

[REDACTED]

with an RPG and Marines doing air security, we took some casualties up there, so we pulled them down and I was punching the Marine under the TC hatch was _____ my platoon commander, Lt [REDACTED] not knowing what happened...at that point our comm went out and that was keep going...so I believe it was going across the bridge. I think they wanted to get to the other side of the bridge. Once we got out...once we got out, we kept trying to...the track was covered in smoke, it was on fire trying to pull the emergency hatch, and we couldn't figure it out. So we ended up jumping out of the door as quickly as possible. At that point the only person I saw, because I was the last one out, everyone was grabbing the casualties bringing them wherever they brought em, I don't know...the only person I saw was my platoon commander, Lt [REDACTED] We ran into this little ditch on the other side of the road. We started getting all aligned. The other Marines started catching up to us. At that point, Lt [REDACTED] went across this little ditch, we jumped over some water and got behind this berm. Some mortars started hitting the road and near the track and indirect fire everywhere. I don't know the difference between arty and mortars and we were taking it from every direction...not every direction, impacts were in every direction. We didn't know which....just kept going back and forth across the water, left and right in the water, just going all over the place. I don't remember what exactly the A-10 hit first, but I remember I heard the sound from the gun, real distinct gun, the burp gun. I asked Lieutenant, I asked, what the *** is that, Sir? It was an A-10. I didn't think anything of it. I heard impacts on the road. I didn't think anything of it cause they were impacts all over the place. He was saying how...that that was too close...real **** close, he said. We were just sitting there and we couldn't figure out where we were taking small arms fire, but you could hear it. It was so far out we couldn't see muzzle flashes. I couldn't see anything. I, we had no idea where we were taking it from. We kept, as I said, we kept going left and right and back and forth across the river, trying to dodge indirect fire. You could hear, at the time we heard the burp gun, you could

[REDACTED]

hear the little flashes on the track, that it kept hitting the track. Either it was the best indirect fire, or the most accurate indirect fire I've ever seen or it just zeroed in on that track. It must have passed us three times when we were down in that little ditch. As we were running and shifting right, indirect fire was walking on us. Somebody yelled, I was on the road, get in the tracks, get in the tracks. We saw other Marines hanging out the door. At that time, we started running out to get in the track, and you could hear the burp gun again, so we all got down. At that time I was right next to LCpl [REDACTED] and I believe the Lieutenant was on the other side of him and that's when, after we heard the burp, we could hear... I can't describe the sound, it was a whizzing sound, and like I said, Sir, it's hard to explain, you hear the whizzing sound. I didn't know [REDACTED] at the time had got hit. I felt burning, I got a piece of shrapnel [REDACTED]... at that time so did Lieutenant too. We both got up. I jumped in the track immediately. LCpl [REDACTED] and Lt [REDACTED] were picking up [REDACTED] trying to get him in, and I was pulling him in. Once we finally got him in... we got hit once by the A-10. You could hear the burp gun and then dink, dink, dink, dink on top, like many mini-explosions on top of the track. That's while we were loading [REDACTED]. Once we got [REDACTED] on, we started to move. We got hit by the A-10 the same thing, the little mini-explosions, you could hear the burp gun. You could hear it hitting the track. We must have got hit at least four times. Four times on our way out. I don't know where we were going. The guy driving the track just wanted to get the hell out of there. Got back on, guess we got hit a couple of times, at least four more times and we must have got hit with about four RPGs by the time we got out in front of this building. We got out of the track and we jumped over this wall. This was inside the city, at the time. There was no enemy there so we just set up security in every direction and we ended up clearing two houses to the right, and holding up like a defensive position in there. Until we saw tanks, we saw a tank and we signaled them that we had friendlies in there and then we had two Humvees come get us. That's when we come out, that's when I

[REDACTED]

came up and I couldn't find anybody from my platoon. At that time, Lt [REDACTED] and LCpl [REDACTED] they did not get on that track after we loaded [REDACTED]. I came back and I was running out on the road. All the casualties that we loaded from inside the house went back on the tank. I found them cause one of my NCOs, one of my team leaders was there, and I wanted to make sure he was alright. He was put with the rest of the casualties, he was going to be alright. I was looking for the rest of my platoon. I kept going across the road, and I saw my Lieutenant on the radio and he said he had just called off...he was trying to find out...trying to call off the air. I don't know, I wasn't there for the actual transaction, but I know he was PANZER 5. I think that was the call sign for the tank that he was talking to. I don't know why he was talking to tanks, but that's who he said he was trying to get a hold of. He grabbed another RTO and set up the radio with a ten foot antenna. At that time, I thought it was just me, Lieutenant, and [REDACTED] who was with him. We ended up finding out that the rest of our platoon, there was like fifteen of us up on the other side of the road. That's when we met up with the rest of the platoon, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Anything else you want to add?

LCPL [REDACTED] No, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

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[REDACTED]

Interview with LCpl [REDACTED]
12 April 2003, 21:30 L

COL [REDACTED] Please state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL [REDACTED] Lance Corporal [REDACTED] Social XXX-XX-XXXX.
Billet, Assistant Sawgunner, C Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL [REDACTED] My name is Colonel [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, I do, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

[REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED]: Yes, I do, Sir.

COL [REDACTED]: Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir.

COL [REDACTED]: OK, [REDACTED] if you would please relay to me the events as you understand them, after you crossed over the bridge relative to the friendly fire incident.

LCPL [REDACTED]: According to mission we dismounted.

COL [REDACTED]: Where were you?

LCPL [REDACTED]: North of the bridge.

COL [REDACTED]: What vehicle were you in?

LCPL [REDACTED]: I was in the lead vehicle that had been hit by an RPG. The second vehicle in our movement then took the lead. Pushed across the bridge, pulled up onto the west side of the road. Our vehicle stopped on the road due to the fire and RPG. We had casualties. We had trouble getting off the AAV. I went through the top, set security on the other side. We got the casualties off to the east side of the road. The platoon commander, Lt [REDACTED] ordered those capable, other than those helping the casualties to push to the west side of the road to cover the

[REDACTED]

west and north, which was according to plan. So I went across the road, brought a squad, including two machine gun attachments to the west side. One machine gun attachment was pulled back to the east side of the road. We then received indirect fire from the enemy on to the track. I took charge of the squadron at that time. The squad leader got hit, team leader was one of the casualties. I took charge. We held position there until they started traversing onto our position. Moved about 100 meters to the north, waited there for Lt [REDACTED] to come over and the others, which he did. And we held a security position there for, I don't know for how long...it was a while. We pushed north again, and they began traversing onto our position further. For some reason I, the indirect fire then cut off for some reason. We were beginning to load up on the tracks to get our wounded back to the casualty collection point. I heard something that I want to describe as a very, it almost sounded like a blender. I knew it was an A-10 cause I saw it flying around. It didn't hit us right away.

COL [REDACTED] You saw it flying?

LCPL [REDACTED] I saw the A-10s above us.

COL [REDACTED] How many were there?

LCPL [REDACTED] One that I saw. Came in on my pos and the track we were loading up the casualties on. After they...the casualties that we were loading up were from the A-10. They came in three times. I'm not sure what time it hit us, but it came in three times. With the gun three times, 30 millimeter. I hit the deck perpendicular to the strafing fire. I saw rounds walk up to Marines in my squad and then cross the track. I know one of them was hit right away. The

[REDACTED]

other one I could tell cause he was moving his legs. Cpl [REDACTED] called. As Cpl [REDACTED] was laying on the deck, I wanted to make sure he was alright. I got up. After rounds had impacted to my left and to my right, I'd gotten up. Some other Marines were helping Cpl [REDACTED]. I saw blood coming from LCpl [REDACTED]. I went over to him and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] So we loaded up Cpl [REDACTED] and as we were loading up LCpl [REDACTED] he came in at least another one or two times. So it was three or four times it came in on us, with the gun. Finally got them loaded up and sent them back to the casualty collection point. The only one from my platoon, beside myself north of the bridge were Lt [REDACTED] my platoon commander, and myself. We linked up with second platoon who was holding pos there, also holding security according to plan to the west and the north. We punched them out. Lt [REDACTED] took command of the only radio unit out there, cause his had been, ours had been destroyed. He called off the air. But before that had happened, it came in on our pos at least two more times, two more times with the gun. I don't know if any casualties were taken, from those last two times, but there was a track left there, and I think that's what it was firing on, but there was nobody inside the track, except a KIA, Cpl [REDACTED]. I believe he was already dead at the time. After we called off the air, we called the support and a tank came up to support our pos. I had to run and gather a illumination, pyro to signal, to mark our pos. A tank rolled up. We secured the pos. We began picking up the...

COL [REDACTED] In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

[REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir. Sir, I think there's one more thing I think you should know. I guess I was told there was an order that came down, while we were in the tracks, I don't know when it happened, but the order was [REDACTED] I didn't know if you knew about that.

COL [REDACTED]: Yes. Thank you very much.



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[REDACTED]

Interview with LCpl [REDACTED]
12 April 2003, 21:30 L

COL [REDACTED] Please state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL [REDACTED] Lance Corporal [REDACTED] XXX-XX-XXXX, Machine Gunner,
C Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

COL [REDACTED] My name is Colonel [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

[REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Would you please relay to me, as I spoke to you earlier, where you were relative to the friendly fire incident, when you crossed over the bridge in An Nasiriyah?

LCPL [REDACTED] We got hit by an RPG. I was in track 211, Charlie 211. _____ through the city and got on the outside of it and we jumped out and got on the west side of the road. I could see, when we got to the berm on the side of the road, I saw the A-10 fly over going east to west. We had some contact with the enemy _____ and looked over again and my squad leader Cpl [REDACTED] pulled me down and I looked up above him and I could see an A-10 that was dropping flares and stuff. We crossed over a ditch on the other side and bounded north towards first squad. Went back across the ditch. There's a track getting ready to go. Right before we got on the track, they told us to get down on the deck and I could hear the gun go off in the sky. I sounded like a _____ going off or a bad-ass blender. Everything just lit up all around me. LCpl [REDACTED] and LCpl [REDACTED] got hit, to my direct right. They couldn't have been more than a foot away from me. The guy from my gun team got hit by shrapnel on my left. That was pretty much it, that was the extent that I had with the A-10.


