The Case for Missile Defense in the Arabian Gulf

Air Defense Artillery, January-March 2005

by Donald M. Lionetti Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Retired)

A risk analysis published by Kroll Associates of London in September 2004 examines the range of threats facing the six member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While theiranalysis is a valuable overview of the main political, business and security challenges, I would like to provide some general reflections on the region and to comment more specifically than Kroll about the potential for missile attack.

The GCC: Risks and Rewards

The GCC is blessed with over 39 percent of the known global oil reserves. All the member states have, to a greater or lesser extent, embarked in recent years on a course of economic reform and liberalization. With the current upsurge in oil prices, the region should now be set for a period of renewed economic expansion, offering prosperity for its citizens and exciting opportunities for external business investors.However, as the Kroll Analysis reminds us, the Gulf is also a region of high and growing risks. Iran and Iraq are sources of potential instability right on the GCC's doorstep. The wider Middle East region remains far from settled. The internal threat from extremist militants poses a mounting challenge to all the GCC monarchies. There is a danger that the uncertain regional security environment could discourage western companies otherwise eager to participate in the economic upturn.

U.S. Policy in the Gulf Region

Iraq is in disarray and struggling to establish stability in a post-Saddam environment. The world is watching an interim government, representative of particular factional interests, seeking to secure popular support while preparing the way for elections in January 2005. Meanwhile various opposition groups pursue a violent insurgency to disrupt the initiative. It is impossible today to predict the outcome of this struggle.

Within this context, the 2004 U.S. presidential elections in our open democracy generated enormous self-criticism and, with it, abundant ammunition for those seeking premature U.S. disengagement from Iraq and the wider Gulf region. In making their case, the opposition was particularly vitriolic and harshly critical of U.S. policy execution in the region.

Despite a decisive victory and a renewed mandate supporting the current Iraq policy, President George W. Bush understands the divisive effect these elections have had and has stated his commitment to reunify the nation. In doing so, he will consider carefully popular impatience to see progress, to see evidence that the conflict in Iraq is not endless.

In the near term, the best evidence of progress will be a successful election in Iraq, delivering a democratically representative government that has the potential to unite the several competing factions. Most importantly, the resulting stability would permit gradual disengagement and return to the United States of military forces. This "best case" scenario would also permit a reduction in U.S. military presence throughout the region, a situation that would be widely applauded within the GCC. But, regardless of whether eventual disengagement of U.S. military forces comes through the above scenario or over a longer period in a less stable environment, the regional players will be required to shoulder a heavier burden of responsibility for their own security.

Threats to the Gulf Region

The Kroll report sets out the main internal and external threats that the GCC states currently face. The internal challenge posed by fundamentalist terrorism tops the list. However, successes observed in recent months suggest the terrorists can be defeated. In July the Kuwaiti authorities broke up and arrested a cell of militant Islamists, and the Saudis at last seem to be realizing the need for resolute action against their indigenous extremists. With local resolve, supported by U.S. and European assistance with intelligence and training, this conflict is winnable.

External factors also may pose less immediate threats to the GCC. The instability in Iraq does not seem likely in the short term to spill over the borders to impinge directly on her southern neighbors. Of more concern is the growing tension between Iran and the West over nuclear proliferation. While there is little appetite to see the dispute degenerate into open conflict, radical elements in Tehran have proven to be unpredictable and willing to hijack issues that can escalate tensions. The GCC states, dependent to a large extent on freedom of navigation in the Gulf, with vulnerable oil and gas assets close to Iranian waters, or even (like the United Arab Emirates) with unresolved territorial disputes with Iran, could find themselves the unwitting victims of a confrontation between Iran and the international community. Indeed, a more confident Iran, harboring nuclear ambitions, with deployed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, poses a potential security risk to all the countries in the Gulf region.

A New Threat to Regional Stability

But in the age of remote weaponry, it is not just immediate neighbors or terrorist organizations operating internally that pose a threat to a state's security. Another threat with an equal potential to disrupt stability and economic growth remains largely unaddressed. Ballistic and cruise missiles are no longer the preserve of sophisticated military powers. They are increasingly available to any government or organization that can afford them. About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as possessing ballistic missiles, and around half of those are in Asia or the Middle East. Many of these, including Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and Israel, can directly threaten the territory of GCC states.

Fourteen countries, excluding the United States, Europe and Russia, have the ability to produce ballistic missiles. Some of these states, notably North Korea, show few scruples about to whom they sell missiles or missile technology. Nineteen countries, including Iran and Syria, have cruise missile programs. The joint Indian-Russian supersonic BrahMos cruise missile passed its last pre-deployment test in December 2004. The Indian and Russian governments have reportedly stated their intent to export this sophisticated new system to Third World countries. Beyond the danger of missile sales by producer states, there is also the threat of uncontrolled leakage from areas such as Afghanistan, Iran and the former Soviet Union.

