

Part III

Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1 Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This Dynamic Joint Defense Force must be proactively built while adequately managing the progress of the various measures laid out in the NDPG and the Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP).

The MOD and SDF are striving to develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force that includes the build-up of defense capabilities in order to respond seamlessly and dynamically to intelligence gathering and warning/surveillance activities in peacetime, “gray-zone” situations, and complex situations wherein various contingencies arise consecutively or simultaneously.

With this in mind, based on the order of the Minister of Defense issued in December 2013, the Ministry of Defense established the Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and has been carrying out these reviews.


The Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, under the direction of the Minister of Defense, carries out essential initiatives for proactively developing the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, while assessing and verifying the progress of various measures laid out in the NDPG and the MTDP. This Committee is to be closely coordinated with various frameworks, including existing committees within the Ministry of Defense, namely the Cyber Policy Review Committee, Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee, and Ministry of Defense Reform Review Committee.

See Fig. III-1-1-1 (Structure of Committees)



State Minister of Defense Sato hosting the Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee

Fig. III-1-1-1 Structure of Committees




Section 1 Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to prevent the occurrence of a variety of situations before they arise by building a comprehensive defense architecture. At the same time, if a situation does arise, it is required to respond

seamlessly to the situations as they unfold.

To that end, it is important to ensure intelligence superiority¹ through continuous surveillance over a wide region in peacetime encompassing the surroundings of Japan. If a situation does arise, ensuring maritime supremacy² and air superiority³ in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage.

Fig. III-1-1-2 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan



JGSDF personnel from the Coast Observation Unit engaging in their duties



P-3C Patrol Aircraft engaging in warning and surveillance around the Senkaku Islands



E-767 early warning and control aircraft

1 To have an advantage over the other party in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing and conveying intelligence.
 2 Maritime supremacy refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in seas and can carry out maritime operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force.
 3 Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of hindrance by the opposing force.

1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

Japan is composed of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by a wide region of sea, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in Japan's territorial waters and airspace in peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace.

1 Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan

(1) Basic Concept

The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea in peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. It also conducts surveillance in major channels, to monitor MSDF guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, the JSDF maintains a defense and security system that enables it to respond quickly to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

See Fig. III-1-1-2 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan)

In 2014, there were seven incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern islands, and also another incident of such activities confirmed in waters south of Okinawa. It is expected that the areas of activity by Chinese Navy vessels will continue to expand and their activities will become more activated.


Moreover, since the Japanese government's acquisition of the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, Chinese governmental ships have intermittently intruded into Japanese territorial waters. In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy vessels and Chinese government ships are rapidly expanding and becoming more activated.

Due to such a state of affairs, the MOD and the SDF are working to strengthen the collaboration with relevant government ministries and agencies, for example by routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard in peacetime.

See Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships)

Fig. III-1-1-3

Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships



2 Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept

Under international law, nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against intruding aircraft is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or in the seas, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting actions against intruding aircraft based on Article 84 of the SDF Act.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the Japanese territorial and adjacent airspace using warning and control radar, the E-767 early-warning and control system, and E-2C early-warning aircraft. If any aircraft suspected of intruding into Japan's territorial airspace is detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace intrusion does occur, responses such as warning to withdraw will be issued.

On December 13, 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan's territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima, which is part of the Senkaku Islands. In addition, on August

22, 2013, a TU-95 bomber of the Russian Air Force intruded into Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Okinoshima, Fukuoka Prefecture. Moreover, September 9 of the same year, an incident where a presumably unmanned aircraft of unidentified nationality flew over the East China Sea. The ASDF urgently scrambled fighters in response to these incidents.

In FY2014, the ASDF aircraft scrambled 943 times⁴, a significant increase by 133 in comparison with the previous fiscal year. This is the second largest number since 1958 when the ASDF started taking strict anti-territory intrusion measures.

See Fig. III-1-1-4 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War)

See Fig. III-1-1-5 (Example Flight Patterns of Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded)

See Fig. III-1-1-6 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded)



F-15 Fighter scrambling

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD and the SDF have been implementing warning and surveillance activities and other activities as before in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD and the SDF have also decided to engage in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act.