COL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] When we just got off the track and I couldn't see if there was a missile going off or if there were flares coming off the back of it.

COL [REDACTED] In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.



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[REDACTED]

Interview with [REDACTED]
12 April 2003, 21:12 L

COL [REDACTED] Go ahead and state your name, rank, social security number and your billet.

LCPL [REDACTED] My name is Lance Corporal [REDACTED] My social security number is XXX-XX-XXXX. I'm a Sawgunner for 1/2 Charlie, 3rd Platoon, 3rd Squad.

COL [REDACTED] My name is Colonel [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation which may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, I do, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

[REDACTED]

spraying all over me. My buddy, LCpl [REDACTED] got hit in the chest, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another fire team leader Cpl [REDACTED]... There's a lot of rumors that he got shot three times, I don't think he's be able to withstand a shot like that three times in his leg. He probably got shrapnel. His leg was [REDACTED] I got shrapnel in my face, and almost got my two fingers knocked off. I had shrapnel all down my arm. When it came down and hit us, I don't know what happened. All I know is there was a lot of dust. The track was, ...you can hear all the metal being hit. And once we finally got into the track. We didn't know who all had been hit until the bodies were getting picked up. [REDACTED] was dead, [REDACTED] was pretty bad. I was alright. Once our track got hit again. We had got hit by a mortar, then we heard that noise in the sky. Apparently it was an A-10...that same noise that we heard when we got hit before. We heard that about twice. Once our track was hit twice by mortars, we got out, cleared out two buildings and from there we heard that noise in the sky four or five more times, while we were clearing out those buildings. We were in that building probably an hour and a half.

COL [REDACTED] Where was the building located?

LCPL [REDACTED] I don't know, Sir. I was in the back of the track. The back hatch was open but I can't remember which direction we were going. All I know is we were getting hit pretty hard. What appeared to be an A-10. All I know is our track was getting hit pretty hard by numerous types of weapons. As far as how many times I heard that buzzing sound in the air, eight times, nine times, that I can remember.

COL [REDACTED] Do you know the direction that the aircraft was flying? Did you see the aircraft at all?

[REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] I never got eyes-on. I believe, I don't know exactly which direction. We were heading north and I believe, once we crossed the road, right here. The A-10, when it had hit myself, LCpl [REDACTED] and Cpl [REDACTED] I had the impression it was coming in north at that time.

COL [REDACTED] From the north?

LCPL [REDACTED] It was heading north. Like I said, I never saw. I never got eyes-on. The direction my body flew. I felt the pressure...

COL [REDACTED] You were outside when this happened?

LCPL [REDACTED] That's right. I was getting ready to get in. My buddy, [REDACTED] was going where I was, and he got hit before he was able to go in, and my body shifted in the north direction, that's why I'm saying....

COL [REDACTED] And [REDACTED] was killed?

LCPL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir, he was. Hopefully he was killed instantly.

COL [REDACTED] And Cpl [REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] He got hit in the leg. There's a lot of rumors about how many times, and like that, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED]: No. I know one of the Marines in the weapons platoon. He has an A-10 round.

COL [REDACTED]: I've got one.

LCPL [REDACTED]:able to tell....not audible

COL [REDACTED]: In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LCPL [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir.



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[REDACTED]

Phone Interview conducted with Sgt. [REDACTED] JSMC on 7 April 03

On 7 April I contacted Sgt. [REDACTED] JSMC to conduct a phone interview. Sgt. [REDACTED] was wounded in An Nasiriyha Iraq on 23 March 03. He is presently at Bethesda Naval Hospital undergoing treatment for injuries received during the battle. After reading Sgt. [REDACTED] the Boards opening statement and giving him the Oath Sgt. [REDACTED] provided the following verbal testimony.

At 1000Z 23 March 03 Sgt. [REDACTED] was in the back of the lead AAV crossing the northern bridge over the Saddam Canal in An Nasiriyah Iraq. His Platoon Commander was in the track with him. While crossing the bridge his AAV was struck by an RPG and 4 Marines inside the track were injured. Sgt. [REDACTED] Cpl. [REDACTED] Cpl. [REDACTED], and Pvt. [REDACTED]. All of these Marines received wounds to their legs. Cpl. [REDACTED] leg was bleeding profusely and Sgt. [REDACTED] assisted Cpl. [REDACTED] in applying a tourniquet. The AAV was filled with black smoke and Sgt. [REDACTED] had difficulty seeing. The AAV came to a stop the back ramp came down and a corpsman assisted the 4 wounded Marines into 1st Sgt. [REDACTED]'s AAV which was the MEDEVAC AAV. The Marines inside this AAV heard shrapnel hitting around them but were not aware of what they were being engaged by. The MEDEVAC AAV was subsequently disabled and the wounded Marines were moved to another AAV located nearby that was in a ditch off of the road to the south. The driver of this AAV could not get it started. Cpl. [REDACTED] stated at this time that the track was being engaged by A-10 fire and that it looked like fireworks going off. Sgt. [REDACTED] closed the door to the AAV and the Marines waited until the firing stopped. When the firing stopped another AAV pulled up and Cpl. [REDACTED] and Cpl. [REDACTED] jumped on it and it moved off. Sgt. [REDACTED] yelled for them to stop but they did not hear him. The Companies Commander arrived at that time and directed Sgt. [REDACTED] and Pvt. [REDACTED] to follow him to the north side of the road against the berm. The Commander helped Pvt. [REDACTED] across the road. There were 10-15 Marines laying against the berm on the north side of the road. Sgt. [REDACTED] was approximately 5 feet away from the nearest Marine, the Company Commander. Pvt. [REDACTED] yelled watch out, Sgt. [REDACTED] turned to look up at the sky and saw an A-10 and a 30MM round coming right at him. Sgt. [REDACTED] rolled and the round skipped off of him as it struck him. All of the other Marines were unhurt by this engagement. A corpsman immediately came to Sgt. [REDACTED] assistance and applied 2 anti-coagulation packs to his wound. GySgt. [REDACTED] arrived and asked if anyone had a [REDACTED]. A [REDACTED] as the A-10 was about to make another pass, somebody said that the A-10 had diverted and was going away. The corpsman also had a [REDACTED] that he was waving at the A-10. Sgt. [REDACTED] did not see this because he was lying on his stomach at the time. During this a Marine behind him had gotten a hold of a radio and was yelling in to it to stop the air. Sgt. [REDACTED] was then loaded into the back of an AAV with other wounded Marines. Marine Corps tanks arrived on scene and all firing stopped. Sgt. [REDACTED] was moved to a casualty collection point and shortly after Marine Corps helicopters arrived to MEDEVAC the wounded.



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TAB K

Tab K

Other Interviews and Statements

**Lt Col [REDACTED], Commanding Officer, Marine Light
Helicopter Squadron 269K-3**

Maj [REDACTED]K-15

Capt [REDACTED] and Lt [REDACTED]K-17

Maj [REDACTED]K-21

Capt [REDACTED]K-25

2Lt [REDACTED]K-33

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[REDACTED]

Interview with Lt Col [REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] My name is Col [REDACTED]. Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

LT COL [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

COL [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

LT COL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. I do.

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] Please state your name, your social security number and your billet for the record.

LT COL [REDACTED] Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269, XXX-XX-XXXX.

COL [REDACTED] Lt Col [REDACTED], do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

LT COL [REDACTED] I do, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] if you could relate to me the incidents that transpired up in An Nasiriyah, Iraq on the 23rd of March? I understand that you made two or three sorties during the day in support of 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines?

LT COL [REDACTED] That is correct, Sir. We took off from USS Saipan, I want to say, probably 0500 that morning. Had very little intelligence on where the fight was. We knew that the _____ was open. We made our way north. Hit the FARP for fuel. Got out on the MSR, found the nearest convoy, started heading north with the convoys till we found smoke and that smoke was coming from the vicinity of An Nasiriyah. At that point, it was probably Team Mech, since I saw mostly AAVs with a few tanks on the outskirts of the city.

[REDACTED]

There was a fight at 3 267 Viper, Cobras working the target area engaging tanks, oil tanks on the south side of the road.

COL [REDACTED] And the oil tanks were in the vicinity of ...

LT COL [REDACTED] South of the south canal, where the road bends going into An Nasiriyah. AAVs were spread across here. The three 267 airplanes were working this side of the road. We held till they binged off. We came in...

COL [REDACTED] And that's south of the railroad bridge about...?

LT COL [REDACTED] About two kilometers. We engaged numerous targets on the MSR, _____ 50's, in this industrial complex, it was a treeline, multiple vehicles in there. We started engaging multiple vehicles in there. We started engaging vehicles in there. We're taking small arms fire, we took a manpad? Shot out of there. At that point we were Winchester and we binged back. A flight of F-18s had also previously 167 or was it 267 Cobras been dropping on this road.

COL [REDACTED] And this is all in the vicinity of the railroad bridge?

LT COL [REDACTED] Correct. I then went back to Jalibah, returned on station probably an hour and 15 to an hour and 20 minutes later, due to the volume of aircraft that were trying to be

[REDACTED]

serviced there. We came back up and we had five total airplanes up there that day. I believe it was Capt [REDACTED] and his wingman working up in this vicinity.

COL [REDACTED] And that grid is around?

LT COL [REDACTED] About the 225...25. And by this point 1/2 had pushed across the southern bridge and had a foothold in An Nasiriyah.

COL [REDACTED] Did you see vehicles cross the southern bridge?

LT COL [REDACTED] I never saw a vehicle across the bridge on Ambush Alley. We did a battlefield handover with him. He _____ it out of there. We took over for him and started pushing our way north across the southern canal. We noticed numerous...where would that be...right here. There was a battery of Z-20s right here, and there was a truck with a triple A piece in it.

COL [REDACTED] And that's...?

