

Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting

*DJMO Scenario and Reference Book
for CENTCOM (Notional)*



March 2001

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U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500

Reference 1. Road to War — Up to 20 June 20XX

Section I. Introduction

Today is 20 June 20XX. You are a member of the J-5 (Plans) staff of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). As part of a crisis action planning effort, you have been tasked to work with the J-3 operations staff to prepare for a contingency operation into Saudi Arabia. Your initial responsibility is to conduct a review of the major political and military events that have led up to the current crisis.

This appendix paints a “revisionist history” of events that occurred from the end of DESERT STORM (1991) to June 20XX (which may be any year from 1996 to 20__). The key military events of this teaching scenario begin in June 20XX.

Section II. Political/Military Events
1991-20XX

Summary of key events of 1991-92

1. *Political/economic events in theater.*

a. The end of 1991 saw the beginnings of Saddam Hussein’s demise. Intelligence sources from within Iran and Iraq began reporting growing discontent and unrest against the dictator. This unrest became apparent with the formation in Iran of a new Iraqi political party, the Party of Righteousness (HIZBIRR), whose stated objectives were to overthrow Saddam Hussein, to replace the secular Baath party, and to cleanse the nation of Iraq of all non-Islamic influences. The party’s origin was clearly linked to Shiite elements in Iraq and Iran. The party had strong connections to Iran’s Party of God (HIZBALLAH) and its stated objective to export Iran’s Islamic revolution. Societal unrest in Iraq, aggravated by UN-imposed sanctions, continued to worsen during late 1991, thus promoting this new party’s influence within Iraq. By late December 1991, the party had developed a strong support base in southern and

central Iraq.

b. In October 1991, the United States Army began its strategic transition from a forward deployed force to a force projection Army. The new Army has as its conceptual focus the capability to project power around the world using a contingency corps supported by additional reinforcing corps.

c. In November 1991, China and North Korea made overtures to Saddam Hussein’s faltering government. Both countries offered to increase trade and to provide military equipment to replace Iraqi losses suffered during the Gulf War. Though no formal agreement was reached, new equipment began to appear in Iraq almost immediately.

d. At the end of the year, the United Nations lifted all remaining sanctions against Iraq, thereby releasing oil export income for Saddam Hussein’s use. In return, Iraq surrendered all its nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare materials. This action further eroded Hussein’s power base by providing his critics an opportunity to condemn him for giving in to Western demands.

e. Both Iran and Iraq suffered a loss in economic power in 1992. World oil production remained high, forcing prices down, and OPEC refused their requests to reduce overall production and raise oil prices. Lower oil prices hindered Iran’s and Iraq’s military rebuilding efforts and forced the two nations to rely more on Chinese and North Korean sources for their military hardware, using oil-for-weapons barter arrangements. Kuwait was able to extinguish all its oil fires and return to its pre-war production levels by April 1992.

f. In the Fall of 1992, HIZBIRR factions protested Saddam Hussein’s regime by openly staging riots in Al Basrah. Republican Guard forces attempted to stop the protest, but the key members of the protest escaped to safe havens within the city. The strange inability of this elite

unit to gain control of this unrest was not fully understood in 1992. We now know that its leadership had already been infiltrated by officers secretly committed to HIZBIRR party goals.

2. *Military events in theater.*

a. From February through December 1991, U.S. forces continued to operate in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in a peacetime engagement role that consisted primarily of providing nation assistance. Special operations forces left in Kuwait continued to monitor the situation in southeastern Iraq near Al Basrah. NATO forces also created an operational contingency force in Turkey to monitor the Kurdish situation in northwestern Iraq and eastern Turkey. Nations that had been friendly to Saddam Hussein's regime before DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM began helping Saddam to rebuild his badly mauled army and air force. In response, the United States and other allied nations in Europe began to increase the military strength of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman) in return for basing rights in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait. Coalition military forces redeployed from the Gulf from February through October 1991. By 28 October 1991, almost all coalition forces had redeployed from Saudi Arabia.

b. Joint Task Force SABER, consisting of a special operations battalion in Kuwait and a complete armored cavalry regiment (207th ACR) stationed in Saudi Arabia's King Khalid Military City near the Iraqi border, remained in theater after the major redeployment was completed. A Pre-positioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) armored division, was also established in Kuwait. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established a new Engineer District in Kuwait. The U.S. Navy maintained a constant vigil over the Strait of Hormuz with a carrier battle group. Several U.S. Air Force elements remained in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Composite wings of F-15E, F-16, and EF-111 aircraft were left in Incirlik, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and began to fly combat air patrols over northern and southern Iraq on a regular basis. Saddam Hussein remained quiet and let his Baath party government function in a vacuum of power caused by his defeat and loss of

face in the Arab world.

c. Throughout 1992, Kuwait continued to clean up the post-DESERT STORM battlefield with assistance from the U.S. Corps of Engineer District in Kuwait City. Kuwait also announced its decision to construct a defensive zone on its border with Iraq. The zone, consisting of a series of antitank obstacles along Kuwait's northern and northwestern border with Iraq, is designed to deter a direct attack into Kuwait similar to that of 2 August 1990. It is intended to compel an opposing force to attack Kuwait from the west rather than from the north along the coast, thereby forcing the attacker to establish longer lines of communication and providing additional warning time to the GCC.

d. Early in 1992, the UN Security Council established a permanent demilitarized zone along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders with Iraq. This zone is 15km wide and runs 10km on the Iraqi side and 5km on the Kuwaiti side of the current borders. It allows for a limited amount of warning of hostile action and gives the UN peacekeeping force established in December 1991 a specific area to monitor. It also allows the U.S. Army's 207th ACR to deploy to the zone on short notice if a threat or crisis develops.

e. Saudi Arabia capitalized on its Gulf War success and increased influence by modernizing its Army and Air Force throughout the year. M1A1 tanks and new F-15 aircraft were incorporated into the military. Saudi Arabia also worked with the GCC to begin forming a GCC force of two to four heavy divisions (U.S. equivalent) with the intent of deterring any future attack into Saudi Arabia from the north. The force, called PENINSULA SHIELD, will eventually be based in Kuwait and in King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Saudi Arabia.

f. Iraq began to rebuild its military in 1992. The Iraqi plan, discovered by U.S. intelligence sources in 1994, was to rebuild the Army to at least one-half of pre-Gulf War levels. It called for strengthening the effectiveness of the Air Force and Air Defense elements of the Iraqi military. The Baathist party continued to dominate military leadership throughout the year, but, for the first time, Iraqi military leaders were allowed to operate with less control from Saddam Hussein than had previously been the case. In late 1992, senior

military leaders also convinced the dictator of the need to begin forming a central institute of military doctrine and arranged for schooling in Russia, China and North Korea for selected Iraqi officers. The individual responsible for these initiatives was General Fazid Izmal. A brigade commander in the Republican Guard during DESERT STORM, General Izmal successfully extracted his brigade from Kuwait without significant losses during attacks by coalition air forces. He then received a series of quick promotions based on his highly successful efforts to rebuild the Iraqi military. By the end of 1992, Izmal was in almost complete control of the military. We now know that his ability to retain influence in the Republican Guard as a secret leader of the HIZBIRR party would prove to be a key element in the party's success. Saddam Hussein, fearing assassination by the emerging HIZBIRR party but unable to identify its leaders, was seen only rarely at public events.

g. The government of Iran continued its support to the Iraqi HIZBIRR party throughout 1992. Iran also began to improve its army and develop a stronger doctrinal basis for its military. Based on lessons learned from their 1980-88 war with Iraq, the military leaders of Iran improved the training and equipment of Baseej and Revolutionary Guard forces and restored the capabilities of conventional army forces. It placed an ambitious leader of its Revolutionary Guard forces as its new military Chief of Staff — General Abdul Barzan. Barzan had been a key brigade commander during the Iran-Iraq war and had played a critical role in reversing Iran's initial setbacks through a counteroffensive using human-wave tactics.

3. *Events elsewhere (bearing on SWA).*

a. USCENTCOM continued to develop contingency plans for future involvement in the theater of operations. The command's contingency plan is shown in OPLAN 1648.

b. XXI (U.S.) Airborne Corps, based in CONUS, and II (U.S.) Corps, based in Europe, were designated as the key forces in CENTCOM's deliberate contingency plans for ground operations in SWA.

c. USCENTCOM also coordinated with the nations of the GCC to conduct regular joint and

combined exercises in the GCC nations. The first exercise was scheduled for 1997 in Saudi Arabia. The next is scheduled for Oman in 20XX. The approved plan is to rotate the exercise between the two nations every other year.

Summary of key events of 1993-97

1. *Military events in theater.*

a. Schools of military doctrine appeared in both Baghdad and Tehran in 1993. Several high ranking officers from both nations began attending military colleges in Russia and other former Soviet Union republics as early as February 1993.

b. Beginning in late 1993, military analysts began to assert that Iranian and Iraqi forces were sufficiently capable to provide a credible defense against external threats. One analyst projected that, together, the two nations could form a credible offensive threat in the region. Estimates at the time placed the ground forces of both these nations at one-half to two-thirds of their 1990 strengths. Most of their new equipment is based on Soviet designs and manufactured in China or North Korea.

c. The air forces of both nations began flying an upgraded Chinese version of the MIG-21 during the summer of 1993. Both nations also began conducting air exercises in their respective interiors. Later in the year, national intelligence sources confirmed the initial use of a more effective ground-based acquisition radar in these exercises. The new radar has since been integrated into the Iraqi air defense system.

d. From late 1993 to 1996, Kuwait constructed its new line of defense from the border with Iraq on the Persian Gulf to a point in the desert near 30 degrees north latitude, 47 degrees east longitude (approximately 80km southwest of Hulaybah). The line consists of a tank ditch, a 50m-wide antitank minefield, and a barbed wire fence. Ground radar sensors are spaced at 15km intervals along what becomes a 100km-long obstacle.

e. Human intelligence sources provided a disturbing report to U.S. military analysts late in 1995. The report, from a senior Iraqi defense official who defected to Jordan, stated that Iraq

had developed a powerful armor-piercing round for its T-72 tanks which gives them the range and effectiveness roughly equivalent to the T-80. Limited testing of this new tank round, monitored by Western intelligence sources, confirmed that the round is a dangerous new addition to Iraq's arsenal. The round was given the code name SHREDDER. The report gave no information about the current or projected number of SHREDDER rounds, and the collection of this data remains a high priority for U.S. intelligence. With this report also came the news that the Iraqi Army had purchased T-80 fire control technology and was outfitting its T-72 tanks with this system. With or without a SHREDDER round, this fire control system now provides the T-72 a high level of accuracy under nighttime and adverse weather conditions.

f. Joint and Combined Exercise DESERT RETURN was conducted in Saudi Arabia in the fall of 1997. The rapid airlift of portions of the XXI (U.S.) Corps into Dhahran, Ad Damman, and Kuwait confirmed a 30-day closure rate of three divisions. The 21st Infantry Division (Light), the 47th Air Assault Division, the 23rd Armored Division (using prepositioned equipment), and the in-place 207th ACR participated in the exercise. The 55th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed in southeastern Georgia, also sent an observer-controller team to help plan for the 55th's role in any future contingency operation. DESERT RETURN was observed by several invited nations. Exercise play by the 1st Battalion, 4th Special Forces Group (FWD) deployed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also revealed some uninvited observers. Early in the operation, the Iraqi military attempted to send small reconnaissance teams deep into Saudi Arabia to observe the exercise covertly. However, SF special reconnaissance teams observed their movement and alerted elements of the 207th ACR, which captured several of the teams along the Iraqi-Saudi border. A subsequent U.S. diplomatic protest to Baghdad was ignored by the government of Iraq.

g. Kuwait finished its 100km-long defensive line along its border with Iraq late in 1996. A Kuwaiti brigade now keeps the line under constant observation.

h. By the end of 1996, Saudi Arabia and the GCC could boast a standing three division corps in KKMC which fields M1A1 tanks, M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles, Vulcan/Stinger and Hawk ADA units, and MLRS batteries. Using stocks prepositioned at KKMC, the GCC can form and deploy in northern Saudi Arabia an additional heavy division in 90 days. With existing agreements, up to an additional six division equivalents can be provided by Egypt, the United Kingdom, France, and Syria 90 days into any crisis. This potentially provides a total of up to 10 non-U.S. divisions within 90 days. Mobilization and partial deployment of four of these divisions was exercised during DESERT RETURN. By C+135, seven additional division equivalents can be provided as a result of still untested GCC agreements with Pakistan, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya, Poland, Bangladesh, Turkey, Malaysia, Morocco, Tunisia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Netherlands. These additional divisions provide the potential for 17 Coalition Command (COALCOM) division equivalents to be in theater by C+135. Five U.S. divisions will bring the potential friendly OB to 22 by C+135.

i. Late in 1997, citing potential commitments to contingency operations in the former Yugoslavia, the U.S. II Corps commander, working with the NATO chain of command, requested that a cap be put on deployment of Europe-based units to other theaters. For CY98, it was agreed that only three U.S. brigades would be considered for potential deployment outside of Europe. These three brigades (Separate MECH INF, Field Artillery, and Aviation) are apportioned for planning to USCENTCOM.

j. Seventy C-17 transports join the U.S. strategic airlift fleet. The aging fleet of C-141 aircraft begins a graduated retirement offset by the introduction of the C-17s. Joining the U.S. strategic sealift fleet are 10 new fast roll-on/roll-off SL-7 ships, bringing the total to 20.

2. Political events in theater

a. On 15 May 1993, in a surprise to the world, the newly proclaimed government of the Islamic Republic of Iraq announced a coup and declared Saddam Hussein dead. The HIZBIRR party claimed responsibility for the overthrow of

the “Godless Baath Party” and its “murderous, corrupt” leader. HIZBIRR spokesmen announced that the new government would seek close relations with Iran and that the party’s objectives are similar to those of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. The party is opposed to hereditary family rule, rejects the stationing of non-Islamic forces in the region, opposes Western attempts to dominate the region and control its resources, and favors Islamic solutions to regional issues.

b. Iraq conducted an election during June 1993 that was dominated by the Shi’ite-based HIZBIRR party. A new president, Jahib Almazzein, was elected. A popular figure with the Iraqi people, the new president seemed to project a future of peaceful cooperation with the GCC as well as with Iran. However, General Izmal soon came to dominate all political affairs from behind the scenes. It was later discovered that his secret negotiations with General Barzan before the coup actually secured the necessary Iranian support and assistance. The details of their agreement, however, remained unknown for several years.

c. The September 1993 “Declaration of Principles” agreement between Israel and the PLO brought some hope that a resolution of the Palestinian issue was finally at hand. However, an outbreak of Palestinian riots in the Gaza and violent protests by radical Israeli settlers in the West Bank soon dashed hopes for rapid progress in the region.

d. In late December 1997, the president of the United States announced the formation of a U.S.-led working committee to resolve any issues that stand in the way of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace treaty. The committee is composed of the foreign ministers of Israel, its neighboring Arab nations, Saudi Arabia, and representatives of the PLO. The SECSTATE also began a round of visits to Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia just prior to the end of the year.

e. Immediately after the U.S. announcement, Iran and Iraq announced their opposition to this latest example of U.S. “coercion” to resolve what they consider to be a Middle East issue. Iran formally stated that it would take whatever action necessary to deter the cooperation of any Arab country in this attempt at “Western and Zionist colonialism.”

Summary of key events of 1998-99

1. *Military events in theater.*

a. In 1998, the 55th MECH Div began planning for a 20XX exercise called DESERT SUPPORT. This exercise will deploy elements of the 55th MECH Div from Georgia to Oman near the Strait of Hormuz. The exercise scenario will require the division to conduct operations as part of a joint and combined task force involving GCC member states.

b. In an effort to enhance the military cooperation between Iraqi and Iranian military forces, Jahib Almazzein, the president of Iraq, extended an invitation to Iran to conduct a small scale combined CPX in Baghdad in the fall of 1998. According to a joint statement issued by General Izmal (Iraq) and General Barzan (Iran), the declared purpose of the exercise was to “examine the possibility of developing common command and control operating procedures between the military forces of the region’s two major Muslim nations.” The exercise was conducted in November 1998 and involved approximately 100 mid-grade and senior-level officers from both nations. Even before it actually took place, GCC nations criticized the exercise as threatening to Gulf stability. In December following the exercise, General Izmal issued a short statement praising the capabilities and vision of Iranian military, political and religious leaders.

2. *Political events in theater.*

a. Throughout early 1998, several high ranking Iraqi Sunni military and political leaders defected to Saudi Arabia. The defectors all repeated a similar story of increasing economic difficulties and growing political unrest among the formerly dominant Sunni population. Individuals critical of the largely Shi’ite civilian and military leadership are now frequently harassed by small groups of soldiers that have received special training in Iran.

b. In July 1998, on the tenth anniversary of the cease-fire ending the Iran-Iraq War, the two erstwhile enemies dedicated identical war memorials to the soldiers who died in the war. The monuments, located in the cities of Al Basrah, Iraq,

and Abadan, Iran, each bear a statement praising the bravery and dedication of the soldiers of both nations and calling for unity between “true believing” Islamic nations in the future.

c. In a major breakthrough, Israel announced in early 1999, that it will begin to close some settlements on the West Bank as part of its agreement with the PLO. However, Israeli settlers resisted several attempts to relocate them and, in some instances, Israeli soldiers refused to comply with their orders. Radical Palestinian elements responded to these developments by approaching the Iraqi government for assistance in stopping what they feel is Arafat’s betrayal of their cause. Despite the problems that continue in the occupied territories, both the Israeli government and the PLO leadership have vowed to press on with the implementation of their 1993 agreement. To assist them, President Bill Clinton appointed former U.S. President Jimmy Carter as Special Envoy to the Middle East during a special Israeli-PLO ceremony at the White House in December 1999. Carter was tasked with identifying any remaining problems that would preclude a peaceful settlement in the region.

Summary of key events of 20XX

1. Political events in theater.

a. The annual Islamic pilgrimage month began on 7 February 20XX. The first day of the pilgrimage was marked by a terrorist attack in Mecca on a crowd of largely Saudi pilgrims going to the Grand Mosque. A car bomb near the crowd of pilgrims killed 25 people and wounded 40. The government of Saudi Arabia denounced the attack as vile and warned the terrorist group responsible that this outrage in Islam’s holiest site will be avenged. No group took immediate responsibility for the attack, but suspicions ran high in Riyadh that Iran was culpable. Several Saudi Arabian Shia radicals from the Kingdom’s eastern provinces were eventually arrested and beheaded even though there appeared to be little evidence tying them to the bombing. Iran also responded to the attack by releasing an official statement that recalled and praised the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by 700 Saudi dissidents opposed

to the pro-Western Saudi regime.

b. On 10 May 20XX, a remote controlled bomb was set off near the Prophet Mohammed’s tomb in Medina, Islam’s second holiest site, during a visit of Saudi Arabia’s king. The bomb failed to harm the king, but five bystanders were killed. Although no group claimed responsibility, intelligence sources have since indicated that a clandestine group of Saudi dissidents — including both Shia and Sunni members — supported by Iran, is the most likely suspect. Radio Tehran, while condemning the location of the attack as an outrage, nevertheless held the Saudi royal family as ultimately responsible for having failed to protect the three holiest sites in Islam: Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. It has repeatedly denounced Saudi Arabia and other Arab members of the committee formed in 1997 to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute for having failed to defend Islam. Iran later issued a formal statement on 25 May that called for the formation of a council of “true believing” Islamic nations to replace Saudi Arabia as custodian of the Holy Cities.

c. On 10 June 20XX, a riot in Mecca outside the Grand Mosque killed over a hundred people and caused considerable damage to portions of the mosque. Saudi Arabian troops required 24 hours to restore order. In response to this latest attack, Riyadh announced that it will close Mecca and Medina to all Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims and to any Shia Muslim from Saudi Arabia.

d. On 11 June 20XX, Tehran radio condemned Riyadh’s action as illegal and contrary to the fundamental obligation of every Muslim to make the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime. The true culprit for the terrorist incidents, according to Tehran, was the Saudi royal family, which had become a “stooge of the Zionist and Western imperialists” by surrendering Islamic rights in Jerusalem and “permitting infidel forces to invade and occupy” Islamic lands. Iran called for a holy war to wrest control of Islamic shrines from the “traitors to Islam.” The same day, Baghdad radio announced that the nation of Iraq fully supports Iran in its call for a *Jihad* to retake the holy places. A highly classified report has now revealed that military leaders of the two nations also met secretly in Tehran on the 11th to discuss combined

military operations against the “enemies of Islam.” They agreed to form a military coalition (Iran-Iraq Coalition — IIC) and to assemble a joint and combined planning staff with elements in Tehran and Baghdad.

e. On 15 June 20XX, Iran and Iraq demanded that Saudi Arabia surrender control of Mecca and Medina to an Islamic council headed by the senior Shia cleric — the *Marja-e-Taqlid* (Source of Emulation) — an Iraqi ayatollah, or face the wrath of Islamic “warriors.” On 16 June, Riyadh denounced the demand as an attempt to undermine its sovereign authorities and called for Arab and Muslim unity against Iran and Iraq’s treachery, and requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council. The UN responded to the request for assistance by issuing the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that follows below.

f. The crisis in SWA appears to have been triggered by an announcement by the U.S. president in early January 20XX that his special envoy, former President Carter, had convinced the multinational working group on the Middle East peace process to hold a concluding negotiation later that month in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The terrorist attacks in Mecca and Medina are now believed to have been a direct reaction to this announcement. The meeting has not yet been held due to the outbreak of violence.

2. *Military events in theater.*

a. On 10 January 20XX, Operation SEA WOLF was conducted by the Navy and U.S. Marines to practice an amphibious landing on the coast of Oman. The exercise involved the forces of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), an air-ground task force of roughly 15,000 personnel) and a carrier battle group. Iran vehemently protested

the exercise as a threat to the “peace and stability” of the region.

b. On 25 January 20XX, USCENTCOM conducted a CPX, in conjunction with a U.S. Air Force exercise “Blue Flag,” to prepare for the planned exercise DESERT SUPPORT in Oman later in July 20XX. This exercise will deploy elements of the 55th MECH Div out of Georgia to Oman near the Strait of Hormuz.

c. On 10 May 20XX, the CJCS directed USCENTCOM to increase WATCHCON status in its AOR in reaction to increased tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Iraq.

d. On 11 June 20XX, CINC USCENTCOM sent a message to the Chairman, JCS, announcing the initiation of JOPES crisis action planning procedures.

e. On 16 June 20XX, national intelligence assets alerted CENTCOM of the movement of Iranian and Iraqi forces into the Euphrates river valley.

f. On 19 June 20XX, CENTCOM received confirmation by national intelligence that Iran and Iraq are building a massive force of up to 24 divisions in the Euphrates river valley northwest of Al Basrah. A division-size force was also observed in Iran moving southeast toward the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the IIC has obtained access to near real-time satellite reconnaissance data and satellite communications from unknown outside sources. The reconnaissance data is sufficiently detailed to expose concentrations of military units, supplies, and equipment anywhere on the Arabian peninsula and can be communicated directly to selected Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC) corps level headquarters.

Following is a *fictional UN resolution*:

Text of UN Security Council Resolution 1002

DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS PRIORITY: Urgent WORD COUNT: 283

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS DATE: June 18, 20XX OB: 3WHEN

Here is the text of UN Security Council Resolution 1002, passed 13 to 1, with China abstaining, on June 18, to condemn the build-up of Iraqi and Iranian forces inside Iraq. The UN demands the immediate disbandment of the force as a threat to peace and authorizes the immediate use of force by UN members if the forces are used offensively against any neighbor of Iran or Iraq. There has been no response from either the government of Iran or Iraq in regard to this resolution. Libya cast the only vote against the resolution.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL: Alarmed by the indicated build-up of military force by Iran and Iraq inside Iraq detected on June 16, 20XX, the hostile government threats made by both countries against Saudi Arabia, and the past history of the use of force by both nations, the Security Council has determined that the build-up of forces and implied intent of those forces to threaten neighboring countries constitutes a breach of international peace. Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations: (1) Condemns the Iranian/Iraqi build-up of forces; (2) Demands that Iran and Iraq immediately disband the combined force; (3) Calls upon Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to begin immediate negotiations for the resolution of their differences regarding the status of the Islamic Holy Cities and supports all efforts in this regard, especially those of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization; (4) Invites member nations to deploy such military forces as may be required to deter aggressive actions by the Iran and Iraq that undermine the peace and stability of the Gulf region; (5) Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution; and (6) Reiterates that the UN Demilitarized Zone created by UNSC Resolution 813 remains in effect and under observation by military forces under UN control.

Key events list up to 20 June 20XX

JANUARY 20XX

- Iran protests U.S. amphibious exercises in Oman as a threat to peace.

MARCH 20XX

- Key Arab nations agree to resolve remaining issues leading to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
- Tensions escalate in eastern Europe; NATO forces assume a higher alert status.

APRIL 20XX

- First terrorist attack in Mecca.

MAY 20XX

- Second terrorist attack in Medina.
- CJCS tells CINC CENTCOM to increase vigilance in CENTCOM AOR (WATCHCON situation in Iran/Iraq/ Saudi Arabia is increased).

JUNE 20XX

- Third violent incident occurs in Mecca.
- Saudi Arabia bans Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims from the Holy Cities.

- Iran threatens a *Jihad* to wrest control of the Holy Cities; Iraq announces its support.
- Iraq meets secretly with Iran to form a coalition (IIC).
- Iran and Iraq demand Saudi Arabia turn over control of Holy Cities to an Islamic council.
- Saudi King denounces demand; requests urgent UN action.
- Joint crisis action planning begins (J-3 and J-5 staff review “on-the-shelf” plan OPLAN 1648).
- National intelligence detects IIC military build-up.
- United Nations approves UNSCR 1002 authorizing deployment of military forces.





Persian Gulf Area



U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500

Reference 2. Theater Strategy, U.S. Central Command

Executive Summary (JAN 20XX)

We at USCENTCOM are charged with maintaining watch in this turbulent area, projecting American presence and influence where possible, and planning for the use of U.S. forces as required to protect U.S. vital interests. Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT RETURN (Fall 1997) reflected continuity with earlier CENTCOM efforts such as the EARNEST WILL escort operations during the Iran-Iraq war. Our experiences and perspectives suggest that the U.S. is faced with important challenges and opportunities in this AOR.

Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, DESERT RETURN and DESERT STRIKE demonstrated our unshakable commitment to protect U.S. interests in this vital part of the world. We will continue to promote regional stability, assist friendly states to defend themselves, maintain access to oil, and work to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And, we are cooperating with countries in the region to stem the flow of illegal drugs and to counter terrorism. We want to take advantage of this new era of international cooperation to encourage security and stability for the benefit of all.

Strategic oil and gas reserves and waterways make the region vitally important to the United States. The health of an increasingly interdependent global economy, including the economic strength of the U.S. and the well-being of our friends and allies, depends on uninterrupted access to Arabian Gulf oil. Additionally, security of the sea lines of communication is essential to the unimpeded flow of world trade through USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

We view our AOR as consisting of four distinct and interdependent sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea/Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Each

sub-region is unique, presenting its own set of challenges. Longstanding conflicts between nations, internal ethnic violence and civil war, religious differences, and large armed forces all contribute to unstable conditions in the area.

The South Asia sub-region, made up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, has great potential for increased conflict. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the civil war in Afghanistan are a major cause for concern. Drug traffic originating from the "Golden Crescent" portions of Pakistan and Afghanistan is also troubling. Additionally, the unraveling of the former Soviet Union, creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the political instability in Russia and many of the other republics add uncertainty along with new opportunities and challenges.

The Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula sub-region has a central place in our area of responsibility. There can be no question of U.S. commitment to the stability of this area and the security of the strategic oil resources and waterways, now more openly evident in the new bilateral security agreements we have recently signed with Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. We are also still negotiating security arrangements with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The countries of the Red Sea/Horn of Africa sub-region border the critical sea lines of communication running from the Western Indian Ocean through the Bab el Mandeb to the Suez Canal. Political upheavals in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia and the destabilizing activities of Iran, Libya, and Sudan have reduced our influence in this volatile region. Egypt, however, remains a key ally, promoting regional stability. We seek to revitalize our relations with other countries in the region to encourage reform, enhance access, and promote regional stability.

Significant challenges to peace in this entire region remain. The Islamic Republics of Iraq and Iran are the two countries which pose the greatest threat of aggressive military action in the region and they have similar political goals. Iraq remains intransigent and, despite enormous losses in the Gulf War, has rebuilt a significant military capability which can threaten its neighbors. Iran has restructured and rearmed its military and remains a threat to U.S. interests. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction among many countries in the region is also cause for great concern. The failed efforts of nation building and peacekeeping efforts in Somalia eroded both UN and U.S. prestige and credibility. These difficulties may embolden other regimes in the region. Other regional challenges include: ethnic and tribal rivalries, border disputes, religious differences, poverty, overpopulation, famine, economic disparity, and water shortages.

The U.S. seeks to deal with challenges to its vital interests in the CENTCOM area of responsibility through both unilateral and coalition efforts. The basis for our security relationships in the region is a three-tier concept of defense against aggression:

- Tier I — National self-defense.
- Tier II — Regional collective defense.
- Tier III — Extra-regional coalition defense.

The three-tier concept is a building block approach that calls upon individual nations and regional coalitions to provide for much of the deterrence against aggression in the region. This approach both enhances the ability of GCC countries to provide for their own defense and limits U.S. deployments to the region.

Recognizing the unique challenges of our area, we have also developed a long-term and flexible CENTCOM theater strategy that is based on five pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power-projection capability from the U.S., and readiness to fight. The first three pillars — forward presence, combined exercises, and security assistance — comprise the overseas presence portion of our strategy. The remaining two pillars — power-projection and readiness to fight

— define the activities associated with deploying forces to the theater and conducting operations once they arrive in the region.

Other aspects of our peacetime strategy provide opportunities for the U.S. to remain engaged in the region. Through the close coordination of U.S. military and other governmental agencies with our friends, we are working hard to combat terrorism and stem the flow of illegal drugs. Additionally, our Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Programs have helped to improve the health care and physical infrastructure of recipient countries. These activities greatly enhance U.S. prestige and good will. Meanwhile, our forces remain trained and ready to protect U.S. citizens and to conduct noncombatant evacuation if necessary.

If deterrence fails, we are prepared to transition to our wartime strategy. This strategy is designed to provide an extensive range of options which permit flexible, measured responses to regional aggression. Our wartime strategy envisions three phases of operations: flexible deterrent options, defensive operations, and offensive operations. The primary objective of these operations is to terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States and our regional coalition partners.

Our planning effort focuses on a number of potential regional contingencies. Wartime operations could range from short-duration crises to major conflicts like the Gulf War of 1990/91. We must be able to defend critical sea lines of communication while ensuring continual access to Arabian Peninsula oil supplies. Our strategy requires that our friends and allies assume an important share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region's stability and security.

A number of essential elements contribute to our ability to build upon our regional strategy in time of war. Superior military readiness, highly trained and quality personnel, combined exercises, timely intelligence, modern equipment, prepositioned equipment and supplies, and strategic mobility provide the ability to shape the battlefield, minimize casualties, and achieve decisive victory. Continued support for quality personnel, sufficient force structure; aggressive training; strategic sea and air lift; and state-of-the-art command, control,

communications, and intelligence systems will be critical to maintaining that advantage.

In summary, the U.S. has vital interests in the USCENTCOM region and a solid record of engagement and commitment there. We remain prepared to again assist our friends and allies in conducting a collective defense of the region and ensuring unhindered access to oil. By maintaining presence and building on our relationships with them through combined exercises and security assistance, we demonstrate our resolve and willingness to respond to their legitimate defense needs. As a result of Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, DESERT RETURN and DESERT STRIKE, we have significantly improved our credibility and influence in the area. It is important that we capitalize on these gains to help provide a more stable and secure future.

I. STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE AREA

The 20 diverse countries in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility form a unique and complex region at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and Africa. As an intercontinental crossroads, this area has long been the scene of military conflict. Access to the region's strategic oil reserves and waterways in this area is vitally important to U.S. national interests. Yet the area is replete with tribal, religious, national, and regional conflicts which constantly threaten influence the area.

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM clearly demonstrated the value the U.S. places on the overall stability of this region. They tested our ability and confirmed our commitment to protect vital national interests there. More importantly, our actions made a powerful, enduring statement that naked aggression will not be tolerated by the world community. Exercise DESERT RETURN further demonstrated our ability to respond to any renewed acts of aggression in the region, while DESERT STRIKE demonstrated our resolve to act, unilaterally if necessary.

The success of our wartime operations provided us an opportunity to take significant steps toward advancing our interests in the region. De-

spite difficulties during operations in Somalia, U.S. credibility remains high and our relations with our friends of the Gulf Cooperation Council states are excellent. We have worked with them to pursue regional defense cooperation arrangements. In each case, we respect the unique requirements and circumstances of our partners. We can point to solid progress throughout the region. Consolidating and building on our recent gains will pay big dividends in the future.

Strategic Oil Reserves

The Middle East provides 70 percent of the world's supply of oil; that oil fuels an increasingly interdependent global economy. Eleven percent of U.S. total oil requirement comes from the area. Many of our European and Pacific allies and trading partners have an even greater reliance on Gulf oil. This region supplies approximately 27 percent of West European and 63 percent of Japanese national requirements.

The Middle East will be the key source of oil production in the future. This region contains 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves, with many promising areas yet to be explored. Five nations — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Iraq — control 90 percent of those reserves. Reserves of easily recoverable oil in the U.S. and the Commonwealth of Independent States will be depleted in the 21st century. When this occurs, the Gulf region will still have over 100 years of proven reserves. Thus, any attempt to control access to Arabian Gulf oil is a threat to regional and global security, and to U.S. vital interests.

Strategic Waterways

The region's strategic importance extends far beyond oil. Strategic waterways include three critical chokepoints: the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. In peacetime, these sea lines of communication are essential to the smooth flow of world commerce. During conflict, they are critical to our ability to deploy and sustain forces abroad.

We moved 95 percent of our lift requirements by sea during Operations DESERT SHIELD and

DESERT STORM. Had the use of these sea lines of communication been denied, our only alternative would have been to move supplies and equipment around the Cape of Good Hope with a 40 percent increase in transit times and a commensurate increase in cost. The denial of free movement through these chokepoints could have disastrous consequences during any regional contingency.

The region's strategic location, vast oil reserves, and critical waterways make stability of USCENTCOM's area of responsibility absolutely vital to the security of the U.S. and its allies. Regional conflicts have the potential to threaten our interests and again result in the commitment of U.S. military forces.

Regional Analysis

The USCENTCOM area of responsibility contains four distinct, yet interdependent, sub-regions: South Asia, the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea/Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Each sub-region remains dynamic and unpredictable, each state pursues its own domestic, regional, and international interests. During the Gulf War, several states were able to overcome traditional differences and work collectively to defeat Iraq. However, many difficult issues remain unresolved. Ethnic diversity, religious differences, limited water resources, economic disparity, territorial or border claims, and weapons proliferation command the attention of leaders within the region.

The Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Sub-region (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Republic of Yemen) remains the most critical sub-region in the CENTCOM AOR. Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM marked a turning point for this sub-region. The U.S. demonstrated its commitment to regional peace and stability and its resolve to maintain the free flow of oil. Success in these operations opened the door to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region as amply demonstrated by the success of the DESERT RETURN exercise in 1995. To date, the U.S. has signed new security agreements with the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and renewed its

long-standing arrangements with Oman and Bahrain. Discussions continue with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Bilateral security arrangements are only part of the evolving regional security strategy as these states take steps to improve their military capabilities and make an effort to cooperate with each other in new ways. However, the security sought by our friends in the Gulf is not yet assured.

Iran

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an effort to reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its capability to threaten neutral shipping and the Gulf Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive naval and amphibious exercises in the Arabian Gulf. It is attempting to modernize its air and ground forces by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also sought to purchase military and industrial items from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts. However, high domestic inflation, a mounting foreign debt, and reduced oil revenues from an aging oil production infrastructure have combined to reduce Iran's ability to modernize as rapidly as desired. If this situation should change, Iran will find many nations willing to provide sophisticated arms in exchange for petro-dollars.

While rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is concentrating on improving its missile and chemical weapons capabilities. It currently possesses SCUD missiles provided by North Korea and may have acquired missiles with a greater payload from China. Iran developed offensive chemical weapons and employed them in response to Iraqi chemical use during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran is pursuing improved chemical agents and delivery means and is bolstering its chemical stockpiles.

We are concerned that Iran may have embarked on a nuclear weapons program. There has been civilian nuclear cooperation between Iran and a number of other countries. Iran could develop a viable nuclear weapons capability within the next

decade.

Iran will play an increasingly important role in the Gulf if it is able to modernize its infrastructure and increase oil exports. It is attempting to establish itself as a major regional power by expanding relations with post-war Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Islamic republics of Central Asia. Tehran continues to challenge renewed U.S. prestige and ties in the region, claiming these developments will result in a permanent U.S. presence on the Arabian Peninsula. It also remains opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace talks. We would welcome a more constructive posture on the part of Iran, but at this time it continues to pursue a course that threatens the stability of this region.

Iraq

Iraq lost much of its military power in the Gulf War, but still retains a significant capability. Its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production and research capabilities were found to be far greater than originally estimated. Iraq may also retain hundreds of ballistic missiles and some production capability. Its new government continues a robust spending program designed to rebuild its military capabilities and, most worrisome, has begun to develop a close military and political relationship with its former enemy, Iran.

Kuwait

Kuwait remains vulnerable because of its geography and limited military capabilities. Iraqi claims to Kuwait predate Saddam and have survived with the successor regime. As a result, Kuwait is working to guarantee its security through a series of bilateral defense relationships with the U.S., the United Kingdom, and France, and has completed construction of a defensive barrier against a potential repetition of Iraq's 1990 invasion. Kuwait has also strengthened its alliance with other Gulf Cooperation Council states, as well as with Egypt and others. Its acceptance of prepositioned equipment sufficient for a U.S. armored division has greatly improved our ability to respond to a crisis, but has also made its continued security vital to the region as a whole.

Kuwait has nearly completed the reconstruc-

tion of its country. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Special Operations Forces are actively assisting in these efforts. Politically, Kuwait continues to make progress towards democratic reform as evidenced by the National Assembly elections planned for October 20XX.

In return for its generous basing rights agreement, Kuwait is pressing hard for increased U.S. military assistance. The government of Kuwait has paid over \$16 billion to the U.S. to reimburse it for expenses incurred during Operation DESERT STORM, has facilitated U.S. access to ports and airfields, and has borne most of the cost associated with the prepositioning program. The current, vigorous U.S.-Kuwait exercise program also serves to allay immediate security concerns. Our improved relations provide opportunities for even stronger cooperation in the future.

Bahrain

Bahrain is a stable emirate which has provided invaluable support to the United States. Bahrain has been the host to the Commander, Middle East Force since 1949, and has consistently supported U.S. actions in the Gulf. Although our relationship with Bahrain has been traditionally close and mutually beneficial, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on 27 October 1991 which expands on earlier bilateral agreements and marks a new era of greater cooperation. Recently, Bahrain has been experiencing some internal unrest among its majority Shia population which is demanding greater political participation.

A long-term friend, Bahrain desires stronger military-to-military relations with the U.S. while it seeks to acquire our state-of-the-art military equipment to improve its defensive posture. If the Administration request for new grant assistance through the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program is approved, Bahrain will be eligible to receive excess defense articles, a move we support. France and Great Britain also seek to strengthen military-to-military ties with the Bahrainis and will maintain a presence in the Arabian Gulf.

Qatar

Prior to the spring of 1988, our relationship

with Qatar was cordial. However, military cooperation was interrupted through the fall of 1990 because of the contentious Stinger missile issue. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, Qatar proved to be a key supporter of UN actions in the Arabian Gulf. Since then, our bilateral relations have improved significantly and military-to-military cooperation is expanding.

Qatar is politically and economically active on several fronts. It is cautiously seeking to normalize diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, as both countries share the huge gas reserves off Qatar's northern coast. Qatar maintains strong economic and military ties with both Britain and France, with the bulk of its military equipment coming from French sources. It has also shown an interest in procuring advanced American weapon systems.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) proved to be a key supporter of the U.S. and the Coalition during the Arabian Gulf War. The Emirates contributed over four billion dollars to defray the costs of coalition forces and provided logistical support and basing. Its ports are valuable sites for U.S. Navy port visits and provide support for our crucial naval presence.

The U.S. has an important role in improving the United Arab Emirates' military capabilities. The UAE has indicated a need for air defense and early warning capabilities, and has expressed an interest in an advanced fighter aircraft and the M1A1 tank. It also asked to buy the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. In order to help strengthen our important friendship, as well as to remain a reliable defense partner, we must contribute to filling its legitimate defense requirements.

Oman

A strong and independent Oman is important to regional stability and the flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman has been a staunch friend and supporter of U.S. regional goals. Oman was the first Gulf country to sign an access agreement with the U.S., and it played an important role in multinational maritime interception

and diversion operations during the Gulf War. It has also agreed to host PHIBLEX SEAWOLF this January and the Operation DESERT SUPPORT exercise later this summer.

Oman remains a stabilizing influence in the region and has been a leader in enhancing Gulf security. Under Sultan Qaboos' leadership, Oman has led the drive to improve the collective defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and is a major contributor to the GCC's PENINSULA SHIELD force. Oman's steadfast cooperation with the U.S. improves our ability to respond to threats throughout the region and is key to the success of our strategic planning.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the largest and most influential nation on the Arabian Peninsula, containing two of Islam's holiest sites as well as the world's largest petroleum producing infrastructure. Its strategic location between the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea makes it pivotal to the security of the region. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and more recently during Operation DESERT RETURN, the U.S. expanded the close military-to-military relationship which it has maintained with Saudi Arabia since World War II. Saudi Arabia provided almost \$17 billion to the U.S. in support of the war effort and funded the bulk of our costs involved in DESERT RETURN.

Saudi Arabia's moderate political orientation, generous foreign aid program, and ongoing efforts to mediate regional disagreements contribute substantially to maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East. The Saudis continue to support the stationing of the U.S.'s 207th ACR and the PENINSULA SHIELD force at King Khalid Military City and provide the bulk of the GCC's deterrent forces. Resolution of the Kingdom's border differences with Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar appears imminent, but the boundary dispute with Yemen is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Saudi Arabia is establishing diplomatic relations with the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union, and is also cautiously exploring diplomatic relations with the newly democratic East European states.

The U.S. enjoys extremely close military-to-military relations with Saudi Arabia. These ties reflect the largest Foreign Military Sales Program in the world, financed entirely by Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has greatly expanded its armed forces and demonstrates a continued willingness to take a more active military role in the region through multilateral security arrangements. Saudi Arabia's efforts at force modernization, through its existing military assistance program with the United States, have provided it with the most highly capable military on the peninsula.

Jordan

A stable, moderate Jordan is essential to achieving U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. It enjoyed a long and cooperative relationship with the U.S. prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, Jordan's political position during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM forced the U.S. to cut off all foreign assistance programs. All of these programs have since been restored to help Jordan respond to the growing Iraqi threat in the region.

Jordan faces many domestic and regional challenges as a result of the Gulf War. Its weakened economy, hard hit by foreign debt, is further burdened by the influx of nearly a quarter-million citizens forced to return to Jordan from Kuwait and Iraq. Relations with Gulf Cooperation Council states have improved slowly and are expected to remain positive. Jordan is addressing internal problems, continuing the process of democratization, and rebuilding relations with its neighbors. It has been an active and supportive member of the regional group working toward resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jordan wants to strengthen military-to-military relations with the United States. It is looking to the U.S. for help in reorganizing and improving its defenses. Increased U.S. security assistance support will foster closer relations and help Jordan in maintaining its defensive military readiness. In turn, this makes it easier for Jordan to accept the security risks associated with its support for the Israeli-PLO peace process and to resist provocative Iraqi military activities. Supporting Jordan in this way

will reinforce its ability to remain a moderating influence in the region.

Republic of Yemen

In the wake of the Gulf War, Yemen is surviving despite its isolation for having supported Saddam Hussein. Although Yemen and Oman seem to be reaching an amicable border settlement, much of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary remains undemarcated and a source of tension. Yemeni expatriate workers, expelled from many GCC countries during the Gulf War, are not expected to regain their privileged residency status in the Gulf states. Additionally, the Yemeni government is not likely to expand its commerce in the region until it can normalize relations with its immediate neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen's recent civil war, where northern forces prevailed against southern secessionists, aggravated long-standing tensions with Saudi Arabia.

With an economy unable to support a military infrastructure capable of meeting its defense needs, Yemen has relied on foreign financial aid, equipment, and advisory assistance to develop its armed forces. Most of the country's military equipment came from the Soviet Union. Termination of U.S. and Saudi security assistance programs during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM ended military-to-military relationships. Yemen is expanding its military and political relationships with both Iran and Iraq, relationships that could become a regional concern in the near future. We should watch Yemen closely to insure it limits its potential involvement in GCC issues.

II. MAJOR THREATS IN THE REGION

Roots of Conflict:

- **Rogue States**
- **Proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles**
- **Transnational Terrorism**
- **Resource Competition**
- **Ethnic and Tribal Strife**
- **Internal Dissent**
- **Religious Strife**

- **Anarchy and Lawlessness**
- **Contested Borders**

Of the many serious and diverse threats to U.S. interests among the region's principal "roots of conflict," Iran and Iraq, particularly since the rise to power of Iraq's HIZBIRR party, are the two countries with the military potential and political ambitions to threaten their neighbors. Weapons proliferation, particularly ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, add to the volatility. The potential is high for the use of these weapons in future conflicts. Regional conflicts over oil, water, borders, and religious issues can threaten U.S. interests.

Iraq

Despite the losses suffered during Operation DESERT STORM, Iraq has rebuilt one of the largest military forces in the region. Immediately following the war, Iraq began to reconstitute its forces, repairing and replacing damaged and destroyed equipment and weapon systems. Its new government has continued along this path while developing closer political and military ties with Iran. Iraq's forces retain a strong defensive capability and efforts to rebuild a major offensive capability are ongoing. Iraq's most significant obstacles to procuring and upgrading military equipment are shortages of foreign exchange and the arms embargo imposed after the Gulf War, but it has been able to overcome these obstacles with Chinese and North Korean assistance.

Iran

Iran has become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988, Iran has been steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied on equipment captured from the Iraqis or repaired through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from oil profits. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to accelerate an already ambitious rearmament program. Even after oil prices fell, Iran has been able to continue its arms build-up

with oil-for-weapons arrangements. Iranian armed forces are modernizing with newer and more capable equipment from other nations. As a result of this ongoing buildup and its developing political and military ties with Iraq, Iran poses an even greater threat to U.S. interests in the region. Finally, Iran continues to support radical terrorist groups in the region.

Weapons Proliferation

Weapons proliferation, including weapons of mass destruction and uncontrolled growth of conventional weapons, undermines regional military balances. The region is now experiencing an expansion of nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities. As more countries feel the need to arm themselves against a perceived threat from their neighbors, the opportunity for regional conflict grows.

Little was known about the extent of Iraq's nuclear program prior to Operation DESERT STORM, but the nuclear-related facilities that survived the war gave us an indication of how far Iraq had progressed with this technology. UN inspections and confiscations have limited the Iraqi nuclear threat for the near term. However, the Iraqi scientific infrastructure is still in place and could be employed in the future.

Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, Iraq had the most extensive biological and chemical warfare program in the Middle East and aggressively pursued research and production. It used several thousand tons of chemical agents in the war against Iran. Coalition air strikes during Operation DESERT STORM severely damaged numerous facilities associated with biological and chemical weapons research and production. The remainder of these facilities were destroyed late in 1991. Dual-use technology, much in evidence in Iraq, is a major challenge to the much reduced UN inspection process. Many legitimate pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries could quickly and easily transition to producing biological and chemical weapons, as the manufacturing facilities and many of the chemical ingredients are common to civilian and military use. Iraq continues use of facilities which support the production of food and medicine.

It is likely that other regional states are working to develop biological and chemical weapons, and we know that Pakistan possesses, and Iran is pursuing, a nuclear capability. The presence of any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in the region is destabilizing.

Iraq's technique of conducting mobile missile launches during the Gulf War demonstrated what could be achieved with 1950 vintage SCUD technology. This strategy enabled Iraqi missile crews to conduct launches in the face of intense pressure from coalition reconnaissance and strike aircraft. The development of larger payload missile systems with greater precision has provided Iraq with an improved deep strike capability and means for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad probably views such capability as essential to its military planning. UN resolutions ordering the destruction of Iraq's ballistic missile program will impede near-term missile production, but we believe it will pursue a renewed missile development program at the first opportunity. We are concerned that it may already be cooperating with Iran in this area.

In recent years, the majority of the conventional arms entering the region went to Iran and Iraq. This created a genuine threat to friendly countries, who have responded by purchasing their own modern weapons to provide a defense against this growing threat. We recognize that friendly nations have legitimate defense requirements. We are concerned, however, that unrestricted and unbalanced increases in the number of modern conventional weapons are dangerous and harmful to developing economies. The U.S. seeks to provide friendly countries with modern defense systems appropriate to the threat those countries face, while pursuing international cooperative measures to restrain the traffic in arms.

Regional Conflicts

Other regional conflicts can spill over and threaten U.S. interests and citizens. Oil will remain the dominant energy source in the world for the foreseeable future, and competition over existing, new, or anticipated oil resources could heighten tensions. This problem may be further aggravated

by low revenues in some oil exporting countries, such as Iran, due to declining reserves, and in Iraq, due to low oil prices and production ceilings. Any conflict which threatens to close regional choke-points such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, or to otherwise disrupt oil supplies would have a dramatic impact on the world's economy.

Over the past decade, radical Islamic movements have become an influential and dynamic force in the political, ideological, cultural, and social mosaic of the region. Economic hardships, wide social gaps, and the failure of various Western-oriented ideologies have created conditions which enable radicalism to thrive. Iran advocates revolution as a means to establish additional Islamic republics and inspired Iraq's revolution in 1993. In Jordan and Egypt, organized elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood are a potent religious and political force working to reverse the secularization of their societies. The result of Iranian influence on the southern republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States remains to be seen. Iranian influence also seems to be behind the renewal of unrest among Shia populations in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Radical religious groups pose a serious challenge to some regimes and could spark dramatic political changes in the region.

III. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OBJECTIVES

Drawing upon a broad range of political, military, economic, and informational instruments, the *National Security Strategy For a New Century* focuses on accomplishing three primary national objectives:

- Enhancing Our Security
- Promoting Prosperity at Home
- Promoting Democracy

The *National Military Strategy* outlines two complimentary, national military objectives that support our overall national security goals:

- Promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction.
- Thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities.

Consistent with the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection, our military strategy relies on three interrelated components in order to achieve our objectives. These three components are the tasks of peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning the nation's wars.

USCENTCOM's regional interests and objectives are derived from, and are closely linked to, U.S. national security objectives and U.S. military objectives. Our regional interests and objectives include:

- To ensure free world access to Southwest Asian oil resources.
- To demonstrate our commitment to the security of our friends and allies in the region.
- To enhance regional peace and stability through the containment of Iran and Iraq.
- To prevent domination of the region by non-friendly powers.
- To promote the principles of human rights, free market economies, and democratic processes.
- To provide for the security of U.S. citizens and property throughout the region.
- To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- To stem the flow of illegal drugs.
- To reduce the threat of terrorism.
- To deter, and defeat if necessary, military operations hostile to U.S. vital interests.

These interests and objectives provide the basis for USCENTCOM's peacetime mission:

- Promote and protect U.S. interests.
- Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources.
- Assist friendly states in providing for their

own security and contributing to the collective defense.

- Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-political gains by threat or use of force.

These national and regional security objectives are also the basis for developing USCENTCOM's theater strategy. Recognizing the importance and unique problems of the region, the theater strategy remains focused on achieving long-range security goals while retaining the flexibility necessary to respond to fast-breaking threats.

IV. USCENTCOM Theater Strategy

In the seven years since the spectacular victory over Iraqi forces by the DESERT STORM coalition, America's presence in USCENTCOM's AOR has continued to be a vital part of our national military strategy in an area of great importance to the United States. Economic progress and a fragile peace have been made possible through the efforts of the men and women of United States Central Command. Working closely with their host-nation counterparts, these soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines are guided by a vision that implements a theater strategy tailored to the unique and daunting challenges of this distant region:

USCENTCOM Vision

U.S. Central Command: A flexible and versatile command into the 21st century.... Trained, positioned, and ready to defend the nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict, and conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve decisive victory in war.

USCENTCOM's strategic challenge revolves around the fact that the U.S. has vital interests in the region that are far from its own shores, yet close to many significant threats. Our strategic response to this challenge reflects the fiscal and political constraints that continue to shape overall

U.S. involvement in the region. The “foundations of stability” depend heavily upon the following strategic components:

- Lethal mix of forward-deployed forces.
- Prepositioning of equipment ashore and afloat.
- Readiness to fight across the conflict continuum
- Bilateral relationships with key regional partners.
- Infrastructure, equipment, and host-nation support agreements to support power projection.

Three-Tier Defense Concept

Our security relationships in the region are built around a three-tier concept of defense against aggression. This approach allows us to work with our regional coalition partners to achieve our objectives and to set the stage for the transition to coalition defense should deterrence fail. The first tier involves actions by each nation to provide the initial line of deterrence and, if required, defense, against aggressors. The second tier involves actions by friendly regional nations to support a threatened state in attempts to restore stability and preclude hostilities. It also calls for nations in the region to provide for the defense of common interests if deterrence fails. The final tier involves direct actions by the U.S. and other friendly nations to support threatened states and regional alliances when their capabilities alone are insufficient to restore stability or to defend our common interests.

Five-Pillar Strategic Concept

USCENTCOM’s theater strategy consists of integrated strategic concepts that are represented by five pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power projection, and readiness to fight. The first three pillars describe our overseas activities. The fourth pillar deals with the rapid projection of U.S. forces to the region. The fifth pillar focuses on our ability to conduct wartime operations within the theater.

Forward presence cements our credibility, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition

from peace to war. Although naval forces provide the bulk of our long-term forward presence, access to ports and airfields is essential to project other forces into the area. The continued presence of the 207th ACR in northern Saudi Arabia sends a strong visible message of our commitment to defend this region. Presence is enhanced through ongoing military-to-military interaction, cooperative defense measures, and prepositioning of equipment and supplies critical to our responsiveness and warfighting flexibility.

Combined exercises, the second pillar of our strategy, are designed to provide the primary foundation for developing strong military-to-military relations and increased coalition training opportunities. Through such activities we maintain access, advance interoperability with regional partners, enhance forward presence, and improve the individual and collective military capabilities of the GCC states. Because we fight as we train, the experience gained in the pre-war combined exercise program contributed significantly to the Coalition’s success in the Gulf War of 1990/91. Combined exercises such as DESERT RETURN 1995 and DESERT SUPPORT help to solidify our military relationships, demonstrate our commitment and capability to defend our interests, and supplement our standing naval presence with short-term air and ground force deployments to the region.

Security assistance, the third pillar of our strategy, helps develop strong relationships with friendly nations and promotes increased U.S. influence in the region. Meeting the legitimate self-defense needs of our friends reinforces regional deterrence and stability, while decreasing the time required for the U.S. to respond should a crisis require coalition military action. Sales of U.S. weapon systems bolster our credibility as a security partner and significantly improve interoperability between our forces and those of our friends. They also support the legitimate security assistance needs of our friends, help to sustain their confidence in us, solidify our bilateral relationships, facilitate interoperability and access, and reduce the probability that U.S. forces will have to fight in the region.

The fourth pillar of our theater strategy, power projection, defines activities and qualities of U.S. military forces that support the rapid projection of

forces from the U.S. into the Gulf region and the preparation of those forces for combat operations. The 70 C-17 transports and 20 fast roll-on/roll-off SL-7 ships now available for strategic lift significantly improve our ability to transport U.S.-based forces to the theater and to support them once they are here. We are now able to accomplish in days deployment activities that required weeks, or even months, during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

The fifth and final pillar of our strategy is readiness to fight. This pillar stresses activities that ensure the Central Command headquarters and individual component commands possess standard operating procedures that facilitate rapid deployment during crises and enable us to conduct synchronized, high tempo joint and combined wartime operations. In support of this pillar of our strategy, we are continually revising our war and contingency plans to reflect emerging developments in the region. We also conduct extensive warfighting conferences and command post exercises designed to help us maintain enhanced levels of readiness.

