

TAB C

PAGES 1-44

EXEMPT

UNDER

FOIA/PA

TAB D

Tab D

Maintenance

Maintenance Advisor's Memorandum.....D-3
Weapons Expenditure Log Excerpt.....D-5

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7 May 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Maintenance Advisor, Friendly Fire Investigation Board (FFIB)

SUBJECT: Maintenance Factors and Analysis

1. A complete review of the AFTO 781 series forms and Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS) documentation was accomplished for both aircraft, GYRATE 73 (MA1) and GYRATE 74 (MA2), involved in this incident. During this review, particular attention was focused on the Fire Control / Weapons Delivery System and the Communication Systems. All systems were fully mission capable at the time of the incident. The only pilot reported discrepancy for the incident sortie was MA2 had a Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement (LASTE) Computer failure code "DG 1C01 24E0 7191".
2. The pilot would not have been alerted to this failure code until the mission was completed. "DG 1C01 24E0 7191" is a Heading Attitude Reference System (HARS) failure and was troubleshot in accordance with Technical Order 1A-10A-2-40TS-4. The Aircraft's performance would not have been affected, as the HARS system is not the primary navigation system. The primary navigation system is the Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) / Inertial Navigation System (INS).
3. Both MA1 and MA2 were examined for canopy crazing. This inspection was accomplished in accordance with Technical Order 1A-10A-3-1 Para. 3.35b.(5). The inspection of MA1 revealed no evidence of canopy crazing. The inspection of MA2 revealed minor crazing and scratches. Through further inspection by this board's pilot expert, it was determined that the crazing and scratches wouldn't impair the pilots view.
4. The crew chiefs for MA1 and MA2 were identified. The crew chief of MA1 has left the AOR and was unavailable for interview. The crew chief for MA2 was interviewed. However, he couldn't recall the incident sortie.
5. In the month prior to the incident sortie, MA1 flew 12 sorties and MA2 flew 21 sorties. After the incident both aircraft continued to fly. In the next 2 weeks MA1 flew 29 sorties and MA2 flew 28 sorties. All sorties flown previous to and after the incident were successful.
6. My conclusion is that no aircraft systems or maintenance issues were factors in this incident.


SMSGT, USAF
Maintenance Advisor, FFIB

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LINE TAIL	M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129		M129	
NO.	T/O	LND	CONFIO	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP	LOT #	LD	EXP
[REDACTED]																								
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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T A B L E

Tab E

Medical

[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED] E-3
[REDACTED] E-5
[REDACTED] E-7
[REDACTED] E-9

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TAB E

PAGES 3-10

EXEMPT

UNDER

FOIA/PA

COL 332 AEW/Clinic/Aerospace Medicine

From: TF TARAWA MAIN AC/S G1 [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 01, 2003 9:03 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Test

Sir,

I hope the following helps:

1. Jordan was promoted posthumously to GySgt.
2. Cpl [REDACTED] was a part of that incident. It was an oversight. I honestly thought I had them all, sir.
3. For all those references, you'll see a narrative section in the message. That tells you what medium those references were rec'd in. I always asked for email confirmation, so I imagine those are all emails from my Higher HQ. (I MEF) Right now, I've moved into Iraq, so I don't have all those references. They are on my computer in Kuwait.
4. "SNM" stands for "subject named Marine"

VR [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] COL 332 AEW/Clinic/Aerospace Medicine
mailto: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2003 11:48 AM
To: 'TF TARAWA REAR AC/S G1'
Cc: [REDACTED] Maj 332AEW VISITOR; Hodgkins William Brig Gen 332 AEW Visitor
Subject: RE: Test

G'Day Lt Col [REDACTED]

Thanks for the list- I have a few questions for you.

First, was Phillip A. Jordan [REDACTED] a SSGT or a GYSGT?

Second from the Hostile PCR list I see CPL [REDACTED] was listed as WIA at the date and time of the incident under investigation. Why was he not listed as one of the WIA's on the list you sent to me?

Third, again from the Hostile PCR list on page 3 of Supplemental #12 several references are mentioned. One is described thusly "Ref Q is electr report of mortuary affairs findings from on site investigation of an anasiriyah". Another is described thusly, "Ref R provided report of DNA findings from Dover AFB. Remains have been recovered and are those of Marines listed below..." Yet another located on page 5 is described as "Per Ref O, the list of Marines who are declared dustwun are suspected to have sustained injuries/death as a result of a probable friendly fire incident." Will it be possible to obtain copies of these references?

Fourth, in reading thru the text of many of the PCR's and supplementals the initials "snm" are frequently used. What does snm stand for?

Thanks so much for your help! Looking forward to hearing from you.

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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
INFO PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
SSIC: 03040
DTG: 240800Z MAR 03

BT

UNCLAS //N03040//
OPER/IRAQI FREEDOM//
MSGID/GENADMIN/TF TARAWA//
SUBJ/PCR (DD-3040-02)//
REF/A/MCO P3040.4/MARCORCASPROC MAN/15APR1996//
AMPN/REF A IS THE MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL (SHORT
TITLE: MARCORCASPROC MAN)//
POC [REDACTED] CAPT/ TF TARAWA G1/KUWAIT/DSN [REDACTED] COMM [REDACTED]

2MEBG1WO2@2MEBDR.USMC.SMIL.MIL//
RMKS/1. 2DLT FREDERICK E POKORNEY JR, [REDACTED]/0802, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/DECEASED/KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN
NASIRIYAH
2. SGT MICHAEL BITZ, [REDACTED] 1833, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/ UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
3. LCPL BRIAN R BUESING, [REDACTED] 0341, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
4. LCPL DAVID K. FRIBLEY, [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/DECEASED/KIA/ UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN
NASIRIYAH
5. CPL JOSE A GARIBAY, [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
6. CPL JORGE A GONZALEZ, [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
7. LCPL THOMAS J SLOCUM, [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
8. SSGT PHILLIP A JORDAN, [REDACTED] 0369, USMC/M, HOSTILE/DECEASED/
KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN NASIRIYAH
9. CPL RANDAL K ROSACKER, [REDACTED] 0331, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/DECEASED/KIA/UNKNOWN/LOCAL TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN/AN
NASIRIYAH
10. CPL [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/VSI/WIA/BLUNT CLOSED HEAD INJURY/STABLE CONDITION/865th KAFH
11. SGT [REDACTED] 1, USMC/M, HOSTILE/VSI/WIA/GUN
SHOT WOUND TO BUTTUCKS/STABLE CONDITION/MEDEVACED TO LANDSTUHL GE 24
MAR 03
12. LCPL [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/VSI/WIA/BURN LEFT ARM, RIGHT ARM SUSTAINED BLAST
INJURY/STABLE CONDITION/865TH KAFH
13. PVT [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M,
HOSTILE/VSI/WIA/SHRAPNEL WOUND TO RIGHT LEG/STABLE
CONDITION/MEDEVACED TO LANDSTUHL GE 24 MAR 03//

BT

SUPPLEMENTAL #1

+--OAAUZYUW RHOFJDR0024 0761936-UUUU--RHOFJDR.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RHHMCA0730 0770725
O 051800Z APR 03 PSN 373483H28
FM CG SECOND MEB//G1//
TO CMC WASHINGTON DC//MRC//

BUMED WASHINGTON DC//33 /
MILMEDSUPPOFF GREAT LAKES IL//09A//
EIGHTH MCD NEW ORLEANS LA
COMUSMARCENT REAR//G1//
COMUSMARCENT//G1//
INFO COMCFLCC DOHA KUWAIT KU//C1//
CMC WASHINGTON DC/MMEA/MMOA/SD/JA/PA
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//047//
NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC//33//
COMMARFOREUR//G1/ADJ//
CG I MEF//G1//
CG I MEF FWD//G1//
CG I MEF CAMP PENDLETON//G1//
COMMARFORLANT//G-1//
CG II MEF//G-1//
CG SECOND MEB//G-1//

DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//00/23//
CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL//JJJ/J1//
CDRLANDSTUHLRAL MC LANDSTUHL GE
NAVHOSP ROTA SP
CG SECOND MARDIV//G-1//
SECOND MAR REGT//S-1//
FIRSTEN SECOND MAR//S-1//
SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/WHLO//
NAVMEDINFOMGMTCCEN BETHESDA MD//04//
CMC WASHINGTON DC//OLA//MRO//
DFAS KANSAS CITY MO//FCMS//
FHTNC NORFOLK VA//
AFIP MEDICAL EXAMINER WASHINGTON DC
436 SVC DOVER AFB DE//SVD//
COMMARFORRES//ADJ//
CG MCRSC KANSAS CITY MO//ADJ//
BT

UNCLAS //N03040//
OPER/IRAQI FREEDOM//
MSGID/GENADMIN/TF TARAWA//
SUBJ/PCR (DD-3040-02) SUPPLEMENTAL 01 SLOCUM//
REF/A/MCO P3040.4/MARCORCASPROCMA/15APR1996//
REF/B/CG SECOND MEB 240800Z MAR 03//
REF/C/CG SECOND MEB 282135Z MAR 03//
REF/D/PHONECON BTWN COL [REDACTED] AND CAPT [REDACTED]
DTD 20030405//

NARR/REF A IS THE MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES
MANUAL (SHORT TITLE: MARCORCASPROCMA)/REF B IS MASS
CASUALTY PCR/REF C IS LCPL SLOCUM'S INDIVIDUAL PCR/
REF D IS PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN COL [REDACTED] OF
MORTUARY AFFAIRS AND CAPT [REDACTED] OF I MEF G-1.
POC/[REDACTED]/GYSGT/TF TARAWA REAR RCT2 ADMIN CHIEF/KUWAIT/DSN
[REDACTED]

RMRS/1. LCPL THOMAS J SLOCUM, [REDACTED] 0311, USMC/M

2. HOSTILE/DECEASED/KIA
3. UNKNOWN

4. TIME UNKNOWN/VICINITY OF AN NASIRIYAH SOUTHERN IRAQ
13. COL [REDACTED] (THE THEATER EXECUTIVE FOR MORTUARY AFFAIRS) CONTACTED
CAPT [REDACTED] (I MEF G-1) ON 20030305 AND VERIFIED THAT THE REMAINS
OF LCPL SLOCUM WAS RECOVERED IN THE HOSPITAL IN IRAQ WHERE THE
AMERICAN [REDACTED] CURRENTLY HIS REMAINS ARE AT DOVER AFB.
CAUSE OF DEATH UNKNOWN AND TIME OF DEATH UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. NO

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED. MINIMIZE EXEMPT. RELEASED BY
LTCOL [REDACTED]

