27,918	56.2 57.2	27,100 28,680	56.2 57.6
Equipment acquisition	7,800	16.7 16.3	7,565	16.3 16.0	7,442	15.9 15.7	7,964	16.6 16.3	7,404	15.4 14.9
R&D	851	1.8 1.8	944	2.0 2.0	1,541	3.3 3.2	1,477	3.1 3.0	1,411	2.9 2.8
Facility improvement	1,198	2.6 2.5	999	2.1 2.1	950	2.0 2.0	950	2.0 1.9	1,293	2.7 2.6
Maintenance	10,713	23.0 22.4	11,057	23.8 23.5	11,134	23.8 23.4	11,361	23.7 23.3	11,808	24.5 23.7
Base countermeasures	4,337	9.3 9.1	4,418	9.5 9.4	4,381	9.4 9.2	4,397	9.2 9.0	4,425	9.2 8.9
The cost for SACO-related projects	101	0.2	86	0.2	88	0.2	120	0.2	46	0.1
U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	1,027	2.1	599	1.3	646	1.4	890	1.8	1,426	2.9
Introduction of government aircraft	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	108	0.2
Others	810	1.7 1.7	769	1.7 1.6	1,460	3.1 3.1	760	1.6 1.6	758	1.6 1.5
Total	46,625 47,752	100	46,453 47,138	100	46,804 47,538	100	47,838 48,848	100	48,221 49,801	100

- Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.  
 2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.  
 3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.  
 4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.  
 5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.  
 6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.  
 7. The "others" category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake.  
 8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.  
 9. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 41** Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Japan (100 million yen)	46,625 47,752 △0.4% △0.3%	46,453 47,138 △0.4% △1.3%	46,804 47,538 0.8% 0.8%	47,838 48,848 2.2% 2.8%	48,221 49,801 0.8% 2.0%
U.S. (U.S. \$1 million)	678,064 1.7%	650,851 △4.0%	607,795 △6.6%	577,897 △4.9%	567,703 △1.8
China (100 million yuan)	5,836 12.4%	6,503 11.4%	7,202 10.7%	8,082 12.2%	8,896 10.1%
Russia (RR 100 million)	15,170.906 20.7%	18,465.847 21.7%	21,064.619 14.1%	24,881.341 18.1%	31,168 25.3%
Republic of Korea (100 million won)	314,031 6.2%	329,576 5.0%	344,970 4.7%	357,057 3.5%	374,560 4.9%
Australia (1 million Australian dollar)	26,560 △1.3%	24,217 △8.8%	25,434 5.0%	29,303 15.2%	32,695 11.6%
U.K. (GBP 1 million)	37,169 △5.8%	34,260 △7.8%	34,800 1.6%	34,500 △0.9%	35,400 2.6%
France (€1 million)	37,409 0.7%	38,001 1.6%	38,124 0.3%	38,921 2.1%	—

- Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.  
 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.  
 3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table. Figures for FY2015 are estimated values.  
 4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (However, in FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. Therefore, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.)  
 5. Russia's FY2015 defense expenditure is based on materials released by the Committee on Defence, State Duma of Russia and other sources.  
 6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.  
 7. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by the Ministry of Defence. The figures for FY2013 and after are based on the initial budget in the budget message.  
 8. French defense expenditures for FY2014 are undisclosed as of June 2014.  
 9. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (10.1 billion yen for FY2011, 8.6 billion yen for FY2012, 8.8 billion yen for FY2013, 12.0 billion yen for FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen for FY2015), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community (102.7 billion yen for FY2011, 59.9 billion yen for FY2012, 64.6 billion yen for FY2013, 89.0 billion yen for FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen for FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.



**Reference 42 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)**

FY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Number of Dispatches	529	586	520	555	521
Personnel	39,646	43,494	12,410	89,049	66,267
Vehicles	6,637	12,177	2,068	7,949	9,621
Aircraft	649	968	684	1,255	1,232
Vessels	2	2	1	51	0

**The Scale of the SDF's Engagement in Disaster Relief Operations Associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake (2010 – 2011)**

	Total
Personnel	10,664,870
Aircraft	50,179
Vessels	4,818

**Reference 43 Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2014)**

- (1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by the Self-Defense Forces (training to respond to earthquakes along the Nankai Trough)
- (2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters
- (3) Participation in “Disaster Prevention Day” operational training by the Government Headquarters
- (4) Participation in government’s role-playing simulation exercise
- (5) FY2014 integrated nuclear disaster prevention training
- (6) Participation in tsunami disaster prevention training
- (7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training
- (8) Participation in wide-area medical transport training
- (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka Prefecture comprehensive disaster reduction drills
- (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and Prefectures joint disaster prevention training
- (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Kinki Region joint disaster prevention training
- (12) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region widearea collaboration disaster prevention training
- (13) Participation in other general disaster prevention training implemented by local government, etc.

**Reference 44 Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government (as of March 31, 2015: 334 persons)**

Prefectural Government	Employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Obihiro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (three persons), Bibai City Government, Sapporo City Government (two persons), Shikabe Town Government, Bihoro Town Government (two persons), Tomakomai City Government, Hokuto City Government, Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kushiro City Government, Kushiro Town Government, Nayoro City Government, Kitami City Government, Nanae Town Government, Rumoi City Government, Engaru Town Government, Takigawa City Government, Akabira City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Shibeche Town Government, Shiraoi Town Government, Teshikaga Town Government, Shikaoi Town Government, Hakodate City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Memuro Town Government, Shinhidaka Town Government, Naganuma Town Government, Ashibetsu City Government
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Oirase Town Government, Misawa City Government
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government, Hanamaki City Government, Shiwa Town Government, Takizawa City Government, Tono Town Government, Hachimantai City Government, Kuji City Government, Morioka City Government
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government (two persons), Tagajo City Government, Oohira Village Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government, Daisen City Government, Yokote City Government, Senboku City Government, Odate City Government
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government (two persons), Higashine City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Ashibetsu City Government
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Ryugasaki City Government
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government (three persons), Shibukawa City Government
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government, Soka City Government, Saitama City Government, Wako City Government, Asagiri City Government, Fukaya City Government
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government, Urayasu City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Isumi City Government, Narashino City Government, Funabashi City Government, Matsudo City Government, Katsuura City Government, Narita City Government, Oamishirasato City Government, Nagareyama City Government
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (five persons), Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Arakawa Ward Office, Adachi Ward Office, Shinagawa Ward Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Sagami-hara City Government, Zama City Government, Ebina City Government
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government, Tainai City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government, Kaga City Government
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government, Fukui City Government, Awara City Government
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Minami-alps City Government, Fujiyoshida City Government
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government, Ina City Government, Matsumoto City Government
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Kaizu City Government, Kakamigahara City Government
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (four persons), Ito City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Oyama Town Government, Fukuroi City Government, Shizuoka City Government, Makinohara City Government, Izunokuni City Government, Shimada City Government
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government, Seto Town Government, Kitagoya City Government (two persons), Miyoshi City Government, Mihama Town Government, Taketoyo Town Government, Aisai City Government, Toyohashi City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tobishima Village Office, Ama City Government, Obu City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Oharu Town Office, Ama County, Nishio City Government, Tokai City Government, Handa City Government, Toyoake City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Minamichita Town Office, Yatomi City Government, Nagakute City Government
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Ise City Government, Kameyama City Government, Nabari City Government, Shima City Government, Toba City Government, Kuwana City Government, Yokkaichi City Government
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government, Takashima City Government
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government, Seika Town Government, Kizugawa City Government, Yawata City Government
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government, Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Izumi City Government, Hirakata City Government, Izumisano City Government, Toyono Town Government, Toyono County, Sayama City Government
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government, Akashi City Government, Toyooka City Government, Miki City Government, Yabu City Government
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government, Nara City Government (four persons), Gojo City Government
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Izumo City Government, Hamada City Government
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hatsukaichi City Government Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Shunan City Government, Hoku City Government, Nagato City Government
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons), Komatsushima City Government (three persons), Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakade City Government, Zentsuji City Government
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons), Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Izuka City Government, Nogata City Government, Kasuga City Government, Tagawa City Government, Nakagawa Town Government, Dazaifu City Government, Chikuzen Town Government, Onojo City Government, Munakata City Government, Kasuya Town Government, Itoshima City Government
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons), Karatsu City Government
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Sasebo City Government (two persons), Nagasaki City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), Minamishimabara City Government, Shimabara City Government, Matsuura City Government
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Government
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Saiki City Government, Kitsuki City Government
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government, Nobeoka City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Office, Kobayashi City Government, Saito City Government, Hyuga City Government
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (three persons), Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Kirishima City Government, Tarumizu City Government

\* Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2015 (part-time personnel included).