Wartime Strategy

Our wartime strategy builds on the framework implemented by our peacetime strategy of deterrence. Should deterrence fail, we would transition to a wartime strategy of deterring/defeating aggression. This strategy encompasses the full operational continuum from regional to global operations and capitalizes on U.S. technological superiority. It is based on coalition warfare and is designed to achieve the following wartime objectives:

- To deter or defeat further aggression.
- To control escalation of hostilities.
- To terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States and our regional coalition partners.

Our wartime strategy envisions three phases of operations which are embodied in all of our operational contingency planning. These phases are:

- *Early flexible response/deterrent options.* These are preplanned, initial response options

to any crisis, encompassing all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic/political, economic, and military). They are designed as a series of flexible actions to be employed sequentially or simultaneously, as needed, to meet the threat. These options demonstrate U.S. resolve and bolster the confidence and self-defense capabilities of friendly nations. The goal of these options is to forestall conflict by demonstrating to potential aggressors the price to be paid for their actions.

- *Defensive operations.* If deterrence should fail, our initial focus will be on operations designed to defend critical facilities, lines of communication, and rear areas. These operations could also be used to create the conditions necessary for the next stage, offensive operations.
- *Offensive operations.* The actions in this stage would be focused on the enemy's centers of gravity. These operations would be designed to break his will to continue fighting and to achieve an early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.

Our strategy emphasizes that our friends and allies will assume their fair share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region's stability and security. This approach allows the U.S. to concentrate on those actions necessary to achieve a speedy, favorable end to any crisis while reducing risks to national interests.

Additional Operations

In addition to operations directly linked to our peacetime strategy of deterrence and our three-phase wartime strategy, USCENTCOM must conduct activities in support of our broad strategic and operational objectives. These activities include noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian/civic assistance operations, and combating terrorism.

- *Noncombatant evacuation operations.* When requested by the Department of State through the Department of Defense, USCENTCOM will conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in the region. These operations provide protection and evacuation for

our citizens when they are threatened by natural disasters, civil strife, or international conflict. For example, in January 1991 during Operation Eastern Exit, we successfully evacuated the American embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, when it came under siege by rebel forces. Contingency planning for non-combatant operations is based on the most likely regional scenarios. We use the worst case situation as the basis for potential evacuation planning. These plans are updated periodically as the embassies and consulates submit their emergency action plans. This enhances USCENTCOM's ability to evacuate personnel within the region.

- *Humanitarian assistance operations.* The Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program, conducted under Title 10 USC, provides a means for the U.S. to gain access and demonstrate presence throughout the region. This program also provides a vehicle for our government to respond to either manmade or natural disasters. Projects conducted under this program have focused on improving medical treatment, preventive health care, and the country's infrastructure, including water production/distribution systems. Overpopulation, poverty, and disease in underdeveloped regions provide challenging, realistic training opportunities for the medical and support personnel of participating U.S. military units. This medical and engineering assistance is a cost effective means for our government to promote favorable relationships with host nations.
- *Combating terrorism/force protection.* Preventing, combating, and recovering from terrorist acts require an integrated effort. This effort includes defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of our forces and property, and offensive measures used to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Our antiterrorism program covers our headquarters, facilities, and security assistance organizations in the region. The program includes antiterrorism training at service schools for personnel being permanently assigned to threat areas, and a local antiterrorism brief

given to all personnel within 48 hours of their arrival in the area. Organizational security managers throughout the region have antiterrorism plans detailing security procedures for their unique situations. USCENTCOM personnel conduct annual inspections to review antiterrorism/force protection plans and conduct counterterrorism exercises to ensure procedures are current and complete.

USCENTCOM Forces

The forces apportioned to USCENTCOM to implement our strategy are drawn from the national inventory of available assets. They incorporate the total force comprised of active, reserve, and civilian elements in air, land, and sea components. Each is flexible and expandable, allowing the proper response to the scope, duration, or intensity of any crisis or conflict. To ensure that we retain our ability to respond effectively, we need to improve our chemical and biological defense capabilities; ballistic missile early warning and identification friend or foe systems; intelligence capability including imagery, reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment; strategic air and sealift; mine countermeasure capability; and regional infrastructure to include prepositioning and command, control, and communications.

V. KEY ENABLING REQUIREMENTS

There are a number of requirements that must be met to enable USCENTCOM to execute its theater strategy successfully in peace and war. Our peacetime requirements include a vigorous combined exercise program, expanded security assistance efforts, improvements in our prepositioned assets, and the maintenance of a quality, highly trained force structure. These requirements have already been elaborated in the discussion of the five pillars of our theater strategy. Some additional requirements that directly support our wartime strategy are: theater missile defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility, and sustainability.

Theater Missile Defense

The proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region requires us to increase our capabilities in the area of theater missile defense. In particular, we must improve our space-based assets and the ability to link our satellite communications architecture directly to our subordinate units. We must also work to increase the interoperability between the assets currently available to USCENTCOM forces and those available to our regional partners.

Command and Control

There is a clear need for improvements in our permanent communications infrastructure within the region and in our ability to rapidly expand our assets in times of crisis. We are working to fulfill this need through the Southwest Asia Defense Information Infrastructure (SWADII) and the transportable Tactical Contingency Communications Equipment-Central Asia (TCCE-CA). These systems enable us to create a flexible, integrated communications system designed to support joint task force (JTF) operations in the region. Satellite systems are also an essential element of our inter- and intra-theater communications architecture.

Intelligence

The region continues to present a significant challenge to our intelligence gathering efforts. The diversity of people, terrain, cultures, conditions, the distance to the U.S., and a limited in-theater intelligence infrastructure compound the problem. We are working to make national and theater intelligence assets more responsive to tactical and theater commanders. We have increased the capabilities of our intelligence activities through formal intelligence exchanges and cooperative intelligence initiatives. We have also developed expanded intelligence data bases, and trained additional Arabic and Farsi linguists. We are refining our Joint Intelligence Center capabilities through participation in combined exercises.

Mobility

USCENTCOM relies heavily on strategic lift to meet its commitments. The extraordinary distances from the continental U.S. to the region magnify the immense difficulties encountered with deploying any size force in response to a crisis or contingency. While existing strategic airlift and amphibious lift adequately support our current regional contingency plans, strategic lift should remain a high priority on our future agenda, and support for procurement of strategic lift assets must continue. We need more roll-on/roll-off ships and additional strategic sealift ships to improve our force closure profiles. We continue to support the National Sealift Policy of 1989 designed to alleviate two systemic problems: the deteriorating capability of U.S. shipyards and the aging Merchant Marine Force. These problems contribute to the overall decline of the Merchant Marine and could jeopardize future deployment efforts.

Sustainability

The remoteness and austere environment of the area requires a number of unique programs to support deploying forces. This is especially true in the case of water production, storage and distribution systems, tactical fuel distribution systems, and bare-base life support systems. These programs are necessary during peacetime training as well as during regional contingency and wartime situations. Congressional support for sustainability programs is essential in order to maintain combat capability.

Host nation support was a combat multiplier during Operation DESERT STORM even though few written agreements existed. Host nation support augmented our capabilities for fuel, food, water, facilities, and transportation. We were fortunate to have fought Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in developed countries with excellent infrastructures, but this was a "best case" scenario. Future conflicts may not afford us this same luxury. It is imperative we continue our pursuit of written host nation agreements to ensure the necessary support will be available when needed.

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting
C/M/S 500

Reference 3. Staff Officer's Strategic Estimate Worksheet Notes

J5 Notes for Strategic Estimate:

Emerging Crisis in Middle East — Iran/Iraq Coalition Threats to U.S. Interests

Purpose:

Info/decision brief for CINCCENT in preparation for his discussion with the National Security Council

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. Mission.

a. Mission Analysis

NSS guidance (Strategy for a New Century):

Core Objectives:	Enhance our security (Life) Bolster America's economic prosperity (Pursuit of Happiness) Promote democracy abroad (Liberty)
Strategic Priorities:	Foster regional efforts in key regions Increase cooperation in confronting new security threats Strengthen military, diplomatic, and law enforcement tools Create more jobs and (economic) opportunities for American citizens
Interests:	<i>Vital:</i> Physical security of our and our allies' territories Safety of our citizens Our economic well-being Protection of our critical infrastructure Access to foreign oil sources <i>Important:</i> Those that affect our national well-being and the character
of	
Objectives:	the world in which we live (examples: Haitian refugees; Bosnia) <i>Humanitarian:</i> Where our values demand it To sustain our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Deterring and defeating large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes• Maintaining a substantial overseas presence• Projecting power efficiently and effectively• Successfully conducting multiple smaller scale contingencies• Countering WMD• Contributing to multilateral peace operations• Supporting counterterrorism efforts, noncombatant evacuation, counter-narcotic operations, and humanitarian assistance

To bolster America's economic revitalization.

- Enhancing American competitiveness
- Creating a government partnership with business and labor
- Enhancing access to foreign markets
- Strengthening macroeconomic coordination
- Providing for energy security
- Promoting sustainable development abroad

To promote democracy abroad.

- Enlarging the community of free market democracies
- Strengthening democratic processes in emerging democracies
- Promoting universal adherence to international human rights and democratic principles
- Alleviating human suffering through humanitarian programs

NMS guidance (Shape, Respond and Prepare):

- Military Objectives: Promoting peace and stability.
When necessary, defeat adversaries
- Strategic Concepts: Strategic agility.
Overseas presence.
Power projection.
Decisive force.
- Strategic Elements: Shape the international environment
- Promote stability
 - Prevent or reduce conflicts and threats
 - Peace deterrence
- Respond to the full spectrum of crises
- Deter aggression or coercion in a crisis
 - Fight and win Major Theater Wars
 - Conduct multiple, concurrent SSCs
- Prepare now for an uncertain future
- Joint Vision 2010
 - Information superiority
 - Technological innovation
- Strategic Components: Peacetime engagement.
- Military-to-military contact
 - Nation assistance
 - Security assistance
 - Humanitarian operations
 - Counterdrug and counterterrorism operations
 - Peacekeeping
- Deter aggression and prevent conflict.
- Nuclear deterrence
 - Regional alliances
 - Crisis response
 - Arms control

- Confidence-building measures
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Sanctions enforcement
- Peace enforcement

Fight and win the nation's wars.

- Clear objectives and decisive force
- Project necessary power to theater of operations
- Fight combined and joint
- Win the information war
- Counter weapons of mass destruction
- Prepare for a second major regional conflict
- Withdraw forces from low priority missions
- Mobilize critical Reserve forces
- Begin plans to win the peace at the outset of conflict

Regional U.S. Interests (NSS):

- Assured access to Gulf oil
- Just, lasting, and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
- Protection of U.S. citizens and property
- Freedom of navigation
- Access to regional markets
- Ensuring security and well-being of Israel
- Helping key regional partners and friends provide for their security
- Free flow of energy—resources at reasonable prices
- Spread of democratic values
- Increased political participation

Regional Interests and Objectives (Theater Strategy):

- Ensure free world access to SWA oil
- Demonstrate commitment to security of friends and allies
- Enhance regional peace and stability by containing Iran and Iraq
- Prevent domination of the region by non-friendly powers
- Promote human rights/free market economies/democratic processes
- Provide for security of U.S. citizens and property
- Prevent spread of WMD
- Stem flow of illegal drugs
- Reduce threat of terrorism
- Deter, and defeat, if necessary, military operations hostile to U.S. interests

Key threats to U.S. Interests and Security (DOD Security Strategy and CENTCOM Theater Strategy):

- Iran (long-term)
- Iraq (short-term)
- Proliferation of TBMs and WMDs
- Terrorism and radical Islam
- Resource disputes
- General regional instability

Objectives and Strategies (OPLAN 1648):

Objectives: Coordinate and establish an effective force to:

- Deter, and if necessary, counter aggression
- Prevent military coercion of friendly states
- Protect U.S. resources and facilities in the region
- Deny enemy access to the same
- Ensure access to regional LOCs

Strategies:

- Deter war
- Improve regional stability
- Counter hostile expansion and influences
- Prepare for war
- Should deterrence fail:
 - Rapidly deploy forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
 - Upon generation of adequate combat power and the conduct of an adequate defense, mass forces and counterattack to restore territorial integrity and the legitimate governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, if necessary.

ISCP guidance (Regional Military Objectives):

- Maintain freedom of access to Mediterranean Sea, Middle East, Indian Ocean and Africa.
- Protect U.S. economic, political, and military interests.
- Ensure access to oil supplies.
- Prevent any power achieving position endangering U.S. in USCENTCOM AOR.
- Deter overt intervention by outside power.
- Monitor actions that threaten stability in AOR; be prepared to increase U.S. military presence.

Mission (USCENTCOM Theater Strategy):

- Promote and protect U.S. interests
- Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources
- Assist friendly states in providing for their own security and contributing to the collective defense
- Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-political gains by threat or use of force

Mission (OPLAN 1648):

When directed, USCENTCOM will deploy forces to the area of operations and take actions to defend Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian territory against an Iraqi attack; and, if required, restore the pre-conflict international borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Conflict Termination Objectives:

For successful deterrence of IIC offensive operations: Diminish cohesion of IIC; eliminate massing of IIC ground and air forces; strengthen defensive readiness of GCC nations; reduce terrorist attacks; prevent additional proliferation of WMD; support resistance of friendly governments to IIC attempts at coercion; maintain free flow of oil; maintain current international borders; maintain freedom of navigation through international waterways. Existing Iraqi and Iranian governments may remain in place.

For warfighting operations: Destroy IIC offensive capability; eliminate IIC WMD programs; restore pre-conflict international boundaries; eliminate IIC military alliance; establish regional stability on terms favorable to U.S. interests; and restore free flow of oil. Current Iraqi and Iranian government regimes may remain.

b. Mission Statement

When directed, USCENTCOM will deploy forces to its AOR and, in conjunction with the GCC and other friendly nations, deter IIC military attack, coercion, or intimidation against GCC nations, and maintain air, land, and sea lines of communication. Should deterrence fail, defend U.S. interests and sovereign territory of friendly coalition states. If required, conduct offensive operations to restore preconflict international boundaries, destroy the offensive military and WMD capabilities of the IIC, and establish a stable and secure environment in the Gulf region favorable to U.S. interests.

2. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

(1) Geostrategic Context

(a) Domestic and international context:

- Strategic oil reserves and waterways make the region a vital interest to the United States.
- IIC poses risk to interdependent world economy and favorable regional balance of power.
- Proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a threat throughout AOR.
- IIC receiving arms and support from China, North Korea, and others.
- IIC military coalition formed to support Iranian regional hegemony, Iraqi territorial claims, and control of Islamic holy places by Shia clergy; to replace regional monarchies with Islamic republics; and, to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Immediate Problem. Iranian/Iraqi-sponsored terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabian citizens and territory, Iranian and Iraqi calls for a Shiite-dominated Islamic council to assume guardianship of Islam's holy cities (Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem), and Saudi Arabia's closure of Mecca and Medina to Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims causes political and religious instability in the Islamic and Arab worlds. The build-up of IIC forces along the Euphrates River and of Iranian military forces in the Strait of Hormuz pose immediate, conventional military threats to the security of GCC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and to the free flow of oil from the region. Political instability, attempts to undermine friendly regimes through military and political coercion, and overt acts of intimidation jeopardize the vital interests of the United States and other industrialized nations and threaten the security of U.S. friends and allies in the region.

Long-Term Problem. IIC political and military alliance threatens the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf region. IIC military and political attempts to coerce and intimidate its neighbors, if unchecked, could influence one or more Gulf states to take political and economic decisions that simultaneously favor IIC interests and undermine their legitimacy and independence. The IIC could dictate Saudi and OPEC oil policy and pressure moderate Arab states to withdraw their support of the Mideast peace process; either result would have important consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the world. U.S. failure to stand by its regional commitments and support its regional interests will lead to a decline of its influence in the region and the rest of the world. Mideast peace accords could fall apart, increasing instability throughout the region.

(b) *Characteristics of the operational area:*

Climate:

- Hot, dry summers (Jun-Sep) and mild winters (Nov-Apr).
- High temperature of 105F; seldom reaches freezing.
- Visibility best in winter; dust, blowing sand and haze in summer.

Topography:

- Arabian Peninsula is desert plain.
- Narrow sea lines of operation in Arabian Gulf.
- Rugged mountains in western Iran.
- Marshlands between Iraq and Iran and in southern Iraq.

Line of Communications:

Seaports: Ad Damman (35k Mtons clearance; receiver container, general cargo and RO-RO); Al Jubail (33k Mtons clearance; receive container and general cargo)

Airfields:

Daharan International/KKMC/Riyadh Int'l/Kuwait International

Population Centers:

Daharan	Hail	Riyadh	Jiddah	Hafar al Batin
Mecca	Medina	Khafji	Buraydah	Kuwait City

(2) Analysis of the Enemy

Intent and Capabilities

ACTOR	INTERESTS/ INTENT	POWER AVAILABLE	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	LIKELY COAS
Iraq	- Hegemony - Control of KU oilfields	- Reconstituted military	- No domestic opposition	- No credibility	- Rebuild military - Intimidate GCC nations
Iran	- Hegemony	- Modernized military with WMD - Silkworm missiles at the strait	- Threat of chemical WMD - No domestic opposition	- Vulnerable coastline - No credibility	- Gain hegemony then split with Iraq

Forces Available

ACTOR	GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCES	MARITIME FORCES	SPECIAL OPS	OTHER
Iraq					
Iran					

(3) Friendly Situation

Interests and Capabilities

ACTOR	INTERESTS/ INTENT	POWER AVAILABLE	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	LIKELY COAS
United Kingdom	- Economic/Oil - Regional stability	- Solid military - Diplomacy	- Credibility - National will	- Limited strategic lift	- Join coalition
France	- Economic/Oil - Regional stability	- Solid military - Diplomacy - Economic	- Credibility - Experience - Power project	- Long LOCs	- Join coalition
Saudi Arabia	- Survival - Pol/territorial integrity	- Moderate military power - Economic	- Legitimacy	- Vulnerable to propaganda	- Seek UN and Western powers support
Bahrain					
UAE					
Jordan					
Egypt					

Forces Available

ACTOR	GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCES	MARITIME FORCES	SPECIAL OPS	OTHER
USA					
United Kingdom					
France					
Saudi Arabia					
Bahrain					
UAE					
Egypt					

(4) Restrictions

(5) Assumptions

- IIC will continue to sponsor terrorism against Saudi Arabia and eventually against U.S. interests.
- The threat of IIC regional dominance will be considered a greater threat by GCC governments other than Saudi Arabia than the threat to Riyadh's guardianship of the Holy Cities. The ability to protect and control the Holy Cities is vital to the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia's government.
- Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations will ask for military assistance from the U.S. and other western nations.

3. Courses of Action Analysis

Scenario 1: Deterrence Options — IIC governments may remain intact, continue bellicose rhetoric, but do not initiate major hostilities. IIC ground forces in Euphrates valley return to normal locations; military coalition may remain intact. IIC-sponsored terrorist acts reduced .

COA 1: Weaken cohesiveness of IIC and strengthen resolve and readiness of friends and allies.

Military Aspect:

- Increase forward presence temporarily to underscore U.S. commitment.
- Continue combined exercise operations. Seek opportunity to increase.
- Expand security assistance programs. Ensure GCC training and equipment readiness.

Diplomatic Aspect:

- Use diplomatic forums (UN, bilateral talks) to isolate IIC.
- Bolster resolve of Saudi Arabia and GCC states to resist IIC intimidation
- Indirect influence to exploit IIC weaknesses/tenuous cohesion.
- Pressure China and CIS to close military hardware sales.

Economic Aspect:

- Introduce UN economic sanctions resolution to deter IIC; continue unilateral sanctions
- Economic pressure on countries to stop trade of military equipment.

Informational Aspect:

- Stress past causes and results of 1980's Iran-Iraq War.
- Stress legitimacy of Saudi Arabia's guardianship of the Holy Cities.
- Emphasize Iraq's war crimes and atrocities.
- Begin domestic "debate" about Reserve Component call-up.

COA 2: Strengthen friends and allies. Encourage negotiated settlement over Holy Cities issue.

Military Aspect:

Diplomatic Aspect:

Economic Aspect:

Informational Aspect:

Scenario 2: Warfighting Options — IIC increases terrorism, continues force buildup, and clearly indicates intent to attack GCC nation(s). United Nations supports creation of a coalition to oppose IIC and authorizes all means necessary to eliminate threat. IIC may initiate major hostilities.

COA 1: Conduct combined defense of the Arabian Peninsula and prepare for offensive operations, focused on IIC strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Military Aspect:

- Full deployment under OPLAN 1648.
- Combined defense operations to secure strategic and operational LOCs.
- Defend forward to protect ports and airfields.
- Conduct counter-offensive into Iraq and Iran to destroy IIC offensive capability.
- Destroy IIC WMD facilities and programs.

Diplomatic Aspect:

- Solidify coalition forces.
- Active diplomatic effort to forestall attempts to disrupt coalition.
- Diffuse attempt to draw Israel into conflict.

Economic Aspect:

- Enforce sanctions with blockade.
- Seek additional economic pressure on those trading with IIC.

Informational Aspect:

- Major PSYOP to emphasize past grievances between Iran and Iraq.
- Stress legitimacy of Saudi Arabia guardianship role.
- Condemn IIC terrorism and attempts at hegemony.

COA 2: Initiate combined offensive against Iran and Iraq.

Military Aspect:

Diplomatic Aspect:

Economic Aspect:

Informational Aspect:

Tasks, Requirements, and Shortfalls

SCENARIO	TASK	FORCE REQUIREMENTS	CURRENT CAPABILITY	SHORTFALL	CORRECTIVE PROGRAM
Deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish/maintain air superiority - Deter attack -Expand security assistance 				
Warfighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defeat attack -Maintain air superiority - Destroy IIC offensive capability 				

4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

COA	Suitable	Feasible	Acceptable

6. Recommendation

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
United Kingdom	<p>Survival: No.</p> <p>Economic: Yes. Free flow of oil.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes. Regional interests.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Maybe.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: No</p> <p>Economy: Yes, Short term.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Probably.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Yes.</p> <p>Population: Yes.</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Yes Limited deployability.</p> <p>Economic: Yes. Can sustain sanctions.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes. Strong diplomatic corps.</p> <p>Information: Yes.</p>	<p>a. Precedent from 1990-91.</p> <p>b. Strong gov't with extensive knowledge of the region.</p> <p>c. Credibility.</p>	<p>a. Long lines of communications.</p> <p>b. Lack of strategic lift.</p> <p>c. Former colonial power.</p>	<p>a. Support UN sanctions and initiatives.</p> <p>b. Join military coalition, if needed.</p> <p>c. Request strategic lift support.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
France	<p>Survival: No.</p> <p>Economic: Yes. Free flow of oil.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes. Regional interests.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Maybe.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: No.</p> <p>Economy: Yes,</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Probably.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Yes. Strong gov't with experience.</p> <p>Population: Yes</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Yes Limited strategic lift.</p> <p>Economic: Yes.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes. Good diplomatic corps.</p> <p>Information: Yes.</p>	<p>a. Credibility.</p> <p>b. Experience in the region.</p> <p>c. Can sustain sanctions.</p>	<p>a. Long lines of communications.</p> <p>b. Former colonial power.</p> <p>c. Lack of strategic lift.</p>	<p>a. Support UN sanctions and initiatives.</p> <p>b. Support military action, if required.</p> <p>c. Use influence.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Saudi Arabia	<p>Survival: YES!</p> <p>Economic: YES! Vital importance.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Will need help.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: No. Vulnerable.</p> <p>Economy: Yes, Can support allied effort.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: YES!</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: YES!</p> <p>Population: No. Not large enough.</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Yes. Modernized, but ? readiness.</p> <p>Economic: Yes.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes. Has legitimacy of issues. Precedent.</p> <p>Information: Fair.</p>	<p>a. Historical legitimacy of custody of Holy Cities.</p> <p>b. Modernized military, but readiness is uncertain.</p> <p>c. Viewed as moderate by most countries.</p> <p>d. History of generous foreign aid in region.</p>	<p>a. Vulnerable to adverse propaganda after closing Mecca/Medina.</p> <p>b. Proximity to IIC.</p>	<p>a. Defend and, when possible, attack.</p> <p>b. View as life and death struggle.</p> <p>c. Not surrender guardianship of Holy Cities.</p> <p>d. Seek UN and Western nation support.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Oman	<p>Survival: Yes.</p> <p>Economic: Yes.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Will need help.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: No. Vulnerable.</p> <p>Economy: Yes.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Yes.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Yes.</p> <p>Population: No. Small country.</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Fair. Small army.</p> <p>Economic: Yes.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes. Precedent.</p> <p>Information: Fair.</p>	<p>a. Proven diplomatic track record in the region.</p> <p>b. Strong economy, but extremely oil dependent.</p>	<p>a. Small military.</p> <p>b. Very dependent on coalition support.</p>	<p>a. Seek Western support.</p> <p>b. Support GCC efforts against IIC.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Kuwait	<p>Survival: YES!</p> <p>Economic: YES!</p> <p>World Stability: Yes.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Will need help.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: No. Vulnerable.</p> <p>Economy: Yes, unless attacked and oil flow curtailed.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Yes, but possibly fragmented by ethnic divisions.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Probably.</p> <p>Population: Yes, but dependent on ethnic tensions .</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Limited. Small, modern force.</p> <p>Economic: If oil flow continues or out of country investments are available.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes.</p> <p>Information: Limited if attacked.</p>	<p>a. Size and proximity plus atrocities of '90-91 generate natural sympathy and worldwide support.</p> <p>b. Strong economy but very oil dependent.</p> <p>c. Perhaps the "tank ditch" along border with Iraq.</p>	<p>a. Proximity to both Iraq and Iran.</p> <p>b. Small but modern military. Uncertain about training readiness and material sustainment.</p>	<p>a. Desperately seek Western and other Arab nation support.</p> <p>b. Support GCC efforts against IIC.</p> <p>c. Increased diplomatic and informational efforts to generate support and sympathy. Probably hire lobbyists to advance cause.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Egypt	<p>Survival: Not immediate, but perceive long term threat if IIC is successful.</p> <p>Economic: Yes. Desperately needs uninterrupted trade.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes. Islamic discontent may spread.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Must have Western support to participate in any coalition effort.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Geography: Yes/No. Not immediately threatened. Not overly long WP.</p> <p>Economy: No.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Maybe.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Probably strong gov't action and support.</p> <p>Population: Uncertain.</p> <p>Instruments:</p> <p>Military: Limited, small, fairly modern force. Probably will need strategic lift.</p> <p>Economic: No. Will probably need economic support similar to '90-'91.</p> <p>Diplomatic: Yes. Established diplomatic record. Has been involved in Arab issues.</p> <p>Information: Limited.</p>	<p>a. Credibility from role/action in '90-91.</p> <p>b. Controls access to Suez Canal.</p> <p>c. Largely viewed as moderate Arab nation to rest of world.</p>	<p>a. Fragile economy.</p> <p>b. Small, fairly modern military but hasn't been able to afford significant readiness training.</p>	<p>a. Encourage diplomatic solution.</p> <p>b. Participate in coalition action, if Saudi Arabia can diffuse crisis over Holy Cities.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Turkey	<p>Survival: Not immediate threat. Long-term concern over balance of power in region and spin-off on Kurdish issue.</p> <p>Economic: Yes. Needs free flow of oil.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes. Balance of power concerns. Wants to avoid inflaming Kurdish issues.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Yes. Will need economic and military assistance, if participating in armed conflict.</p>	<p>Sources: Geography: Yes. Not immediately threatened, but can threaten north flank of IIC. If granted, access for other coalition forces.</p> <p>Economy: Fair. Cannot sustain long-term hardship resulting from problem.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Uncertain. Depends on how serious the inflaming of their Kurdish problems.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Uncertain.</p> <p>Population: Don't know</p> <p>Instruments: Military: Good armed forces. Will need strategic lift, if joining coalition armed force.</p> <p>Economic: No. Will need assistance similar to '90-91.</p> <p>Information: Uncertain.</p>	<p>a. Geographic location.</p> <p>b. Strong alliance ties to NATO partners.</p> <p>c. Viewed as moderate Islamic nation.</p>	<p>a. Its own Kurdish problem. Internat'l problem which can cause international criticism.</p> <p>b. Will need economic support.</p>	<p>a. Avoid direct military involvement unless more direct threat.</p> <p>b. Focus on containing Kurdish issues.</p> <p>c. Provide landing rights, if supported in other issues.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Israel	<p>Survival: Yes. Will view any change in balance of power as threat to survival.</p> <p>Economic: Probably not.</p> <p>World Stability: Yes. Doesn't need anything to disrupt balance of power or draw attention to Palestinian problems.</p> <p>Relations w/Ally: Generally doesn't want and can't afford challenges to ties with U.S.</p>	<p>Sources: Geography: No. Vulnerable to Scuds and other weapons of mass destruction.</p> <p>Economy: No.</p> <p>Nat'l Will: Yes. To survive at all cost.</p> <p>Nat'l Direction: Yes. Survival dominates. Seems to want peace negotiations to succeed.</p> <p>Population: No. Ethnic tension always a threat. Internal problems can be fueled by other Arabic issues.</p> <p>Instruments: Military: Yes, but only for own defense.</p> <p>Economic: No.</p> <p>Diplomatic: No influence in Arab world.</p> <p>Information: Yes. Ties to U.S. lobby groups.</p>	<p>a. Commitment to survival.</p> <p>b. Strong national defense force.</p>	<p>a. Ongoing and easily inflamed problems with treatment of Palestinians.</p> <p>b. Likely target to try and separate any coalition.</p>	<p>a. Avoid direct confrontation, so long as it perceives U.S. can and will protect from direct attack.</p> <p>b. Avoid/prevent external events from rekindling Arab violence. Maintain peace accords.</p>

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Russia	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Probably. Nat'l Direction: Population: Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
China	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Nat'l Direction: Yes. Population: Yes. Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Jordan	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Nat'l Direction: Population: Yes. Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Iran	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Nat'l Direction: Population: Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
Iraq	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Nat'l Direction: Population: Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

Actor	Interests	Elements of Power	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
	Survival: Economic: World Stability: Relations w/Ally:	Sources: Geography: Economy: Nat'l Will: Nat'l Direction: Population: Instruments: Military: Economic: Diplomatic: Information:			

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C/M/S 500

Reference 4. Practical Exercise Requirement (C/M students only)

1. **Purpose.** This practical exercise requires the staff group to analyze the revised strategic estimate, other applicable strategic guidance, and the scenario's strategic and operational environments in order to gain a consensus determination of the first three operational/campaign planning "imperatives": (1) The "strategic aim" of the campaign; (2) The political, military, and economic conditions that define the desired "end state" of the campaign; and (3) The principal operational (military) objectives that, when accomplished, will achieve or support the achievement of the end-state conditions.

2. **Scenario.**

a. On 20 June 20XX, the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff directed the J3 to activate the command's battlestaff to monitor the situation and plan for future operations. He specifically asked the staff to update the command's strategic estimate within the next 36 hours and to begin campaign planning for joint/combined operations to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (See following text of the Chief's note)

b. The CINC is currently visiting potential coalition partners in the region. He will return to HQ USCENTCOM on 21 June for intelligence and operations update briefings. He leaves for Washington early on the 22d to confer with the President, SecState, SECDEF, CJCS, and probably some key members of Congress. The focus of these discussions will be the developing crisis in the Gulf and potential political, military, and economic options available to the United States.

c. The Chief of Staff wants to provide the CINC an update to the strategic estimate to read during the flight to Washington and to use as a reference document during discussions. Both the CINC and Chief of Staff anticipate that, as a result of these consultations in Washington, the CJCS will publish a Warning Order for USCINCCENT to plan operations for the defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Although the CINC would like to review the entire strategic estimate, he is most interested in receiving the staff's consensus on the strategic aim to be pursued by all the nation's instruments of power, the specific conditions that define the desired end state, and the key military objectives that USCENTCOM must accomplish to achieve that end state. The Chief of Staff, with the J2, J3, and J5 present, intends to present this strategic analysis to the CINC during the few hours he will be available.

d. You are a member of the USCENTCOM Planning Cell which supports the full battlestaff. The Chief, J5 Plans, heads this planning cell. The J5 planners have started to update a strategic estimate using the format at Appendix B of Joint Pub 3-0. Their analysis is based primarily on the "Road to War," the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and the U.S. Security Strategy for the Middle East. Their **incomplete notes** are included in a "draft" Strategic Estimate. Your planning cell should review these notes as a start point in responding to the CINC's concerns.

3. **Requirement.** Respond to the following note from the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff:

Date: 20 June 20XX

Memo For J5, USCENTCOM

From LTG T.H.E. Best, C/S, USCENTCOM

Subject: CINC Update on the Gulf Crisis

I just finished talking to the CINC. He'll be back tomorrow and is looking forward to your analysis of the developing crisis. He will leave almost immediately for Washington for discussions with the NCA/NSC and expects the President will make several decisions about the U.S.'s initial responses to the crisis, particularly its military response. He wants a briefing packet he can use during these discussions that is based on conclusions drawn from the ongoing strategic estimate your staff has been conducting. As you know, the CINC is intimately familiar with the estimate's format and purpose and is likely to ask hard questions about the rationale behind conclusions. He has specifically asked that you provide the following:

a. IIC Intent/Problem Statement: What are the strategic interests/objectives/intentions of the IIC? What do its recent statements and actions imply about its true intentions? Are they a prelude to offensive action or merely a means to pressure the GCC in general and Saudi Arabia in particular to make concessions? If the latter, what are these concessions?

b. Key U.S. interests at risk: Also list the relevant theater objectives (from the CENTCOM strategy) most affected as a result of the threat to those interests.

c. Theater Strategic Objectives/Campaign Objectives/Conflict Termination Objectives (Your briefing should concentrate on this area): Provide the following for two potential scenarios: (1) Successful deterrence (IIC does not attack), and (2) Unsuccessful deterrence (major military action/warfighting):

- The Strategic Aim (Desired political effect; focus of all instruments of power)
- The End State (Political, economic, and military conditions/conflict termination objectives that define successful achievement of the Strategic Aim)
- Operational Objectives (Principal military actions required to achieve the end state)

Remember deterrence is the first mission. In **both** the successful deterrence and "warfighting" scenarios, the strategic aim/end state must resolve the principal threat(s) to U.S. interests that have brought the region to the verge of armed conflict. The CINC has specifically requested that the end state in both scenarios define what constitutes a "stable and secure" regional environment. Be prepared to discuss the costs and benefits of achieving the end states in both scenarios.

d. Recommended military COA: Provide the CINC your considered advice on what military COA or series of military actions USCENTCOM should begin to implement now, e.g., show of force, increase in security assistance, partial deployment, full execution of OPLAN 1648 deployments, etc. Think *strategically*, not tactically, and consider the CINC's Washington audience. Your recommendation will directly affect the President's decisions and contribute to the preparation of the Warning/Alert Order that the Chairman will probably issue in the next few days.

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**Reference 5. Road to War (Continued) up to 10 July and
projected forward through August and early September 20XX**

1. **Disposition.** The IIC has forces of two armies and a separate corps currently poised in assembly areas along the Euphrates River Valley and along the roads leading from Baghdad to Al Basrah. Estimates projecting the IIC build-up based on current information show that more than half of this coalition force is ready for offensive action, and the remaining forces will be closed and ready by the first two weeks of September 20XX. Offensive posturing of combat and sustainment forces is confirmed. The enemy's assembly area is broken into three major areas:

a. The Iraqi Army units are in an area between Al Basrah (3030N, 4800E) and An Nasiriyah (3104N, 4615E). The area is approximately 175 km long from east to west, and 50 km wide from north to south.

b. The Iranian Army units are in an area roughly located between Al Amarah (3150N, 4709E) and Aprifa (3144N, 4607E). The area is approximately 125 km from north to south and 125 km wide from east to west.

c. The elite 1st Iraqi Corps (Governor's Vanguard) is located in an area roughly centered on As Samawah (3118N, 4518E). The area is approximately 50 km wide from east to west and 75 km long from north to south.

2. **Strength.** The IIC currently has a total of 12 divisions positioned in the areas described above or moving toward those areas. In total, Iran and Iraq can field greater than 24 divisions along the Euphrates River within the first two weeks of September (this is not considered likely since this would be all the military units of the coalition). They are assessed to be well-trained to brigade level and at 100 percent manning.

3. **Reinforcements.** The IIC, forming along the Euphrates, is organized into a main body of two separate armies, the Iraqi (Babylonian) Army and the Iranian (Persepolian) Army. The operational reserve will probably be the Iraqi 1st Corps (Governor's Vanguard). However, use of one or more of the other corps within the two armies should not be ruled out. Other available forces, up to eight divisions, for the IIC are committed far to the north as the unstable Kurdish situation continues.

4. **Air Forces.** Iraq has a total of 15 combat squadrons and 4 support squadrons with approximately 400 fighter and ground attack aircraft, 150 support aircraft, and 127 helicopters. Iran has a total of 12 combat squadrons and 5 support squadrons with nearly 500 fighter and ground attack aircraft, 200 support aircraft, and over 500 helicopters. This total is based upon intelligence prior to June 20XX. If the Iran-Iraq War and DESERT STORM are any indication, the IIC will use initial small air strikes to test coalition defenses. If serious resistance is met or losses occur, the IIC will probably conserve its air forces for later use. If the IIC transitions to CIS traditional tactics, then large massed aircraft attacks will be directed at coalition ground forces and targets. Although most IIC aircraft are currently based at airfields in Iran and Iraq,

movement of these aircraft to former Soviet republics sympathetic to the Islamic cause cannot be ruled out should the IIC begin to sustain heavy losses.

5. **Naval Forces.** The naval forces of the IIC are primarily composed of small coastal patrol vessels, but they do possess four Garcia Class destroyers and Iran has acquired three diesel, KILO Class submarines. Iran's acquisitions have also improved their coastal mining and their anti-ship missile capabilities.

6. **Other Forces.** The IIC has deployed an Iranian mechanized infantry brigade onto the island of Jazireh-ye-Qeshm in the Strait of Hormuz. This brigade's artillery battalion is equipped with Chinese silkworm missiles, which accounts for the sinking of a Japanese tanker and discontinuation of shipping. Forward positioning of combat air support squadrons and air reconnaissance presence confirms assessments that IIC intends to maintain control over shipping in the strait.

7. **Logistics.** IIC forces appear to have built up 30-day supply and, at current rates, they are estimated to have a 90-day supply available in early September. Assessment: A 90-day supply is the minimum required to launch an offensive while 30-day is sufficient to defend.

8. **Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons.** Neither Iran or Iraq have a known nuclear warhead. However, both now have the potential to create rounds. Sanctions imposed on both countries during the 1991-20XX timeframe kept the two belligerents from having access to the necessary technology or materials to build nuclear triggers or variable yield warheads. Both countries have the capability to produce both biological and chemical weapons and are believed to have a stockpile of these munitions in their arsenals. Their problems are in the delivery means for these weapons, both reliability and quantity.

9. **Enemy Capabilities/COAs.**

- Attack southeast to take the Persian Gulf coastline, then prepare to attack inland to seize Riyadh.
- Attack south-southeast to take the key cities of Hafar Al Batin and KKMC along the Tapline Road.
- Attack due south towards Riyadh out of contact with coalition forces along the Kuwait border.
- Attack southwest away from defending forces directly for Mecca and Medina.

10. **Conclusion.** IIC likely to wait for cooler September weather and a buildup of supplies to attempt any of the COAs.

Key Events List (20 June - 10 July 20XX):

JUNE 20XX

- Saudi King asks U.S. president to send military forces.
- SOF assets on ground confirm national intelligence assessments of the IIC buildup.
- Saudi King and GCC put GCC forces on border.

JULY 20XX

- GCC three division equivalents in place on defensive line along Kuwait/Saudi Arabia borders with Iraq.
- U.S. president alerts CENTCOM.
- Iran and Iraq declare Holy War on Saudi Arabia to free Mecca and Medina.
- U.S. president requests UN Security Council meeting.

- U.S. president mobilizes forces (M-Day is 5 July 20XX).
- UN Security Council meets.
- CENTCOM staff publishes Deployment Execution Order based on OPLAN 1648.
- 207th ACR deploys into UN neutral zone in Kuwait.
- U.S. forces, including air, land (U.S. XXI Corps) and sea forces, begin deployment (CENTCOM's C-Day: 10 July 20XX).
- CENTCOM orders Marine air-ground task force to steam to vicinity of Strait of Hormuz.
- Iranian brigade takes Jazireh-ye-Qeshm island in Strait of Hormuz.
- Iranian brigade sinks one Japanese tanker and stops other shipping with silkworm missiles.
- U.S. Air Force assets, already in theater, begin bombing of the Iranian brigade's silkworm missile sites as CONUS fighter wings deploy into theater.

JCS PLANNING ORDER

Reference 6

**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900**

IMMEDIATE

101000ZJULXX

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC//CJCS//

TO: AIG 8790

UNCLASSIFIED

OPER/DESERT BLAST//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/JCS PLANNING CONFERENCE//

REF/A/USCINCENT/202319ZJUNXX/OPREP-1PCA/NOTAL//

ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS 94-8//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

NARR/FORCES ALLOCATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX A USCENCOM
OPLAN 1648-XX WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 53D MECH DIV AND THE 25TH AD.
AMPN/SUFFICIENT AERIAL TANKER ASSETS ARE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT THIS
ALLOCATION//

NARR//THIS IS A CJCS PLANNING ORDER. THE NCA HAS DIRECTED THAT
USCENTCOM CONDUCT EXECUTION PLANNING IN PREPARATION FOR
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTION IN SWA AND SUBMIT CAMPAIGN PLAN CONCEPT
FOR NCA CONSIDERATION NLT 251000ZJULXX. USCENCOM OPLAN 1648-XX IS
ACTIVATED FOR DEPLOYMENT ONLY AND WILL BE REVISED AS USCENCOM
OPORD XX-1.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. (U) REPEATED ACTIONS BY THE IRAN IRAQ COALITION (IIC) INDICATE THAT
HOSTILITIES AGAINST KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL (GCC) ARE INCREASINGLY LIKELY. AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS THAT THE
MOST LIKELY IIC COURSE OF ACTION WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE KUWAITI
AND SAUDI ARABIAN OILFIELDS AT SOME FUTURE DATE. THIS WILL BE AN EFFORT
TO RECOVER LOST ECONOMIC POWER AND TO FURTHER DISCREDIT THE GCC AND
SAUDI ARABIA WITH THE EVENTUAL OBJECTIVES OF TAKING OVER KUWAIT AND
SAUDI ARABIA.

2. (U) THE GOVERNMENTS OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE REQUESTED
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO DETER THE IIC THREAT.

3. (U) THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY HAVE
INDICATED THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT U.S. AND GCC RESPONSES TO THE IIC
THREAT.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

4. (U) WHEN DIRECTED, USCENTCOM WILL DEPLOY FORCES WITHIN ITS AOR TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING GCC NATIONS AND, IF REQUIRED, WILL CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH GCC ARMED FORCES TO DESTROY THE IIC OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, TO RESTORE PRECONFLICT INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, AND TO RETURN STABILITY TO THE REGION.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

5. (U) COURSE OF ACTION. US OPERATIONS MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ESTABLISH AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION, OPEN AND MAINTAIN AIR, SEA, AND GROUND LOCS IN THE REGION, PROTECT AND DEFEND AIR AND SEA PORTS IN THE REGION, CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, CONDUCT SEA DENIAL OPERATIONS, PROTECT AND DEFEND ESSENTIAL GCC MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESOURCES AND FACILITIES IN THE REGION, CONDUCT DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, SPECIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FOCUSED ON DISCREDITING THE IIC AND FOMENTING REBELLION AMONG INSURGENT FORCES WITHIN IIC BORDERS. U.S. OPERATIONS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO GCC TERRITORY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE NCA; THE NCA IS DISPOSED TO CONSIDER REASONABLE REQUESTS FAVORABLY.

A. (U) USCENCOM. RECEIVE FORCES SPECIFIED IN USCENCOM OPLAN 1648-XX WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 53D MECH DIV AND 25TH ARMD DIV WHICH WILL REMAIN COMMITTED IN THE EUCOM AOR. COORDINATE AND PREPARE CAMPAIGN PLAN, OPORD, AND OPLAN AS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. DEVELOP AND COORDINATED PLANS FOR OPERATIONS AS A PART OF A COALITION; PROVIDE RECOMMENDED COMMAND STRUCTURE IN FUTURE PLANS. IMMEDIATELY INITIATE AND HOST GCCS/JOPES PLANNING TELECONFERENCE. COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THIS PLAN IS GRANTED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. REVIEW OPTIONS AND PROVIDE JCS WITH ANTICIPATED PSYOP, INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND TARGETING CONCEPTS ASAP.

B. (U) USCINCPAC. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED IN USCENCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, TO USCENCOM. IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER.

C. (U) USCINACOM. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED IN USCENCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, TO USCENCOM. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIR BRIDGE FOR DEPLOYING CARGO AIRCRAFT. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OPERATION GARDEN PLOT IF REQUIRED.

D. (U) USCINCEUR. PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES, AS REQUIRED, TO USCENCOM. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ISRAEL AND TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN GULF AREA. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS IN THE EUCOM AOR. BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AIR BRIDGE FOR DEPLOYING CARGO AIRCRAFT.

E. (U) USCINSPACE. PROVIDE SPACE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. PREPARE TO PROVIDE DSP SUPPORT TO USCENCOM AND USEUCOM.

F. (U) USCINCSOC. PROVIDE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED IN USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.

G. (U) USCINSTRAT. INITIATE TARGET PLANNING PROCEDURES FOR THE AFFECTED REGIONS IMMEDIATELY. DIRLAUTH WITH USCINCCENT.

H. (U) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE TANKER SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES. INITIATE AND HOST GCCS/JPES DEPLOYMENT TELECONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY. PREPARE TO SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES AS REQUIRED IN TPFDD DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

I. (U) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

J. (U) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

K. (U) DLA. PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO PREPARING, DEPLOYING, AND REDEPLOYING FORCES AS REQUIRED.

L. (U) DCS. IMPOSE COMMUNICATIONS MINIMIZE IMMEDIATELY FOR EFFECTED COMMUNICATIONS.

M. (U) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. CJCS ANTICIPATES THAT FORCE MOVEMENTS AND PLANNING ACTIVITIES WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES AND ALLIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE. SOUND OPSEC PROCEDURES WILL BE EXERCISED. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION ARE: (1) WHEN, WHERE, AND IN WHAT STRENGTH WILL U.S. FORCES BE DEPLOYED TO THE GULF REGION. (2) WHICH TYPES OF DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION WILL BE USED BY DEPLOYING FORCES? (3) WILL THE U.S. DEPLOY FORCES TO THE REGION? (4) WILL THE U.S. BE WILLING TO USE FORCE TO DETER AGGRESSION? (5) WILL THE U.S. BE WILLING TO COMMIT FORCES TO THE DEFENSE OF GCC TERRITORY? (6) WHAT ACTIONS WILL THE U.S. TAKE IF ATTACKED? (7) WILL THE U.S. COMMIT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IF UNPROVOKED? (8) WHICH OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION WILL THE U.S. PURSUE? (9) WHEN, WHERE, AND IN WHAT STRENGTH WILL U.S. SPECIAL FORCES BE EMPLOYED?

6. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. (U) C-DAY IS 10 JUL 20XX.

B. (U) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATE ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM IMMEDIATELY.

C. (U) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS WILL ENTER DEPLOYMENT AND PLANNING GCCS/JPES TELECONFERENCES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

D. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF THIS OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 90 DAYS.

E. (U) ROE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.

F. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED. INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AND NMCC AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE ON ALL RECORD TRAFFIC. AIG 1592 IS ESTABLISHED AS THE DESERT BLAST AIG.

G. (U) NO FORCES WILL DEPLOY WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL. REPEAT NO FORCES WILL DEPLOY WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL.//

7. (U) TRANSPORT.
 - A. (U) ANTICIPATED AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY WILL BE 1B2.
 - B. (U) APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR PLANNING ONLY AND IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.
 - C. (U) TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITIES LISTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONAL JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN WILL BE ASSUMED.
8. (U) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA, ORDERS, AND PLANS.
9. (U) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATORS (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.
10. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL CRISIS REPORTING PROCEDURES WILL BE FOLLOWED.
11. (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.
12. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA QUERIES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AND REFERRED TO OASD (PA), DSN 227-5131/5337. NECESSARY ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE FURNISHED BY OASD(PS) BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS.
13. (U) COMBAT CAMERA. COMBAT CAMERA WILL DOCUMENT THIS OPERATION TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPSEC, OR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY WILL PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON THROUGH THE ARFCOS OR OTHER APPROPRIATED TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL//
14. (U) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCENTCOM WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED MOBILE AND TRANSPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCENTCOM PLANS WILL RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS CRISIS.
15. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS DESIGNATED AS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINACOM, USCINTRANS, USCINSPACE, USCINCSTRAT ARE DESIGNATED AS SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. DIRNSA, NIMA, DIA, AND DCS ARE DESIGNATED SUPPORTING AGENCIES.//
DECL/OADR//

INSTRUCTIONAL JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

(IJSCP)

Reference 7

**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900**

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SECTION I INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND.

a. The CGSC academic environment precludes the use of actual plans and documents that form a part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Obviously, such planning documents could contain politically sensitive information. Therefore, most of those documents are classified for operational security and to protect their politically sensitive nature. In keeping with the college mission, however, students must become familiar with the types of joint staff guidance available to commanders of unified and specified commands and chiefs of military Services for accomplishing assigned military tasks. Therefore, this Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP) was developed. To avoid using classified material, some information normally found in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is incorporated into the IJSCP.

b. An actual Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) outlines the nation's military strategy by providing planning guidance and taskings for the upcoming fiscal year to the unified combatant commanders to develop specific plans. In addition to assigning tasks, the JSCP provides planning guidance, apportions major combat forces and strategic transportation assets for each plan, and requires each unified CINC and chiefs of military Services to assess the operational impact of projected manpower and resource requirements necessary to accomplish assigned tasks. Unresolved shortfalls are then identified to the CJCS or possibly higher for resolution.

c. Despite the classified nature of the actual documents, students must become familiar with the types of joint staff guidance available to unified and specified commanders and chiefs of military Services for accomplishing assigned military tasks. The Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP) complements classroom instruction by providing JSCP-type guidance so student planners can gain proficiency in solving planning problems.

d. The IJSCP is a fictional simulation of the real world JSCP and is to be used for CGSC instructional purposes only. This IJSCP supports student planning exercises focused on a fictional crisis scenario within U.S. Central Commands (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It contains guidance for developing plans in support of CGSC planning problems. A number of areas found in a JSCP are listed but not provided in detail. This was done to provide students an understanding of what is in a JSCP and at the same time reduce overall detail. The IJSCP is divided into a number of sections. These sections reasonably correspond to those found in an actual JSCP.

(1) Section I. INTRODUCTION provides a document overview, implementing instructions, and general guidance.

(2) Section II. STRATEGIC SETTING provides guidance on threats, national security and national military objectives, insight into the strategic concept, and regional strategies.

(3) Section III. PLANNING GUIDANCE provides guidance for regional planning, low intensity conflict, logistics and host nation support.

(4) Section IV. FORCES addresses the forces apportioned for planning and strategic transportation assets in support of operational planning.

(5) Section V. REGIONAL PLANS identifies specific planning tasks to the various regional and functional CINCs.

(6) Section VI. CONCLUSIONS discusses critical planning considerations for deterrence, warfighting, uncertainty, deliberate planning, and plan execution.

(7) Annexes, the last portion of the IJSCP, provide essential information in a number of areas that impact on or need to be considered during the planning process.

2. PURPOSE. The IJSCP provides direction and guidance to commanders of unified and specified commands to accomplish tasks and missions by stating the national security objective and basic military objectives. It presents strategic appraisals of major factors that are likely to influence U.S. strategy during its effective period and it provides strategic planning guidance.

3. SCOPE.

a. IJSCP is a single volume that includes planning guidance, tasks, and forces. It is accompanied by a number of annexes and is effective for USCENTCOM planning requirements.

b. Much of the data relevant to other combatant commands but not relevant to the USCENTCOM planning requirements are not included herein.

c. The IJSCP supports and further defines and refines the National Military Strategy (NMS).

d. The timeframe portrayed by this document is FY 199_, where the blank is as indicated in the college planning exercises.

4. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Planning will be conducted per this document and the college curriculum schedule.

b. Commanders are responsible for preparation of current plans for the execution of tasks assigned in Section V of this document. These tasks conform with the planning guidance in Sections III, V, and VI and may be further amplified in follow-on guidance.

c. Tasks assigned in Section V are requirements for planning operations, or other actions, by combatant commanders. Plans are categorized as operation plans or concept summaries.

(1) Operation plans are prepared in either complete format (OPLAN), concept format (CONPLAN), or concept summary.

(2) Operation plans include disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, protection of U.S. civilians, nuclear weapons recovery, and continuity of operations.

d. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOPES Volume I (Joint Pub 5-03.1, to be renamed CJCSM 3122.01) outlines the deliberate planning process and gives guidance for

preparation/submission of operation plans and review of operation plans. JOPES Volume II (CJCSM 3122.03) contains planning and execution formats and guidance. CJCSM 3122.02 (TPFDD Manual)

describes building, refining and maintaining force deployment databases for Deliberate and Crisis Action planning. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functions guidance are contained in the supplement (classified) to JOPES Volume II, named CJCSM 3122.04.

e. A single plan may suffice for related operations.

f. All plans must conform with domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict and international agreements that are binding on the United States.

5. GENERAL GUIDANCE. In DJMO planning problems, students may assume accomplishment of planning responsibilities normally assigned the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; USTRANSCOM components; and other DOD agencies. Students are responsible for integrating specific Service planning responsibilities set forth in CGSC instruction.

a. The NCA directs the combatant commanders. The CJCS passes NCA directives to the combatant commanders. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) provides strategic communications from the NCA and CJCS to the combatant commanders.

b. During both the planning and conduct of operations, commanders will exercise command IAW guidance in the UCP and Joint Pub 0-2.

c. Unified commanders coordinate with American embassies within their geographic borders for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. In carrying out that duty, unified commanders:

(1) Prepare necessary military supporting plans.

(2) Prepare necessary operation plans.

(3) Cooperate with chiefs of diplomatic missions in planning.

(4) Implement military plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants as required.

d. All operation plans will include proposed command structure and command relationships.

e. Non-U.S. military forces will be employed IAW multilateral or bilateral agreements or as directed by the NCA.

f. Within the guidelines in subparagraphs a. and b. above, supported commanders will assess the capability of non-U.S. military forces that could contribute to accomplishing assigned tasks for inclusion in operation plans.

g. Non-U.S. military forces of the host government should accomplish major efforts, but U.S.

unilateral support will be tailored to maximize the full capability of host government forces.

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Ref 7-I-4

h. Changes from previous JSCP.

(1) General. Since late 1989, events in Europe and Southwest Asia have brought about a transformation in the international security environment. Along with other events a shift in U.S. military strategy and associated deliberate planning had to be made, resulting in a new framework for operational planning.

(2) New Framework for Operational Planning. The new national security environment requires a much more flexible, adaptive approach to planning for the use of military force in pursuit of U.S. national security objectives.

(a) Regional threats have become the central basis for U.S. conventional planning. This IJSCP emphasizes regional planning as a top priority and directs that the Base Case Global Family of Plans be retained, but, until further notice, not maintained.

(b) The guidance in this IJSCP focuses attention on developing a wide spectrum of options for responding to a variety of possible crisis conditions. These options are labeled Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), Deploy Decisive Force, and Counterattack.

(3) Prioritization of Work. As a planning guide, the following lists the prioritization of work:

(a) Major Theater War (MTW) plans.

(b) Most likely Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) plans.

(c) Concept Summary for the second of two concurrent MTWs that develop sequentially.

(d) Remaining SSC plans.

(4) Prioritization for Training. Because of multiapportioned forces for regional planning, the following prioritization guidelines give an appropriate focus for training readiness.

(a) Units should train first to the operation plan in which they are an early deployer.

(b) If a unit is an early deployer to more than one operation plan, it should train to its MTW plan.

(c) Commanders may use the guidance or tasks in the IJSCP to assist in deriving Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLS).

i. Forces available for planning.

(1) Forces approved by the CGSC faculty for insertion in this publication are available for planning purposes per guidance in Sections IV, V, and VI.

(2) Availability of reserve forces is based on the given mobilization assumptions.