See Fig. III-1-1-7 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries)

See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Defense Policies of Other Countries and Regions: China)

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept


With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters⁵, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water

Fig. III-1-1-4 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War



Note: The peak of the cold war

⁴ Break down by country of aircraft subject to scrambles: Russia, approximately 50%; China, approximately 49%; and others, approximately 1%.

⁵ The term "territorial waters" also includes inland waters.

Fig. III-1-1-5 Example Flight Patterns of Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded







Fig. III-1-1-6 Example Flight Patterns of Russian Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded



areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign national submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating underwater in Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas.

In May 2013 and March 2014, although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous water zone. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal nations, Japan maintains a stance of properly dealing with such activities.


4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

Fig. III-1-1-7 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries



The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013.

In light of the lessons learned from the incident involving an unidentified vessel off Noto Peninsula in 1999, the incident involving an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the Japanese government has been taking all necessary precautionary measures while the MOD and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

The MSDF is taking the following steps: (1) deployment of missile boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit⁶; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns;

(4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)⁷; (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team.

In addition, the MOD and the Japan Coast Guard regularly carry out joint exercises, etc. Based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels,” which was prepared jointly by the then Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense) and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard are strengthening cooperation between the two organizations.

2 Defense of Japan's Remote Islands

1 Basic Concept

Japan possesses a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and try, through the joint operation involving all the SDF forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), to deter and remove enemy

attacks. If, by any chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and taking other initiatives.

It is particularly important in the defense of Japan's remote islands to obtain and secure maritime and air superiority.

Furthermore, a clear response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and so forth.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)


See Fig. III-1-1-8 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Offshore Islands)⁸

⁶ A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.

⁷ The flat front edge of the destroyer prevents a non-bursting shell from scattering when launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on the ship.

⁸ During FY2015, the MOD is to acquire V-22 Osprey and AAV7 amphibious vehicles as equipment necessary to enhance rapid deployment and response capabilities in dealing with attacks to Japan's remote islands.

Fig. III-1-1-8 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Offshore Islands



2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF

In the southwest region, there are many remote islands that are vacuum regions for SDF deployment. Thus, the GSDF will newly form a coast observation unit in Yonaguni and deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial responses within the remote islands area in the southwest region. The GSDF will also establish an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations. In addition, the MSDF will acquire fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and other equipment. The ASDF will deploy two fighter squadrons at Naha Air Base and establish the 9th Air Wing. Through these initiatives, the MOD and SDF will continue

persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and develop an immediate response posture in the case of contingencies.

Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); overseas research to review the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys.

In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the Ariake Saga Airport was the best airfield to be used as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional relationships with relevant units in joint



Osprey (the photo shown is an MV-22 Osprey operated by U.S. Marine Corps) [U.S. Government]



GSDF personnel conducting a landing exercise during the Iron Fist 15, a field training exercise



LCAC entering the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita”

operations, the length of the runway, and the geographic environment that can reduce burdens borne by the local community. Along with other topics such as the training relocation of the US Marine Corps, the MOD and the SDF hope to gain understanding from the local community through providing in-depth explanations⁹.

In addition, the SDF conducts various training to improve the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also training exercises with the U.S. Forces aimed at establishing mutual coordination procedures. In

January through March of 2015, the GSDF and US Marine Corps conducted a field training exercise (Iron Fist) in California, which was first started in 2006, and worked to improve amphibious operational capabilities. In August 2015, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF is to participate in a joint exercise that has been held on the western coast of the United States, called “Dawn Blitz.” As a Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises overseas (Dawn Blitz 15), they are to practice a series of tactical activities related to collaborating with the U.S. Forces, and response to island invasions.