LT COL [REDACTED] Again, about 226 323. We reported that to the FAC. Asked for permission to engage. He said that he could not see us and he was north of the bridge, so he cleared us...actually he did not clear us for Type 3 control, that he'd have to work on getting us clearance to _____ those targets. So we flew up to the triple A pieces, there's a big date grove over here. I noticed that there were children playing on the Z-20s? so we made the decision that

[REDACTED]

we weren't going to engage, one way or the other because of the kids were on the artillery pieces.

CAPT [REDACTED] Sir, do you remember the Ground FAC's callsign?

LT COL [REDACTED] I do not. Over here we were working with MOUTH, but when we got up here...

COL [REDACTED] At the railroad bridge you were working with MOUTH?

LT COL [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. Once they crossed the canal, he was real busy doing other things. It did not sound to me like he was engaging a lot of targets. Their primary concern at that point was they had pushed, probably, a company with at least four tanks onto this road and their intent was to bypass the eastern side of the town and grab the bridge. All those tanks and a couple of tracks got stuck right here...really this is a sewage treatment plant...and they got stuck in the sh...literally the shit right here.

COL [REDACTED] 218 35...

LT COL [REDACTED] 354. So he was obviously very concerned with the security of those vehicles. We pushed north of the south canal and basically for the next 45 minutes, we provided security for those vehicles. Several times made high speed runs over the top of them, just trying to keep anybody that might give them the bum's rush back with noise. Hauled out in this area

[REDACTED]

where we kept receiving triple A fire and flak bursts, probably 37 millimeter and possibly 57 millimeter. They were pretty big bursts.

COL [REDACTED] Could you see where they were coming from?

LT COL [REDACTED] We never saw the origin of the fire. We kept our speed up. We kept bumping around and just about everywhere we went we got shot at.

COL [REDACTED] And that was to the east of...about 3 clicks, 4 clicks to the east of the bogged down vehicles.

LT COL [REDACTED] That is correct. About this time, and I can't be positive it was the second sortie or the third sortie, I could see smoke from up north and I heard the GYRATE flight on the TAD frequency. And he was reporting numerous armored vehicles and other targets north of the T, which is here. And I believe he was working...It looked to me like it was probably three or four miles up north...north of the north canal. But that's just, you know, we never stopped. I just saw the smoke and I heard him reporting, and I did hear the FAC reporting that he was cleared Type 3 control on those targets. And I heard him make numerous runs calling in with the direction of attack, coming off and reporting secondaries. At that point Capt [REDACTED] showed back up. We did another relief in place with him. Kept reporting back into the FAC that his boys were OK over here, stuck in the mud. Told him where we were getting fire from. There were several buildings over here that we were taking small arms fire from. You could see

[REDACTED]

them shooting out the windows. We chose not to address those targets because there were...I mean, they were civilian buildings and the small arms fire wasn't having a great effect..

COL [REDACTED] And that's about the 244 350?

LT COL [REDACTED] That's correct. Obviously the FAC...we reported that to the FAC. The FAC couldn't see us so he could not clear us hot. So we just decided, basically, to keep moving and keep away from the areas of known fire. Did a turnover with Capt [REDACTED] I'm not sure if I came back up again, or not, quite honestly, but I logged ten hours of flight time that day, so I think there was time for me to come back out there again. Nothing else happened that I was aware of. They were just getting established on this side, north of the bridge. They were not...I did not hear any reports of them taking fire, or they had no work for us at that time, other than security on those stuck vehicles. At that point, I wanted all the squadron aircraft to return to Jalibah, and shut down, because it didn't seem like there was a big fight going on up there, and I was sure that some of our aircraft were probably battle damaged and I wanted to look them over, and the pilots were tired. I knew that Capt [REDACTED] was coming back up. He did. We went back to Jalibah, shut down and he showed up about an hour and a half later, and told me at that point that 1/2 had been ambushed up here and lost three tracks and had a bunch of _____.

COL [REDACTED] Can we go back to the A-10, the A-10 conversation that you heard? The A-10 conversation between MOUTH, or the FAC and the A-10?

[REDACTED]

LT COL [REDACTED] I cannot confirm that MOUTH was the FAC that was controlling them, the callsign. But yes, I heard GYRATE flight calling targets north of the north canal. He was describing the targets to the FAC. The FAC said Roger, that. We've got intel that there's targets up there, you're cleared Type 3 control.

COL [REDACTED] Do you remember the types of descriptions he gave of the vehicles?

LT COL [REDACTED] Armored vehicles along the MSR, and that's about the extent of it. And that's really all the FAC needed. He said I've got armored vehicles moving north of the north canal. I don't recall which way the vehicles were moving.

COL [REDACTED] About how long...do you know about how long the A-10s engaged?

LT COL [REDACTED] It seemed to me that it was a period of at least, probably 15 minutes. Possibly longer. Again, trying to recollect something over a month ago. But he was working those targets for quite a while and I saw at least three clouds of black smoke coming from the area he was working.

CAPT [REDACTED] When you were taking the triple A fires, did you mention that to the Ground FAC?

LT COL [REDACTED] Yes.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Did you happen to hear if GYRATE flight was taking any triple A?

LT COL [REDACTED] I did not. I don't recall him saying he was taking fire. I was looking for him. I never saw him. I never went out to the block he was working, but I don't think he was coming low.

COL [REDACTED] Did you hear the FAC tell GYRATE flight to cease fire?

LT COL [REDACTED] No. At no time did I ever hear anything that remotely sounded like he was engaging friendly forces. It was absolutely no Blue on Blue or cease fire or anything like that. In fact, I only found out about this about two weeks ago. That what happened up there was possible a Blue on Blue. Because none of us had any suspicion.

CAPT [REDACTED] Sir, at any of the time you looked up in there, see [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LT COL [REDACTED] No. It was too far away and there was date groves in here. We were operating right on the treetops and there was no way. I couldn't even see up to this bridge. The furthest we got up was probably 36 northing here. We just, basically, kept jumping around all over in here, and about every 15 minutes, 10 minutes pop over these guys and make sure they were OK.

COL [REDACTED] The...what running headings were the A-10s using that you observed?

[REDACTED]

LT COL [REDACTED]: Sir, I don't remember. I want to say...but I can't be sure...I want to say east to west.

CAPT [REDACTED]: And just for the record, could you clarify...you mentioned a T in the canal just to have on the record, where you were talking about...

LT COL [REDACTED]: The T, became known as the T, basically the where 225409.

CAPT [REDACTED]: The canal, being the northern canal.

LT COL [REDACTED]: Located generally at 223348 at the bridge, and it was all on this eastern MSR, was where all the action was.

COL [REDACTED]: When you reported that you were taking triple A, was that the same time that GYRATE flight was engaging? Was that prior...or...?

LT COL [REDACTED]: Multiple times. We got engaged multiple times out there, and each time we got lit up we'd call the FAC and tell him, and basically, tell him we're moving, because we were seeing air bursts, but we couldn't see where the source of the fire was coming, and I was obviously very concerned we were going to close on this guy and catch one. I don't remember time relation to the A-10 attack. I just don't remember. I also don't remember what TAD net it was.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Sir, at any time did you happen to say that you were going to suppress some of the triple A?

LT COL [REDACTED] No. If we could have found them, we would have suppressed. But we never saw the muzzle flash. All we saw were the air bursts, other than the small arms fire that I could see the muzzle flashes on those guys but again, it was a three story apartment complex. I was not going to engage those targets.

COL [REDACTED] In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

LT COL [REDACTED] I do.



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STATEMENT BY MAJ. [REDACTED]

- IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF 23 MARCH, IN THE TOWN OF AN NIZIRIYAH, MYSELF AND MY CO-PILOT (STLT [REDACTED]) WERE DASH-3 IN A FLIGHT OF 3 A-10'S PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES, TASK FORCE ZARIFA. THE LIGHT DIVISION WAS LED BY THE SQUADRON CO, LTCOL [REDACTED] DASH 2 WAS CAPT [REDACTED]. WE ARRIVED ON STATION AT APPROXIMATELY 1330-1400 LOCAL AND WERE INITIALLY ANCHORED IN THE SOUTHERSTERN PARTION OF THE CITY, BUT WORKED NORTHWARDS, STAYING IN THE SALT FLATS TO AVOID ENEMY FIRE. OUR FLIGHT WAS IN CONTACT WITH A SECTION OF COBRAS FROM UNCL-29 LED BY CAPT [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] WAS LOW ON FUEL AND CONDUCTED A VERY THOROUGH BATTLEFIELD TURNOUT WITH AIR DIVISION BEFORE DEPARTING FOR JALIBTH TO RE-FUEL + RE-ARM. I BELIEVE THAT WHILE WE WERE CONDUCTING THE BATTLEFIELD HANDOVER, THERE WERE A-10'S CONDUCTING ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN THE CITY. I DON'T RECALL WHO THE FIC

[REDACTED]

WAS WHO WAS CONTROLLING THE A-10'S FROM MY POSITION IN THE FLIGHT (I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING LOCAL SECURITY TO THE CO'S AND SANDER'S COBRA'S) I DID NOT WITNESS ANY OF THE A-10 ATTACKS. HOWEVER, I DO REMEMBER HEARING A COMMENT FROM THE CO OVER THE RADIO SAYING, IN EFFECT, THAT A-10'S WERE ON STATION AND ENGAGING TARGETS IN THE CITY. OUR DIVISION STAYED ON THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE CITY FOR THE NEXT HOUR BEFORE BINGOING FOR FUEL. WE DID NOT ENGAGE ANY TARGETS DURING THE ENTIRE TIME ON STATION FROM \approx 1330 - 1530.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Interview with Cobra pilots
Captain [REDACTED]
1Lt [REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] If you would please both state your name, rank, social security number, squadron.

CAPT [REDACTED] Captain [REDACTED] XXX-XX-XXXX, HMLA-269.

1LT [REDACTED] First Lieutenant [REDACTED] XXX-XX-XXXX, HMLA-269.