(3) (Unless otherwise directed) Services will publish a list of combat support and combat service support forces available to each CINC. The list will be based on the need to support major combat forces made available for planning.

j. Shortfall identification. Per JOPES procedures, supported commanders will report unresolved shortfalls to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an assessment of associated risks and the threat that can be met.

k. Command relationships. Forces apportioned for planning will remain under the command of their providing organization until specified otherwise by the National Command Authorities.

SECTION II STRATEGIC SETTING

1. GENERAL.

a. The National Security Strategy. The primary goal of U.S. foreign policy issue since the 1970s has been to develop a framework of durable peace and economic stability throughout the world. Emphasis has been placed on multilateral economic assistance and freer trade between nations to effectively bring about economic change, development, and social justice. The premise underlying the above aims is that the United States will continue to play a leading role in world affairs, never a preponderant role. The national security strategy's three core objectives are:

- (1) To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
- (2) To bolster America's economic prosperity.
- (3) To promote democracy abroad.

b. The following national strategic priorities are established to advance these core national security objectives:

- (1) Foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe.
- (2) Create a stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community.
- (3) Prosper in the global economy.
- (4) Be an unrelenting force for peace.
- (5) Move strongly to counter growing dangers to our security: WMD, terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.
- (6) Maintain a strong and ready military.

c. The National Military Strategy. This IJSCP implements, through the deliberate planning process, the National Military Strategy (NMS). A detailed account of the strategic setting can be found in the NMS. The following summary relates aspects of deliberate planning to that setting and strategy.

2. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. The Strategy — Shape, Respond, Prepare Now. Our National Military Strategy depends first and foremost upon the United States remaining secure from external threats. A secure homeland is fundamental to U.S. global leadership; however, it is not the only prerequisite. To protect and promote U.S. national interests, our national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and, when necessary, to Defeat Adversaries that threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies. U.S. Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power to Shape the international environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crises, while we Prepare Now for an uncertain future.

3. NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

a. Promote Peace and Stability. Promoting peace and stability means creating and sustaining security conditions globally and, in key regions, allowing the peaceful pursuit of our interests and the just resolution of international problems through political means. This does not imply a resistance to change; rather, it underscores a desire for peaceful change. Pursuit of this objective supports the President's 1997 National Security Strategy by ensuring that no critical region is dominated by a power hostile to the United States and that regions of greatest importance to the U.S. are stable and at peace. Such stability reduces the likelihood of widespread conflict and allows the pursuit of our interests by other instruments of national power. Where a potential regional hegemony threatens our interests and those of our allies through the buildup or use of armed forces, U.S. military power may be concentrated to assure allies and friends, redress the imbalance, and deter or defeat aggression. Where the risk to peaceful political intercourse stems from other sources, U.S. forces may conduct operations or otherwise contribute to efforts that seek to prevent conflict and reduce threats. Our role as a global leader is underscored by U.S. forces performing tasks that encourage other nations to resolve problems through negotiation and compromise rather than by aggression and intimidation.

b. Defeat Adversaries. In the event of armed conflict, U.S. Armed Forces will render an adversary incapable of armed resistance through destruction of his capacity to threaten our interests or by breaking his will to do so. This sets the military conditions for winning the peace. In conducting combat operations, the United States will use all means available, commensurate with the national interest at stake, the risks involved, and international law. We will endeavor to commit decisive force to ensure that we achieve the objectives established by the NCA and conclude hostilities in the shortest time possible and on terms favorable to the United States.

4. ELEMENTS of the STRATEGY: SHAPE, RESPOND, PREPARE NOW.

a. U.S. Armed Forces pursue these national military objectives in support of the President's integrated approaches of shaping, responding, and preparing now, which synchronize all elements of national power to achieve our security objectives. Our use of military force should be guided by several considerations. First, military force should be used judiciously and decisively. Military missions must be clearly stated, with achievable military objectives that support national political aims. Second, on most occasions, our forces will operate as a joint team, harmonizing the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services. Third, while retaining unilateral capability, whenever possible we must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths. Finally, we must ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement and withdrawing military forces are clearly established.

b. Shaping the International Environment. U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion.

c. Promoting Stability. Through peacetime engagement activities, U.S. Armed Forces promote regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure

global environment. The commanders-in-chief of our unified commands, based on guidance from the NCA and CJCS, develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional security objectives.

(1) Our international exercise program is one such activity. Exercises enhance interoperability and readiness and demonstrate our ability to form and lead effective coalitions. They demonstrate our capabilities and resolve to friends and potential adversaries alike. They provide realistic conditions for working with the technologies, systems, and operational procedures that will be crucial in times of crisis. International exercises also provide geographic familiarity and foster an understanding of cultures, values, and habits of other societies. Exercises encourage burden sharing on the part of friends and allies, and facilitate regional integration.

(2) Through other engagement activities, such as information sharing and a wide range of contacts between our military and the defense establishments of other nations, we promote trust and confidence and increase the security of our allies, partners, and friends. Partnership for Peace, defense cooperation activities, foreign military sales, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and other programs establish long-term professional relationships between our Armed Forces and the future military leadership of other countries. Military-to-military contacts with countries that are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes build constructive security relationships, help to promote the appropriate role of armed forces in a democratic society, and enhance stability.

d. Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats. Conflict prevention means the reduction, mitigation, or neutralization of the causes of conflict. Though the military by itself can rarely address the root causes of conflict — as it often stems from political, economic, social, and legal conditions that are beyond the core competence of the military to resolve — military forces can provide a degree of fundamental security and use their unique operational and logistical capabilities to help civil initiatives succeed. Such military operations can have important strategic value when they promote the overall stability the U.S. seeks, thus reducing the need for greater military effort later.

(1) The U.S. effort to prevent conflict and reduce threats includes arms control measures as an essential part. Verifiable arms control agreements, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, help reduce tensions and dangers. Military resources are an important component of this effort, particularly in the conduct of reciprocal inspection, verification, and, in some cases, enforcement activities. Bringing worldwide arsenals into conformity with international nonproliferation standards helps to reduce uncertainty about potential threats and allows countries to direct resources to safer, more productive relations. The United States remains committed to our obligations under bilateral and international arms control agreements. Expanding arms control efforts to address the use or possession of WMD, the development of WMD technology, and the control and transfer of fissionable materiel are also extremely important to enhancing U.S. security.

e. Peacetime Deterrence. Deterrence means preventing potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions that threaten our interests, allies, partners, or friends. It is the military's most important contribution to the shaping element of the President's strategy. Deterrence rests in large part on our demonstrated ability and willingness to defeat potential adversaries and deny them their strategic objectives. Our deterrence capability gives allies and friends the confidence necessary for normal political discourse and peaceful resolution of differences. The critical elements of deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities: forces and equipment strategically positioned; our capability to rapidly project and concentrate military power worldwide; our ability to form and lead effective military coalitions; and our capacity to protect our homeland, forces, and critical infrastructure from the full range of potential threats. Our

strategic nuclear forces complement our conventional capabilities by deterring any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests. Our nuclear forces may also serve to convince such leaders that attempting to seek a nuclear advantage would be futile.

f. Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises. Given the strategic environment, the U.S. military undoubtedly will be called upon to respond to crises across the full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning MTWs and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies. U.S. forces must be able to respond to crises from a posture of global engagement. In the event of a major theater war the United States will need to be extremely selective in undertaking substantial engagement activities and smaller-scale contingency operations. More than likely, we would have to disengage from activities and operations not deemed vital in order to better posture our forces to deter or defeat aggression in a second major theater war. A credible U.S. force-in-being, despite multiple demands, is a key stabilizing influence in the world. Responding to multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and, therefore, either unable or perceived as unable to respond to more critical threats.

g. Deterring Aggression or Coercion in Crisis. The first response in any crisis normally consists of steps to deter an adversary so the situation does not require a greater U.S. response. This generally involves signaling our commitment by enhancing our warfighting capability in a theater or by making declarative statements to communicate U.S. intentions and the potential cost of aggression to an adversary. We may also choose to emphasize our resolve by responding in a limited manner, for example, by enforcing sanctions or conducting limited strikes. The deterrent posture and activities of our armed forces ensure we remain prepared for conflict should deterrence fail.

h. Fighting and Winning Major Theater Wars. As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. For the time being, we face this challenge in the Arabian Gulf region and in Northeast Asia. However, even should these challenges diminish, this capability is critical to maintaining our global leadership role. Lack of such a capability would signal to key allies our inability to help defend mutual interests, thus weakening our alliances and coalitions. Because such weakness would not escape the attention of potential adversaries, it might make two simultaneous crises more likely. U.S. commitment to one crisis would present the opportunity, otherwise unrealized, for another aggressor to act. Even more dangerous, it could inhibit the United States from responding to a crisis promptly enough, or even at all, for fear of committing our only forces and thereby making us vulnerable in other regions of the world. The capability to fight two major theater wars initiated in rapid succession is of critical importance as it helps deter opportunism, promote stability, and provides the depth and flexibility to deal with unanticipated challenges.

(1) In this regard, a particularly challenging requirement associated with fighting and winning major theater wars is being able to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two theaters in close succession, one followed almost immediately by another. Maintaining this capability is absolutely critical to our ability to seize the initiative in both theaters and to minimize the amount of territory our allies and we must regain from aggressors. Failure to halt an enemy invasion rapidly would make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory much more difficult, lengthy, and costly. Such failure would also weaken coalition support, undermine U.S. credibility, and increase the risk of conflict elsewhere.

i. Conducting Multiple, Concurrent Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations. Future challenges to our interests will likely require use of our forces in a wide range of concurrent operations short of major

theater war. Swift action by military forces may sometimes be the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflict, thereby precluding greater effort and increased risk later. Using some of our unsurpassed

capabilities in the pursuit of common interests and values demonstrates leadership and encourages confidence and greater contributions by others, reducing the demand on us in the long run. U.S. military forces provide a full array of capabilities that can be tailored to give the NCA many options in pursuing our interests. Our capacity to perform shows of force, limited strikes, opposed interventions, no-fly zone and sanctions enforcement operations, interposition or observation operations, and other missions allows us to deter would-be aggressors and control the danger posed by rogue states. U.S. forces can perform peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations, and can evacuate noncombatants from dangerous situations, whether opposed or unopposed. U.S. forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security partners, using all means authorized by the President and the Congress, to counter international terrorism at home and abroad. Unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct and indirect threats to the U.S. homeland, such as the illegal drug trade, especially when the potential for violence exceeds the capability of domestic agencies.

j. Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future. As we move into the next century, it is imperative that the United States maintain the military superiority essential to our global leadership. To be able to respond effectively in the future, we must transform U.S. combat capabilities and support structures, but while we do so, our forces must remain engaged worldwide and ready to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Success demands a stabilized investment program in robust modernization that exploits the RMA. It also requires fundamental reengineering of our infrastructure and streamlining of our support structures through the RBA to realize the cost efficiencies necessary to recapitalize the force. Though difficult to accomplish, such tasks are essential to reaching new levels of joint warfighting effectiveness.

(1) JV 2010 is the conceptual template for joint operations and warfighting in the future. It provides the azimuth for the Services' visions, thus ensuring the future interoperability of the joint force. Because we will often act in concert with like-minded nations, as we implement JV 2010 we must also retain interoperability with our allies and potential coalition partners. This vision of future capabilities guides our warfighting requirements and procurement, and focuses technological development. JV 2010's key enablers of information superiority and technological innovation will transform the current concepts of maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics into the new operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. Turning these concepts into reality will help us to conduct decisive operations in any environment, a characteristic JV 2010 calls "full spectrum dominance." JV 2010 rests on the foundations of information superiority and technological innovation.

k. Information Superiority. Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of precise and reliable information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. While it is dependent upon superior technology, systems integration, organization, and doctrine, it is not an inherent quality but, like air superiority, must be achieved in the battlespace through offensive and defensive information operations. Information superiority yields battlespace awareness, an interactive, shared and highly accurate picture of friendly and enemy operations as they occur. Information superiority allows our commanders to employ widely dispersed joint forces in decisive operations, engage and reengage with the appropriate force, protect the force throughout the battlespace, and conduct tailored logistical support.

l. Technological Innovation. As we reshape our forces to meet the challenges of a changing world, we will leverage emerging technologies to enhance the capabilities of our servicemen and women through development of new doctrine, organizations, material, and training. Development and acquisition of new systems and equipment will improve our ability to conduct decisive operations and achieve full spectrum dominance. However, they are not a panacea. We must recognize that each includes inherent vulnerabilities, each must be applicable across the range of operations, and each must enhance the human capability of our forces.

m. Balanced Evolution. The fundamental challenge for our Armed Forces is to shape and respond in the current and near-term security environment while we concurrently prepare for the future. Because our forces are engaged worldwide every day, their transformation to achieve the new capabilities described in JV 2010 is necessarily evolutionary. Through a rigorous process of experimentation, assessment, refinement, and doctrinal development, we can meet our responsibility to maintain ready forces today while taking steps to transform those forces to be superior tomorrow. This transformation of our forces is not a choice between people and technology, but about how to integrate the strengths of both to give the Nation the best possible military capability. It involves much more than the acquisition of new military systems. It means harnessing new technologies to give U.S. forces greater military capabilities through advanced concepts, doctrine, and organizations so that they can dominate any future battlespace.

5. **STRATEGIC CONCEPTS.**

a. Strategic concepts are key ideas that govern our use of military force and forces as we execute the strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now. These ideas are also important considerations that guide how our forces are trained, equipped, and organized.

b. Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is the timely concentration, employment, and sustainment of U.S. military power anywhere at our own initiative, at a speed and tempo that our adversaries cannot match. Our forces must be able to seize and maintain the momentum of operations rapidly to meet multiple demands in an uncertain and complex strategic environment. Strategic agility requires our Armed Forces to be versatile, that is, to conduct multiple missions simultaneously across the full range of military operations in geographically separated regions of the world. This versatility, and the equally important abilities to orchestrate, command, control and support dispersed joint forces, permit the decisive application of our strengths against enemy weaknesses. Strategic agility is essential if we are to remain globally engaged but not find ourselves improperly positioned or otherwise unable to respond to crises.

c. Overseas Presence. Overseas presence is the visible posture of U.S. forces and infrastructure strategically positioned forward, in, or near key regions. Permanently stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forces promote security and stability, prevent conflict, give substance to our security commitments, and ensure our continued access. Overseas presence enhances coalition operations by promoting joint and combined training and encouraging responsibility sharing on the part of friends and allies. Overseas presence contributes to deterrence by demonstrating our determination to defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests in critical regions while enabling the U.S. to rapidly concentrate military power in the event of crisis. The presence of our forces provides commanders with a flexible array of options to respond promptly to aggression. Overseas presence forces embody global military engagement. They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects U.S. interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic development.

d. Power Projection. Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain U.S. forces in and from multiple, dispersed locations. Complementing overseas presence, power

projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Power projection assets are tailored to regional requirements and send a clear signal of U.S. commitment. Being able to project power means being able to act even when we have no permanent presence or infrastructure in a region. If necessary, it means fighting our way into a denied theater or creating and protecting forward operating bases. The ability to assemble and move to, through, and between a variety of environments, often while reconfiguring to meet specific mission requirements, is essential to offsetting an adversary's advantages in mass or geographic proximity. Global power projection provides our national leaders with the options they need to respond to potential crises.

e. Decisive Force. Decisive force is the commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm all armed resistance in order to establish new military conditions and achieve political objectives. In cases not involving armed resistance, decisive force means that U.S. forces will be wholly sufficient to accomplish the full scope of their military tasks. Decisive force in the early stages of a crisis can be critical to deterring aggression. The concept does not promise quick or bloodless solutions to military challenges, but does require that, where the actual commitment of military power is anticipated, such force will be clearly superior to that of any potential adversary.

SECTION III PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. GENERAL.

With the end of the Cold War and resulting changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, many of the traditional planning concepts of previous IJSCPs are ill-suited for contemporary contingency planning. It has become clear from an assessment of these changes and from the lessons of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM that fixed values assigned to planning assumptions for warning and political decisions regarding force movements, reserve call up, mobilization, and other executive emergency measures, while necessary to develop operational plans, may and most likely will change at execution. What is also fairly clear, and critically important to recognize and plan for, is that crisis response always entails an element of risk encompassing diplomatic, political, economic, and military considerations. Because of this, warning time or, more correctly stated, available response time is far more likely to be well used by key decision makers if they have a menu of discriminate preplanned response options from which to choose, gauged to a range of crises.

2. PLANNING FLEXIBILITY GUIDANCE.

a. Therefore, this IJSCP introduces the concept of adaptive planning. Its premise is that a crisis can arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of likely or possible responses. Accordingly, the IJSCP assigns planners the task of developing several response options keyed to a specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. Although CINC's are directed in Section V to apply these concepts to specific tasks and develop options considering specific threats, the intent is to produce plans varied and flexible enough so they can be applied and with some modification adapted to unforeseen regional threats or unexpected contingencies as well.

b. Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begins with multiple deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to avoid the classic response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. These deterrent-oriented early response options are called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).

(1) FDOs using military forces and resources should be combined with diplomatic, political, and economic actions by non-DOD agencies to demonstrate to a potential adversary a clear signal of U.S. resolve. Therefore, during the planning process, CINC's will plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, political, and economic options as well as military options. The intent is to give the NCA a wide range of options, encompassing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military). Examples of diplomatic, political, economic, and military options are shown on Pages III-18 to III-20.

(2) All regional operation plans will have FDOs. It is expected that FDOs will have a regional flavor, uniqueness, or variation. It is also expected that certain FDOs will be linked to actions not under the direct purview of the supported CINC, such as lift staging and readiness upgrades in CONUS. For the most part, as initial military responses, plans for flexible deterrent options should use active, in-place forces and theater lift assets (Case 1 forces). Some portions of the augmentation forces listed in the Case 2 force list (early deployers for Deploy-to-Fight Option) may be used. It is envisioned that a single FDO should be approximately brigade, squadron, or battle group size. Combat support and combat service support should be furnished primarily by active-duty support forces.

(3) In planning FDOs, CINCs should avoid placing forces in a position where they may be sacrificed if a potential adversary is not deterred. In addition, FDOs should facilitate escalating to the deploy-decisive force response should it appear that signaling of resolve has not been effective. Finally, FDOs should also be capable of rapid de-escalation should the crisis appear defused.

(4) To facilitate the review of these FDOs, CINCs will include them as part of their CINC's Strategic Concept for each operation plan during concept review per the appropriate CJCSM 3122.03 (old JOPES Volume II) format. The description of these options will include anticipated mobilization and transportation enhancements, if required.

c. Deploy-Decisive Force. If decision makers elect not to make a response or an adversary may not be deterred by FDOs, planners must prudently plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrent perspective) resulting from the receipt of unambiguous warning. These actions must include the rapid deployment to the crisis region initially of a sufficient and supportable warfighting force to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to end the conflict quickly.

d. Counterattack. There is also the distinct possibility that a crisis would begin with an attack against U.S. forces or vital interests without prior warning or deterrent moves. U.S. force deployments would, therefore, not occur until after conflict had been initiated. The CINC may consider using an existing plan as a common reference for a point of departure, saving valuable time and permitting execution to begin almost immediately. Thus, such a concept for the deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces will be included in the MTW plans directed in Section V.

e. Specific Guidance for Adaptive Planning and TPFDDs. In general, adaptive planning OPLANs required in Section V will have a Deploy-Decisive Force TPFDD that includes the Presidential Selected Reserve callup and partial mobilization. For TPFDD development, the ordering of cases within the force tables (Cases 1 to 4) does not preclude the CINC from sequencing forces as required to meet his concept of operations with decisive force. The intent of sequencing force apportionment in these cases is to furnish a regional focus to forces, minimize multiapportionment of early deployers, and offer the flexibility of having plans to respond to other contingencies.

2. DELIBERATE PLANNING for TWO NEAR SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR THEATER WARS (MTWs) THAT DEVELOP SEQUENTIALLY.

Major regional threats to U.S. interests could occur in a number of different places. Because potential foes could consider U.S. involvement in one crisis as affecting our ability to protect interests elsewhere, plans should support the possibility of two concurrent major theater wars. Planning for two concurrent MTWs does not mean that our military strategy is designed to fight multiple wars. It simply enables us to deter an adversary or defend vital national interests in a theater while our attention is focused elsewhere. The NCA will establish priorities and decide on deployment or redeployment of forces based on global strategic requirements at the time of execution. Under these circumstances a CINC will prepare a CONCEPT SUMMARY dealing with the consequences, requirements, constraints, and shortfalls of executing the second of two concurrent MTWs.

4. DELIBERATE PLANNING for SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCIES (SSC).

SSC plans are for operations against a less compelling threat than those involved in an MTW. Thus, an

SSC is limited in scale and duration and involves primarily active forces mainly for crises and conflicts like URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE. Nevertheless, where appropriate, plans for SSCs will adopt the adaptive planning structures described in this section. CINCs planning for SSCs can plan to use some reserve forces where and when they consider it appropriate and necessary to move a force. CINCs must clearly identify the circumstances where this use will be required in their SSC plans. Section V further explains assumptions for both MTWs and SSCs.

5. PLANNING for NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, and CHEMICAL WARFARE.

All plans developed at CGSC will be based on the assumption that opponents neither possess NBC weapons nor will obtain them for the duration of the planning period. While it may be argued that this is an unrealistic assumption, time constraints preclude adding this complex issue to an already difficult planning task.

6. PLANS for MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW).

For this planning period, specific areas of interest are Operational Training and Deployments, Security Assistance, Protection of U.S. Citizens Abroad (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and Combating Terrorism), Combating Drugs, and Humanitarian Assistance. CJCSI Supplemental Instruction 13, "Military Operations Other Than War," contains general guidance and considerations for planning in these areas.

7. ACCESS and HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

Any U.S. operation may require access by U.S. forces to lines of communication and facilities not in U.S. territory, air space, or territorial waters. Plan for allied contributions to logistics, lift, administration, rear area security, medical, and C3I support, and allied combat forces, whenever feasible. Specific assumptions for regional and global tasks are found in Sections V and VI, respectively.

8. LOGISTICS.

a. General. Guidance and planning factors for support, materiel sustainment, and strategic mobility are found in Sections IV, V, and VI and CJCSI Instructions, 2, 10 and 12.

b. Threat Distribution. As a result of lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, plans will include, as much as practicable, guidance distributing the threat among Service components and identifying the expected duration of each phase of the operation. Deliberate threat distribution in joint operations is to ensure those resources support the CINC's Strategic Concept as it applies to the joint force as a whole. Independent resourcing by Service component commands that does not take into account the operational contributions of all Service component commands, collectively, or the expected duration of specific phases of the operation may place unacceptable strains on critical strategic lift assets and can impede the closure of forces.

9. THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS (TEP).

Theater engagement plans will be developed by all regional CINCs. Current national military strategy and national strategic goals will be incorporated into these plans. They will be tailored to fit each theater of operations and areas of responsibility.

DIPLOMATIC FDOs

ALERT & INTRODUCE SPECIAL TEAMS - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY - MTT - COMMUNICATIONS	PREPARE TO WITHDRAW U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL REDUCE NATIONAL EMBASSY PERSONNEL
REDUCE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC TIES	TAKE ACTIONS TO WIN SUPPORT OF ALLIES
ENCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS TO PRESSURE RESOLVE THE CRISIS	INCREASE CULTURAL GROUP PRESSURE TO
INITIATE NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION	PURSUE MEASURES TO INCREASE REGIONAL SUPPORT
PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS	IDENTIFY THE NATIONAL LEADER WHO MAY BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE STEPS TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION	COORDINATE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
RESTRICT ACTIVITIES OF DIPLOMATS	USE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ALTER EXISTING MEETINGS, PROGRAMS OR SCHEDULES	DEVELOP OR WORK WITHIN AN EXISTING COALITION (AVOID UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHEN POSSIBLE)
HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS DIRECTED AT - THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - THE PEOPLE WITHIN THE NATION - THE ALLIES OF THE OPPONENT - THE COALITION FORMED TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS	SHOW INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE

INFORMATIONAL

HEIGHTEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT	HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS
GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT	COORDINATED EFFORTS TO INFORM: - QUICKLY - HONESTLY
TAKE MEASURES TO INCREASE PUBLIC SUPPORT	- WITHIN SECURITY RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE CRISIS
GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT	TAKE STEPS TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC
MAINTAIN AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH THE PRESS	KEEP SELECTED ISSUES AS LEAD STORIES
PROMOTE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS	

ECONOMIC FDOs

FREEZE MONETARY ASSETS IN THE U.S.	ENCOURAGE CORPORATIONS TO RESTRICT TRANSACTIONS
SEIZE REAL PROPERTY IN THE U.S.	REDUCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FREEZE INTERNATIONAL ASSETS WHERE POSSIBLE	HEIGHTEN INFORMATIONAL EFFORTS DIRECTED AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
EMBARGO GOODS AND SERVICES	QUESTIONING THE SOUNDNESS OF CONTINUING ACTIONS WITH THE OPPONENTS BUSINESSES
ENACT TRADE SANCTIONS	REDUCING OR ELIMINATING CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
REDUCE U.S.-FUNDED PROGRAMS	

MILITARY FDOs

EMPLOY READILY IN-PLACE ASSETS	MOVE MPS TO REGION
UPGRADE ALERT STATUS	DEPLOY SURFACE ACTION GROUP TO REGION
INCREASE STRATEGIC	RECON DEPLOY CVBG TO REGION
DEPLOY AWACS TO REGION	START CONTINGENCY FORCE DEPLOY ACTIONS
INCREASE COLLECTION EFFORTS	BEGIN MOVING FORCES TO APOEs/SPOEs
INITIATE OR INCREASE SHOW OF FORCE ACTIONS	MOVE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE TO REGION
EMPLOY ELECTRONIC MEASURES	DEPLOY THE FORWARD DEPLOYED ARG/MEU TO THE REGION
AIRCRAFT FLY-OVERS	ACTIVATE PROCEDURES TO BEGIN RESERVE CALLUP
INCREASE EXERCISE ACTIVITIES, SCHEDULES AND SCOPE	PRE-STAGE OR DEPLOY CONTINGENCY READY BRIGADES
INCREASE MILITARY EXCHANGES AND STAFF VISITS TO THE AREA	INCREASE THE USE OF SOF FACILITIES -SPECIALLY DESIGNED TEAMS
INCREASE NAVAL PORT CALLS OR AIR SQUADRON VISITS TO THE AREA	PRESTAGE AIRLIFT
INCREASE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	PRESTAGE AIRLIFT SUPPORT ASSETS
IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY PERSONNEL RETIREMENTS, LEAVES,	PRESTAGE SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT RECEPTION ASSETS TO APOEs/SPOEs

INSTITUTE PROVISIONS OF EXISTING HOST
NATION AGREEMENTS

OPEN PREPO STOCKAGE FACILITIES
USE NAVAL OR AIR CAPABILITY TO
ENFORCE SANCTIONS

EMPLACE LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE
WHERE POSSIBLE

OPEN AND SECURE SLOCs/ALOCs

INCREASE PSYOPS/MISSION AWARENESS
DEPLOY TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS

SECTION IV FORCES

1. SECTION DESCRIPTION. Section IV of the IJSCP deals with forces and general strategic considerations and guidance. The information is generally limited to an appraisal of the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, its strategic importance, and possible impact on the roles of U.S. military forces.

a. Strategic forces and general purpose forces comprise American military strength.

(1) Strategic forces are the primary deterrent to nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies. They compel an aggressor who is contemplating less than an all-out attack to recognize the unacceptable risk of escalation, and they reduce the likelihood of intimidation. Our strategic forces are based on a doctrine of strategic sufficiency, that is, sufficient force to inflict a level of damage that will deter a potential aggressor from attacking. "Strategic sufficiency" also means possession of available forces that are adequate in quantity and that have the qualitative characteristics to maintain a stable strategic balance despite technological and numerical changes.

(2) General purpose forces, on the other hand, are essential because they must cover the range of conflicts that strategic forces alone can deter. If general purpose forces are weak, aggression by conventional means and attempts by political coercion might seem inviting. To minimize those possibilities, U.S. general purpose forces are manned and equipped so they can meet a major threat to American and allied interests in Europe or Asia and simultaneously cope with a minor contingency elsewhere. The presence of potentially hostile countries in Asia and Europe requires counterpoising allied forces that are capable of maintaining a successful defense in either theater until reinforced.

2. SECTION OUTLINE.

a. **PART 1. GENERAL APPORTIONMENT INFORMATION.** Quantitatively, fewer forces are available during FYXX than the objective force levels recommended, but those forces are considered adequate to support U.S. strategy within the limits of prudent military risk.

(1) Major Combat Forces available to unified commanders for planning are shown.

(2) Where possible, missions and tasks will be accomplished with assigned forces. If required, augmentation and supporting forces will be kept to a minimum consistent with sound military strategy and operational considerations.

(3) Planned active force disposition is shown in Tables IV-4 through IV-6. Required combat support and combat service support forces will be requested by component commanders through Service channels.

(4) Forces specified for use in operation plans will not exceed those authorized in the force tables in a given situation.

<p>NOTE: Forces are not assigned to a unified commander by the IJSCP. Assignment of Forces to the various CINCs is promulgated semi-annually by a separate JCS secretarial memorandum (SM).</p>

(5) Supported commanders who determine during planning that forces made available or assigned are inadequate shall advise the JCS as expeditiously as possible regarding:

- (a) Force and materiel shortfalls.
- (b) Estimate of risk as a result of shortfalls.
- (c) Estimate of threat level.
- (d) Recommended changes in tasks, if appropriate.

(6) JCS approval of an operation plan constitutes a de facto approval of forces planned. Actual force levels may be altered, however, at the time a plan is executed.

(7) The JCS will direct the assignment of actual augmentation or support forces at the time a plan is executed.

(8) Commanders of unified and specified commands may be required to alter courses of action in the event force levels are reduced for execution.

b. PART 2. REGIONAL PLANNING FACTORS.

(1) Command and Control.

(a) Command and control passes from the NCA to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands, through the Chairman of the JCS, who passes NCA instructions directly to the operating forces. The critical component of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is the National Military Command Center (NMCC), through which the NCA receives information and passes instructions.

(b) During both the planning and conduct of operations, commanders will exercise command IAW guidance in the UCP and JCS Pub 2.

1. USCINCEUR Omitted

2. USCINCCENT

a. Without mobilization, forces available to USCENTCOM should be able to simultaneously:

(1) Maintain essential forward presence at current levels.

(2) Conduct small-scale, short-duration operations in support of minor contingencies within the unified command area of responsibility and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. With mobilization, forces available to USCENTCOM should be able to undertake only one of the following:

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(1) Reinforce in the NATO area and, in concert with allies, conduct the initial defense of the NATO area.

(2) Be prepared to curtail operations and provide assistance to unified and/or specified commands if so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Reinforce essential forward presence.

(4) Conduct operations in support of U.S. interests in a major theater war (MTW).

3. USCINCCOM Omitted

4. USCINCPAC Omitted

5. USCINCSO Omitted

6. USCINCSOC Omitted

7. USCINCSpace Omitted

8. USCINSTRAT Omitted

9. USCINTRANS Omitted

c. PART 3. FORCE APPORTIONMENT SUMMARY.

(1) The forces in this IJSCP are apportioned and are effective for planning purposes upon receipt and for operations during FYXX. Forces available to unified commanders for planning purposes are listed in the tables that follow. The forces listed are in addition to those assigned to the unified commands. Actual assignment or reassignment of forces is authorized only by the JCS or higher authority.

(2) The forces listed in the tables that follow are major combat forces only.

(3) Support of major combat forces is the responsibility of the Service and military departments as outlined in UNAAF and DOD instructions. Unified commanders, through their component commanders, are responsible for determining the availability of combat support and combat service support units not listed in the tables. Service capability plans may be used for identification of such forces. **Under no circumstances will a unified commander plan for the use of forces which exceed the level of major combat forces authorized. (Exception: Unless directed by the NCA as discussed under deliberate planning for two near simultaneous MTW's on page 7-III-16).**

(4) Major combat forces identified in Part 3 of Section IV provide for two levels of involvement:

(a) Forces available for contingencies which require partial mobilization.

(b) Forces available for support of allies and minor contingencies which require no mobilization.

NOTE: Although only two force availability tables are provided for use in this IJSCP, it is important to understand the full spectrum of planning for which the unified commanders are responsible. The IJSCP, as promulgated by JCS, identifies five force levels available for planning, which range from full mobilization down to minor contingencies for which no mobilization is required. It is this source that the unified commanders use to determine what additional type combat forces are available to them for planning purposes.

NOTE: Forces are not assigned to a unified commander by the IJSCP. Assignment of Forces to the various CINCs is promulgated semiannually by a separate JCS secretarial memorandum (SM).

(5) Service Planning Considerations.

(a) Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the NCA for responding to crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of a national emergency or war (Joint Pub 4-05, chap 4). The statutory authority, basic policies, and procedures for mobilizing elements of the reserve component are set forth in Title 10, United States Code; DOD Directive 1235.10; and other related DOD memorandums and instructions.

(b) Whenever the President and Congress determine that more units and organizations are needed for national security than are in the regular components of ground and air forces, units of the Army National Guard, together with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, will be ordered to active duty and retained as indicated in the levels of mobilization as follows:

1. Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC): The expansion of the active armed forces with reserve component units and/or individual reservists, by the authority of Congress or the President, to satisfy an emergency requirement for a force which can meet that requirement. PSRC authority makes up to 200,000 selected Reservists available for up to 270 days. President publishes Executive Order and informs the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use.

2. Partial mobilization: The expansion of the active armed forces, short of full mobilization, resulting from action by Congress or the President, to mobilize reserve component units and/or individual reservists to meet all or part of the requirements of a particular contingency and/or operational war plans or to meet the requirements incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet such requirements will be ordered to active duty at authorized strength. Partial mobilization differs from selective mobilization in that it would normally be associated with requirements for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security. Presidential or Congressional proclamation of a national emergency makes up to one million Reservists available for up to 24 months.

3. Full mobilization: Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress declaring war or national emergency brings remaining Reserve component personnel on to active duty. The Retired, Standby Reserves, and Ready Reserves become available that were not previously called.

4. Total mobilization: Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower. Total mobilization adds new units and personnel to the active inventory.

(c) Selection of Units for Mobilization. Actual selections will depend upon the reason for the mobilization and the domestic and international situations that exist at M-Day; whether or not units will be mobilized according to their authorized strengths; whether or not military service obligations and enlistment's will be extended; and if individuals from the ready reserve are to be mobilized. During planning for and/or execution of a partial mobilization, consideration should be given to the following factors when selecting units to be mobilized:

1. Units with highest training, logistical and personnel readiness should be selected first.

2. Units within the types and organizational structuring desired should be selected from as wide a geographical area as is feasible.

3. Selection of units previously mobilized should be avoided, if possible.

4. Select only those units necessary to meet the stated objectives.

5. In order to achieve maximum utilization of resources within the period for which they are to be mobilized, plan for their deployment as soon as practicable following mobilization.

(6) Active and Reserve Force Mobilization Capability.

(a) U.S. Army total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-1.

(b) U.S. Naval total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-2.

(c) U.S. Air Force total mobilization capability is outlined in table IV-3.

(d) Tables IV-1 through IV-3 indicate the major combat elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force quantified by active and reserve status as well as the total **Forces listed in the tables are not necessarily authorized for planning by all unified commanders. Authorization for planning is found in Section V of the IJSCP.**

NOTE: For purposes of CGSC instruction, reserve force quantities are limited to those that may be considered under partial mobilization in support of USCENTCOM planning.

(7) Planned U.S. Active Force Disposition in Peacetime.

(a) Army disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-4.

(b) Naval disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-5.

(c) Air Force disposition of active forces outlined in table IV-6.

(d) Tables IV-4 through IV-6 indicate the planned disposition of major combat active duty forces to the indicated unified or specified commander. The tables do not constitute assignments that are accomplished semiannually by separate JCS special memorandum. **As with tables IV-1 through IV-3,**

the forces listed are not necessarily authorized for planning by all unified commanders. Planning authorization is found in Section V of the IJSCP.

(8) Forces available for contingencies (Mobilization not Authorized).

(a) The major combat forces listed in tables IV-7 through IV-9 are available to the unified commander for CENTCOM for planning and are in addition to those forces regularly assigned. The forces listed herein are available to unified commanders for developing contingency plans in specific countries and other areas designed by higher authority where support of U.S. national interests might likely evolve into hostilities.

(b) Use of Forces for Regional Contingency Planning.

1. Forces listed in the table may be deployed to the operational control of or in support of another command.

2. In developing plans pursuant to this section, supported commanders should place primary emphasis on the use of FORSCOM forces where augmentation or supporting forces are essential to a plan.

3. During execution or implementation planning, if forces listed in the table are planned for use by more than one supported commander, priorities will be established by the NCA and JCS. (For example, the CJCS Planning Order excludes the 53d MECH and 25th ARMD Div on page 6-1.)

4. Strategic mobility assets for the movement of the forces listed herein will be planned for in accordance with CJCSI 10 to IJSCP.

5. Planned deployments/employment of the type forces listed herein should be based on the TOE strengths.

6. Forces will be available for deployment at their home base in accordance with the times listed in the table. Times indicated are based on the alert date. Loading, deployment, and forward staging times are additional planning considerations.

7. Forces envisioned for deployment in support of a contingency plan must be kept within the support commander's capability to receive, redeploy or employ, and support.

(c) Description of Tables.

1. Tables IV-7 through IV-9 provide types and quantities of force elements available for planning by unified commanders. Tables are provided for Army, Naval, and Air Force combat elements.

2. The first four columns indicate the number of force elements which may be planned for by the particular unified command. The next column provides the force element description. The next column shows the amount of time (in days or weeks) required after notification before the force element could depart home station. The last two columns show geographical location of the unit and the owning command.

TABLE IV-1
U.S. ARMY FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY

MAJOR ELEMENT	ACTIVE	RESERVE	TOTAL
Army HQ	4	--	4
Corps HQ	4	--	4
Division	10	8	18
Brigade (Separate)	1	15	16
Regiment	2	3	5
SF Group	5	2	7
ADA Command	3	--	3
FA Brigade	6	7	13

TABLE IV-2
U.S. NAVAL FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY

MAJOR ELEMENT	ACTIVE	RESERVE	TOTAL
Fleets	4	--	4
CV/CVN (Note 1)	11	1	12
CV Wing (Note 2)	11	2	13
CG (Note 3)	33	--	33
DD/DDG (Note 4)	38	--	38
FFG (Note 5)	34	16	50
Mine Warfare (Note 6)	11	5	16
Amphib Warfare (Note 7)	29	2	31
SS/SSN (Note 8)	66	--	66
SSBN (Note 8)	18	--	18
Mine CM Sqdn (Note 9)	2	--	2
MEF (Note 10)	3	*	3

NOTES: The following information is provided to give students a feel for how many people, ships and aircraft are available.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. 5,000 people per ship | 6. 95 person crew |
| 2. 50 Fighter/Attack A/C per Wing | 7. 6,000 people/6 ships per group |
| 3. 400 person crew | 8. 150 people per boat |
| 4. 300 person crew | 9. 4-8 helos per Sqdn |
| 5. 230 person crew | 10. 49,700 USMC; 2,600 USN; and 40 + ships |

* Marine Reserve forces will augment Active MEFs.

TABLE IV-3
U.S. AIR FORCES MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY (PAI)

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ACTIVE	RESERVE/GUARD	TOTAL
Numbered Air Force	11	4	15
Bomber Sqdn	8	3	11
Tanker Sqdn	15	29	44
Fighter Sqdn	27	24	51
Air Defense Sqdn	--	12	12
Transport/Tanker Sqdn (37	69	106
C-5 (110)	4	3	7
C-17 (46)	2	1	3
C-141 (141)	7	7	14
C-130 (479)	9	30	39
C-9A (23)	2	1	3
KC-135 E/R (497)	15	27	42
KC-10 (54)	4	2	6
Special Opns Sqdn	4	7	11
AWACS (28)	25	5	30
Rivet Joint Sqdn (16 A/C)	1	--	1
U-2 Sqdn (29 A/C)	1	--	1
EW Sqdn (USN/USAF)	4	--	4
Airspt Sqdn	12	--	12

TABLE IV-4
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY ASSIGNED FORCES

MAJOR ELEMENT	EUCOM	ACOM	CENTCOM	PACOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	TOTAL
Army HQ	1	1	1	1	--	--	4
Corps HQ	1	3	--	--	--	--	4
Divisions	1	8	--	1	--	--	10
Brigades	--	--	--	1	--	--	1
Regiment	--	2	--	--	--	--	2
SF Group	1	--	1	1	--	2	5
ADA Cmd	1	1	--	1	--	--	3
FA Bde	1	4	--	1	--	--	6

TABLE IV-5
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. NAVAL ASSIGNED FORCES

MAJOR ELEMENT	PACOM	ACOM	CENTCOM	TOTAL
Aircraft Carrier	5	6	1	12
Cruiser	12	13	2	27
Destroyer	23	26	4	53
Frigate	16	18	4	38
Submarine, Attack	32	32	4	66
Submarine, Ballistic	9	9	--	18
Amphibious Ship	13	13	3	29*
Mine CM Sqdn	1	1	--	2
Mobile Logistics	15	15	2	34
MEF	2(-)	1	1 MEU	3
Mine Warfare	2	22	2	26

* Includes LCCs, TAH, and TAVBs.

TABLE IV-6
PLANNED PEACETIME DISPOSITION OF U.S. AIR FORCE ASSIGNED FORCES

MAJOR ELEMENT	EUCOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	SOUTHCOM	TRANSCOM	SOCOM	ACC	TOTAL
# Air Force	2	4	-	-	4	-	5	15
Bomber Sqdn	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	11
Tanker Sqdn (KC-135/KC-10)	-	-	-	-	44	-	-	44
Fighter Sqdn	12	15	-	-	-	-	29	56
Airlift Sqdn	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	30
C-5 (A/C)	-	-	-	-	(104)	-	-	(104)
C-17 (A/C)	-	-	-	-	(25)	-	-	(25)
C-141 (A/C)	-	-	-	-	(150)	-	-	(150)
C-130 (A/C)	(20)	(10)	(12)	(6)	(308)	-	(24)	(380)
C-9A (A/C)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(12)	-	-	(18)
Spec Ops Sqdn	3	3	-	-	-	8	-	14
U-2	-	-	-	-	-	-	(29)	(29)
AWACS (A/C)	(4)	(4)	(4)	-	-	-	(18)	(30)
Rivet Joint	-	-	-	-	-	-	(16)	(16)
EW Sqdn	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4
Airspt Sqdn	3	3	4	1	1	-	-	12

(A/C) = aircraft #'s

TABLE IV-7
U.S. ARMY FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)

EUCOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	ELEMENT	TIME (weeks)	LOCATION	SOURCE
-	1	2	Corps HQ	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
-	-	2	AR Div	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
-	1	-	INF Div			
2	2	2	INF Div (MECH)	2	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	1	-	ABN Div	1	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	1	1	AASLT Div	a	CONUS	FORSCOM
-	-	2	AV Bde (Cbt)	2	CONUS	FORSCOM
2	1	2	ACR	2	CONUS	FORSCOM
-	-	1	MECH Bde (SEP)	2	CONUS	FORSCOM
1	1	2b	SF Group	1	CONUS	SOCOM
2	1	6	FA Bde	2	CONUS	FORSCOM
-	-	1	RGR Regt	1	CONUS	FORSCOM

Footnotes:

- a. One brigade in 2 weeks; two additional brigades in 3 weeks.
- b. Should include: SF, SEALs, AFSOF, CA, and PSYOPS.

TABLE IV-8
U.S. NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)

ACOM	EUCOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	ELEMENT	DATE	LOCATION	SOURCE
1	1	-	3	Carrier Battle Grp	Immediate a	Norfolk	ACOM
-	-	1	2	Carrier Battle Grp	Immediate	San Diego	PACOM
-	1	-	-	Carrier Battle Grp	Immediate	Naples, IT	EUCOM
1	1	-	1a	ARG w/MEU*	Immediate	Norfolk	ACOM
-	-	1	1a	ARG w/MEU**	Immediate	San Diego	PACOM
1	-	1	2b	MEF (-)	Immediate	San Diego	PACOM
-	-	1	1c	ARG/MEU* **	Immediate	Okinawa	PACOM

Footnotes:

- a. Source dependent on contingency operation, total of up to 5 to CENTCOM.
- b. U.S. CENTCOM contingency MEF is same force as indicated for ACOM. Actual employment will be contingent on crisis priority.
- c. PACOM MEU can swing for CENTCOM contingencies when approved by NCA/JCS.

* From II MEF.

** From I MEF.

*** From III MEF.

Initial employment of the MEF's may be through use of MPS.

TABLE IV-9
U.S. AIR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
(MOBILIZATION NOT AUTHORIZED)

CENTCOM	ELEMENT	DATE	LOCATION	SOURCE
16 2 6 5 2 1	Fighter Sqdn F-117A F-16 F-15C F-15E A-10	Immediate	CONUS	ACC
4 2 2	ECS Sqdn EA6B (USN/USAF) EC-130			ACC
8 3 3 2	Bomber Sqdn* B-1 B-52 B-2			ACC
(24) (8) (8) (8)	RS A/C RC-135 (A/C) E-8 (A/C) U-2 (A/C)			ACC
4 2 2	Tanker Sqdn*** KC-10 KC-135	Immediate	CONUS	TRANSCOM
8 1 1 1 3 1 1	Spec Ops Sqdn AC-130 EC-130 (CS) HC-130 MC-130 MH-53 MH-60	Immediate	CONUS	AFSOC
(13) (8) (5)	AEW Sqdn (A/C) E-3A (A/C) ABCCC (A/C)	Immediate	CONUS	ACC
7 4 2 1	Airlift Sqdn C-130E AMOS TACP	Immediate	CONUS	ACC
1	JCSE**	Immediate	CONUS	Joint Staff

Footnotes:

- * ECS/Bomber/RS resources provided by ACC as directed by JCS.
- ** JCSE is listed here solely for space conservation.
- *** Tanker/Airlift resources provided by AMC (21AF) as directed by JCS.

**SECTION V
REGIONAL PLANS**

1. AUTHORITY.

a. Execution authority for all plans rests with the NCA. Commanders exercise authority, command, and discharge responsibilities as directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. Operation planning will be conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 5.03-1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*.

c. Contingency plans will provide for:

(1) Deterrent options consisting of different sizes and types of forces designed to show U.S. resolve in defense of U.S., allied, and friendly nation interests.

(2) Deployment of major U.S. combat forces to achieve U.S. objectives.

(3) Implementation of post-combat operations to assist governments in the reestablishment of essential civil services.

2. REGIONAL PLANS.

a. General. The focus for current planning is regional, and conflict may arise under a variety of circumstances from slow-building to imminent conflict situations.

b. Planning Assumptions. Assumptions governing regional conflicts, applicable to all CINCs, are in Table V-1 and will be incorporated into operation plans as appropriate. Items not under U.S. control must be covered by plan assumptions concerning them.

**TABLE V-1
IJSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS**

R-1 No Attacks on U.S. assets in space	R-2 CINCs will plan to use the mobilization & transportation necessary to move and sustain the force.	R-3 LOCs outside the theater will remain open.	R-4 The threatened nation will furnish bases for reinforcement and support.	R-5. PWRMS will be per FY 20__ programs.	R-6 Nuclear and lethal chemical weapons will not be made available to the enemy. (classification necessitates this assumption)
R-6 Mobilization will not occur except as noted.					

c. Common Tasks and Planning Considerations. A number of tasks and planning considerations are common to all commands. Table V-2 lists selected common regional tasks. Commands may develop plans for the situations the commander considers necessary. Planning considerations are included to assist the development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.

TABLE V-2
COMMON REGIONAL TASKS

(1) Rules of Engagement	(2) Movement of Forces	(3) Command Relationships
(4) Nuclear Weapons Control	(5) Intelligence Coordination	(6) Special Operations
(7) Civil Affairs	(8) Host-nation Support	(9) Deescalation/Conflict Termination
(10) Support for Host-nation Restoration	(11) Continuity of Operations	(12) Conduct Exercises
(13) Reconnaissance Operations	(14) Maritime Operations	(15) Air Traffic Control
(16) NASA Support	(17) Humanitarian Assistance	(18) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)
(19) Military Deception	(20) Search and Rescue	(21) Psychological Operations

(1) Rules of Engagement (ROE). Establish and maintain ROE in conformity with peacetime ROE for U.S. Forces. Submit proposed ROE for those situations not covered by existing rules to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval or staffing and forwarding to the NCA for approval.

(2) Movement of Forces. When appropriate, include considerations for the movement of forces as specified in Forces (Section IV). Plan operations security (OPSEC) and deception as required.

(3) Command Relationships. Supporting CINCs coordinate planning with supported CINCs, participate in the planning process, and prepare supporting plans as required. Commanders establish relationships with international commands, organizations and activities, and participate in combined planning as required. Include necessary actions to receive and deploy units and support contingency deployments.

(4) Nuclear Weapons Control. Not applicable.

(5) Intelligence Coordination. The Joint Intelligence Centers will coordinate with Service, DOD and national agencies.

(6) Special Operations. Coordinate with USCINCSOC on special operations matters.

(7) Civil Affairs (CA). Conduct CA activities in support of U.S. National Military Strategy to successfully fulfill the U.S. legal and treaty obligations, coordinate host-nation and nation-building activities, and, if necessary, perform additional civil-military operations.

(8) Host-Nation Support. Include provisions for using HNS to meet in-country and intratheater requirements. Areas for consideration of HNS programs are reception and onward movement of forces and selected logistic and security functions.

(9) Deescalation and Post-Conflict Planning. Include considerations for deescalation, crisis termination, and post-conflict requirements throughout the planning cycle as required.

(10) Support for Host-Nation Restoration. At the conclusion of hostilities, planning for and the implementation of operations directed at normalization of host-nation operations will take place. Interagency coordination and responsibilities will dominate as priorities and requirements are identified and programs implemented with the consensus of the host-nation leadership.

(11) Continuity of Operations. The integration of military and civil operations is complicated but paramount to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives or maintenance of U.S. interests in any contingency.

(12) Exercises. Plan and conduct exercises across the operational continuum. Project positive perceptions of U.S. and allied capabilities to respond credibly to any crisis. Exercises should consider interoperability; incorporate indications; warning and alerting procedures; joint and combined command, control, and communications (C3) involving the National Military Command System (NMCS); and tests of selected military and supporting civil functions. Commands will submit after-action reports on exercises.

(13) Reconnaissance Operations. Plan for maximum efficient use of all available assets.

(14) Maritime Options. The following range of maritime options should be included in plans.

(a) From conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations to seizing and destroying the ships and aircraft of hostile nations and conducting aerial minelaying.

(b) Controlling and protecting U.S. and allied shipping and LOCs in critical areas.

(c) Conducting mine countermeasures operations against mine warfare operations by hostile forces.

(d) Deploying amphibious forces and/or maritime pre-positioned force squadrons or pre-positioning ships to the region as an indication of the possible use of ground forces or for the purposes of deception or surveillance.

(15) Air Traffic Control. Include provisions in existing plans for continued support by the FAA for air traffic control operations in the AORs of the combatant commands during periods of war or national emergency.

(16) NASA Support. Support NASA, as directed, and be prepared to conduct search and rescue missions in support of the space transportation system (STS).

(17) Humanitarian Assistance. Hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, drought, and manmade events may require DOD forces to lend support to government disaster relief assistance agencies with minimum notice and support civil agencies, as directed by the DOD executive agent.

(18) Enemy Prisoners of War. Include provisions for the internment of EPWs.

(19) Military Deception. Conduct military deception operations to support OPSEC, deterrence, preparation for hostilities, intervention operations, combat operations, and attainment of other strategic objectives.

(20) Search and Rescue. Establish a theater search and rescue system for the recovery of personnel and materiel. Include provisions for coordinating the capabilities of available theater Service and allied resources.

(21) Psychological Operations. Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) in coordination with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in support of national objectives, policies, interests, and military missions.

3. REGIONAL PLANNING.

a. General. As discussed in Section III, Planning Guidance, CINCs may be required to prepare operation plans for either Major Theater Wars (MTWs) or Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) by preparing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.

(1) Plan for the exercise of combatant command (COCOM) of all assigned forces and all augmentation forces assigned.

(2) Plan, as required, to establish joint task forces under designated commanders to execute military operations.

(3) Be prepared to accept foreign national military forces under operational control or tactical control when directed by the NCA IAW treaties or agreements between the governments of the United States and host or third nations.

(4) Be prepared to operate in conjunction with foreign military forces when directed by the NCA.

(5) Conduct concurrent security assistance and/or foreign internal defense planning as required by JCS memorandums.

(6) All operation plans will include proposed command structure and command relationships.

(7) IAW the provisions of JCS Pub 3, *Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (JLPPG)*, unified commanders coordinate with appropriate Department of State representatives in countries within their geographic boundaries for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. In carrying out that duty, unified commanders:

(a) Prepare necessary military supporting plans.

(b) Prepare necessary operation plans.

(c) Cooperate with chiefs of diplomatic missions in planning.

(d) Implement military plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants as required.

b. Regional Planning — Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). To help deter regional conflicts and promote stability, especially in Third World countries, innovative strategies are required to support representative governments. The intent is to undertake a policy of forward presence including diplomatic, political, economic, and military actions aimed at preventing conflict, enhancing regional stability, and building coalition. In general, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are categorized as follows: Operational Training and Deployment; Security Assistance (including peacekeeping operations); Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad (including NEO and Combating Terrorism); Combating Drugs; and Humanitarian Assistance. By engaging in these activities we strengthen deterrence, build U.S. influence, develop alliance cohesion, and contribute to the prevention of war.

(1) Guiding Principle. The guiding principle for U.S. involvement is deterrence. The responsibility for resolving interregional conflict lies with the host nation. Unless that nation is willing and able politically to solve its problems, no amount of U.S. assistance will ensure a lasting solution. The strategic environment is characterized by a mix of conditions and threats that can be dealt with only by a balanced application of the elements of national power: political, economic, diplomatic, and military. Strategies and plans must reflect U.S. national interests and be realistic in expectation. Planning should include national power options that, when directed by the NCA, permit rapid transition from periods of peace to conflict and back to peace.

(2) Planning Considerations. Planning for and conducting MOOTW operations should consider the following:

(a) Primacy of the Political Element. Political objectives affect military planning at every level. Courses of action may often slip outside traditional military doctrine.

(b) Unity of Effort. Efforts from other government agencies and host-nation institutions must be integrated and coordinated during OPLAN and CONPLAN development.

(c) Adaptability. The skill and willingness to modify doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, equipment, and organization is necessary for successful operations.

(d) Legitimacy. Legitimacy of the host nation is a central concern to all parties involved. Military contributions and operations should be designed to enhance the host nation's position and legitimacy.

(e) Perseverance. Civilian and military leaders may have to reject limited or short-term objectives and successes in favor of actions supporting long-term goals.

(f) Restricted Use of Force. ROEs will usually be more restrictive, more detailed, and subject to more political scrutiny than in other types of conflicts. The use of force should be only that necessary to solve the particular problem at hand.

(3) Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Detailed discussion of MOOTW operations and planning guidance and considerations for security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad (including NEO and combating terrorism), combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance are found in CJCSI Instruction 13, "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)."

4. REGIONAL TASKS — SPECIFIC. Specific regional objectives, tasks, and force apportionments are listed in the following sections.

- a. USCINCEUR Omitted
- b. USCINACOM Omitted
- c. USCINCCENT

(1) Regional U.S. strategy is influenced by:

(a) Local tensions in the Middle East periodically threaten to break into open conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict is foremost among them, but progress in either a resolution or at least normalization of relations appears to be progressing. Potential unrest is endemic in the region. The continued drive by the Palestinian people for a homeland, a problem that can spill over into the USCENTCOM area, continues. In the Persian Gulf, the consolidation of new political entities and structures remains unstable. Personal, religious, ethnic, economic, ideological, and a variety of other rivalries divide the Islamic world. Subversive movements threaten many of the moderate, stable governments. At the same time, potential and active insurgencies, aided and supported from the outside, are triggered against a number of less liberal or responsive governments.

(b) The protracted Iraq-Iran war damaged much of the oil-producing infrastructure in those two states. While a peace settlement was agreed to prior to the coalition effort against Iraq, the underlying causes for conflict remain valid and continue to threaten other oil-producing states within the region. The agreement also enabled Iraq to resume its anti- Israeli focus. Damage to Iraqi petroleum production and the trade embargo established for the resolution of the Kuwaiti invasion has further irritated Iraq. Arms merchants continue to take advantage of regional volatility by supplying arms to Iran, Iraq, and any other party with funds to purchase munitions.