Commentary

Enhancement of the Air Defense Posture in the Southwestern Region – Establishment of a New Air Wing

In recent years, Japan’s neighboring countries have been expanding and intensifying their activities in the sea and airspace around Japan. In particular, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters intermittently and has violated Japan’s territorial airspace. At the same time, China has also been engaging in dangerous activities, which could cause unexpected situations, including infringement of the freedom of flight over the high seas such as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its own unilateral assertion.


Currently, scrambles against aircraft in the Southwestern Composite Air Division are conducted solely by the 204th fighter squadron, which belongs to the ASDF 83rd Air Wing (Naha Air base). However, not only has the number of scrambles been steadily increasing, but also, the airspace that must be covered by the 204th fighter squadron is quite extensive.

In light of these circumstances, in order to enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will transfer the 304th fighter squadron of the 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki Air Base) to Naha Air Base in JFY2015.

Along with this, the 83rd Air Wing will be abolished, and a new “9th Air Wing” will be established.

This establishment of the new Air Wing would be the first time in nearly 50 years since 1964 when the 8th Air Wing was newly formed.

Establishment of the new 9th Air Wing will enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region and will enable the ASDF to obtain and secure air superiority, which is the basis for realizing effective deterrence and response in various situations.



Abolition of the 83rd Air Wing and the establishment of the 9th Air Wing.

⁹ At the Ariake Saga Airport, the ramp and aircraft hangars etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport by FY2019. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.

3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers¹⁰ and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)¹¹.

See Reference 50 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

1 Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) Basic Concept

Japan's BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).

In case ballistic missiles or other objects¹² are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations.



PAC-3 missile test launch

On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan, and the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles with sufficient consideration taken to (1) carrying out prompt and appropriate response and (2) ensuring civilian control.

As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

See Fig. III-1-1-9 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD)

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

In March 2009, the MOD and the SDF, in response to North Korea's advance notification for an intended launch of an "experimental communication satellite" received through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), organized the Joint Task Force-BMD and transmitted launch information collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW)¹³ and the various SDF radar units¹⁴ to the Prime Minister's Office and other agencies, while carrying out information gathering to identify any damage caused by this incident.

In March 2012, the MOD and the SDF, responding to North Korea's advance notification for an intended launch of an "earth observation satellite" received through the IMO, deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area, while dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands in case any debris were to fall from the sky.

In December, the MOD and the SDF, in response to North Korea's announcement regarding a launch of a "satellite," took all possible measures including the deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles.

North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including an implication of missile launches in the first half of 2013, while it launched ballistic missiles on March 3 and 26, June 29, July 9, 13 and 26, 2014, and on March 2, 2015. Under such circumstances, the MOD and the SDF took every necessary measure to protect the lives and properties of the nation in any potential situation.

See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (North Korea)

¹⁰ See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2, Footnote 5


¹¹ The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

¹² The term "ballistic missiles or other objects" refers to objects other than aircraft such as ballistic missiles which could cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to the ground.

¹³ Information on the area of launch, the time of the launch, the projected area where objects fall and the projected time when the objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.)

¹⁴ On the day before an actual launch, misinformation related to the launch was distributed due to the mishandling of information by the MOD and the SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted.

Fig. III-1-1-9 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD



Further cooperation with the U.S. government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is necessary for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2).

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Policy Consultation between Japan and the United States)

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving SEW from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. In addition, maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. In February 2015, following on from the previous year, a special BMD exercise was held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination.

2 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner. Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTGS)¹⁵ was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014.

¹⁵ One of the U.S. information processing systems for ballistic missiles.

(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.

The government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks, and it is aimed to be completed by around 2017.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports

would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions¹⁶. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on June 21, 2011.

The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

See Reference 17 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

4 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security**1 Basic Approach by the Government**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," and will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other countries by conducting bilateral/multilateral joint exercises related to maritime security. In addition, it is stated that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities.

The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy¹⁷, which was given Cabinet approval in April 2013, states the following initiatives for ensuring the security of the oceans: reinforcement of the wide-range routine system of surveillance; systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles; strengthening of the system of collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard; and development of a system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands.

In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration

and promote international cooperation and will make use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to international rules and consensus-building.