COL [REDACTED] My name is Colonel [REDACTED] and we're in the process of investigating a friendly fire incident that happened in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah, Iraq on 23 March 2003. The board president is Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins. The purpose of the investigation is determine facts and circumstances surrounding the incident and to gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. It will be a public record. I want you both to understand that there is no confidentiality throughout this. Do you both swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] What I'd like you to do...when you were out in An Nasiriyah on the 23rd, relate to me the events during the second sortie that transpired...where you operated, what you saw, particularly focusing on the conversations you heard between the FAC, MOUTH and the A-10s.

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. The FAC said we got the call to push up just north of the river here. Set up overwatch position for the tanks, we were under the control of MOUTH at that time, and that was our main objective basically, to assure the security of the M-1s. We set up in this area, here in the brush area, keeping up speed. Basically a three-ship at that time, 24, CO, and myself. Myself being on the right flank, the skipper on the left flank and we had another Cobra in the back doing a lazy eight, to protect us, for general security. At that time, the times were hazy, I'm sure it was before noon. I saw the flack. I saw the triple A, were going up. I saw it on my right flank. So, I'm on the right flank, and I'm looking. It has to be somewhere north of where we're at. About here.

COL [REDACTED] And you're someplace over here?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. We just...we worked this area and we bumped across the river.

COL [REDACTED] And the grid is about 220...

LT [REDACTED] Grid 220 345.

COL [REDACTED] 220 345?

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir. At that point I could hear basic pieces of the conversation between MOUTH and the A-10. I was really concentrating on ...obviously what was going on in our section. I heard A-10 doing his run, setting up. MOUTH was talking to him. I heard him abort. I looked over, I saw the black smoke that's characteristic of the triple A. At that point, I don't know if it was me or DASH 2 that came. And one aircraft dropped one bomb. I saw the smoke, the impacts. The FAC said great hits. Go ahead and re-attack. At that point, I saw three more hits in the general vicinity. He's passing the BDA to him. I don't recall what it was. At no time did I hear friendly fire, Blue on Blue or any visual signal for cease fire.

COL [REDACTED]: Did you hear the A-10 pilots call AAA fire?

CAPT [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir. I heard him say they're shooting and that was the reason why, the abort, from my understanding of the radio traffic. They were shooting up. I never saw them visually. I tried to acquire them as much as I could, but again, I was moving myself, just to keep airspeed on the aircraft.

COL [REDACTED]: Do you have anything to add that you saw from your perspective?

LT [REDACTED]: Well, Sir, I didn't actually see the A-10. I didn't see them work around the area. I can't really say. We were pretty busy within our section.

COL [REDACTED]: I understand.

[REDACTED]

LT [REDACTED] I personally recall there being some sort of friendly fire. I recall a call being put out that there was friendly fire or possible friendly fire and I believe that was by the FAC.

CAPT [REDACTED] I heard that.

LT [REDACTED] We had no visual on any of that. It was out of our area at the time.

COL [REDACTED] Did you hear the conversations between the FAC and the A-10?

LT [REDACTED] I don't really recall, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] I know there was a lot going on. You guys _____. Do you have anything else then?

LT [REDACTED] No, Sir.

COL [REDACTED] In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

[REDACTED]

Interview with Major [REDACTED] USA

CAPT [REDACTED]: Captain [REDACTED] with Major [REDACTED] and Major [REDACTED] concerning the 23rd March incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. My name is Capt [REDACTED]. Under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we are investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Yes.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]: Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Alright, Sir, if you could, for the record, please state your name, rank, unit and current job here?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Major [REDACTED] United States Army, currently ground liaison officer to the 332nd AEW.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Your normal unit?

MAJ [REDACTED]: 411th Ground Liaison Attachment, Montana Army National Guard.

CAPT [REDACTED]: The purpose of calling you in, we're just trying to get some clarification on I guess the investigation into a potential, at that time, potential friendly fire incident from 23 March. We understand that you may have gotten a phone call from Maj [REDACTED] that day.

MAJ [REDACTED]: I personally didn't. I've heard rumors about this, but it could have been another incident, entirely. I have nothing specific on this incident.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. I guess we have no further questions for you.

MAJ [REDACTED] Nothing in our records seems to indicate anything, either.

CAPT [REDACTED] Had any of the pilots approached you at all? Did you have phone conversations?

MAJ [REDACTED] I heard one conversation in Tallil which would have happened about a week and a half to two weeks after that, about a potential one. But it was referenced...originally it was called an A-10 one, but none of them had claimed to done it...and that was apparently a Navy pilot, and it was on a supply convoy. But again, that was rumor control, I have nothing to verify it.

MAJ [REDACTED] Sir, do you know anybody else...this is Major [REDACTED] anybody else who would have worked on the 23rd? Capt [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Possibly SFC [REDACTED]. He is with us. Capt [REDACTED] to _____ . They went north somewhere. I'm not really sure where. They should be back this evening. You can probably talk to them tomorrow.

MAJ [REDACTED] Go ahead and spell that last name.

MAJ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SFC, my NCO.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]: Thank you.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Those are all the questions we have.

MAJ [REDACTED]: Not a problem, I just, I know we got to make it quick.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Just a real quick closing. I want to remind you that this is an official interview and not to discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

MAJ [REDACTED]: OK.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Thank you, Sir.

MAJ [REDACTED]: No problem.

[REDACTED]

Interview with Capt [REDACTED], USA
25th Infantry Division
CFLCC C-3, 332 AEW, GLO

2 May 2003

Parties present:

MAJ [REDACTED] USAF
CAPT [REDACTED] USAF
[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] This is Capt [REDACTED] with Maj [REDACTED], the legal advisor to the board, Capt Duckworth being the pilot member of the board. We're with Capt [REDACTED], the ground liaison officer here at Al Jaber Air Base. My name is Capt [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

CAPT [REDACTED] I do.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

CAPT [REDACTED] I do.

CAPT [REDACTED] I guess really the big thing, we're just trying to make sure we get on record the conversation the pilots had with you concerning the incident, or at the time, the Pop Go incident. And, I understand that they had already spoken with Major [REDACTED] but then they followed up with you. Is that correct?

CAPT [REDACTED]: I don't know if they had talked with Maj [REDACTED] or not. But, they did come to me during my shift, and this is like shortly after they had landed, but I can't tell you the time difference between when they landed and came to me. They came to me shortly after they landed asking about, "Hey, did you hear anything about some sort of friendly fire incident or anything like that?" At that time, I looked at all my sources, which is like...the chat rooms that I have opened, any kind of email traffic, and then also any kind of significant activity traffic

[REDACTED]

that shows up also. I had not either gotten a phone call, not seen anything on email, not seen anything on chat, not seen anything on significant activities, and those are all CFLCC sources, not CENTAF or CFAC or anything. And, I had not seen anything until they asked me about it, "Hey, have you heard anything, have you seen anything?" I, at that time had not seen or heard anything. So, I went to check those sources again. I said, "No. There's nothing indicating that there'd been anything that was being reported." So I told them, "No. I haven't heard anything." And, they asked me, "Would you have heard anything?" And I said, "Well, if something had happened, you know...we, i.e. either us at the GLO or us as the wing would have heard something." And, I said, quote, unquote, "Before you would've landed, we would have heard something." And, because of that, also, I kept an eye out for anything over the next few days. You know, like on the SITREPs 24 hour SITREPS that came out, things like that, to see if anything showed up. But I never saw anything, any mention, any reference to any kind of fratricide incident, any kind of large one in that vicinity.

CAPT [REDACTED] Had you heard about, like later on, had you heard about any other of the fratricide incidents?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah.

CAPT [REDACTED] How fast did that information get to you?

CAPT [REDACTED] Oh, boy...

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] That you can remember.

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah, yeah... A lot of them ended up coming through... first, I would hear about the other fratricides and it would be on the chat room, the mission director list we were reviewing. There would be something on there saying, you know, like: we have a report of this happening, and then shortly after that, and I would say within hours, not like a few, but within like maybe max a couple of hours, I would see something across my channels from the CFLCC mentioning a fratricide incident.

CAPT [REDACTED] So, within two hours, the mission director maybe catching wind of it, you would hear something from the CFLCC channel?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah. That would be fair to say, within two hours, sometimes shorter, sometimes maybe a little bit longer than that. So, I would get something through my channels, also shortly after the mission director, saying something to that effect also.

CAPT [REDACTED] The pilots are on... in this case... did they come back to you after that to check up on it?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah. After I told them that I hadn't seen anything. I did not hear from them. You know... it was... a... I didn't see anything else on it. So, it became a non-issue. Then after a... I'd say a couple of weeks, they came back to me asking specifically for the SITREPS that we were covering that day and then a couple of subsequent days, to find out if

[REDACTED]

anything was going on because by that time, they were telling me that, "OK. Well people are looking into it again." The word was coming through, as far as I know, Air Force channels, because I had not heard anything through Army channels, about it being an issue, that people were considering it as if it were a Blue on Blue engagement. Like I said, they were coming back to me and they were asking me, "Hey, can we have...Do you have any kind of documentation that covers that time period, that we can use to look in to see if there's any reference to any kind of Blue on Blue engagement?" So, I gave that to them. I printed out the SITREPS starting on the day of and then several days after that. I gave that to Lt ...Intel, [REDACTED] the Intel guy.

CAPT [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] [REDACTED]..There you go [REDACTED] He did tell me he looked through them. I did know to what detail he read them or anything, like that, but that there was nothing in there. I personally did not review the SITREPS again, _____ provided to them, and that was the end of it.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. And that's the last you had heard about it until...?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah, and that was it until, you know...you gentlemen came and asked me about it also, there was an actual getting into an investigation. That's the next thing I found out about it.

CAPT [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED], do you have any follow up questions?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I have a couple. I don't think we went on tape formally to... Would you state your name, rank, spell your last name so that we know how to spell.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK, yeah. My name is [REDACTED] Captain, Aviation, United States Army.

MAJ [REDACTED] And what unit are you assigned with?

CAPT [REDACTED] I'm currently assigned officially to the 25th Infantry Division in Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and I'm over here tasked out as an individual augmentee to the CFLCC C-3, and then given to the 332nd as a ground liaison officer.