(c) The United States, the newly independent southern tier of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other governments have competitive interests in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and the contiguous waters. This competition is a further source of tension that adds to local instabilities and poses the risk of a wider and more dangerous conflict.

(2) Regional U.S. strategic interest is described as:

(a) Unrestricted use of international air and sea lines of communication (LOCS) in the Mediterranean Sea is essential to U.S. and allied interests. During hostilities, nonsupport of U.S. unilateral actions by allies and friendly powers would make Mediterranean Sea LOCs even more critical.

(b) The Middle East area sits on the southeastern flank of NATO and is astride the routes to Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. It is rich in oil resources, and it dominates access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. Those realities, combined with intra-Arab differences and a conflict of interest between with Israel and the numerous Arab states, make the Middle East one of the most strategically important and explosive areas in the world.

(c) Unrestricted use of international air and sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean is vital to the continued flow of oil and other resources from the Middle East to the United States and its allies. Failure to maintain these LOCs would evoke grave consequences.

(3) Regional U.S. military objectives are to:

(a) Maintain freedom of access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Africa.

(b) Protect U.S. economic, political, and military interests.

(c) Ensure access to oil supplies.

(d) Prevent any power from achieving a military or political position that would endanger U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

(e) Deter overt intervention by any outside power.

(f) Monitor internal and external actions that threaten the stability of the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and be prepared to increase the U.S. military presence.

(4) Threats to regional U.S. interests are defined as follows:

(a) Exploitation or expansion of existing differences in Middle East countries by the building up of military supplies. Those actions have serious implications for the stability and balance of power in the area. Expanding instability and friction in Africa along with equipment, advisers, and training present real threats to U.S. and allied interests in the region and a general threat to stability.

(b) Locally precipitated military actions are always possible, with or without foreign assistance, as a result of traditional animosities or the ambitions of individual leaders.

(5) USCENTCOM responsibilities:

(a) Exercise combatant command and operational control of all assigned forces and augmented forces assigned through a Service component or an established subordinate joint command which is directly responsible to him. CINCCENT will exercise directive authority in the area of logistics to assure economy and efficiency of operations and to eliminate duplication and overlapping operations.

(b) Neither directly command any Service, i.e., act as a component commander, nor directly command a subordinate force except through a commander he has designated.

(c) Divide the command geographically into subordinate unified commands if that is necessary due to geographic compartmentalization, political considerations, or to ensure coordination and efficient performance of certain territorial administrative matters.

(d) Establish, as required, joint task forces under designated joint commanders to execute military operations. A JTF organization command and control will conduct operations up to 180 days. Subunified command structure may be considered if the timeframe is extended significantly.

(e) Assign missions that require operations by a uni-Service force to the commander of that Service component.

(f) Exercise operational control of any foreign national military forces placed under its jurisdiction; such control, to the maximum extent possible, is to be exercised through a combined command arrangement.

(g) Will accept command authority over the forces of any beleaguered foreign national government that agrees to place its military forces under U.S. military jurisdiction. That nation relinquishes command and control of those forces until it is in a position to resume direction and support of its own forces.

(h) Maintain and, in conjunction with Department of State, renegotiate bilateral agreements for establishing basing rights and support facilities which now exist with Oman, Egypt, and Kenya.

(i) In countries without status of forces agreements, civil affairs will be a national responsibility except in combat zones occupied by U.S. forces. Those combat areas will be turned over to national governments concerned as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(j) Effect coordination with:

1. Other DOD commanders to ensure a positive and clearly defined understanding regarding geographic and functional assignments of responsibility.

2. Commanders of adjacent areas under DOD jurisdiction in all matters concerning delineation of respective areas of responsibility.

(k) Each USCENTCOM component commander:

1. Will employ the forces of his component.

2. Provides logistic and administrative support to all U.S. forces assigned to his component.

3. Provides logistic support, less Class I, to all allied forces placed under operational control of his component.

(6) USCENTCOM Assigned Regional Tasks:

(a) Specific task assignments for USCINCCENT are listed in Table V-3A. All common tasks that are listed in Table V-2 are to be included in these plans.

TABLE V-3A
USCENTCOM ASSIGNED REGIONAL TASKS (RT)

CINC TASK	PLAN TASK	ASSUMPTIONS	SUPPORTING CINCS
RT-1 Prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Saudi Arabia/Kuwait in case of aggression and in support of U.S. interests.	OPLAN	R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5, R-6	USCINCCACOM USCINCEUR USCINCPAC USCINCSOC USCINCTRANS USCINCSPACE USCINCSTRAT
RT-2 Prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Egypt in case of aggression and in support of U.S. interest.	OPLAN	R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5, R-6	USCINCCACOM USCINCEUR USCINCPAC USCINCSOC USCINCTRANS USCINCSPACE USCINCSTRAT
RT-3 Prepare a CONPLAN.....	CONPLAN	(omitted)	(omitted)

(7) USCINCCENT Regional Force Tables: Regional forces apportioned for planning are listed in Table V-3B.

TABLE V-3B
USCENTCOM FORCES APPORTIONED FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING

ARMY FORCES (ARCENT)

IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)

ARMOR CAVALRY REGIMENT (FWD) (1)

AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/FORSCOM)

CORPS HQ (2)
 CORPS ARTILLERY HQ (2)
 CORPS COMBAT SUPPORT (2)
 CORPS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (2)
 LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION (1)
 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION (2)
 ARMOR DIVISION (2)
 AIR ASSAULT DIVISION (1)
 ARMOR CAVALRY REGIMENT (1)
 MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP) (1)
 FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE (6)
 AVIATION BRIGADE (2)
 AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BRIGADE (1.3)

NAVY FORCES (NAVCENT)

IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)

CARRIER BATTLE GROUP (CVBG) (1)
FLEET SUPPORT SERVICE GROUP (FSSG) (1)
AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON (PHIBRON) (1)
SSN w/DRY DECK SHELTER (1)

AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/USPACOM)

CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS (CVBG) (4)
SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG) (2)
ASW PATROL SQUADRON (VP) (1)
MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP (1)
FLEET SERVICES SUPPORT (0.3)
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP (PLT1BGRU) (1)
AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON (PHIBRON) (1)

MARINE FORCES (MARCENT)

IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT SPECIAL OPERATION CAPABLE (MEUSOC) (1)

AUGMENTATION FORCES (USACOM/USPACOM)

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) (AMPHIBIOUS) (1)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MPF) (1)
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (1)

AIR FORCE FORCES (CENTAF)

IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)

AWACS AIRCRAFT\E-3A (4 A/C)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRON\C-130 (2)
AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY DETACHMENT (1)

AUGMENTATION FORCES (CONUS BASED/ACC/TRANSCOM)

FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-117 (2)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-15C (6)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-15E (5)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\F-16 (11)
FIGHTER SQUADRONS\A-10 (6)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-1 (1)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-2 (6 A/C)
BOMBER SQUADRONS\B-52 (2)
EA-6B-USN/USAF SQUADRONS (2)
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SQUADRON\EC-130 (1)
AWACS AIRCRAFT\E-3A (2 A/C)
ABCCC (1 A/C)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRONS\C-130 (4)
AIR REFUELING DETACHMENT\KC-135 (6)
AIR REFUELING DETACHMENT\KC-10 (2)
AERO RESCUE AND RECOVERY SQUADRON (RESERVE/ANG) (1)

SPECIAL FORCES (SOCCENT)

IN-PLACE FORCES (USCENTCOM)

SPECIAL FORCES BN(-) (1)
SOF THEATER NSW TU (1)
JSOTF HQ (1)

AUGMENTATION FORCES (USSOCOM)

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPS TF (1)
JOINT CA/MILITARY OPS TF (JCAMOTF) (1)
AFSOF SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (2)
AFSOF WING AUGMENTATION (6 SQDNS) (1)
RANGER BN (1)

- d. USCINCPAC Omitted
- e. USCINCSO Omitted
- f. USCINCSOC Omitted
- g. USCINCSPACE Omitted
- h. USCINCSTRAT Omitted
- i. USCINTRANS Omitted

SECTION VI GLOBAL PLANS

- 1. AUTHORITY.** Execution authority for all plans rests with the NCA.

- 2. GENERAL.** The focus for current military (except for nuclear) planning no longer centers on global conflict but on regional contingencies. The base case family of plans will be retained, but put aside until further notice. No work will be done on base case planning until notification.

- 3. RECONSTITUTION.** Reconstitution is designed to increase our combat capability by creating new forces. New units would be created beyond existing force capabilities to meet possible emergency situations or major new threats. Reconstitution will occur in the range between full mobilization and the upper bounds of total mobilization. Reconstitution is a key ingredient in our post-Cold-War military strategy to deal with a resurgent global threat.

SECTION VII CONCLUSION

- 1. GENERAL.** The world has changed in many dramatic ways recently. The national military strategy reflects those changes, with the shift in focus to regional planning and flexible planning offering more options for decision-makers. Forces must be ready to move from CONUS or forward-deployed locations to the scene of a crisis able to mass overwhelming force and terminate conflict swiftly and decisively. The strategy recognizes the very positive developments in the former Soviet Union and acknowledges the changes brought about through the arms control process.
- 2. PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY.** It is the intention of the IJSCP to offer guidance that will lead to plans that are balanced between the details necessary for specific contingencies and the breadth required for unknown or unforeseen contingencies that may be necessary during execution.
- 3. PLANNING FOR DETERRENCE and WARFIGHTING.** The main focus of adaptive planning and FDOs is deterrence. Although plans must allow for flexibility in deterrent action, they also must provide for the deployment and employment of decisive force to defeat an adversary should deterrence fail. The Deploy Decisive Force and counterattack options are focused on warfighting and must not become graduated responses to an adversary's military actions.
- 4. DELIBERATE PLANNING and EXECUTION.** Deliberate planning allows commanders and planners to think through problems that are similar to those that may actually arise. For this reason alone, the concepts herein and the process that follows will be of great value. This IJSCP implements the new national military strategy in support of the U.S. national security strategy.

CJCSI 1 TO IJSCP INTELLIGENCE

1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI Instruction contains an Intelligence Estimate Overview and lists essential elements of information (EEI) required in joint planning. The Intelligence Estimate Overview contains information to assist planners in developing COAs/CONOPs.

2. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OVERVIEW.

a. The past few years have seen tremendous change in the world political picture. The rapid collapse of communism has brought about changes that few would have anticipated only a few years ago. These changes have come so quickly that it has been difficult to predict the impacts of evolving away from a bipolar world. While the likelihood of conflict on a global scale has been significantly reduced, the change to a multipolar world has greatly increased the probability of smaller-scale regional conflicts.

b. Without the Soviet Union as a moderating influence on its ex-client states, some nations are less inhibited in pursuing their own ambitions and goals. Drawing U.S. forces down to the base force level (and beyond) may be seen by such nations as offering an opportunity for their own expansionist aims.

c. The world is now much less stable than it was only a few years ago. Many of the governments of less-developed nations have only tenuous grasps on power, and a worldwide economic recession will make it difficult for them to remain in power. Civil unrest and war are likely in or between a number of nations, and neighboring nations may be drawn in either to aid participants or settle long-standing regional disputes.

d. The USCENTCOM AOR has been a source of continual problems in recent history. It is a region marked by contrasts and political instability. It is the seat of two major religions. It sits between the impoverished nations of Africa and the uncertain awakening of the far Eastern nations. These factors will continue to shape the political landscape of the region in the coming years

e. The following questions can assist strategists and operational planners when developing course of action/concepts of operation:

(1) With the demise of the Soviet Union having run its course and the CIS now beginning to assert itself abroad, how will U.S. interests in the region be affected?

(2) What are the prospects for long-term or sustained U.S. military presence in the region?

(3) What are the likely potential conflicts in the region?

(4) How will political instability in the region affect U.S. interests?

(5) With the political instability in the region, where is the United States likely to be forced to conduct NEO?

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI).

a. EEI listed below depict the type of information that would come from the Joint Staff. This information requires continual updating to assess enemy military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area characteristics; receive advance warning of attacks; carry out initial wartime operations; and fulfill the intelligence requirements of higher authority.

b. Essential elements of information (EEI) for USCENTCOM area of responsibility are as follows:

(1) CIS

(a) Where and under what conditions would the CIS commit its own forces?

(b) What are the military objectives, strategies, and vulnerabilities of the CIS?

(c) What are the CIS estimates of the U.S. military objectives, strategies, capabilities, and vulnerabilities?

(2) OTHER COUNTRIES

(a) Will any country, acting separately or in concert with other powers, initiate combat operations?

(b) What countries are most capable of pursuing independent military courses of action? Under what circumstances and to what extent?

(c) What countries are most susceptible to being brought into the U.S. sphere of influence?

(d) What pro-free world or neutral countries are most susceptible to outside influences?

(e) In what countries of strategic importance to the United States do conditions of incipient insurgency exist?

TABLE 1
PROSPECTS FOR USCENCOM NEO 199X-20XX

COUNTRY/AREA	THREAT LEVEL									COMMENTS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
AFGHANISTAN									4	
BAHRAIN									8	
DJIBOUTI									6	
EGYPT									6	
ERITREA									4	
ETHIOPIA									5	
IRAN									2	
IRAQ									2	
JORDAN									5	
KENYA									6	
KUWAIT									8	
OMAN									8	
PAKISTAN									4	
QATAR									7	
SAUDI ARABIA									7	
SEYCHELLES									8	
SOMALIA									1	
SUDAN									2	
UAE									8	
YEMEN									3	

NOTE: Threat level scale starts with 1 as the highest threat and decreases to 9 as the lowest.

CJCSI 2 TO IJSCP LOGISTICS

1. GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This annex contains policy and guidance for the conduct of logistics operations in combatant commands and joint task forces (JTFs).

b. Policies outlined are consistent with published joint publications and directives. NOTE: Joint Pub 4.0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, and subordinate publications in the 4.0 series should be used as appropriate.

c. Each Service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces except when logistics support is otherwise provided for by agreements.

d. Combatant commanders will do the following:

(1) Exercise directive authority in logistics to ensure economy and efficiency of operations and to eliminate duplication and overlapping of operations. This does not release the Services from their responsibilities to man, equip, train, and sustain their Service components.

(2) Review reports, budgets, and requirements of Service components for adequacy, as required, consistent with Service directives.

(3) Coordinate priorities and programs to use supplies, facilities, and personnel effectively within the theater.

(4) Coordinate the total logistic effort through Service components and other subordinate commands.

(5) Allocate common-user resources to components and subordinate commands.

(6) Establish joint boards and offices at the combatant command level to ensure economy and efficiency of operations.

(7) Establish coordination with other DOD supporting commands.

(8) Make maximum use of inter-Service support and common/cross-servicing agreements to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

(9) Establish policies within the command in functional areas of logistics to ensure economy and efficiency of operations consistent with existing joint publications.

(10) Assume temporary operational control of all logistic forces in case of an emergency, consistent with Joint Pub 0-2.

e. Component commanders will do the following:

(1) Component commanders are responsible for logistics support of their forces and direct communications with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters. Component commanders will keep the CINC informed of the status of supply matters affecting readiness of the force.

(2) Furnish logistics support of assigned forces within the command except as already done by common/cross-servicing.

(3) Forward logistic requirements to the combatant commander when directed.

(4) Communicate directly with appropriate Service departments on all logistic matters except those the unified commander directs to be forwarded through him.

(5) Identify logistic forces required to support operation planning.

(6) Use standard Service planning factors as outlined in approved publications except as otherwise directed.

(7) Furnish qualified personnel to serve on joint boards and offices.

f. Other Subordinate Commands. Logistic responsibilities of subunified commands and joint task forces and their assigned components parallel those of the combatant command. Service components of subordinate commands will communicate uni-Service requirements through the Service components of the combatant command and not directly to the appropriate Service department.

2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. General

(1) Supply responsibilities of the combatant commander and assigned components follow those outlined in paragraph 1.

(2) Maximum use will be made of common/cross-servicing to eliminate duplication.

(3) Priorities for critical materiel will be established by the combatant commander.

(4) Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect situational considerations.

(5) Theater supply levels will be established at 30 days for all classes of supply except Class III. (See paragraph 2b.) Requests for variations from this policy must be approved by the Joint Staff. Time-phasing of supplies into the theater will be established by the combatant commander.

(6) Standard requisitioning procedures will be established by Service components within the theater as soon as practical.

(7) Supplies will be given to forces of allied nations and indigenous personnel only as directed by higher authority. Emergency authority may be granted by the combatant commander.

b. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants

(1) A Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) will be established by the combatant commander to coordinate petroleum supply requirements within the theater.

(2) Combatant commanders will monitor petroleum supply levels in the theater and submit requirements for bulk fuels and packaged products under procedures established by the Defense Fuel Supply Center.

(3) To the extent practical, management of POL will be assigned to a single Service within the theater.

(4) Service components are responsible for determining POL requirements for assigned forces.

(5) Theater level of supply for petroleum products is established at 15 days.

c. Procurement. The combatant commander will coordinate all procurement activities within the theater to ensure that Service competition for limited resources is minimized. A Joint Procurement Coordinating Board may be established within the policies outlined in Joint Pub 4-01.

3. MAINTENANCE.

The combatant commander is responsible for coordinating maintenance within the command. The Services will attain a self-sufficient military capability and capability for direct maintenance support to their tactical elements. Where practical and without jeopardizing military effectiveness of tactical units, maintenance facilities for joint use should be established.

4. MEDICAL SERVICES.

a. The combatant commander will establish policies and procedures for a coordinated medical service program within the theater.

b. Service components are responsible for furnishing medical services to assigned forces except as already done by inter-Service support agreements or directed by higher authority.

c. To the maximum extent feasible, joint use of medical facilities will be encouraged to avoid duplication.

d. A Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) will be established as outlined in Joint Pub 4-0.

e. Non-U.S. medical facilities will be used only in extreme emergencies.

f. Treatment of foreign nationals will be authorized only when considered essential by the combatant commander and will consist of minimum emergency care.

g. For planning, a 60-day intertheater evacuation policy will be the objective. Modification of this policy is authorized for contingencies when medical capabilities do not permit reasonable implementation. Combatant commands will recommend intertheater evacuation policy if deviation from that planning is necessary.

h. Maximum use will be made of air evacuation.

i. Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect situational considerations.

5. MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION.

a. The combatant commander will allocate common-user transportation and assign priorities. Service component commanders will supply resources as directed.

b. For operations planning, the combatant commander will consolidate and submit movement requirements to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to facilitate strategic movement planning.

c. USTRANSCOM Transportation Component Commands (TCCs)

(1) The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is responsible for military traffic, land transportation, and operation of common-user ocean terminals in CONUS.

(2) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for furnishing military common-user sea transportation services.

(3) The Air Mobility Command (AMC) is responsible for furnishing common-user airlift services.

(4) Control of the TCC is under USTRANSCOM and is outside the scope of the combatant commander.

(5) The combatant commander will establish liaison with TCCs when they are supporting the combatant command mission.

(6) Support to TCCs will be given by the combatant command as required. Requests for support will be initiated by the TCC and forwarded to the appropriate commander.

d. Standard Service planning factors will be used but may be modified to more accurately reflect situational considerations.

e. A Joint Transportation Board (JTB) will be established by the combatant commander to coordinate theater transportation requirements.

f. Strategic Mobility. Transportation resources allocated for planning from DOD agencies are outlined in CJCSI Instruction 10.

g. Responsibility for establishing and operating port facilities rests with the using component or, in the

case of multiple users, the Service with the most forces.

6. GENERAL ENGINEERING AND BASE DEVELOPMENT.

- a. Requests for negotiation of new or revised agreements for use of bases will be initiated by the combatant commander when operational or political situations dictate. Requests will be validated by the Joint Staff.
- b. Maximum use will be made of existing facilities in the theater to minimize civil engineering support requirements.
- c. The combatant commander will allocate real estate and facilities consistent with existing agreements. A joint agency may be established if necessary.
- d. The combatant commander will coordinate civil engineering support requirements and establish centralized control of programs when necessary. Theater civil engineering support programs will be consistent with approved plans.
- e. Construction standards will be held to the lowest level consistent with mission requirements. Only construction considered operationally essential will be approved for short-term operations.
- f. The combatant commander will establish civil engineering support priorities.
- g. Service components will supply resources for completion of civil engineering support programs. Army and Navy components will normally support Air Force requirements.
- h. Service components are responsible for identifying civil engineering support requirements in support of assigned forces.
- i. Contract construction for all Services will be negotiated by the Service designated as construction agent for the geographic area concerned.
- j. Standard Service planning factors will be used for civil engineering support.

7. AIR AND WATER PORTS.

Non-military air and water ports located outside CONUS are responsibility of the CINC. Each Service has primary responsibility for coordination of loading/unloading its units.

8. HEALTH SERVICES.

The responsibility for the coordination and integration of health services remains with the CINCs. The use of joint medical assets will be coordinated by the CINCs to support operational requirements.

9. MORTUARY AFFAIRS.

CINCs are responsible for the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel with their AOR. The responsibility applies to allied, third country, enemy dead, and local populace.

10. HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

a. CINCs will ensure that proper negotiations for host-nation support is conducted with proper authorities. This may include but is not limited to the following: air and surface transportation; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); telecommunications; civilian labor; rear area protection; facilities; contracting; acquisition of equipment; supplies; services; and medical support.

b. CINCs must coordinate with the host nation for the use of facilities.

CJCSI 3 TO IJSCP NUCLEAR

1. PURPOSE.

This annex gives broad guidance to combatant commanders planning for nuclear operations.

2. GENERAL.

Planning for the employment of nuclear weapons requires adherence to the same basic principles and procedures as for employment of conventional weapons. However, special consideration is necessary to ensure that these weapons will be used with the utmost discrimination because of their increased destructive power and wide area coverage. Operation plans developed by combatant commanders will contain appropriate supporting nuclear plans.

3. RELEASE AUTHORITY.

The decision for U.S. forces to use nuclear weapons rests with the President of the United States. Following Presidential authority, the combatant commanders exercise the sole authority for release of weapons within their respective commands. Combatant commanders may further delegate this authority to major subordinate commanders.

4. NUCLEAR POLICY.

a. Strategic Planning

(1) Planning for the strategic employment of nuclear weapons will be per the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP). The Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) is an agent for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who maintains the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) to perform targeting and planning functions. The JSTPS develops and maintains the National Strategic Target List (NSTL), Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and National Strategic Requirements List (NSRL).

(2) Combatant commanders will coordinate, through their representatives to the JSTPS, all operation plans containing nuclear weapon employment options.

b. Tactical Planning

(1) When preparing contingency plans with nuclear weapon employment options, combatant commanders will comply with the following operational constraints:

(a) Although early nuclear employment will generally not be authorized except in response to an enemy nuclear attack, the United States retains the right to first use of nuclear weapons.

(b) Every reasonable effort will be made to limit attack in the vicinity of densely populated areas.

(c) Weapon yields and surface bursts will be limited to those essential to mission

accomplishment.

5. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES.

- a. Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full nuclear delivery system capability.
- b. Nuclear weapons allocation, handling, and storage will be per approved plans.

CJCSI 4 TO IJSCP PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. PURPOSE.

This annex gives information and guidance for use by combatant commanders during joint psychological operations (PSYOP) planning.

2. GENERAL.

a. The Secretary of State has responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental psychological activities of the U.S. government in overseas areas. PSYOP policies will be disseminated through U.S. Information Agency channels to U.S. Information Service (DISA) representatives in a host country.

b. In a theater of operations, USIA will furnish representatives to serve on the staff of the combatant commander to advise and guide military PSYOP planners.

c. Combatant commanders will control the execution of all psychological warfare operations under the policy guidance of the Department of State.

d. When U.S. combat forces are committed to an overseas operation short of a declaration of war or at the request of a friendly foreign government, PSYOP will be conducted by the military under the overall guidance of the U.S. ambassador in country, or the Secretary of State in the absence of a U.S. ambassador.

e. Where insufficient guidance exists or conflicts arise regarding joint operational employment of forces, the matter will be referred to the Joint Staff for decision and/or policy guidance.

3. SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDANCE.

a. All PSYOP plans developed by a combatant commander must stem from national policy and strategy for a particular country or area.

b. Combatant commanders will ensure the integration of supporting PSYOP plans into the operation plans.

c. The combatant commander's responsibilities regarding PSYOP planning include the following:

(1) Preparation of PSYOP plans, orders, directives, and requests for support.

(2) Coordination of PSYOP intelligence requirements.

(3) Analysis of target audiences.

(4) Determination of psychological objectives.

(5) Coordination and allocation of PSYOP resources, using available friendly foreign military and

civilian support and facilities.

(6) Analysis of PSYOP effectiveness.

(7) Giving PSYOP technical support to subordinate and supporting commanders.

(8) Coordinating psychological support requirements with other interested staffs and agencies.

d. In PSYOP planning, particular attention must be paid to enemy courses of action, availability of indigenous resources, assets of all U.S. agencies, and the time available to produce and pretest PSYOP information and propaganda materials.

CJCSI 5 TO IJSCP SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. PURPOSE.

This annex gives information and planning guidance regarding special operations within the combatant command.

2. GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE.

a. Combatant commanders will conduct special operations in support of U.S. national interests during conditions of war and in support of revolutionary uprisings considered appropriate and approved by the NCA.

b. Coordination and control of special operations will be retained at the highest level possible consistent with conventional warfare mission, command relationship agreements, and assets available.

c. Combatant commanders will establish a Special Operations Command (SOC) for the conduct of special operations where elements of two or more Services are assigned or attached. Other governmental agencies may be included.

d. Subject to any joint support agreements, component commanders are responsible for the administrative and logistic support of their Service elements assigned to a SOC.

e. Emphasis should be placed on the political, economic, sociological, and psychological conditions in the human environment that may be exploited to enhance special operations.

**CJCSI 6 TO IJSCP
CHEMICAL WARFARE; NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL DEFENSE; RIOT CONTROL AGENTS; AND HERBICIDES**

1. PURPOSE.

This annex gives broad guidance to combatant commanders planning for chemical operations and biological defense.

2. GENERAL.

The United States no longer employs chemical or biological weapons

3. CHEMICAL POLICY.

- a. Plans will not be made for the use of chemical weapons and such weapons will not be used.
- b. All U.S. forces will be trained, equipped, and supplied for chemical defense operations.
- c. All operation plans will include defensive measures to be used if chemical weapons are employed by the enemy.

4. BIOLOGICAL POLICY.

- a. Plans will not be made for the use of biological weapons and such weapons will not be used.
- b. All U.S. forces will be trained, equipped, and supplied for biological defense operations.
- c. All operation plans will include defensive measures to be used if biological weapons are employed by the enemy.

5. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES.

Supporting commanders deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full chemical protective system capability.

CJCSI 7 TO IJSCP GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES

1. PURPOSE. (The Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) CJCSI to the IJSCP)

- a. Provides planning guidance to the CINCs; the Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); and Chiefs of the Services regarding MC&G support to U.S. and allied military operations.
- b. Assigns MC&G tasks to the CINCs; the Chiefs of the Services; and the Directors, NIMA and DIA.
- c. Indicates the capabilities of the DOD MC&G community to support projected military requirements during the IJSCP timeframe.

2. PLANNING GUIDANCE.

- a. The MC&G annexes to OPLANS drive requirements for MC&G products and services. Guidance on preparation, format, and content of MC&G annexes is provided in Joint Pub 5-03.1.
- b. Available standard maps, charts, digital products, and related materials are identified in NIMA catalogs. Data bases for geodetic and geophysical surveys, and other MC&G-related source materials are also maintained by NIMA.
- c. Requirements for these standard NIMA MC&G products are formally established and submitted by the CINCs, Services, and other Defense agencies and published by NIMA.
- d. NIMA provides an evaluation of the adequacy of the standard products available to fulfill validated requirements.
- e. Many areas of the world are not covered by a NIMA or co-producer large-scale (1:50,000 scale) map, and available maps may not be current or accurate enough to satisfy operational requirements. NIMA has co-production agreements to produce and exchange maps, charts, and digital products with many nations. NIMA provides CINCs with substitute foreign or commercial map products for contingency planning purposes.
- f. New and revised MC&G products are normally provided to operational units automatically through subscriber accounts established at NIMA using their DODAACs. These products are obtained for normal operations, planning, and unit-held MC&G contingency stocks for initial operations in accordance with Service MC&G doctrine and OPLANS. More copies of MC&G products can be obtained for normal operations, contingency planning, or crisis situations.
- g. NIMA holds prepositioned MC&G contingency stocks at forward-deployed NIMA offices overseas and in CONUS depots for operational commands. These stocks generally support sustained operations prescribed by the Defense Planning Guidance. Transportation to move stocks both intertheater and intratheater must be planned in advance by the CINCs and their component commands. Movement requirements for stocks will be in OPLAN TPFDDs.

h. Requirements for new or modified MC&G products and services and the geographic areas to which they pertain must be identified early in the planning cycle and documented in the appropriate OPLANS.

i. In all joint operations, coordinates referenced to the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) shall be used. Universal use of the WGS 84 position reference system will eliminate confusion regarding which system is being used in reporting positions. If some preexisting circumstance precludes using WGS 84, the CINCs shall coordinate on position reference procedures to be used. When reporting positions, a complete reference to the source datum for the coordinates must be included in the report and will contain map or chart producer, series, sheet number, edition, date, and datum for all coordinates derived from maps, charts or cartographic products.

j. For combined operations, CINCs will coordinate with allied commands on position reference procedures to be used. WGS 84, with appropriate transformations for the local datum, is recommended to ensure commonality between all forces involved. Datum references must be given close attention due to the wide variety of datums used by other countries to complete their maps and charts or derive coordinates.

3. TASKS to UNIFIED COMMANDS. CINCs will:

a. Prepare MC&G annexes to their OPLANS IAW Joint Pub 5-03.1 with provisions for using survey ships of the Navy and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) when transferred to CINC operational control.

b. Maintain, within their headquarters, the staff capability to direct command MC&G activities.

c. Coordinate all applicable MC&G programs and activities with NIMA, and advise NIMA when the command has excess production capabilities.

d. Maintain a capability to distribute MC&G materials to assigned forces and maintain contingency stocks.

e. Validate and submit MC&G area, product, and service requirements of their commands to NIMA.

f. Assess the responsiveness of NIMA to their operational needs.

4. NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY SUPPORT.

As a combat support agency, NIMA is responsible for providing a wide variety of MC&G products, services, and training in direct support of the unified commands, their component commands, the Services, and other Defense and Federal agency users. As program manager for the DOD MC&G program, NIMA is responsible for data collection, production, storage, training, international cooperation, and other associated functions such as participating in the distribution process.

5. SERVICE SUPPORT TO THEATER COMMANDER.

a. General. The capabilities addressed in this section are Service activities dedicated to support

commanders in theaters of operation. They complement NIMA capabilities and support.

b. Army. The Army provides tailored topographic products and services in support of its own combat operations. Although some Army topographic forces may be assigned joint Service support responsibilities by the unified command within whose area they operate, the configuration and size of these forces depend on force allocation rules tied to supported Army forces. Army topographic units have the capabilities to:

(1) Prepare terrain analysis type products reflecting mobility and countermobility, intervisibility, etc., to support tactical operations.

(2) Analyze effects of terrain and weather on combat operations and weather system performance.

(3) Produce both map and image-based graphics, photomaps, and expedient revisions to standard maps.

(4) Establish third- or higher-order survey control points for ground control.

(5) Store, maintain, and distribute standard and nonstandard MC&G products.

c. U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy MC&G program provides support to the theater commanders through NIMA products. Operational control of Navy assets belongs to the theater commander where surveys are being conducted. Tactical control is delegated to NAVOCEANO, who recommends ship deployment to the Military Sealift Command. In time of national emergency, Navy assets provide direct CINC support in whatever role required.

d. U.S. Marine Corps. The mission of the topographic platoons is to supplement normal mapping sources, to establish primary ground control points in support of force units, and to collect coast and landing-beach data during peacetime and limited mobilization. The Marine Corps topographic platoons have the capability to:

(1) Prepare multicolor map substitutes and photomaps.

(2) Conduct third- and lower-order geodetic ground-control surveys and establish primary ground-control points.

(3) Maintain original geodetic data (trig lists) of all primary ground-control points established by the platoon.

(4) As independent survey teams, collect coast and beach data in support of amphibious operations and, when required, assist NAVOCEANO in hydrographic survey activities.

(5) Accomplish terrain analysis activities as required.

e. U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Force possesses no organic production capacity or resources for mapping; however, they have the capability to produce points for targeting.

CJCSI 8 TO IJSCP COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this annex is to give information and guidance to combatant commanders on counter-C3 planning.

2. OBJECTIVE.

The objectives of counter-C3 are to destroy enemy C3, disrupt the enemy's communications, deceive the enemy as to the true situation, and deny information to the enemy commanders.

3. GENERAL.

Counter-C3, supported by intelligence, integrates the various approaches having the common goal of reducing the effectiveness of opposing C3 capabilities.

4. PLANNING GUIDANCE. Counter-C3 planning should be accomplished for at least the following operations:

- a. Campaigns and combat operations
- b. Crisis-related operations
- c. Reconnaissance and surveillance
- d. Logistic movements
- e. Deployments
- f. Demonstrations and shows of force
- g. Exercises

5. COORDINATION.

Counter-C3 planning requires detailed integrating throughout all phases of the deliberate planning process.

6. RESPONSIBILITY.

Combatant commanders are responsible for counter-C3 planning needed to ensure mission accomplishment. The counter-C3 estimate will summarize counter-C3 objectives and concepts critical to successful execution.

CJCSI 9 TO IJSCP
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS

1. PURPOSE.

This annex gives information and guidance to combatant commanders on joint command, control, and communications support; responsibilities; and procedures.

2. GENERAL.

a. The required communications capability will come from the Defense Communications System (DCS), other National Communications System operating agency systems, or other DOD communications systems (tactical and special purpose). Regardless of the source, communications personnel furnished to a commander will be under his operational control and will be an integral part of his command and control system.

b. It is imperative that communications and ADP systems be compatible with and make maximum use of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

c. The Joint Staff, through the combatant commands, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the military Services, will ensure that the commander at each echelon has the communications necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.

3. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

a. National Communications System (NCS)

(1) NCS encompasses the DCS and selected communications assets of the Department of State, Federal Aviation Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, General Services Administration, Departments of Commerce and Interior, Federal Communications Commission, U.S. Information Agency, and Department of Energy.

(2) The objective of the NCS is to ensure that the important federal telecommunications resources are so interlinked that the aggregate will function as a single system.

(3) The Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NCS and the Director, DISA, is the manager, NCS.

b. Defense Communications System (DCS)

(1) DCS is a single worldwide complex comprising a composite of certain DOD communications systems/networks under the management, control, and operational direction of the DISA. DCS includes all nontactical, long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications facilities, personnel, and materiel within DOD.

(2) Organic facilities of the field armies, fleets, air forces, and fleet Marine forces, posts, camps, bases, stations, and air defense facilities are excluded.

c. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

(1) The DISA is an agency of DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, responsive to CJCS and combatant command C-3 requirements. The agency supports worldwide DCS through subcommands and DISA field organizations located with combatant commands and at major military and governmental population centers.

(2) Combatant command, subordinate command, and JTF nontactical communications support, including command and control, operations intelligence, weather, logistics, and administrative functions, is offered through the DCS facilities and managed by the DISA field organizations. DISA field organizations further serve as the points for integration of the station/tactical communications excluded in paragraph b(2) into the worldwide communications system.

4. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Chiefs of DISA field organizations and Service component commanders respond to the operational needs of the combatant commanders.

b. Combatant commanders will develop agreements that clearly delineate their relationships with DISA field organizations within their areas of responsibility.

c. Combatant commanders have command authority over the Service operating elements of the DCS through the Service component commander. DISA field organizations exercise operational direction over the DCS operating elements. Hence, the operating elements are subject to authoritative direction from different sources. To avoid conflict, combatant commanders will exercise combatant command in the direct operation of DCS by expressing their DCS operational requirements to the senior DISA field organization serving their area of responsibility.

d. Combatant commanders are authorized to assume temporary operational control of the DISA field organization and DCS within their assigned geographic areas in case of a major emergency.

e. The authority and responsibilities of the combatant commander include control, review, and coordination of assigned communications resources and/or actions affecting such resources.

f. The combatant commander is responsible for reviewing and coordinating major DCS communication requirements, projects, systems, networks, and related resources that are initiated within his command.

g. The combatant commander will designate the points where interface of various communications services between the DCS and tactical communications system will occur. Such points will normally include the following:

(1) Component command headquarters.

(2) Joint task force headquarters.

(3) Other subordinate element headquarters directly controlled by the combatant command.

h. The component commanders have the following common functions and responsibilities in joint operations:

(1) Furnish communications personnel, equipment, and supplies for the effective performance of assigned tasks.

(2) Furnish, organize, and train communications personnel for joint operations.

(3) Supply, operate, and maintain command and control facilities organic to their own tactical forces.

(4) Supply, operate, and maintain assigned facilities of the DCS and terminal equipment of DCS access circuits.

(5) Furnish, operate, and maintain communications for distress, disaster, emergency, and safety as directed and per mutual agreements.

(6) Offer the capability of meeting the DCS interface standards.

(7) Cooperate with and assist other Services in the accomplishment of their communications functions.

CJCSI 10 TO IJSCP MOBILITY

SECTION I — GENERAL INFORMATION

- 1. Purpose.** Provide mobility planning guidance to support regional planning tasks assigned in the IJSCP.
- 2. Scope.** CJCSI 10, in conjunction with the JOPES transportation reference files provides:
 - a. Deliberate planning guidance on the use of airlift, sealift, and air refueling assets that may be planned for use during OPLAN development in support of IJSCP tasking.
 - b. The characteristics and capabilities of individual types of strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and air refueling assets for deliberate planning.
- 3. Movement Planning Guidance.** USTRANSCOM-controlled common-user lift is the pool of strategic transportation assets, either government owned or chartered, that are under the operational control of AMC, MSC, or MTMC for the purpose of providing, in peace and war, common-user transportation to the Department of Defense. These assets range from common-user organic and/or chartered commercial assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from other sources. Lift assets from organic and other sources are delineated in Sections II and III.
- 4. Apportionment and Allocation of Assets.** Airlift, sealift, and air refueling assets are available for planning as specified in Sections II, III, and IV. CJCS approval of an OPLAN does not guarantee a specific allocation of airlift, sealift, or air refueling assets for execution. Apportioned levels of mobility assets are for the deliberate planning and movement support of a particular OPLAN and are based on the best projections available of expected future capabilities. Specific assets available for actual allocation during a crisis at some unknown time should be expected to differ somewhat.
- 5. Transportation Feasibility Criteria.** The new JOPES standard model for gross transportation analysis, JFAST, should be used for the gross transportation evaluation of all OPLANs and Concept Summaries. Combatant commanders should determine the gross transportation feasibility of their plans' decisive force response before submitting it to USTRANSCOM for further TPFDD refinement.
- 6. Interface with JOPES.** The mobility planning data presented in this document and the JOPES transportation reference files are primarily intended for use in conjunction with JFAST for the purpose of gross transportation feasibility evaluations. Table I-1 lists the two-digit MOBCODES.

Table I-1
MOBILIZATION CODE REFERENCE TABLE

<u>Airlift and Sealift</u>	<u>OPLAN Segment</u>	<u>Mob Guide</u>	<u>Component Fleets</u>
MA	FDO	None	AMC, MSC
MB	Early Dep.	None	AMC, CRAF I, MSC, RRF, SRP
MC	Initial Res.	PSRC	AMC, CRAF I, MSC, RRF, SRP
MD	Counterattack	Partial	AMC, CRAF I, II, and III, MSC, RRF, SRP

(1) CRAF Stage I and Stage II aircraft are available for loading at the deployment airfield within 24 hours of notification of commercial carriers. Aircraft in the aeromedical segment of Stage II require an additional 24 hours for proper configuration. As a guideline for deliberate planning, CRAF Stages I and II are generally first associated when the PSRC is authorized (usually at the Deploy Decisive Force response).

(2) CRAF Stage III aircraft are available for loading at the deployment airfield within 48 hours of notification of commercial carriers. As a guideline for deliberate planning, CRAF Stage III is generally associated only when Partial Mobilization is authorized. Although these guidelines are considered appropriate to the intent of adaptive planning response options, CINCs may plan for CRAF as necessary.

SECTION II — INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT MOVEMENT

1. General. This section presents the airlift assets and capabilities available to support time-phased transportation requirements. The airlift planning factors found in this annex and the JOPEs reference files are provided to assist the planner in developing airlift capability estimates during deliberate planning. These estimates can be used in making a gross analysis of the airlift feasibility of an OPLAN. For execution planning, all deliberate planning guidelines and factors must be modified with the most current knowledge of mission requirements, current lift availability, and the environment in which the operation occurs or is expected to occur. The general categorization of aircraft as either organic or nonorganic is introduced to distinguish between assets the U.S. government already owns and can control through internal measures and those assets that require coordination outside government channels. (All assets require crews to operate them. All crews for organic assets are within the Active or Reserve military structure; whereas, all crews for nonorganic assets are outside the Active and Reserve structure.)

2. Sources and Availability of Intertheater Airlift Assets. USTRANSCOM-controlled common-user airlift assets from organic and other sources are described below:

a. USTRANSCOM-controlled common-user organic aircraft consists of 64 C-5, 15 C-26, and 91 C-141 active inventory aircraft. Half of the aircrews necessary to operate these aircraft are from the Reserve forces. An additional 40 C-5, 10 C-17, and 50 C-141 aircraft are assigned to either the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve. The total organic USTRANSCOM-controlled airlift fleet is 104 C-5, 46 C-17, and 141 C-141 aircraft. Because of maintenance and other high priority DOD support missions, not all organic aircraft should be planned to be available to a supported CINC. See Table 2 for the number of organic military aircraft to be used for deliberate planning. An additional number of KC-10 aircraft may be planned to be available for cargo operations.

b. CRAF is a program in which the Department of Defense and Transportation augment military airlift capability with civil aircraft owned by a U.S. entity or citizen. When fully mobilized, the CRAF provides over 90 percent of the total passenger lift and over 35 percent of airlift cargo. When DOD airlift requirements, in response to a defense-oriented emergency, exceed USTRANSCOM-controlled organic military airlift capability, USCINCTRANS may incrementally implement the CRAF (with SecDef approval) in three stages.

Stage I: Long-range international (LRI) passenger and cargo aircraft. These aircraft may be activated during smaller scale contingencies when the airlift requirements exceed AMC's military airlift capability.

Stage II: Long- and short-range international, aeromedical evacuation and Alaskan section aircraft. These may be activated to augment AMC's military airlift capability during a major theater war.

Stage III: Up to a total CRAF capability from all segments. These aircraft may be activated for a national emergency requiring greater than Stage II capability, up to total mobilization.

Aircraft are allocated in accordance with DOD requirements to a route segment according to their capabilities. The segments are Long Range International (LRI) (for both cargo and passenger requirements), Short Range International (SRI) (for both cargo and passenger requirements), Aeromedical, Domestic, and Alaskan. The Aeromedical segment of CRAF (AECRAF) consists of B-767 aircraft, which are allocated only to Stages II and III of CRAF. The Domestic and Alaskan segments are not used for deliberate planning of OPLAN support.

3. Application of Airlift Planning Factors. The airlift planning factors in this annex and the JOPES reference files are provided to assist the planner during deliberate planning to develop airlift capability estimates. If the supported CINC determines these guidelines are too restrictive, coordinate with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. These estimates are not constrained by enroute and theater factors but can be used in making a gross analysis of the airlift feasibility of an OPLAN. Planners should be aware that these planning factors are based on average performance characteristics and are applicable only for broad planning purposes. For execution planning, all deliberate planning assumptions and factors must be modified with the most current knowledge of mission requirements and the environment in which the operation occurs or is expected to occur. Therefore, it may be necessary to refer to appropriate aircraft loading manuals in determining detailed capabilities of individual aircraft types to move specific cargo loads, and ensure the related settings and default values are accurate in mobility models for airlift closure. AF Pam 10-1403, *Airlift Planning Factors*, contains planning factors and detailed explanations of the methodology used in computing airlift capabilities.

a. FDOs developed in response to MTWs and SSCs may include plans for the use of military aircraft to transport passengers with their accompanying baggage, cargo exclusively, or a mix of passengers/baggage and cargo. This policy applies to planning for missions departing both CONUS and non-CONUS locations. This policy also pertains to the movement of medical patients and medical equipment and supplies (Class VIIIA and VIIIB), and for the return of aeromedical crews and related equipment to the theaters of operation.

b. During the initial 96 hours, consideration will be given to the impact of AMC essential mission support movement requirements and the time required for fleet generation of airlift delivery capability to fill

CINC requirements. AMC mission support, aeromedical evacuation system assets, and aerial port force positioning requirements must be incorporated within the TPFDD to facilitate development of flow plans and to maximize aircraft utilization.

c. Planning availability rate for C-5 A/B and C-141 is 12 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge), and 8 hours/day/aircraft (thereafter). Planning availability rate for C-17 is 15 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge), and 12 hours/day/aircraft (thereafter).

d. The average cargo payload for each type of aircraft by type of cargo (bulk, oversize, outsize) that can be deliberately planned for movement over an indicated distance is listed in JOPES reference files. Variation in aircraft configurations require that cargo carrying capacities be categorized by aircraft loading characteristics. Categories are used for broad planning purposes only. Airlift of a specific item of equipment is governed by the dimensional and floor-loading restrictions of the particular aircraft available. (For further guidance see AF Pam 10-1403.)

e. For deliberate planning of Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) airlift, the standard passenger capability of available aircraft will be used. For KC-10 and CRAF cargo aircraft, pallet subflooring and sufficient cargo straps are required before moving NEO passengers. Three percent of the total estimated NEO requirements should be used for deliberate planning to estimate the aeromedical NEO movement requirements. The three percent rate includes 1.5 nonmedical attendants (average) per medical NEO patient requiring evacuation. The emergency NEO airlift capability by type of aircraft for execution planning is in Table II-5. These loading figures are based on seating NEO passengers on the cargo compartment floor of cargo-configured aircraft. Movements under these circumstances are expected to occur only under extreme emergencies.

f. Aeromedical evacuation (AIREVAC) planning factors for wartime strategic lift of patients can be found in Table II-6. Intertheater air evaluation in deliberate planning will be accomplished using backhaul/retrograde missions on apportioned common user C-141s as much as possible. AECRAF augmentation requires CRAF Stages II or III activation. The numbers of specific types of aircraft and their characteristics for deliberate planning are listed in the JOPES reference files. In regional planning, AECRAF augmentation (requiring CRAF Stages II or III augmentation) for strategic AIREVAC is assumed only for the Deploy Decisive Force or Counterattack; all CRAF aeromedical augmentation aircraft are assumed available to the supported CINC. For deliberate planning, USCENTCOM will assume all B767s are extended range aircraft.

g. The basic IJSCP tasks USCINCTRANS to develop strategic mobility FDOs for all geographic CINCs. As a minimum, for strategic airlift, the following FDOs should be developed:

- (1) Assembling and staging USTRANSCOM-controlled airlift assets.
- (2) Assembling and staging of CRAF Stages I through III.
- (3) Assembling and staging of appropriate allied air assets.

These FDOs will be coordinated and refined during the planning process.

4. Intertheater Airlift Analysis Guidance. The JOPES transportation reference files provide the planner with a means of developing and testing the gross transportation feasibility of the air movement

portion of an OPLAN. Gross transportation feasibility evaluations should be performed from the earliest stage of constructing a time-phased arrival sequence of IJSCP apportioned forces. As more forces (combat/ CS/CSS) and sustainment approximations become known, the gross transportation feasibility evaluations should become more detailed. At this stage the assistance of USTRANSCOM, with its in-house systems, may be requested.

After all forces and sustainment requirements are calculated, a refined transportation analysis is performed by the TCCs. After TCC analysis, if CINCs must accept delayed closures that may negatively affect their concept of operations, they must provide an impact assessment of these movement shortfalls on their concept of operations.

Table II-1
Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Airlift Assets

<u>W/O dec of Emergency</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>MAINT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Avail for</u>
	<u>PAA</u>		<u>DOD</u>	<u>Planning</u>
C-5	64	10	24	30
C-17	26	7	7	12
C-141	91	15	50	26
KC-10	54	5	40	9
<u>PSRC</u>				
C-5	104	15	39	50
C-17	46	7	6	33
C-141	141	20	45	76
KC-10	54	5	29	20
<u>Partial Mobilization</u>				
C-5	104	15	20	69
C-17	46	5	5	36
C-141	141	20	20	101
KC-10	54	5	29	20
<u>Full Mobilization</u>				
C-5	104	15	9	80
C-17	25	4	1	41
C-141	150	10	15	116
KC-10	54	5	19	30

Table II-2
Organic USTRANSCOM-controlled Airlift Capability for SSCs

<u>USCENTCOM SSC C000-C090</u>					
<u>FDO</u>	<u>C5</u>	<u>C-17</u>	<u>C141</u>	<u>KC-10</u>	<u>S/T Per Day</u>
Decisive Force	30	11	55	9	4,964
PRSC	50	12	85	20	7,478
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	9,487

Table II-3
 Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Airlift Capability
 for SSCs and NOPLAN Contingencies

Unconstrained	<u>C5</u>	<u>C17</u>	<u>C141</u>	<u>KC-10</u>	<u>S/T Per Day</u>	
FDO	30	11	55	10	8,401	
Decisive Force						
PRSC	50	12	85	20	12,695	
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	16,126	2,500 NM
FDO	30	11	55	10	6,883	
Decisive Force						
PRSC	50	12	85	20	10,330	
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	13,102	3,500 NM
FDO	30	11	55	10	5,877	
Decisive Force						
PRSC	50	12	85	20	8,770	
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	11,112	4,500 NM
FDO	30	11	55	10	4,530	
Decisive Force						
PRSC	50	12	85	20	6,830	
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	8,663	5,500 NM
FDO	30	11	55	20	3,814	
Decisive Force						
PRSC	50	12	85	20	5,753	
Part Mob	69	15	110	20	7,287	6,500 NM

Table II-4
CRAF Assets and Capabilities

USCENTCOM SSC — Apportionment

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Unconstrained S/T Per Day</u>
Stage I		
LRI	10	6,940
SRI	0	0
<u>PAX</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Unconstrained PAX Per Day</u>
Stage I		
LRI	10	4,010
SRI	0	0

CRAF Availability by Activation Stage (planning factors) *

<u>AIRFRAME</u>	<u>STAGE I (Cargo/Pax)</u>	<u>STAGE II (Cargo/Pax)</u>	<u>STAGE III (Cargo/Pax)</u>
B-747	4/10	8/20	24/43
B-757	0/3	0/9	0/9
B-767	0/3	0/18	0/93
DC-8	3/0	6/0	14/0
DC-10	6/7	24/26	59/65
L-1011	0/10	0/13	0/35
MD-11	6/2	14/15	30/24

* Planning availability rate for all CRAF aircraft: 10 hours/day/aircraft (45 day surge).
 CRAF is available 24 hours after activation: 10 hours/day/aircraft (thereafter).

Table II-5
Emergency NEO Capability

<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Emergency Pax Capability</u>
C-5	600
C-17	300
C-141B	288
C-130	100
KC-10	427
KC-135	250
B-747-100/200C/200F	600
DC-10-30CF	500
DC-89-61/63CF	360

Table II-6
Aeromedical Evacuation — General Planning Data

A/C Type	Patient	Load	Config	Crew	
	Planning	Time	Time	Composition	
	Factor	(min)	(min)	Nurse	Tech
C-141B	70	60	90		4
C-130	50	30	30	2	3
C-9	40	35	40	2	3
B-767	100	300	0	4	6

SECTION III — STRATEGIC SEALIFT

1. General. This section presents information on the sealift assets available to support time-phased common-user transportation requirements. General information on non-common-user sealift assets is presented to help delineate their differences. Detailed common-user sealift planning data are located in JOPES reference files. The estimates on ship types, numbers, capabilities, sources, and apportionments are judged to be reasonable planning estimates for sealift capabilities for the IJSCP planning period. The information on sealift assets and associated deliberate planning guidance is provided for estimating gross transportation feasibility only. The general categorization of ships as either organic or nonorganic is introduced to distinguish between assets the U.S. government already owns and can control through internal measures and those assets that require coordination outside U.S. government channels. (NOTE: As a caution, a too restrictive interpretation of the above general categorizations of organic and nonorganic should not be made since both categories of assets require civilian crews, and all civilians are outside of the Active and Reserve military structure and must be gained through implementation of labor contracts.)

2. Sources and Availability of Strategic Sealift Assets

a. The availability of ships for the sealift of cargoes is centered around two principles of who or what owns the ship and in what nation is the ship registered (its flag). These two precepts, as well as the actions required to gain control of the ship (by implementing a program, requisitioning, etc.), underlie how and why the categorization of source is formed and used in planning.

(1) The availability of ships already controlled by the U.S. government (organic) is more easily predicted than for ships that the government must temporarily charter from the private sector (and/or coordinate with foreign governments for “free” charters (nonorganic)). For deliberate planning, ships of U.S. government ownership are further categorized between those already in active service or in reduced operating status (Source: MSC) and those that first require activation and crewing before they can be used (Sources: RRF and NDRF).

(2) Privately owned U.S. registered ships, which first must be chartered to gain their use, remain subject to U.S. law. Foreign flag ships are not subject to U.S. law unless inside U.S. territorial waters.

Control of a portion of the privately owned U.S. flag ships can be gained by implementing certain contractual programs (Source: SRP) or, if necessary, control of any U.S. flag ship (including those possible through SRP implementation) can be gained by means of requisitioning (Source: USNC). For planning, privately owned and foreign registered ships are further categorized into three sources. The first category consists of ships that NATO nations (except the United States) have earmarked for only the rapid reinforcement of Europe (Source: NATO). The second category is a small group of ROK ships restricted for contingencies involving the Korean Peninsula (Source: KFS). The third category is foreign flag ships that are majority owned by U.S. citizens or corporations and have a reasonable assurance that the foreign nations where the ships are flagged will not hinder attempts to enforce U.S. requisitioning law (Source: EUSC). NATO and KFS ships are expected to be provided to the United States when their particular situation warrants, while the third category, EUSC, is composed of foreign flagged (and crewed) ships that are assumed to be subject to requisitioning under U.S. law.

b. Sealift assets used for the deliberate planning of the carriage of common-user requirements in regional plans tasked by the IJSCP are controlled by USTRANSCOM. Sealift assets used in deliberate planning for other than common-user requirements, such as the afloat pre-positioning of specific cargoes (MPS and PREPO), specialized aviation activities (TAVB), or acute medical care (T-AH), are not controlled through USTRANSCOM channels and are apportioned as forces in Section V of the IJSCP. Ships of the APF are intended to individually chop to USCINCTRANS after discharge of their pre-loaded cargoes and release by the supported commander, and are then to participate in the movement of common-user requirements. Ships of the RRF that have been specifically modified to augment the Navy's Combat Logistic Force (CLF) (nine console-capable dry cargo ships, seven modular-delivery capable dry cargo ships, and two modular delivery capable PAL tanker) have been excluded from the common-user apportionment of organic ships for the counterattack option. These specifically modified RRF ships are included in common-user apportionments for FDO and Decisive Force options only.

3. Sources of Common-User Organic Strategic Sealift Assets.

a. MSC Controlled Fleet. U.S. government-owned or American merchant ships under charter to the U.S. government (i.e. MSC ships) fall into one of three subcategories based on their mission: the Strategic Sealift Force (SSE) (common-user shipping), Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), and Special Mission ships. While MSC retains OPCON of all ships, only SSE ships support common-user requirements under the auspices of USTRANSCOM. The FSS are one type of ship in the SSE category and are kept in 96-hour reduced operating status (ROS-4). The FSS are lay-berthed on the East and Gulf coasts.

b. Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). This is a special source and category of ships within the NDRF that provide readily available dry cargo ships (i.e., RO/RO, breakbulk, LASH, SEABEE), tankers, and passenger ships to augment the movement of strategic common-user requirements. This program also includes other non-common-user ship categories such as auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS), tankers configured with an offshore petroleum discharge system (OPDS), and ships for naval CLF augmentation. All RRF ships are maintained by MARAD with various availability dates (5 to 20 days). Selected RRF ships are lay-berthed near or in expected ports of embarkation or activation facilities.

c. National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) (minus the RRF). These U.S. government-owned ships serve as the U.S. strategic reserve capability. The NDRF's militarily useful assets include World War II Victory-class breakbulk ships, other dry cargo ships, troopships, and tankers. These ships are located at three fleet sites — The James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay, California. These ships require major industrial shipyard repairs and, therefore, will not be considered for activation until shipyard

industrial capability has met naval and RRF requirements. They should not be considered for deliberate planning.