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF

In order to maintain the order of "Open and Stable Seas" and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD and the SDF promote various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint exercises and practices using a variety of opportunities.

Within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been actively engaged in and cooperating with initiatives such as the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014¹⁸.

On October 7, the sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum hosted by the MOD took place and participants agreed to further strengthen cooperation in each field such as discussion of the establishment of a hotline in preparation for unforeseen consequences and the promotion of capacity building by the MSDF.

In addition, in relation to China, consultation meetings have been held between the defense authorities of both

¹⁶ This refers to the case where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the future transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA.

¹⁷ Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy specifies the following targets for Japan as an oceanic state and has set out initiatives to be pursued intensively: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2) wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country that protects the ocean, and (4) challenge towards unexplored frontiers.

¹⁸ This specifies the procedures for ensuring safety, communications methods and other factors when there are unplanned encounters at sea by naval ships and naval aircraft of the participating nations in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). (It does not have legal binding force, and does not supersede international civil aviation rules, international treaties and so forth.)

countries towards the commencement of early implementation of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected situations.

See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-4 (Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation)

See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Ensuring Maritime Security)

5 Responses in Space

1 The Whole-of-Government Approach

The Office of National Space Policy established in the Cabinet Office in July 2012 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating and other policy matters relating to the government's development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy, and in order to sufficiently reflect the new security policies stated in the NSS that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, improve predictability of industries' investments, and strengthen the industrial base, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established within the Cabinet in January 2015 as a 10-year development plan focusing on the next approximately 20 years. This plan has set the following goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining and strengthening of space industry and scientific/technological bases.

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The use of space is extremely important for the MOD and the SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and efficiently. Thus, from the following three perspectives of: (1) promoting the use of space by leveraging the special characteristics of satellites that are able to access every

region of the earth; (2) using outer space to respond to various incidents including incoming ballistic missiles; and (3) ensuring stable use of space; the MOD and the SDF is implementing initiatives to enhance their information gathering capabilities using satellites; reinforcing command, control and communication; and realizing the stable use of space.

The MOD's "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space," which was decided when the Basic Space Law was enacted in 2008, was revised in August 2014. This was done in light of the major changes in the environment surrounding space policy such as the revision of the Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2012, the Cabinet Decision on the NSS and NDPG in 2013, and from the viewpoint of systematically and realistically promoting various measures concerning the development and utilization of space. From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities in Japan and the U.S., the "Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)" was established based on the instruction given in the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talk in April 2015. Making use of this working group, reviews will be further promoted in broader fields such as: 1. promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, 2. closer information sharing, 3. cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, 4. implementation of tabletop exercises.

6 Response to Cyber Attacks

1 The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives

Information and communications technology has developed and been widely adopted at great speed and, as a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people's lives and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail. This is the same for both the MOD and the SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core of Japan's defense may arise. The number of cyber attacks targeting Japanese governmental organizations and agencies in JFY2013 reached approximately 5,080,000. It shows a rapid increase by five times in comparison with the number in the previous

fiscal year, which was approximately 1,080,000¹⁹.

In order to deal with these issues, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted in the 187th Extraordinary Session of the Diet. In light of the current situation where urgent response to emerging threats against cyber security occurring on a global scale has become a pressing matter along with the development of information and communications technology advances, the act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan's cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber security.

Based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters has been established in the Cabinet to take a controller role, and the National

¹⁹ Cybersecurity Annual Report 2013 (submitted at the "Information Security Policy Council" on July 10th, 2014).

center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC)²⁰ has been established in the Cabinet Secretariat as a secretariat of the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and takes the central role in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Various initiatives are also being promoted by both the public and private sectors; along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD is designated as one of the five government agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the NISC. The MOD contributes to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC to provide it with the knowledge and skills of the MOD and the SDF. For example, the MOD participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the NISC has established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming cross-cutting partnerships among ministries and agencies. The MOD also sends personnel to the CYMAT.

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF

As for response to cyber attacks, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is monitoring MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock. Along with introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communications systems, and development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in holistic measures including enactment of regulations²¹, stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology.