MAJ [REDACTED] And, you had also stated your shift. What was your shift on that day, when the pilots came in?

CAPT [REDACTED] Oh boy, myself and two other GLOs rotated shifts as the need was made. Usually, I have to be like 6 o'clock in the morning to about 1 o'clock in the afternoon shift. So, it would have been like 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning to like around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and _____. If I remember it correctly, and I... this is not 100% ... that came by in the morning. I know it was daytime when they stopped by. It was not during the nighttime shift.

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] By they, you mean both the pilots showed up?

CAPT [REDACTED] I don't know for sure, not 100% sure if it was both pilots or just one.

MAJ [REDACTED] That's all I have.

CAPT [REDACTED] Before closing remarks, we many come back with more questions at another time. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.



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Interview with 2Lt [REDACTED]
332 EFS, Sandy Intelligence.
2 May 2003

Parties present:

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Members of this interview, Capt [REDACTED] pilot advisor to the board, and Maj [REDACTED] legal advisor to the board, and Lt [REDACTED] one of the intelligence officers here on base. My name is Capt [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

2LT [REDACTED] I do.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

2LT [REDACTED] I do.

CAPT [REDACTED] If you could, please, just state your name, rank, and your unit.

2LT [REDACTED] 2Lt [REDACTED] and deployed unit 332 EFS, Sandy Intel, original unit from the states is 172nd Fighter Squadron, Battle Creek, Michigan.

CAPT [REDACTED] And what's your job here at Al Jaber?

2LT [REDACTED] Intelligence Officer.

CAPT [REDACTED] Working under the wing, or for the squadron?

[REDACTED]

2LT [REDACTED] Working for the squadron.

CAPT [REDACTED] Real quick, could you just walk us through a typical pilot interview, and what...I've also brought the copy of the debrief form that you handed me the other day.

2LT [REDACTED] Typically what we do is the pilot comes in after he's done flying...comes into the Air Field Management trailer where debrief is taking place, and they come into the building and we ask them to sit down or would you like water? And we start the debrief. I have a debrief form, and I ask them their call sign, mission number, mission type, and then standard questions...are the time you took off, the time you landed, engine shutdown, the time you were in the AOR, and the time you left the AOR. And then they go into more specifics, as far as, right down to the target location. Then, for each target location, I ask them the target name, if it was a building, vehicles, or troops. Then I ask them target coordinates and then ask them the TOTs of the time they dropped. Then, I ask them the heading, altitude, air-speed, slant range and dive angle that they used for each target. I ask if they were successful or not successful, if they saw any secondaries or smoke from the target area.

CAPT [REDACTED] And you also ask what type of ordinance. Is that normally included in there?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Once you're done with this, are there additional...after they're done talking about any type of weapons delivery, or different targets; is there any other pieces of information that you try to gather from them?

LT [REDACTED] Yes, there is. After you're done with all the targets, info I ask them if they saw any Triple A, any SAFIRES, report any RWR indications, and then if that is the case, I may go through different aspects and ask them what happened, what's the range, what the target location was, what their SAFIRE was about, etc. Then after every target, we ask them their weather, how was the weather in that target area.

CAPT [REDACTED] In the process of getting information on the attacks and that type of thing, do you normally watch tapes with the pilots?

2LT [REDACTED] Usually...not always. It just depends. Some of the time, the pilots would go in and put the tape in the player, and we'd start asking them questions. I truly...I can't remember if we did that or not with this set of pilots. If I was then in there taking the debrief when they were reviewing or not. But that's what sometimes occurs, and then they're watching the tape and filling out the info for the debrief at the same time.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK, and taking that directly from the tape, or having them review it?

2LT [REDACTED] Right.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Then, once you've gotten all this information, how long before you write the report?

2LT [REDACTED] 5 minutes later. Right after, right when they leave the door, I'm starting to type.

CAPT [REDACTED] Is there a time limit on that?

2LT [REDACTED] We have a 2 hour time limit to get the report out.

CAPT [REDACTED] And that starts when?

2LT [REDACTED] From the time the engine shuts down.

CAPT [REDACTED] Engine shutdown. If you have like follow up question for them later on, how do you go about doing that?

2LT [REDACTED] We work them through Intrep, Intelligence Report, and put in any information we missed or that we wanted to change.

CAPT [REDACTED] And that's something that can happen after that 2 hour period as long as the MISREP is filed within that 2 hours?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] During this campaign, what typically were you doing, maybe not specifically in this case, but what do you typically do with tapes once they're done reviewing them, or once they're done looking at them?

2LT [REDACTED] Typically, we would put a label on them, put their target type, the mission number, the pilots, and what they expended, what the weapons system video guys should be looking for, and rubber band it, put a rubber band around the tape, and then submit it to the weapons systems video people at the end of the day...whenever we were available and could submit it to the wing.

CAPT [REDACTED] That's targets over at the EOC?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

CAPT [REDACTED] Did all pilots turn in tapes to you?

2LT [REDACTED] No, Sir.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you remember on this specific day if anybody turned a tape into you? Either of the two pilots that were, that we're talking about.

2 LT [REDACTED] No, Sir. I don't remember.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]: Do you happen to remember...you have a copy of the MISREP...Do you remember specifically them telling you about surface to air fire on that mission?

2LT [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir. It was a SAFIRE event. I think I put it in the MISREP report.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Are you remembering it from that MISREP or are you remembering it from the conversation with the pilots?

2LT [REDACTED]: I'm remembering it from the MISREP.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Once the tapes go to the targets, do you...how do they get them back, or what's the process that goes on once they get those tapes?

2LT [REDACTED]: They're supposed to review the tapes, and then after they review them, put them in the outbox, and the squadron will pick them up. We know which ones are ours because they still have the labels on them, and then we give them back to the pilots.

CAPT [REDACTED]: And you try to give them back to those specific pilots?

2LT [REDACTED]: Yes, Sir.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Those labels you're talking about are the ones that are stuck to the side, or are they just...?

2LT [REDACTED] They're just rubber banded onto the tape.

CAPT [REDACTED] I think that's about all I...

MAJ [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] here. You said on the tape, I know you're from Battle Creek, the pilots are from Pennsylvania, Willow Grove. Would you have done the same thing in marking the tape for them, even though it wasn't your squadron?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. We did the same thing for all three squadrons we debriefed, _____ the squadrons.

MAJ [REDACTED] You say...I also note on the piece of paper, which is your checklist for how you debrief...right now, it's got SECRET top and bottom. I assume that that's when it's filled out. Right now it's unclassified in its present form?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

CAPT [REDACTED] And would you typically get mission tapes from other squadrons, and you would go ahead turn those in as well?

[REDACTED]

2LT [REDACTED] We would, Sir. But, we did not always get 100%. I'm not even truly saying 50% tapes back.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. Tapes back from the pilots.

2LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

MAJ [REDACTED] Do you know a reason for that?

2LT [REDACTED] Several different reasons. Most of the time, the pilots wanted to review their tapes before they gave them to Intel. When that happened, we usually wouldn't get them. Intel wouldn't get them after that. And, so, we would request them...for that reason, we needed them before, and they could review them after. But, the pilots like to get their own tapes to review their missions too for the debriefs. Another possibility is that they're afraid, the pilots, were not going to get their tapes back. So, they were worried about that, and they wanted it for their history purposes.

CAPT [REDACTED] With the...This is kind of a hypothetical...with the time frame that you're working under, was it ever possible to get several MISREPs and then go and type them...type several of them up at the same time?

2LT [REDACTED] Very possible.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Is it possible to transfer information from, let's say, one group of pilots would pass to you that they saw something and then another group of pilots did not, but then that ends up going two different MISREP? Could that be?

2LT [REDACTED] It could have happened, Sir. But, everytime I get a pilot coming in...if I had 3 of them at the same time, 3 different mission that's happened, I would take a separate debrief form for each mission. And the, so after you had 3 different missions, 3 different MISREPs and then you're trying from the 1st MISREP to go and remember what happened, it is possible you could remember differently.

CAPT [REDACTED] But, when you try to take notes...as far as taking notes, what was...I guess kind of your personal techniques as far as taking those notes?

2LT [REDACTED] I would try to write everything down the pilot told me on the MISREP. So, therefore I could remember and write in a narrative form what happened.,

CAPT [REDACTED] On page 4 of this one has all the information for the surface to air fire, and then also the weather. I just wanted to verify the other day when you and I spoke, you had mentioned something about not...in this case, you weren't sure if you'd used this page. Is that correct?

2LT [REDACTED] That's correct. I don't think I used a fourth page.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] So, in that case you would have taken the notes on a different page?

2LT [REDACTED] I would have just put it on the side of the sheet, yeah.

CAPT [REDACTED] I think that was all the questions that I had.

MAJ [REDACTED] The only question I have...After you're done with the notes to type up the MISREP report, what do you do with the notes?

2LT [REDACTED] We kept them, just for a day, and then we shredded them, which was a big lesson learned.

MAJ [REDACTED] Thank you. That's all I have.

CAPT [REDACTED] Just a closing. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

2LT [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.