4. Sources of Common-User Nonorganic Strategic Sealift Assets.

a. NATO. Ships committed by individual NATO countries (other than the United States) to augment U.S. common-user sealift for the rapid reinforcement of Europe by U.S. forces. NATO member nations have made commitments to provide 400 dry cargo ships for this purpose. To provide a high level of confidence in the availability of at least 400 dry cargo ships, more ships are nominated than the commitment requires. Only 400 ships are available for deliberate planning. Tankers capable of carrying clean products are also nominated toward meeting NATO PAL requirements, and passenger ships are nominated toward meeting troop requirements (including Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE)) for NATO. These assets form the NATO Sealift Ships List, which is updated semiannually by PBOS. These assets would become available only after a North Atlantic Council decision to reinforce NATO.

b. U.S. Flag. All ships owned by U.S. citizens and registered in the United States. This category is inclusive of ships enrolled in the SRP.

(1) Sea Readiness Program (SRP). Militarily useful active U.S. flag merchant ships that can be brought under charter to the U.S. government to augment the USTRANSCOM controlled fleet by invoking the emergency charter clauses of the SRP agreement. SRP enrollment is based on the past and present financial obligations of shipping companies (and obligates these companies to commit a specified capability, not specific ships). SRP call-up would occur only after the following successive actions have been completed:

(a) First, USTRANSCOM determines that SSE capability is insufficient to meet escalating requirements, even when augmented by voluntary charters from the open charter market (U.S. and foreign flag) and also when further augmented by activation of the RRF.

(b) Second, the Secretary of Defense determines that the non-RRF portion of the NDRF cannot be made available in sufficient time or numbers to meet stated requirements.

(c) Finally, the Secretary of Transportation confirms both that sufficient numbers of ships are available from the SSE, the commercial charter market, and the RRF, based on DOD-provided requirements and that the adverse economic impact of SRP implementation will not be great enough to justify requisitioning instead.

(2) USNC. Militarily useful U.S. flag merchant ships that are not enrolled in the SRP, but which can be requisitioned into government service (primarily for common-user movements) under jurisdiction of Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This Act provides that “whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency by proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of Transportation to requisition ships or purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States.” Under this authority, requisitioning of U.S. flagged ships based on known or anticipated requirements could be implemented.

(3) Effective U.S. Control (EUSC). Ships that are majority owned by U.S. citizens or parent U.S. companies located or incorporated in the United States but registered/flagged in certain specific foreign

countries for which there are bilateral understandings are manned with foreign crews and are militarily useful or can be used to support the civil economy. Only militarily useful EUSC ships are listed here. For planning purposes, there is reasonable assurance that these ships can be requisitioned by the United States (primarily for common-user movements) under the requisitioning authority of Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 cited above.

(4) Foreign Flag. An unknown number of foreign flag ships that may be available at the time of execution from the open charter market or from “at the moment” foreign nation offerings. Because of the more significant uncertainty involved than for those categories above, such ships are not planned to be available for deliberate planning. Ships available from this source would greatly influence decisions about SRP call-up and other actions at execution.

5. Programs of Non-Common-User Strategic Sealift.

a. Afloat Preposition Forces (APF). A force consisting of two major components: the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) and the Pre-positioning (PREPO) ships. Although there are similarities, each serve different Services’ requirements and should not be thought of as a single entity. In both cases, the Services are responsible for the maintenance of all prepositioning cargoes, and any conflicts concerning apportionment of these ships after USCINCTRANS assumes control will be resolved by the JCS Joint Transportation Board.

b. Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB). Two T-AVBs provide dedicated sealift for movement of a USMC aviation intermediate activity (organic to deploying units) to support the rapid deployment of a MAGTF aviation combat element. T-AVBs are designed to provide Intermediate Maintenance Activity support at the destination. Complete offload and release to USTRANSCOM for common-user movements is not envisioned.

c. Hospital Ships (T-AH). Two T-AHs (1,000-bed afloat hospitals each) provide afloat health care facilities in support of amphibious task forces, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force elements, and forward deployed Navy elements of the fleet and fleet activities. T-AH operations are critical during combat when hospital facilities have not been established ashore.

6. Special Strategic Sealift Features.

a. All refined POL products (e.g., military specification fuels), especially aviation grade fuels, must be carefully transported to prevent contamination. Tankers may have coated or uncoated tanks. All tankers capable of carrying a range of clean POL products are considered militarily useful. Before the movement of any aviation grade fuel, a tanker must meet much more stringent standards. The availability of tankers listed in the JOPEAS ASSETS file accounts for probable cleaning delays. Changing patterns in the U.S.-tanker fleet inventory indicate a continuing decline in the number of handy-size, small, shallowdraft tankers (see tanker categories below). This development requires specific plans to employ the remaining larger tankers. Such planning should consider the standard commercial practice of using light-loaded, medium-to-large tankers, and lighterage, to carry POL transferred from larger tankers through shallow-draft ports. Militarily useful tankers are divided into five categories:

<u>Tanker Type</u>	<u>Barrel Capacity</u>
Shallow-draft	50,000 or less
Small	50,001 - 180,000
Handy-size	180,001 - 235,000

Medium	235,001 - 320,000
Large	320,001 - or greater

b. At the supported CINC's discretion, selected USTRANSCOM-controlled tankers made available for point-to-point movement of common-user requirements may be planned for underway replenishment (CONSOL) of fleet oilers (i.e., temporary CLF augmentation). The supported commander's TPFDD will specify CONSOL requirements by fuel type, quantity, EAD, LAD, and ocean area (GEOLOC) in nonunit POL records.

c. The total inventory of passenger ships available for planning is 26. This number comprises 3 NDRF, 2 RRF, 2 U.S.-flag, 7 EUCS, and 12 NATO assets. The Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) can be supported by assets drawn from all sources apportioned common-user assets.

d. The basic IJSCP tasks USTRANSCOM to develop strategic mobility FDOs for all geographic CINCs. As a minimum, for strategic sealift, the following FDOs should be developed:

(1) Assembling and staging terminal transportation units.

(2) Assembling and staging USTRANSCOM- controlled sealift assets, including readying and staging the FSS.

These FDOs will be coordinated and refined during the planning process.

7. Strategic Sealift Support to an AFOE. An Amphibious Task Force (ATF) is a task organized force which includes Navy forces and a Marine Landing Force (LF). A Marine LF is composed of two integral echelons: the Assault Echelon (AE) and the Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE). Each echelon is planned to be carried by separate groups of ships. The first echelon, the AE, is composed of assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies required to initiate the assault. Except under extraordinary conditions, this echelon is exclusively carried and supported by Navy amphibious assault ships. The Navy possesses sufficient amphibious assault ships to transport only the AE of two MEBs while maintaining the forward presence of one deployed MEU and ARG Bravo. The second echelon, the AFOE, also composed of assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies, is required to support and sustain an already initiated assault in the AOA and, in order to accomplish its purpose, is normally required within five days after the initiation of the assault landing. Some AFOE forces and materials may, however, be required to arrive simultaneously with the AE and offload sooner than D+4. Planned merchant ship support for an AFOE will be based on the number and capability of USTRANSCOM- controlled common-user ships capable of offloading in the stream, and which have been coordinated between the supported CINC and USTRANSCOM for dedication to this mission. The supported CINC will list in Annex D of the OPLAN the number, type, capability, SPOE, and required availability relative to C-day of formerly common-user ships coordinated with USTRANSCOM for planned support. The ships required to transport an AFOE will be deleted from the common-user sealift file used for evaluating the supported CINC's common-user sealift requirements.

8. Application of Strategic Sealift Planning Factors.

a. The notional sealift planning factors, except ship draft and ship length, located in the JOPES ASSETS and CHSTR reference files are simple arithmetic averages based on the aggregated individual characteristics of actual ships in a specific ship category (e.g., fast breakbulk) given a specific type of

contingency (e.g., contingencies with partial mobilization). The ship draft and length planning factors represent the maximum draft and length existing within a ship category given a specific contingency type. The speed planning factor is the average speed acquired at design full-load draft using 80 percent of maximum commercial horsepower on trial with a clean bottom, a smooth sea, and no wind. The average load and unload rates are only for planning purposes and could differ in actual operations.

b. Strategic common-user sealift capability data for deliberate planning is listed in the ASSETS file and based on an assigned mobilization code for each adaptive planning element for tasked OPLANs. Sealift capability is expressed as the number of ships of a specific type from one specific source at the earliest date (relative to C-day) that are expected to be able to be on-berth and ready to load cargo for their initial voyage against the matrix of worldwide ports listed below:

- (1) East Coast — Norfolk, Virginia
- (2) Gulf Coast — New Orleans, Louisiana.
- (3) West Coast — Oakland, California.
- (4) Hawaii — Honolulu, Hawaii.
- (5) Diego Garcia — Diego Garcia.
- (6) Greece — Piraeus, Greece.
- (7) United Kingdom — Liverpool, United Kingdom.

These data represent only the general patterns and rates of strategic shipping. These patterns and rates are based on positional “snapshots” taken from naval intelligence data, but do not represent fixed or actual schedules. The projected availability is only for the purpose of determining a gross movement capability and should not be applied to specific supplements of the transportation problem, such as the requirement for berthing space.

c. Several withhold estimates are made during ASSETS file construction to reflect other expected simultaneous sealift requirements. Withhold estimate categories vary dependent on scenario and source of ship. Withhold considerations are made for:

(1) Maintenance. A certain percentage of ships are undergoing overhaul or repair at all times. These ships would not be available for execution and so are not available for planning. A 4 percent maintenance withhold reflects this expectation.

(2) Economic Support. Support for the civil economy acknowledges that the flow of certain raw materials to support the industrial base as well as other commodities must continue to flow during wartime. Raw materials are moved principally by large dry or liquid bulk carriers which, because of the time and expense required to convert them into militarily useful assets, are not used in deliberate planning. Containerized subsistence and industrial base support for Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico are drawn down from militarily useful container ships. This application assumes a certain drawdown of stocks and assumes the imposition of rationing of defense-related commodities.

(3) DOD Support. Support for worldwide DOD activities other than the primary supported unified command.

9. Strategic Sealift Analysis Guidance. The methods and sealift planning factors in Annex J and the JOPES transportation reference files provide the planner with a means for developing and testing the sea

movement portion of an OPLAN. The JFAST model should be used where available. If JFAST is not yet available at a given site and if the plan is in TPFDD format, the TFE model is recommended. If, applying all factors, the plan cannot be supported using apportioned sealift assets and it is not feasible to adjust the plan's concept of operations to stay within specified limitations, possible actions the planner may consider include:

- a. Adjusting delivery dates.
- b. Switching a portion of the sealift requirement to airlift if residual airlift capability exists.
- c. Matching cargo configuration to ship availability. For example, expanded use of containerization where possible may improve closure times if container vessels are available and other vessel types are not.
- d. Combining the above actions.

Table III-1
Organic USTRANSCOM-Controlled Sealift Assets

	<u>Total Ships</u>	<u>Maintenance Withholds</u>	<u>Avail. for Planning</u>
No Mobilization			
Dry Cargo	13	1	12
Tanker	2	1	1
PSRC			
Dry Cargo	42	2	40
Tanker	4	1	3
Partial Mobilization			
Dry Cargo	49	2	47
Tanker	10	1	9
Full Mobilization			
Dry Cargo	356	5	351
Tanker	84	2	82

Table III-2
USTRANSCOM-Controlled Sealift Capability
USCENTCOM Region (SSC)

<u>Organic</u>	<u>Dry</u>	<u>Tanker</u>	<u>Capacity (000) Sq Ft/BBLs</u>
FDO			
No Mobilization	12	1	1,139/3,083

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Decisive Force			
PSRC	39	2	5,773/6,360
Partial Mobilization	5	6	7,332/13,000
<u>Nonorganic</u>			
FDO			
No Mobilization	0	0	0/0
Decisive Force			
PSRC	13	2	1,640/2,100
Partial Mobilization	22	6	2,775/7,500

SECTION IV — THEATER AIRLIFT MOVEMENT

1. General. This section presents information on C-130 theater airlift assets for support of theater airlift planning. CINCs may incorporate additional aviation assets in theater airlift planning only if so apportioned by Service documents. Detailed C-130 aircraft characteristics are located in the JOPES CHSTR reference file. Availability of C-130 aircraft assets is based on the apportionment of theater airlift forces by contingency type. Theater airlift requirements will be documented in supported CINC's OPLANs and Concept Summaries.

2. Sources of Theater Airlift Assets. The majority of theater airlift assets consist of military C-130 aircraft. Although these airlift assets do have limited strategic capability, this capability will NOT be deliberately planned to be used for OPLANs or CONPLANs, concept summary developments, or TPFDD refinements (except from CONUS to the Caribbean and Central America). Only during execution planning may this limited strategic capability be incorporated, at the supported CINC's discretion, into planning.

3. Application of Theater Airlift Planning Factors. Theater airlift planning factors, JOPES CHSTR reference file, and data presented in AFP 76-2 are provided to assist the CINC planner in developing theater airlift capability estimates. Estimates produced from these sources are to be used to make a general analysis of the theater air-movement feasibility of a contingency response and in determining the general level of airlift mobilization necessary to support greater levels of required airlift support. Planning for specific operations must be modified with the best available knowledge of mission requirements and the environment in which the operation occurs or is expected to occur. Therefore, it will be necessary to refer to appropriate aircraft and loading characteristics manuals to determine the capabilities of individual types of aircraft to move specific cargo loads. For theater level planning, the relationship between runway length, range, average payload, etc., as detailed in AFP 76-2, should be used when estimating theater airlift capability.

4. Theater Airlift Analysis Guidance. The theater airlift planning factors must be complemented by those outlined in AFP 76-2. In an operational environment, aircraft capabilities are significantly constrained by mission profiles, aircraft characteristics, and the exigencies of the tactical situation.

CJCSI 11 TO IJSCP CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this annex is to offer information and guidance on principles, responsibilities, and authorities for joint planning of civil affairs operations in the combatant commands.

2. GENERAL.

a. The term "civil affairs" has three common usages:

(1) Civil affairs concept — embraces the totality of the relationships of a military commander with the civilian environment.

(2) Civil affairs operations — obtains for a military commander essential civilian support and assists in the attainment of politico-military objectives. This may involve the performance by military forces in an area of operations of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

(3) Civil affairs organization — consists of staffs and units particularly designed and trained to supervise and conduct civil affairs operations in support of military forces.

b. Planning for and conducting civil affairs is the responsibility of every echelon of command.

c. Each commander of a military unit, regardless of size or organizational position, must comply with the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, or agreements with respect to inhabitants, governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host countries.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY. The assignment of responsibilities within the U.S. government for civil affairs is as follows:

a. The Department of State is the agency primarily charged with the formulation of foreign policy and has primary or collateral interest in policies concerning

(1) the governments with whom U.S. Armed Forces will deal,

(2) the degree to which commanders of U.S. Forces will intervene in the government of a particular country,

(3) the level at which the economy of a given country will be maintained by civil affairs operations,

(4) the level of AID support,

(5) matters involving psychological warfare, information, and propaganda, and

(6) plans for turning civil affairs activities over to civilian control.

b. The Department of Defense coordinates with other federal departments and agencies and prescribes DOD policies affecting civil affairs activities.

c. The Joint Staff will do the following:

(1) Formulate policies within broad policy guidance obtained from OSD for transmittal to combatant commanders necessitated by military situations.

(2) Ensure adequate coverage of civil affairs in all joint plans.

(3) Establish a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, if necessary, at the outbreak of hostilities.

d. Combatant commanders' responsibilities:

(1) Plan for the conduct of civil affairs operations that are appropriate in their areas of responsibility as an integral part of their missions.

(2) Secure, through the Joint Staff, civil affairs units and personnel needed to execute their plans the same way they secure other forces.

(3) Arrange for political advisers on their staffs, to be obtained from the Department of State.

(4) Ensure the adequacy of civil affairs planning by all subordinate commanders.

(5) Combatant commanders are authorized, but not required, to delegate authority for civil affairs to one of the Service components of their commands, normally the Army component commander.

e. Services and Service component responsibilities:

(1) The Army will do the following:

(a) Act as executive agent for the Joint Staff for civil affairs planning.

(b) Train and furnish civil affairs units and personnel needed in combatant commands, except where such responsibility is assigned to other Services.

(c) Furnish to the other Services, at their request, civil affairs personnel as required.

(2) The Navy and/or Marine Corps will do the following:

(a) Train and deploy civil affairs personnel needed to support the operations of the forces, activities, and facilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.

(b) Furnish specially qualified personnel to the Army as instructors or specialists in the Department of Army civil affairs training and operational units.

(3) The Air Force will furnish to the Army, as requested, specially qualified personnel for service in the Department of Army civil affairs training and operational units as instructors or specialists in matters of primary concern to the Air Force.

(4) All components will perform missions in the field of civil affairs that are directed by appropriate authority.

**CJCSI 12 TO IJSCP
MOBILIZATION**

NOT PUBLISHED

CJCSI 13 TO IJSCP
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI gives informational guidance to combatant commanders for planning joint operations in support of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

2. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW includes forces based overseas, periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts.

a. Ways. Consistent with the NMS, MOOTW operations are categorized as operational training and deployments, security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance.

b. Means. MOOTW operations depend on the collective efforts of all governmental departments and agencies. Some of the governmental agencies and international organizations that may be involved include the Departments of State, Justice, and Agriculture; DEA; UN; and NATO. A U.S. ambassador's country team is the focal point for coordinating all U.S. governmental agency actions in a particular nation. The CINC provides the theater focus and interest. The CINC also provides the regional coordination point for the various military resources employed throughout the theater and closely coordinates with the country teams to ensure unity of effort.

(1) Maritime Forces. MOOTW of maritime forces demonstrates our ability to protect our interests, expeditiously respond to crises, avoid burden sharing disputes, and project combat power in the littoral region. During a crisis, offshore presence demonstrates U.S. interest, commitment, and power without the potential of putting land-based forces in a crisis region.

(2) Land-Based Forces. The MOOTW of air and ground forces usually connotes a longer commitment in a region. Forward basing of forces and prepositioning of equipment and supplies facilitate rapid response and enhance the capability to project forces. Forward bases and access agreement provide forward staging areas for crisis response, an in-place infrastructure, and often enhance stability.

c. Flexible Deterrent Options. Flexible deterrent options are actions to preempt or precipitate actions or reactions that may result in the protection of U.S. interest or the promotion of U.S. influence. FDOs may provide the means to use MOOTW operations to counter instabilities when they threaten national vital interests before the only alternative is to cross the threshold from peace to conflict.

3. Planning Guidance. MOOTW operations contribute to the deliberate planning process because through the day-to-day peacetime activities various aspects of operations plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs) can be validated, procedures and plans developed or refined, and forces can become familiar with the environment in which they may have to fight.

a. CINCs are not tasked to develop operations plans for MOOTW operations. However, if a CINC should desire to develop such a plan, it is called a functional plan (uses the concept of a campaign plan). Campaign planning provides strategic unity of effort through which the CINC guides the planning of joint operations within their theater of operation. Campaign plans for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations may be designed to facilitate crisis response through the execution of selected

flexible deterrent options developed during deliberate planning.

4. Planning Considerations. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations may include:

- a. Support for the accomplishment of theater objectives.
- b. Validating plans or portions of plans tasked in the JSCP.
- c. Coordinating closely with the country teams.
- d. Strengthening U.S. ties with allies.
- e. Advancing military-to-military contacts.

5. Operational Training and Deployments. Many specific DOD activities are authorized by law to be carried out during operational training and deployments. Examples of these activities include humanitarian and civic assistance, special operations forces (SOF) training of foreign armed forces, and exercise-related construction. While operational training and deployments are not part of the deliberate planning process, in the long run they contribute to the accomplishment of wartime missions tasked in the IJSCP.

6. Security Assistance. Security assistance (SA) encompasses various military and economic assistance programs for allied and friendly foreign countries conducted by the United States. One of the primary methods used to carry out our foreign and national security policy is through the transfer of defense articles and services, military training, and economic assistance.

a. Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense. FID programs seek to help other governments free and protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Although SA encompasses far more than FID, it plays a major FID role through logistic assistance, training, and advisory support.

b. Programs. Generically, SA refers to the range of U.S. programs that are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. The military component of SA implemented by the Department of Defense in accordance with policies established by the Department of State has as its principal components the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Also included are the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program and the special authorities that provide emergency drawdowns of defense inventories. DOS directly manages the other main components of SA, including the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

c. Peacekeeping Operations.

(1) General. Military PKO support diplomatic efforts to maintain a negotiated peace or truce, covering a wide spectrum of activities. The United States normally provides observe personnel and/or logistics to support an international or multinational peace initiative requiring one of the following types of operations:

(a) Peace observation.

(b) Internal Supervision and Assistance.

(c) Monitor Terms of Protocol.

(2) Tasks. Examples of tasks peacekeeping forces may be involved in are:

(a) Supervision of Free Territories.

(b) Supervision of Cease-Fires.

(c) Supervision of Withdrawals and Disengagements.

(d) Supervision of Prisoner of War Exchanges.

(e) Supervision of Demilitarization and Demobilization.

(f) Maintenance of Law and Order.

(3) Planning Considerations for PKO.

(a) Establishing clear objectives for a PKO before committing U.S. personnel.

(b) Maintaining a neutral non-hostile posture because the success of peacekeeping is based on the perceived neutrality of the peacekeepers.

(c) Establishing clear and understandable rules of engagement.

(d) Ending the U.S. participation in the PKO whenever any of the belligerent withdraw their consent for the presence of U.S. personnel in the operation.

(e) Maintaining the capability for evacuation, force protection and security operations, and rapid transition to self-defense operations.

7. Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad.

a. General. NEO may be executed as a contingency operation in response to a deterioration of order or as a result of a natural disaster in a host nation. NEO categorizes are permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The goal of NEO is the protection and evacuation of American citizens, designated foreign nationals, and property.

b. Plans. The U.S. ambassador or chief of diplomatic mission is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans (EAP) that address the evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated aliens from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of these EAPs is the sole responsibility of the supporting military commander

c. Threat. Theater NEO planning is based on uncertainty — uncertainty of time, location, and condition.

d. Planning Guidance.

(1) Plan for worst case — hostile evacuation.

(2) Incorporate the procedures developed by the chief of mission for evacuee notification, movement to assembly areas, and documentation.

(3) Integrate NEO plans with those of the country team and, where appropriate, the host nation or to other nations.

(4) Assess potential threats and our ability to conduct NEOs at various threat levels.

8. Combating Terrorism. An effective program to combat terrorism requires both offensive (counter terrorism) and defense (anti-terrorism) measures. Military forces must maintain their coordinated worldwide capability to combat terrorism as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

9. Combating Drugs.

a. General. The production, distribution, and sale of illegal drugs threaten stability by endangering the legitimacy of democratic institutions, thus posing a direct threat to the security of the United States. Plans must reflect the multinational and multiagency approach to the problem. DOD efforts must be coordinated with and complement the efforts of the other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign governments in attacking the illegal entry of drugs into the United States. The counterdrug guidance of the Secretary of Defense establishes a three-pronged attack against the threat and is directed at the following:

(1) Countries that are the source of the drugs.

(2) Countries that allow the transit of drugs from their source to the United States.

(3) Distribution networks in the United States.

b. DOD Missions. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned responsibilities to the Department of Defense including:

(1) Act as single lead U.S. agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States in support of the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.

(2) Integrate into an effective communications network the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States to interdict the movement of illegal drugs into the United States.

c. Planning Guidance.

(1) Plan and conduct operations to detect and monitor aerial and maritime transit.

(2) Provide available assets to assist drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) responding to drug trafficking activity.

(3) Collect, process, and disseminate all source, drug-related intelligence.

(4) Encourage and support host nation law enforcement programs.

(5) Coordinate with other federal agencies and/or cooperating host nations engaged in counterdrug activities.

(6) Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises as required by negotiated agreements and treaties.

10. Humanitarian assistance.

a. General. Increasingly, U.S. forces will be called upon to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Planning considerations need to include options for peace, potential hostilities, during hostilities, and post hostilities.

b. Military Capabilities for Assistance. DOD has transportation, material, special skills logistics, medical, engineer, military police (civil affairs, PSYOP, etc.), and personnel assets unmatched in other departments or agencies of the federal government. When properly applied, these resources may significantly enhance the efforts of other governmental assistance programs. Commanders of combatant commands are encouraged, where possible, to integrate humanitarian assistance activities and objectives into their MOOTW operations.

c. Integrated Effort.

(1) Every effort should be made to ensure the coordination of military and civil agency efforts. Organizations that may be involved include:

(a) Host nation.

(b) Country team.

(c) UN or other international organizations.

(d) USG agencies.

(e) Nongovernment or private volunteer and contracted organizations.

(f) Supporting CINCs.

(2) DOD involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations must be requested by the Officer of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development (AID/OFDS), and approved by Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)).

(3) Disaster Relief. The Department of State is the lead agency for the USG.

d. Planning Considerations.

(1) Focusing problem resolution actions on the host nation. The U.S. role is to help nations provide for themselves. The U.S. military is best suited for emergency relief, not sustained assistance.

(2) Integrating military assistance objectives and missions into plans, where possible, including involvement of other USG agencies.

(3) Involving other nations, as much as possible, to show world community concern and involvement.

(4) Formulating assistance operations using the format of a phased campaign plan with a clear cutoff point. The military is best suited for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by providing relief assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

(5) Developing and maintaining the capability for conducting adequate force protection and security operations either unilaterally or with the support of the host nation.

CJCSI 14 TO IJSCP SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

1. PURPOSE. This CJCSI contains planning guidance for special technical operations. For this IJSCP, the only area presented in this section will include the effective use of electronic warfare (EW) and its integration into military operations.

2. GENERAL. The increased application of electronics in the development of weapon system control and guidance systems, command and control communications, and reconnaissance systems has created new requirements for EW. An explanation of terms used in electronic warfare follows.

a. Electronic Warfare. EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are three divisions within EW as follows:

(1) Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM). ESM is the division of EW involving actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy to exploit those radiations in support of military operations. Thus, ESM is a source of EW information needed to conduct electronic countermeasures (ECM), threat detection, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), warning avoidance, target acquisition, and homing.

(2) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). ECM is EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM includes the following:

(a) Jamming. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the electronic devices, equipment, or systems being used by the enemy.

(b) Deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use of information received by its electronic systems. There are three categories of deception: manipulative deception, which is the *alteration of friendly* electromagnetic emission characteristics, patterns, or procedures to eliminate revealing or convey misleading telltale indicators; simulative deception, which is the *creation* of electromagnetic emissions to represent *friendly* imaginary or actual capabilities; and imitative deception, which is the *introduction* of electromagnetic radiation *into enemy* systems, thereby imitating their own emissions.

(3) Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). ECCM is EW involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of EW.

b. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is the generic term that includes communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). SIGINT planning is not discussed in this annex. However, the scope and responsibilities for these activities are set forth in DOD Directives S3115.7, "SIGINT"; S3115.4, "COMINT"; and S3115.2, "ELINT."

3. EW POLICY.

a. EW Program. The establishment and maintenance of superiority in EW is essential to the

successful conduct of modern warfare. Therefore, a dynamic and progressive EW program must be implemented and maintained to support the missions of U.S. forces.

b. Combatant Commands. Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and conducting EW operations in support of objectives, missions, and tasks assigned by the CJCS. Authority to employ ECM may be delegated to commanders of joint task forces or other subordinate commanders. Commanders at all echelons have authority to perform ESM and ECCM. Combatant commanders will issue command policy guidance pertaining to EW.

c. Service Responsibility. Responsible for implementation of CJCS EW policy as follows:

(1) Develop, plan, program and budget for, organize, train, test, maintain, and employ EW forces, capabilities, and systems required to support U.S. military objectives.

(2) Advise the Joint Staff of any inability to furnish the EW forces or capabilities required to meet U.S. objectives.

(3) Keep JCS, CINCs, and components fully informed of EW developments and requirements.

(4) Frequently exercise the EW system, including communications, electronics, and weapon systems, through planned military maneuvers.

(5) Maintain close liaison with the other Services to prevent duplication of effort in EW programs and equipment that may be readily adaptable to multi-Service requirements and coordinate use of Service-unique assets in joint training exercises.

(6) Establish signals security (SIGSEC) measures (EMCON for Navy) and security restrictions for use in employing electronic equipment, techniques, and tactics.

(7) Periodically review and update the EW assistance program for equipment, training aids, training courses, and publications releasable to Reserve forces and friendly foreign governments.

4. AUGMENTATION, SUPPORTING, AND DEPLOYING FORCES. Supporting commanders of deploying forces in support of or in augmentation of supported commanders will ensure that such forces are deployed with their full EW system capability.

USCENTCOM OPLAN

1648-XX (U)

Reference 8

**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900**

CENTCOM J5

SUBJECT: USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)

See Distribution
(Annex Z)

1. (U) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX, which provides for the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, is attached.
2. (U) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX fulfills a requirement established in section V 4.C.(6)(a) RT-1 of ISCP 20XX and is effective for planning purposes only until approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. (U) Elements of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX were coordinated with USCINCTRANS, USCINCPAC, USCINCACOM, USCINCEUR, USCINCSOC, USCINCSPACE, and USCINCSTRAT during preparation.
4. (U) The supporting plans will be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60 days after approval of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

28 FEB 20XX

USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX

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USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

(U) This classification guidance provides users with subjects requiring protection, specifies the level of protection to be afforded those subjects, and establishes the time period during which the protection must be continued.

SUBJECTS REQUIRING PROTECTION

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USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
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NOTE: The letters “I,” “O,” and “S” through “W” are intentionally omitted as annex designations.

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USCINCCENT OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
DEFENSE OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. (U) Map: TOC-H-6A, 6B, 6C, 6D; Stock #TPCXXHO6D, 1:5000,000.
 - b. (U) Map: Joint Operations Graphics (Air); NH 38-11, 12, 15, 16; 1:250,000.
 - c. (U) *Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan*, 19XX.
 - d. (U) AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 1997.
 - e. (U) AFSC Pub 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces*, August 1992.

(U) **TASK ORGANIZATION.** Annex A.

1. (U) *Situation.*

a. (U) *General.* This is a unilateral USCINCCENT OPLAN which provides for the U.S. defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack. This OPLAN would probably be implemented upon receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia or an attack into Kuwait only. This OPLAN is in response to Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan, Part V, tasking to prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the event of future aggression and for the support of U.S. interests therein. This OPLAN also could provide for the security of U.S. forces, citizens, installations, and resources in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

(1) (U) *Strategic Significance.* The area's strategic importance is emphasized by the fact that approximately two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are located in the Arabian Peninsula/Arabian Gulf region. Beyond the oil itself, this area also contains strategic waterways which facilitate the flow of world commerce. On the east side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz provides maritime access to Gulf oil fields and associated transshipment facilities. On the west side of the Peninsula, the Red Sea line of communication stands as one of the most strategically important waterways in the world. In time of peace, this waterway is important to international commerce. In the event of a conflict, it provides a strategic lifeline for the timely deployment and sustainment of friendly forces. The strategic significance of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is that they account for approximately 25 percent of the world's oil production, contain almost 50 percent of the world's oil reserves, and Saudi Arabia is the center of Islamic culture. The defense of Kuwait is of particular importance to the U.S. in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991. Even after the overwhelming defeat at the hands of coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, Iraq may still have aspirations to annex Kuwait. Iraq may also feel a need to seize all or part of Saudi Arabia to punish its largest neighbor for the extensive support provided to Coalition forces during 1991/1992 and to establish itself as a power in the Arab world by seizing and controlling the critical oil facilities in Eastern Saudi Arabia, or by seizing and controlling The Two Holy Mosques at Mecca and Medina.

(2) (U) *Objectives and Strategy.* U.S. objectives are to coordinate and establish an effective force to deter and, if necessary, to counter aggression, prevent military coercion of friendly states, protect our

resources and facilities in the region, deny enemy access to the same, and ensure access to the regional lines of communication. The strategy of the U.S. is designed to: deter war, improve regional stability, demonstrate a commitment to the region, counter hostile expansion and influences, and prepare for war. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy U.S. forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Once adequate combat power has been generated and an adequate defense has been conducted, the strategy is to mass forces and to counterattack to restore the territorial integrity and legitimate governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if they have been violated.

(3) (U) *Purpose*. This plan provides a concept for the deployment and employment of U.S. forces to assist in countering an attack by Iraq into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

b. (U) *Area of Concern*.

(1) (U) *Area of Responsibility*. The USCINCCENT AOR consists of the countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., Oman, Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Sudan; and the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean areas to the USCINCCENT boundaries. (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C.)

(2) (U) *Area of Interest*. The area of interest encompassed by this plan includes the airways and land area of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq; and the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Gulf, and related sea lines of communication. On order, the AOI will be designated as a theater of war. (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C.)

(3) (U) *Area of Operations*. The area of operations for this plan is defined as the airspace and land areas of friendly nations, and the international airspace over and international water of the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf. On order, the Area of Operation will include the airspace, territorial waters, and land areas of Iraq. On order, the AOO will be designated as a theater of operations (See Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C).

c. (U) *Enemy Forces*. Iraq's combat power lies in its ground forces. Iraq began to rebuild its military during the 1992-94 time period using its oil revenue to trade on the black market and with China and North Korea. Iraq's military is currently equivalent to 19 divisions. Seven of these 19 divisions are located near the border with the CIS, and 12 are stationed along the Euphrates River from Turkey to Al Basrah. (See Annex B.)

d. (U) *Friendly Forces*.

(1) (U) Unassigned Forces.

(a) (U) General. This operation plan was written using U.S. forces only because the provision of forces by other nations is so dependent upon circumstances surrounding the conflict that they cannot be accurately predicted either in size, type, or source. However, information on friendly forces that may participate is provided for general reference.

1 (U) Saudi Arabian Ground Forces and National Guard could provide a limited defense and delay against an attack by Iraqi ground forces. The Saudi Air Force is capable of maintaining limited air superiority over Saudi territory and does possess a small offensive air capability. Coordination between deployed U.S. forces and Saudi forces would be required to maximize Saudi capabilities, to include the integration of air and sea missions and the establishment of operational boundaries for ground forces.

2 (U) Kuwaiti ground forces are too small in both number and combat power to protect their territory without assistance from the other GCC nations. Kuwaiti Air Forces and surface-to-air units are capable of inflicting significant losses on enemy aircraft.

3 (U) Given similar circumstances of an unprovoked attack, other GCC states could at least be expected to provide the similar numbers and types of ground forces seen during DESERT STORM. Additional purchases of modern aircraft and increased pilot training have improved the overall air defense and offensive capabilities of the GCC member states.

4 (U) Great Britain has contributed forces to various operations in the Arabian Gulf area, to include a mechanized division and numerous aircraft to DESERT STORM. Based on past history, Great Britain could be expected to contribute sizable ground, naval, and air forces to protect GCC interests.

5 (U) France participated in DESERT STORM with a light division and air and naval assets. Based on past history, France could be expected to contribute forces to protect GCC interests.

(2) (U) *Specific Tasks.*

(a) (U) Department of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

1 (U) Provide logistics and administrative support to Service forces.

2 (U) Provide intelligence support to USCENTCOM as requested.

3 (U) Provide personnel replacements and administrative support as required.

4 (U) Coordinate and provide for interface with joint, Defense Communications Agency, and other Service communications-electronics (C-E) systems as required.

(b) (U) Department of State (DOS).

1 (U) Obtain use of foreign bases, overflight rights, and transit rights, as required, and establish status of forces agreements (SOFA).

2 (U) Seek use of the offices of other nations in the region to effect a political solution to a crisis through negotiation.

3 (U) Initiate political and diplomatic activity to gain international support — including the UN, GCC, EC — for economic sanctions and possible military support against Iraq.

4 (U) Attempt to limit through diplomatic means the number of nations supporting Iraq.

5 (U) Assist in the arrangement of host nations support.

6 (U) Identify military assistance requirements for NEO.

7 (U) Provide guidance and direct the evacuation of U.S. citizens in the AOR if required.

(c) (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

1 (U) Provide intelligence support as required.

2 (U) Provide interface with Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence services operating in the region.

(d) (U) USEUCOM, USACOM, USPACOM.

1 (U) Provide forces as directed.

2 (U) Provide for safe movement of forces in respective AORs.

3 (U) Provide basing support for air and naval operations in USCENTCOM's AOR as required.

4 (U) Coordinate chop of naval forces entering USCENTCOM's AOR with USNAVCENT.

5 (U) Provide logistical support for transient forces.

(e) (U) USACOM. Provide forces, as directed by appropriate authority, to meet deployment and employment requirements; reassign forces under the COCOM of USCENTCOM.

(f) (U) USTRANSCOM.

1 (U) Coordinate all air and sea movements.

2 (U) Provide airlift, air rescue, and air weather support as required.

3 (U) Provide sealift as required.

4 (U) Provide aerial and seaport movement control.

(g) (U) USSOCOM. Provide forces as required; reassign forces under the COCOM of USCINCCENT.

(h) (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Provide charting, mapping and geodesy support, to include multispectral imagery, as required.

(i) (U) USSPACECOM. Assure U.S. access to space-based resources as required.

(j) (U) National Security Agency (NSA).

1 (U) Provide/coordinate cryobiological support requirements for implementation of this plan or any portion thereof. Provide signal intelligence (SIG) support as required.

2 (U) Provide a cryptological support group to USCENTCOM Headquarters (Forward).

3 (U) Work with supported and supporting commands in developing effective electronic warfare (EW) strategies and advising the commands of potential losses in intelligence.

(k) (U) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Provide communication support as required.

(l) (U) United States Information Service (USIS).

1 (U) Coordinate foreign information policy guidance with DOS, DOD, and USCINCCENT Public Affairs entities.

2 (U) Conduct radio broadcasts over Voice of America facilities in support of USCINCCENT, as mutually agreed upon with DOD.

3 (U) Provide liaison officers to USCINCCENT, USCENTAF, USARCENT, USNAVCENT, and SOCCENT, as required.

(m) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

1 (U) Direct deployment of communications assets, strategic airlift, and sealift in support of this plan.

2 (U) Direct supporting U.S. commands to provide resources, IAW this plan, when directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA).

3 (U) Provide Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) support to USCENTCOM as required.

(n) (U) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Provide logistics support, as required.

f. (U) *Assumptions.*

(1) (U) The military threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is an air and ground attack by Iraq.

(2) (U) Forces in the Task Organization (Annex A) will be available for plan execution IAW ISCP apportionment.

(3) (U) UN Security Council-sponsored sanctions and blockades will be placed into effect.

(4) (U) Forward positioning of Iraqi armor and mech units will yield at least 45 days unambiguous warning of an Iraqi invasion into either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, and that the NCA will direct execution of this OPLAN immediately upon receipt of such warning.

(5) (U) Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will request U.S. assistance and permit deployment of U.S. forces into their sovereign territories upon receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack.

(6) (U) Gulf Cooperation Council nations will permit overflight and basing rights for U.S. air and naval forces.

(7) (U) Republic of Yemen, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Sudan will not allow overflight rights to U.S. friendly nations, nor will they allow the use of their territories in any way.

(8) (U) Iraq will use chemical weapons in an attack against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia; nuclear weapons will not be used.

(9) (U) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide extensive host nation support.

(10) (U) Sufficient airlift and sealift is available to execute this plan as written.

(11) (U) The New Independent States (NIS) will not intervene in a military conflict in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia nor provide support to Iran and Iraq.

(12) (U) NATO states will support U.S. operations by continuing to allow overflight and in-transit rights. NATO forces will not be committed in “out of area operations” under a NATO sanction or under NATO commander.

(13) (U) Egypt will insure the Suez Canal remains open and is available for use.

(14) (U) The NCA will direct execution of the PSRC 200K reserve call-ups.

(15) (U) Iraq will attempt to purchase space-derived data/intelligence from third party sources.

g. (U) *Legal Considerations.*

(1) (U) In the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution requires a detailed report to Congress within 48 hours following the introduction of forces equipped for combat into foreign territory. If deployment of advance elements triggers this requirement, operational security could be compromised prior to deployment of the main body.

(2) (U) The War Powers Resolution requires that unless the Congress declares war or enacts specific legislation authorizing continued use of U.S. forces, the President must remove all U.S. forces within 60 to 90 days of their introduction. The resolution also provides for termination of military operations in less than 60 days, if so directed by Congress.

(3) (U) Although military operations conducted pursuant to this plan may occur in the absence of a declaration of war, it is the declared policy of the U.S. that all captured enemy personnel, whether members of the regular or irregular forces will be accorded the status, treatment, and protection of “prisoner of war” as defined in the Geneva Convention of 1949. It is also the declared policy to the United States to demand that U.S. military personnel captured by the enemy be accorded the status of POWs, as defined in the Geneva Convention.

(4) (U) Preceding implementation of OPLAN 1648-XX, it is assumed that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will request U.S. military assistance.

(5) (U) Peacetime ROE will be in effect until supplemental ROE are identified in subsequent directives.

(6) (U) Enemy prisoners of war (EPWS) will not be transferred to the custody of any foreign power that is not a signatory to the Geneva POW Convention or, if a signatory, when there is reason to believe that the EPWS will be mistreated.

(7) (U) CENTCOM JA will be notified of all requests by the international committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives to visit EPW facilities, internment centers, and displaced persons facilities.

(8) (U) Captured enemy weapons, documents, and equipment become property of the U.S. government. Retention of those items by individual soldiers as “war trophies” is prohibited.

(9) (U) Prior to any negotiation of SOFAs or other international agreements, coordination will be made with CENTCOM SJA.

(10) (U) Jurisdiction over civilian personnel remains with the local court of the foreign country concerned, if such courts are operating. To the extent practical, custody of non-U.S. civilian personnel will transferred be to local authorities. Commanders will coordinate with their supporting Staff Judge Advocates before transfer of custody.

(11) (U) Upon commencement of hostilities, the parties to the conflict will be notified of the hospital ship's name and locations.

2. (U) *Mission.* When directed, U.S. Central Command will deploy forces to the area of operations and take actions to defend Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian territory against an Iraqi attack; and if required, restore the pre-conflict international borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

3. (U) *Execution.*

a. (U) *Concept of Operations.*

(1) (U) *General.* USCENTCOM forces will conduct operations in three phases in order to: (a) deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, (b) rapidly deploy defensive forces as far forward as possible to confront Iraq with a formidable defense, and (c) conduct an effective defense should Iraq choose to attack. The phases of the operation may overlap and are discussed in more detail below.

(a) (U) *Phase I. Deterrence (C-Day thru D-Day).* At the first sign of ambiguous warning (threatening Iraqi activity), USCENTCOM will initiate Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. FDOs, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and confront Iraq with the prospect of unacceptable costs for aggression, include all of the instruments of national power (economic, diplomatic, informational, and military). Likely FDOs include, but are not limited to, the following:

1 (U) *Economic, diplomatic, informational.*

a (U) Initiate diplomatic talks with the Iraqi government.

b (U) Solicit support from the UN and regional friends.

c (U) Request all nations to cease trading with Iraq.

d (U) Freeze Iraqi assets in the U.S. and seek support from other nations in doing the same.

e (U) Expel Iraqi diplomats from the U.S.

f (U) Establish trade embargo against Iraq.

2 (U) *Military.*

a (U) Reposition in-theater forces (207th ACR, MEU Afloat, and CVBG).

b (U) Deploy four (4) Fighter Squadrons.

c (U) Deploy electronic surveillance aircraft.

d (U) Conduct multilateral exercises in theater.

e (U) Alert major forces for deployment.

If deterrence is successful, de-escalation measures may be implemented at the direction of the NCA. If deterrence fails, forces will be properly positioned to facilitate follow-on deployment in Phase II and the establishment of the defense in Phase III.

(b) (U) *Phase II. Deployment/Force Build-Up (C+5 through C+90)*. In the deployment phase, emphasis is placed upon rapidly deploying from CONUS and OCONUS locations into the main APODS and SPODS at Dhahran, King Khalid Military City, Ad Dammam, Kuwait City, and Al Jubayl IAW the time-phased force and deployment list (Appendix 1 to Annex A). Priority of deployment is to those forces necessary to defend our initial center of gravity, which is our capability to deploy combat forces into theater. In order, those forces are fighter aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft to conduct defensive counter-air operations; light, airborne, airmobile, or amphibious ground forces to protect PODS from ground attack; and command and control assets. Naval assets will deploy as rapidly as possible to the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea in order to establish immediate control over the sea LOCs into the theater. Priority of deployment after the initial defensive forces (those that are critical to protecting the continued deployment) will be based upon the principle of providing (a) antiarmor forces, (b) long-term support forces, and (c) offensive-oriented forces, in that order. USCENTAF will be responsible for reception at APODS; movement from APODS will be the responsibility of USARCENT. The deployment phase will continue until all forces have arrived in theater IAW the TPFDL, but is expected to be complete NLT C+90. Priority of initial defense will be to: (1) APODS and SPODS that provide for continued deployment; (2) C2 facilities; (3) force assembly and build-up areas; and (4) forward defensive positions. Space systems will be positioned to provide support to the initial deployment. Priority will be intel/recon, communications, weather, multispectral imagery, and position/navigation systems.

(c) (U) *Phase III. Defensive (C+45 thru Indefinite)*. The defensive phase, initiated with the arrival of the USARCENT 47th AA Div, 23d AR Div, 55th MECH Div, 21st LT Inf Div, 53d MECH Div, 209th ACR, 15th AVN Bde, the 11th and 12th ADA Bns, and the USMARCENT I MEF, is designed to repel an Iraqi attack into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. During this phase, our center of gravity will shift to become our ground combat forces. This phase is sub-divided into three sub-phases designed to: (1) improve and strengthen defensive postures; (2) blunt and defeat an invasion; and (3) restore international boundaries with counter-offensive operations if required. This phase will terminate upon direction of the NCA based upon a decrease in the threat of aggression or the defeat of hostile forces.

1 (U) *Sub-Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day)*. This subphase is designated to strengthen and improve the theater defensive posture established not later than C+45. This phase consists of the time between establishment of an effective defense and the commencement of hostilities. This phase may be as short as a matter of hours, or as long as a period of months. During this phase initial, alternate, and final ground defensive positions will be established well forward and improved to the maximum extent possible. (See Appendix 19 to Annex C for the ground defense scheme and see tasking paragraphs for USARCENT and USMARCENT task.) Defensive air operations will be maintained at heightened levels commensurate with sustained operations capabilities. Naval operations will continue to insure the unhindered use of sea LOCs and prevent any Iraqi offensive naval operations in the Arabian Gulf. Theater logistics will be improved as rapidly as possible, and joint training will be conducted on a continuous basis. This sub-phase will continue until Iraqi attack commences, or until so directed by the NCA.

2 (U) *Sub-Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7)*. This phase is implemented when an Iraqi attack is initiated against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. During this phase U.S. air forces initiate theater counterair operations, interdictions, and close air support to gain air superiority, destroy, delay, disrupt, or divert attacking Iraqi ground forces. USARCENT and USMARCENT, supported by tactical air and naval surface fire support, will delay and attrite attacking enemy forces as far forward as possible, and establish in-depth defenses on suitable terrain. In the MARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on critical ports, oil facilities, major population centers, and key terrain along the Arabian Gulf coast. In the ARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on major population centers and resources of potential military value at King Khalid Military City, Hafar Al Batan, and the approaches to Riyadh. The ability to withstand chemical attack on friendly forces is dependant upon active chemical defense and through ATBM assets. This phase will continue until the enemy has been sufficiently attrited to allow counteroffensive operations, estimated to occur on or about D+7. If this phase commences prior to C+45, major combat forces will continue to deploy to the theater of operations and will be employed to reinforce the defense or to conduct counteroffensive operations, depending upon the theater operational situation.

3 (U) *Sub-Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20)*. This phase will be implemented once force ratios favor counteroffensive operations. During this phase the ground forces of USARCENT and USMARCENT will initiate supporting counteroffensives to fix and destroy Iraq forces in their respective sectors. The theater reserve (designated by ARCENT), comprised of at least two heavy mechanized Div's, an ACR, and an aviation brigade, will then conduct the main theater counteroffensive to destroy the Iraqi center of gravity, which is the operational reserve, if it has penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi territory. If the Iraqi operational reserve has not penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the U.S. theater reserve will either be held in reserve and not committed, or will be committed in support of USARCENT or USMARCENT to destroy those Iraqi forces that have penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Only upon the direction of the NCA will offensive ground operations be conducted in Iraq. This phase will be terminated when all Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces are again postured into adequate defense positions along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders as per sub-phase IIIb (Defensive Combat) of this OPLAN. U.S. forces will remain in consolidated defensive positions until so directed to redeploy by the NCA. Post conflict operations will be conducted as required with USARCENT serving as the USCENCOM executive agent for post-conflict operations.

a (U) USMARCENT. Marine forces will initially establish a screen along the Northern Kuwait border from vicinity 3000N4800E to 2958N4707E to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will be established from vicinity 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and slow their advance. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with USARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENAF, and SOCCENT and must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, a strong point defense will be established around Kuwait City as a last ditch defensive effort to save this facility.

b (U) USARCENT. Army forces will initially establish a screen along the western Kuwait and the Northern Saudi Arabian border from vicinity 2958N4707E to 2905N4634E to 2810N4415E to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will be established from vicinity 2928N4717E to 2742N4434E. Army forces will also establish a security force of at least air assault division size and capability to guard and secure the theater left flank from vicinity 2810N4415E to 2630N4521E. In addition, ARCENT will provide a heavy mechanized division as the theater reserve to be positioned vicinity 2710N4815E. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and slow their advances. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with USAMARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENAF, and USSOCCENT and must not occur until given

permission by USCINCCENT. If required, strong point defenses will be established around KKMC and Hafar Al Batin as a last ditch effort to save these critical facilities.

c (U) Supporting Forces.

(1) (U) USCENTAF (JFACC). The JFACC is the supported commander for counter air, interdiction and strategic attack missions throughout the theater in accordance with the JFC concept of operations. The JFACC will support land component commanders with close air support and interdiction within their areas of operation. During the defensive combat phase (phase IIIb), air operations will be focused on gaining air superiority, destroying WMD capability and destroying, delaying or disrupting Iraqi heavy forces. When the counteroffensive phase (phase IIIc) begins, air operations will focus on maintaining air superiority, close air support and interdiction.

(2) (U) USNAVCENT. Naval forces will support the land battle by gaining maritime superiority, conducting coastal defense along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coast line, providing naval fire support, and participating in the air effort as coordinated by JFACC. Naval forces will make available to the JFACC all sorties in excess of those required for naval warfare task (see coordinating instructions).

(3) (U) COMSOCCENT. SOF will support the overall operations to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Special operations forces will deploy along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders and conduct special reconnaissance and electronic surveillance to provide early warning to friendly forces. These forces will conduct operations within designated special operations areas (SOAs). Operations will not be conducted into Iraq without the permission of CINCCENTCOM. Upon initiation of hostilities, the SOAs will be terminated and the SOF forces withdrawn. The focus of SOF operations after an Iraqi attack will be against enemy C3 nodes and line of communications. COMSOCCENT will also conduct and coordinate the theater CSAR efforts as required and will be prepared to conduct foreign internal defense operations with friendly nations in theater.

b. (U) TASK.

(1) (U) *Phase I. (Deterrence, Ambiguous Warning thru D-day).*

(a) (U) *USARCENT.*

1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of deployment is to those forces designated in para 3a(1)(a).

2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception of forces at SPOD's Dhahran, Al Jubayl, and Ad Dammam.

3 (U) Assume responsibility for transportation and theater support activity theater-wide, IAW interservice support agreements.

4 (U) Support NEOs as required.

5 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.

(b) (U) *USCENTAF.*

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of deployment is to those forces that can be rapidly deployed to establish a theater air defense system as designated in para 3a(1)(a).

2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception of forces at APODs and coordinate with ARCENT for hand-off of deploying force movement and transportation from APODs.

3 (U) Support NEOs as required.

4 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.

(c) (U) *USMARCENT (Designated on C-Day)*.

1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of deployment is to those forces that can be rapidly deployed to secure critical PODs designated in para 3a(1)(a).

2 (U) Assume responsibility for reception and transportation of USMC forces arriving at APOD/ SPOD Kuwait City.

3 (U) Support NEOs, as required.

4 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.

(d) (U) *USNAVCENT*.

1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives. Priority of deployment is to those forces that can rapidly secure and retain access to the critical sea LOCs of the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

2 (U) Provide cargo handling personnel and equipment to augment USARCENT terminal service, fixed port, and JLOTS operations as required.

3 (U) Conduct port security and harbor defense, as required to maintain access to SPODs.

4 (U) Assume OPCON of Military Sealift Command Forces in theater and conduct theater sealift operations as required.

5 (U) Support NEOs as required.

6 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.

7 (U) Conduct protection of shipping operations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden sea lines of communication.

(e) (U) *COMSOCCENT*.

1 (U) Deploy designated subordinate forces IAW deployment directives.

2 (U) Assume OPCON of Special Forces (except PSYOP and Civil Affairs) upon their entry into the USCENCOM AOR.

3 (U) Conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in support of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states, as directed.

4 (U) Support NEO and combat search and rescue as directed.

5 (U) Ensure personnel are prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment.

(2) (U) *Phase II (Deployment/Force Build-Up, C+5 thru C+90).*

(a) (U) *USARCENT.*

1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and defending critical facilities.

2 (U) Be prepared to defend port facilities vic Dhahran, AD Dammam, Al Jubayl, and KKMC.

3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, establish defensive sector from 2958N4707E to 2810N4415E.

4 (U) Assume OPCON of Army PSYOP and civil affairs units upon arrival in AOR, and conduct PSYOP and civil affairs operations with the intent of deterring Iraqi aggressions. Assume command, less OPCON, of all other Army SF forces upon their entry into the AOR.

5 (U) Serve as USCENCOM coordinating authority for civil affairs and PSYOPs operations.

6 (U) Provide combat support and combat service support to USCENCOM forces in theater IAW interservice support agreements.

7 (U) Provide a brigade-sized mechanized force to serve as the theater reserve NLT C+20. Position reserve vic 2710N4815E.

8 (U) Assume responsibility for rear operations in the Joint Rear Area effective C+4.

9 (U) Position follow-on forces in tactical assembly areas generally northwest of Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl and prepare for future operations.

10 (U) Provide one MP battalion for the defense of HQ USCENCOM in Riyadh commencing C+10.

(b) (U) *USCENTAF.*

1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and establishing combat air patrols over Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

2 (U) Serve as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) commencing C+2 to ensure the unity of effort for the conduct of theater air operations. The JFACC will exercise TACON of AAC tanker sorties operating in support of USCENCOM air operations and will exercise TACON of Navy and Marine sorties provided IAW subparagraphs below.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, prepare air tasking orders on a daily basis to counter an Iraqi offensive.

4 (U) Serve as the area air defense commander (AADC) with the authority to establish and operate a joint integrated air defense and airspace control system.

5 (U) Serve as the airspace control authority (ACA).

6 (U) Serve as the coordinating authority for USCENTCOM interdiction operations with the responsibility of coordinating interdiction planning and operations outside the ground force commanders defensive sectors.

7 (U) Assume responsibility for theater aeromedical evacuation operations.

8 (U) Coordinate strategic reconnaissance operations with USSTRATCOM.

9 (U) Assume command, less OPCON, of U.S. Air Force special operations forces in the CENTCOM AOR.

10 (U) Provide TACPs to forward deploying ground forces.

11 (U) Support PSYOP and civil affairs operations.

(c) (U) *USNAVCENT*.

1 (U) Support or implement deterrent measures by continuing to deploy forces and by establishing control of the sea LOCs in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

2 (U) Conduct Port Security and Harbor defense with priority of effort to Kuwait City, Ad Damman, Dhahran, and Al Jabayl, in that order.

3 (U) Assume OPCON, or TACON of all U.S. Naval Forces entering the USCENTCOM AOR (except U.S. Navy SOF).

4 (U) Conduct mine countermeasure operations in the Straits of Hormuz, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf.

5 (U) Coordinate the efforts of any supporting naval forces operating outside the USCENTCOM AOR.

6 (U) Conduct MPF operations in the vicinity of Kuwait City.

7 (U) Provide air support to the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions paragraph below.

8 (U) Be prepared to provide CAP over the Suez Canal, if requested by Egypt.

(d) (U) *USMARCENT*.