See Reference 52 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks)

3 Initiatives towards the Responses to Cyber Attacks

The Cyber Policy Review Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting

integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, training and securing personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry, and responses to supply chain risks²². In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, in March 2015, cyber information gathering devices have been installed to aid the prevention of attacks by the early detection of cyber attack indications. The necessary systems are also scheduled to be developed, such as the development of a cyber training environment in which the SDF units can conduct more practical trainings.

At the same time, it is difficult for the MOD and the SDF alone to achieve the stable use of cyberspace. In particular, since comprehensive defense cooperation between Japan and its ally the United States, including joint response, is vital, the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) was set up as a framework between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan. Under this framework, meetings have been held three times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. In May 2015, a joint declaration on the specific future direction of the cooperation between the two countries was announced. In addition, through participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a whole-of-government approach by both nations, and in the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be strengthened.

In addition to the IT Forum held between the defense authorities of Singapore and Vietnam, cyber dialogues are also being held between the authorities of the United Kingdom, NATO, Estonia, the Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country.

In 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks by both the MOD and the SDF, and the defense industry, through joint exercise and other initiatives.

20 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the name of the organization was changed from the National Information Security Center (NISC) to the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC).

21 There are directives relating to the information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007).

22 Supply chain risks refers to the risks that malicious software, including computer viruses, may be inserted in the components of equipment during the design, manufacturing, procuring or installation of equipment.

7 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods.

1 Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches

In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other officials when there has been a natural disaster; in cases where a request has been made to the Minister of Defense or another designated officer who then determines that the situation warrants such action²³. This is because the course of action considered to be most appropriate is that prefectural governors and other officials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch.

However, when a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes²⁴ or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).


See Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal)

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

See Fig. III-1-1-11 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard))

Fig. III-1-1-10 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal




Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister.

2. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense.

²³ The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster dispatch. With regard to disaster dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Act; (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.

²⁴ The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

Fig. III-1-1-11 State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)



2 Response of the MOD and the SDF

(1) Response to Natural Disasters

a. Disaster relief dispatch to a lifesaving operation in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture

On August 20, 2014, a landslide occurred in the Asaminami district and Asakita district of Hiroshima City in Hiroshima Prefecture due to heavy rain. In response to the request for a disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 14,970 personnel, 3,240 vehicles and 66 aircraft.



GSDF personnel engaging in a disaster dispatch for the landslide disaster in Hiroshima Prefecture

b. Disaster dispatch relating to eruptions on Mount Ontake

On September 27, 2014, a volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake. In response to the request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons in cooperation with the municipality, police, fire department, and other relevant organizations. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 7,150 personnel, 1,840 vehicles, and 298 aircraft.



GSDF personnel conducting disaster relief mission related to Mount Ontake Eruption

c. Disaster relief dispatch related to the eruption in Kuchinoerabu-jima

On May 29, 2015, an eruption occurred in Kuchinoerabu-jima. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, the SDF conducted evacuation assistance and intelligence gathering. The scale of this disaster relief effort was approx. 430 personnel, approx. 20 vehicles, and a total of around 44 aircraft.

d. Other natural disasters

The GSDF conducted disaster relief dispatches for an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture that occurred on November 22, 2014 and a disaster caused by heavy snow in Tokushima Prefecture that occurred from December 5 to 6.



ASDF's rescue helicopter engaging in a rescue operation off the coast of Noto

See Fig. III-1-1-12 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2014))

See Reference 42 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years))

Fig. III-1-1-12 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2014)

Description	Number of dispatches	Total number of personnel	Total number of vehicles	Total number of aircraft	Total number of vessels
Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters	13	50,522	8,239	560	0
Transporting emergency patients	407	2,239	0	442	0
Search and rescue	17	1,457	271	36	0
Assisting firefighting	73	7,285	539	162	0
Other	11	4,764	572	32	0
Total	521	66,267	9,621	1,232	0

(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2014, out of a total of 521 cases of disaster relief operation dispatch, 407 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures) and the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo) representing the majority of such cases.