**Reference 45 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense				
	Special Service		Regular Service	
	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength	Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength
Minister of Defense				
State Minister of Defense				
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2)				
Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense				
Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)				
	SDF Personnel		Administrative Officials, and others	29
	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense	Candidates for SDF Personnel		
	Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs	Reserve Personnel		47,900
	Director General, and others	Ready Reserve Personnel		8,175
	Administrative Officials, and others	Candidate Reserve Personnel		4,600
	SDF Regular Personnel	National Defense Academy students		247,160
		National Defense Medical College students		
		GSDF High Technical School students		
		Part-Time Officials		

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations

2. The law to add partial revision to the National Public Service Act, etc. (Act No. 22 of 2014) was enacted on May 30, 2014, and Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Defense was newly established (for one person if particularly necessary) as a joint position across each Government ministry.

3. Based on the law (Act No. 65 of 2014) enacted on June 13, 2014, which added partial revision to the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, etc., Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be established in the Ministry of Defense.

**Reference 46 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel**

(As of March 31, 2015)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	151,023	45,494	47,073	3,570	247,160
Actual	138,168	42,209	43,099	3,266	226,742
Staffing Rate (%)	91.5	92.8	91.6	91.5	91.7

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel			Fixed-Term Personnel	
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)	
Authorized	45,396	4,877	140,461	56,426	
Actual	42,544 (2,046)	4,517 (28)	137,603 (7,276)	19,370 (1,183)	22,708 (2,425)
Staffing Rate (%)	93.7	92.6	98.0	74.6	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

**Reference 47 Status of Recruiting and Employing Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2014)**

Classification		Number Recruited	Number Employed	Multiple		
Candidates for general, technical staff		GSDF	3,922 ( 512)	150 ( 9)	26.1 ( 56.9)	
		MSDF	1,946 ( 261)	85 ( 5)	22.9 ( 52.2)	
		ASDF	2,647 ( 453)	57 ( 12)	46.4 ( 37.8)	
		Total	8,515 (1,226)	292 ( 26)	29.2 ( 47.2)	
Non-commissioned officer	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	100 ( 24)	12 ( 4)	8.3 ( 6.0)	
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	1 ( 1)	—		
	GSDF personnel (Nursing)	GSDF	9 ( 5)	4 ( 4)	2.3 ( 1.3)	
Aviation students		MSDF	948 ( 97)	82 ( 6)	11.6 ( 16.2)	
		ASDF	2,908 ( 233)	50 ( 4)	58.2 ( 58.3)	
		Total	3,856 ( 330)	132 ( 10)	29.2 ( 33.0)	
Candidates for non-commissioned officers		GSDF	18,887 (2,485)	2,655 (151)	7.1 ( 16.7)	
		MSDF	4,967 ( 717)	1,001 ( 42)	5.0 ( 17.1)	
		ASDF	7,291 (1,208)	780 ( 95)	9.5 ( 12.5)	
		Total	31,145 (4,410)	4,457 (288)	7.0 ( 15.3)	
Privates		GSDF	21,224 (2,482)	5,948 (499)	3.6 ( 4.9)	
		MSDF	4,451 ( 622)	789 ( 79)	6.0 ( 7.9)	
		ASDF	5,686 ( 938)	1,502 (270)	3.8 ( 3.6)	
		Total	31,361 (4,042)	8,239 (848)	3.8 ( 4.8)	
National Defense Academy students		Recommended	Social sciences	169 ( 54)	23 ( 6)	7.3 ( 9.0)
			Science and engineering	265 ( 29)	85 ( 5)	3.1 ( 5.8)
			Total	434 ( 83)	108 ( 11)	4.0 ( 7.5)
		Integrated selection system	Social sciences	123 ( 28)	14 ( 3)	8.8 ( 9.3)
			Science and engineering	143 ( 11)	34 ( 2)	4.2 ( 5.5)
			Total	266 ( 39)	48 ( 5)	5.5 ( 7.8)
		General first term	Social sciences	6,192 (2,529)	66 ( 16)	93.8 (158.1)
			Science and engineering	9,578 (1,887)	275 ( 15)	34.8 (125.8)
			Total	15,770 (4,416)	341 ( 31)	46.2 (142.5)
		General second term	Social sciences	212 ( 51)	16 ( 3)	13.3 ( 17.0)
			Science and engineering	447 ( 44)	30 ( 1)	14.9 ( 44.0)
			Total	659 ( 95)	46 ( 4)	14.3 ( 23.8)
National Defense Medical College students			7,240 (2,240)	85 ( 24)	85.2 ( 93.3)	
National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)			2,654 (2,159)	75 ( 68)	35.4 ( 31.8)	
Technical High School students		Recommended	231	61	3.8	
		General	3,565	267	13.4	
		Total	3,769	328	11.6	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate number of females.  
 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2014.



**Reference 48 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2014**

## ○ Integrated training

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external organizations	
SDF Joint Exercise (command post exercise)	Jan. 26 – 30, 2015	Camp Ichigaya, the locations of participating units, etc.	Internal bureau, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, JMSDF Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc.		Plan to maintain and enhance the SDF's joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations.

## ○ GSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external	
Army Corps field training exercise	Sep. 25 – Oct. 15, 2014	Northern District	JGSDF Northern Army Headquarters, 2nd Division, 7th Division, 5th Brigade, 11th Brigade, JGSDF 1st Artillery Brigade, JGSDF 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, etc. Approximately 6,600 personnel		Plan to maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to various military situations
Army Corps field training exercise	Oct. 27 – Nov. 26, 2014	Western District	JGSDF Western Army, Central Readiness Force, 2nd Division, JGSDF North Eastern Army Artillery Unit, etc. Approximately 16,000 personnel		Plan to maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to various military situations
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Jun. 26 – Jul. 25, 2014	Central-Northern Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	10th Division Headquarters Approximately 3,200 personnel and 1,100 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Sep. 25 – Oct. 14, 2014	Northeastern-Northern Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,750 personnel and 500 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 14 – Oct. 29, 2014	Northern-Eastern Districts (Higashifuji Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 400 personnel and 140 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 27 – Nov. 26, 2014	Northern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division Approximately 1,000 personnel and 320 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 11 – Nov. 22, 2014	Northeastern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	One squadron of the 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group Approximately 230 personnel and 100 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility

## ○ MSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external	
Self Defense Fleet Practical Exercise (maritime defense map exercise)	Sep. 2 – 5, 2014	MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating units	Maritime Staff Office, Self Defense Fleet command, regional headquarters, etc.		Plan to have senior commanders and others practice their assessment of the situations and the operation of units in times of peace and contingencies, as well as to acquire the necessary knowhow for executing the duties of the JMSDF.