1 (U) Support or implement deterrence measures to deploy forces and defend critical facilities.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

2 (U) Be prepared to defend port facilities vic Kuwait City.

3 (U) As combat forces arrive in theater, establish defensive sector from 3000N4800E to 2958N4707E.

4 (U) Be prepared to conduct sustained operations ashore.

5 (U) Be prepared to reembark forces for subsequent amphibious operations.

6 (U) Provide ANGLICO teams to Army forward units, as requested.

7 (U) Operate the Port of Kuwait City as a strategic sustainment port.

(e) (U) *COMSOCCENT*.

1 (U) Assume OPCON of all special operations forces (except PSYOP and Civil Affairs) upon their entry into the USCENTCOM AOR and conduct special operations to support deterrent measures.

2 (U) Conduct foreign internal defense (FID) operations in support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states, as requested.

3 (U) Identify escape and evasion nets for airmen downed in Iraq in coordination with other government agencies, as required.

4 (U) Provide liaison personnel to other USCENTCOM components and to Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian agencies, as required to coordinate SOF operations.

5 (U) Commence special reconnaissance operations and electronic surveillance of Iraqi forces. Cross border operations authorized only when permission is granted by USCINCCENT.

6 (U) Serve as coordinating authority for all USCENTCOM search and rescue operations.

(3) (U) *PHASE III (DEFENSE, C+45 THRU INDEFINITE)*.

(a) (U) *USARCENT*.

1 (U) Establish defensive sector from 2928N4717E to 2742N4434E. Defend as far forward as possible. Guard theater left flank from 2810N4415E to 2633N4521E.

2 (U) Continue PSYOP and Civil Affairs operations.

3 (U) Continue to provide theater CS and CSS, as directed.

4 (U) Provide a heavy mech division as theater reserve positioned vic 2710N4815E. Theater reserve committed only by permission of USCINCCENT. Be prepared to provide a two-division heavy corps (with ACR and AVN Bde) to the CINC for the conduct of theater counteroffensive operations.

5 (U) Serve as the joint rear operations commander.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

6 (U) Be prepared to reinforce USMARCENT.

7 (U) Be prepared to conduct counteroffensive operations to eject enemy forces and restore the integrity of the Kuwait and Saudi Arabian borders.

8 (U) Be prepared to reestablish defensive positions from 2810N4415E to 2958N4707E.

9 (U) Assume responsibility for enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations. Establish theater EPW retention facilities.

10 (U) Be prepared to conduct post conflict restoration and clearing operations. Serve as the CENTCOM executive agent for post conflict operations.

(b) (U) *USCENTAF*.

1 (U) Serve as the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions listed below.

2 (U) Serve as the AADC IAW coordinating instructions listed below.

3 (U) Serve as the ACA IAW coordinating instructions listed below.

4 (U) Conduct counterair, close air support, and interdiction operations, as required.

5 (U) Conduct airdrop, airland, and aerial resupply operations, as required.

6 (U) Support COMSOCENT, as required.

7 (U) Be prepared to support counter-offensive operations, as directed.

(c) (U) *USNAVCENT*.

1 (U) Continue port security/harbor defense operations.

2 (U) Continue to conduct protection of shipping operations in the SLOCs.

3 (U) Continue countermine operations.

4 (U) Conduct counterair, CAS, and interdiction operations in support of the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions below.

5 (U) Provide Naval Surface Fire Support, as requested and planned.

6 (U) Destroy all Iraqi naval assets.

7 (U) Be prepared to conduct amphibious operations.

8 (U) Be prepared to support counteroffensive operations.

9 (U) Support COMSOCENT, as required.

10 (U) Coordinate employment of any supporting naval forces.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

11 (U) Support combat search and rescue, as required.

12 (U) Be prepared to receive HQ USCENTCOM aboard U.S. Navy command and control ship if required.

(d) (U) *USMARCENT*.

1 (U) Establish defensive sector from 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E. Defend as far forward as possible.

2 (U) Be prepared to reinforce USARCENT.

3 (U) Be prepared to conduct counteroffensive operations to eject enemy forces and restore the integrity of the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders.

4 (U) Be prepared to reembark Marine forces of MEB size and conduct amphibious operations behind enemy advances vic Mina Abd Allah to Mina Saud on the Kuwaiti coast.

5 (U) Be prepared to reestablish defensive positions from 2940N4809E to 2928N4717E.

6 (U) Be prepared to conduct post-conflict restoration and clearing operations.

7 (U) Provide air sorties to the JFACC IAW coordinating instructions below.

8 (U) Conduct sustained operations ashore.

9 (U) Defend Kuwait City at all costs.

(e) (U) *COMSOCCENT*.

1 (U) Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action missions in support of the theater interdiction effort. After an Iraqi attack, infiltrate into Iraqi rear areas within Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and conduct operations to disrupt and delay Iraqi advances.

2 (U) Continue FID missions with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

3 (U) Coordinate with Joint Rescue Coordination Center for combat search and rescue operations.

4 (U) Be prepared to assist ground force commanders in conducting counteroffensive operations, as required.

c. (U) *Coordinating Instructions*.

(1) (U) C-Day will be designated by the NCA.

(2) (U) D-Day is the day Iraqi forces initiate hostilities against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.

(3) (U) This OPLAN effective for planning upon receipt and for execution when directed.

(4) (U) Cross-border operations into Iraq require CINCCENT approval.

(5) (U) Direct liaison is authorized among all components. Keep HQ USCENCOM advised of all significant operational or logistical coordination.

(6) (U) Authority to initiate mining operations in the AOR is held by USCINCENT.

(7) (U) Be prepared to integrate forces of other friendly nations into the OPLAN.

(8) (U) Be prepared to provide liaison teams to other friendly nations.

(9) (U) Due to the sensitivity to foreign troops on Arab soil, U.S. forces should avoid any actions which may violate the customs of Arab nations.

(10) (U) Reporting requirements will be IAW the USCENCOM Crisis Action SOP.

(11) (U) All units will be prepared to conduct chemical and biological defense operations.

(12) (U) Boundaries. See Appendix 19 to Annex C.

(13) (U) JFACC responsibilities include planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking based on USCINCENT apportionment decisions. The JFACC will direct the air effort to ensure integration of service air operations within USCENCOM concept of operations. Naval forces will make available to COMUSCENTAF all sorties in excess of those required for assigned naval warfare task. COMUSMARCENT will retain operational control of his organic air assets. COMUSMARCENT will make sorties available to the JFACC for tasking through the MAGTF Air Combat Element Commander for air defense, long-range interdiction, and reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFACC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole.

(14) (U) The Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) will integrate all service air defense forces into the theater air defense systems IAW the overall air defense priorities of USCINCENT. The AADC will establish weapons control measures and fire control procedures. Land- and sea-based SHORAD and POINT AIR DEFENSE systems will remain under the OPCON of their respective component commanders. Army and Navy area defense systems will be controlled by the AADC.

(15) (U) USCINCENT will serve as the Joint Force Ground Component Commander.

(16) (U) The JFACC will coordinate JFC-directed, theater-wide missions with a ground AO with the affected commander to ensure accomplishment of the JFC's overall objectives (Ref. JP 3-09, p. I-3).

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. (U) *Concept of Support.* Logistic support for forces is a Service responsibility. USCENCOM will exercise directive authority for logistics and will assign cross and common servicing responsibilities IAW the developing situation and ability of service components to insure equitable distribution of resources provided by service components, host nations, or through private enterprise. Components and forces in support of USCENCOM will comply with the instructions of their respective commands and may coordinate with other Services via logistic channels. Components and supporting commands will coordinate interservice, common, and cross-servicing agreements. Copies of agreements will be provided to USCENCOM ATTN: CJ4 (CENTCOM J4). Support for CENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX will be provided in three phases as follows:

(1) (U) Prior to the implementation of this or any derivative of this OPLAN, the main effort will be to insure the readiness of forces tasked to support operations under COCOM of CINCCENT. This Headquarters will coordinate with Service components to insure specific units identified by the Services to support requirements under this plan have their METL and are training for operations in the SWA Area of Operation.

(2) (U) Phase I. Deterrence Phase (C-Day thru D-Day). Initial efforts in this OPLAN in concert with identifying friendly centers of gravity is to establish a functioning COMMZ and to take the necessary actions to protect it. Within this broad scope, Service components will comply with policies and procedures outlined in the ISCP tables of data and USCENTCOM SOP for sustainment and logistical planning. Priorities for the use of facilities and supplies will be coordinated by the CENTCOM J4. The reinforcement of CJ4 forward to coordinate the basing of deploying forces, complete as necessary any remaining Host Nation Support Agreements in conjunction with the USCENTCOM Logistics Coordination Center (CENTCOM LCC) located at the American embassies in Riyadh and Kuwait City. LCC will coordinate with CJ4 forward to coordinate service and supporting CINC's requirements prior to the deployment of HQ, USCENTCOM, from MACDILL AFB during Phase II. USARCENT is responsible for APOD reception activities and movement to initial deployment locations. This phase continues until deployment of forces listed at Annex A is complete; anticipate completion of this phase at C+90.

(3) (U) Phase II. Deterrence/Force Build-up Phase (C+5 thru C+90). Priority of effort is to the development of the COMMZ and the logistical support base to sustain forces throughout the Area of Operation. Upon establishment of the COMMZ, COMUSARCENT is designated Joint COMMZ Commander. Joint Boards will be established as soon as practical to coordinate the sustainment effort with initial effort to movement, petroleum, medical, public affairs, and medical regulating in order. Supply build-up to levels indicated in Annex D to this plan is essential to insure continuity of support to deployed forces. These actions will logistically posture USCENTCOM for a strong defense and transition to Phase III of this plan should deterrence fail and defensive operations be initiated. Be prepared to provide common item support to allied forces as directed.

(4) (U) Phase III. Defensive Phase (C+45 thru Indefinite). Sustainment of Phase III will be implemented in three subphases to track with the tactical concept of operations, paragraph 3a of this OPLAN.

(a) (U) Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day). Priority of effort during this phase is the improvement of the logistic posture of deployed forces throughout the Area of Operations. The improvement and possible relocation of supply stocks and facilities to sustain a coordinated defense of the theater rather than deploying forces will mark this subphase. Forward basing of priority supplies will be essential. However, this process must remain within the commander's intent for deception operations. Actions which must be accomplished prior to the completion of this phase include the establishment of the joint boards to coordinate movement, petroleum, and medical regulation.

(b) (U) Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7). During the defense, it is essential to establish the logistical preconditions necessary to prosecute decisive combat operations. While defensive operations continue, staging of supplies forward will insure that sustainment is not the sole limiting factor of the combatant commander.

(c) (U) Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20). Sustainment of offensive operations to restore the national borders and transition to defensive operations on those borders is the priority effort during this phase. Service components will be prepared for the reception of rotating units and the redeployment of forces directed to other locations/supporting CINC's AORs as required.

(5) (U) There are two likely sequels to this OPLAN, each of which will be conceptually developed and drafted as internal taskings to CJ4. The first involves a unilateral redeployment similar to what was done following Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and the second involves a long-term defensive posture along the secured boarders.

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|---|------------|
| b. (U) Logistics, Annex D | Ref 8-D-59 |
| c. (U) Personnel, Annex E. | Omitted |
| d. (U) Public Affairs, Annex F. | Omitted |
| e. (U) Civil Affairs, Annex G. | Omitted |
| f. (U) Environmental Services, Annex H. | Omitted |
| g. (U) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy, Annex M. | Omitted |
| h. (U) Space Operations, Annex N. | Omitted |

5. (U) *Command and Control.*

- a. (U) *Command Relationships.*

(1) (U) USCINCCENT will be the JFC and will have COCOM of all assigned forces in the Theater of War.

(2) (U) Theater of War for this plan is defined as that area identified in paragraph 1b and Appendixes 18 and 19 to Annex C of this plan.

(3) (U) Command Relationships as per Annex J.

b. (U) Command Posts. HQUSCINCCENT will be located at MACDILL AFB until relocation to Riyadh during Phase II. A rear HQ will remain open at MACDILL AFB.

c. (U) Succession to Command. USCINCCENT, USDEPCINCCENT, USARCEN, USCENAF, USMARCENT, and USNAVCENT, in that order.

(1) (U) USCINCCENT JCEOI (Omitted).

(2) (U) JCSE arrives in Theater on C+1.

ANNEXES

A-TASK ORGANIZATION

B-INTELLIGENCE

C-OPERATIONS (Appendixes 18 and 19)

D-LOGISTICS

F-PUBLIC AFFAIRS

J-COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX

ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

<i>ORGANIZATION</i>	<i>COMMANDER</i>
USCENTCOM	USCINCCENT
U.S. Army Forces (33D Army) CENTCOM	COMARCENT
U.S. Air Forces CENTCOM	COMCENTAF
U.S. Naval Forces CENTCOM	COMNAVCENT
U.S. Marine Forces (Ashore) CENTCOM	COMUSMARCENT
U.S. Special Ops Command CENTCOM	COMSOCCENT

TASK ORGANIZATION BY COMPONENT COMMANDS (U)

USCENTCOM—Ground Forces

USARCENT

33D Army

33rd TCC
3rd PERSCOM
113th MP Gp
530th AMMO Gp
110th TAACOM
515th MI Bde
110th ENCOM
86th MEDCOM
37th PETROL Gp
103rd Press Camp
33rd TAACOM
46th TRANSCOM
TA FINANCE COMMAND
720th TAMCA
111th ASG
112th ASG
18th Eng Const

XXI Corps (U.S.)

47th Div (AASLT)
23rd Arm Div
55th Mech
21st Lt Inf Div
207th ACR (In-theater)
312 Mech Bde (Sep)
21st Corps Arty
76th FA Bde
77th FA Bde
78th FA Bde
15th Avn Bde
41st Chem Bde
21st Engr Bde
21st MI Bde
21st MP Bde
71st Sig Bde
21st COSCOM
11th ADA Bn

II Corps (U.S.)

25th Arm Div
53rd Mech Div
209th ACR
2nd Corps Arty
62nd FA Bde
63rd FA Bde
64th FA Bde
12th Avn Bde
12th ADA Bde
42d Chem Bde
52d Engr Bde
22nd MI Bde
22nd MP Bde
72nd Sig Bde
2nd COSCOM

USCENTAF

HQCENTAF

9th Air Force
Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)
AEW
AEW
AEW
AEW
34th Composite Wing
23d Composite Wing

Resulting Aircraft Available

108 F-15C
190 F-16C
24 F-117A
90 F-15E
12 EA6B
108 A-10/OA-10A
5 U-2
34 B-52H
16 KC-10
121 KC-135R/E
4 RC-135
11 E-3
2 E-8A
104 C-130H
5 AC-130
10 EC-130
5 EC-130H

4 HC-130
8 MH-53
8 MH-60
4 C-12A
4 C-21A
24 B-1B
6 B-2A

USNAVCENT

5 CVBG Task Forces (w/F-14s, F/A-18s, and EA-6Bs)
1 LCC (Command Ship)
1 AGF (Command Ship)
2 SAG
1 PHIBRGM
2 PHIBRON

USMARCENT

I MEF

1st Marine Div
 7th Marines
 3rd Marines
 6th Marines
 11th Marines (arty)
 1st Assault Amphibian Bn
 1st Tank Bn
 1st Light Armored Recon Bn
 3rd Light Armored Recon Bn
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
 Marine Aircraft Group 11 (fixed wing)
 Marine Aircraft Group 16 (rotary wing)
 Marine Air Control Group 38
 Marine Wing Support Group 37
1st Force Service Support Group
 General Support Group
 General Support Group 2

(Afloat)

14th MEU (SOC)
27th MEU (SOC)

2nd MEB

 Regimental Landing Team 2
 Marine Aircraft Group 20
 Brigade Service Support Group 2

USSOCCENT

4TH SF Group
6th SF Group

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

76 Ranger Regt
169th Special Operations Aviation TF
528th Special Ops Spt Bn
112th Signal Bn
685th Special Operations Wing (Air Force)
3219 SEAL Tm
3220 SEAL Tm
3221 SEAL Tm
3222 SEAL Tm
SEAL Delivery Vehicles
Special Boat Unit

ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief

Appendixes:

- 1—Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
- 2—Extract of Shortfall Identification
- 3—Force Module Identification (Omitted)
- 4—Deterrent Options (Omitted)
- 5—Active and Reserve Component Apportionment Tables (Omitted)

HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
 MACDILL AFB, FL
 25 JULY 199X

(U) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
US AIR FORCE TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)

(U)	FORCE	ORGANIZATION	BEDDOWN BASE	ARRIVAL
		HQ CENTAF	DHAHRAN	C+6
		9TH AIR FORCE	DHAHRAN	C+17
1ST AEW				
	18 F-15C	27 FS	DHAHRAN	C+2
	18 F-15C	71 FS	DHAHRAN	C+3
	18 F-15C	51 FS	DHAHRAN	C+10
	18 F-15C	117 FS	HAIL	C+29
	18 F-15C	55 FS	TABUK	C+37
	18 F-15C	53FS	HAIL	C+11
388TH AEW				
	18 F-16C	17 FS	AL DHAFRA	C+3
	18 F-16C	33 FS	AL DHAFRA	C+4
	18 F-16C	32 FS	AL DHAFRA	C+4
	18 F-16C	31 FS	AL DHAFRA	C+5
37TH AEW				
	18 F-16C	4 FS	AL KHARJ	C+38
	18 F-16C	308 FS	AL KHARJ	C+7
	18 F-16C	62 FS	DOHA, QATAR	C+36
	12 F-117A	17 FS	KHAMIS MUSHAIT	C+5
	12 F-117A	16 FS	KHAMIS MUSHAIT	C+5
4TH AEW				
	18 F-15E	335 FS	THUMRAIT	C+6
	18 F-15E	313 FS	AL KHARJ	C+8
	18 F-15E	303 FS	THUMRAIT	C+9
	18 F-15E	295 FS	THUMRAIT	C+11
	18 F-15E	293 FS	THUMRAIT	C+13

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

<i>FORCE</i>	<i>ORGANIZATION</i>	<i>BEDDOWN BASE</i>	<i>ARRIVAL</i>
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27TH AEW

18 F-16C	552 FS	TAIF	C+12
18 F-16C	523 FS	TAIF	C+19
12 EA6B	40 ECS	TAIF	C+9
18 F-16C	551 FS	TAIF	C+10
10 F-16C	550FS	TAIF	C+28

23RD COMPOSITE WING (PROVISIONAL)

18 A-10/OA-10A	356 FS	KKMC	C+9
18 A-10/OA-10A	23 FS	KKMC	C+37
18 A-10/OA-10A	117 FS	KKMC	C+40
18 A-10/OA-10A	118 FS	KKMC	C+45
18 A-10/OA-10A	121 FS	KKMC	C+14
18 A-10/OA-10A	222 FS	KKMC	C+28
5 U-2	171 RS	TAIF	C+6
14 B-52H	2 BW	CAIRO WEST	C+7
20 B 52H	91 BS	DIEGO GARCIA	C+4
10 KC-10	40 AREFS	RIYADH	C+28
2 KC-10	32 AREFS	DIEGO GARCIA	C+4
2 KC-10	34 AREFS	JEDDA	C+4
2 KC-10	42 AREFS	SEEB	C+10

34TH COMPOSITE WING

15 KC-135R	70 AREFS	JEDDA	C+8
15 KC-135R	31 AREFS	JEDDA	C+8
20 KC-135R	306 AREFS	JEDDA	C+16
8 KC-135R	41 AFEFS	SEEB	C+27
15 KC-135R	132 AFEFS	SEEB	C+43
16 KC-135R	37 AFEFS	KKI	C+10
19 KC-135R	38 AFEFS	KKI	C+10
5 KC-135R	39 AFEFS	KKI	C+10
3 KC-135R	133 AFEFS	CAIRO WEST	C+7
5 KC-135R	33 AFEFS	DIEGO GARCIA	C+4
4 RC-135	170 SRS	RIYADH	C+5
6 E-3	1 AWAC S	RIYADH	C+6
5 E-3	2 AWAC S	RIYADH	C+42
1 E-8A	173 RS	RIYADH	C+7
1 E-8A	173 RS	RIYADH	C+34
18 C-130H	131 AS	RIYADH	C+7
18 C-130H	132 AS	RIYADH	C+7
18 C-130H	133 AS	RIYADH	C+27
18 C-130H	134 AS	RIYADH	C+27
16 C-130H	158 AS	KUWAIT INTL	C+34
16 C-130H	105 AS	DHAHRAN	C+42
5 AC-130	95 SOS	AL KHARJ	C+10
6 EC-130E	42 ACCS	RIYADH	C+13

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4 EC-130E(VS)	193 SOG	RIYADH	C+28
5 EC-130H	41 ECS	JEDDAH	C+8
4 HC-130	15 SOS	AL KHARJ	C+15
4 MC-130	16 SOS	AL KHARJ	C+15
8 MH-53	17 SOS	AL KHARJ	C+23
8 MH-60	18 SOS	AL KHARJ	C+23
4 C-12A	110 AE	RIYADH	C+4
4 C-21A	111 AE	RIYADH	C+4
4 B-1		DIEGO GARCIA	C+7
6 B-2A		CONUS	

Air Force Units with no self-deploying capability

8 Weather Detachments	C+30
1 Air Mobility Element (AME)	C+3
2 Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCE)	C+3
3 Mobile Airport Squadrons	C+30
2 Prime Beef Squadrons	C+30
2 Prime Rib Squadrons	C+10
1 Tactical Airlift Element	C+3
2 Red Horse Squadrons (Heavy Construction)	C+35
1 Numbered Air Force Staff for the JFACC	C+5
1 Air Operations Center (AOC)	C+7
2 Air Support Operations Centers (1 per Army Corps)	C+50
6 Combat Control Teams	C+75
2 Special Operations Command & Communications Teams (SOCCT)	C+1
2 Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities (MASF)	C+10
3 Control and Reporting Posts	C+15
6 Forward Air Control Posts	C+35

U.S. NAVAL TIME-PHASES FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)

NAVAL UNIT	LAD
MPS (2) at Diego Garcia	C+7
MPS (3) at Guam	C+20
MPS (1) at Norfolk	C+30
LCC (Command Ship)	C+21
AGF (Command Ship)	C+14
SAG	C+14
SAG	C+14
PHIBRON	C+1
PHIBRON	C+20
PHIBGRY	C+35
CVBG	C+1
CVBG	C+10
CVBG	C+14
CVBG	C+20
CVBG	C+40

**EXTRACT FROM US GROUND FORCES
TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (U)**

<i>ARMY UNITS</i>	<i>POD</i>	<i>EAD</i>	<i>LAD</i>	<i>RDD/CRD</i>
33D ARMY HQ (AIR)	RIYADH	C+1	C+26	C+26
33D ARMY HQ (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+20	C+26	C+26
TA FINANCE CMD	RIYADH	C+1	C+9	C+9
720 TAMCA	DHAHRAN	C+1	C+13	C+13
46 TRANSCOM	DHAHRAN	C+13	C+26	C+27
76 RANGER RGMT	RIYADH	C+14	C+20	C+20
4TH SFG	RIYADH	C+10	C+12	C+13
6TH SFG	RIYADH	C+12	C+19	C+28
530 AMMO GP	KING KHALID MIL	C+17	C+28	C+28
33D TCC(A)	RIYADH	C+21	C+41	C+30
3D PERSOM	RIYADH	C+27	C+47	C+47
33D TAACOM (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+7	C+53	C+30
33D TAACOM (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+9	C+53	C+30
111TH ASG (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+40	C+57	C+60
111TH ASG (SEA)	JUBAYL	C+37	C+57	C+60
110TH TAACOM	DHAHRAN	C+52	C+72	C+75
112TH ASG (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+52	C+72	C+75
112TH ASG (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+54	C+72	C+75
18TH ENG CONST (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+60	C+77	C+77
18TH ENG CONST (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+63	C+77	C+77
86TH MEDCOM (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+60	C+80	C+80
86TH MEDCOM (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+61	C+80	C+80
110 ENCOM (AIR)	RIYADH	C+65	C+84	C+85
110 ENCOM (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+66	C+84	C+85
103 PRESS CAMP	RIYADH	C+17	C+27	C+27
113 MP GP (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+65	C+85	C+85
113 MP GP (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+67	C+85	C+85
515TH MI BDE (AIR)	RIYADH	C+42	C+57	C+60
515TH MI BDE (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+43	C+58	C+61
37TH PETROL GP (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+49	C+58	C+62
37TH PETROL GP (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+50	C+60	C+63

XXI CORPS

XXI CORPS HQ	KING KHALID MIL	C+1	C+5	C+5
47TH AA DIV (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+8	C+14	C+14
21 LT INF DIV (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+2	C+24	C+24
21 LT INF DIV (SEA)	AD DAMMAN	C+22	C+24	C+24
47TH AA DIV (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+23	C+28	C+28
21 COSCOM (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+12	C+77	C+80
21 COSCOM (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+40	C+80	C+80
23D ARMD DIV (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+12	C+27	C+30
23D ARMD DIV (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+17	C+30	C+30
76TH FA BDE (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+12	C+47	C+50
76TH FA BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+11	C+49	C+50
15TH AVN BDE (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+20	C+31	C+31

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15TH AVN BDE (SEA)	JUBAYL	C+31	C+31	C+31
11TH ADA BN (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+14	C+30	C+31
11TH ADA BN (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+17	C+31	C+31
41 CHEM BDE (AIR)	KING KHALID MIL	C+17	C+65	C+65
41 CHEM BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+19	C+73	C+73
71 SIG BDE (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+25	C+40	C+45
71 SIG BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+27	C+43	C+45
21 ENGR BDE (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+14	C+38	C+40
21 ENGR BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+16	C+40	C+40
55 MECH DIV (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+23	C+38	C+38
55 MECH DIV (SEA)	JUBAYL	C+25	C+38	C+38
312 MECH BDE (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+29	C+50	C+50
312 MECH BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+31	C+49	C+50
21 CORPS ARTY -(AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+17	C+60	C+60
21 CORPS ARTY -(SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+19	C+61	C+60
21 MP BDE (AIR)	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+23	C+40	C+40
21 MP BDE (SEA)	KUWAIT	C+25	C+67	C+67
21 MI BDE (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+17	C+40	C+40
21 MI BDE (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+19	C+67	C+67

II CORPS

II CORPS HQ (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+31	C+50	C+48
II CORPS HQ (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+33	C+68	C+70
207 ACR	KUWAIT	C+6	C+21	C+25
209 ACR (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+28	C+30	C+42
209 ACR (SEA)	JUBAYL	C+30	C+36	C+42
53 MECH DIV (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+29	C+40	C+45
53 MECH DIV (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+31	C+40	C+45
12TH AVN BDE (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+35	C+41	C+49
12TH AVN BDE (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+37	C+41	C+49
12TH ADA BN (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+28	C+30	C+30
12TH ADA BN (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+30	C+30	C+30
72 SIG BDE (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+31	C+42	C+51
72 SIG BDE (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+33	C+87	C+51
52 ENGR BDE (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+42	C+67	C+63
52 ENGR BDE (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+44	C+67	C+67
22D MP BDE (AIR)	L MANAMAH	C+43	C+49	C+62
22D MP BDE (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+44	C+64	C+65
22D MI BDE (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+45	C+50	C+65
22D MI BDE (SEA)	INA SULMAN	C+47	C+65	C+65
42 CHEM BDE	DHAHRAN	C+47	C+48	C+67
42 CHEM BDE	AD DAMMAM	C+49	C+67	C+67
25 ARMD DIV (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+65	C+75	C+76
25 ARMD DIV (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+67	C+76	C+76
II CORPS ARTY (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+58	C+65	C+65
II CORPS ARTY (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+60	C+65	C+65
2D COSCOM (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+60	C+65	C+66
2D COSCOM (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+61	C+66	C+68

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<i>MARINE UNITS</i>	<i>POD</i>	<i>EAD</i>	<i>LAD</i>	<i>RDD/CRD</i>
MEU (AFLOAT)		C+1	C+1	C+1
MEU (AFLOAT)		C+20	C+20	C+20
I MEF	KUWAIT INTERNAT	C+4	C+45	C+34

NOTES: (1) USMC A/W WILL BE BEDDOWN IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
KUWAIT CITY, BAHRAIN, AS WELL AS AFLOAT.


(2) THE MPS GOODS WILL BE OFF LOADED IN KUWAIT CITY AND AL
JUBAYL.

HEADQUARTERS, USCENTCOM
 MACDILL AFB, FL
 25 JULY 199X

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
EXTRACT OF SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION (U)


<i>UNIT</i>	<i>POD</i>	<i>EAD</i>	<i>LAD</i>	<i>SHORTFALL</i>
33D TAACOM (AIR)	DHAHRAN	C+7	C+53	23 DAYS
33D TAACOM (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+9	C+53	23 DAYS
21 CORPS ARTY (SEA)	AD DAMMAM	C+19	C+61	1 DAY
II CORPS HQ (SEA)	AL MANAMAH	C+31	C+50	2 DAYS
72 SIG BDE (AIR)	AL MANAMAH	C+31	C+82	31 DAYS
72 SIG BDE (SEA)	MINA SULMAN	C+33	C+87	36 DAYS

APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C (Operations) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
Operations Graphics (U)



CENTCOM AOR

APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C (Operations) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
Operations Graphics (U)



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MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 199X

ANNEX B TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX
INTELLIGENCE

REFERENCES:

- a. (U) Map: TPC-H-6A, 6B, 6C, 6D; Stock # TPCSSH06D, 1:500,000.
- b. (U) Map: Joint Operations Graphics (AIR); NH 38-11, 12, 15, 1:250,000.

1. (U) *Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations.*

a. (U) *Mission.* The combined intelligence mission is to provide that intelligence required by the Commander in Chief before, during and after execution of the supporting plan, and to contribute to the intelligence needs of supporting and subordinate components and commanders from all nations involved in the execution of the plan. This mission includes all aspects of intelligence operations.

b. (U) *Concept of Intelligence Operations.* The concept of intelligence operations is to collect, process, produce and disseminate appropriate intelligence in a timely manner in response to Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Requests for Intelligence Information (RII) needed to fulfill approved Essential Elements of Information (EEI).

2. (U) *Situation.*

a. (U) *Characteristics of Area of Operations.*

(1) (U) Military Geography.

(a) (U) Topography.

1 (U) Existing Situation.

a (U) General. The Republic of Iraq dominates the Fertile Crescent region of Southwest Asia. Bounded by Syria and Jordan on its east; Turkey on the north; Iran on the west; and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf on the south, Iraq is strategically located to dominate regional affairs. About the size of California, Iraq stretches along its border with Iran and Turkey to reedy marshes in the Southeast. Iraq is a land of contrast; desert plains occupy most of Iraq with the exception of the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, which are the most fertile in the Southwest Asia. Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf is limited to the Shatt al-Arab region. An area of historical dispute between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab waterway provides Iraq with a narrow corridor to the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly one of Iraq's objectives in its failed attempt to retain Kuwait was to improve its access to the Persian Gulf.

b (U) Terrain. Iraq can be divided into four major geographical zones or regions: the desert in the west and southwest, the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the mountains in north and northeast region, and the alluvial plan through which the Tigris and Euphrates river flow.

(1) (U) The desert region west and southwest of the Euphrates River is part of the Syrian Desert. Covering sections of Syria and Jordan, this desert is sparsely inhabited and consists of vast stony plains intersected with sandy subregions.

(2) (U) The upland region of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria and Turkey. Water flows in deeply cut wadis (valleys) hampering irrigation efforts. This region is predominantly desert.

(3) (U) The mountainous region begins southwest of Mosul and Kirkuk, extending to Turkey and Iran. Mountains range from 1,000 to 3,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. With the exception of a few valleys this region is suitable only for grazing. At lower elevations in the steppes and foothills, adequate rainfall make cultivation possible.

(4) (U) The alluvial plain region begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Described as a delta plain interlaced with irrigation canals and intermittent lakes, for years this region was subject to flooding by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. From the late 1960s to the mid-70s, government efforts were increasingly devoted to flood control. In southern Iraq, an area (15,600 square kilometers) from Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is predominantly marsh land.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The mountainous and upland regions provide the most natural defense. Avenues of approach are limited in these regions, and the Iraqis should be able to defend this region with a small force. The delta plain and southern marsh lands limit avenues of approach to major road networks. This region is less defensible than the mountainous region and the Iraqis should be able to contain an attack. The Syrian Desert is the least defensible and the Iraqis are vulnerable to mobile operations in this region.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Course of Action. The vast Syrian Desert region is ideal for mobile operations; however, cover and concealment is limited and water is scarce. The upland region limits mobile operations to improved/unimproved roads and dirt tracks. Some cover and concealment is provided by the numerous wadis in the region. Mobile operations are severely restricted in the mountainous region. Vehicles are limited to the few road networks, and during rainy season the area may be impassable. In the delta region vehicle movement is restricted to the present road network. Marsh land in southern Iraq would impede light operations.

a (U) Hydrography.

(1) (U) Existing Situation. Iraq's coastline is severely limited and not suited for large scale amphibious operations. Linking the port city of Basra with the Persian Gulf, amphibious operations in the Shatt al-Arab area would be limited.

(2) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. With a limited coastline the threat of a major amphibious operation in this region is limited. Iraq should be able to defend this area with a small force. Lacking multiple outlets to the Persian Gulf, Iraq's naval operations are limited to port security and coastal patrol.

(3) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. It would be difficult to launch large-scale amphibious operations against Iraq without violating the territory of neighboring countries. Amphibious actions would be limited to small boat operations.

b (U) Climate and Weather.

(1) (U) Existing Situation. The average temperatures in Iraq range from higher than 48 degree C (120 Fahrenheit) in July and August to below freezing in January. A majority of the rainfall occurs from December through April and is more abundant in the mountainous region and may reach 100 centimeters a year in some places. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena: the southern and southeasterly *sharqi*, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts to eighty kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November; the *shamal*, a steady wind from the north and northwest, prevails from mid-June to mid-September. Dust storms accompany these winds and may rise to height of several thousand meters, closing airports for brief periods of time.

(2) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity, coupled with the scarcity of water, will effect both men and equipment. During dry season, clouds of dust caused by vehicle movement will increase detection capabilities in desert regions. Flash flooding in wadis and across roads will hinder trafficability and resupply efforts during the rainy season. Clear, cloudless skies make air superiority a prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iraq. Air operations may be reduced during windy season.

(3) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same effect on friendly courses of action as on the threat.

(2) (U) Transportation.

(a) (U) Existing Situation.

1 (U) Road nets. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq's road system stretched over 20,000 kilometers with approximately 60 percent of the roads paved. These roads included four-lane highways linking Baghdad with Basra and Mosul. Smaller highways have been repaired with the exception of key bridges along the southern route of the Baghdad/Basra highway. Traffic in this area has been reduced by 25 percent.

2 (U) Railroads. Iraq has a well-developed rail system available for military transport and supply. The rail system consists of over 2,000 kilometers of railroads linking the major cities with the capital of Baghdad. The railroad system suffered minimal damage during the war and is operating at 80 percent capability. It is estimated that Iraqi trains can average about 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It is not known how many armored vehicles can be carried on each Iraqi flat car; however, a fair estimate would be one or two APCs or one main battle tank per car.

3 (U) Ports. Iraq's port city of Basra is the country's major port and handles the bulk of dry cargo. Located at the northern end of the Shatt al-Arab, Basra was vulnerable to Iranian attacks during the Iran-Iraq War and much of its cargo was diverted to the port of Aqaba in Jordan. The smaller ports of Umm Qasr and Az Zubay handle far less cargo but grew in importance during the war between Iran and Iraq. Extensive damaged sustained during the recent Gulf War has significantly reduced the port's capability. It's believed to be operating at less than 50 percent of its minimum thru-put capability per day.

4 (U) Airfields. Iraq has 94 usable airfields — 56 with permanent surface runways; 6 with runways over 3,659 meters; 50 with runways over 2,438 meters; 12 with runways over 1,220 meters. Most of these airfields were damaged during the Gulf War; however, they have been repaired and are functioning at full capacity.

5 (U) Pipelines. Iraq has four existing oil export pipelines: northward, via Turkey; south, via offshore terminals in the gulf (Al Faw area); south via Saudi Arabia; and west via Syria. Regional politics continue to govern the use of these pipelines. For example, during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria denied the shipment of Iraqi oil through its pipeline and onward to the Mediterranean terminals. And more recently

during the Gulf War all pipelines with the exception of Al Faw were shut down by the host countries. Today it's believed oil shipments have resumed through the Al Faw terminal and northern pipeline through Turkey.

6 (U) Rivers. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers dominate Iraq's river system and their waters are essential to the life of the country. Small boats are able to negotiate major portions of these rivers, but a navigable inland waterway does not exist throughout the river valley and delta plain.

(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Present transportation net will limit the Iraqi's ability to quickly reinforce the different regions of the country. Lack of roads in the mountainous region will require the military to rely on its limited airlift capability to move supplies and personnel in that area. In the south, marshlands will force the Iraqis to utilize major roads for vehicular traffic. Lacking adequate access to the Persian Gulf, naval operations will be limited. The multitude of airfields in the country will enable the air force to operate from diverse locations.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Regional transportation nets will have the same effect on friendly courses of action. The use of heavy tactical airlift for movement of supplies and troops will reduce these limitations.

(3) (U) Telecommunications.

(a) (U) Existing Situation. Severely damaged during the Gulf War, Iraq's telecommunications system is limited. The system consists of coaxial cables, radio-relay links, and radio communication stations, the bulk of which services Baghdad and the major cities. Of the nine AM stations and 81 television stations, 60 percent are functioning. Iraq is a signatory to Intelsat and Inmarsat. However, only a few earth terminals are in operation for international telephone and telegraph communications. The Iraqi military does not possess portable SATCOM terminals to access these systems.

(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iraq's limited telecommunications will have a detrimental effect on command and control as well as logistics. Actions against communications facilities could seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Limitations in the present telecommunications system, will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy's command and control capability.

b. (U) *Politics*.

(1) (U) Existing Situation.

(a) (U) Government systems. Iraq is an authorization one-party state headed by the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party. The President serves as head of state and government and as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the top decision-making body in Iraq. In accordance with the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the president and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) respectively. Legislative functions are split between the RCC and a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The 250 members of the Assembly are elected to four-year terms according to proportionate representation. In practice, real power rests with the president and the RCC, with the Assembly serving as a rubber stamp to RCC decisions.

(2) (U) Political Dynamics. Since his ascendancy to the presidency in 1979, Saddam Hussein has established himself as the country's strong leader. Exercising a heavy hand approach, Saddam Hussein effectively removed his opposition and maintained control of the government. The Gulf War revealed the

vulnerabilities of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party government and civil war erupted throughout the country. Today significant unrest continues with the Kurdish population in the north and pockets of Shiite resistance in the south.

(3) (U) Foreign Relations. The Gulf War has not significantly changed Iraq's orientation in foreign affairs. Iraq continues with its nonaligned but necessary relationship with the NIS and East Europe. Although disappointed with the lack of support during the war, cooperation continues on a number of economic and military issues. On the regional front, Iraq continues to maintain a hard-line position with regard to a Middle East peace settlement, winning the support of many of the Palestinians throughout the region. Relations with its neighbors have not improved since the Gulf War and diplomatic relations with the U.S. remain broken.

(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. While the Gulf War and subsequent civil turmoil has weakened the central government, the president and the RCC remains firmly in control of the government and the armed forces. Military operations vis-a-vis foreign forces in areas of civil unrest will require additional troops to govern the population. Commanders will continue to be hampered by the rigid command and control exercised by the RCC.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iraq's internal situation by aiding partisan forces. The lack of decentralization in Iraqi command and control will enable friendly forces to maintain the initiative in military operations.

c. (U) *Economics*.

(1) (U) Existing Situation. Oil exports fuel the Iraqi economy. With an annual gross national product (GNP) of \$40 billion, approximately 40 percent is provided by the petroleum sector. Iraqi oil exports will continue to dominate the country's economy. Much of Iraq's oil wealth was used to purchase armament and build the military. This, combined with the financing of two wars and the requirement to pay war reparations, has severely weakened the Iraqi economy. The future of Iraq's economy lies with its ability to meet pre-war petroleum export levels, while undergoing an economic austerity program.

(2) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Dependence on foreign trade and petroleum exports to generate foreign currency makes Iraq susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply.

(3) (U) Effects on Friendly Course of Action. Iraq's heavy reliance on the petroleum sector to sustain its economy makes the oil fields, pipelines and its off-shore terminal facility at Al Faw lucrative strategic targets. Seizure or destruction these facilities would hasten the destruction of Iraq's military.

d. (U) *Sociology*.

(1) (U) Existing Situation. Estimated at 16 million in 1986, Iraq's population is divided among the two largest ethnic groups (Arabs and Kurds) and several smaller ethnic communities. These groups include Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs and Armenians. Approximately 95 percent of Iraqis are Muslims, and Islam is officially recognized as the state religion. Of these Muslims, 55 percent are Shiites with a majority residing in southern Iraq. Living in the northern mountainous region of Iraq, Kurds make up approximately 20 percent of the country's population. A fiercely independent people, historically the Kurds have resisted central government rule. A major Kurdish rebellion ended in 1975 following the Algiers agreement between Iraq and Iran; however, recent fighting erupted during the Gulf War and isolated pockets of resistance continue today. Less troublesome than the Kurds, the Shiites remain a potential problem in southern Iraq.

(2) (U) *Effects on Enemy Capabilities.* Mistrust of the Kurds and Shiites will make Iraqi military operations in these regions difficult. Additional armed forces will be necessary to govern these while conducting military operations against a foreign power.

(3) (U) *Effects on Friendly Courses of Action.* Friendly forces should be able to exploit these divisions within Iraq. Support to Kurdish and Shiite partisan groups could serve as a force multiplier when conducting military operations against Iraq.

3. (U) *Enemy Capabilities.*

a. (U) *Ground Capabilities.* Significantly reduced during the Gulf War, the Iraqi Army has reconstituted and is operating with an estimated force of 400,000 men. The Iraqis have seven corps HQs functioning as the operational headquarters for the Army. During war, these headquarters communicate directly with the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Army's highest echelon of command. The corps frequently have operational control of five to seven divisions. These divisions could be a mix of up to six infantry divisions, one to two armored, and one to two mechanized infantry divisions. Other units organic to the corps include brigade-size or larger artillery and air defense artillery units, a reconnaissance battalion, one or two commando brigades, and other support units. The burden of support operations and the command and control of additional elements often force corps to send out a forward command post.

b. (U) *Air Capabilities.* The priority of Iraq's rearmament has gone to improve its severely damaged air capability. It is believed the Iraqis now have 300 plus combat aircraft in their inventory. Mostly of Soviet origin, these aircraft have been updated with the latest avionics and include Su-17/20/22 FITTERSs, Su-265/FROGFOOTs, and MiG-25/FOXBATs. The Air Force also holds a small inventory of French Mirage F-1s. In addition to combat aircraft, the Iraqis have a substantial inventory of attack and transport helicopters.

c. (U) *Naval Capabilities.* Iraq's naval capability is limited. It consists of several light cruisers and patrol boats used primarily for coastal security and maritime assistance.

d. (U) *Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities.* Amid speculation that Iraq had acquired the technology to develop nuclear weapons, to date Iraq does not possess a nuclear weapon capability. Although the bulk of Iraq's biological and chemical capability was reduced during the Gulf War, Iraq does maintain the capability to employ chemical weapons.

4. (U) *Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.*

a. (U) *Worst Case.* The Iraqis have the military capability to launch an attack through Kuwait and into the Iraq/Saudi Arabia neutral zone. With United Nation military observers in the demilitarize zone, the Iraqis would precede this attack with an extensive political and military deception campaign. The Iraqis would be able to employ and sustain up to 24 divisions in this attack. The Iraqis would use their helicopters early in the attack to secure critical Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian command and control and key petroleum facilities.

b. (U) *Probable Course of Action.* Constrained by United Nations embargoes on the purchase of military equipment, the Iraqis have nonetheless been able to obtain military equipment through international arms dealers. Continuing with the incremental rearmament of their armed forces is Iraq's most probable course of action. While it is unlikely that Iraq would threaten Saudi Arabia at this point, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that they would attack if the appropriate political deals could be made to preclude another coalition effort on the part of the U.S. To date, significant improvements have been made in Iraq's Air Force, air defense, and command and control capabilities.

5. (U) *Conclusion.* The Iraqi strengths are significant. Units are at 95 percent strength in personnel and equipment. The soldiers will view this as a Holy War, if initiated, and appear willing to die for martyrdom. They appear better trained than past experience has shown. They are using a modified form of Soviet Doctrine and, having taken their lack of knowledge of the operational art to heart, have been closely studying and emulating a form of Soviet operational art. They are making better use of their armor, mech infantry, and artillery in a synchronized battle than seen in 1990/91. Our intelligence sources tell us that they will not assume a defensive posture and passively wait for us to attack their position. They will also make better use of any American citizens that they can bring under their control, learning from their earlier mistakes. Their weaknesses are also significant. Their intelligence will be ineffective and they have no current access to satellites. Iraq does not appear ready for capable of task organizing outside of its brigade-sized units and limits itself to barrage-style artillery attacks. These attacks can be exploited if the barrage is avoided. Their logistics base and capability to support a deep thrust into Saudi Arabia is suspect.

6. (U) *Intelligence Activities.*

a. (U) *Direction.* Initial intelligence requirements have been satisfied by this Annex and Appendix I, EEI. Components and supporting commands will assess the adequacy of available intelligence for both planning and operational use.

b. (U) *Collection Management.* USCENTCOM exercises collection management authority (CMA) for collection assets organic to the command.

c. (U) *Reporting.* Intelligence information collected in response to EEI of the OPLAN will be forwarded immediately by U.S. Forces to the USCENTCOM/J2 IAW appropriate USCENTCOM directives.

d. (U) *Processing.* During the execution of this OPLAN, intelligence information received by USCENTCOM will be processed and evaluated by the USCENTCOM/J2.

e. (U) *Production.*

(1) (U) U.S. Forces.

(a) (U) Joint intelligence reporting procedures will apply to all components and supporting commands under the operational C2 of USCENTCOM. These reports should provide accurate and timely intelligence information on which to base future operational decisions.

(b) (U) Components and supporting commands will produce their own required intelligence or advise USCENTCOM of their inability to do so and request assistance. The USCENTCOM J2, when possible, will then produce the necessary reports or request assistance from higher HQs.

f. (U) *Dissemination.*

(1) (U) Timely dissemination of intelligence to all interested components and supporting components and supporting commands of Joint Forces and Theater of Operations Commander and USCENTCOM is essential. Normally this flow of intelligence will be accomplished by means of General Service (GENSER) communications using an "Immediate" or "Flash" precedence. TENCAP information dissemination is in accordance with appropriate service directives. If these means are inoperative or backlogged, then consideration should be given to using an alternate means such as secure voice, secure facsimile, or messenger.

(2) (U) The principle intelligence report produced by the USCENTCOM components and supporting command intelligence staffs is the intelligence summary (INTSUM). The INTSUM will be submitted by the components and supporting commands to the USCENTCOM/J2 as required.

g. (U) *Counterintelligence*. Will be performed under joint agreement between counterintelligence authorities of the host nation and all other participating nations.

7. (U) *Assignment of Intelligence Tasks*.

a. (U) *Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units*.

(1) (U) Acquire basic and current intelligence required by deploying forces.

(2) (U) Prepare CI and security plans for predeployment of deploying forces.

(3) (U) Ensure that CI and security subjects are a part of intelligence training at all levels of command.

(4) (U) Ensure that prior arrangements are made with commanders of staging bases for the security of forces and movement information.

(5) (U) Ensure that forces maintain adequate planning stocks of maps and charts.

(6) (U) Ensure that adequate coordination has been made with the intelligence staff of the coalition forces which occupy adjacent sectors.

b. (U) *Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units*. All friendly forces operating within the Operational Theater of Saudi Arabia are requested to forward information of intelligence interest to the combined intelligence staff by the most expeditious means available.

8. (U) *Miscellaneous Instructions*.

a. (U) *Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion (SERE)*. Component Commanders will ensure that personnel receive indoctrination and training in SERE techniques and are issued equipment, as appropriate.

b. (U) *Collection and Reporting*. Joint unconventional warfare forces will collect and report, within capabilities, intelligence information observed and obtained.

ENCLOSURES

Appendix 1—EEI

Appendix 4—Targeting

Appendix 11—Iraqi Ground Order of Battle

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B, USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (U)

1. (U) *General.*

a. (U) The purpose of this appendix is to identify the essential elements of information (EEI) in support of USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX.

b. (U) All military and civilian agencies participating in the collection effort are requested to report information pertinent to these questions by the most expeditious means possible.

2. (U) *Essential Elements of Information.*

a. (U) Will Iraq attack U.S. and/or friendly forces deployed to the Arabian Gulf region? If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what weapons?

b. (U) What are Iraqi intentions toward American, UN and other Western citizens in Kuwait and Iraq? What are the locations of potential American hostages in Kuwait and Iraq?

c. (U) Will Iraq employ chemical weapons? If so, when, where, and what type?

d. (U) Will Iraq use short-range ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia? If so, when, where, what type, and with what payload?

e. (U) Identify the strength, dispositions, subordination, capabilities and intentions of Iraqi forces deployed in attack positions, especially the Governor's Vanguard Corps. What is the C2 structure of the Iraqi forces?

f. (U) Will terrorist actions be directed against U.S. and friendly forces? If so, how, when, and where?

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B, OPLAN 1648-XX
TARGETING GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) *General.*

a. (U) The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance on the formulation of a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCCB) and to provide priority targets for destruction/neutralization in the event OPLAN 1648-XX is executed.

b. (U) A JTCCB will be organized and the JFACC or his representative will chair the board. All service components, SOF, and primary staff will participate. The J2, through the JIC will provide advice and possible locations on the following target types.

(1) (U) Initial priority will be to Offensive Counter Air (OCA) with emphasis on airfields, radars and C2 nodes for Iraqi Air Defense forces.

(2) (U) Second priority will be Iraqi 2 nodes for the control of ground forces.

(3) (U) Third priority will be lines of communication (LOCs) into the Saudi/Kuwaiti area of operations.

(4) (U) Fourth priority will be Iraqi ground forces, especially the operational reserve.

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B, USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
IRAQI GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE (U)

UNIT

IRAQI GHQ

901 SF BDE
902 COMMAND BDE
907 SCUD BDE
908 SCUD BDE
909 SCUD BDE
910 SCUD BDE

GOVERNORS VANGUARD CORPS

11 GV TANK DIV
12 GV TANK DIV
13 GV MECH DIV
14 GV MECH DIV
101 GV SF BDE
102 GV COMMANDO BDE

BABYLONIAN ARMY

II CORPS

21 TANK DIV
22 MECH DIV
23 INF DIV
24 INF DIV
201 GV SF BDE
201 GV SF BDE

III CORPS

31 TANK DIV
32 MECH DIV
33 INF DIV
3B4 INF DIV
301 SEP MECH BDE
302 COMMANDO BDE

IRAQI RESERVE

VII CORPS

71 TANK DIV
72 MECH DIV
73 MECH DIV
74 MECH DIV
75 INF DIV
76 INF DIV
77 INF DIV
701 SEP MECH BDE
702 COMMANDO BDE

Iraqi Air Order of Battle:**(1) (U) Baghdad Sector:**

<i>Airfield</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Unit</i>
Al Asad	30 SU-17	42d Ftr/bmbr Regt
	25 MIG-25	32d Intcptr Regt
	8 MIG-21 (Rec)	37th Recce Regt
Al Muhammadi	40 SU-24	29th Bmbr Regt
Al Taqaddum	30 SU-17	452 Ftr Bmbr Regt
	30 MIG-21	33d Intcptr Regt
Balad SE	40 MIG-23	34th Intcptr Regt
	20 SU-25	45th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
K2	12 TU-12	27th Ftr/Bmbr Sqdn
Rasheed	18 Hunter	61st Air Tng Sqdn
Saddam Intl	18 TU-16	28th Bmbr Sqdn
	14 Candid	62d Trans Sqdn
Shayka Mazhar	12 Candid	63d Trans Sqdn

Dispersal Fields:

Al Iskandriyah
 Al Jarrah
 Al Numanlyah
 Al Sahra
 Kut Al Hayy E.
 Samarra E.

(2) (U) Iraqi Western Sector:

<i>Airfield</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Unit</i>
H2	20 MIG-23	35th Intcptr Regt
	7 MIG-25	32d Intcptr Regt
	20 MIG-27	46th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
H3	30 SU-17	47th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
	15 MIG-21	38th Incptr Regt
	6 MIG-21 (Rec)	37th Reece Regt

Dispersal Fields:

Bashur
 Erbil NW
 Maraygah S.
 Qayyarah S.
 Qurrah Bay
 Tail Afar
 Tail Ashtah New

(3) (U) Iraqi Southern Sector:

<i>Airfield</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Unit</i>
Basrah W.	20 SU-25	45th Ftr/Bmbr Regt
Jalibah	30 SU-17	42d Ftr/Bmbr Regt
	6 MIG-21 (Rec)	37th Reece Regt
Shibah	20 MIG-23	35th Intcptr Regt
Tallil	15 MIG-21	33d Intcptr Regt

Dispersal Fields:

Amara New
 Ar Rumaylah
 As Salman N.
 Ghalayasan New
 Nejef New
 Qalat Salih
 Qalat Sikar
 Salwan
 Wadi Al Khirr

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ANNEX D TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
LOGISTICS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. (U) JCS Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*.
 - b. (U) AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 1997.
 - c. (U) USCINCCENT *Planning Directive*, 19XX.
 - d. (U) *CJCS Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (ISCP)*, 19XX.

1. (U) *General*

a. (U) *Purpose*. This annex provides policy and guidance for the logistics support of deployed U.S. forces operating within the Area of Operations for the implementation of USCINCCENT OPLAN 1648-XX.

b. (U) *Concept of Logistic Support*.

(1) (U) *Paragraph 4 of basic OPLAN 1648-XX*

(2) (U) Logistics support of deployed forces remains a service responsibility. CINCCENT exercises directive authority for logistics to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort to support deployed forces. Maximum use will be made of cross and common servicing as early in the deployment sequence as possible.

c. (U) *Assumptions*. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide host nation support as previously agreed in bilateral agreements and will, within the means available, provide ad-hoc support to deployed forces on a cost reimbursable basis.

d. (U) *Resource Availability*. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will provide to U.S. forces available classes of supply to include Class I, III, IV and water to the extent possible. These items will be managed as critical supplies.

e. (U) *Planning Factors*.

(1) (U) Conservative estimates, i.e. FM 101-10-1/2 and sound judgment, will be utilized in calculating supply requirements for assigned and attached forces. Historical information from Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM with modification may be useful.

(2) (U) U.S. components will use planning factors published in appropriate service directives for defensive operations using a moderate rate.

f. (U) *Responsibilities*.

(1) (U) Kuwait will provide logistic support to U.S. forces IAW paragraph 1d of this annex.

(2) (U) Saudi Arabia will provide logistic support to U.S. forces IAW paragraph 1d of this annex.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

- (3) (U) Commander, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) will provide:
- (a) (U) Inland surface transport to USCENTCOM forces.
 - (b) (U) Receive, store, issue, and provide theater distribution of class I, I(W), II, III(P), III(B), IV, common V(W) and VI to U.S. component forces.
 - (c) (U) Support for COMSOCCENT as required.
 - (d) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
- (4) (U) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) will provide:
- (a) (U) Support to Naval and Marine forces both ashore and afloat.
 - (b) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
 - (c) (U) Port augmentation to COMUSARCENT as required.
- (5) (U) Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command (COMCENTAF) will provide:
- (a) (U) Theater airlift in support of U.S. forces.
 - (b) (U) Base support for HQ USCENTCOM.
 - (c) (U) Support to SOCCENT air force component as required.
 - (d) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
- (6) (U) Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (COMUSMARCENT) will provide:
- (a) (U) Inter-Service cross and common servicing as required.
 - (b) (U) Port augmentation to COMUSARCENT as required.
- (7) (U) Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Central Command (COMSOCCENT) will coordinate service peculiar requirements with USCENTCOM.
- (8) (U) Joint Transportation Board, Joint Petroleum Office, Joint Medical Regulating Office, Joint Central Graves Registration Office, Joint Facilities and Utilization Board, and Joint Movement Center will assume coordination functions as per USCINCCENT SOP upon arrival during Phase II of this plan. Locations TBD.

2. (U) *Supply and Distribution.*

a. (U) *General Guidance.*

- (1) (U) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will provide supplies and distribution IAW paragraph 1d above.
- (2) (U) U.S. forces will continue to receive supplies from CONUS and supporting CINCs.

b. (U) *Specific Guidance.*

(1) (U) Distribution and Allocation.