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#1 #2

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RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA:

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MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

LAU-131 2.75" FFAR RKTS _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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MK-82LD _____ HDG: _____ ALT: _____ AIRSPD: _____ SLANT _____ ANGLE _____

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RESULT SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL OR BDA: _____

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
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EA/JAM

TARWI

ESM

RWR SYMBOL _____ ACFT LOCAL _____ TIME _____ Z DURATION _____
BEARING _____ INTCPT DIST _____ SIGNAL POS _____ ACFT ALT _____ HDG _____



SAFIRE

WPN TYPE _____ # _____ ACFT LOCAL _____ TIME _____ Z BEARING _____
ALT OF BURST _____ COLOR: WHT YELL BLUE GRN ORNG LNCH LOCAL _____
COUNTERTACTICS _____
ACFT ALT _____ HDG _____

SIGHTINGS/TGTS

~~SECRET~~

TAB L

Tab L

Expanded Narrative of the Events of 23 Mar 03

Narrative..... L-3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FRIENDLY FIRE INVESTIGATION BOARD
APO AE 09888

9 May 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Marine Corps Advisor, Friendly Fire Investigation Board (FFIB)

SUBJECT: Detailed Sequence of Events

1. (U) Ground Picture.

a. [REDACTED] Early on 23 March 1st Battalion 2nd Marines launched out of their defensive positions in Jalabah and staged on the Main Supply Route (MSR), route 7/8, heading north towards An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Team Tank lead the way followed in trace by Team Mech, the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company, and Charlie Company. The plan was to approach the city in a column formation and attack to seize the eastern bridges in An Nasiriyah. The seizure of the eastern bridges was a "be prepared to" mission, until the evening of the 22nd of March when higher headquarters ordered the Battalion to execute.

b. [REDACTED] Approximately 10 kilometers south of An Nasiriyah the battalion came under artillery and mortar fire. They also began to take machine gun and small arms fire as they proceeded north. The Battalion stopped along the MSR to clear out buildings on either side from which they had been taking small arms fire. At approximately 0600Z the TF Tarawa Commander and the Commanding Officer of RCT 2 approached the Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion 2nd Marines and explained to him that he needed to bypass the small arms fire and seize the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah in order to allow the two RCTs following in trace of his Battalion to pass over the bridges and proceed north towards Baghdad.

c. [REDACTED] The Battalion continued its movement north receiving sporadic indirect mortar and artillery fire and small arms fire. Prior to reaching the outskirts of the city, Team Tank (the lead element), came upon a small dwelling complex and received mortar and small arms fire. They returned fire with their machine guns and main tank guns. Shortly after this engagement a Humvee approached them and a US Army soldier came out of it yelling that they had been ambushed further north. Team Tank notified the command post (CP) that they had encountered seven US Army survivors from a convoy that had been ambushed by forces inside the city. Team Tank pushed the survivors to the rear of the column and when they reached the CP the Army soldiers notified the Battalion that there were an additional 5 wounded soldiers forward. The Battalion pushed Team Tank forward to find and rescue the additional US Army soldiers. The Battalion also pushed Team Mech and Alpha Company forward to handle the engagement to their immediate front. Team Tank located the 5 soldiers in the vicinity of the An Nasiriyah railroad bridge to the south of the city and evacuated them to the rear of the column.

d. [REDACTED] Team Tank, which had been racing back and forth in front of the lead column, was now critically low on fuel. Fuel was available, however each tank could only take [REDACTED] gallons and could [REDACTED]. The

[REDACTED]

Commander of TF Tarawa and the RCT 2 Commander arrived on scene and relayed to the Battalion Commander that, according to higher headquarters, there were still 12 soldiers missing from the Army convoy. The Task Force Tarawa Commanders Intent, passed to 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commander, was to rapidly seize the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah and to find any of the survivors who may have still been along the MSR within the city of An Nasiriyah.¹

e. [REDACTED] The original mission called for Team Tank to establish a support by fire position south of the Euphrates river, so that Alpha Company could seize the bridge. At which point, Team Mech would pass through Alpha, continue north and establish a support by fire position and pass through objective 2, the Saddam Canal. Alternatively Team Mech would provide support by fire for Charlie Company to seize the Saddam Canal, and then Team Mech would push through and seize objective 3 at the T intersection north of the northern bridge.²

f. [REDACTED] All of the Battalion's tanks were now in the rear refueling. The Battalion rapidly advanced towards An Nasiriyah with Team Mech in the lead followed by Alpha Company on the right flank and Charlie Company on the left flank. Alpha and Charlie Companies were moving forward in a bounding over-watch in trace of Team Mech.

g. [REDACTED] As the Battalion approached the railroad bridge to the south of the city they received increasing direct fire and received reports of tanks to their front. Team Mech backed off and the Battalion Commander sent a Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) forward to engage the T-55 tanks observed to their front. There were a total of 9 T-55s engaged. Three tanks had finished refueling and re-joined Team Mech as they proceeded north towards the Euphrates River Bridge. The enemy fire slackened and the Battalion pressed ahead to take the southern most bridge over the Euphrates River.³

h. [REDACTED] After crossing the southern bridge Alpha Company remained by the bridge to secure it for the passage of Charlie Company and Team Tank while Team Mech proceeded approximately 1000 meters north into the city and turned to the east. The plan was for Team Mech to sweep north on the salt flats 2000 meters east of the urban area and bypass what was referred to as "Ambush Alley". Charlie Company was supposed to follow in trace of Team Mech and the Forward CP to the east, then pass through and seize the bridge. Team Mech and Team Tank were supposed to establish a support by fire position to support Charlie Company's seizure of the northern bridge.⁴

i. [REDACTED] Team Mech turned east and proceeded about 800 meters, muddy conditions stopped their advance. The Command AAV for Team Mech the C-7, and the alternate Command AAV, the P-7, two tanks, and a Humvee sunk into the mud. The Battalion Commander attempted to contact Charlie Company to tell them not to follow in trace but to push to seize the bridge over the Saddam Canal. Charlie Company had crossed the southern bridge and their Commander observed that Alpha Company had taken up positions to the west of the MSR and had spread out

¹ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer and Forward Air Controller for Team Tank.

² Tab J, Interview with Operations Officer, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines.

³ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer.

⁴ Tab J, Interview with Operations Officer, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines.

[REDACTED]

into the city. During this time both companies were engaged by small arms fire. The Charlie Company Commander tried to ascertain the location of Team Mech but was unable to communicate with them or the Forward CP. With Alpha company on his left flank he made the assumption that Team Mech had gone straight up the MSR through Ambush Alley with Tanks in the lead to seize the northern bridge over the Saddam Canal. Believing this to be one of the briefed options to the original plan he pushed his company north through "Ambush Alley". The Company began to take heavy fire from RPGs and small arms as it moved north.⁵

j. [REDACTED] As Charlie Company approached the bridge, the Commander still did not see Team Mech but assumed that they had pushed north of the bridge. He understood his mission to be to secure the southern and northern approaches to the bridge to allow Team Tank, and the rest of the Battalion, to push through. While crossing the bridge a RPG struck the right rear of the lead AAV of 3rd Platoon Charlie Company. The AAV immediately caught fire. The Platoon Commander who was on board identified that they had four casualties. He lost communications and ordered the driver to continue north and clear the bridge. The AAV halted 300-500 meters north of the bridge, the troops evacuated it, and it burst into flames. The Platoon Commander ordered his machine gun team to set up on the west side of the MSR and moved the remainder of his personnel to a berm on the east side of the MSR. Seven Marines moved the 4 casualties to the Charlie Company First Sergeants AAV, the designated medical evacuation AAV, which had just pulled up.⁶

k. [REDACTED] After crossing the bridge the Charlie Company Commander ordered his company to get on line and halted them 300-400 meters north of the bridge in tactical formation. Charlie Company had 11 AAVs and 3 - 4 Humvees north of the bridge. One AAV had broken down south of the northern bridge. Testimony indicates that approximately 3 AAVs were oriented north of the burning AAV with 4 or 5 on the western side of the MSR and 1 or 2 east of the MSR. The company was not receiving a lot of fire and troops began to dismount the AAVs to provide security and to deal with their medevacs. The Commander realized that Team Mech was not in front of him and that he was lead trace. He called the Battalion Commander and notified him that Charlie had seized the northern bridge, and had halted at the 39 northing with 4 medevacs. The Battalion Commander was surprised to hear that Charlie Company was on the northern bridge but elated that they had taken the objective. He immediately notified higher headquarters that both bridges were secure.

l. [REDACTED] North of the bridge Charlie Company began taking fire from both the north and south of their positions. Witnesses describe taking small arms, RPG, mortar and artillery fire. The artillery fire was described as variable timed (VT) and they believed that an observer was adjusting it on to their positions. The road that they were on was elevated and the Iraqis had built 15-20 meter high berms on either side. While this provided cover from small arms fire from the north, it prevented the Company from maneuvering to the north. Maneuvering north would require them to proceed in column formation up the MSR between the berms. Approximately 700-800 meters to their north was a 23rd Iraqi Infantry Division building from which they could see Iraqi troops engaging them. The elevated road and the berms also meant that the company was extremely vulnerable to enemy fire from their rear. Immediately south of the northern bridge

⁵ Tab J, Interview with 1st Battalion 2nd Marines Commanding Officer and Commanding Officer Charlie Company.

⁶ Tab J, Interview CO Charlie Company and CO 3rd Platoon, Charlie Company.

[REDACTED]

and west of the MSR was an area known as the Martyr's district. Both indirect and direct fires were coming from this location as well.⁷

2. (U) Forward Air Controller Picture.

a. [REDACTED] During the battle of An Nasiriyah the Battalion Air Officer was located with the Forward CP in a Command and Control variant of an AAV, the C-7. Additionally there were 3 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) located with 3 of the 4 maneuver companies, Alpha Company, Team Tank, and Team Mech. Charlie Company did not have a FAC during the battle. The Battalion Air Officers UHF radio had been damaged and on the 23rd of March he was only able to communicate very briefly with his FACs and a single UH-1 aircraft early in the engagement. Throughout the rest of the day he did not have UHF communications, which meant that he could not talk to or receive communications with any aircraft nor could he listen as the FACs controlled air. The Battalion Air Officer also had intermittent communications with higher headquarters through out the battle. As the Battalions Fwd CP moved forward and crossed the railroad bridge the Battalion Air Officer lost all communication with higher headquarters. He made a call to the Team Mech FAC directing him to get on guard and contact any aircraft to get them some help, because he could not do anything for him right now. Shortly after that call he lost communications with all of his FACs.⁸

b. [REDACTED] The first attack aircraft to show up on the morning of the 23rd were two Cobra's who arrived at Team Tanks position as they were approached by the Army Humvee from the 507th Maintenance convoy south of the railroad bridge. Team Tanks FAC employed the Cobra's against a small housing complex and then deeper to his front into a tree line. He also employed the Cobra's and a section of AV-8 Harriers against T-55 tanks and 2 ZSU-23-4s located to his front. Team Tank moved to the south to rejoin the Battalion and refuel. Team Mech took the lead with their FAC "MOUTH" controlling the air in front of the Battalion. MOUTH directed a section of Cobra's north to screen to the companies front for enemy troops. The Cobras found three Iraqi T-55 tanks and destroyed them with Hellfire missiles. When the Cobras ran low on fuel MOUTH asked them to re-arm, refuel and return with more assets. The Cobras complied. Cobra aircraft flew in support of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines throughout the day and in to the evening of 23 March. From the time Team Mech moved from south of the railroad bridge until they became stuck in mud, MOUTH did not have contact with the Battalion Air Officer and controlled all air for the Battalion. When Team Mech became bogged down east of the MSR they were taking intense small arms and RPG fire, at this point the Battalion Air Officer was finally able to reach MOUTH by radio and directed him to call on guard to request air support.