BT
#0001

NNNN
+-OAAUZYUW RHOFJDR0024 0761936-UUUU--RHOFJDR.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RHHMCA0730 0770725
O 282135Z MAR 03 PSN 373483H28
FM CG SECOND MEB//G1//
TO CMC WASHINGTON DC//MRC//
BUMED WASHINGTON DC//332//
MILMEDSUPPOFF GREAT LAKES IL//09A//
EIGHTH MCD NEW ORLEANS LA
COMUSMARCENT REAR//G1//
COMUSMARCENT//G1//
INFO COMCFLCC DOHA KUWAIT KU//C1//
CMC WASHINGTON DC/MMEA/MMOA/SD/JA/PA
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//047//
NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC//33//
COMMARFOREUR//G1/ADJ//
CG I MEF//G1//
CG I MEF FWD//G1//
CG I MEF CAMP PENDLETON//G1//
COMMARFORLANT//G-1//
CG II MEF//G-1//
CG SECOND MEB//G-1//
DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//OO/23//
CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL//JJJ/J1//
CDRLANDSTUHLRMC LANDSTUHL GE
NAVHOSP ROTA SP
CG SECOND MARIDIV//G-1//
FIRSTBN SECOND MAR//S-1//
SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/WHLO//
NAVMEDINFOMGMTCEN BETHESDA MD//04//
CMC WASHINGTON DC//OLA// (ALSO /MRO//
DFAS KANSAS CITY MO//FCMS//
FHTNC NORFOLK VA//
AFIP MEDICAL EXAMINER WASHINGTON DC
436 SVC DOVER AFB DE//SVD//
COMMARFORRES//ADJ//
CG MCRSC KANSAS CITY MO//ADJ//
BT
UNCLAS //N03040//
OPER/IRAQI FREEDOM//
MSGID/GENADMIN/TF TARAWA//
SUBJ/PCR (DD-3040-02) DEATH//
REF/A/MCO P3040.4/MARCORCASPROCMAN/15APR1996//
AMPN/REF A IS THE MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL (SHORT
TITLE: MARCORCASPROCMAN)//
REF/B/CG 2D MEB 240800Z MAR 03 MASS CASUALTY PCR)//
POC [REDACTED] GYSGT/RCT-2 ADMIN CHF/KUWAIT/DSN [REDACTED] COMM

[REDACTED]

RMKS/1. LCPL THOMAS J SLOCUM [REDACTED]/0311, USMC/M
 2. HOSTILE/DECEASED/KIA
 3. UNKNOWN
 4. SAME AS LINE 5
 5. APPROX 1500 L/20030323/VICINITY OF AN NASIRIYAH SOUTHERN IRAQ
 6. IN THE CITY OF AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ ON 23 MAR 03 AT APPROX 1500
 LOCAL, CHARLIE COMPANY, FIRST BATTALION SECOND MARINES WAS
 CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO SECURE THE EASTERN BRIDGES OF AN NASIRIYAH.
 THE COMPANY WAS AMBUSHED BY ENEMY FIRE. LCPL SLOCUM'S VEHICLE
 RECEIVED A DIRECT HIT AND THE VEHICLE BEGAN TO BURN. LCPL SLOCUM WAS
 KILLED AS THE RESULT OF THAT AMBUSH.

7. 1STBN 2DMAR [REDACTED] COMM [REDACTED]
 8. AS OF THIS DATE, REMAINS NOT RECOVERED
 9. NO
 10. [REDACTED]

11. N/A
 12. NO
 13. WAITING TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF REMAINS.
 SUPPLEMENTAL PCR WILL FOLLOW ONCE UNKNOWN INFORMATION HAS BEEN
 OBTAINED.

14. 19980602
 15. 1528.80/HDPL 50.00/HFP 150.00/DEPLOYED P/D 3.50 PER DAY

16. [REDACTED]
 17. [REDACTED]
 18. [REDACTED]
 19. [REDACTED]
 20. [REDACTED]
 21. [REDACTED]
 22. [REDACTED]
 23. [REDACTED]
 24. [REDACTED]

25. WHITE [REDACTED]
 26. [REDACTED]
 27. NONE
 28. [REDACTED]

MINIMIZED EXEMPT. RELEASED BY LTCOL [REDACTED]

BT
 #0001

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TAB F

Tab F

Human Factors

Human Factor's Advisor's Memorandum..... F-3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FRIENDLY FIRE INVESTIGATION BOARD
APO AE 09888

07 May 03

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Captain [REDACTED] Human Factors Advisor, Friendly Fire Investigation Board
(FFIB)

SUBJECT: Human Factors Consultation

(U) 1. Human factors analysis was used to determine possible contributing factors leading to the Friendly Fire Incident between USAF A-10 aircraft and US Marines in An-Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 2003. Many factors were considered, and most were found to be non-factors (Section 5, A-4 and B-4). Three factors were considered to be possible contributing to the incident: acute fatigue, task misprioritization, and a well used but undefined term – “fog of war”.

(U) 2. Acute fatigue is a factor when the individual has the type of exhaustion associated with physical or mental activity between two regular sleep periods that degrade performance. MOUTH, as well as the other Marines, had been engaged in a combat environment for multiple hours prior to the incident. The mental and physical stresses of combat over time degraded the performance capabilities of all the Marines. Examples of this degradation can include such things as the ability to physically perform tasks quickly (exertion), or to mentally make clear decisions in a timely manner (cognition).

(S) 3. The second factor to address is task misprioritization. Task misprioritization is a factor when the individual does not organize, based on accepted prioritization techniques, the tasks needed to manage the immediate situation as perceived by the individual. In the events of the incident, MOUTH is presented with multiple tasks to accomplish in a compressed amount of time. After calling “on guard” for CAS assets, the A-10’s (GYRATE 73 flight) checked in with him. The A-10’s report that they loitered for approximately 15 minutes while establishing visual contact with MOUTH. During this time, MOUTH never attempted to contact the Battalion commander for approval of Type 3 CAS, which was required. MOUTH had ample time to attempt a radio call to the Battalion Commander while working with GYRATE 73 flight. He misprioritized tasks by recognizing the decision to call the Battalion Commander as a lower priority, and deciding that there was not enough time. The Battalion Commander had knowledge that Charlie Company had proceeded to a position north of the bridge. Had this information been passed to MOUTH, he would not have cleared GYRATE 73 flight to engage north of the bridge.

(U) 4. The last factor to discuss is not actually a defined human factor. The term “fog of war” has no clear definition, however the concept has been utilized for centuries during warfare. The

"fog of war" is actually a conglomeration of many human factors encompassing operational, logistical, physiological, psychological, and psychosocial areas. These areas combine to provide an overall umbrella of confusion on the battlefield. Decision-making during "fog of war" relies primarily upon training and assumptions. Many overriding reasons are associated with this limit of decision-making. First, the ability to gain reliable information in a timely manner is limited. Part of this is due to the operational limitations of communications equipment. Additionally, there is a limitation of the volume of information that personnel can process. Technology has improved the ability for troops to communicate on the battlefield, however it has not achieved a perfectly clear picture. Also, some information received may not be clear or correct, which leads to troops making decisions based on information available, regardless of accuracy or clarity. Coupled with this is the fact that decision-making inherently contains emotion. While directly engaging enemy forces, sensory overload often occurs, such as feelings of fear, anxiety, apprehension, and anger.

While trying to make decisions during the common stresses of combat, personnel commonly encounter temporal distortion. Temporal distortion is an inaccurate ability to judge the passage of time. This inability may compress time ("time flies"), or it may expand time (time moves very slowly). A person attending to multiple tasks often has no accurate perception of elapsed time. The more critical or demanding the tasks are also compounds this problem.

In close combat, decisions must be made immediately, and the outcome weighs on troops surviving hostile engagements. Multiple decisions must be made in a time-critical manner and are often based on information that is limited or may not be accurate, as mentioned above. Additionally, the emotion of taking direct fire and the anxiety of other friendly forces taking fire begin to cloud the accurate picture of the battlefield.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ROBERTS, Capt, USAF, BSC
Aerospace Physiologist

TAB G

Tab G

Pilots' Interviews

[REDACTED]	Interview	G-3
[REDACTED]	Follow-up Interview	G-31
[REDACTED]	Interview	G-35
[REDACTED]	Follow-up Interview	G-75

*Declassify entire
Tab G, except parts
marked.*

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[REDACTED]

26 April 2003
Interview with M [REDACTED]

Parties present:

BRIG GEN WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] First of all, I'd like to identify the members in the room. Capt [REDACTED], pilot advisor to the board. We also have Capt [REDACTED], physiologist and advisor to the board. There is Col [REDACTED], Marine advisor, and Brig Gen Hodgkins, who is the board president, and then Maj [REDACTED] the legal advisor. My name is Capt [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] I do.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MAJ [REDACTED] I do.

CAPT [REDACTED] For the record could you please state your name and rank and your unit?

MAJ [REDACTED] Major, 103rd Fighter Squadron, the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 23rd Air Expeditionary Squadron.

CAPT [REDACTED] And your deployed unit?

MAJ [REDACTED] 103rd Expeditionary Force, attached to the 332 Air Expeditionary Wing.

CAPT [REDACTED] As far as your flying history, how long have you been flying the A-10?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I've been flying the A-10 sixteen years, total flight time, and I've been in the A-10 for all but one year, or less than one year in the OV-10 as a Forward Air Control.

CAPT [REDACTED] And as far as the number of hours that you have?

MAJ [REDACTED] Over 2000 hours in the A-10.

CAPT [REDACTED] And your qualifications?

MAJ [REDACTED] I'm a check pilot, SEFE pilot, flight commander

CAPT [REDACTED] FAC-A?

MAJ [REDACTED] FAC-A, CSAR, SANDY 1 qualified, mission commander qualified, and pretty much...pretty much been with the unit for...since 1991, and prior to that I was Forward Air Controller, embedded FAC inside of a fighter squadron with 18th Fighter Squadron in Eilson, Alaska.

CAPT [REDACTED] As far as experience in the theatre, have you done any ONW?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] We've been to Al Jaber, and this is... I'm sure my fourth, possibly my fifth... I've been coming here since 1995 on the 103rd deployed at the first guard unit.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any experience or, about what time did you get here prior to Iraqi Freedom?

MAJ [REDACTED] I was one of the first in with the six-ship that flew across. We arrived here March 3rd. Within my three days, once my orientation flight on, I believe March 7th or 8th, I'll have to check my record. And then prior to March 19th to March 20th, I think I'd flown about six times.

CAPT [REDACTED] How many missions did you have prior to the 23rd?

MAJ [REDACTED] would have been... possibly my fifth mission.

CAPT [REDACTED] What kind of schedule were you keeping at that time?

MAJ [REDACTED] Our squadron was on the 12 to 12, noon to midnight shift. Basically our 2nd and 3rd go at the time period.

CAPT [REDACTED] At this time did you have any weird... did you have any schedule shifts that turning night sorties to...?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] We were pretty much always in that time frame, and I didn't have anything major.

CAPT [REDACTED] On the day in question, did you happen to have any...were you double turning from something else or...?

MAJ [REDACTED] We were flying, that was our first flight and double turning into our 2nd flight.

CAPT [REDACTED] Anything in the day prior?

MAJ [REDACTED] I believe the day prior for me was CSAR alert.

CAPT [REDACTED] CSAR alert, OK. Do you feel you had adequate time off?

MA [REDACTED] Yeah. I mean...absolutely I sat CSAR alert, I think. I'll check the schedule, but I believe it was from the 2nd period which as 9 to 15Z. So, I mean, after that, my time was spent...building the schedule as our squadron scheduler. Chief of scheduling, waited and made sure our guys were squared away and that the schedule was done with the...according to the frag for the 23rd.

CAPT [REDACTED] Did you get plenty of sleep?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I couldn't tell you what time the frag actually dropped, or what time we got done, but I was at least done probably about 1 o'clock. Which for us was getting up around 10, 11 in the morning and go from there.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you think you had enough time from the time you got to Kuwait until the time that you started, or until the time Iraqi Freedom started? Do you feel you had enough time to adjust to the time zone changes and recover then? As far as your roommates? Were your roommates on the same schedule?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah.