In addition to aiding in the transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range, in the event that urgent action is required due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing, the SDF carries out sea rescues when requested to do so by the Japan Coast Guard.

Furthermore, it conducts wide-ranging medical transport operations, using the Mobile Medical Unit to move serious-case patients by C-130H transport aircraft.

At the same time, in FY2014, there were 73 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after those for the transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, responses to fires in areas near SDF facilities were the largest in number, with 54 cases in FY2014. The SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations such as mountain and forest areas where firefighting conditions are difficult.



ASDF personnel engaging in an emergency patient transport

(3) Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.

On January 15 and January 18 of 2015, there was an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza at poultry farms in Kasaoka City in Okayama Prefecture and Arita Town in Nishi-Matsuura County of Saga Prefecture, respectively. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds, and other relevant activities. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 670 personnel, and a total of around 100 vehicles. Also, on April 12, there was an outbreak of

highly pathogenic avian influenza at poultry farms in Kuma County in Kumamoto Prefecture. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the SDF conducted the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds, and other relevant activities. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 880 personnel, and a total of around 180 vehicles.

(4) Exercises Involving SDF

In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters with speed and accuracy, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint exercises for rescue in peacetime, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

In FY2014, the SDF organized and participated in various emergency drills with the objective of maintaining and improving the ability to carry out disaster relief missions swiftly and accurately in times of disaster, such as major earthquakes, and many of the issues relating to the response in the event of a disaster that arose due to the Great East Japan Earthquake were actively incorporated into disaster prevention exercises.

See Reference 43 (Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2014))

On October 19, 2014, the SDF participated in tsunami response drills hosted by Wakayama Prefecture and worked to enhance their earthquake response capability in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough. In collaboration with the U.S. Forces in Japan, the SDF conducted exercises and other activities in which SDF personnel carried the sick and wounded to the MSDF destroyer “Ise” standing by offshore, and used the Osprey V-22 vertical takeoff and landing transport aircraft. On November 6, 2014, the SDF conducted disaster response training for the Northeastern Army called “Michinoku ALERT 2014” covering the whole Tohoku region.

(5) Response to Large-Scale Disasters, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Other Disasters

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, the MOD and the SDF dispatched as many as 100,000 or so personnel and did their utmost to rescue disaster victims. The SDF’s disaster relief activity ended on December 26, 2011, when the period for the dispatch for nuclear relief expired. In addition, the MOD and the SDF are making efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their work by reviewing the format of collaboration with the relevant organizations through assigning two GSDF regular personnel to the Nuclear Regulation Authority in September 2012²⁵,



Rescue activities during Michinoku Alert training



MSDF personnel conveying an injured person at Rimpac 14 Disaster Relief Exercise

participating in nuclear disaster prevention exercises, and other collaboration opportunities.

3 Initiatives for Preparation for Disaster

(1) SDF Plans for Responding to Various Disasters and Operational Plans

In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD and the SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. At the same time, by establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD and the SDF will ensure that they are able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the two organizations will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

The MOD and the SDF are in the process of formulating various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan that was formulated in 2012 to respond to such earthquakes.

²⁵ Based on the fourth recommendation by the ruling parties for the acceleration of the reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, alongside the strengthening of the nuclear disaster prevention system, these personnel were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office on October 14, 2014.

(2) Coordination with Local Governments

It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Establishment of the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Headquarters; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommending retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in response to requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2015, the total number of retired SDF personnel working in disaster prevention in local governments was 334 individuals in 46 prefectures and 220 municipalities throughout the country. Personnel-related cooperation with local governments and the MOD and the SDF is a very effective method of improving cooperation with those governments, and its efficacy was confirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In

particular, each GSDF regional army provides opportunities to interact with crisis management supervisors and other officials from local governments and exchange information and opinions to strengthen the cooperation with these local organizations and agencies.