**Reference 49 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2014)**

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch	Jun. 22 – Aug. 6, 2014	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay in Oahu Island, Hawaii, U.S., Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii Island, and their surrounding sea areas and airspace	Western Army Headquarters, Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Approximately 40 personnel
	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sep. 22 – Dec. 23, 2014	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	17 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 570 personnel
	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Oct. 4 – Nov. 7, 2014	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.	Each Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, GSDF Artillery School Unit Approximately 220 personnel
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others	Jun. 7 – Aug. 21, 2014	Hawaii, Guam, U.S. West Coast, and their surrounding sea areas and airspace	2 destroyers 3 aircraft Approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal divers
	(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers	Jun. 25 – Jul. 16, 2014	Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam	7 destroyers 1 training support ship 2 aircraft
	(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Aug. 22 – Nov. 22, 2014	Sea areas surrounding Hawaii	1 submarine
	(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Feb. 6 – May. 9, 2015	Hawaii and the sea areas surrounding Guam	1 submarine
	(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers	Mar. 14 – Apr. 4, 2015	Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam	3 destroyers 1 training support ship 2 aircraft
ASDF	Annual practice by antiaircraft units	Aug. 20 – Nov. 26, 2014	White Sands Range and McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	12 Air Defense Missiles (6 groups), Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 380 personnel

**Reference 50 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan**

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Act (ballistic missile destruction measures)
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan
2007	The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started
	SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
2009	North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacific Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July. Orders for ballistic missile destruction measures were issued for the first time (March).
2012	North Korea launched missiles which it called "Satellites" in April and December
	April: The missile was in flight for over a minute before disintegrating and landing in the Yellow Sea
	December: Passed through Okinawa airspace toward the Pacific The Minister of Defense issued the operation order for the implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc.
2014	North Korea launched several ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
	March 3: Two missiles were launched and landed in the Sea of Japan
	March 26: Two missiles were launched and flew over 600 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
	June 29: Several missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan
	July 9: Several missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan
	July 13: Two missiles were launched and flew about 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
2015	March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan


**Reference 51 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles**



**Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military**

- Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.
- In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister's approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.

**Reference 52 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks**



**Reference 53 Main Measures for Re-employment Support**

Items	Measures for employment support	Description
Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based individual aptitudes
	Technical training	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, information processing, crane operation, motor vehicle repair, boiler maintenance, nursing care [home helper], etc.)
	Disaster prevention and risk control training	Provide uniformed SDF personnel who will take early retirement with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
	Correspondence courses	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public certification (certified insurance labor consultant, health supervisor, real estate transaction specialist, etc.)
	Business management training	Support uniformed SDF personnel who will take early retirement to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide knowhow to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment
	Career guidance	Prepare soon-retiring uniformed SDF personnel to find new employment and provide them with knowhow to choose new occupation
	Outsourcing career counseling, etc.	Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each SDF personnel who plans to retire
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel	Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
Measures for promotion outside of SDF	Support publicizing to business owners	Publicizing to companies, etc. the effectiveness of uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire
	Inviting business owners on unit tours	Invite business owners to units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.



**Reference 54 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2010 – May. 31, 2015)

		Dialogue	Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministerial Meeting</li> <li>• Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM Plus)</li> <li>• Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG)</li> <li>• Experts' Working Group (EWG)                                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maritime Security EWG</li> <li>• Military Medicine EWG</li> <li>• Counter-Terrorism EWG</li> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG</li> <li>• Peacekeeping Operations EWG</li> <li>• Humanitarian Mine Action EWG</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM)</li> <li>• Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	(Oct. 10, Aug. 13) (Apr. 11, Apr. 12, Apr. 13, Apr. 14) (Dec. 10, Feb. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13, Mar. 13, Feb. 14, Jan. 15)  (Jul. 11, Feb. 12, Sep. 12, Nov. 12, May 13, Sep. 13, Jan. 14, Jun. 14, Oct. 14, Feb. 15) (Jul. 11, Jul. 12, Oct. 13, Jun. 14, Oct. 14) (Sep. 11, Apr. 12, Mar. 13, Oct. 14, Feb. 15) (Nov. 11, Aug. 12, Jan. 14, Jul. 14, Dec. 14) (Nov. 11, Jun. 12, Nov. 12, Apr. 13, Feb. 14, Sep. 14, Mar. 15) (Jun. 14, Dec. 14)
	Hosted by the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)</li> </ul>	(Jun 10, Jun. 11, Jun. 12, Jun. 13, Jun. 14)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum</li> <li>○ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges</li> <li>○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)</li> <li>○ Subcommittee of Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)</li> <li>○ International Seminar for Military Science</li> <li>○ International Conference of Cadets</li> </ul>	(Sep. 11, Mar. 13, Feb. 14, Oct. 14) (Sep. 11, Mar. 13) (Sep. 10, Mar. 12, Oct. 12, Oct. 13, Mar. 15)   (Jul. 10, Jul. 11, Jul. 12) (Mar. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13)	

**Reference 55 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2014)**

(Number of students)

Institution	Country																			Sub total
	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	Singapore	Viet Nam	Cambodia	Timor-Leste	Laos	India	Pakistan	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	Australia	New Zealand	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France		
National Institute for Defense Studies	1		1						1						2			1	6	
National Defense Academy	5	2	4		9	3	2	2			2	5	1		8			6	49	
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	2			1		1			1	4	3	1			3				16	
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1										2				1	1			5	
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	3								1		3		1		1				9	
Joint Staff College	2				1						2		3	1		1	1		11	
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>96</b>	

**Reference 56** Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

(Apr. 1, 2010 – May. 31, 2015)

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
Internal Bureau and others	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Minister-level Meeting	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. Vice -ministerial level officials from Defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	The 6th consultation was held in Yokohama in October 2014, with the participation of 10 countries in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN secretariat. Frank and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of "To Promote Maritime Defense Cooperation" and "Possible Maritime Cooperation – From Perspective of Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Capacity Building."
	Tokyo seminar on common security challenges	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.	With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled "Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN." The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.	With the participation of 24 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (including Japan), the ASEAN secretariat, the EU, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 19th Forum was held in March 2015. Opinions were exchanged on "Enhancing Maritime Security" and "Synergy Among the Frameworks for Multilateral Cooperation."
GSDF	Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.	In November 2014, with the participation of a record 26 countries in the Asia-Pacific region as well as government and other organizations, group discussions took place on the theme of "multilateral coordination in the field for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief." In addition, earthquake response exercise "Michinoku ALERT 2014" and other activities were held.
	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 18th MLST meeting was held in November 2014. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the EU. Keynote speech and opinion exchanges were held on topics regarding logistic cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region.
	Army Command and General Staff College seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	With the participation of students from air force colleges in 15 countries in Asia-Pacific region, the 13th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held on August 2013. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of the leadership teamwork in the multinational peace cooperation activities in the multilateral environment.
MSDF	Multi-national seminar for students of the Command and Staff Course (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program for Officers of the Next Generations (WPNS STEP))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/ research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.	The 17th seminar was held in February 2014 with participants from 14 countries, and the main theme of the event was "the challenges to the future of maritime security in Asia-Pacific region." Opinions were exchanged on the theme of traditional security and transnational issues, humanitarian support, disaster relief, PKO. Japan Coast Guard also participated as a part of interministerial cooperation.
	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996, with participation by officials related to air force academies mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education.	The 19th International Air Force Education Seminar was held in February 2015, inviting seven countries. Opinions were exchanged on the main theme of "Mid- to long-term education and of senior officers and research at air force academics in each country."
ASDF	Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	With the participation of students from air force colleges in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the 14th seminar was held in September 2014. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "The current status, issues and future direction of the Air Force in each country" and "The roles that Air Forces should assume in the Asia-Pacific region."
	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides an opportunity to invite instructors of military academies in the Asia-Pacific regions and to discuss international affairs and security.	The 19th International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2014, inviting 16 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Education of military academy that provides the foundation for executing duties in diverse environments."
National Defense Academy	International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	In March 2015, 19 countries were invited to the 18th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Near future: When we are commanders."
	International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.	In November 2013, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., India and Singapore, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Potential multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region beyond the differences in viewing security."
National Institute for Defense Studies	International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studied, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	In October 2012, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., Sweden and India, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Directions and challenges to overcome for innovation of military capabilities."
	International Forum on War History	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	In September 2013, researchers were invited from the United States, U.K. Australia and Japan to exchange opinions on the theme of "Defense of the Wider Realm :the Diplomacy and Strategy of the Protection of Islands in War."
	Asia-Pacific Security Workshop	Giving workshop-style group study sessions to discuss arising security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common.	In January 2013, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan and China, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Security outlook of the Asia Pacific countries and its implications for the defense sector."