CAPT [REDACTED] You were making the flying schedule?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] At least the squadron was on that schedule. Is that correct?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] So, were there any type of interruptions or anything during the night after?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, I have very good roommates.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] And personal relationship with Maj [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I've know Maj [REDACTED] since 1991. We've flown together, we've traine4d together and we've fought together. We have a very good relationship. Basically I came up, I was an active duty guy, sent to the squadron in 91. He was just coming back from pilot training, and _____ pretty much been friends from that time

CAPT [REDACTED] Were the two of you a combat pair?

M [REDACTED] No. We are not a combat pair.

CAPT [REDACTED] In your squadron are there, by any chance, an atmosphere where there's any type of pressure to employ ordinance or even just an un-official competition or whatever?

MA [REDACTED] No, there was not. I mean...no personal strive to get everything off the airplane, and do everything, and be the first one to do this. I mean, I would say our squadron was very good about that. We actually had a couple of meetings prior to during the whole operation on Iraq, and said look we'd been doing it right. We feel we've been doing it right. We're not going out there with our fangs hanging out where...you know...we're coming back with stuff because we don't have a target to hit. We're not just going to hit anything. And that made me feel pretty good about the guys that we're talking about.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] In preparation for coming here, was the squadron spin up or...?

MAJ [REDACTED] We've had a squadron spin up throughout the time frame. I live in [REDACTED], and go to fly in [REDACTED] due to my civilian job. But, in January I pretty much had a higher than normal sortie rate. In December, it was kind of low because some of the guys were over in Baghram, but I spent a lot of time up there preparing. And... a little bit of February, we got, hey you're going to be activated, and I basically said, OK, I've gotta go do this, take care of my family stuff and less than a week flying out.

CAPT [REDACTED] As far as academic, was there any kind of visual recognition training?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. The squadron's been doing... and in our briefs in the morning throughout the years, and Intel comes in and gives us a brief, and there's usually a couple of vis recce pictures that they do. I know when we first started flying around here, Intel did a couple but kind of dropped off after a while and we've done vis recce pictures for several years.

CAPT [REDACTED] On the day in question, how would you describe the weather?

MAJ [REDACTED] The weather was pretty clear, maybe just the standard breezy day... you know... we were afternoon, so the sun was kind of high and setting off to the west. It wasn't cloudy overcast at all.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
CAPT [REDACTED] The aircraft you were flying, any type of problems with that, anything annoying, fly funny?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. It was...the aircraft was actually pretty good. I don't remember what tail it is, but as far as I could tell it was pretty good.

CAPT [REDACTED] So nothing funny about the airframe. By any chance, did you wear high-contrast visor while you were flying? Any sunglasses or anything in addition...?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] And on the day in question, were you carrying binoculars and using them for target ID?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah.

CAPT [REDACTED] What type were these?

MAJ [REDACTED] Basically, the small power. I believe the [REDACTED] power binoculars. We ha [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] At any time around there were you using GO or NO-GO pills?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] If you would please start now, if you could just kind of walk us through the mission from about the time you checked in with...you know, about the time you had FENCE in until about the time you were done working with MOUTH? Could you let us know what happened there?

MAJ [REDACTED] Alright, basically from the time we crossed and pushed over...we were enroute to, I believe the...check my line-up card, but just south or southeast of the Baghdad area, passing An Nasiriyah and kind of maintaining the ingress block, is when we received an immediate call for CAS on guard, by call sign MOUTH, and the frequency which had come up, [REDACTED]. It was in my line-up card. And...literally we had just passed An Nasiriyah at that point in time, and a call came over guard. We were in the vicinity, and we responded to the emergency call for CAS. We checked in. The guy that called was MOUTH on the frequency and we started talking about it. He was under direct fire, from what I understand, there was a tank that was basically stuck that they were trying to get out, and they were taking fire and needed...and made a call for CAS. That's how it occurred. We got over the area, basically, myself and Maj [REDACTED]. I'm just going to call him [REDACTED] for here on out, if that's OK. You know...we've flown together a number of times, and we just basically set up...you know...our tactical plan was to kind of go into a shooter-cover role of a stack, knowing that the threat of a Roland was in the Tallil, An Nasiriyah area. We kind of stayed in an offset situation outside of the town to the north and northeast, and started talking with MOUTH. Our first situation, which we started with was to try and determine the friendly location. We got a hold of MOUTH and we were talking. He started

[REDACTED]

taking about a couple of the rivers, a couple of bridges, the canal to the north and he was kind of located in the middle of those. I wanted to make sure we were talking about the same area. He said, "Yeah, we've got two bridges." You can see on the map there's the Euphrates and then the canal. There's two bridges up there. We said, you know...he's on the eastern side of the bridges, and kind of talked to him from there. He ended up being actually down into this vicinity over here, is where he was at. While he kept on talking...once again, I'm looking down and trying to find his position when my wingman's taking a higher cover position and listening to the over, the overall general picture. I said, "I'm not really sure where he's talking about. I believe it's over down into..." actually it's kind of more over in here, and Maj [REDACTED] said...if he could talk to him, and I said, "Yeah. Let's make sure we know what we're talking about." He requested the tactical lead, and you know...having flown with him for the past twelve years, I mean...I have no problem giving him the tactical lead. And, actually, I think it kind of makes it a little bit better. So, now I can kind of back off and listen and comprehend what I had actually been hearing. He talked to him, figured out...yeah, hey, we got it. And he said, "We've got a couple of rockets." He ended up saying, "Hey, what I'd like to do is kind of take it and shoot rockets no further south." I think then the 3-6 or somewhere in this area here. And "Is that OK?" to make sure we had the understanding that we could see those rockets, and MOUTH cleared him hot, as we basically came from here, he had a couple of HE, which didn't help out. My understanding is that point and time, by MOUTH clearing him hot, that he had full eyes-on where we were and had seen us.

COL [REDACTED] And you were doing that to identify his position?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Well, what we wanted to make sure cause he had initially given us the 3-7 grid line, and we said, "OK, we want to make sure we understand where you are. We wanted to mark, basically in the field." He said, "Nobody is north of this road." That he knew... My understanding is, we wanted to mark and make sure we had him, and basically say everything north of those marks is what he was calling getting the firing from. We wanted to mak... There's the smoke, there's the line, we don't cross the smoke. And that's the concept. Unfortunately, there were HE rockets versus willy-petes. We were back into our wheel, basically stayed in that position and at this point and time... from... basically this area coming down, there was a couple of other helicopters that [REDACTED] and I had picked up. They were Apache or...

COL [REDACTED] Now, you're pointing just south of the canal?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah, they were running the... southern edge of the canal, and ended up going off...

COL [REDACTED] East to west?

MAJ [REDACTED] I thought they ended up going out pretty much this way here, from what I recall.

CAPT [REDACTED] So, they were going west to east, and they ended up going southeast?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. They left the whole target area...off into this vicinity here. We relayed all that information back to him,...to MOUTH, and said that you know, "Were you talking to these guys?" You know...They could've come in here, but I know they headed off into this vicinity. And shortly thereafter, I mean...during the time frame as we were talking and seeing the helicopters, one vehicle basically, when fire comes into this position up here, and now that one vehicle blown up on the ground, big black smoke running, and we're talking down to MOUTH saying, "Hey. Here's what we see on the ground right now. Here's where some fire came at. There's one vehicle burning. Do you see the smoke?" "Yes, I see the smoke."

CAPT [REDACTED] Could you just point to the grid of that? Approximately where that was?

MAJ [REDACTED] At about 22-39.

CAPT [REDACTED] And this is a 1:15,000. I've also got some imagery here [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

MA [REDACTED] Right about...224 391, 2. Along there.

COL [REDACTED] Did you see any other vehicles when you saw the one vehicle burning along with that vehicle?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] We had one vehicle burning on the road. We had about three other vehicles down into...you've got the larger canal and you've got the center canal just in the vicinity of about 223 391, right in this V-section of the road and the small canal. There was about three vehicles there, and to the north there was about four or five vehicles on the western side of the road, and then there's about one or two just east of the burning vehicle in into this area here. It looks like...

COL [REDACTED] You said you saw the Cobras going south. Did you associate the burning vehicle with the Cobras?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. At the same time something was fired in here is when these guys were leaving. So, I can't tell you if they fired. I cannot say. I assume at this point and time...you know...I couldn't tell if they were Cobras or Apaches due to being a little bit higher. You know...they were egressing the area, and they had a vehicle burning, and we hadn't laid down a single piece of fire yet.

CAPT [REDACTED] Could you just describe what type of vehicles, or if there's any type of description you could give me of the vehicles?

MAJ [REDACTED] You know...looking about 15,000 feet with probably [REDACTED] binoculars, the vehicles over in this particular corner appeared to be white, the small type of pickup truck that you see running around base all the time. This one, out into the field here, appeared to be another white single pickup truck. These to the north were a bit larger. To the best I could tell,

[REDACTED]

they were the truck style. You've seen the...kind of cab over, no nose to the truck. At least one of them, one or two of them was, with a long flat bed. I mean...kind of like what I walk by all the time by self-help. I mean one of the small Mitsubishi style trucks with a flat bed. It appeared to be dark in color. And those were these to the north here.

COL [REDACTED] About how many total vehicles did you see?

MAJ [REDACTED] Eight to nine.

COL [REDACTED] Eight to nine?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, Now that we had the burning vehicle right smack dab in the middle of the roads, I was talking to MOUTH. He said he could see the vehicle. As we were talking down he says hey, you know...he initially told us when we were trying to figure out where he was, and no one's north of the 3-7, he came back and said, "No one's north of the 3-8 grid." And no friendlies were north of the canal. So basically from this V...you know, we said, "OK. Nobody's north of this, nobody's north of the canal. Everything that we are seeing and the burning vehicle is north of the canal and north of the 3-8 grid line."

COL [REDACTED] When you say the burning vehicle, could you see the vehicle or did you see the smoke from the vehicle?

MAJ [REDACTED] We just saw the smoke from the...whatever was burning on the ground is all we saw.

COL [REDACTED] Right. But did he see the smoke coming from the vehicle, or did he see the vehicle...in your mind?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't know if he had eyes-on it when it got hit, but he saw the smoke of that particular burning...if it was a vehicle. We assume it was a vehicle being on the road. I don't ever remember hearing anybody from MOUTH's side say cleared to shoot any vehicles, but all of a sudden it just happened. I mean, all of a sudden, when I research, of the finding of the friendlies, knowing where they were, and going back up here to go north of the canal,...at that point and time, now we've got a burning vehicle, and...

COL [REDACTED] And how much time between that?

MAJ [REDACTED] About 10 or 15 minutes.

COL [REDACTED] 10 or 15 minutes?

M [REDACTED] But...by the time we checked out, before we ever expended was about 10 to 15 minutes. So, we wanted to make sure we had...you know...we got called to this emergency CAS, we wanted to make sure we know where he's at. Yeah, at that point in time, we're telling MOUTH what we say, and he's saying what we see, and he's basically cleared us to engage any

[REDACTED]

of the vehicles north of the 3-8 and north of the canal. And we kind of told him what we saw and the rough vicinity of where they were at, and at that point and time, we were cleared to engage those vehicles.

COL [REDACTED] Did he tell you what type of CAS he was running, or do you know?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. From everything that we had heard since we had it cleared hot call down here is that, and he was in the vicinity of seeing the target area with the smoke, you know, we thought we were under totally his control. There was nothing said cause we would call for "in and hot." We were getting, to the best of recollection we were getting cleared.

CAPT [REDACTED] You had clearance each time?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Would you do me a favor and just kind of using the maps to help you out, could you just draw a diagram of how the vehicles were sitting, and then where the...just kind of an orientation for, so we can kind of get an idea of where you were...?