See Reference 44 (Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government)



Retired uniformed SDF personnel actively working as a supervisor on disaster prevention for a local government

8 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others

1 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Even small-scale infiltrations and attacks by guerrillas or special forces can pose a serious threat. Such attacks could result in the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks on people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In the event that an armed attack is carried out against Japan by guerrillas or special forces, Japan will respond under a defense operation order.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas, the MOD and the SDF respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of an intelligence gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, the safeguarding of key facilities, and search and defeat of invading units. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and signs through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to guard key facilities such as nuclear power plants and a guarding posture will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territorial land by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched

for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to defeat them.

See Fig. III-1-1-13 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

2 Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assumes primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents²⁶, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, it is important for the SDF to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police²⁷, as well as local agreements and other agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded²⁸.

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The GSDF continues to implement combined field exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture and has been strengthening such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at the sites of nuclear power

²⁶ Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.

²⁷ The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).

²⁸ In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

Fig. III-1-1-13 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces



GSDF personnel conducting checkpoint training jointly with the police

plants throughout the country since 2012²⁹. Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with unidentified vessels are also continuously implemented between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

3 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the

danger of the proliferation of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack³⁰ on the Tokyo subway in 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through different

²⁹ The GSDF also conducted exercises at the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at the Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, and at the Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) in 2015.

³⁰ An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

dispatches such as disaster relief dispatches, and civilian protection dispatches.

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The MOD and the SDF possess and maintain the GSDF Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit and increasing chemical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the

capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

9 Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.

In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense is authorized to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Foreign Minister, as well as on the basis of Article 84 (3) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the country in question, and safely guide them to transport by aircraft, ships and vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

Through the revision of the SDF Law in 2013, vehicles were added to the means of ground transport, resulting in the introduction of transport protection vehicles with superior defensive capabilities.

Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, collaborative exercises are carried out in peacetime. In addition, in FY2014, the first joint exercises in Japan were carried out. The MOD participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual

multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, and others, together with local Japanese Embassy staff and their family members, and conducted the first ever overseas ground transport exercises.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)



Cobra Gold 15 – GSDF personnel guiding Japanese nationals to ASDF's C-130H transport aircraft in training to transport Japanese nationals overseas

10 Readiness against Invasion

The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained.

In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to

complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3-5 (Existing Related Security Legislation)

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)


1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars³¹, it is expected that Japan will be hit by repeated rapid aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial

³¹ Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

³² A special characteristic of aerial defense operations is the importance of initial response in terms of influencing the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the onset of operations.

Fig. III-1-1-14 Example of Air Defense Operations



Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments.
 2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

defense³² can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

See Fig. III-1-1-14 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

As the islands of Japan are attacked with arms, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.

Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining the results of these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

See Fig. III-1-1-15 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan)

3 Operations Protecting the Land

In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.


Invading ground and airborne troops find it difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to eliminate this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See Fig. III-1-1-16 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces)

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the existence of our country and the foundation of our prosperity. Furthermore, in case our country comes under armed attack, maritime transportation routes set the foundation to maintain continuous warfare

Fig. III-1-1-15 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan



capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. As such, operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation are important. Our operations ensuring security in maritime transportation can be done in waters around Japan or in sea lanes³³.

In the case where operations are to be implemented in waters around Japan, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol³⁴, defend SDF ships, and

protect straits and ports. In the case where operations are implemented by setting up sea lanes, the SDF periodically patrols the defined areas, detects and addresses attacks by enemy vessels or submarines at an early stage, and directly defends Japanese ships as required. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.

11 Response to Other Events

1 Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the MOD and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Act.

See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

2 Military Intelligence Collection


For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for effective operation of defense capabilities in dealing with various contingencies, it is necessary to ascertain the long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the signs of those situations at an early stage. For this reason, the MOD and the SDF always make efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately using various methods.

Some examples of intelligence collection methods used by the MOD and the SDF include:

³³ Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

³⁴ The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

Fig. III-1-1-16 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces



- (1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, in the air over Japanese territory;
- (2) collecting and analyzing high resolution commercial satellite imaging data³⁵;
- (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other vehicles;
- (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information;
- (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and
- (6) intelligence collection conducted by Defense Attachés and other officials.