**Reference 57 Other Multilateral Security Dialogue**

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview	
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Putrajaya Forum		This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2010.
	Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)		This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2011.
	Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)		This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has been a participant since the first meeting in 2012.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic- support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
		Land Forces Pacific (LFP)	LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The JGSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the "Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation on HA/DR," which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.
		Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX)	CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The JGSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the JGSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.
		Air Power Conference (APC)	APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.
		International Conference on Air & Space Power (ICAP)	These international conferences on air and space are hosted by Turkish Air War College. ICAP, on the theme of the future of the air forces, and ISAW, on the theme of the history of the air forces, are respectively held every other year. Japan has participated since their first conferences in 2013.
		International Symposium on the history of Air Warfare (ISAW)	
Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence	Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)	Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.	
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-la Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
	Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.
	Munich Security Conference		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.
	Halifax International Security Forum		Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.



**Reference 58 Status of Invitation Program**

(March 2013–May 31, 2015)

Country	Period	Description	Beneficiary	Dispatched personnel
Vietnam	March 5-8, 2013	Introduction of SDF's UN PKO activities, etc. for the Vietnam People's Army's dispatch of personnel to PKO	Ministry of National Defence and People's Army of Vietnam	6 personnel
	September 19-26, 2013	Underwater Medicine training at related MSDF units and facilities.	Navy of Vietnam	5 personnel
	February 4-5, 2014	HA/DR training	Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam	3 personnel
	March 3-5, 2014	Training in flight safety and other fields	Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Air Defence-Air Force of Vietnam	5 personnel
Mongolia	November 20-23, 2013	Military Medicine training at related GSDF units and facilities.	Medical Department, General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces	6 personnel
	March 10-13, 2014	Engineering training	General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces	5 personnel
	March 4-9, 2015	Military Medicine training at GSDF Sapporo Hospital	General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital	5 personnel
	February 23-March 20, 2015	Engineering training at GSDF Engineer School	Mongolian Armed Forces	6 personnel
Indonesia	February 3-7, 2014	Oceanography and Marine Charting training at related MSDF units, facilities of Japan Coast Guard's Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, and private company	Oceanography and Marine Charting Department, Indonesian Navy	5 personnel
Timor-Leste	June 10-13, 2014	Training on GSDF logistic support troops	Timor-Leste Defence Force	6 personnel
Cambodia	September 21-October 5, 2014	Engineering training at related GSDF units and facilities	Engineering Department Royal Cambodian Armed Forces	5 personnel
Philippines	February 17-20, 2015	Airlift training at related GSDF and ASDF units and facilities.	Philippine Air Force	4 personnel

**Reference 59 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Cobra Gold	February 2013 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	February 2014 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	February 2015 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
Pacific Partnership	June – July 2012 (Philippines, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.	1 vessel 6 aircraft (personnel transportation) Approximately 50 personnel
	June – July 2013 (Tonga, Papua New Guinea)	Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	1 vessel, 2 aircraft Approximately 40 personnel
	May – July 2014 (Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, Chile, ROK	1 vessel, 1 aircraft (personnel transportation), Approximately 40 personnel
ARF-DiREx	May 2013 (Thailand)	Japan, Thailand, ROK, ARF countries	1 aircraft Approximately 50 participants from Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Central Readiness Force, Middle Army, and Air Support Command, SDF Hanshin Hospital
	May 2015 (Malaysia)	Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Mongolia, Laos, China, India, Cambodia, U.S., etc.	Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital
Asean Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercises	April – May 2014 (Thailand)	Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, China, U.S., France, EU, Canada	7 personnel
ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise	June 2013 (Brunei)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Northeastern Army
	Military Medicine Meeting October 2013 (Singapore)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office
ADDM Counter Terrorism Exercise	September 2013 (Indonesia)	Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Russia, U.S., ROK, Philippines, Myanmar, Japan	3 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau
Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise	Shanti Prayas-2 March – April 2013 (Nepal)	Japan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, ROK, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.	Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army
	Garuda Canti Dharma August – September 2014 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, ROK, Vietnam, Pakistan, etc.	Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force
Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)	August 2012 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, India, Singapore	2 personnel
	August 2013 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, U.K., France, India, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Nepal	Approximately 4 personnel including observers
	June – July 2014 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Canada, Germany, U.K., India, Indonesia, ROK, Nepal, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, France, Tajikistan	Approximately 8 personnel including observers
American-Filipino Bilateral Training (Balikatan 12)	April 2012 (Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia	3 personnel

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention	May 2012 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, U.K.	Approximately 20 personnel
	May 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, China, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.	Approximately 40 personnel
	May 2014 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.	Approximately 30 personnel
	April 2015 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S.	Approximately 30 personnel
Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013)	September 8 – November 8 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, U.S., France, Spain, Tonga, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan	1 vessel
ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (part of the Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training described above)	September 29 – October 1 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., New Zealand, China, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Singapore	1 vessel
Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise	September 20 – 28, 2013 (Yokosuka, Sagami Bay)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.	3 vessels, etc.
Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise	February 12 – March 8, 2013 (New Zealand)	Japan, U.S., China, ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.	7 personnel
KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy	March 20 – April 9, 2014 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Russia, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.	1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training	June 2012 (Kyushu, southeastern waters)	Japan, U.S., Australia	2 vessels 1 aircraft
	September 2012 (Waters around Australia)		2 aircraft
	June 22 – 26, 2013 (Waters and airspace around Guam)		1 vessel 2 aircraft
	August 9-15, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Guam)		2 aircraft
	September 20-21, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)		1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Korea Trilateral Training	June 2012 (Korean peninsula, southern waters)	Japan, U.S., ROK	3 vessels
	August 2012 (Waters around Hawaii)		2 vessels
	May 15, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)		2 vessels
	October 10 –11, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)		1 vessel
	December 11, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)		2 vessels
	July 21 –22, 2014 (Waters west of Kyushu)		1 vessel
Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)	August-September 2012 (Waters around Australia)	Japan, Australia, etc.	1 vessel 2 aircraft
	August-September 2014 (Waters around Australia)		1 vessel 2 aircraft
U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise	September 2012 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
	May 4 – 29, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	6 personnel
	October 27 – November 13, 2014 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)	February 2013 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)	Japan, U.S., Australia	20 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel
	February 2014 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)		20 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel
	February 2015 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)		20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)	May 2013, May 2014, May 2015 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 45 personnel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Michinoku Alert)	November 2014 (Tohoku)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Northeastern Army Headquarters Approximately 12,500 personnel, approximately 1,700 vehicles
RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)	June-August 2012 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, ROK, Russia, U.K., etc.	3 vessels 3 aircraft
	June-August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.	2 vessels, 3 aircraft Western Army, etc.
Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint Training	August 30, 2014 (Surrounding airspace of Darwin)	Japan, Australia, New Zealand	2 aircraft
Multilateral training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)	August 25-September 5, 2014 (New Caledonia)	Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Tonga, U.K., Vanuatu	4 personnel
Japan-U.S.-France Joint Training	May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)	Japan, U.S., France	1 vessel, 2 aircraft

**Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jun. 2012	Meeting between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Japan) and Australian Defense Minister (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2012	☆ Agreement reached to promote international peace cooperation and technical Cooperation 4th Japan-Australia "2+2" meeting (Sydney)
	Sep. 2012	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) regional security situation and 2) Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation
	Sep. 2012	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney)
	Sep. 2012	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) their security policies, and 2) Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Jun. 2013	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2013	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) Japan-Australia defense cooperation and 2) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation
	Jul. 2013	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2013	☆ Agreement reached to advance Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Jul. 2013	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2013	☆ Confirmed the regional situations and the progress of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, and exchanged views regarding the future Japan-Australia defense cooperation as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation
	Apr. 2014	Attendance of Prime Minister of Australia to Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) and a special meeting of the National Security Council (Four Ministers Meeting)
	Apr. 2014	☆ Agreement was reached on 1) Strengthening of defense cooperation in a real term, 2) Commencement of negotiation towards the agreement of a framework regarding defense equipment and technical cooperation
	Apr. 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth)
	May 2014	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation including the areas of equipment and technologies
May 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue))	
May 2014	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation	
Jun. 2014	5th Japan-Australia "2+2" Meeting (Tokyo)	
Jun. 2014	☆ 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confirmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology	
Jun. 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Jun. 2014	☆ Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training	
Jul. 2014	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Canberra)	
Jul. 2014	☆ Issued Joint Statement (signed defense equipment transfer agreement, approved proposals to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, and decided to commence negotiations to create an agreement for facilitating Japan-Australia joint activities and training, etc.)	
Oct. 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	
Oct. 2014	☆ Examined possibility of potential cooperation on F-35, examined possibility of submarine cooperation, technical exchanges (e.g., marine hydrodynamics), etc.	
May 2015	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))	
May 2015	☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation	
	Visit to Australia by GSD Chief of Staff (Jun 2012, Sep 2014 (twice)), Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Jun 2012, Nov 2014), Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff (Feb 2013, Mar 2014, Feb 2015), Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff (Aug 2014)	
	Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Defence Force (Jun 2013), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy (May 2012, Mar 2015), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force (Oct 2014), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Ground Force (Oct 2012)	
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	13th Japan-Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM) (Aug. 2012), 17th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Nov. 2012), 18th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Feb. 2014)	
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Jun. 2013, Sep. 2013, Aug. 2014), Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia (Feb. 2013, Feb. 2015), Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015)	
	Sep. 2012	Participation in the Australian hosted multinational joint maritime exercise "Kakadu 12"
	Sep. 2013	Participation of an Australian Navy fleet in the Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Training hosted by Japan.
	Aug. 2014	Japan participated in the International Fleet Review to commemorate the centenary of the Royal Australian Navy's fleet into Sydney, Australian Navy-hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013) and ADMM Plus
	Aug. – Sep. 2014	Visit to Hamamatsu and Chitose Air Bases by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft (E-7A)
	Participation in the Royal Australian Navy hosted multinational joint maritime exercise "Kakadu 14"	
Japan – U.S.– Australia trilateral cooperation	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2012	☆ Joint Statement issued and trilateral cooperation in regional security and stability confirmed
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2013	☆ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued and promotion of dynamic and versatile trilateral defense cooperation confirmed
	May 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2014	☆ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued
	May 2015	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2015	☆ Joint Statement issued and agreement reached to further deepen the trilateral defense cooperation
	Feb. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Oct. 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF) (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Sep. 2012, Jun. 2013, Aug. 2014, Sep. 2014), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF) (Feb. 2013, Feb. 2014, Feb. 2015)	
Dec. 2012	Participation of Major General of Australian Army as Vice Commander of U.S. Pacific Command in Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises	
Feb. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)	
Jul. 2013	1st Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)	
Mar. 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Canberra) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)	
Jul. 2014	2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff)	
Feb. 2015	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)	

**Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Nov. 2013	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)
	Mar. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta)
	Oct. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul)
	Nov. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax)
	May 2015	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	May 2013	20th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister-level talks) (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Sep. 2014	5th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group Meeting (Director-level talks) (Seoul)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Apr. 2015	10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Apr. 2012	Visit to Japan by the ROK Army Second Field Army Commander (GSDF)
	Nov. 2012	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
	Nov. 2012	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Dec. 2012	Japan-ROK basic level officer exchange (Japan) (GSDF)
	Apr. 2013	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Sep. 2013	Participation of Korean Navel vessel in a submarine rescue training in the western Pacific Ocean hosted by Japan
	Sep. 2013	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Oct. 2013	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
	Oct. 2013	Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (Japan) (GSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (MSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Dec. 2013	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Mar. 2014	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Sep. 2014	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
	Oct. 2014	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
Dec. 2014	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)	
Mar. 2015	Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (ROK) (GSDF)	
Mar. – Apr. 2015	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)	



Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral cooperation	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A press release was issued. The three ministers shared a common recognition on the regional security situation while reaffirming the value of trilateral defense cooperation.
	Jan. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The three ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation, while agreeing to expand the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral defense cooperation.
	Apr. 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
	May 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreeing to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation.
	Jul. 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting
	May 2015	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ The three ministers once again emphasized their resolute position that they do not accept North Korea's continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They agreed to continue to hold consultations on the security issues facing the three countries and to coordinate among the three countries.
	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Aug. 2012, May 2013, Oct. 2013, Dec. 2013, Jul. 2014)	
	Japan-U.S.-ROK Basic Level Officer Exchange (GSDF) (Apr. 2013 (ROK), Dec. 2013 (Japan), Apr. 2014 (ROK), Dec. 2014 (Japan), Apr. 2015 (ROK))	

### Reference 62 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	May 2013	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and establishment of working group to facilitate bilateral cooperation concerning regular exercises between MSDF and Indian Navy as well as US-2 decided.
	Jan. 2014	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries, bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, as well as regional and global security issues, etc.
	Sep. 2014	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi) Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and both sides reaffirmed the importance of their bilateral defense relationship and agreed to launch working-level consultations on defense equipment cooperation. Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges was signed.
	Mar. 2015	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries which have shared interests in the maritime security domain, as well as defense cooperation and exchange, etc.
	Oct. 2012	2nd Japan-India Vice-Ministerial "2+2" Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2012	3rd Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2013	Visit to India by the ASDF Chief of Staff
	May 2013	Visit to India by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2014	Visit to India by the GSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by the Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jun. 2012	First Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Second Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Jul. 2014	Exercise Malabar

### Reference 63 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Mar. 2015	13th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jun. 2012	3rd Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Beijing)
	Jan. 2015	4th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Tokyo)
	May 2015	2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) Japan-China vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Apr. 2013	First Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Beijing)
	Apr. 2014	Visit to China by the MSDF Chief of Staff (WPNS (Qingdao))