COL [REDACTED] Just kind of go down on the bridge and...

MAJ [REDACTED] I can't tell you if they're...

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] just from the best of your recollection of what you saw.

MAJ [REDACTED] I think there was four or five up here, so that had us at about nine vehicles. Right in here in this particular part and right up in this vicinity here.

COL [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah, at that point and time, our tactics were still with the threats in the area, and what we had was still under the shooter-cover role. So, over this whole time frame, my wingman's still [REDACTED] and at that point and time, I say, "You're i [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We both have eyes-on target. We feel comfortable, and we know where MOUTH is at. We had gotten up there north of the canal, north of the 3-8. He expended two MK82s, I believe, on the eastern...

COL [REDACTED] Now, did you assume the tac lead at this point?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, he still had the tac lead. I'm still the flight lead, but due to our timeframe and the stack which we were in, it was easier to keep him down and expend from that timeframe. We both had good SA from what we thought at this point and time. We had talked about it, and we'd...we evaluated everything, with the burning vehicle, and with MOUTH. We went after, I believe, the vehicle to the east. With a couple of MK82s, and as for sequence from here out, what he shot after that, I'd had to sit there and say...it may have been gun on his next pass, some more MK82s, gun...the Mavericks were saved at this timeframe. So we kind of

[REDACTED]

switched at some point and time, and I took a single bomb down into this area, with three vehicles on the south of the burning vehicle and just to the west side of the road.

COL [REDACTED] to the east side of the road.

MAJ [REDACTED] East. OK.

COL [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. My wingman took out the eastern target.

CAPT [REDACTED] that's east. Right here.

MAJ [REDACTED] So, I went after these three down in this vicinity here. Came back with basically another single bomb. I whip it in there. Now we're getting to the point...we're in the target area, and it became more of, we weren't seeing any threats on the RWR. The vehicles were still all stationary at that point and time. We pretty much went into a cover, not a cover, but a wheel type of operation, encircling the area. Basically still...all of this was still done pretty much above...we were still in the [REDACTED] wheel block of which we were trying to...

COL [REDACTED] Where were you bottoming out from on your runs?

[REDACTED]
MAJ [REDACTED] My particular runs, I was using about [REDACTED] which starts at about [REDACTED] feet and pickles are [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] We they HADBs and High Angle Strate to stay ab [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. We were trying to do the best we can. We were looking [REDACTED] and all...you know...basically [REDACTED] instead of the [REDACTED] just because of the block and you've got the [REDACTED] pot egress and their attitude block. And so basically doing that kind of thing. After being 10 or 15 minutes in there, so that, OK, I think [REDACTED] will work off the line-up card. The mils are all set up in the EGI. And, then...High Angle Strate pretty much at that point in time, would keep us about [REDACTED] feet looking at minimum...My particular thing, and I wish I had the tape, so we can say, "I was at this altitude." I think the MISREPs got...you know...because we spent our time coming back writing down on cards...you know...Here's what the tapes were saying times, and turn that into an Intel and actually reviewed it. So, once again I came back around here, and then from that point and time, it was kind of shooter-cover at all times during the wheel. I think he came back around on the third pass and maybe dropped his next two bombs, and I came around and finished off my last two bombs. I kind of went 1, 1, and 2 and he went 2 and 2. Now we get a call from MOUTH that ...maybe another 15 minutes into this, "Hey. I'm looking north." And he's seeing...wants us to kind of go up into this compound up here and see and kind of tell him what we see. I believe this is...he says north to to the T intersection comes out on the east side. You see some sort of a compound.

CAPT [REDACTED] K.

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] We kind of looked there, and we're saying, "Hey, from what we can tell looking under the bins...you know...so, we had stopped actually and when we went up there...you know...still kind of went into the role here, one person down on the bins looking. All I could tell from my position was "Yeah, there's buildings down there." As to anything next to buildings, anything like that, I could not see.

COL [REDACTED] Going back to the target, did you see what kind of BDA did you have on the target that you were striking initially, before you broke off and went up to the intersection?

MAJ [REDACTED] The best that I could tell you is, under the first bomb, it went short. The second bomb...I guess if there's anything about the jet I kind of didn't like was it was a little bit cocked off from some of the offsets. So, now I'm kind of readjusting to that. The second bomb...and I know the two bombs went right...cut through it...I couldn't tell you what my wingman's BDA was...you know...my job at that point and time is to cover the whole area, and you know...say, "It looked like your bomb went a little bit short," or "You hit the target." I couldn't tell you if the thing was totally destroyed.

COL [REDACTED] Did you see any troops while you were doing this?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. So, after we kind of reviewed down into this area, the complex just south of the T intersection, is where we had the four to five vehicles, one vehicle was still remaining up here and about, from what I can recall. Four vehicles were now leaving this area,

[REDACTED]

making kind of a V shape straight to the road, and starting heading southbound into the city. This was the information that was relayed back to MOUTH. "Hey, you've got four vehicles from the northern target sector that we talked about, progressing into the city." And...you know...he said basically he needed those not to get across. So, I had two options from my position here. I can't tell you if I shot first or my wingman shot first. I believe, I think [REDACTED] shot first and his first one overflowed it. I know I came in from east to west running heading with [REDACTED] model Maverick. The [REDACTED] and it appeared black. And the last picture I had in my mind of that vehicle is truck style, no nose, and kind of a top on it. So, I mean it was...what I picture as one of these small, truck size, white vehicles you see in front of self-help. With a canvas top over it or some sort of top over the back, giving it a pure box shape. At this point in time, by the time I was in position, had locked on the vehicle, the vehicle was on the bridge. I elected not to fire on the bridge, fire the Maverick just as it was crossing the south side of the bridge, and basically, it was impacting about [REDACTED] later. I mean...the vehicle did not make it any farther than maybe...It was still in the open. So, still north of the 3-8, nowhere into this...I would have to say it is right in this vicinity here. So, what is that? Maybe one width of the canal south of the river.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

COL [REDACTED] And that was a direct hit?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, it was. The [REDACTED] shot at was maybe about a width and a half south of right into the vicinity here, or maybe...I think it was actually right here, maybe two widths of

[REDACTED]

the canal south of the bridge, and it was stopped, and he came back around and fired a second Maverick. He used [REDACTED] Maverick at this point and time, and that was another direct hit. We had two of the vehicles that made it through, went around, and as for the exact location, I know they went down south, and actually kind of went off into a side street and pretty much pulled over right next to a couple of buildings. And at that point and time, we said, No. We're not going any further than this." We know that one...civilian collateral damage, and ...you know...Their lucky day, or unlucky day. I don't know how you want to say these things, but...those which were not shot upon. During this whole time frame the comment from MOUTH came across the radio saying, "Hey, you're putting smiles on the guys' faces down here." Maj [REDACTED] responded back, "Well, you've got a couple of Guard guys up here, trying to do our best." When that actually happened, I think it was during the bombing or strafe prior to the Mavericks coming off. We had one vehicle remaining in this area here. We're getting close to our...which would be the northern set of vehicles, where the four came out, five came out. And basically I was going to roll in, I still had some 30 millimeters. That one vehicle had no sign of any damage on it. It was either stuck or whatever...but we hadn't hit that area, and that vehicle was there, and I was rolling in from the west to east, and at that point in time is when the cease fire call was made, and I did not expend, and we both...you know...my wingman said, "Hey, did you hear that?" I said, "I'm off, dry. Come back into wheel. Set up the cover position." At that point and time, you know...we said, "What's going on?...Who called it? And what's going on?" There was no call sign association...you know, "Hey, this is MOUTH..." any of that. It was just cease fire, cease fire. We tried to figure out at that point and time what was going on. I talked to MOUTH, and he said, "Hey, we think we might have had a Blue on Blue, some guys up north at the river, but we're not sure. No one really knows." And we stuck

[REDACTED]

around for about another 5 minutes on our cover positions to see if there was anything else we could...you know...answer questions, look at. But I think pretty much at that time, we wanted to try and make sure what was going on, and we now physically had to bingo out due to low fuel state.

CAPT [REDACTED] At any time during there, did you see any kind of markings that would identify friendlies?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any kind of reaction from the vehicles you were hitting other than the ones that started driving south.

COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] Any tripel A while you were doing this?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

COL [REDACTED] So, nothing coming in here at all?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] No, and as the time went on, that's what allowed us to just go to a wheel type of engagement.

CAPT [REDACTED] He did not mention anything more about friendly forces at all in that area?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. We had no idea that he had any kind of problems. We were pretty much under his direct control up here.

CAPT [REDACTED] On RTB, as far as any in-flight report, did you pass the possibility of...

MAJ [REDACTED] To be honest with you...coming back, we tried the in-flight report on the Intel frequency. There was a lot of problems with that particular radio. I do not remember or recall if...you know...because I went through on our radio and said, "Here's kind of what I got," verified it with [REDACTED] and that was his responsibility to pass that report. He didn't, as far as I recall, my best recollection directions were he could not get a hold of them. We spent...I know I did...[REDACTED] was with me at the time reviewing my tape and Intel at the debrief shack out on the line, and during this time, I know [REDACTED] also made a phone call to...I forget the gentleman's name. It's in this...it's in the report.

CAPT [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]: Yes, thank you. While I was reviewing the tape with Intel and said, "Here's what we got. Here's where the Maverick shot. Here's...you know...the bombs." And I turned my tape into the person who did the debrief. That was the last I saw of it.

CAPT [REDACTED]: K, and that was Lt [REDACTED], by any chance?

MAJ [REDACTED]: I couldn't tell you. The MISREP actually had who did it at the bottom of it.

COL [REDACTED]: Going back to the engagement. Did you get an abort call at any other time during the engagement?

MAJ A [REDACTED]: No. It was just that...we just got one call at the very end.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Was the person who took the MISREP perhaps a female?

MAJ [REDACTED]: I can't remember. I mean, really, I don't recall that.

CAPT [REDACTED]: Is there anything you would like to add as far as...?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Yeah, I think...the important part about this whole thing...It's an unfortunate situation. I personally feel bad about having this happen, but under the situation that was presented at that time, on that day...you know...the calls that were made...you know...I

[REDACTED]

don't know what else, anybody else would've done, except respond to a guy. A US force guy saying he was under fire and needs help. You know...and being on that location at that time frame, I still think I'd go right...if he needed help, I'd go and say, "Hey, what do you need?"

CAPT [REDACTED] Any follow up questions? Col [REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] General, any questions?

GEN HODGKINS: No.

CAPT [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Just one question. You said you reviewed the tape with [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] That's correct.

MAJ [REDACTED] Did you talk about this incident?

MAJ [REDACTED] Now, [REDACTED] .when I found out that this was under investigation, I was here and Maj [REDACTED] was in Tallil.

COL [REDACTED] And when was that?

MAJ [REDACTED] It was about two weeks after this whole time frame...you know...and then for the next two to three days...I...you know... [REDACTED] had kept his tape...Maj or Col [REDACTED] I guess is the person that got called in since Col [REDACTED] and myself were out flying that night. He got the information, passed it as soon as we got done. He said that he had gone and talked to [REDACTED] over the phone at Tallil. He said he had the tape in his office, or in his locker, and ...you know, wherever he had it, and at that point and time, I guess he accidentally used it at some other time. The next day, I...you know...went down to Visual Imagery and say, "Do you have this mission on this date." No. I say, "Where's the tape?" "I don't know," they say, "They get put in a box when they get here. Then when they're done, the get sent back over to Intel." I took a box of tapes that were in Intel, and just reviewed them to see if any were mine. That produced nothing. The next day a box came from the flight line to the Ops desk and I was the Top 3. I took the box, reviewed the tapes, nothing. So, I wish we had the tape. I wish the process had worked. You know...I can't say any more on that.