The proliferation of available missiles is leading to an increased danger that some weapons may fall into the hands not just of hostile governments, but of rogue organizations. Such organizations can be ruthless, difficult to trace and unaccountable. Armed with ballistic or cruise missiles they could pose a formidable challenge to legitimate states unprepared to face them.

States that possess ballistic and cruise missiles can exert political leverage on neighbors without the ability to defend against them. Indeed, when a state is vulnerable to attack by ballistic or cruise missiles, then such attacks are more probable. As progress is made in countering agents of terror on the ground, hostile elements may revert to other methods to strike at targets . . . with potentially catastrophic results. Weakness can in itself be provocative.

Most GCC member states are unusually vulnerable to the missile threat. The GCC economies rely on easily targeted economic installations, notably oil-related infrastructure, to generate a large proportion of their wealth. They also rely on an expatriate labor force to perform key economic functions. A missile threat, whether used in a strategic role to destroy assets or as a means to sow terror among the civilian population, causing expatriate workers to leave, could severely damage the GCC economies. Combined with weapons of mass destruction concerns, the effect could be devastating.

A GCC Anti-Missile Defense Capability

Given the uncertain U.S. political situation described above, and its implications for the Gulf, it would be unwise for the GCC states to count on the deployment of U.S. air and missile defense systems to the region in the long-term. The region may have to rely on its own resources in the future. Is this realistic? Absolutely! Nine Iraqi missiles were targeted against coalition forces during the recent Gulf conflict. All were intercepted and destroyed, one of them by a Kuwaiti Patriot battery. It would be foolish to believe that missiles will not fly again in the Gulf region. An early investment in missile defense against such a contingency would be prudent.

Defense systems capable of countering short and medium range ballistic missiles are available today. The United States and Russia have credible offerings and France is developing one. Only Patriot, however, has been proved effective in combat operations. Moreover, next generation improvements are ready for deployment. The United States is also working on systems to counter the elusive cruise missile threat. The new Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAM) system is likely to be deployed in the next two years and will be fully integrated with Patriot.

Investment by the GCC states in a comprehensive air and missile defense system will not be cheap, but it can be staged in order to spread the cost over time. The most immediate threats can be addressed first by each member state in national systems. This initial capability could later be augmented as necessary to counter more sophisticated threats, such as cruise missiles, and to develop beyond national to regional coverage to provide an integrated antimissile network across the whole GCC area.

Each of the GCC states is unique, and each has different security needs. Geography, number and size of critical economic assets, as well as existing defense infrastructure will dictate their varying antimissile requirements. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia already possess Patriot batteries. Qatar and Bahrain can rely in the short term on the Fifth Fleet and U.S. Army Central Command for ballistic missile defense, so long as a U.S. commitment to forward deployment in the region remains, and so long as U.S. bases there remain acceptable to domestic opinion and so long as other out-of-region requirements don't affect current deployments. The United Arab Emirates and Oman currently have no anti-missile defense coverage.

At the very least, each of the GCC members should undertake a survey leading to the development of a timephased plan to establish an effective air and missile defense capability. Investment in missile defense assets could start modestly, growing into a comprehensive system as new elements are added. The key will be proper integration to ensure interoperability, underscoring the need for a comprehensive assessment. The development by adjacent GCC states of interoperable air and missile defenses would present opportunities for further integration. The benefits are obvious; mutual support and potential economies of scale.

A Shield for Economic Development

Politically, missile defenses are benign. They threaten no one. They can be used only for self-defense, enabling every state to protect its sovereignty, its people and its economic assets.

With the return of high oil prices and an upsurge in business confidence, the Gulf states are expected to enjoy the benefits of a booming economy over the next several years. The aggregate gross domestic product of the six GCC members was predicted to breach $400 billion in 2004, and oil exports to exceed $180 billion. GCC spending on civil projects over the next three years alone is expected to reach $220 billion.

The main brake on such economic performance will be a perception of continuing risk, whether driven internally or externally, which will limit the willingness of foreign companies to invest or operate in the Gulf and of qualified expatriate personnel to work there. Saudi Arabia is already facing difficulties in securing foreign expertise.

While the missile threat may not at present appear at the top of the risk agenda, it is real and likely to grow. It is also a threat that can be directly confronted and addressed. Compared to projections for GCC economies cited above, the investment required to establish an effective air and missile defense is relatively modest. It is a small price to pay for providing a secure environment that will underpin growth and encourage foreign participation in the GCC economies.