### Reference 64 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Sep. 2012	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Russia (Vladivostok APEC)) ☆ Concurred on deepening Japan-Russia cooperation in the fields of security and defense
	Apr. 2013	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow) ☆ Agreement reached to hold Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) Agreement reached to expand exchanges between defense officials and forces of the two countries as well as to seek new areas of cooperation including counter-terrorism and counter-piracy measures
	Nov. 2013	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding future Japan-Russia defense cooperation and exchange as well as defense policies of both countries
	Nov. 2013	Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding security and defense policies of both countries based on the security situation in Asia-Pacific region, cooperation within the region based on a multilateral framework, and deployment of a missile defense system in the region, etc.
	Feb. 2014	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Sochi)
	May 2015	Japan-Russia vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Visit to Russia by the Chief of Joint Staff (Jun. 2012), Visit to Russia by the ASDF Chief of Staff (Aug. 2012), Visit to Russia by the MSDF Chief of Staff (Aug. 2013), Visit to Russia by the GSDF Chief of Staff (Feb. 2014)	
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Apr. 2012	6th Japan-Russia Security Talks
	Sep. 2012	11th Japan-Russia Consultation between defense authorities
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Aug. 2012	Visit to Japan by Russian Navy's vessels
	Jul. 2013	Visit to Japan by the delegation of the Russian Ground Forces, Eastern Military District
	Mar. 2014	Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army
	Dec. 2014	Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commander of the ASDF Northern Air Defense Force
	13th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Sep. 2012), 14th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Dec. 2013), 15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Dec. 2014)	

**Reference 65 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Brunei	May 2012 Aug. 2013	Visit to Japan by the Bruneian Deputy Minister of Defense Visit to Brunei by the Minister of Defense
	Cambodia	Aug. 2013 May 2015	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Indonesia	Jun. 2012 Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the Indonesian Minister of Defense (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions on ADMM-Plus-related cooperation and memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Agreement reached to advance cooperation in the area of defense Visit to Indonesia by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the ASDF Chief Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Chief of Air Force Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Indonesia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Laos	Jun. 2012 Aug. 2013 Jan. 2014 Feb. 2015	Meeting between the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the Laotian Vice-Minister of National Defense (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Laos by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Laos by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Malaysia	Jan. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 May 2015	Visit to Malaysia by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) Visit to Malaysia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Malaysia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Myanmar	Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2014	Visit to Myanmar by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Myanmar by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Myanmar by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar Visit to Myanmar by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by the Minister of Defense (Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers' Roundtable)
	Philippines	Apr. 2012 Jun. 2012 Jul. 2012 Sep. 2012 May 2013 Jun. 2013 Dec. 2013 Sep. 2014 Jan. 2015 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015	Visit to Japan by the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to the Philippines by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Visit to the Pacific Partnership 2012, etc.) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Signed statement of intent on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila) Visit to Japan by the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by the Minister of Defense (Visit to international disaster relief operations) Visit to the Philippines by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to the Philippines by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Singapore	Jun. 2012 Jul. 2012 Oct. 2012 Jan. 2013 Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the Singaporean Minister of Defense (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Confirmed that both countries would work cooperatively as co-chairs of ADMM-Plus military medicine EWG Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Agreed to work together on bilateral exercises, multilateral exercises, logistics supports, etc. Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Thailand	Nov. 2012 Jan. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2013 Nov. 2014	Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Army Commander Visit to Thailand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Thailand defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Air Force Commander Visit to Japan by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
	Timor-Leste	Mar. 2012 Mar. 2015	Visit to Japan by Timor-Leste's Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Security Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Vietnam	May 2012 Jun. 2012 Nov. 2012 Apr. 2013 May 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015	Visit to Vietnam by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Vietnam Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force 1st Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army Visit to Vietnam by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force Visit to Vietnam by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People's Navy Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Multilateral National Security Talks etc., Held at Bilateral Meetings	Jun. 2012	11th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore, Chief of Joint Staff-level meetings are as follows)
		Sep. 2012	Chief of the General Staff of the Filipino National Armed Forces, Commander of the Singaporean National Military
		Nov. 2012	13th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Kuala Lumpur, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows)
		Mar. 2013	Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy, Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy
		May 2013	15th CHOD (Sydney, Chief of Joint Staff-level meetings are as follows)
		Jul. 2013	Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines
		Dec. 2013	4th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice Ministerial Forum (Tokyo, vice ministerial-level meetings are as below)
		Feb. 2014	Vice ministers of Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia
		Apr. 2014	IMDEX2013 (Singapore, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows)
		Sep. 2014	Singapore Navy Commander, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry High-level talks between heads of state and defense representatives	Cambodia	May 2013	2nd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Brisbane)
		Sep. 2014	3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo)
	Indonesia	Jul. 2013	2nd Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 5th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Jakarta)
		Nov. 2014	6th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Philippines	May 2013	6th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 6th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
		Apr. 2014	7th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Manila)
	Singapore	Jul. 2013	13th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
		Dec. 2014	14th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Singapore)
	Thailand	Mar. 2013	11th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 11th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Bangkok)
		Mar. 2015	12th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 12th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
Vietnam	Dec. 2012	3rd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi)	
	Nov. 2013	4th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo)	
	Oct. 2014	5th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi)	
Malaysia	Nov. 2012	4th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Kuala Lumpur)	
	Oct. 2013	5th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)	
Myanmar	Nov. 2013	1st Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)	
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.	Feb. 2013	Participation in Cobra Gold 13 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		Mar. 2013	Exchange between Japanese and Singapore troops (Japan) (GSDF)
		Feb. 2014	Participation in Cobra Gold 14 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		Feb. 2015	Participation in Cobra Gold 15 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		May 2015	Participation in 4th ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) hosted by Malaysia and China (Malaysia)

**Reference 66 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom (Past Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Apr. 2012	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2012	☆Decision reached to start negotiations on a government to government information security agreement, endorse signing of the Defence Cooperation Memorandum, identify a range of appropriate defence equipment for joint development and production, etc.
	Jan. 2013	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and U.K. Defence Minister (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2013	☆Exchanged memorandum relating to defense exchange. Confirmed to work to deepen cooperation in areas including equipment and technologies.
	Jul. 2013	Visit to the U.K. by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
	Sep. 2013	☆Exchanged views on Japan-U.K. defense cooperation, including the fields of equipment and cyberspace
	May 2014	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2014	☆Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the U.K. and on regional situation
	Jul. 2014	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology
	Jan. 2015	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jan. 2013	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Dec. 2013	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Mar. 2014	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Apr. 2014	☆Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the U.K. and on regional situation
	Jul. 2014	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Oct. 2014	Visit to the U.K. by the State Minister of Defense
	Oct. 2014	Japan-U.K. foreign and defense ministers' meeting, Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jan. 2013	☆Confirmed progress of cooperation on defense equipment and technology, and exchanged views on strengthening cooperation on global security issues, regional situation, etc.
	Dec. 2013	Visit to the U.K. by the GSDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jun. 2012	Visit to Japan by the First Minister of Navy and the U.K. Royal Navy Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2014	Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the U.K. Army
	Apr. 2014	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Jul. 2014	Visit to the U.K. by the ASDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2014	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jan. 2013	12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2013	13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (GSDF) (Sep. 2014, Oct. 2014), Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (MSDF) (Nov. 2013, May 2014), Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (ASDF) (Jul. 2013 (Japan), Jul. 2014 (U.K.))	