CAPT [REDACTED] any questions? Alright, just a quick closing statement. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

[REDACTED]

30 April 2003

Follow-up Interview with Maj [REDACTED]

Parties present:

BRIG GEN WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] This is Capt [REDACTED] with Gen Hodgkins, Col [REDACTED], Maj [REDACTED] and M [REDACTED] on a follow up interview from the 28th of April interview. Just to remind you of all the previous opening statements still apply. You're still considered under oath.

MAJ A [REDACTED] I acknowledge that.

CAPT [REDACTED] The big questions we had, and there's just a couple of places on our...on the MISREP we have from your flight that day, we're just trying to get some clarification on. First of all, in here, if you want to look at it. We've got the Intel officer lists four different Maverick shots through here, but then in a narrative at the end, there's three.

M [REDACTED]: Let me just look at this here. Can I write on this?

COL [REDACTED] No. I don't know if we have another copy of that. Just tell us...if there's a problem there, just let us know.

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah. I me... just like we reported to them... I me... unless they're just going down GYRATE... OK, they just did GYRATE 7-3's and then GYRATE 7-4's. They didn't put it in the order of which they were dropped. I kind of made... we told them that. There was only three Mavericks. I'll tell you that.

CAPT [REDACTED] We have a few listed down at the bottom and at the top of the second page.

MAJ [REDACTED] This was a good Maverick, which would [REDACTED] I only see one for GYRATE 7-3... yeah. There is a mistake on the MISREP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not have three Maverick missiles. He only had two. He [REDACTED] Maverick. So, they have added an extra one on there, and it's not mine because I came home with one Maverick. So there was only...

COL [REDACTED] OK. So he dropped two and you dropped one?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] And the next thing, again, a point of clarification, we noticed here that she had listed something for a SAFIRE event.

MAJ [REDACTED]: No, we didn't see any SAFIRE. Small arms, automatic weapons, we didn't report that. You know... it seems like everything here is just kind of a straight canned 7-3, 7-4. But, no, as far as I can remember, to the best of my recollection, it is nothing that we saw.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Even in the narrative, it mentioned something about it. So, again, we're just trying to clear it all up.

MAJ [REDACTED] You know...you could sit there and...I never saw any small arms coming up at me, you'd know whether...because in the very next mission that we did fly, that we did have triple A coming at us. You know, so...I don't know who did the next mission behind that one, but to the best of my recollection, you know...I know that I didn't see any that I remember, and I don't believe that...Maj [REDACTED] did. I can't speak for him.

CAPT [REDACTED] The next question that I have is just...the number of mission that you might have flown following the incident. Do you remember how many about, since, between that incident and our interview the other day? Do you remember the approximate number?

MAJ [REDACTED] It exceeds twenty missions.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. Between then and now?

MAJ [REDACTED] I would say I almost did thirty missions total since I've been here, since March 3rd.

CAPT [REDACTED] So, at least twenty since, at least twenty since that day?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Easily. I think I just had my twenty-seventh OIF mission, or twenty-sixth OIF mission yesterday, dropping leaflets.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] And you said you had, I think about four or five...?

MAJ [REDACTED] Going through my 14 day report, I would say at least five minimum. I wish I had brought it over. It's on my computer right now. I'm just trying to...at least five or six, looking back at it now.

CAPT [REDACTED], you're saying at least twenty. That's fairly accurate now?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any further questions, Sir? We're going to try to minimize the number of follow ups that we do

MAJ [REDACTED] I've looked at a couple of these MISREPS reports because they're, I don't know...they kind of got to the point of being so overwhelmed out there. The...to me it seemed like things were just kind of like, here's what they want, and I never saw what they wrote until afterwards. That's the best I can recall.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. Once again, please don't talk about the testimony you've given here today, thanks.

[REDACTED]

26 April 2003
Interview with Major [REDACTED]

Parties present:

BRIG GEN WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] My name is Captain [REDACTED] and under the direction of the board president, Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, we're investigating a friendly fire incident that occurred on 23 March 03 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This investigation, conducted under DOD Instruction 6055.7 is separate and apart from any other investigation that may have been conducted concerning this incident. The purpose of this investigation is to produce a publicly releasable report on the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident and gather and preserve evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Your sworn testimony to me may be used for any proper purpose and may be released to the public. Additionally, the chain of command will review the final report. Do you understand what I have just read to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] I do.

CAPT [REDACTED] Finally, do you also understand that you are being interviewed as a witness in this friendly fire investigation and acknowledge that no promise of confidentiality has been extended to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] Understood.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give in the matter now under investigation shall be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MAJ [REDACTED] I do.

CAPT [REDACTED] For the record could you please state your name and rank and your home and deployed units?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Major [REDACTED]. 23rd Fighter Squadron, home base is Willow Grove Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Air National Guard. 23rd Air Expeditionary Squadron.

CAPT [REDACTED] Far as your flying history, how long have you been flying the A-10?

MAJ [REDACTED] I've been in the A-10 about 12 years now.

CAPT [REDACTED] How many hours, approximately?

MAJ [REDACTED] 2200, 2300.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] as far as experience in this theatre, ONW, OSW?

MAJ [REDACTED] This is my third time to Al Jaber and _____ in December. Third time flying out of Al Jaber for OSW. Two OSWs now.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any ONW experience?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] And as far as this campaign? How long were you here before it began?

MAJ [REDACTED] Probably only about ten days. Ten days, two weeks.

CAPT [REDACTED] Prior to March 23, how many mission have you flown, for Iraqi Freedom?

MAJ [REDACTED] This was either the third or fourth.

CAPT [REDACTED] Were you able to engage targets on anything prior to this?

MAJ [REDACTED] Only...this would have been the fourth, and I engaged targets on the _____ peninsula the night prior.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] You said you arrived in theatre about ten days prior, so about the ninth?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. I actually showed up at Al Jaber on the 10th.

CAPT [REDACTED] What type of schedule were you keeping? Day, night?

MAJ [REDACTED] We went to a noon to midnight local schedule. And I was flying mostly nights. This, I believe, was my first day sortie.

CAPT [REDACTED] In relation to that, when did the change happen, between nights and days?

MAJ [REDACTED] That day. I'd flown the previous night, then turned to this afternoon...daylight sortie.

CAPT [REDACTED] So, it was a double turn then?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] How much time did you have off in between the sorties?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't recall, exactly. I mean, it was well within crew rest.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Time to eat?

MAJ [REDACTED] Oh, yes. Plenty of time.

CAPT [REDACTED] Prior to your night mission, did you get plenty of sleep, enough rest to...?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Your relationship with GYRATE 7-[REDACTED] Personal?
Professional?

MAJ [REDACTED] Excellent, we've been flying together since 91.

CAPT [REDACTED] Were you guys combat paired?

MAJ [REDACTED] We are not.

CAPT [REDACTED] How many times have you flown together?

MAJ [REDACTED] That was our first time flying together here.

CAPT [REDACTED] So you flew with somebody the night before and then turned to have a sortie with Maj [REDACTED]?

MAJ [REDACTED] Correct.

CAPT [REDACTED] In the squadron, was there any sort of an atmosphere of pressure, as far as going out to employ ordinance? Pressure to get the job done? Kind of maybe a competition or...? Weapons delivery?

MAJ [REDACTED]: Quite the contrary. Col [REDACTED] has done a stand up job with the objective of the squadron. I was briefed on every one of my sorties and I know either Col [REDACTED]...too...our mission is to support friendly forces, period dot. The only way to do that is to... The best I can say is quite the contrary. People are tallying up what's going on...the fires and how many bombs have been dropped. -- squadron numbers would reflect a conservative as opposed to a number of bullets or Mavericks or something.

CAPT [REDACTED] As far as the preparation for this campaign, what types of training were you guys working toward? Spin up sorties?

MAJ [REDACTED] Code? Thunder. Code Thunder was the previous June. Code Thunder was designed for the first three, four days of the war, I believe. Back at Willow Grove, the Code

Thunder folks _____ - so Code Thunder was
outstanding training. I'd say even the trip to Baghram in December was a great kind of
continuity if you will, procedural...way of doing business...checking in, checking out, just the
day to day stuff that you might not do day to day at home _____.

CAPT [REDACTED] How long was it from the time you left Baghram to the time you arrived
here?

MAJ [REDACTED] I was home for about six weeks.

CAPT [REDACTED] Six weeks, OK. The immediate preparation...was there a huge shift in
ops tempo from what you were doing at home versus what you were doing as soon as you got
here?

MAJ [REDACTED] There wasn't very much time. We...I actually was home about six weeks, but
the rest of the squadron was home four weeks. I went home a couple of weeks early. My wife
had a third kid, so it was a good reason to get out of Baghram a couple of weeks early. In the
guard, we put all of our airplanes and packed up some people together to ? rainbow, so when we
got back to Willow Grove, we were short a few airplanes so, there was...I'd say we were flying a
four turn four. So, it was not a big spin up. Probably in large part due to a ...well, they didn't
have enough planes on the ramp.

CAPT [REDACTED] Your personal schedule, from your noon to midnight shift, within that
type of schedule, were you getting plenty of sleep?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] Were your roommates on a different schedule?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, we were all...everybody in the squadron was on the same schedule so, that was not a factor.

CAPT [REDACTED] As far as the training leading up to...what kind of fratricide type training and visual recognition training were...how much of that was going on?

MAJ [REDACTED] We do it regularly at Willow Grove in the daily brief. The mass brief consists of threat of the day, weapon of the day, system of the day and _____. And part of Intel's portion of the mass brief is reccy, in addition to our unit training assemblies, where everyone is gathered together for one weekend a month for a rehash of _____ that kind of stuff. That was our _____.

CAPT [REDACTED] Had you guys looked specifically at Marine vehicles? Marine type vehicles?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. I wouldn't say we _____ at Marines.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] On the day in question, in preparation for the thing, anything unusual about anything? Out of the ordinary?

MAJ [REDACTED] Nope. Everything from the _____ - to Intel's brief, the GLO's brief being pretty standard.

CAPT [REDACTED] When you took off were you assigned to go with the MAP, or did you think you'd be going to the fifth corps?

MAJ [REDACTED] We were going to the fifth corps, 86 Alpha Tango, well north of Nasiriyah, and then got re-rolled via the...off the tanker, through the tanker updated to Alpha Tango. As soon as we...shortly after _____ and enroute to 86 Alpha Tango, the call on guard frequency for any CAS _____.

CAPT [REDACTED] Weather that day? Can you describe for me what the weather was like?

MAJ [REDACTED] If I recall it was sky clear...I'm not sure of the vis.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any problems with the aircraft? Anything annoying or flying funny by any means?

MAJ [REDACTED] Not at all.

[REDACTED]
CAPT [REDACTED] any chance, do you wear a high contrast visor?

MAJ [REDACTED] do not.

CAPT [REDACTED] do you wear sunglasses underneath your visor or anything? Anything?
Just the normal dark tinted visor?

MAJ [REDACTED] Just the visor.

CAPT [REDACTED] On that day, were you carrying and using binoculars?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, Sir.

CAPT [REDACTED] What type?