c. [REDACTED] Almost immediately after making the call on guard numerous flights of fixed wing aircraft checked in with MOUTH and he stacked them overhead waiting for a FAC(A) capable F/A-18D or F-14 to check in. MOUTHs intent was to send them north of the bridge to find and destroy enemy reinforcements or enemy waiting to ambush them at the bridge. The incident flight of A-10s checked in shortly after and MOUTH sent them north of the Saddam Canal to find targets.⁹

⁷ Tab J, Interview with Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

⁸ Tab J, Interview with Air Officer, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

⁹ Tab J, Interview with Team Tank FAC, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, Tab H, Statement of Capt. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. (U) Air Picture.

a. (U) GYRATE 73 flight took off from Al Jaber and proceeded to a tanker. Following air refueling, they heard a radio call on UHF "Guard frequency from a FAC asking for CAS in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah. GYRATE 73 flight was passing An Nasiriyah and answered the call. Upon check-in they spoke with the FAC for tasking.

b. (U) For approximately 15 minutes, GYRATE 73 attempted to ascertain MOUTH's position. In the process, GYRATE 74 believed that he had acquired the FAC's position and requested the tactical lead from GYRATE 73. Once he had the tactical lead, GYRATE 74 states that he asked MOUTH if he could employ rockets north of the suspected friendly position in order to verify MOUTH's position. He stated in his testimony that MOUTH cleared GYRATE 74 to employ rockets, which were high explosive and not white phosphorous and that MOUTH did not see the rocket impacts, and could not provide a verification of his position off of those impacts. When asked about whether or not GYRATE requested the use of rockets to verify his position MOUTH in his testimony had no recollection of this. The 332nd AEW weapons element logbook noted that GYRATE 74 employed 3 rockets.¹⁰

4. (U) Final Incident.

a. [REDACTED] North of the Saddam Canal, GYRATE 73 saw a large plume of black smoke that he determined was a burning vehicle in the center of the MSR. GYRATE 73 asked MOUTH if he could see the vehicle, to which MOUTH replied that he could see the smoke. GYRATE 73 also identified 8 to 10 vehicles located in the vicinity of the burning vehicle and dispersed on both sides of the MSR. Approximately 3 vehicles were on or beside the MSR near the burning vehicle. To the north of the burning vehicle were 4 or 5 vehicles on the western side of the road. To the east of the burning vehicle were an additional 1 or 2 vehicles. Flying at approximately [REDACTED] to negate the briefed Iraqi threats, GYRATE flight attempted to identify the enemy vehicles using [REDACTED] binoculars. In their testimony they described the vehicles as two small white pick-up trucks, other larger trucks.... "kind of cab over, no nose to the truck", and one or two dark colored Mitsubishi style flat bed trucks.

b. (U) GYRATE passed the target location to MOUTH, who asked him to standby while he checked on the location of the Battalions lead vehicles. MOUTH's Fire Support Team leader used the AAV internal communication system to query Team Mechs Company Commander for lead trace. Team Mechs Company Commander attempted to call the Battalion Command to determine lead trace, but he was unable to communicate with them due to the heavy volume of traffic on the net. Unable to communicate with the Battalion and confident that based on the scheme of maneuver Team Mech was the main effort and was lead trace, the Company Commander passed to MOUTH that Team Mech was lead trace. He also passed that he was on the 36 northing and that the northern bridge was at the 40 northing. MOUTH then referenced his gridded overhead photo of the city and compared the two locations. The targets were approximately 3000 meters north and on the other side of the Saddam Canal. MOUTH passed to GYRATE that no friendlies were north of the 38 Grid and no friendlies were north of the canal.

¹⁰ Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74, Tab H, Statement Capt [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

He also stated that he passed to GYRATE that he could not observe him or the target area and that he cleared him for Type 3 CAS and directed him to make his runs east to west so as not to endanger Marines or civilians in the town to the South. A Cobra pilot flying in the same area at the time confirmed that he heard MOUTH clear GYRATE flight for Type 3 CAS. GYRATE 73 stated in his testimony that the FAC did not tell him what type of CAS he was running and he believed that he was under positive control by the FAC. GYRATE 74 states that he did not recall any restrictions that MOUTH gave the flight other than that no friendly forces were north of the canal.¹¹

c. (U) GYRATE 74 was the first to engage, he made his first attack run on the vehicles to the east of the MSR and, according to his MISREP dropped 2 MK82LD bombs at 1040Z. (From this point on the pilot witness statements regarding sequence of engagements and ordnance expended are inconsistent with the filed MISREP. There are also inconsistencies with the MISREP but, because the witness statements were taken on 26 April 03 while the MISREP was taken immediately following the flight, the MISREP sequence of events will be utilized throughout the remainder of the final incident summary). GYRATE 73 then engaged the vehicles to the south of the burning vehicle west of the MSR dropping one MK82LD bomb at 1040Z. The aircraft were in a wheel over the vehicles at this time making their runs on multiple headings and releasing their ordnance between [REDACTED] feet. At 1042Z GYRATE 74 engaged the vehicles with his 30MM gun expending [REDACTED] and then re-engaged at 1044Z with another [REDACTED].²

d. (U) From the witness statements obtained from Charlie Company Marines, the first time that anyone realized that A-10s were engaging them was when the A-10 used the 30MM gun. The board believes that Charlie Company Marines mistook the first 3 MK82LD bombs dropped by GYRATE flight as artillery fire. All witnesses remember hearing the very distinct sound that the 30MM gun makes and witnessing multiple weapons impacts. The impact of the 30MM rounds preceded the noise of the gun by a few seconds. Numerous witnesses stated that they saw Marines killed or struck by 30MM rounds and heard or saw AAVs struck by 30MM rounds. During the A-10 engagement numerous witnesses reported either seeing or firing doctrinal ordnance to cease the engagement. None of the signals worked and the A-10s continued to engage friendly forces. With the numbers of killed and injured mounting calls were made to the Fwd CP for MEDEVAC aircraft. Due to heavy fire in the area the decision was made to move the injured on AAVs back through the city to get them aid.¹³

e. (U) At approximately 1045Z MOUTH directed GYRATE flight to proceed to the companies 3rd objective the T intersection to investigate buildings in the vicinity. GYRATE flight moved north to the T intersection but did not see any vehicles or troop movement. Charlie Company Marines had, by this time loaded up 4 AAVs with wounded Marines and these vehicles began moving rapidly south towards the northern bridge. GYRATE flight saw the 4 vehicles moving south towards the bridge. They called MOUTH and told him that vehicles from the northern target sector were progressing into the city. GYRATE flight states that MOUTH said not to let those vehicles get across the bridge.¹⁴

¹¹ Tab H, Statement Capt [REDACTED], Tab K, Interview LtCol [REDACTED], Tab G, Interviews GYRATE 73/74.

¹² Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74, Tab H, Statement Capt [REDACTED], Tab O, Pilot MISREP.

¹³ Tab J, Interviews with Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.

¹⁴ Tab G, Interviews; GYRATE 73/74, Tab J, Interviews Charlie Company Marines, Tab H, Statement Capt [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

f. (U) At approximately 1055Z GYRATE 74 engaged one of the vehicles as it reached the southern side of the bridge. He fired an AGM-65 Maverick missile at the vehicle; the Maverick missed the vehicle. GYRATE 73 then engaged a vehicle just as it was crossing over the bridge, the Maverick struck the vehicle approximately 100 meters south of the bridge and destroyed it. GYRATE 74 then re-engaged with his second Maverick missile and destroyed a vehicle approximately 200 meters south of the northern bridge. Two additional vehicles were seen moving south through the city. GYRATE flight did not pursue these vehicles because of their proximity to buildings within the city.¹⁵

h. (U) During the A-10 engagement, one of the Platoon Commanders was able to get on a radio and communicate with the Fwd CP telling them that they were under friendly fire. Subsequently MOUTH called "check fire" to the A-10s and told them that there may have been Marines north of the Saddam Canal. The A-10's were low on fuel and returned to base. Following the A-10 engagement on Charlie Company friendly tanks arrived and took up defensive positions to the north of Charlie Company. At that time all enemy fires stopped.¹⁶

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Colonel, USMC
Marine Corps Advisor

¹⁵ Tab G, Interviews with GYRATE 73/74.

¹⁶ Various interviews

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TAB M

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
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TAB P

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Excerpts of SPINS



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for that day. VERSION 2 would be the second version within the listed day.

(U) SPINS change proposals must first be coordinated with the appropriate section OPR. If the proposed change is accepted by the section OPR it will be submitted by the OPR to the SPINS cell in C2 Plans in properly formatted electronic format.

SPINS cell will staff proposed changes as appropriate and will post the change once it is approved. Change requests will be in MS Word format IAW the example below.

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¹ Due to the Board's late notification of the incident, this was the only version of the SPINS the Board could obtain. A review of the changes after 23 Mar 03 indicates none of the cited paragraphs were added or changed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECTION 5
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

[REDACTED]

5.5.2.

[REDACTED]

5.7.3. (U) AIR-TO-GROUND ENGAGEMENT.