**Reference 67 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Nations and Others (Past Three Years)**

(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense

Belgium	Mar. 2014	Visit to Belgium by the Chief of Joint Staff
France	Jun. 2012	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and French Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Concluded pursuing possible cooperation in the areas of equipment and technologies
	Jun. 2013	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the situation of Japan-France defense cooperation exchange and regional situations
	Aug. 2013	Visit to France by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2014	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France defense cooperation and exchange
	Jan. 2014	Japan-France foreign and defense ministers' meeting (Paris) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France security and defense cooperation
	Mar. 2014	Visit to France by the Chief of Joint Staff
	Jun. 2014	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2014	☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and security policies
	Jul. 2014	Visit to France by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
	Mar. 2015	Visit to France by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France foreign and defense ministers' meeting, Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, and exchanged opinions regarding Japan-France security and defense cooperation, security policies, regional situations, etc.
Germany	Apr. 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2015	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Army Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Navy Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Italy	Jun. 2012 May 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2014	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed Statement of Intent on defense exchanges and cooperation. Concurred on advancing the bilateral cooperation into a new level. Visit to Italy by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Italy by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Italy by the Minister of Defense
Spain	Jan. 2013 Nov. 2014	Visit to Spain by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Poland	Mar. 2013	Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Norway	May 2012	Visit to Norway by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Sweden	May 2012 Mar. 2015	Visit to Sweden by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces
Finland	Jul. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015	Visit to Finland by the Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Finland by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland
Estonia	May 2015	Visit to Estonia by the State Minister of Defense
Lithuania	Feb. 2014	Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Bulgaria	May 2015	Visit to Bulgaria by the State Minister of Defense
Turkey	Jul. 2012 Mar. 2013 May 2015	Visit to Turkey by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Signed statement of intent on defense cooperation and exchanges Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces
Kazakhstan	Jul. 2012	Visit to Kazakhstan by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Azerbaijan	Aug. 2013	Visit to Azerbaijan by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Canada	Jun. 2012 Mar. 2014 Nov. 2014	Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial "2+2" Dialogue (Ottawa) Japan-Canada vice-ministerial meeting (Halifax)
Latvia	May 2015	Visit to Japan by the State Secretary of Defence of Latvia
Mongolia	Nov. 2012 Aug. 2013 Nov. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015	Japan-Mongolia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Ulan Bator) Visit to Mongolia by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Mongolia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Mongolia by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Vice Minister of Defense of Mongolia (19th Tokyo Defense Forum) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
New Zealand	May 2013 Jul. 2013 Aug. 2013 Jun. 2014 Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015	Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to New Zealand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force Visit to New Zealand by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Pakistan	Feb. 2013	Visit to Pakistan by the MSDF Chief of Staff
Sri Lanka	Jun. 2014	Visit to Sri Lanka by the MSDF Chief of Staff
Brazil	Aug. 2014	Visit to Brazil by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Colombia	Mar. 2015	Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Middle East/ Africa	Apr. 2012 May 2012 Nov. 2012 Feb. 2013 Mar. 2013 Apr. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jan. 2015 May 2015	Visit to Israel by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Bahrain by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Djibouti, Jordan, and Israel by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Saudi Arabian Commander of the RSNF Visit to Japan by the Saudi Arabian Deputy Defense Minister Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Minister of Defense Visit to South Africa by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Chief of Djibouti Navy Visit to Djibouti and South Sudan by the Minister of Defense Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Multi-country	Sep. 2012 May 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Apr. 2014 Sep. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015	13th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Kuala Lumpur) IMDEX2013 (Singapore) 8th PACC (New Zealand) International Maritime Security Symposium (Jakarta) 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Qingdao) 21st International Seapower Symposium (Newport) Navy League Sea-Air-Space (Maryland) IMDEX2015 (Singapore)

Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	New Zealand	Oct. 2013 Sep. 2014	7th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo) 8th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Auckland)
	Canada	Apr. 2012 Jun. 2014	7th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	France	Feb. 2013 Nov. 2014	16th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 15th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris) 17th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 16th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Germany	Sep. 2012 Oct. 2014	11th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin) 14th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Italy	Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013	1st Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome) 2nd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Poland	Sep. 2014	1st Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	NATO	May 2012 Feb. 2014	12th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo) 13th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo)
	Sweden	Dec. 2012	2nd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)
	Norway	Feb. 2013 Nov. 2014	1st Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Oslo) 2nd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Pakistan	Aug. 2012 Nov. 2014	6th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad) 7th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Turkey	Jan. 2015	2nd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Mongolia	Jan. 2013 Dec. 2014	1st Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 1st Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 2nd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Ulan Bator)
	Unit-level exchange, etc.	New Zealand	Aug. 2014
NATO		Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014	Japan-NATO bilateral exercise Japan-NATO bilateral exercise
EU		Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Mar. 2015	Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise (twice) Japan-EU bilateral exercise
Turkey		Nov. 2014	Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise
Pakistan		Mar. 2015	Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise

## Reference 68 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy

### 1. Purpose of the Legislation

To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people's lives.

### 2. Definition of Acts of Piracy

Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan's territorial waters, etc.:

(1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons

### 3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy

A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:

- (1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.
- (2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years
- (3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years

### 4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy

- (1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy.
- (2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

### 5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy

- (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).
- (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.
- (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded.
- (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.

**Reference 69 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities**

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace	○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ International peacekeeping activities ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security	○ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq) ○ High seas and the airspace above <sup>1</sup>	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) <sup>1</sup> ○ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above <sup>1</sup>
Diet Approval	○ In principle, prior approval in the Diet session is required for the SDF to conduct peace keeping missions <sup>2</sup>	○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures <sup>2</sup>	(Note 3)
Diet Report	○ Prompt report on the details of the operation plan is required	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.

2. In case the Diet is closed, an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.

3. As prescribed by Law, (1) The category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) The area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to once again obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to the Diet approval.

**Reference 70 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities**
**(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq**

(As of May 31, 2015)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	Jun. – Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004	Approx. 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009	Approx. 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

**(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Nov. 2001 – Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		–	• Transportation of materials

**(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

**(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF (Maritime Force)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Mar. 2009 –	Approx. 400	• Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
MSDF (Air Unit)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	May 2009 – Jul. 2014	Approx. 120 (*)	• Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.
	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Jul. 2014 –	Approx. 70	• Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
MSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 –	Approx. 40	• Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.
MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)	Bahrain	Aug. 2014 –	Under 20	• Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151
MSDF (Local Coordination Center)	Djibouti	Jul. 2012 – Jul. 2014	3	• Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation
GSDF (Air Unit)	Djibouti	May. 2009 – Jul. 2014	Approx. 70 (*)	• Security of activity base and P-3C
GSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 –	Approx. 70	• Security of activity base and P-3C

\*Number of personnel as of July 2014



## (5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

			Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks		
PKO	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	8	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire</li> <li>Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border</li> </ul>		
		Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	600	1200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure</li> <li>Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups</li> <li>Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	5	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft mid- and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters</li> </ul>		
		Transport coordination unit	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	48	144	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport</li> </ul>		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep. – Dec. 1994	260		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies</li> </ul>		
		Air transport unit	Sep. – Dec. 1994	188		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo)</li> <li>Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009	1st-3th personnel: 2	38	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters</li> </ul>		
			Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013	14th-17th personnel: 3				
		Transport unit	Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel: 43	1463	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transport food and other supplies</li> <li>Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance</li> </ul>		
Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013	34th personnel: 44							
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	113		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR</li> <li>Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel</li> </ul>		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Oct. 2001	138		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st personnel: 10 2nd personnel: 7	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</li> <li>Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities</li> <li>Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance</li> <li>Public welfare support operations</li> </ul>		
		Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd personnel: 680 3rd personnel: 522 4th personnel: 405				
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	Mar. – Apr. 2003	50		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR</li> </ul>		
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	Jul. – Aug. 2003	98		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007 – Jan. 2011	6	24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008 – Sep. 2011	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector</li> <li>Database management</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items</li> </ul>		
		Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	1st personnel: 203 2nd personnel: 346 3rd and 4th personnel: 330 5th and 6th personnel: 317 7th personnel: 297 Removal support personnel: 44			2184	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012	2	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste</li> </ul>		
PKO	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 –	4	19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics</li> <li>Management of database</li> <li>Planning and coordination of engineering duties</li> </ul>		
		Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 –	1st personnel: approx. 210 2nd – 4th personnel: approx. 330 5th and 6th personnel: approx. 400 7th personnel: approx. 350			2348	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel)</li> <li>Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities</li> <li>Coordination regarding logistics</li> </ul>
		Joint Coordination Center	Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013	1st personnel: approx. 30 2nd – 4th personnel: approx. 20				