MAJ [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] binoculars.

CAPT [REDACTED] Using GO or NO-GO pills at that time?

MAJ [REDACTED] I was not.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] guess at this time, if you could go ahead and let me...or I'll just let you talk...if you could just talk me through the mission flow and how things went from the time that you check in with _____ onto when you...

MAJ [REDACTED] OK. We actually didn't make it to _____. Punched in, we're talking to COMMA? Ran through the check in procedures and then we're just in there _____ to the north. Call comes over guard looking for any CAS fire, I think was the verbage. He came up with here's the call sign, here's the frequency to get me, and here's where we need you to come.

COL [REDACTED] Do you remember those?

MAJ [REDACTED] I remember the call sign was MOUTH. I don't recall the frequency. I can't say with complete certainty that he said to go to An Nasiriyah. I think he just gave us a grid, or had maybe given the kill box and a keypad to go to. So we headed over to An Nasiriyah, which 84 Alpha Whiskey which was... you know, we were the obvious choice because we were pretty close by the timing of it all.

COL [REDACTED] Do you know what time this was, approximately?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't...I want to say it was 1020-ish maybe. _____ I don't remember the exact time. Went over, _____ on MOUTH's frequency. We checked in with him, got into a wheel, over the top...the top of his position, the keypad he assigned us, and let him...checked in with him, here we are, what's going on? From there, I'm pretty sure I

[REDACTED]

remember him saying that he had a tank or a couple of tanks stuck in the mud. That's what I remember hearing, and that they were taking fire. So we, GYRATE flight are still orbiting overhead and for probably the first 15 minutes, I would say, we spent just trying to get fires on GYRATE...or on MOUTH. He at some point, I think, passed us some coordinates of where he was and I remember plotting him to the east of town, but I did not have eyes on his position. I could not see him. As we going around, looking at the details of where he was exactly, I think at some point in there he had to move, just cause of the amount of fire he was taking. But he stayed in radio contact with us as this was going on. I, at one point asked...I said OK, I said OK, I said to _____, I think I got an idea of where these guys are. Can I take the tactical lead and _____ to these guys, and see if we can get this, _____? So I take the tactical lead, talk to MOUTH. "I think I know where you are. Looking at the terrain and having, I think, tanks stuck in the mud, and the coordinates that he gave us, I pick an open, I'm not sure if I'm pointing at the map here correctly, but I said hey, I got an open field where I'd like to put down a couple of rockets, where I think is north of your position, but I can see it's an open field. There's nothing in it. I'll just put a couple of rockets down there, tell me if you see them. Unfortunately all I had was HEI rockets, fired those, and he didn't see them.

COL [REDACTED] About what location did you fire those? Approximately?

MA [REDACTED] East of the town, south of the canal. So...25 36, I'm thinking somewhere out here.

[REDACTED]
CAPT [REDACTED] st for _____ I've got a 1: 15,000 here. Map number 941? For An Nasiriyah, just so you can have the scale.

MA [REDACTED] It's east of the city, an open field, south of the main...the big canal, north of the river and...so I roll in, MOUTH clears me to put the rockets down. I put the rockets down. I put the rockets down. They're not usable. So we go back to hey look, talk us onto your position. He's talking and at some point gives us coordinates of where he is...and I want to say, somewhere around the 35 or 36 northing, gridline. Nobody was further north than that.

COL [REDACTED] ????????????

MA [REDACTED] I think he was saying...I'm not sure if it was 35 or 36 where he started out with, no friendlies are further north than this grid, and I want to say it was 35 or 36. So we continued talking with him, put this on the map, and kind of jotted a note on the map where he is, though we're still not eyes on. We're still just...kind of...seems to be... slowing down a bit there as far as what _____-an excessive amount of time to get eyes on the friendlies on that position. A couple of helos, I guess, Cobras, kind of crossed the canal. We picked them up crossing the canal, and then they head off to the southeast. I said hey, or I'm not sure if the flight lead asked him, do you see these helicopters that are heading south? I think he said yeah I got those guys in sight, they were working the target area.

COL [REDACTED] And that was about the _____, the _____?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Roughly. I think that...canal down over here sticks? Just off this map a little bit.

CAPT [REDACTED] Earlier you said they were moving south across the canal?

MAJ [REDACTED] I saw them crossing the canal from north to south...and then they turned to the southeast. And then that was the last we saw them. I think they were RTB at the time. They were on their way out of the area at that time. A few minutes later, we're still trying to get eyes on MOUTH. A couple of minutes later, north of the bridge, 2239 grid, we pick up one vehicle on fire, on the road. Huge plume of black smoke pretty much going straight up. So I'm thinking, again, the weather is pretty good. The winds aren't...they're probably pretty calm. I asked? MOUTH...

COL [REDACTED] About what position was that? Was it across the railroad bridge?

MAJ [REDACTED] It's up in here. Probably 224, 223 _____. Somewhere up in here.

CAPT [REDACTED] One other question. What altitude were you at at the time?

MAJ [REDACTED] At this point, I think we were about [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] You kept at that altitude pretty much the whole time?

[REDACTED]

MA [REDACTED] Yes. Intel had briefed that there was a Roland in the area and that was our biggest concern. Not the biggest concern, but a concern. Friendlies position, at this point, was our biggest concern. This vehicle was burning, a huge plume of black smoke and we ask MOUTH, "Can you see this smoke from the burning vehicle?" And he said that he can see that. So it's great reference point. And we're now all working off it. [REDACTED] and I kind of reference him the burning vehicle. MOUTH somewhere during all this comes back to give us updated friendly positions. Says no friendlies north of the 38. And that sticks out in my mind, cause we've now moved 2 clicks to the north with the friendly positions. So 38 gridline sticks out in my mind, that there's nobody north of the 38 gridline. Also, I mean there's a lot of prominent landmarks here, the canal, the river, they both bend down to the south, this major road coming out of here, the bridge, major intersection up here to the north. So, as far as looking at stuff on the ground, and then having the burning vehicle with the black smoke going straight up and stayed burning for pretty much the whole time on station, I felt pretty comfortable with that we're all looking at the same thing here. He says he sees the vehicle and that that's the target area that he wants us to attack.

COL [REDACTED] Did he say he saw the vehicle or the smoke?

MA [REDACTED] I want to say he just saw the smoke. But I can't say with 100% certainty. So he said yup I see that. And then somewhere in there he says there are no friendlies...I can't remember if we asked him this or if he gives this to us on his own initiative, but no friendlies north of the canal.

COL [REDACTED] Am I correct, you were talking to him at this time?

MAJ [REDACTED]: For the most part, and then at some point in here, we switched back cause I think somewhere in the point where I think I am still primarily talking to him. Again I can't remember exactly where we handed the lead back, the tac lead back to 7-3.

CAPT [REDACTED] When you spoke to him, did you speak as GYRATE 7-3?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. As 7-4. So, again, the latest I have is no friendlies are north of the 38 gridline. Now, no friendlies are north of the canal. This is all starting to build my SA.

COL [REDACTED] And MOUTH said that?

MAJ [REDACTED] MOUTH said no friendlies north of the canal. At some point, and again, at some point MOUTH gave us some coordinates for friendlies that were west of the position that we were thinking he was. In my mind MOUTH is down in this area somewhere. He's southeast of the city. His coordinates for friendlies are further west. I think at that point I just put them into the navigation system, into _____ and my technique is to type out the whole name and everything, so I know these guys are friendlies. So I had that in my head. So now I had nearest friendlies, with a line on my map, says nobody's north of the 38. This canal—there's nobody north of the canal. Those all make sense to me. I have coordinates in the GPS that indicate the same thing...that everybody, all friendlies...and I kept friendlies in the HUD through this whole engagement. Because we were able to use the smoke as a reference point for everybody. I gotta

[REDACTED]

say, by the time we got around to attacking the target, there's not an ounce of doubt where we have friendlies located, target area located. The Roland, we don't know where it is, but we're not getting any indications of him. And now we're... somewhere in there MOUTH says that we're clear to engage any vehicles north of town.

CAPT [REDACTED] advance on vehicles, other vehicles other than the one that was burning?

MAJ [REDACTED] Right. Vehicle's burning on the road, a couple, a couple more vehicles to the north of it and a ...it looked like some revetment to the east of the burning vehicle, just on the east side of the road...

CAPT [REDACTED] I'm sorry...I've got some imagery. I keep forgetting to bring this out. But there's some imagery, it [REDACTED] imagery of the target area. Would you agree that that's the target area?

MAJ [REDACTED] I sure would.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] So we're all...we're working up in here.

CAPT [REDACTED] And that grid's approximately?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] 229.

CAPT [REDACTED] Approximately the same location as the burning vehicle?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] That vehicle is right about here, again. 223..393 something, somewhere around there. Some vehicles are actually off the side of the road, to the left side and then what looked to be some vehicles...I actually thought there were some revetted...vehicles to the east. We'd been looking with the binos. We swapped back and forth, one guy at a time looking through the binoculars, looking for vehicles and because...I was in the lower block so I ended up rolling in first with MK82s.

COL [REDACTED] you could just stop for a second. How many vehicles did you see? Do you have an approximate number of vehicles?

MAJ [REDACTED] About a half a dozen...eight.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] And if you could...we'll give you some paper. Would you mind drawing a diagram of just where you saw the different vehicles? We've got a pencil there for you.

MAJ [REDACTED] That's our road, our canal is here, bridge, burning vehicle down the road here. I think this kind of corresponds to...up in this area right here. I think I see...I recall a vehicle...I'm pretty sure they were north of the burning vehicle. Something like that, off on the west side of the road...and then some...probably another couple of vehicles, I can't remember how...how I remembered seeing them but I thought they looked like they were in revetments...to the east of the road, the vehicles that were over to the east...and this is what I rolled in on first...was a couple of vehicles further to the east of the burning vehicle. Again, we're referencing everything off of the smoke.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] And my first roll in was MK82s on vehicles to the east of the road.

COL [REDACTED] What kind of MK82s were you carrying?

MAJ [REDACTED] MK82s with...I don't recall what kind of fuses they had.

CAPT [REDACTED] You don't remember if they burst on impact?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I'm pretty sure everything was impact at that point. I don't think we were using air burst fuse. But again, I can't say for sure, absolutely. So, the rest of the sortie is we were trying to orient ourselves parallel roughly the canal and run kind of perpendicular across the...across this first _____. Frag considerations there, and friendlies.

CAPT [REDACTED] Did MOUTH happen to give you any restrictions at all?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't remember, I don't recall getting any restriction from MOUTH, other than everything north of the canal. Really the only restriction I can say for sure...and that was for the targets north of the canal, was a valid target. From there we just go into...we shifted gears from concentrating on friendly positions, we now,...sorted that out in our minds and were confident that we had all friendlies located and now we're confident that there's no friendlies...MOUTH tells us there's no friendlies north of the canal. Any vehicle up there, you're clear to engage vehicle targets north of the canal. Now we shift gears, at least in my mind anyway, to target sorting and mutual support, especially with regard to the Roland that was out here somewhere. And then from there we roll into a couple of attacks and again I couldn't give you the exact sequence of attacks, but I know I came in from the west to east first with two MK82s, and then off to the north, and then 7-3, was, I believe, in next on the vehicles that he had picked up, I think, northwest of the vehicle.