5.7.3.1

[REDACTED]

5.7.3.2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5.7.3.3. [REDACTED]

5.7.3.4. [REDACTED]

5.7.3.5. [REDACTED]

5.7.3.6. (U) HARM/ALARM EMPLOYMENT. Every effort should be made to minimize collateral damage in the employment of HARM/ALARM. This includes utilizing Range Known mode to the extent possible and disabling Flex and Glide options when tactically feasible. See paragraph 6.14.6 for specific guidance.

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TAB S

Tab S

**Excerpt of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Close Air Support Concept of Operations**

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I. (U) KI/CAS Background

A. (U) Definitions

1. (U) Air Interdiction. Air interdiction is defined as, "air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required."
2. (U) Armed Reconnaissance. Armed reconnaissance is defined as "locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy material, personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along assigned ground communication routes, and not for the purpose of attacking specific/located briefed targets." Armed reconnaissance offers the joint commander a capability to address mobile enemy force structure targets enroute to the battlefield.
3. (U) Killbox Interdiction (KI). KI are missions that are flown against non-fixed targets, within killboxes. Due to the fluidity of the battlefield and unpredictable nature of warfare, the targets do not always arrive at the killbox in which they are expected. This requires reconnaissance to be performed to find the intended target sets. That being said, Killbox Interdiction is a combination of Air Interdiction and Armed Reconnaissance conducted within a killbox.
4. (U) Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance. SCAR is defined as "a mission flown for the purpose of acquiring and reporting targets and coordinating missions upon those targets." This term is the standard term for the USCENTCOM AOR, replacing such terms as "killer-scout".
5. (U) Close Air Support. Close Air Support is defined as "Air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

a. (U) Kinds of CAS.

- (1) (U) Preplanned CAS are those CAS requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the ATO.
- (2) (U) Immediate CAS are those CAS requirements that cannot be identified early enough to allow detailed coordination and planning.

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Types of CAS Control

(1) (U) Type 1 Control. Type 1 control is used when the risk assessment requires JTAC to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. Type 1 is the default method of control.

(2) (U) Type 2 Control. Type 2 is less restrictive than Type 1 control. Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC desire control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch. Examples are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, and high altitude and standoff weapons employment.

(3) (U) Type 3 Control. Type 3 control is the least restrictive of all measures. Type 3 control may be used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize type 3 control, JTACs grant a "blanket" weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets, which meet the prescribed restrictions, set by the JTAC.

6. (U) Ground Directed Interdiction. Ground Directed Interdiction can be described as terminal guidance of interdiction strikes by any delivery system that are directed by ground forces which are not in close proximity to friendly forces and which do not require detailed integration of each mission with the fire and movement of those forces. These ground forces will normally include special operations forces (SOF) operating from isolated observation posts far from the forward line of troops (FLOT), usually outside of CFLCC boundaries. As these strikes are not in close proximity to concentrations of conventional maneuver forces, the risk of fratricide is mitigated and no requirement exists for the same level of detailed integration normally associated with Type 1 or 2 close air support (CAS).

7. Tactical C2 Platforms. Defined as USAF E-3B/C(AWACS), E-8C(JSTARS), CRC, USN E-2C, USMC TAOC, DASC, DASC(A), TACC

TAB T

Tab T

Diagrams and Imagery

[REDACTED] Diagram of Target Area T-3
[REDACTED] Diagram of Target Area T-5
[REDACTED] of Target Area T-7

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



Diagram drawn by **[REDACTED]**
[REDACTED] in 28 APR
interview
[REDACTED]

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This is the diagram drawn by
Maj [REDACTED] (Grade 74) during the
28 April Interview.

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TAB U

Tab U

Statement of Property Damages

Statement U-3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FRIENDLY FIRE INVESTIGATION BOARD
APO AE 09888

05 May 03

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: CDR [REDACTED], Administrative Assistant to the Board President, Friendly
Fire Investigation Board (FFIB)

SUBJECT: Property Damage

1. The following US Marine Corps equipment was destroyed or damaged during the time frame of this incident and also while the respective US Marine Corps personnel were engaged in a fierce firefight with Iraqi forces. The identification of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle (Personnel), and the location where the equipment was when it was hit by ordinance, is as follows:

<u>NOMEN</u>	<u>TAMCN</u>	<u>Serial #</u>	<u>Grid Loc</u>
AAV-P7	E0846	522748	223389
AAV-P7	E0846	522948	223385
AAV-P7	E0846	522812	222384
AAV-P7	E0846	522712	221383 vicinity
AAV-P7	E0846	522850	221383 vicinity

All of the above cited grid locations are in close proximity to the bridge, at the north end of the city of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, where the incident under investigation took place.

It is impossible to state with absolute assurance the number of vehicles destroyed, and/or the extent of damage to the vehicles, which was caused by the ordinance discharged by the two A-10 pilots involved in this incident investigation.

2. The above-cited vehicles have an approximate value of 2.2 million dollars each. A request has been made to US Marine Corps for a specific cost estimate of the above-discussed destruction or damaged equipment.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CDR, USN
Administrative Assistant to the Board President, FFI

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TAB V

Tab V

Weather

AF Form 3803 (Reverse) V-3
Illuminations Table..... V-5

Illumination Table

Station : Saddam Intl, Baghdad
 Location : 31° 10' 00'' N 046° 15' 00'' E

Date : 23 March 2003

Time (Local)	Solar Position (deg)		Lunar Position (deg)		Lunar Percent Illum.	Ground Illumination (mlux)
	Elevation Angle	Azimuth Angle	Elevation Angle	Azimuth Angle		
1200	59.8	179.1	-31.5	260.3	69	94913280.0
1215	59.6	186.6	-34.5	261.8	69	94771912.0
1230	59.0	193.8	-37.5	263.4	69	94251760.0
1245	58.1	200.8	-40.6	264.9	68	93349160.0
1300	56.8	207.3	-43.6	266.6	68	92057904.0
1315	55.2	213.4	-46.7	268.3	68	90369688.0
1330	53.3	218.9	-49.8	270.0	68	88274512.0
1345	51.2	224.0	-52.8	271.9	68	85761600.0
1400	48.8	228.5	-55.9	273.9	68	82820464.0
1415	46.4	232.7	-58.9	276.2	68	79442496.0
1430	43.7	236.5	-61.9	278.6	68	75622840.0
1445	41.0	240.0	-64.9	281.5	68	71362816.0
1500	38.2	243.2	-67.9	284.9	67	66672516.0
1515	35.3	246.2	-70.8	289.0	67	61573764.0
1530	32.3	249.0	-73.6	294.3	67	56103008.0
1545	29.3	251.6	-76.3	301.3	67	50313868.0
1600	26.3	254.0	-78.8	311.2	67	44279020.0
1615	23.2	256.3	-80.9	325.6	67	38090952.0
1630	20.1	258.5	-82.2	346.0	67	31861146.0
1645	16.9	260.7	-82.3	10.1	67	25717394.0
1700	13.7	262.8	-81.2	31.7	67	19799142.0
1715	10.6	264.8	-79.3	47.3	66	14251234.0
1730	7.4	266.8	-76.9	58.0	66	9217388.0
1745	4.3	268.7	-74.2	65.6	66	4838948.5
1800	1.3	270.7	-71.4	71.1	66	1477293.3
1815	-2.3	272.6	-68.5	75.5	66	135881.3
1830	-5.5	274.6	-65.6	79.0	66	5629.4
1845	-8.7	276.5	-62.6	81.9	66	189.5
1900	-11.9	278.6	-59.6	84.5	66	11.0
1915	-15.1	280.6	-56.6	86.8	66	2.9
1930	-18.2	282.8	-53.6	88.9	65	1.6
1945	-21.3	285.0	-50.5	90.8	65	1.6
2000	-24.4	287.3	-47.5	92.6	65	1.6
2015	-27.4	289.8	-44.5	94.3	65	1.6
2030	-30.4	292.4	-41.5	96.0	65	1.6
2045	-33.4	295.1	-38.4	97.6	65	1.6
2100	-36.2	298.0	-35.4	99.1	65	1.6
2115	-39.0	301.2	-32.4	100.7	65	1.6
2130	-41.7	304.6	-29.4	102.2	65	1.6
2145	-44.3	308.4	-26.5	103.8	64	1.6
2200	-46.7	312.4	-23.5	105.3	64	1.6
2215	-49.0	316.9	-20.6	106.9	64	1.6
2230	-51.1	321.7	-17.7	108.5	64	1.6
2245	-53.0	327.0	-14.8	110.1	64	1.6
2300	-54.6	332.7	-11.9	111.7	64	1.6

T Y P E	T I M E (UTC)	W I N D				V I S I B I L I T Y			W E A T H E R A N D O B S T R U C T I O N S T O V I S I O N	S K Y C O N D I T I O N	T E M P (°C)	D E W P O I N T (°C)	A L S T G (Inches)	S T A P R E S S U R E (Inches)	O T A L S K Y C V R (21)	O B S I N I T
		D R C T N (true)	S P E E D (knots)	M A X W I N D (knots)	V A R I A B I L I T Y (true)	M E T E R S	S M T I L L E U S E (SM) (4B)	R U N W A Y V I S U A L R A N G E L O C A L (4C)								
(1)	(2)															
SA	1055	360	12	17		9000			FU	25	00	2994		0	JC	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP167																
SA	1155	020	15			9999				26	00	2993		0	JC	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP158 56020																
SA	1255	010	12			9999				26	00	2991		0	JC	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP 158																
SA	1355	020	09			9999				24	00	2993		0	JC	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP158																
SA	1455	020	09			9999				22	00	2992		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLPNO																
SA	1555	020	04			9999				21	01	2996		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLPNO																
SA	1655	020	03			9999				20	02	2999		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP178																
SA	1755	360	06			9999				20	02	3000		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP182 52027																
SA	1855	300	07			9999				18	02	3002		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP187																
SA	1955	300	07			9999				18	01	3001		0	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP184																
SA	2055	340	05			9999				17	01	2999		3	RH	
(13)RMK WND DATA ESTMD SLP178 8/008 9/003 58003																
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