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

**(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF**

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)	Medical support unit	Jun. 1 – 22, 2006	149	• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85	• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)	Medical support unit	Oct. 5 – 17, 2009	12	• Medical treatment
	Joint liaison office		21	• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others
International disaster relief activities in Haiti (earthquake disaster)	Medical support unit	Jan. 18 – Feb. 16, 2010	104	• Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		97	• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Joint liaison office		33	• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others
International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (floods)	Air support unit	Aug. 20 – Oct. 10, 2010	184	• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies by air
	Joint operations coordination center		27	• Coordination with related organizations in Pakistan and other related countries
	Marine convoy		154	• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by sea
	Air transport unit		149	• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by air
Transportation of resources and personnel necessary for the implementation of international disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air transport unit	Feb. 23 – Mar. 3, 2011	40	• Transportation of international disaster relief teams by air
International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)	Local operations coordination center	Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013	1,086	• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others
	Medical assistance unit/Air support unit			• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials
	Maritime dispatched unit			• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
	Airlift unit			• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)	Local support coordination center	Mar. 11– Apr. 28, 2014	137	• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries.
	MSDF Patrol aircraft unit			• Rescue operations including searching
	ASDF Airlift unit			• Rescue operations including searching
International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)	Local coordination center	Dec. 5 – 11, 2014	4	• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		10	• Transport activities
	Epidemiological study support	Apr. 21 – May 29, 2015	1	• Support for WHO's epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)	Local support coordination center	Jan. 3 – 9, 2015	3	• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
	International disaster relief surface force		Approx. 350	• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)	Joint operations coordination center	Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015	4	• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries
	Medical support unit		Approx. 110	• Medical treatment for affected people
	Air transport unit		Approx. 30	• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.  
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

**Reference 71 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations**

(As of June 31, 2015)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Aug. 1, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) <sup>1</sup>
Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 25, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013 –	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013 –	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 1, 2015 –	Senior Communications Officer, Senior Africa Division I, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Captain)

Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

**Reference 72** Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,560 disposal operations (average of approximately 30 operations per week), weighing approximately 57.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 22.9 tons, (accounting for about 40 % of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Removal of Mines <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II.</li> <li>○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing and disposing of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in the last fiscal year: a total 333 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.8 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Medical Activities <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (six out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.</li> <li>○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.</li> <li>○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.</li> <li>○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.</li> </ul>
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities.</li> <li>○ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.

4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.

**Reference 73** Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel</li> <li>○ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on chemical disasters response, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.</li> </ul>
Transportation Work <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister.</li> <li>○ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)</li> </ul>
Ceremonial Work at National Events <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard<sup>4</sup> forming a line for guests<sup>5</sup> and firing a gun salute for them<sup>6</sup></li> <li>○ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration <sup>7</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Since the seventh observation in 1965 Japan has lent its cooperation such as through the use of icebreaking ships. Japan has contributed significantly to South Pole observation projects, which marked their 50th anniversary in FY2007, and will continue to provide support for such projects in the future through the launch of the new Shirase in 2009.</li> <li>○ In the 56th South Pole for Antarctic Expedition cooperation provided since November 2014, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,040 tons of supplies to Showa Station, and provided cooperation for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.</li> </ul>
Other Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions.</li> <li>○ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps.</li> <li>○ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)<sup>8</sup></li> <li>○ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for flights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto Island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.

5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.


6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.

7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.



**Reference 74** Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area

Areas around bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise:

Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher

Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher

Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher

\* Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.

Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.

(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.

(3) Lden


The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night.

Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of United States Forces and Other Forces.

**Reference 75** Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities

**Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions**

- ◆ Background
- ◆ Diversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business)
  - ◆ Evaluation results of the "business classification" by the Government Revitalization Unit ⇒ "To make the uses more free and improve usability"



**Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions**

- (1) Revision of calculation method
- ① Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements (budget allocation for "operation" will be increased)
  - ② Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale exercises, etc., are held)
- 
- (2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density (population density points will be added)
  - (3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations (points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces)
  - (4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point and exercising personnel points will be subdivided)

**Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages, respectively**

Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Matsushima Air Field	Ishinomaki
Iwo Jima Airport	Ogasawara, Tokyo
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	Fujisawa
Ashiya Air Field	Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture
Torishima Range	Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture
Shimokita Test Center	Higashidōri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture

Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
	Tsuchiura
Kasumigaura Air Field	Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture
Utsunomiya Air Field	Utsunomiya
Soumagahara Airfield	Shintō, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture
Kisarazu Air Field	Kisarazu
Camp Zama	Sagamihara
	Zama


Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Sagami General Depot	Sagamihara
Tokushima Airfield	Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture
Metabaru Air Field	Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture
	Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture
Camp Gonsalves	Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture
	Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture

**Reference 76** "Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues" (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2015)

Outline of the survey period: January 8–18, 2015  
 Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 20 years or older in Japan  
 Valid responses (rate): 1,680 (56.0%)  
 Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel  
 For details, refer to <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html>


Reference

**1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues**




Notes: 1. Total of "very interested" and "somewhat interested" until the survey of November 1984.  
 2. For gender- and age-specific information, see: <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z01.html>.

**2 Impression toward the SDF**




Notes: 1. Total of "good impression" and "not bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.  
 2. Total of "not good impression" and "bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.


**3 Defense capabilities of the SDF**




**4 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities**



**5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF**



**6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities**





**Reference 77 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2014)**

	Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Total
1. Number of disclosure requests	1,797	1,765	3,562
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure	1,914	1,855	3,769
Number of all ASDF decisions Requests accepted	1,111	984	2,095
Requests partially accepted	678	860	1,538
Requests declined	125	11	136
3. Number of administrative protests	596	5	601
4. Number of lawsuits	0	0	0

**Reference 78 MOD Contacts for Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection**

Name		Address	Phone
Japan Ministry of Defense	162-8801	5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo	03-5366-3111 (switchboard)
Hokkaido Defense Bureau	060-0042	Sapporo third government office building, Odorinishi 12-chome, Chuo-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido	011-272-7578
Obihiro Defense Branch	080-0016	Obihiro Regional Joint Government building, 3, Nishi 6-jo minami 7-chome, Obihiro-shi, Hokkaido	0155-22-1181
Tohoku Defense Bureau	983-0842	Sendai third government office building, 3-15, Gorin 1-chome, Miyagino-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi	022-297-8209
North Kanto Defense Bureau	330-9721	Saitama-shintoshin government office building No.2, 2-1, Shintoshin, Chuo-ku, Saitama-shi, Saitama	048-600-1800
South Kanto Defense Bureau	231-0003	Yokohama second government office building, 57, Kitanakadori 5-chome, Naka-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa	045-211-7129
Kinki-Chubu Defense Bureau	540-0008	Osaka government office building No.2, 1-67, Otemae 4-chome, Chuo-ku, Osaka-shi, Osaka	06-5945-4951
Tokai Defense Branch	460-0001	Nagoya government office building No.1, 2-1, Sannomaru 2-chome, Naka-ku, Nagoya-shi, Aichi	052-952-8212
Chugoku-Shikoku Defense Bureau	730-0012	Hiroshima government office building No.4, 6-30, Kamihatchobori, Naka-ku, Hiroshima-shi, Hiroshima	082-223-8284
Kyushu Defense Bureau	812-0013	Fukuoka second government office building, 10-7, Hakataeki Higashi 2-chome, Hakata-ku, Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka	092-483-8811
Kumamoto Defense Branch	862-0901	1-11, Higashimachi 1-chome, Higashi-ku, Kumamoto shi, Kumamoto	096-368-2171
Nagasaki Defense Branch	850-0862	2-25, Dejimamachi, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki	095-825-5303
Okinawa Defense Bureau	904-0295	290-9, Kadena, Kadena-cho, Nakagami-gun, Okinawa	098-921-8131