CAPT [REDACTED] What sort of weapons did he put on there?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't know. I don't remember.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Did you ever see any troops on the ground at all, during this time?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. It was all just the vehicles, and then probably the biggest, the distinguishable thing I can remember seeing, was ...at some point, this road comes up, this road follows up off this map...I see this intersection right here on the map that we're talking about up in around the 225 4, almost 410 grid. MOUTH says there's some buildings and some activity in the southeast corner of the intersection north of the burning vehicle. Take a look at that _____ . So we take a look around up in this area here around these buildings _____ complex right here and we don't see anything. No activity, no troops, no vehicles.

CAPT [REDACTED] The complex was at about 227 406?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes.

UNKNOWN?: ?????????????????????????????????

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, I would say so. This was after we'd made a couple of attacks, so we were probably down a little bit lower, but we're still for sure [REDACTED] We went to take a look at that...and by the time we take a look at that, we don't see...we don't see any activity around...around the complex of buildings. At that time, we pick up three vehicles, that were further west of the road, somewhere out in here. I never even saw them until they came up, just about approached the road from the west. As they were approaching the road from the west,

they came, turned from west...they're still on the west side of the road, they just left the burning vehicle trying to merge onto the _____ road, and start heading for the bridge.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you know how many vehicles were there?

MA [REDACTED] Three or four...I would say three. When I see them I'm east of the target area, I believe [REDACTED] 7-3, he is in the shooter-block and he is west of that position and we make the comment that we need to stop these guys cause it looks like they're heading into town. So our objective is now to stop these vehicles from heading from north to south down this road. We pick them up as they come out of the northwest of the target area.

CAPT [REDACTED] Can you describe for me real quick the shooter-block versus the cover-block?

MA [REDACTED] I don't remember what exact altitudes we used, we probably shifted. For the most part I think it was [REDACTED] And the [REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] Quick question. Did MOUTH tell you that this was going to be Type 3 CAS when you came on target?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, Type 3 CAS... He did not.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you believe he had eyes on? Or just the smoke?

MAJ [REDACTED] I believe...I was certain he had eyes on the smoke, which led me to believe...made me quite certain that he was eyes in this target area when he said cleared to engage the vehicles north of the canal.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

COL [REDACTED] The vehicles you engaged, what did you recognize those as?

MAJ [REDACTED] I couldn't say that I recognized them as a...for the most part, they're wheeled vehicles, no track vehicles. But other than that I couldn't give you a whole lot of detail.

COL [REDACTED] Did you see any markings on them, marking panels or anything?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. And with the binoculars on, there were no panels on them.

CAPT [REDACTED] Just the coloration of the vehicles...?

MAJ [REDACTED] There were a couple of white vehicles, a little white pickup truck, kinda looking vehicles in there somewhere. But the vehicle that came out of this northwest area came from north to south down the road were dark or camouflage vehicles heading down the road and we're

trying to spot those. Again, I can't remember what 7-3 did for ordinance, as far as his attacks on those, I, at one point...

CAPT [REDACTED] He attacked first?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. And then when I came around for...he came off...now we set up a wheel where we were both...we were running west to east attacks on these, and when I come around, 7-3 said that he's off to the northeast and he's visual with me, he's got eyes on the targets and he's supporting me cause I'm now in a position to run in from the west to strafe these vehicles in an effort to stop them from heading back down.

COL [REDACTED] So you used guns on them?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. My first attack west - east with guns, a pretty long range shot...probably a [REDACTED] range shot with impacts right on top, of the vehicles. And then, and that did not stop them, so we came back and with Mavericks, and put the Mavericks on...locked these vehicles up, but at this point...When I came in with my first Maverick, they were south of the bridge, so in my mind I know that we're getting close to now, we're venturing back down to friendly territory, but there still is no doubt in my mind, because we saw where they came from. We followed them visually, up in this area northwest of the burning vehicle. My first Maverick...they come into town...just as he comes across the bridge, my first Maverick goes in and misses the vehicle to the east but impacts on the road. I believe 7-3 _____-here, 7-3 comes in with a Maverick and hit the vehicle...

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] And where did that one impact?

MAJ [REDACTED] Again, this is all right in this side of the road here, so it's 221 384. It's right in the tips of these...just as we're starting to get into...some you know...I little bit more of a, I'll call them, city blocks, for lack of a better term. So [REDACTED] 7-3 has made an attack, hit a vehicle and I now come around and roll in with my Maverick and lock up and launch on the...I can't say for sure it was the same vehicle I'd locked up and missed, the Maverick missed. But that one, I came in on more of a, more of a northwest - southeast. Fired the Maverick on that one and it hit and destroyed the vehicle.

COL [REDACTED] Now this was...he had destroyed one vehicle and this was a second vehicle that you hit?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. I believe his Maverick...he was the first to actually destroy these vehicles once we got south of the bridge.

COL [REDACTED] So he took out one and you took out the second?

MAJ [REDACTED] Correct. Now we are down...these guys are...the remaining vehicles are again...so, there's two more vehicles that I'm looking at in this area. They're still going south down this road. They're kind of, they're spread out here a little bit. But there's two vehicles from the group that headed from the north there. One I can remember seeing pull into...off the

[REDACTED]

side of the road into...for lack of a better term, city blocks. Pulled up into here and in my mind that makes perfect sense. He's going to go and hide in a built up area. It just makes sense to me based on everything that we're hearing they're... you know working in and around not knowing _____ so, that's kind of the thought process in my brain at this point.

COL [REDACTED] A quick question. During your Maverick runs were you aborted by MOUTH at anytime?

MAJ [REDACTED] We were not aborted till later on. Out of this area and back up to the north and that's...I'll go back to this quickly. That vehicle pulled off and went to this built up area here. The other one came all the way down to this intersection here and turned off to the west and stopped, pulled up right next to a building right here on the northwest corner of that intersection. And we were like, OK....we can't attack those...

COL [REDACTED] and you had two other burning on the west side of the bridge?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. On the road, two burning down in there. Now, we go back up to the north, now we focus our attention back up here to the north to work targets and back to your question, Sir, being aborted on any of the Maverick passes. 7-3 still has one Maverick left and he's got a vehicle that he's locked up and he is actually rolling in, rolling out on final and a call comes up, check fire. I mimic that to him to abort his pass, 7-3, making sure that he heard that. He aborts his pass, comes out. 7-3 I think he says say the reason for check fire. And then that's when we get at some point there, I think we get a stand by, we're sorting it out....

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] I'm just going to stop and change the tape. This is tape one, side two. Interview with Maj [REDACTED] for the An Nasiriyah incident. We were just talking about being aborted. About this time you were saying that GYRATE 7-3 was aborted off of a Maverick pass.

MAJ [REDACTED] 7-3 was aborted off his Maverick pass. They called check fire and then we orbited overhead and try to sort out why we were aborted on this pass...and MOUTH comes back with there may be friendlies up there. I think it was there may be friendlies up there. At this point we've been expending ordinance out there, probably 10, 15 minutes attacking these targets. That's where the ordinance, you know, the weapons delivery is...ends right there. Now, as far as what's going on in the airplane. There's in my cockpit, I've gone from absolute certainty of what we were doing to one radio transmission and then...incredible amount of disbelief. I couldn't believe I heard those words. I didn't mention it earlier, but someone in the course of all this, it's in my statement that as we were attacking these targets, MOUTH goes, something along the lines of you Air Force guys are putting smiles on our faces. This is all...this kind of further validates, in my mind that we had a 38 gridline, we have a canal...so we got pretty good lines on the ground as far as friendly positions. We have a burning vehicle up here. Nobody's north of the canal. You're clear to engage targets in that area. Your attacks are putting smiles on our faces. They seemed to be...they're not taking fire, MOUTH is not taking fire, anymore. All these things kind of validating what we're doing. And then it ends with there may be friendlies up there.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] And was that the first time, was that the only time you were told to check fire, or abort?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah, and again, that was...I had dropped all my bomb...all four MK82s over the course of this 15 minutes or so, both Mavericks. It might show on the MISREP...I don't remember how many rounds of 30 millimeter, and my flight lead only had one Maverick remaining. I don't know how many rounds he had left, and that was the first _____ we'd gotten word of that.

CAPT [REDACTED] In your MISREP, you also mentioned triple A. Do you remember seeing that?

MAJ [REDACTED] I did not see triple A, only 7-3 saw it.

CAPT [REDACTED] Did you see anything coming up from the area other than...I mean anything that might have been...give away that it might have been friendlies?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

[REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Alright. Anything that would maybe resemble triple A or...?

MAJ [REDACTED] Nothing.

COL [REDACTED] Did you see a reaction from the targets that were down there?

MAJ [REDACTED] No. I saw nothing. No return fire. No triple A. Nothing fired up. Again, no indications of _____ out there.

COL [REDACTED] What altitude were you bottoming out on in your runs?

MAJ [REDACTED] Probably about [REDACTED].

CAPT [REDACTED] Is there anything I haven't covered? If we would talk with the Cobras at all would you see them saying anything at all?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] Once you heard there may be friendlies in the area what actions did you two take?

MAJ [REDACTED] _____ up our switches, orbited overhead until we reached bingo fuel in hopes of sorting out, try to clear up some of the absolute astonishment.

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] Did any conversations take place between you and MOUTH at that point?

MAJ [REDACTED] We just...I believe, 7-3, you know...I can't...I couldn't give you the exact verbage, but it was you know, again, there is not, I can assure you...there is not a shred of doubt in either cockpit while we were prosecuting these attacks, these targets. To hear that, I think...I said toI mean as soon as he said there may be friendlies there, I said you've got to be kidding, and that was interflight between us, between the A-10s. I think 7-3 is working with GYRATE to try to get some information. I don't remember how the conversation went, but we just orbited overhead. Radios kind of went silent for a bit. I assume that was MOUTH on his net trying to sort out the details of where are...no kidding...where are all the friendlies.

CAPT [REDACTED] To comment on this, the inflight reports or any _____ type communications or anything pass as far as this goes?

MAJ [REDACTED] 7-3 passed the...our inflight reps and left me on AWACS frequency, he went off to the other frequencies to pass the inflight reps, but to the best of my knowledge, his inflight reps were...included all the standard inflight rep stuff...time on target, vehicles destroyed, attacked...and I don't know if he had passed...excuse me _____ about the possible friendly fire. I don't know that.

CAPT [REDACTED] And when you got back to Al Jaber?

MA [REDACTED] We get back to Al Jaber, we go to the, we go into the Intel debrief...go in talk to Intel. And when we go into Intel. _____ our tapes, look at our tapes...Intel's looking at our tapes with us, in particular the Maverick attack up here, my gun attack on the vehicle as it was coming down the road from north to south, and the bomb attacks. But primarily we're looking...We're mostly were concerned with the Maverick attacks down here. Of concern to me was why did my first Maverick miss with a valid lock in narrow field of view? We went through that. And even with the Maverick, you couldn't tell for sure what kind of vehicle it was. Other than, you know, it appeared to be a wheeled vehicle, but it...you couldn't tell if that's a no-kidding tank. It just wasn't...the video just wasn't good enough. I don't know if it was because of sometimes the player or the monitor that you're looking at, the quality just isn't as good as playing it on the smaller ones...I don't know. So we looked at... we viewed our tapes, debriefed all the information with Intel, all the standard stuff, the time on station, time on target, the weapons delivery, parameters, time, number of ordinance released, the _____.