(a) (U) Prepositioned logistic resources PWRMS are available for planning at the following locations:

	OMAN	KENYA	BAHRAIN	DIEGO
GARCIA				
CLASS I (ST)	1,000	2,000	250	25,000
CLASS III (GAL)	1,500,000	550,000	300,000	1,450,000
CLASS V	13,500	4,000		92,000
OTHER (ST)	23,000	1,500		53,000

(b) (U) Existing terminals and LOCs are identified in the USCINCCENT Planning Directory.

(2) (U) Level of Supply.

(a) (U) Resupply as required by service doctrine to maintain a four-day operational safety level for all units.

(b) (U) Supply Build-up.

1 (U) All classes, except class III and VII: 15 days of supply as of C+30; 30 days of supply as of C+60.

2 (U) Class III: Five days of supply as of C+30; 15 days of supply by C+60.

3 (U) Class VII as determined by each service.

(3) (U) Salvage. U.S. forces will dispose of salvage material IAW applicable service policies and directives.

(4) (U) Captured Enemy Material. U.S. forces will collect, locate, safeguard and dispose of captured enemy material IAW national/service policy on the disposition and use of captured enemy material.

(5) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. USCENCOM Assigned and attached forces are responsible for providing local purchase support for their forces IAW service policies.

(6) (U) POL. Appendix 1 (Omitted).

(7) (U) Inter-Service Logistic Support. Components requiring support will initiate ISSAs with components providing support. Provide copies to USCENCOM J4 with copies of negotiated ISSAs.

(8) (U) Mortuary Services. A mortuary affairs collection point will be established and operated by USARCENT at a location to be determined by CJ4 ICW the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO). Service components are responsible for evacuation to the collection point. Cemeteries will not be established in the area of operation. All remains will be evacuated to CONUS.

(9) (U) Ammunition. USCINCCENT components will develop ammunition support plans IAW DOD and service directives. ARCENT will provide common class V(W) support to USCINCCENT components. Munitions support provided through ISSAs will be provided to the maximum extent possible. Copies of ISSAs will be provided CJ4.

3. (U) *Maintenance and Modification.*

a. (U) General Guidance.

(1) (U) Maintenance of service unique equipment remains a service responsibility.

b. (U) *Specific Guidance.*

(1) (U) USARCENT Maintenance Depot in Egypt will offer maintenance depot level overhaul for all common items of equipment for all services. USARCENT will provide personnel augmentation as necessary to accommodate the increased workload. No equipment will be evacuated until C+30 to facilitate the rapid turn-around of shipping.

(2) (U) USARCENT will establish a general support maintenance capability in Saudi Arabia NLT C+42.

(3) (U) Maintenance priorities will be based upon component requirements to field and sustain weapon systems in a combat-ready status as quickly as possible.

(4) (U) Cannibalization and controlled substitution are authorized as directed by component commanders.

4. (U) *Medical Services.* USCENTCOM Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) will be established at Riyadh to coordinate the movement and evacuation of sick and injured personnel within and from the area of operation. Initial theater evacuation policy is 10 days and changing to 25 days on or about C+45. Maximum use will be made of host nation facilities. Specific guidance follows:

a. (U) USCENTCOM JMRO will regulate movement throughout the first three phases of this operation. In the event CINCCENT should create a JTF with responsibility for a subordinate area of operation, sub-area JMROs will be established.

b. (U) USCENAF will establish casualty staging facilities and operate the aeromedical evacuation system.

c. (U) USNAVCENT will establish casualty staging facilities and operate a naval medical evacuation system.

d. (U) *Hospitalization.*

(1) (U) Service components will specify time-phased bed requirements based upon service planning factors.

(2) (U) Availability of hospital facilities prior to the TPFDD medical facilities are:

USARCENT	2200 beds
USCENTAF	450 beds
USNAVCENT	1150 beds
Total	3800 beds

(3) (U) In situations where these facilities become saturated, hospital facilities in EUCOM area of responsibility will be the first priority back-up. Any changes to this policy or the medical annex to this plan will be coordinated with the command surgeons of USPACOM and USEUCOM.

(4) (U) Blood products are furnished through the U.S. Armed Services Blood Program Office and are managed by the USCENTCOM Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) to be co-located with the JMRO in Riyadh.

(5) (U) Host nation hospital beds will not be used to offset component combat zone bed requirements; however, they will be used to augment communication zone requirements.

5. (U) *Mobility and Transportation.*

a. (U) *General.* All USCENTCOM forces will follow procedures as outlined in USCENTCOM directive 55-1, Transportation SOP, and component service policy.

b. (U) *Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis.*

(1) (U) All commanders will develop service specific implementing support plans to this OPLAN. Supporting plans will include resupply and distribution procedures.

(2) (U) All commanders will maximize use of organic wheeled vehicles for surface transport requirements. Requests beyond organic capability are to be submitted to the supporting area commands for resolution.

(3) (U) During periods of increased tension, road networks will become highly congested with military and civilian traffic. Careful and continuous coordination with host nation movement control officials is directed to insure safe passage for both military and civilian requirements.

(4) (U) This OPLAN is grossly transportation feasible given the TPFDD at Annex A and the mobility assets apportioned for planning in the ISCP. Risk may be minimized through coordination with SACEUR to obtain international assets from the NATO shipping pool in support of this plan. SACEUR will advise CINCUSCENTCOM and CJCS of details of negotiations.

6. (U) *Civil Engineering Support Plan.*

a. (U) USCENTCOM ICJ4 will coordinate all engineering support plans. USARCENT will develop CESP for Saudi Arabia and USMARCENT will develop the CESP for Kuwait.

b. (U) Maximum use will be made of existing military facilities and installations. Use of civilian and/or other government facilities, except ports and airfields, will not be utilized without permission of the host nation authorities.

c. (U) Civil engineering support projects will be limited to those that are operationally essential. Construction will not exceed initial standards.

7. (U) *Sustainability Assessment*. CINCUSCENTCOM can sustain operations in support of this OPLAN provided the force structure is not significantly increased over that shown at Annex A. In the event that additional forces are earmarked for deployment to the Area of Operation, assistance will be required for EUCOM and PACOM.

8. (U) *Security Assistance*.

a. (U) *General Guidance*. USCENTCOM will continue to assist the State Department in the execution of security assistance programs IAW existing directives and memorandums of agreement.

b. (U) *Specific Guidance*. Component commanders will coordinate any service-peculiar new requests for assistance with the security assistance office at the U.S. embassy, Riyadh.

9. (U) *OPSEC Planning Guidance for Logistics*. Adequate measures will be developed and implemented by all forces to enhance operations security without impacting on mission accomplishment. The logistical posturing of the theater for sustainment of operations can provide the enemy with valuable intelligence information. Action will be taken at all levels to ensure security of this information.

ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief

Appendixes:

- 1 — Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply (Omitted)
- 2 — Mortuary Services (Omitted)
- 3 — Medical Services (Omitted)
- 4 — Mobility and Transportation (Omitted)
- 5 — Civil Engineering Support Plan (Omitted)
- 6 — Nonnuclear Ammunition (Omitted)
- 7 — Sustainability Assessment (Omitted)

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MACDILL AFB, FL
10 JAN 20XX

ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. (U) USCINCCENT 021500Z Feb 87, "CENTCOM Deployments Public Affairs Guidance."
 - b. (U) USCINCARRED 041440Z Feb 87, "Public Affairs Guidance on Media Coverage/ Photography of Special Forces in Training."
 - c. (U) Letter, subject "USCENTCOM Public Affairs Guidance," dated 22 Oct 85.
 - d. USCENTCOM Reg 360-1, "Public Information."

1. (U) *Situation.*

a. (U) *General.*

(1) (U) This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for the conduct of public affairs (Public Information and Command/Internal Information) in support of operations described in Annex C.

(2) (U) Overall responsibility for public affairs will remain with the Director of Public Affairs, USCENTCOM.

(3) (U) Whenever possible, coverage of operational activity should focus on combined military operations, combined humanitarian assistance activities, and engineer activities.

(4) (U) Public affairs participation will be based on actual, real world requirements. Accordingly, the introduction of pseudo news media or events into any element of the operation is not authorized.

(5) (U) In an open society, the public can be expected to have access to military information which does not damage national security with the exception of information controlled by operational security restrictions.

b. (U) *Enemy.* See Annex B.

c. (U) *Friendly.*

(1) (U) Department of State (DOS). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy, and conducts information programs through the U.S. Information agency (USIA).

(2) (U) Department of Defense (DOD). Responsible for the conduct of U.S. military operations and information programs worldwide, through unified/theater commands. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, plans, coordinates, executes, and monitors defense information programs.

(3) (U) American Embassy. Headed by a U.S. ambassador appointed by and representing the President of the United States; is responsible for all U.S. activities and citizens in the host country. The ambassador is assisted by senior representatives of the DOS, USIA, and DOD, and is the approving authority for execution of U.S. information programs in the host country.

(4) (U) Host Country PAO. Conducts information programs in support of forces; is capable of supporting dissemination of U.S. and/or combined information products to host country or regional audiences; can provide indispensable advice in the planning, preparation, and coordination stages.

d. (U) *Assumptions.*

(1) (U) USCINCCENT will provide proposed PA guidance to OASD (PA) IAW procedures described in Ref a, and OASD (PA) will provide guidance for releasing information upon receipt of USCINCCENT proposed PA guidance.

(2) (U) The American public will be informed to the maximum extent possible consistent with operational security and troop safety. This release of information can best be accomplished through U.S. and international media.

(3) (U) NCA will make initial announcements concerning major military aspects of this plan.

(4) (U) Forces hostile to U.S. efforts will attempt to discredit U.S. efforts through the media.

(5) (U) The information agencies of the U.S. government and of the host country (HC) can be expected to cooperate in an effort to explain military aspects of this plan.

(6) (U) Media interest will focus on U.S. presence in the operational area.

(7) (U) Relative freedom of movement could result in media overflights and news media visits in the operational area without prior coordination.

(8) (U) Distance to operation, site, poor road networks, and the length of the operation may all lead to excellent opportunities for media flights, tours, and group visits at coordinated times. DOD Reg 4515.13R will be adhered to.

(9) (U) A public affairs detachment will be deployed to support the operation.

2. (U) *Mission.*

a. (U) The public affairs mission is to provide both timely and factual on-the-scene coverage of the operation to both the internal military audience and the American public through national, regional, and local news media.

b. (U) All public affairs actions associated with this operation will be consistent with essential military security and within policy guidance provided by higher authority.

c. (U) The following goals will be accomplished by public affairs personnel participating in this operation.

(1) (U) Increase public understanding of U.S. Central Command operations.

(2) (U) Increase the internal military community's understanding of the U.S. Central Command and its component/subordinate commands.

(3) (U) Highlight the readiness and capabilities of participating commands.

(4) (U) Support overall operation objectives outlined in this plan.

(5) (U) Counter hostile disinformation.

(6) (U) Support U.S. regional objectives.

3. (U) *Execution.*

a. (U) *Concept of Operations.* The Director of Public Affairs, USCENTCOM, is responsible for the conduct of U.S. military public affairs within the region.

(1) (U) Public affairs actions will be accomplished in collaboration with both U.S. embassy diplomatic representatives and host country armed forces.

(2) (U) The responsibility of planning, coordinating, and directing military public affairs field operations rests with the CENTCOM public affairs officer, who will work in close coordination with the Public Affairs counselor of the American embassy and the HC public affairs officer.

(3) (U) Initial concurrent news releases will be made from the seats of government by OASD-PA and HC armed forces. (See Ref k for detailed procedures on development of public affairs guidance and procedures.) Subordinate commanders may hold press interviews and issue press releases only after coordination with CENTCOM PAO and receipt of amplifying public affairs policy guidance.

(4) (U) The CENTCOM PAO will determine the best date for a media day(s) and make arrangements for transportation and accommodation of media to cover activities.

(5) (U) The CENTCOM PAO will provide written after-action PA evaluations to USCENTCOM.

b. (U) *Tasks.*

(1) (U) USCINCCENT will:

(a) (U) Provide OASD (PA) with proposed policy guidance on PA matters, and when approved by OASD (PA), provide approved guidance to all subordinate commanders participating in the operation.

(b) (U) Coordinate and control all theater PA activities of commands concerned with this plan.

(c) (U) Maintain liaison with OASD (PA) on policy matters.

(d) (U) Ensure that public affairs elements are properly equipped and staffed, and provide ready access to voice and message communications connecting USCENTCOM headquarters, the joint task force, and the nearest State Department PA representative. This support will be provided unless unavoidable military necessity, related to mission and/or safety of U.S. Armed Forces requires all available assets.

(e) (U) Furnish communications facilities for PA personnel.

(f) (U) Furnish equipment as needed.

(g) (U) Coordinate for military audiovisual/operational documentation.

c. (U) *Coordinating Instructions.*

(1) (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J.

(2) (U) CENTCOM public affairs officer is authorized to provide UNCLASSIFIED synopsis of operations after coordination in both public affairs and operations channels. Response to media query is authorized as prescribed in Appendix 2. Spokesmen may confirm presence of troops, ships, and aircraft where they are plainly visible to news media and confirmation of their presence is requested.

(3) (U) The physical security of PA personnel, equipment, and visiting media is a command responsibility and will be incorporated into all planning.

(4) (U) Communiqués, briefings, and news summaries will be required. Specific requirements will be transmitted after plan implementation.

(5) (U) Public affairs activities will be incorporated in established operational reports.

(6) (U) Materials produced during the execution of this plan will be approved by the CINCCENT public affairs officer, who will coordinate with the U.S. embassy public affairs counselor and host country armed forces prior to public release. If there is no concurrence, the materials will not be released but instead forwarded through USCENCOM for SECDEF/SECSTATE review and decision.

(7) (U) Hometown news release items should be generally approved by CENTCOM PAO or his designated representative. However, subordinate commands are encouraged to pursue an aggressive Hometown News Release Program including Reserve and National Guard personnel participating in the operation.

(8) (U) Close coordination will be maintained at all levels with USIA and the American embassy concerned, as well as HC armed forces public relations.

(9) (U) Timely, accurate, and appropriate information will be made available regarding casualties.

(10) (U) Routine coordination will be made with PSYOP commands and staffs to preclude contradictory efforts. However, PA will not be used for PSYOP purposes, nor will PSYOP staffs be permitted to participate in public affairs operations.

(11) (U) In the event of an accident or incident, the commander of the forces involved is responsible for immediately notifying the nearest public affairs office, who will in turn coordinate directly with the CENTCOM or DOD public affairs officers.

4. (U) *Accreditation.*

a. (U) USCINCENT will not recommend accreditation of news media representatives (NMRs) to the DOD. However, correspondents will be expected to certify association with recognized media by formal identification. All representatives of legitimate news organizations will be afforded equal consideration with regard to releasable information on this operation.

b. (U) All news media representatives will be required to comply with HC requirements prior to being afforded access to U.S. military activities. CENTCOM; PAO should obtain names and NOK notification for U.S. media representatives.

c. (U) The CENTCOM public affairs officer, on behalf of his commander, is responsible for U.S. news media representatives in the area of operations in coordination with the U.S. embassy and host nation.

d. (U) Media access may be cleared through and confirmed by public affairs channels when required.

5. (U) *Field Press Wartime Information Security Program (WISP)*. Field press censorship will not be applicable for this operation and may only be invoked by OASD (PA) message.

6. (U) *Arrangements for News Media Representatives (NMRs)*.

a. (U) *General*. Several events in this operation provide an opportunity to facilitate public understanding of the USCENTCOM mission and scope of the operation and merit consideration for media tours.

b. (U) *Facilities*. Facilities and logistics support will be provided on a noninterference-with-mission basis when commercial facilities are not available.

c. (U) *Inoculations*. Correspondents accompanying forces in the field should have the same inoculations required for military personnel participating in the operation.

d. (U) *Expenses*. In the absence of commercial facilities, messing and billeting may be extended to NMRs on a space available basis. The expenses will be borne by individual news media representatives.

e. (U) *Pools*. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary to select a small group or pool of media representatives to cover certain aspects of the operation. It is important that all types of media are represented and that the pool be as large as transportation facilities permit. News media participation in the pool will be contingent on proper identification and compliance with HC requirements for news media.

f. (U) *Simulated Rank*. Correspondents will be afforded the privileges of an officer for messing, billeting, and transportation. This provision applies to reserve and retired officers acting as news media representatives regardless of their reserve or retired grade.

g. (U) *Briefings*. The CENTCOM PAO will arrange for UNCLASSIFIED briefings by the commander or his representative. The briefings will outline — as far as possible and within the bounds of security — plans and operations.

h. (U) *Media Days*. This will be the preferred method of handling media (See Para 3a.)

i. (U) *Communications*. Commands at which two PAOs are physically located will provide the media communications service when commercial facilities are not available. Commercial news copy will be transmitted by military communications facilities free of charge and in accordance with Annex K. Commercial news copy will normally be transmitted with the precedence of ROUTINE; however, the CENTCOM PAO may approve up to a precedence of IMMEDIATE in exceptional circumstances. When commercial facilities are not available, no attempt will be made to censor news copy to be filed over

military communications facilities unless field press WISP has been invoked by higher authority. However, copy filed over military communications facilities may be reviewed before transmission, and potential violations of military security may be called to the attention of the sender. If the copy is not redrafted to overcome valid security objections, it is entirely within the prerogative of the commanding officer of the communications facility to refuse to accept it for transmission. However, force will not be used to withhold the drafted material, nor will material be confiscated without authorization from higher headquarters. Many media teams are expected to have their own mobile satellite communications terminals. Use of these terminals can result in the near real-time release of text and visual reports to the rest of the world, to include Iraq and others. Media may be reminded that 18 USC, 793e makes it a criminal offense to photograph, publish, or refuse to surrender classified information.

j. (U) *Courier Flights*. If government communications facilities are not available, the on-scene commander will provide an air-courier flight for forwarding news materials to appropriate processing or news filing points.

k. (U) *Travel*. CENTCOM will plan for and provide authorized media representatives military travel into and within the area of operations when such travel has been approved by OASD (PA) and is in connection with assignments to cover this operation and commercial transportation is not available. Appropriate "hold harmless" agreements will be executed prior to travel and invitational travel orders will be issued as required.

7. (U) *Security*. Certain precautions are required by the presence of correspondents in the operating areas.

a. (U) Execution of this operation presents a variety of challenges in maintaining military security as well as diplomatic or political propriety. Security at the source offers the best protection of classified information. Diplomatic and political implications of statements of news releases to media representatives should be weighed carefully at all echelons of command.

b. (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) must be protected.

c. (U) Access to operations, intelligence, and other classified areas must be controlled. Media will normally be accompanied by a PAO or NCO. Newsmen will not be permitted to visit those portions of installations which have been restricted for security reasons. They will not be excluded from operational areas solely on the grounds of personal danger but will be warned when danger exists and advised that the government assumes no responsibility. The commander is the sole and final judge in determining when their presence interferes with operations.

d. (U) Security at the source is essential.

e. (U) No correspondent is cleared for classified information.

f. (U) Correspondents will assume that all statements made to them are "for the record."

g. (U) "Off the record" or "deep background" statements will not be included in briefings for members of the press corps.

h. (U) The on-scene commander will review all materials to be released locally for OPSEC considerations.

8. (U) *Audiovisual.*

a. (U) Operational documentation, traditionally a staff function of the J3, becomes a critical public affairs requirement. The ability to rapidly, clearly, and geographically portray the circumstances surrounding a contingency to key decisionmakers and the public can have a profound effect on their perceptions and decisions to support or subvert ongoing operations.

b. (U) The CENTCOM Public Affairs staff will coordinate and define public affairs documentation requirements.

c. (U) Release authority for audiovisual materials is described in coordinating instructions, this Annex.

9. (U) *Internal Audience.*

a. (U) Commanders at all levels are responsible for implementing vigorous command information programs to insure they are kept well-informed, in order to reinforce confidence in the chain of command, and counter the effects of hostile propaganda and disinformation.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ADVERSE INCIDENTS WHEN MORE THAN ONE SERVICE IS INVOLVED (U)

1. (U) *Purpose*. To provide basic procedures for the release of information concerning adverse incident/accidents to aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, missiles, ships or facilities, and casualties to personnel involving more than one military service.
2. (U) *Applicability*. This appendix applies to personnel of the United States Army, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Coast Guard, and civilians serving or accompanying those forces when they are participating in joint operations. It applies to the U.S. Central Command within the geographic limits of the operation area.
3. (U) *Definitions*. For the purpose of this appendix, four categories of adverse incidents are established. They are:
 - a. (U) *Emergency*. Any incident which results in the death of one or more operation participants, or which will, in all probability, result in the death of one or more operation participants.
 - b. (U) *Accident/Injury*. Any incident which involves serious injury to one or more operation participants not causing death, but requires his/her withdrawal from the operation. Also included are incidents which cause a short delay in operation events or incidents which would have resulted in an emergency if emergency procedures had not been successful. Aircraft accidents are included in this category to include mishaps, crashes, or emergency landings.
 - c. (U) *Civil Disturbance*. Any incident involving the local population which would tend to disrupt the peace and order of the operation. The incidents may range from a nonviolent demonstration to actual physical interference with the conduct of the operation.
 - d. (U) *Routine*. All injuries, equipment failures, etc., which are not classified as emergencies, accidents or civil disturbances. Incidents in this category will not involve adverse incident procedures.
4. (U) *Basic Procedures*.
 - a. (U) During joint operations, initial release of information concerning all emergencies of the accidents/injuries will be made by CENTCOM PAO after coordination with the Service(s) involved. All initial inquiries from the public concerning these accidents or incidents will be referred to the CENTCOM PAO, regardless of the Service involved. Where necessary, the appropriate CENTCOM PAO will coordinate with U.S. embassy PAO and HC RPPP. It is important, in this regard, that information not be held at any one level, but that prompt, accurate information be available for release. Bad news does not get better with age.
 - b. (U) Participating commands and units will notify the CENTCOM PAO as expeditiously as possible when an emergency or accident occurs. The CENTCOM PAO will inform OASD/PA, USIS, the U.S. embassy, and RPPP of the HC armed forces immediately upon notification of any emergency, accident, and incident involving major damage to facilities or any other potentially newsworthy incident.

The Service(s) involved will immediately report the adverse incident through its (their) public affairs channels in accordance with applicable regulations.

c. (U) An adverse incident during a joint operation will generate requests from NMRs to visit the scene of the incident. NMRs may visit the scene under escort of public affairs personnel or by a representative designated by the on-scene command (OSC). While NMRs are on-scene, they will have access to the accident on a non-interference basis within the limits of established security policy and if their personal safety is not endangered. Personal safety decisions will be made only by the OSC.

d. (U) The CENTCOM PAO or his/her designated representative will be the CINC's official spokesperson on-scene, and all initial on-scene media queries will be referred to him/her.

e. (U) Photography of an adverse incident will be permitted if no classified material is exposed. Determination as to the exposure of classified material will be made by the cognizant Service. If there is doubt as to the exposure of classified material, photographers will be advised they cannot take photographs and that taking photographs of classified material is in violation of federal law. Federal Criminal Statutes 28, U.S.C. 795 and 797 may render them liable for criminal prosecution. *However, force will not be used to prevent photography.* Film and/or videotape will not be confiscated without authorization from higher authority.

f. (U) After the initial news release has been made, or after the NMRs have departed the scene, the responsibilities for follow-on public affairs actions relative to adverse incidents may be delegated to the Service involved in accordance with applicable regulations, including the release of information concerning the personnel or equipment involved. All follow-on public affairs activity will be coordinated with the CENTCOM PAO. At this time, if not previously identified, other Services assisting or participating in rescue operations may make public release of their part in these operations.

g. (U) If not stated in the initial release, a statement that an investigation is being or will be conducted to determine the exact cause of the incident will be included in a subsequent release. If no subsequent release is planned, this information will be available to respond to queries.

h. (U) Release of information concerning incidents involving civil disturbances will be coordinated with U.S. embassy PAO and HC armed forces public relations.

5. (U) *Casualty Information Actions.*

a. (U) Names of casualties will normally be released only by the Service to which casualties belong. Where facts of the emergency are obvious to the public or covered by NMRs on-scene, the operation public affairs officer may announce, when queried, the number of known dead, the number of known survivors, and the number of known injured survivors.

b. (U) The CENTCOM PAO will inform NMRs that release of names of casualties will be made by the parent Service involved after casualties' next of kin have been notified and that all subsequent queries concerning casualties should be addressed to the public affairs office of the parent Service.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA (U)

1. (U) *General.*

a. (U) The principle of maximum information to the public will be followed, consistent with safety and security. The situation in any military operation is such that correspondents may come into possession of information which has not been released officially under set ground rules. Such information is not to be transmitted by American or allied spokesmen in regard to their respective national forces.

b. (U) Restrictions will be kept to a minimum but may be applied by a commanding officer when the security of an operation warrants such action. Correspondents will be advised of restrictions by the commanding officer or public affairs officers of the unit involved.

2. (U) *Ground Rules.*

a. (U) *Releasing Authority.* CINCCENT or CENTCOM PAO are sole releasing authorities for all military information material contained in any medium (audio-visual, photography, drawings, etc.) gathered or produced within the area of operations.

b. (U) *Release of Cleared Information.* Information cleared for official release will be made available to the press through one or more of the following means.

(1) (U) Press releases.

(2) (U) Press briefings.

(3) (U) Call outs.

(4) (U) Special press handouts.

(5) (U) Interviews.

c. (U) *Categories of Releasable Information Following Initial Official Release.*

(1) (U) General.

(a) (U) Arrival of major units in country or within operational areas when officially announced by U.S. spokesman.

(b) (U) Approximate friendly force strength figures, by Service, after announced by DOD spokesman.

(2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present).

(a) (U) Friendly force size in an operation.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

- (b) (U) Nonsensitive tactical operations details.
 - (c) (U) Identification and location of military targets and objectives currently or previously under attack.
 - (d) (U) Origin of air operations (i.e., land-based or carrier-based).
 - (e) (U) Date/time/location of previous conventional military missions/activities.
 - (f) (U) Previous conventional mission results.
 - (g) (U) Number of aerial combat/reconnaissance mission/sorties flown in theater of operational area.
 - (h) (U) Type forces involved (infantry, armor, Marines, carrier battle group, interceptor, fighter bombers, etc.).
 - (i) (U) Weather/climate conditions.
 - (j) (U) Allied participation by type.
 - (k) (U) Operations nicknames.
- d. (U) *Categories of Information Not Releasable.*
- (1) (U) General.
 - (a) (U) Any information — general, implied, or specific — regarding any aspect of actual or conceptual future military plans, activities, or operations. Includes all information directly or indirectly associated with combat, combat support, or combat service support endeavors (i.e., operations, logistics, administration, politico-military, civil affairs, C S, etc.).
 - (b) (U) Information on any command, control, personnel, operational or support vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls.
 - (c) (U) Rules of engagement details.
 - (d) (U) Information on friendly force security and deception measures/countermeasures.
 - (2) (U) Air, Ground, Sea Operations (Past and Present).
 - (a) (U) Information on intelligence collection activities to include targets.
 - (b) (U) Information on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct/indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
 - (c) (U) Information on classified or “unique” operations methodology/tactics (air ops angles of attack, speeds, etc.; naval tactical/evasive maneuvers, etc.).
 - (d) (U) Information on classified special operations and special purpose operation and activities.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PARTICIPANTS (U)

(U) Each participant of a combined operation in the Middle East must remember that his or her personal conduct, appearance, and attitude while enroute to or from and while in the country will reflect upon his or her fellow soldiers, the United States Central Command, the U.S. military in general, and our country.

(U) It is incumbent upon each of us to ensure that we continuously show respect to the people of the host nation, their culture and traditions, and their roads and towns. To do so will ensure that we will project our image of professionalism in areas of the country unaccustomed to American military activities firsthand.

(U) In order to maximize favorable impressions of the U.S. military by the local inhabitants, as well as minimize the chances of trouble, there must be strict compliance with the following rules:

- Remember you are guests. Any contact with the local inhabitants must be courteous, professional, and low-key.
- All local inhabitants must be respected both during duty hours and while off-duty. Do not get involved in altercations with local residents. Likewise, houses, crops, and other property in the area will be respected. Damage to such costs us, the taxpayers.
- Any off-limits areas and restrictions must be strictly observed.
- No non-prescription drugs will be tolerated.
- No alcoholic beverages will be taken to or possessed in the area.
- Uniforms must be correct and as neat as conditions allow.
- All exercise participants are prohibited from handling both wildlife and domestic animals in the area.
- Be familiar with and observe the rules of engagement, which are specified in plans or as determined by your commander.

(U) In addition, the following safety points will be observed as appropriate to prevent accidents:

- Ground guides will be used when backing any vehicle larger than 3/4 ton.
- Drive defensively; be alert to hazardous road conditions (e.g., heavy blowing sand).
- Livestock, such as cattle and sheep, are common in many areas. Drivers should pay special attention for wandering animals.
- Prevent heat strokes by promptly seeking medical assistance when you become overheated.

(U) *The Bottom Line* - Remember you are in a sovereign country, and you are guests invited to help.

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ANNEX J TO USCENTCOM OPLAN 1648-XX (U)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
 - b. JCS Pub 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
 - c. JCS Pub 10, *Tactical Command and Control, and Communications Systems Standards*.
 - d. JCS Pub 12, *Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations*, Vol. 1-4.”

1. (U) *General*.

- a. (U) *Purpose*. To establish the relationship between:

- (1) (U) National Command Authorities (NCA).
- (2) (U) Other unified and specified commands.
- (3) (U) International commands and organizations.
- (4) (U) Coordinating authorities.
- (5) (U) U.S. diplomatic missions.
- (6) (U) Government departments or agencies that support the operations.
- (7) (U) Forces and agencies of other nations.

- b. (U) *Scope*.

(1) (U) This annex establishes the command relationships pertaining to military operations by USCENTCOM and supporting forces, in accordance with JCS direction, in the geographic area of the Middle East, specifically the Arabian Peninsula.

(2) (U) During the planning phase of operations, USCENTCOM component commanders, supporting commanders, and designated planning agents will pre-prepare plans and provide information in support of this plan, further designating subordinate commands and planning agents as necessary.

2. (U) *Command Lines*.

- a. (U) *Service Components*.

(1) (U) Commander, U.S. Army Central (COMARCENT), provides theater- level support to USCENTCOM as required and is designated as Joint Land Component Commander (JLCC) for Phases III through V of this plan.

(2) (U) Commander, U.S. Central Air Forces, (COMCENTAF), provides theater-level support to USCENTCOM as required and is designated as Joint Air Component Commander (JACC) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) for this plan.

(3) (U) Commander, U.S. Navy Central, (COMNAVCENT), provides theater-level support to USCENTCOM as required. Prior to the establishment of the amphibious landing force ashore (AOA dissolved), operational control of designated Marine Corps forces will be exercised by COMNAVCENT.

(4) (U) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Central, (COMMARCENT), provides theater-level support to USCENTCOM as required. After Marine Corps forces are placed under the OPCON of JLCC (Phase IV), COMMARCENT assumes OPCON of Theater Reserves and the Theater Reserve responsibility.

(5) (U) Commander, Special Operations Command Central (COMSOCCENT) provides theater-level support to USCENTCOM as required.

b. (U) *Other Subordinate Commands.* N/A.

c. (U) *Augmentation Forces.* Augmentation forces will be provided by direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They will be used to complete Theater Army logistics structure and provide other required support. Duration of mobilization is from M-Day to 60 days past termination of hostilities. Deployment of augmentation forces will be IAW TPFDL (Annex A), as amended.

3. (U) *Support and Coordination Relationships.*

a. (U) *Supporting Military Forces.*

(1) (U) Per JCS direction, USCENTCOM is the supported commander for operations outlined in this plan. USCINACOM, USCINCPAC, USCINTRANS, USCINCSOC, USCINSPACE, USCINSTRAT, USCINCEUR, and the services support USCENTCOM in the development and execution of plans to support operations outlined herein.

(2) (U) As the situation develops, USCENTCOM will request augmentation forces from the JCS as required and as outlined in Annex A. Operational control (OPCON) of Naval Forces will pass from USCINACOM and USCINCPAC to USCENTCOM COMNAVCENT at H-12 hours prior to D-Day. In the event that augmentation forces deploy by air, OPCON will pass to the appropriate component commander upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). Operational control of augmentation forces from USCINCPAC will pass to USCINACOM when these forces enter USCINACOM's geographic area of responsibility. Operational control of other augmentation forces approved by the JCS will pass to USCENTCOM or component commander in accordance with procedures stated above.

b. (U) *Coordinating Authorities.* None.

c. (U) *Supporting Agencies.* Per SOP.

d. (U) *Inter-Service Support Agreements.* All inter-Service logistics agreements are in effect.

e. (U) *Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies.* All coordination with diplomatic agencies will be done by HQ, CENTCOM. Subordinate organizations will communicate coordination requirements to the J-6. USCINCENT will maintain close coordination with the Chiefs of Mission of the U.S. embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and those nations bordering Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

4. (U) *Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations.*

a. (U) Relationships with GCC Forces. It is anticipated that the GCC will form a headquarters to command all GCC Forces. This command will be co-equal with USCENTCOM headquarters. Coordination will be conducted through C3IC (see para 5). Units operating alongside GCC units will exchange liaison elements.

b. (U) FAR. If French forces are committed to defense of Saudi Arabia, diplomatic efforts will be made to have FAR ground forces placed under OPCON of 33d Army. French air forces committed to defense of Saudi Peninsula will remain under French control but will coordinate air operations with USCENTAF.

c. (U) British Armored Division. If British Armored Division is committed to defense of Saudi Peninsula, diplomatic efforts will be made to have division placed under OPCON of U.S. II Corps. British air forces committed to defense of Saudi Peninsula will remain under British control but will coordinate air operations with USCENTAF.

d. (U) Saudi I Corps is expected to remain under control of the GCC headquarters.

5. (U) *Planning Relationships.* A Coalition, Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC) will be established with USCENTCOM headquarters and GCC headquarters representatives to plan and coordinate all operations.

ALEX P. FOSTER
General
Commander in Chief

PLANNING DIRECTORY

Reference 9

**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900**

USCENTCOM PLANNING DIRECTORY

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, U.S. UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

SUBJECT: U.S. Central Command

1. Effective 1 January 1983, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was activated as a unified command. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), exercises command as provided herein and as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.
2. USCINCCENT, with headquarters located at MacDill AFB, Florida, is the commander of USCENTCOM comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. His general area of responsibility (AOR) for the conduct of normal operations includes the MIDDLE EAST, the land mass of INDIA, the RED SEA, the PERSIAN Gulf, the HORN OF AFRICA, SUDAN, EGYPT, and the majority of the INDIAN OCEAN.
3. USCINCCENT will have responsibility for the conduct of normal operations with the authority and responsibilities of a unified commander, as outlined in the UCP, UNAAF (JCS PUB 0-2), and DOD Directive 5100.1, or as may be amended in subsequent correspondence.
4. The USCINCCENT, in coordination with USCINCLANT, USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCSOC, USCINCSTRAT, USCINCSPACE, and USCINCTRANS as necessary and, when required, in conjunction with adjacent allied commanders, will develop plans for the conduct of operations to fulfill U.S. commitments and to control and protect lines of communication in the USCENTCOM AOR.

INTRODUCTION

1. (U) During each assignment, officers accumulate information needed in the performance of their duties. The information collected covers a broad spectrum of items including:

- Phone numbers.
- Points of contact in other organizations.
- Copies of unit SOPs.
- Copies of the internal SOPs of other organizations with which you deal.
- Specific data on weapons systems and equipment.
- Mobility information for air and sealoading.
- Reports and reporting formats.
- General reference data related to your specific job.

2. (U) This publication provides you with a collection of some of the information you would have acquired over a period of time in an assignment to Headquarters, United States Central Command. While it is not all inclusive, it does give you information which will be of assistance during the planning exercises in C500.

3. (U) Formalized documents included in this document are copies of the *USCENTCOM's Planning Guidance* to the staff for deliberate planning in the AOR and a memorandum from JCS entitled *Assignment of Forces* which provides a list of the forces available to CINCCENT for planning purposes. Both of these documents would normally be classified. Unclassified versions have been given to you to facilitate instruction. The key point here is that, while you would no doubt have access to these documents and the information contained therein, they would be secured in a classified document container and not included in your personal continuity or policy and precedent files.

4. (U) This information, in conjunction with the information found in your Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (ISCP), your defensive OPLAN 1648, and CINCs Theater Strategy, should all facilitate your learning process in the area of unified staff operations and operational planning.

5. (U) Any suggestions for additional information that should be included in this publication should be provided to your instructor.

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USCINCCENT WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY

(Issued Prior to June 199X)

(U) This (notional) planning philosophy provides USCINCCENT's guidance for the development of USCENTCOM Operational Plans. It is intended to be used as the basic planning guidance for operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. Current guidance from higher authorities (NCA, CJCS, JCS) has been, and will continue to be, incorporated into this directive and subsequent plans.

REFERENCES (U):

- a. (U) USCENTCOM AOR Map
 - b. (U) USCENTCOM Theater Strategy
 - c. (U) USCENTCOM Intelligence Estimates
 - d. (U) USCENTCOM Area Studies
1. (U) **MISSION:** Developed by students.
 2. (U) **COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:**
 - a. (U) *Strategic Problem.* Problems affecting USCENTCOM forces are the ability of U.S. forces to react to missions within the USCENTCOM AOR and the fact that most of the forces apportioned to USCENTCOM are CONUS-based. It will be very difficult to deploy forces required to confront the various threats, and it will be even more difficult to adjust to new threat requirements. All apportioned and/or assigned USCENTCOM forces must, therefore, remain as flexible as possible — ready to adjust to various threats, mobilization, deployment, employment and sustainment conditions, environments, and requirements. Lead times for reaction to orders will be extended as much as possible.
 - b. (U) *General.* At the initiation of hostilities, USCENTCOM will consist of the following subordinate commands, also referred to as Service component commands: USARCENT, USCENAF, USNAVCENT, and USMARCENT. In addition, SOCCENT will serve as a functional component command. These forces will operate under the combatant command (COCOM) authority of CINCCENT. Subunified commands and/or joint task forces (SUCs/JTFs) may be organized on an "as required" basis from existing resources and assigned to conduct joint-combined (if combined forces are available) land, sea, air, and special combat operations on an area basis within specific subordinate theaters of operations. When SUCs/JTFs are organized, Service components will provide component command combat and sustainment forces to these warfighting commanders.
 - c. (U) *Theater Organization.* For planning purposes, should major operations become necessary anywhere in the USCENTCOM AOR, CINCCENT envisions structuring any one or all of the following five major theaters of operations within the USCENTCOM AOR using assigned USCENTCOM forces:
 - (1) (U) Northern Theater of Operations (Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan);
 - (2) (U) Central Theater of Operations (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, to include the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden);
 - (3) (U) Southern Theater of Operations (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya);

(4) (U) Western Theater of Operations (Egypt, Sudan).

(5) (U) Maritime Theater of Operations (Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean areas to the USCENTCOM boundary). The maritime region may be subdivided and portions assigned to other theaters of operation on a mission/OPLAN basis.

3. (U) **ASSUMPTIONS:** Theater planning and actions are based on assumptions derived from an assessment of the strategic environment and operational implications to include global implications which could include “implied” assumptions. The following planning assumptions are not all inclusive and may need modification based upon threats and the situation, etc.:

a. (U) Regional conflicts, with the potential to spill over and directly involve U.S. military forces, are the principal threat to U.S. interests in USCENTCOM’s AOR. The most probable near-term threats to regional stability are the reemergence of a militant Iraq, Iran’s continued export of radical fundamentalism, and insurgencies in the Horn of Africa. Conflict may erupt for one of several reasons:

(1) (U) Insurgencies.

(2) (U) An attempt to gain control of and secure oil field complexes.

(3) (U) Secure port facilities in the area.

(4) (U) Occupy key or critical terrain to control the strategic choke points in the region.

(5) (U) Border conflicts.

(6) (U) Religious rivalries.

(7) (U) Given the improvement in relations between the United States and the Russian republics, USCENTCOM believes the potential for direct conflict with many of these regional republics has been significantly reduced for the near term. In the long term, however, we face the challenge of countering increasing influence as they actively pursue their respective strategic interests in the region. It is unlikely Russian forces will attempt to conduct conventional operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. However, unconventional and covert operations in support of selected organizations and countries may occur in the AOR.

b. (U) U.S. unilateral forces will *not be augmented by coalitions or alliances from outside the USCENTCOM AOR* (e.g., *NATO forces*) unless independent nations elect to assist. Coalitions from within the USCENTCOM AOR will be available to assist USCENTCOM (e.g., GCC); however, command and control arrangements with these forces have not been established.

c. (U) Partial mobilization will be required to conduct sustained conventional land, sea, or air operations within the USCENTCOM AOR. A presidential call-up of 200,000 personnel of the Selected Reserve, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I, and partial sealift mobilization will occur on or about C-day.

d. (U) Host nation support will be made available by nations who have requested U.S. support. Support and basing rights of other countries must be rapidly negotiated.

4. (U) **SUPPORTING COMMANDS and AGENCIES:** USCENTCOM planning requires the support of all Department of Defense (DOD) commands, agencies, and the State Department country teams in the AOR. Specifically:

a. (U) Combatant commands that may become USCENTCOM supporting commands when so directed by NCA through CJCS are:

U.S. Atlantic Command (CINACOM/ACOM)

U.S. European Command (CINCEUR/EUCOM)

U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC/PACOM)
U.S. Space Command (CINCSpace/SPACECOM)
U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC/SOCOM)
U.S. Strategic Command (CINCSTRAT/STRATCOM)
U.S. Transportation Command (CINCTrans/TRANSCOM)

b. (U) U.S. government agencies that may be tasked to support USCENTCOM operations in the AOR are:

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
National Security Agency (NSA)

5. (U) **FORCES APPORTIONED:** The force list in the ISCP contains apportioned, assigned, and augmenting U.S. forces designated for planning to USCENTCOM. They include currently assigned forces that are in theater conducting ongoing continuous missions. The combat and combat support forces for each Service, which are not apportioned in the ISCP, have been identified by the component commanders after consultation with their respective Services.

6. (U) **COALITION FORCES:** For planning purposes, there are a number of allied and friendly forces that may be of assistance to USCENTCOM in promoting coalition warfare:

a. (U) *France.* French forces in Djibouti consist of nearly 5,000 ground, air, and naval forces. Strategic mission is containment of Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb and keeping the strategic chokepoint open.

Ground Forces:	3,800 Personnel 33 Tanks
Air/Air Defense Forces:	850 Personnel 10 Fighter Aircraft
Naval Forces:	200 Personnel 5-8 Ships

(U) Force d'Action Rapide. May be deployed to assist forward deployed French forces in Djibouti. Consists of marine infantry, light armor, airborne/air-mobile/alpine capabilities.

b. (U) *United Kingdom.* Great Britain has no permanent bases in the Middle East or SWA. Periodically, British Royal Navy forces conduct combined training and exercise maneuvers with several Persian Gulf nations. British-Omani agreements incorporate some British military personnel (mostly officers) in the ground forces of Oman. Additionally, there are many British technical assistants in Oman to include some 1,000 expatriate workers. In 1990/91, British participation in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Granby (British name for Desert Storm) demonstrated British resolve to contribute to regional stability when they deployed several thousand British soldiers and airmen to the region.

c. (U) *Gulf Cooperation Council.* Established in 1981, the GCC has moved quickly to establish an effective multinational Arab relationship. The GCC has worked for joint-combined defenses for the deterrence of war in the region. The GCC's Peninsula Shield Force is a combined force of nearly 80,000 ground, air, and naval forces training together on a frequent basis. It has a standing combined land force based at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia. Total GCC forces in the region are:

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

<i>Country</i>	<i>Army Pers/Tanks</i>	<i>Air Forces/ Air Def Pers/Fighters</i>	<i>Navy Pers/ Surf Ships</i>
Bahrain	2,000/34	200/4	560/2m*
Kuwait	11,000/275	6,150/59	1,000/8m
Oman	24,000/39	2,150/51	2,000/4m
Qatar	5,000/24	300/25	700/3m
Saudi Arabia	75,000/540	17,500/54	5,500/13m-3M**
UAE	40,000/113	4,000/28	1,500/6m
Totals	157,000/1025	30,300/375	11,260/36m-3M

*Minor surface combatants

**Major surface combatants

d. (U) Other friendly nations' forces in the USCENTCOM AOR. While other friendly nations are limited in force structure, if deterrence fails several have expressed a willingness to support military operations — most constructive of these are Pakistan and Egypt. The following country personnel figures reflect approximate strengths:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Air Forces/Air Def</i>	<i>Navy</i>
Djibouti	3,700	300	50
Egypt	320,000	109,000	20,000
Kenya	18,345	3,000	650
Pakistan	450,000	25,000	13,000

7. (U) **GUIDANCE:**

a. (U) *Nuclear and Chemical Weapons.* The United States reserves the right to first use of nuclear weapons. There have been known uses of chemicals in the Soviet incursions of other countries in the past and were used by both Iran and Iraq during their war. Thus, USCENTCOM planners will assume that these weapons are available in the region and may be used by these countries, and they will plan defenses accordingly.

b. (U) *Mobility Resources.* All support operations will remain the responsibility of the Service component commands. USCINCCENT will retain directive authority for logistics. Maximum use of common/cross servicing will be made to eliminate duplication. Required stockage levels will be 15 days of supplies (except class III) NLT C+30 and 30 DOS NLT C+60. AWR-2 and POMCUS from Europe are not available for use without JCS/NCA decision. Initial resupply and buildup will be from AWR-3 and AWR-5, and follow-on supplies will arrive from CONUS AWR-1. Initial resupply will be by airlift until SLOC are operational. Medical evacuation policy goal is 30 days. Personnel will deploy by air, unit equipment by sea and air where appropriate. Protection priorities for sustainment are:

- (1) (U) SLOCs/SPODS
- (2) (U) ALOCs/APODS
- (3) (U) bases/facilities
- (4) (U) PWRS (AWR/MPS/APA)

c. (U) *Command and Control.*

(1) (U) Command relationships. CINCCENT exercises combatant command (COCOM) authority over all USCENTCOM assigned forces. No other commander will be granted COCOM of forces in the USCENTCOM AOR. Service component commanders generally exercise command over those subordinate Service component forces deploying to the AOR. Subunified commanders and joint task force commanders, if organized, will exercise only OPCON (and perhaps only TACON) of forces assigned or attached to them for the duration of their missions or for a specified time. (See each OPLAN/CONPLAN for specific command relationships.)

(2) (U) Command Post: HQ, USCENTCOM will deploy to the AOR during a significant crisis. USCENTCOM (FWD) remains always present in AOR on board a U.S. Navy command ship, vicinity BAHRAIN. Alternate USCENTCOM headquarters will remain at MacDill AFB. Depending on the situation, component commands will deploy to the AOR as directed by CINCCENT.

8. (U) **TASKS:**

a. (U) On notification by NCA, planning staff will meet to develop detailed plans and orders. Notification messages will be sent to all subordinate commands to increase troop readiness and prepare for movement. Liaison elements will immediately be exchanged as prearranged. All prearranged intelligence, reconnaissance, and PSYOP actions will commence. Deception operations will be initiated according to separate deception plans. Depending upon the situation, selective early deployment of SOF, specified logistical assets, and C2 staff may commence.

b. (U) The Instructional Strategic Capabilities Plan (ISCP) directs that specific country and strategic location CONPLANS and OPLANS be developed. These plans should be developed based on the task of:

(1) (U) U.S. unilateral support to the following countries in the event of future aggression and for support of U.S. interests therein:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Type of Plan</i>	<i>PID</i>
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait	OPLAN	1648
Egypt (Suez Canal)	OPLAN	1649
Oman	CONPLAN	1650
Qatar/Bahrain	CONPLAN	1652
UAE	CONPLAN	1653
Pakistan	CONPLAN	1655
Somalia	CONPLAN	1657
Kenya	CONPLAN	1658
All countries	USCENTCOM Emergency Evacuation Plan (for U.S. and other designated foreign nationals)	1677

(2) (U) Prepare plans for unilateral action to reopen the following strategic chokepoints in the event of aggression, closure and maintain freedom of navigation:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Type of Plan</i>	<i>PID</i>
Straits of Hormuz	CONPLAN	1651
Straits of Bab el Mandab	CONPLAN	1656

(NOTE: These plans are not yet in usable form.)

c. (U) *Coordinating Instructions.*

(1) (U) CINCCENT will determine theater objectives based upon his theater strategy priorities and the political and military situation at hand. Component commanders and JTF commanders will be afforded maximum authority and support to design and fight the battle within their own respective assigned areas.

(2) (U) Specific employment of joint forces will be designed to:

- Secure air and sea LOC into AOR.
- Establish required lodgement areas for operations and sustainment.
- Deter any threat intervention into the AOR military situation.
- Reestablish lost territorial control by legitimately recognized governments in AOR.
- Protect international maritime shipping and other economic interests.
- Deny hostile control of the Persian Gulf, littoral, oilfields, or other key facilities.
- Deny hostile attainment of air and sea ports facilities in the AOR.
- Protect U.S. and allied citizens, installations and facilities.

(3) (U) Deployment and movement capabilities will be first priority for protection during any crisis. We must be able to deploy into theater in order to secure strategic objectives.

(4) (U) All component commands will mobilize and alert according to their Service systems.

(5) (U) All CENTCOM operations are restricted to CENTCOM AOR and supporting LOCs; supporting commands may conduct supporting operations from outside the CENTCOM AOR.

(6) (U) Service components will prepare supporting plans for all assigned plans.

(7) (U) Planning data for sustainment is located in TAB H.

d. (U) *Strategic Constraints.* Accomplishment of the CENTCOM mission may be impeded if the following factors exist:

(1) (U) Other priority military actions are in progress or imminent in the world. This would reduce the availability of forces, sustainment, or transportation assets needed for the execution of this plan.

(2) (U) Lack or shortage of a host nation or other friendly nation support for basing, overflight, transit, or sustainment.

(3) (U) Delay in the political decision to use military force which would prevent adequate planning and deployment time.

**FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE
Coalition Command (COALCOM)**

(U) This section shows the framework of command and the major forces of the coalition forces which are in the Theater of War for this scenario. Note that not all of the forces listed here are in the Theater of Operations. Forces of the Saudi Arabian military (West Regional Command) are positioned as immediate protection for the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. These forces are earmarked below; they will meet any threat from Yemen directed at the holy cities. Also shown is the 45-day, 90-day, and 135-day status of deployment for the non-U.S. forces of the coalition.

NOTE: Shown below are division and brigade equivalents. A division counts as three brigades.

(by C+90)

COALCOM Forces

GCC (Peninsula Shield Force) Corps

1st Mech Div (SA)
Mech Div (KU)
Mech Div (OM)

I (SA) Corps

2nd Mech Div (SA)
3rd Mech Div (SA)
3rd Armd Div (EG)

Euro Corps

1st Armd Div (UK)
FAR (FR)

(By C+135)

West Regional Command (SA)

4th Mech Div (SA)
Mech Bde (SANG)
Mech Bde (SANG)

COALCOM Support

Med Bn (Sweden)
Truck Bn (Bahrain) x 2
Inf Bn (Poland)
Inf Bn (Denmark)
Mech Bn (Pakistan)
Chem Bn (Germany)
Supply Bn (Greece)
Engr Bn (Italy)

FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE
British, French, and Saudi

1st British Armoured Division {15.45}

7th Armoured Brigade {4.85}

Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (57 Challenger MBTs) {1.0}

Queen's Royal Irish Hussars (57 Challenger MBTs) {1.0}

1st Staffordshire Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}

39th Regiment, Royal Engineers

664th Helicopter Squadron (9 Lynx) {1.0}

10th Air Defense Battery (Javelin)

40th Field Regiment (24 M109 SP howitzers) {1.0}

4th Armoured Brigade {3.40}

14/20 King's Hussars (43 Challenger MBTs) {0.75}

1st Royal Scots Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}

3d Royal Fusiliers Infantry (45 Warrior IFVs) {0.85}

23d Regiment, Royal Engineers

46th Air Defense Battery (Javelin)

2d Field Regiment (24 M109 SP howitzers) {1.0}

Following are Division Troops:

**16/5 Queen's Royal Lancers Recon Battalion (24 Scorpion,
24 Scimitar, 12 Striker) {0.50}**

4th Army Air Regiment (24 Lynx with TOW, 12 Gazelle) {3.0}

32d Heavy Artillery Regiment (16 M109, 12 M110) {1.65}

29th Heavy Artillery Regiment (12 MLRS) {2.0}

12th Air Defense Regiment (24 tracked Rapier)

32d Regiment, Royal Engineers

Following are EPW handling infantry battalions:

1st Coldstream Guards

Royal Highland Fusiliers

King's Own Scottish Borderers

French Force Action Rapide (FAR) {16.25}

- **Daquet Division (French 6th Light Armored Division, Reinforced)**
 - 1st Foreign Legion Armored Regiment (35 AMX-10RC) {1.0}**
 - 1st Regiment de Spahis (35 AMX-10RC) {1.0}**
 - 2d Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}**
 - NOTE: VAB = Vehicule De L'Avant Blinde APC**
 - 21st Marine Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}**
 - 68th Marine Artillery Regiment (155T/Mistral SAM) {2.0}**
 - 6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment**

Reinforced by the following units:

From the 4th Airmobile Division:

- **5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (10 20mm gunships/30 AT helicopters with HOT ATGM) {3.0}**
- **1st Transport Helicopter Regiment**
- **1st Infantry Regiment (airmobile) {1.0}**

From the 9th Marine Division:

- **2d Marine Infantry Regiment (VAB APCs) {0.50}**
- **Detachment, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment (269 men) {0.25}**
- **11th Marine Artillery Regiment (155T) {1.75}**

From the 10th Armored Division:

- **4th Dragoon Regiment (40 AMX-30B2 MBTs) {1.25}**
- **17th Reconnaissance Squadron (40 AT helicopters) {3.5}**

Source for British and French units: Caffrey, Matt and Chadwick, Frank; *Gulf War Factbook*, published by GDW, Bloomington, Illinois, copyright 1991

(U) The TTUSA must coordinate with two Saudi corps during the defensive phase of the scenario and with one Saudi corps during the offensive phase. For purposes of understanding and to help offset the problems of coordination, the structure of a proposed Saudi armored and mechanized division are given here to help the user understand what type of unit is on his/her flank:

1st Saudi Arabian Armored Division {22.29}

- **Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) 10th Mechanized Brigade {6.68}**
- **2 Tank Battalions (1 w/58 M1, 1 w/58 M60A3) {1.68+2.25=3.93}**
- **1 Mech Inf Bn (w/M113) {1.25}**
- **1 FA Bn (w/155 SP howitzers) {1.5}**
- **Combat Service Support Units as required**
- **RSLF 8th Mechanized Brigade {6.68} – organized same as 10th Bde**
- **RSLF 20th Mechanized Brigade {6.68} – organized same as 10th Bde**
- **RSLF 14th Field Artillery Battalion (155 SP) GS to division {1.5}**
- **RSLF 2d Antitank Company (M113/TOW) DS to division {0.75}**
- **Combat Support units as required GS to division**
- **Combat Service Support units as required GS to division**

Saudi Arabian Mechanized Infantry Division {17.75}

- **RSLF 4th Armored Brigade**
- **3 Tank Battalions (French AMX-30 MBT) {3.0}**
- **RSLF 9th Mechanized Brigade {5.25}**
- **3 Mech Inf Bn (w/M113) {3.75}**
- **1 FA Bn (w/155 SP howitzers) {1.5}**
- **Combat Service Support Units as required**
- **RSLF 21st Mechanized Brigade {5.25} – same as 9th Bde**
- **RSLF 15th MLRS Battalion – GS to division {2.5}**
- **RSLF 4th Airborne Battalion – OPCON in offense {1.0}**
- **RSLF 3d Antitank Company (M113/TOW) DS to division {0.75}**
- **Combat Support Units as required**
- **Combat Service Support units as required**

(U) NOTE: Both of these two Saudi units are fictional for use in this scenario. Saudi Arabia does not currently have divisional headquarters, but uses corps and brigade.