As the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, the strengthening of information capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting comprehensive enhancement of its information capabilities at all stages, including gathering, analyzing, sharing, and securing intelligence. Specifically, the MOD will implement the high-level use of geospatial data such as by integrating various information to visualize the situation, securing highly competent analysts by integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and strengthening the dispatch system for Defense Attachés through their dispatch to Africa, and other means.

³⁵ In order to enhance Japan's capabilities for gathering image intelligence, five intelligence-gathering satellites are currently operated at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD has properly utilized the information provided by these satellites.

Commentary About Defense Attachés


Defense Attachés are stationed in Japanese Embassies and other relevant offices abroad and perform tasks such as collecting military intelligence and coordinating defense cooperation with the country where they are stationed. Based on a trusting relationship between militaries that share the same mission of “national defense,” Defense Attachés are able to gain various types of information from the armed forces, national defense authority of the country where they are stationed and from Defense Attachés from other countries.

As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, the importance of collecting military intelligence in a timely manner is growing. In addition, defense cooperation, including equipment cooperation, between Japan and other countries is expanding both in quality and quantity. Therefore, expectations for the role to be played by Defense Attachés are becoming increasingly higher. For this reason, the MOD is working to enhance the dispatch system of Defense Attachés.

During the previous fiscal year, the MOD newly dispatched Defense Attachés to seven countries in Africa (Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco) in order to enhance its intelligence gathering capability regarding Africa, in light of the terrorist attack in Algeria in which Japanese nationals in Algeria were involved. Also, the MOD increased the number of Defense Attachés in three European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France), which possess a wide range of information regarding Africa.

Furthermore, in cooperation with MOFA, the MOD is currently considering the strengthening of its dispatch system of Defense Attachés in the Middle East, in light of the terrorist attack in Syria which involved the killing of Japanese nationals.

Defense Attachés are seconded from the MOD to MOFA, and are then dispatched overseas. They possess the status of both SDF officer and MOFA official. This ensures the mechanism that allows MOFA and the MOD to cooperate closely, whilst maintaining centralized diplomatic efforts. As of March 31, 2015, the MOD has a total of 58 Defense Attachés dispatched to 40 Embassies of Japan and two Permanent Missions of Japan.



A Defense Attaché who was newly dispatched to Algeria in January of this year

Commentary

Forming KIZUNA (meaning “Bonds”) – Dispatch and Acceptance of Liaison Officers

In order for us to maintain our peaceful and stable lives in the contemporary international community, it is necessary to cooperate with other countries that share the same values as Japan. People to people exchange is a valid means of achieving this objective. The SDF dispatches Defense Attachés and security attachés to the Embassies of Japan and other relevant offices located in foreign countries. In addition, the SDF personnel are dispatched to foreign countries that have a cooperative relationship with Japan as liaison officers to exchange and share information, as well as to engage in various tasks such as coordinating joint exercises.

The MSDF dispatches liaison officers to the Naval Academy, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and other organizations of the U.S. Navy. At the same time, it accepts a liaison officer from the U.S. Navy to the MSDF Officer Candidate School. Furthermore, since February 2015, the MSDF has accepted a liaison officer from the Royal Navy, who is the first liaison officer accepted from a country other than the United States. Just like Japan, the United Kingdom is a maritime state whose development as a nation depends on the “sea”. Thus, the two countries share common values, and Japan recognizes the United Kingdom as an important partner in the same manner as the United States. This acceptance of a liaison officer on this occasion will significantly contribute to information exchange and the enhancement of cooperation between Japan and the U.K.

In order to further ensure peace and stability of Japan, liaison officers are steadily forming small but strong and firm KIZUNA “bonds” in foreign countries at this very moment.



Commander in Chief of the Self Defense Fleet and the first Royal Navy liaison officer dispatched to the Headquarters of the Self Defense Fleet visit the Memorial Ship Mikasa (former battleship Mikasa) (Yokosuka City)