Gave them the full debrief, to include the most significant event...the radio call at the end...there may be friendlies up there. I told [REDACTED] GYRATE 7-3, I said I would like to call the GLO. Because we were turning to go back out for our next...for our second sortie. I would like to call the GLO and get this...this strikes me as very odd, that somebody would make that radio call, we come back here and nobody knows what we're talking about. That strikes me as odd, so I call the GLO. I said hey...I gave him the whole story... _____ Maj [REDACTED]. Give him the whole story, ask him can you look into this...this is what happened, and then that's it. Go back out for the second sortie, come back from the second sortie, debrief, run into Capt [REDACTED] I don't know his last name. He's got a last name that no one can pronounce, so we use his first name. Run into him and say...tell him the story, and oh by the way we called Maj [REDACTED] over

[REDACTED]

in EOC there, and went in to ask him to look into it. Have you heard anything about this? He says yes, he mentioned that to me. He's looking into it. There's nothing anywhere, any MISREP, there's nothing, anywhere that indicates friendly fire. I'm trying to convey to him the magnitude of this and how we were so astonished from being so certain to hearing that radio conversation. How can that be? Capt [REDACTED] said something along the lines of...there's nothing anywhere that indicates any of this. If you had engaged friendlies you'd know about it before you landed. That seemed to make perfect sense to me. And that was the last we heard of it until

_____.

CAPT [REDACTED] By any chance, did you use the first tapes for the second go...going into the second go?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

CAPT [REDACTED] Do you know what happened to those? We're just trying help to build a picture and so we're trying to figure out what...?

MAJ [REDACTED] We turned the tapes in. I...we... [REDACTED] turned his tape in. I looked at my tape. I asked Intel, can I keep this and turn it in later. I'd like to look at this tape later on. Go back out, fly the sortie, cause I want to run the whole tape from start to finish and see what...did I miss something. So I kept my tape, and now I think now from first sortie to second sortie...maybe not first sortie to second sortie...I got my tape back and I put it in my...I brought it back to put it in my life support locker...I want to keep this in my life support locker before I

turn it in, just because...just something _____ with that radio call. And then the thing that happened was maybe the next day or somewhere in the following sorties, I grabbed that tape and taped over it. That's what I think happened. I did not turn it into Intel, for just that reason. I wanted to review it. Went back out, flew that second sortie and then I think somewhere... I never reviewed it. Other than the review in Intel. I never got the chance to sit down, and I think...happened was I taped over it.

CAPT [REDACTED] When you say you were going to turn it into Intel, would that have been Lt [REDACTED]?

MA [REDACTED] No, it's just whomever. I don't remember who the Intel Officer was who debriefed us. But my hack at it was...just turn this back into Intel so that it can be digitized. Again, I think...I'm at fault...I taped over it.

COL [REDACTED] Did you subsequently talk to your commanding officer about this incident?

MA [REDACTED] I spoke with...I mean yes, I talked to the squadron commander and I believe it was the next night...it was either a night or two later, we had a squadron meeting—completely unrelated. We're now at day 3, 4, 5 of the war. Commander gets everybody together, hey I just want to make sure we're doing things right. Again, completely unrelated to this. And I say, hey I think...here's what happened to [REDACTED] I...I want to convey this to the rest of the squadron, for no other reason than to open people's eyes that...again, I can't...I'm not convinced I'm doing a very good job describing the degree of astonishment on my part. So what I'm trying to do, is

[REDACTED]

I'm going to go explain to the guys, hey this is what happened to us. The highlights of the sortie...and we're absolutely certain we're attacking these targets, enemy targets...and that's all validated by stuff we're hearing from MOUTH and at the end of the sortie...hey there may be friendlies up there. The sole intent of that was to get the word out to the rest of the squadron. That this is big stuff that we're doing here.

COL [REDACTED] So was there doubt in your mind at that time that this might have been a friendly fire incident?

MAJ [REDACTED] There was some doubt...there was some degree of doubt, yes. Very small based on, I felt completely comfortable with the actions we took after the sortie to look into it. Asked the GLO, hey can you look into this for us? Come back the next day, talk to the other GLO, ask him about it, ask him if he heard anything about this. No, we haven't heard anything on it. We haven't seen anything on any reports about this. Oh by the way, if you're involved in a friendly fire incident you'd know about it before you got to ground. All this is easing my mind, but there is some degree of, something doesn't seem right. Then after several days go by, a week, two weeks go by...it's out of my mind. I'm now starting to go more into the category of when we were actually running the attacks, hey we are doing some no-kidding good stuff here for friendly forces, I mean this is troops in contact and we're stopping the enemy. This is good stuff. I was kind of leaning back towards that _____.

COL [REDACTED] When did you become aware of this...was a friendly fire incident?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] I went, I was in Tallil, operating out of Tallil. Got a message to call back down here...can't remember... [REDACTED] eighth or ninth of April. I think it was about the middle of the week we were in Tallil, we had a call. I get a message to call Lt Col - [REDACTED], one of our squadron pilots, - [REDACTED] happened to be a top three. This is when [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] we think this may be a friendly fire. So that was, however many days later, I was up in Tallil, so...that was the first I heard of it then I went down the road of probably maybe not because looking at MISREPS indicating...there's nothing significant on that day or day either side I think. And then again, last week,.....

CAPT [REDACTED] A little bit of follow up on your background. What kind of qualifications do you have right now?

MAJ [REDACTED] I've been in the A-10 since 91, 22-2,300-ish hours. I've been [REDACTED] in the Air National Guard the whole time. [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] So, IP?

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] Anything you'd like to add to the testimony you have already given?

MAJ [REDACTED] Actually I think I _____ ---, the biggest point I can make, that stood out in my mind is to being so certain of doing...to be so certain of something...and then to be so uncertain of it in such a short amount of time was _____. How you could go from one end of that spectrum to the other. Cause I can assure you that based on everything we'd gotten, nobody's north of here, nobody's north of the canal, engage the targets north of the canal, you're putting smiles on the faces down here...all that kind of stuff...to where there is not an ounce of that.

CAPT [REDACTED] Any questions for us?

MAJ [REDACTED] I do not.

CAPT [REDACTED] Anybody else have any questions?

CAPT [REDACTED] I just have one attack real quick. You said that you'd been here for about three days, prior to when you started flying. Did you feel like that was adequate? That you had the right tools and everything to _____ quick to the time zone changes and everything like that?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes. I got in. Did the standard 48 hours on the ground before I flew an RSW with one of the Boise guys. I was on his wing so I got the local fam. Oddly enough, to look at the targets around Tallil and Nasiriyah. _____ --couple of days before that, Operation

[REDACTED]

Southern Watch mission, so I think I flew two Southern Watches, three Iraqi Freedom before this so I was completely comfortable.

CAPT [REDACTED] Did you have any trouble turning from the night prior to go into the first kind of day go? _____adequate rest?

MAJ [REDACTED] Not even remotely.

CAPT [REDACTED] As another re-attack, Capt [REDACTED] again. I'm a little confused. You turned from a night sortie and then you were turning into a double turn?

MAJ [REDACTED] Correct. I'd flown the night prior and went from a day mission to double turn to a night mission.

UNKNOWN: Can't hear???

MAJ [REDACTED] I'd flown the night before, on the 22nd, and then turned to a late afternoon, daylight mission, and then the second mission of the 23rd was dusk into night.

CAPT [REDACTED] OK. General?

[REDACTED]

GEN HODGKINS: I just have one question. Since we don't have the tape...there were no issues in terms of your aircraft or lead's aircraft with radios quality anything like that? Good radios for the mission?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. No _____ comm. Issues, interflight or outside agencies.

GEN HODGKINS: Clarify for me again, you guys never spoke to the Cobras?

MAJ [REDACTED] Never spoke to the Cobras.

GEN HODGKINS: Did you hear any reference to them?

MAJ [REDACTED] No.

GEN HODGKINS: OK. And then as far as you guys observed ...the ones you saw north and south _____ you didn't see any others?

MAJ [REDACTED] That's correct, Sir. North to south, picked them up coming over the canal. They turned to the southeast. Again, I think we asked MOUTH if he was working with them or if he saw them. He said he did. They went southeast and they were out of the area.

GEN HODGKINS: Was there any specific comm between you guys and MOUTH that referenced civilian vehicles, white vehicles, an SUV, anything like that?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, Sir.

GEN HODGKINS: You guys considered yourselves, essentially sort of operating under a troops in contact scenario? You were asked the question on Type 3, which was never... Type 3 was not passed to you by the GFAC, by MOUTH, so you assumed either he had line of sight or it's a troops in contact type of situation.

MAJ [REDACTED] I was thinking... I was certain he had sight of me for some portion of this, for some of the attacks. He cleared me hot on the rocket attack I talked about earlier trying to get eyes on friendlies, pick an open field hey let's put some willy-petes on here to try to help me get eyes on friendlies. He cleared me hot on that attack. That led me to believe that he was eyes on my airplane. And then the remainder of it was that he was eyes on the target area.

GEN HODGKINS: I guess the last one... You took the tac lead when you were trying to get eyes on MOUTH.

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, Sir.

GEN HODGKINS: You guys have a positive change of command of tac lead back at some point? You were talking for a while and then 7-3 is back primarily for these attacks...

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes, Sir. Clear, concise, tactical lead changes over the radio.

[REDACTED]

COL [REDACTED] When you were talking were you using lead's call sign? Were you using one call sign or...?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, Sir. I always used GYRATE 7-4. When I spoke with MOUTH, I referenced, I always used GYRATE 7-4.

COL [REDACTED] And GYRATE 7-4 was the...?

MA [REDACTED] The wingman. 7-4 was the wingman, and that was me and I always said that this is GYRATE 7-4.

CAPT [REDACTED] Thank you, Sir. In closing, I want to remind you that this is an official interview and direct that you not discuss your testimony with anyone without the board's permission or until the report has been officially released to the public. Do you understand?

MA [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

[REDACTED]

30 April 2003

Follow-up Interview with Maj [REDACTED]

Parties present:

BRIG GEN WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED]

CAPT [REDACTED] This is Capt [REDACTED] with Brig Gen Hodgkins, Col [REDACTED] Maj

[REDACTED] A follow up interview from the 28th of April interview for the 23 March An Nasiriyah incident. Just to remind you of all the previous statements still apply, so consider yourself under oath. One of the things we wanted to just clear up, and we did get some good words from [REDACTED] on the number of Mavericks. It looks like there's a mistake on the MISREP. One of the other ones that we were curious about, just as a point of clarification, is on here...in your testimony you guys have not seen any triple A, but as we were looking through the MISREP, it kind of mentions that there's triple A in the target area. We're just trying to get some clarification.

MAJ [REDACTED] Still, I didn't see any. I don't know if...I don't know how that got in there, but I certainly didn't say I saw any. Although, well [REDACTED] was giving some of the Intel debrief. I was on the phone with the GLO, but I can't imagine that...

CAPT [REDACTED] That's not something that you mentioned to Lt [REDACTED] who took the MISREP?

[REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Yeah...again, I didn't see it. I don't know if Andy forgot, or what, but I never saw anything from the ground, and...

CAPT [REDACTED] OK.

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't know.

CAPT [REDACTED] One of the questions that we missed yesterday, two days ago, sorry, was we're just trying to get an idea of how many missions you've flown since the day in question. So, between your interview and the 23rd of March.

MAJ [REDACTED] S, from the 23rd of March to the interview day?

CAPT [REDACTED] Yeah.

MAJ [REDACTED] How exact does this number have to be?

CAPT [REDACTED] Approximate is good.

MAJ [REDACTED] Probably eighteen-ish. Eighteen, twenty, somewhere in there.

CAPT [REDACTED] Approximately twenty?