COALITION AIRCRAFT BEDDOWN FOR C/M/S 500

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

<i>Location</i>	<i>Origin</i>	<i>No/Type</i>	<i>Sort/Rate</i>	<i>Mission</i>
Shaikh Isa	Bahrain 1	5 F-5E	36 sorties	(CAP)
Shaikh Isa	Canada	30 CF-18	60 sorties	(AI, CAS)
Al Karj	France	12 Mirage 2000	36 sorties	(AI, CAS)
King Fahd	Italy	8 Tornado	16 sorties	(AI, CAS)
Riyadh	Kuwait	15 Mirage F-1	30 sorties	(AI, CAS)
Al Minhad	Oman	36 Jaguar, Hawker Hunter	36 sorties	(AI, CAS)
Doha	Qatar	8 Mirage F-1C	16 sorties	(AI, CAS)
King Fahd	Saudi Arabia	48 Tornado IDS	96 sorties	(AI, CAS)
Tabuk		53 F-5E/F	106 sorties	(CAP)
KKMC		69 F-15C	210 sorties	(CAP)
Tabuk		10 RF-5E	20 sorties	(Recce)
Dharan		36 BAE-167	72 sorties	(Strike)
Al Dafra	UAE	57 Mirage 2000/5AD	114 sorties	(AI)
Jiddah	UK	42 Tornado GR Mk 1	84 sorties	(AI)

**SWA ORDER OF BATTLE
Preliminary Guidance**

(U) This tab provides the user with preliminary information on the IIC order of battle. With this information, the user will be able to determine the relative combat power of each of the Iranian and Iraqi units. Additionally, the type of equipment found in each “type” unit is listed.

(U) **Comparison Values/Relative Combat Power.** This section provides the user with a baseline for beginning his/her analysis of combat power. This model is based on the figures provided in ST 100-9, 1990 edition. *These values are notional and for instructional purposes only.* (Additional comparison values/relative combat power figures are available in CGSC Student Text 100-3.) Real values would be classified or based on an actual situation. During the course of this scenario, the user should reevaluate these figures based on the situation presented. For example, in the counter-offensive phase of the scenario, the user should consider the effect of the air campaign in attrition of the enemy and reduce his combat power. The user can do this by using these values as his starting point for comparison. All values are based on the use of Soviet-style equipment or its equivalent. These equipment types are noted throughout the Enemy Order of Battle to give the user a constant frame of reference in doing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

(U) **U.S. versus IIC Combat Unit Comparison Values:**

United States (J-series MTOE)		MANEUVER		Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC) (Soviet Equipment or its Equivalent)	
Light Inf Bn	= 0.75				
AASLT Inf Bn	= 1.25				
M113 Mech Bn	= 1.5			Mech Bn (BTR 50)	= 1.0
M2 Mech Bn	= 2.0			Mech Bn (BMP 2)	= 1.5
M60A3 Armor Bn	= 2.25			Tank Bn (T-72)	= 1.55
M1 Armor Bn	= 3.0			Tank Bn (T-62)	= 1.2
M1A1 Armor Bn	= 3.15			Tank Bn (T-55)	= 0.65
M1A2 Armor Bn	= 3.25			Commando Bde	= 1.0
ACR Squadron	= 2.75			Recon Bn	= 1.0
Div Cav Sqdn	= 1.5			AT BN (T-12)	= 1.0
Div Cav Sqdn w/ Attack Hel	= 2.0			Infantry Bn	= 0.75
Atk Hel Bn (AH-64)	= 4.0			Type III Inf Bn	= 0.50
Atk Hel Bn (AH-1)	= 3.0			GV Recon Bn	= 1.6
				Helo Sqdn (Hind)	= 3.0

ARTILLERY	
United States (J-series MTOE)	Iran-Iraq Coalition (IIC) (Soviet Equipment or its Equivalent)
FA Bn (105 towed) = 0.75	FA Bn (M46) = 0.7
FA Bn (155 SP) = 2.0	FA Bn (FROG) = 1.05
FA Bn (155 towed) = 2.0	FA Bn (2S3) = 1.1 <i>Use same</i>
FA Bn (203 SP) = 2.0	FA Bn (2S5) = 1.2 <i>number</i>
MLRS Battery = 2.0	FA Bn (SCUD) = 1.3 <i>for towed</i>
ATACMS Battery = 2.0	FA Bn (2S7) = 1.4 <i>version.</i>
	FA Bn (BM 21) = 2.2
	FA Bn (BM 22) = 2.9
 DEFENSIVE PREPARATION: <i>Both forces; 12-24 hours multiply by 1.3; 24-48 hours by 1.5 and over 48 hours by 2.0 .</i>	

(U) Using the values from the table, the user can now calculate the relative combat power of the IIC forces he faces and his own U.S. forces for any analysis leading to a specific course of action. A sample of the calculations is shown here to demonstrate how to use the values.

(U) Governor's Vanguard Corps:

11th GV Tank Div:

10 bns x 1.55 per Tank Bn (T-72)	=	15.50
6 bns x 1.5 per Mech Bn (BMP-2)	=	9.00
1 bn x 1.6 per Recon Bn	=	1.60
4 bns x 1.1 per FA Bn (2S3)	=	4.40
1 bn x 1.2 per FA Bn (2S5)	=	1.20
3 bns x 1.0 per Commando Bn	=	3.00
TOTAL	=	34.70

(U) IIC Artillery (GHQ for Iran and GHQ for Iraq):

6 bns x 0.70 per FA Bn (M46)	=	4.20
3 bns x 1.20 per FA Bn (2S5)	=	3.60
3 bns x 1.40 per FA Bn (2S7)	=	4.20
4 bns x 2.20 per FA Bn (BM21)	=	8.80
3 bns x 2.90 per FA Bn (BM22)	=	8.70

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

(U) For this teaching scenario, there are three categories of units. Type I units are the most elite, have the best equipment, and are trained to the highest standard within the coalition. The Type I units for this scenario are the divisions and brigades within the Governor's Vanguard of Iraq. This corps of Type I units represents a future version of the Republican Guard seen during the Gulf War of 1990/91. The Type II units for this notional enemy force are all the units of II and III Corps (Iraq) and those of IV and V Corps (Iran). Type II units are also found in all the strategic reserves of Iran and Iraq (VII, VIII, and IX Corps). The Type II units represent the standing regular armies of both countries and also any Pasdaran of Iran, which could be held in a standing army status with better training and equipping than seen during the 1980-1989 Iran/Iraq War. The Type III units are the least-trained, poorest-equipped units of the two countries and represent the popular army/rapid conscripting efforts of both countries. For this scenario, Type III units are found in Iran's VI Corps. Finally, a rough rule of thumb for the scenario is that Type I units have the T-72 with improved munition round ("Shredder"), Type II units have the T-62 or its equivalent Chinese/North Korean make, and Type III units have the T-55 or its equivalent non-Soviet make.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAQ

1. (U) **MISSION** (Omitted).
2. (U) **ENEMY SITUATION.**
 - a. (U) *Characteristics of Area of Operations.*
 - (1) (U) **Military Geography.**
 - (a) (U) Topography.

- 1 (U) Existing Situation.

a (U) General. The Republic of Iraq dominates the Fertile Crescent region of Southwest Asia. Bounded by Syria and Jordan on its west; Turkey on the north; Iran on the east; and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf on the south, Iraq is strategically located to dominate regional affairs. About the size of California, Iraq stretches approximately 167,924 square miles. From 10,000-foot mountains along its border with Iran and Turkey to reedy marshes in the Southeast, Iraq is a land of contrast. Desert plains occupy most of Iraq with the exception of the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, which are the most fertile in the Southwest Asia. Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf is limited to the Shatt al-Arab region. An area of historical dispute between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab waterway provides Iraq with a narrow corridor to the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly one of Iraq's objectives in its failed attempt to retain Kuwait was to improve its access to the Persian Gulf.

b(U) Terrain. Iraq can be divided into four major geographical zones or regions: the desert in the west and southwest; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers; the mountains in north and northeast region; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers flow.

(1) (U) The desert region west and southwest of the Euphrates River is part of the Syrian Desert. Covering sections of Syria and Jordan, this desert is sparsely inhabited and consist of vast stony plains intersected with sandy sub-regions.

(2) (U) The upland region of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers is part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria and Turkey. Water flows in deeply cut wadis (valleys) hampering irrigation efforts. This region is predominately desert.

(3) (U) The mountainous region begins southwest of Mosul and Kirkuk, extending to Turkey and Iran. Mountains range from 1,000 to 4,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. With the exception of a few valleys, this region is suitable only for grazing. At lower elevations in the steppes and foothills, adequate rainfall make cultivation possible.

(4) (U) The alluvial plain region begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Described as a delta plain interlaced with irrigation canals and intermittent lakes, for years this region was subject to flooding by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. From the late 60s to the mid-70s, government efforts were increasingly devoted to flood control. In southern Iraq, an area (15,600 square kilometers) from Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is predominantly marshland.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The mountainous and upland regions provide the most natural defense. Avenues of approach are limited in these regions, and the Iraqis should be able to defend it with a small force. The delta plain and southern marshlands limit avenues of approach to major road networks. Less defensible than the mountainous region, the Iraqis should be able to contain an attack in this region. The Syrian Desert is the least defensible, and the Iraqis are vulnerable to mobile operations in this region.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. The vast Syrian Desert region is ideal for mobile operations. Unimproved roads and numerous dirt tracks provide both east/west and north/south movement. However, cover and concealment is limited, and water is scarce. The upland region limits mobile operations to improved/unimproved roads and dirt tracks. Some cover and concealment is provided by the numerous wadis in the region. Mobile operations are severely restricted in the mountainous region. Vehicles are limited to the few road networks; during rainy season, the area may be impassable. In the delta region, vehicle movement is restricted to the present road network. Marsh land in southern Iraq would impede light operations.

(b) (U) Hydrography.

1 (U) Existing Situation. Iraq's coastline is severely limited and not suited for large-scale amphibious operations. Linking the port city of Basra with the Persian Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab is Iraq's only channel for ocean going vessels. Amphibious operations in the Shatt al-Arab area would be limited.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. With a limited coastline, the threat of a major amphibious operation in this region is limited. Iraq should be able to defend this area with a small force. Lacking multiple outlets to the Persian Gulf, Iraq's naval operations are limited to port security and coastal patrol.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. It would be difficult to launch large-scale amphibious operations against Iraq without violating the territory of neighboring countries. Amphibious actions would be limited to small boat operations.

(c) (U) Climate and Weather.

1 (U) Existing Situation. The average temperatures in Iraq range from higher than 48 degrees C (120 Fahrenheit) in July and August to below freezing in January. A majority of the rainfall occurs from December through April and averages between 10 and 18 centimeters (4-7 in.) annually. Rainfall is more abundant in the mountainous region and may reach 100 centimeters a year in some places. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena. The southern and southeasterly sharqi, a dry and dusty wind with occasional gusts to 80 kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. The shamal, a steady wind from the north and northwest, prevails from mid-June to mid-September. Dust storms accompany these winds and may rise to heights of several thousand meters, closing airports for brief periods of time.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity, coupled with the scarcity of water, will effect both men and equipment. During dry season, clouds of dust caused by vehicle movement will increase detection capabilities in desert regions. Flash flooding in wadis and across roads will hinder traffic ability and resupply efforts during the rainy season. Clear, cloudless skies make air superiority a prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iraq. Air operations may be reduced during the windy season.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same effect on friendly courses of action as on the threat.

(2) (U) **Transportation.**

(a) (U) Existing Situation.

1 (U) Road nets. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq's road system stretched over 20,000 kilometers with approximately 60 percent of the roads paved. These roads included four-lane highways linking Baghdad with Basra and Mosul and smaller highways providing access to Iraq's different regions. Damage sustained during the war has been repaired; with the exception of key bridges along the southern route of the Baghdad/Basra highway, traffic in this area has been reduced by 25 percent.

2 (U) Railroads. Iraq has a well developed rail system available for military transport and supply. The rail system consist of over 2,000 kilometers of railroads linking the major cities with the capital of Baghdad. The railroad system suffered minimal damage during the war and is operating at 80 percent capability. It is estimated that Iraqi trains can average about 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It is not know many armored vehicles can be carried on each Iraqi flat car; however, a fair estimate would be one or two APC's or one main battle tank per car.

3 (U) Ports. Iraq's port city of Basra is the country's major port and handles the bulk of dry cargo. Located at the northern end of the Shatt al-Arab, Basra was vulnerable to Iranian attacks during the Iran-Iraq war, and much of its cargo was diverted to the port of Aqaba in Jordan. The smaller ports of Umm Qasr and Az Zubay handle far less cargo but grew in importance during the war between Iran and Iraq. Extensive damage sustained during the recent Gulf war has significantly reduced the port's capability. It is believed to be operating at less than 50 percent of its maximum thru-put capability of 50,000 short-tons per day.

4 (U) Airfields. Iraq has 94 usable airfields: 56 with permanent surface runways, 6 with runways over 3,659 meters; 50 with runways over 2,438 meters; and 12 with runways 1,220 meters. Most of these airfields were damaged during the Gulf war; however, they have been repaired and are functioning at full capacity (for location of major airfields see enclosure 1).

5 (U) Pipelines. Iraq has four existing oil export pipelines: northward via Turkey, south via offshore terminals in the gulf (Al Faw area), south via Saudi Arabia, and west via Syria. Regional politics continue to govern the use of these pipelines. For example, during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria denied the shipment of Iraqi oil through its pipeline and onward to the Mediterranean terminals. And more recently during the Gulf war, all pipelines with the exception of Al Faw were shut down by the host countries. Today it is believed oil shipments have resumed through the Al Faw terminal and northern pipeline through Turkey.

6 (U) Rivers. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers dominate Iraq's river system, and their waters are essential to the life of the country. Small boats are able to negotiate major portions of these rivers; however, a navigable inland waterway does not exist throughout the river valley and delta plain.

(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Present transportation net will limit Iraq's ability to quickly reinforce the different regions of the country. Lack of roads in the mountainous region will require the military to rely on their limited airlift capability to move supplies and personnel in that area. In the south, marshlands will force the Iraqis to utilize major roads for vehicular traffic. Lacking adequate access to the Persian Gulf, naval operations will be limited. The multitude of airfields in the country will enable the Air Force to operate from diverse locations.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Regional transportation nets will have the same effect on friendly courses of action. The use of heavy tactical airlift for movement of supplies and troops will reduce these limitations.

(3) (U) **Telecommunications.**

(a) (U) Existing Situation. Severely damaged during the Gulf war, Iraq's telecommunications system is limited. The system consists of coaxial cables, radio-relay links, and radio communication stations, the bulk of which services Baghdad and the major cities. Of the 9 AM stations and 81 television stations, 60 percent are functioning.

(b) (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Iraq's limited telecommunications will have a detrimental effect on command and control as well as logistics. Action against communications facilities could seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Limitations in the present telecommunications system will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy's command and control capability.

(4) (U) **Politics.**

(a) (U) Existing Situation.

1 (U) Government Systems. Iraq is an authoritarian one-party state headed by the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party. The president serves as head of state and government and as Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the top decision-making body in Iraq. In accordance with the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, executive and legislative powers are exercised by the president and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) respectively. Legislative functions are split between the RCC and a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The 250 members of the Assembly are elected to four-year terms according to proportionate representation. In practice, real power rest with the president and the RCC, with the Assembly serving as a rubber stamp to RCC decisions.

2 (U) Political Dynamics. Since his ascendancy to the presidency in 1979, Saddam Hussein has established himself as the country's strong leader. Exercising a heavy hand approach, Saddam Hussein effectively removed his opposition and maintained control through loyal security forces. Today significant unrest continues with the Kurdish population in the north and pockets of Shiite resistance in the south.

3 (U) Foreign Relations. The Gulf war has not significantly changed Iraq's orientation in foreign affairs. Iraq continues with its nonaligned but necessary relationship with FSU countries. Although disappointed with the lack of Russian support during the war, cooperation continues on a number of economic and military issues. On the regional front, Iraq continues to maintain a hard-line position with regard to a Middle East peace settlement, winning the support of many of the Palestinians throughout the region. Relations with its neighbors have not improved since the Gulf war, and diplomatic relations with the U.S. remain broken.

(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. While the Gulf war and subsequent civil turmoil has weakened the central government, the president and the RCC remains firmly in control of the government and the armed forces. Military operations vis-a-vis foreign forces in areas of civil unrest will require additional troops to govern the population. Commanders will continued to be hampered by the rigid command and control exercised by the RCC.

(c) (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iraq's internal situation by aiding partisan forces. The lack of decentralization in Iraqi command and control will enable friendly forces to maintain the initiative in military operations.

(5) (U) **Economics.**

(a) (U) Existing Situation. Oil exports fuel the Iraqi economy. With an annual gross national product (GNP) of \$40 billion, approximately 40 percent is provided by the petroleum sector. Believed to hold oil reserves of approximately 75 billion barrels, Iraqi oil exports will continue to dominate the country's economy. Much of Iraq's oil wealth was used to purchase armament and build the military. This, combined with the financing of two wars and the requirement to pay war reparations, has severely weakened the Iraqi economy. The future of Iraq's economy lies with its ability to meet pre-war petroleum export levels, while undergoing an economic austerity program.

(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Dependence on foreign trade and petroleum exports to generate foreign currency makes Iraq susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply.

(c) (U) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. Iraq's heavy reliance on the petroleum sector to sustain its economy makes the oil fields, pipelines, and its off-shore terminal facility at Al Faw lucrative strategic targets. Seizure or destruction of these facilities would hasten the destruction of Iraq's economy.

(6) (U) **Sociology.**

(a) (U) Existing Situation. Estimated at 16 million in 1986, Iraq's population is divided among the two largest ethnic groups (Arabs & Kurds) and several smaller ethnic communities. These groups include Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs and Armenians. Approximately 95 percent of Iraqis are Muslims, and Islam is officially recognized as the state religion. Of these Muslims, 55 percent are Shiites with a majority residing in southern Iraq. Living in the northern mountainous region of Iraq, Kurds make-up approximately 20 percent of the country's population. A fiercely independent people, historically the Kurds have resisted central government rule. A major Kurdish rebellion ended in 1975 following the Algiers agreement between Iraq and Iran. However, recent fighting erupted during the Gulf war, and isolated pockets of resistance continue today. Less troublesome than the Kurds, the Shiites remain a potential problem in southern Iraq.

(b) (U) Effects on Enemy Capabilities. Mistrust of the Kurds and Shiites will make Iraqi military operations in these regions difficult. Additional armed forces will be necessary to govern these areas while conducting military operations against a foreign power.

(c) (U) Effects on Friendly Courses of Action. Friendly forces should be able to exploit these divisions within Iraq. Support to Kurdish and Shiite partisan groups could serve as a force multiplier when conducting military operations against Iraq.

(7) (U) **Science and Technology** (omitted).

3. (U) **ENEMY CAPABILITIES.**

a. (U) *Ground Capabilities.*

(1) (U) **Organization.** Significantly reduced during the Gulf War, the Iraqi Army has reconstituted its divisions and is operating with an estimated active force of 400,000 men and 500,000 reservists. The Iraqis have seven corps headquarters functioning as the operational headquarters for the Army. During war, these headquarters communicate directly with the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Army's highest echelon of command. The corps frequently have operational control of three to five divisions. These divisions could be a mix of up to three infantry divisions, one to two armored, and one to two mechanized infantry divisions. Other units organic to the corps include brigade-size or larger artillery and air defense artillery units, a reconnaissance battalion, one or two commando brigades, and other support units. The burden of support operations and the command and control of additional elements often force corps to send out a forward command post.

b. (U) *Air Capabilities.* The priority of Iraq's rearmament has gone to improve its severely damaged air capability. It's believed the Iraqis now have 500 plus combat aircraft in their inventory. Mostly of Soviet origin, these aircraft have been updated with the latest avionics and include Su-17/20/22 FITTERS, Su-25/ FROGFOOTS, MiG-25/FOXBATs, and MiG-29/FULCRUMs. The air force also holds a small inventory of French Mirage F-1s. In addition to combat aircraft, the Iraqis have a substantial inventory of attack and transport helicopters.

c. (U) *Naval Capabilities.* Iraq's naval capability is limited. It consists of several light cruisers and patrol boats used primarily for coastal security and maritime assistance.

d. (U) *Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities.* Despite United Nations efforts to verify the existence of and dismantlement of facilities to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, there is still evidence that Iraq does possess a very limited nuclear weapon capability, and unverified chemical and biological stores. Although the bulk of Iraq's biological and chemical capability was reduced during the Gulf war, Iraq does maintain the capability to employ chemical weapons.

4. (U) **ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.**

a. (U) *Worst Case.* The Iraqis have the military capability to launch an attack through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia. With United Nation military observers in the demilitarized zone, the Iraqis would precede this attack with an extensive political and military deception campaign. The Iraqis would be able to employ and sustain up to 24 divisions in this attack. The Iraqis have improved their helicopter airlift capability and would employ helicopters early in the attack to secure critical Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian command and control and key petroleum facilities.

b. (U) *Probable Course of Action.* Constrained by United Nations embargoes on the purchase of military equipment, the Iraqis have nonetheless been able to obtain military equipment through international arms dealers. Continuing with the incremental rearmament of their armed forces is Iraq's most probable course of action. While the Iraqi military is presently capable of conducting offensive operations, it is unlikely the Iraqis would initiate hostilities unless threatened by a foreign power. To date, significant improvements have been made with Iraq's air force, air defense, and command and control capabilities.

5. (U) **CONCLUSION.** (Purposely omitted; students analysis provides this information.)

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAN

1. (U) **MISSION.** USCENTCOM, within the CENTCOM AOR, will deny hostile countries the ability to threaten with military force or to use military force to impose their will on the United States, its allies, and friends; will ensure freedom of sea, air, and space regions as defined by international law, treaty, or agreement; will support U.S. initiatives in the application of national, diplomatic, economic, and informational power; will protect U.S. nationals and others as directed; and will assist selected governments in promoting regional stability and in defeating aggression, subversion, and insurgency.

2. (U) **ENEMY SITUATION.**

a. (U) *Characteristics of the Area of Operations.*

(1) (U) **Military Geography.**

(a) (U) *Topography.*

1 (U) Existing Situation.

a (U) General. Iran is strategically important as a part of the land bridge between Asia and Europe, and it has been so since the beginning of time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is bounded in the north by the CIS Republics and the Caspian Sea, in the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and in the west by Iraq and Turkey.

(U) Iran is almost entirely ringed by mountains, with a central interior plateau at about 1,000 meters above sea level. Mountainous rimland covers nearly half of Iran's territory. The longest and largest mountain range, the Zagros Mountains, extends from the northwest to the southeast, paralleling the Persian Gulf and getting ever wider as it reaches Pakistan. Near Pakistan, the Zagros, with a series of rugged ridgelines, become even more imposing and connect with the Elburz, which runs east to west from Afghanistan. The Elburz is a thin chain of rugged mountains that combine with the Zagros and form an extremely formidable barrier to a CIS Republic invasion from the north. The eastern highlands consist of a series of isolated mountain ranges separated by lowlands that, to a large extent, are impassable or feed into sand, gravel deserts, or swampy areas of the Central Plateau. The Kavir, a salt swamp that is next to impossible to cross, covers part of the Central Plateau. A mechanized force would be roadbound in most of Iran, especially in the Zagros.

(U) Geographically, a scarcity of water, inaccessibility to water, and inhospitable terrain characterize Iran. Except for the northern area, poor soil and a lack of precipitation preclude any significant degree of cultivation. Large sections of Iran's terrain are so hostile they are virtually uninhabited.

b (U) Terrain.

(1) (U) The Central Plateau. Iran is located on a high triangular plateau that is actually a part of a larger plateau that includes parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Approximately half of Iran is in the sparsely settled Central Plateau, an almost totally desert area that is some of the driest and most barren in the world. Muddy black salt marshes dot the area and present dangers to travelers. Settlement is confined to oases and the flanks of small mountain chains. The region has no outward drainage, occupies a series of closed basins with elevations of 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and is almost completely surrounded by mountains. The basins have central drainage areas that remain dry for months or years. The lowest parts

of the Central Plateau may have holes a few inches deep that dry up and leave salt crests known as kavirs. As evaporation occurs, the thick plates of crystallized salt increase in size, press against each other, break up, and give the appearance of glaciers. Slimy black mud marshes lie underneath the salt crust. The marshes, called dashts, are dangerous to cross and are generally unexplored. The extensive Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-Lut Deserts are located in the Central Plateau.

(2) (U) The Zagros. The Zagros begin where Iran borders Turkey, the CIS Republics and Iraq, and they extend south and east into Pakistan. In the northwest, the Zagros start as an alternation of high tablelands and lowland basins with a number of lakes. They become even more imposing as they move toward the southeast and change to a series of parallel razorback ridges. Some of the peaks are more than 12,000 feet high.

(3) (U) The Elburz. Joining the Zagros Mountains in the northwest and extending east along the southern edge of the Caspian Sea is the narrower but equally high Elburz Range. Although few mountains in this range exceed 10,000 feet, Mount Damavand at 16,000 feet is the highest in Iran. The Elburz Range is a formidable barrier to north-south movement because of its sheer drop-off into the Caspian Sea.

(4) (U) The Eastern Ranges. The broken and irregular ranges of mountains in the east extend from the CIS Republics on the north to Pakistan in the south. They are barren, but their interspersing valleys are fertile. In the north the mountains are 7,000 to 9,000 feet high and are generally arable above 4,000 feet.

(5) (U) The Coastline. Iran's coastline is generally smooth and shallow. Two lagoons that require constant dredging make possible the well-sheltered ports of Bandar-e Khomeyni on the northwestern end of the Persian Gulf and Bandar-e Anzali on the Caspian Sea.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. The northwest and the north afford the best natural defense features (the Zagros and Elburz mountains) because rugged terrain would limit threat avenues of approach. The terrain of the oilfields favors the attacker. Avenues of approach out of Afghanistan in the east generally favor an attacker, but Iran's rugged terrain would even greatly hinder those approaches. Should the attacker cross the terrain of the oilfields and seize the Port of Bandar Abbas, he could dominate the vital Strait of Hormuz.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Both the Zagros and Elburz mountains are formidable barriers to vehicular traffic, especially north-south traffic. East-west movement is somewhat better because the eastern ranges funnel out into two major deserts of the Central Plateau. Operations throughout Iran would be adversely affected.

(b) (U) *Hydrography.*

1 (U) Existing Situation.

a (U) Iran's southern coast extends eastward a distance of approximately 550 kilometers from Bandar Abbas to the Pakistan border. The shoreline is generally straight with a few natural harbors. The offshore approaches are clear and do not pose major obstacles to navigation.

b (U) To the west, a shallow wave-cut platform of silt, sand, and mud lines the coast and extends 100 to 600 meters seaward. Associated with the shallow platform are numerous bars, shoals, and reefs. Bandar Abbas reaches a maximum depth of 6 fathoms over a limited area adjacent to the seaward entrance. The gradient to the high-water mark is slight and uniform throughout. The silty bottom is unstable and subject to shifting caused by random currents. One natural channel leads to the port area.

Four major islands guard the approach to Bandar Abbas. They are Qeshm, Hengam, Larak, and Hormoz. Two beaches suitable for amphibious landings are west of Bandar Abbas.

c (U) Although many ports in the Persian Gulf are north of Bandar Abbas, the small maneuver area and the silting effect on the Iranian side of the Gulf do not lend themselves to amphibious assaults. However, other amphibious operations can be conducted.

d (U) Currents along the near shore are of minor significance. From April to October the monsoon drift from the southwest Arabian Sea results in an east-west longshore current of approximately 1 nautical mile per minute. Storms associated with the monsoon weather conditions are most prevalent along the coast during July. The resultant high seas and heavy surf conditions are of particular significance. Except for the few embayments, the entire coastline is exposed. The effects of the high seas in the embayments are considerably abated; however, large clouds of dust and sand that accompany high winds may reduce visibility.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Long stretches of usable beach make Iran susceptible to amphibious and deception operations. The Iranian military would be hard pressed to defend their entire coastline.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. The presence of usable beaches broadens the possible courses of action for friendly forces amphibious operations. The beaches can be used to supplement port facilities in the event hostile forces occupy the coastal areas.

(c) (U) *Climate and Weather.*

1 (U) Existing Situation.

a (U) The south is one of Iran's hottest and driest regions. Mean daily temperatures are highest in the interior basins where they reach more than 110°F on most summer days (May through September). Coastal temperatures, moderated by proximity to the sea, usually peak in the mid-80s and are uncomfortable because of the high relative humidity. Major temperature aberrations occur in the mountains in the east and in the Sistan Basin where winter temperatures are cold and normally drop below freezing on many days in December and January.

b (U) Conditions in the Bandar Abbas area are basically semidesert with persistently high temperatures and high relative humidity. Precipitation, vegetation, and surface water sources are nearly nonexistent. Limited quantities of poor-quality ground water are generally available from moderate depths beneath the coastal plain, but the area's major sources of water are several deep wells and limited desalinization facilities. The outstanding aspect of surface temperature common to most of Iran is the large seasonal variation. In the Chah Bahar area, however, seasonal variations are somewhat stable. Mean daily minimum temperatures during winter months average in the middle 50°F and the low 60s; maximum daily temperatures are in the 70s. During the summer months, average afternoon temperatures are in the 90s because of cloudiness associated with the moist onshore monsoonal flow. Summer nights are very warm. Mean daily minimums at low elevations range in the high 70s and 80s.

c (U) The southern coast of Iran receives less than 5 inches of precipitation during an average year. In addition to the normal summer and autumn aridity, long periods of drought may result when winter and spring precipitation is deficient. To further complicate matters, a large portion of a month's precipitation may fall in one day. This is particularly true during summer when rainfall is very infrequent and is usually limited to relatively brief showers.

d (U) Along the Gulf of Oman, onshore monsoonal winds prevail throughout the day during the summer months, and the sea breeze strengthens this flow in the afternoon. During most of the remainder of the year when the onshore monsoonal flow is absent, surface winds along this coast display the regular land-sea variations.

e (U) In contrast to the rest of Iran, the region bordered by the Gulf of Oman experiences maximum cloudiness during the summer months. This phenomenon, caused by monsoonal intrusions into the area, results in about 20 percent cloud cover during May and June. Likewise, the region experiences increased cloudiness between sunset and dawn. Along the eastern extent of the Gulf, ceilings less than 5,000 feet are not uncommon during the night and early morning hours of the summer months. Occasionally the ceilings drop to 2,000 feet.

2 (U) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Extremes of temperatures and humidity coupled with the scarcity of water will have an adverse effect on men and equipment.

3 (U) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Climate and weather will have the same effect on friendly courses of actions as on the threat. Clear, cloudless skies make air superiority a prerequisite to successful offensive operations throughout Iran. During the wet season, flash flooding in wadis and across roads will hinder traffic ability and resupply.

(2) (U) **Transportation.**

(a) (U) *Existing Situation.*

1 (U) Roadnets. Iran's mountains and deserts make direct travel impractical, difficult, and hazardous. Road maintenance has historically been very difficult and expensive and has resulted in a system that is constantly in need of repair. Vast central and southeastern plateaus, which make up most of Iran, contain arid desert sand and clay soils that are constantly windblown and support little or no life. Wheeled vehicles negotiating those areas are confined to roadways. Cross-country movement in tracked vehicles ranges from fair to extremely difficult and even impossible in certain areas. The road network links the major population centers and economic areas. Main arteries form a T-pattern, with the crossbar extending from the northwest corner of Iran to the northeast along the southern edge of the Caspian Sea. The vertical runs through Tehran down to the Persian Gulf and finally to Kerman. Other roads link the T-pattern with most of the country along the Persian Gulf plain, including the ports of Khorramshahr, Bandar-e Khomeyni Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas.

2 (U) Railroads. The railroad system suffers from the same need of repair as the road network. The railroad connects Khorramshahr and Bandar-e Khomeyni to Qom.

3 (U) Ports. Iran has a number of highly sophisticated seaports developed essentially for petroleum exports. In the area of operations, the ports are Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.

a (U) *Bandar Abbas.*

(1) (U) Location: 27°8'N; 50°12'E; approximately 10 kilometers west of city.

(2) (U) Accessibility: The approach channel is 9.5 meters deep. Harbor approaches are exposed to gales. Worst weather occurs June and July. Tides can be as high as 3.05 meters.

(3) (U) Capacity: Six berths provide 1,050 meters for general cargo. Depth of the berths does not exceed 10.5 meters. Also available are:

— An ore-loading berth and an oil berth.

- Equipment for loading and offloading: one 60-ton floating crane and three mobile cranes of 25-ton capacity, 18-ton capacity, and 7-ton capacity.
- Two utility boats, four forklifts of 2-ton and 3-ton lifting capacity, two tractors with 30-ton and 10-ton trailers, and 200 wooden pallets.

(4) In the harbor are two 550-horsepower tugs for towage. The daily loading and offloading rate is approximately 15,000 tons (based on an 18-hour day). The ore-loading plant has a loading capability of 300 tons per hour. The grain-loading elevator has a capability of 3,000 tons per day. Under construction are a ship-building port and a ship-repairing port. The facilities include two permanent drydocks for ships of 500,000 deadweight tonnage, one floating dry dock for ships of 40,000 deadweight tonnage, and one ship lift for handling vessels up to 20,000 tons. The partially completed new port has four wharves 720 meters in length for special cargoes and an open area of 60,000 square meters for storage.

(5) (U) Clearance: Two roads that feed into a single major highway of the Bandar Abbas road network lead out of the Bandar Abbas port area. Some local trucking is available.

(6) (U) Storage: Four warehouses have a capacity of 40,000 cubic feet of cargo storage. Cold storage is limited to 25,000 tons, and petroleum storage is only 100,000 barrels. Near the construction site are 10 acres of open storage.

b (U) *Chah Bahar*.

(1) (U) Location: 25°17'N; 60°37'E.

(2) (U) Accessibility: The approach is 12 meters deep. Worst weather is in summer. Tides can be as high as 5 meters.

(3) (U) Capacity: Three jetties for ships with a 12-meter draft and a container terminal. Anchorage is extensive.

(4) Storage: Cold storage is limited to 5,000 tons; 54,000 square feet of indoor storage area are available.

(5) Clearance: Clearance is based on a single road and a very limited trucking capacity.

4 (U) Airfields. Iran has about 20 major airfields capable of supporting military aircraft. Additionally, numerous smaller fields are usable for light aircraft and can be prepared to accept aircraft up to C-130 in size. Nearby countries have major international airports that can support combat aircraft.

5 (U) Principal Towns and Cities.

a (U) *Tehran*. Tehran, a relatively young city, is the capital city of Iran and an industrial center and is located at the foot of the Elburz Range. Its population is about 3.5 million, and another 4 million live in its metropolitan area.

b (U) *Tabriz*. Tabriz, located in the northwest corner of Iran, is the capital of East Azerbaijan Province and has historically been a major population center because water is available from Lake Urmia. Tabriz boasts a population in excess of 400,000.

c (U) *Esfahan*. Esfahan is the capital of Esfahan Province, has a population of about 300,000, and is the principal center of Iran's textile industry. Esfahan was the capital of the Safavi Dynasty in the 17th century. Because of its wonderful architectural monuments of the Safavi period, it is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. It is situated on the southern periphery of the Central Plateau, about 260 miles from Tehran.

d (U) *Shiraz*. Shiraz, the capital of Fars Province, is located about 250 miles southeast of Esfahan. It is renowned for its beautiful gardens and pure water. Its population is about 200,000.

e (U) *Mashhad*. Mashhad, capital of the Khorasan Province, is located in the northeastern corner of Iran. It has about 250,000 inhabitants and is most famous for the Shrine of Imam Reza, one of the holiest characters in the Shia literature.

f (U) *Kermanshah*. Kermanshah is a sizable town on the main road between Tehran and Baghdad.

g (U) *Hamadan*. Hamadan is a town about the size of Kermanshah. It is astride the road to Baghdad.

h (U) *Abadan*. Abadan, principally an oil refinery town, is located on the Shatt-al-Arab of the Persian Gulf.

i (U) *Khorramshahr*. Khorramshahr is adjacent to and just upstream of Abadan. It is Iran's principal non-oil port and one of two southern terminals of the Trans-Iranian Railway (the other terminal being Bandar-e Kohmeyni on the Khor Musa, an inlet near the head of the Persian Gulf).

j (U) *Bushehr*. Bushehr is a small but important port near Kharg Island on the Persian Gulf shore.

k (U) *Bandar Abbas*. The small city of Bandar Abbas in Hormozgan Province is located on the Persian Gulf shore in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. It is the port for eastern Persia.

l (U) *Kerman*. Kerman, a center of Persian culture, is the capital of Kerman Province, which borders Baluchistan va Sistan Province. Kerman is also a copper mining center.

m (U) *Zahedan*. Zahedan, the province capital, has a cosmopolitan population of 93,000 Baluchis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Persians. A thriving smuggling business keeps the bazaars of this market center well stocked with merchandise.

6 (U) Pipelines. Multiple pipelines extend north and south from Iran's oilfields. Most of the southern pipelines terminate at the Khark Island complex. The pipelines are part of a highly sophisticated petroleum production network that includes crude oil and natural gas.

7 (U) Rivers. Iran has no navigable rivers. Most of the rivers become mere trickles during the summer months.

(b) (U) *Effect on Enemy Capabilities*. The scarce and uneven distribution of the ground transportation net should markedly affect Iranian supply and reinforcing operations. Even on the Central Plateau where avenues of approach are more defined, the extremes of the terrain and climate would impede the rate of advance and would take their toll in vehicles. The use of helicopters and airborne units to overcome terrain considerations can be expected.

(c) (U) *Effect on Friendly Courses of Action.* Iran's poor ground transportation net will likewise effect friendly ground operations. Friendly forces will require substantial heavy and tactical airlift assets for the rapid movement of supplies and forces. Securing Iran's ports are critical for the initial deployment and subsequent operations of friendly forces.

(3) (U) **Telecommunications.**

(a) (U) *Existing Situation.* The telecommunications infrastructure is limited. The bulk of the system services Tehran and the major cities of north-east Iran. Facilities in the major cities of southern Iran are limited and practically without redundancy in equipment.

(b) (U) *Effect on Enemy Capabilities.* Iran's limited telecommunications will have a detrimental effect on command and control as well as logistics. Action against communications facilities could seriously disrupt the presently overloaded facilities.

(c) (U) *Effect on Friendly Courses of Action.* Limitations in the present telecommunications system, will enable friendly forces to exploit the enemy's command and control capability.

(4) (U) **Politics.**

(a) (U) *Existing Situation.*

1 (U) Government Systems. The current Iranian government, as volatile as it may be, is run by parliamentary procedures. The party in control is the Islamic Republican Party. Provincial governments are not centralized as in the sense of state-to-federal government in the United States. Rather, they are "influenced," and many, not trusting the stability of the current government, adhere to their own local political needs. Because no direct line of command and control exists for provincial elements, Iran is governed by a procedure somewhat akin to a feudal system.

2 (U) Political Dynamics. Iran has been in turmoil since the death of its religious leader, the Ayatollah. Several factions are struggling for power in Tehran. One faction is headed by a moderate leader who was recently elected president. He has the support, generally, of the Bazaris (middle class), merchants, and most intellectuals, and claims the loyalty of most elements of the armed forces in his constitutional role as commander in chief. Opposing him are elements of several religious groups who fear the Islamic Fundamentalist Revolution is being betrayed by the moderates whom they disparagingly call Westernizers. But these religious groups are in conflict with each other — mainly over the best way to achieve Islamization of the country and the region. The Leftists are divided between the Tudeh Party (Moscow-oriented communists) and the Marxist Nationalists (ideologically oriented toward Libya and Syria); these two groups are in conflict with each other over interpretation of Marx and Lenin and reconciliation of their teachings with those of Islam.

3 (U) Foreign Relations. Since the revolution, Iran has taken a nonaligned stance based essentially on its style of Islamic revolutionary fervor. Iran has treated its neighbors and the United States coolly. In fact, the government and the people have been looking inward in their dealings with all foreigners.

(b) (U) *Effect on Enemy Capabilities.* Political uncertainty, the Iran-Iraq war and internal divisions concerning support to the Shiites in southern Iraq have all contributed to weakening the central government. Short of a national emergency, the central government may have difficulty in sustaining the political support for long-term military operations.

(c) (U) *Effect on Friendly Courses of Action.* Friendly forces should be able to exploit Iran's internal situation by aiding the traditional anti-government groups such as Kurds and Baluchi tribesman.

(5) (U) **Economics.**

(a) (U) *Existing Situation.*

1 (U) Iran uses its oil revenues to establish an industrial base for self-sustaining growth in the future. Its largest source of employment is industry, which ranges from handcrafted carpets to steel technology and petrochemicals. Agriculture employs about 30 percent of the work force, and grains are the major products.

2 (U) The revolution and the war with Iraq have caused a major breakdown in Iran's economic system. Iran has attempted to sell its "national treasures" (high-value items confiscated from the Shah after the revolution). The money was used to finance the war effort, which reportedly cost more than \$40 billion.

3 (U) Oil export is the mainstay of Iran's economy, but a depressed world oil market has created a cash-flow problem of major proportions for the central government. Additionally, poor management of the oil infrastructure has contributed to a reduced oil flow.

4 (U) Many of Iran's trading partnerships were dissolved after the revolution, most notably its partnership with the United States. Potential trading partners, suspicious of Iran's economy, require cash payments. The requirement for cash payments puts a heavy economic burden on a country that is already under an economic strain.

(b) (U) *Effect on Enemy Capabilities.* Iran's heavy reliance on oil production to earn foreign exchange credits makes the oilfields and oil-producing infrastructure lucrative strategic objectives.

(c) (U) *Effect on Friendly Courses of Action.* Dependence on foreign trade makes Iran susceptible to operations against her lines of commerce and supply. The vulnerability of the oilfields and other means of petroleum production must be considered in any friendly course of action.

(6) (U) **Sociology.**

(a) (U) *Existing Situation.*

1 (U) General. Iran, a nation smaller in area than the United States east of the Mississippi, has a population estimated at about 37 million. Once largely composed of nomads and tribesmen, the population is now almost evenly divided between rural and urban inhabitants. Nomads and seminomadic tribesmen account for less than 5 percent of the total population. The principal language is Persian, which is known as Farsi in Iran. More than half of the population speaks Farsi, and the minorities use it as a second language. Turkish, the second major spoken language, is followed by Kurdish and Arabic. As may be expected from a nomadic culture, a number of dialects exist among the tribes. For example:

- In southeastern Iran, Afshars of Kerman Province speak Turkish.
- Farther east, Baluchis, the most prominent tribe in the area, speak a mixture of Persian and Turkish.
- Afghans, in northeastern Iran, speak Pushtu.

2 (U) Labor Force. About 30 percent of Iran's population is involved in agriculture. The other 70 percent is in services or petroleum.

3 (U) Education. Despite a basically free education at primary and secondary levels, literacy in Iran is only about 40 percent. Financial assistance may be provided at higher levels.

4 (U) Religion. Shiism, the official religion in Iran, has a following of about 90 percent of the population. Other religions include Armenian Christianity, Assyrian Christianity, Bahatism, Judaism, Sunnism, and Zoroastrianism.

5 (U) Social Values. The revolution in part was a reaction to the Shah's modernization, or Westernization, of Iran. Islamic fundamentalism, as Khomeini preached it, became the way of life for the Iranians. The importance of Shiism to the people and government of Iran must therefore not be underestimated. Although Shiism underscores all government actions and thinking, disenchantment with some precepts of the Islamic revolution is apparent.

(b) (U) *Effect on Enemy Capabilities*. Internal divisions within the clergy, government and ethnic communities has weakened the central governments ability to respond to a crisis. Iran is susceptible to indigenous unrest and turmoil fueled by external forces.

(c) (U) *Effect on Friendly Courses of Action*. Friendly forces should be able to exploit these divisions within Iran. Support to anti-government groups could serve as a force multiplier when conducting military operations against Iran.

(7) (U) **Science and Technology** (Omitted).

3. (U) **ENEMY CAPABILITIES**.

a. (U) *Ground Capabilities*. The Iranian Army has approximately 350,000 men organized into various armor/infantry divisions (10-12 divisions total) and combat support/service support units. Four army headquarters have responsibility for the training, sustainment, and operations of these forces. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has up to 15 divisions (approximately 100,000 men). Rebuilding from their long and costly war with Iraq, the Army is equipped with an assortment of military equipment. Their armored divisions are organized around 100 U.S.-made M-60A1s; 100 British-made Chieftains; and several hundred Soviet T-54/55s, T-62s, and T-72s. Artillery pieces are from both western and eastern European sources with the majority of hardware coming from the CIS Republics.

b. (U) *Air Capabilities*. Iranian air capabilities are limited. Years of fighting coupled with poor sustainment and training programs has severely weakened the Iranian air force. Numbering approximately 30,000 men, the Iranian air force is organized around 185 combat aircraft and several squadrons of transport aircraft.

c. (U) *Naval Capabilities*. Iranian naval capabilities are limited but improving. Iran's reliance on the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as their oil outlet has shaped their military improvements. Equipped with three Kilo class submarines and several small frigates, destroyers and support vessels, its primary mission is coastal security. Principal naval bases are located at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e-Anzelli and Bandar-e-Khomeini.

d. (U) *Nuclear Capabilities*. None.

e. (U) *CB Capabilities*. Artillery and missiles; known agents: mustard gas and cyanide; probable agents: nerve gas.

f. (U) *Joint Capabilities*. None.

4. (U) **ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.**

a. (U) ***Worse Case.*** Iran's improved relationship with Iraq may contribute to combined political and military activities in the Persian Gulf. Of major concern to the U.S. is a combined operation whereby Iraq attacks Kuwait and Iran in a supporting role attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz to U.S. and allied naval forces. In such a contingency the introduction of Iranian ground forces in Kuwait cannot be ruled out.

b. (U) ***Probable Course of Action.*** It is unlikely that Iran will depart from its present course of rebuilding its armed forces and maintaining the status quo in the region. After years of fighting, the central government's priority of effort has been in consolidating its power and laying the political framework for Iran's future.

5. (U) **CONCLUSIONS.** (Purposely omitted; student analysis provides this information.)

AREA STUDY OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)

1. (U) **INTRODUCTION.** Recognizing the need to develop coordinated responses to regional threats, the GCC was established in May 1981. Including the countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Oman, the GCC has made considerable progress in cooperative economic, diplomatic, and military security efforts. The GCC states have a combined population of 12 to 15 million, a land area of about 2,653,000 square kilo meters, and a combined annual gross domestic (GDP) of about \$210 billion. Saudi Arabia is the dominant GCC country with its larger economic/military infrastructure and geographical advantage. Holding vast oil resources estimated to be 30 percent of the free world's known reserves, the politically moderate and strategically located Saudi Arabia is the key player within the region and an influential force in international affairs. Since the GCC's establishment, Saudi Arabia has been the driving force in encouraging political, economic, and military cooperation between the member states.

2. (U) **GEOGRAPHY.** The GCC countries share a similar topography and climate. The land is largely flat desert covered with loose sand and small rocks. Low outcroppings of limestone form rolling hills, stubby cliffs, and shallow ravines in many of the countries. Inland, the climate is generally hot and dry with temperatures frequently reaching 48 degrees centigrade. The coastal plains are hot and humid with annual rainfall less than 120 millimeters. At higher elevations, temperatures are considerably cooler with an increased annual rainfall. The Persian Gulf dominates this region and provides the crucial waterways and outlets for the export of oil and other maritime traffic. Within the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is the most critical maritime chokepoint; its opening to international maritime traffic is essential for maintaining access to the strategic resources of the region.

a. (U) **Road Nets.** Road nets are limited within in each country and generally serve to link the capital with the major cities and ports. Major four-lane highways can be found in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait linking them with the other rich Persian Gulf countries. This includes a causeway completed in the mid-1980s which provides a land-link between the island state of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. These roads can support heavy loads such as tractor trailer and heavy equipment trucks. Vehicle traffic is limited to the existing road nets unless vehicles are equipped with all terrain capabilities.

b. (U) **Ports.** Port facilities throughout the GCC countries are modern and capable of handling most maritime vessels to include super tankers. Superb ship repair facilities are located in Bahrain and the UAE where their location adjacent to one of the busiest shipping routes has transformed ship repair from a small business venture into a major regional industry. For additional information on GCC ports, see Logistics Annex of USCENTCOM Planning Guidance.

c. (U) **Pipelines.** A petroleum dominated economy, petroleum pipelines are the lifeline of the GCC's economic infrastructure. The primary oil producing countries of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE own thousands of miles of pipelines linking the oil fields with oil refineries and port export facilities.

3. (U) **DEMOGRAPHICS.** Arabs are the predominant ethnic group, and Islam is the predominant religion within each country. Bahrain is unique in that it includes a fairly large number of citizens of Iranian origin. Although most Bahrainis are Arabs, 70 percent are Shia Moslems and 30 percent Sunni. Most GCC countries depend on a large foreign work force to provide their basic government services. They include Palestinians, Egyptians, Iranians, Pakistanis, Indians and thousands of Asians. This is especially true in Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia where this work force provides most of the skilled and unskilled labor requirements.

4. (U) **POLITICS.** The GCC members share similar political systems whereby their countries are governed by ruling families. In most countries political parties are nonexistent, and all political, economic, military, and foreign relations decisions are made by the head of state with the advice of other family members or an advisory council. The UAE perhaps has the most progressive political system with the federation of seven emirates, as defined in the 1971 Provisional Constitution. Power is divided between federal and emirate governments with the head of state chosen by a Supreme Council of Union composed of rulers of the seven emirates.

5. (U) **ECONOMICS.** The petroleum industry dominates the economies of the GCC countries. Containing approximately 70 percent of the free world's proven oil reserves, it is unlikely the petroleum sector will decline in the near future. In fact, it is estimated that while U.S. economically exploitable reserves could be depleted in 20 to 40 years, the Persian Gulf region will still have over 100 years of proven reserves. In 1981, the GCC members signed its Unified Economic Agreement with the intent of reducing redundancy and increasing economic cooperation between the GCC countries. Joint venture successes between Bahrain and Oman have encouraged planners to magnify the concept of cooperative planning and development strategies. From approximately \$29,000 in the UAE to \$13,000 in Bahrain, the GCC countries enjoy one of the highest per capital incomes in the world. Understandably, the quality of life is very good in these countries. Most countries provide free health/dental care, subsidized housing, and free university education.

6. (U) **SECURITY AND DEFENSE.** The need to find a more credible and effective means to deal with regional military threats was the primary reason the GCC was established. Today the Peninsula Shield Force, the military arm of the GCC, provides a military complement to the economic, trade, cultural, and other areas of cooperation between the GCC countries. Far from being an integrated regional military alliance, the GCC has made impressive gains in military cooperation. In 1983, troops from all the GCC states participated in joint military exercises in Abu Dhabi. Involving more than 6,500 troops, "Shield of the Peninsula" exercised the GCC's ability to conduct various joint and combined operations. Considered a success by participating members, this exercise provided the framework for subsequent joint and combined exercises by the GCC states. Far from being a unified and integrated regional military force, improvements continue in the joint and combined operations arena and in the development of a regional air defense capability. See USCENCOM Planning Directive for GCC countries military balance.

7. (U) **CONCLUSION.** Cooperation among the GCC states continues to improve on all levels. Since 1981, the GCC has made tremendous progress on economic and military issues. Militarily, problems exist in air defense coordination and interoperability of the various armed forces. Continuing with joint/combined exercises and coordinating the procurement of military equipment will help improve this area. In the event of a major threat to GCC interest (as in the case of Iraq), the GCC will require external support. Holding vast financial resources, the GCC wields a tremendous amount of influence in world affairs and are key players in promoting regional stability. The GCC has demonstrated a moderate approach to solving regional issues and continued cooperation among the member states is necessary for maintaining stability in this very volatile and strategically important region.

LOGISTICS

Appendix 1 to Tab H. Mobility and Transportation

1. (U) **GENERAL.** This section consolidates available air and seaport capabilities information for deployment planning in CENTCOM.
2. (U) **CONCEPT.** Intertheater movement of all forces, equipment, and supplies will be programmed through the JDS as coordinated by USTRANSCOM. Personnel movement will be by air, equipment and supplies by sea, with critical items movement by air on an exception basis. MTMC will maintain responsibility for port operation. Intratheater movement will initially be coordinated by USCENCOM J4 and transferred to the Theater Army Commander once it is operational.
3. (U) Resources availability is contained in the ISCP.
4. (U) Necessary movement data, resources, and available airfields and sea ports are contained in the enclosures to this appendix.

2 Enclosures

1. Air Field Data
2. Port Data

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

Enclosure 1 to Appendix 1, Tab H. AIR FIELDS

NAME	LOCATION	RUNWAY	CAPABIL- ITIES	LOGISTICS SUPPORT	REMARKS
OMAN: Seeb	23°36'N 58°17'E	11,762x148 ft paved runway	Up to C5	Maintenance facilities available; NAVAIDS excellent weather forecasting available; fuel storage capability 850,000 gallons; water supply adequate; parking facilities can be expanded up to 3 sqdns of C141 aircraft in surge.	International airport best airport in Oman; monsoon weather Apr-Sep for all Omani airports; 3 sqdns of SOAF located.
Masirah	20°41'N 58°53'E	10,005x148 ft paved runway; 7,000x150 compacted gravel	C141	Facilities for two fighter sqdns plus 1 C130 sqdn; 700,000 gallon fuel storage; all weather capability.	Water desalinization plant needed. Additional POL can be pumped from jetty. Road from port makes for excellent resupply. At D+1 can process up to 25,000 soldiers a day.
Salalah	17°02'N 54°06'E	8,967x148 ft concrete; 6,000x150 ft natural material	C141	Base facilities other than water in short supply; limited all weather capability; fuel storage capability of 40,000 gallons.	Additional fuel (2M gallons) available at Port Haysut but only two 3,600 gallon tank vehicles available to move it.
Thumrait	17°40'N 54°02'E	1,123x148 ft	C5	Maintenance and logistics are adequate; fuel storage capability is 300,000 gallons; limited all weather capability; water is in short supply.	Primary tactical airbase of SOAF can support 1 US fighter sqdn; fuel supplies come overland by road from Muscat or Port Raysut.
SOMALIA: Berbera	10° 24'N 44 57'E	13,615x174 ft asphalt, natural material	C5	Fuel storage 400,000 gallons; limited maintenance facilities. All weather capability.	Capable of holding up to 1 air wing of tactical; can be used for carrier divers. Road available from port to airfield for resupply.
Mogadishu	02°01'N 45°18'E	10,355x148 ft	C5	Limited fuel storage capability of under 10,000 gallons; fuel trucked in from port.	International airport adjacent American embassy compound which has sufficient area of 50 acres for AIREVAC hospital; can be used for carrier divert.
EGYPT: Ras Banas	23°59'N 35°28'E	9,840x130 ft	C130	Recently refurbished facilities can support	At D+1 can process up to 25,000 soldiers per day; water desalinization plant needed.

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NAME	LOCATION	RUNWAY	CAPABILITIES	LOGISTICS SUPPORT	REMARKS
				either one sqdn of tactical or logistic air; fuel capability is 200,000 gallons.	
KENYA: MOI International	04°2'S 39°36'E	10,991x148 ft asphalt	C5	Excellent facilities for logistics and maintenance; fuel storage capacity is 4 million gallons in refinery next to airport; ammunition storage sites available.	Capability for all US aircraft; port adjacent to airfield; 1 sqdn of tactical aircraft can be maintained for indefinite period.
Nairobi	01°17'S 36°52'E	7,999x151 ft	C141	Most modern facilities in area of operation; fuel storage capacity 1 million gallons; no limitations on water but hanger space and billeting extremely limited.	-----
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Sharjah International	25°20'N 55°31"E	12,336x148 ft	C5	NAVAIDS available; Fuel storage 750,000 gallons; adequate water available. Maintenance facilities limited with most maintenance done in Dubai.	International airport. light pattern same as Dubai for landings and takeoffs.
Dubai International	25°15'N 55°21'E	13,123x151 ft	C5	All weather; NAVAIDS available fuel storage; 750,000 gallons adequate water available. Maintenance facilities limited. Plenty of storage and ramp parking space in area adjacent to runway.	Excellent condition. International airport.
Ras Al Khaimah International	25°37'N 55°56'E	12,336x148 ft	C141	All weather; NAVAIDS available. No maintenance facilities. Limited ramp space.	-----

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NAME	LOCATION	RUNWAY	CAPABILITIES	LOGISTICS SUPPORT	REMARKS
SAUDI ARABIA: Arar	30°55'N 41°08'E	10,007x148 ft asphalt	C5	Fuel available.	-----
Dhahran	26°16'N 50°10'E	12,008x148 ft asphalt	C5	Maintenance hangers; ramp spaces; large open area for storage. Fuel available.	-----
Hafr Al Batin	28°20'N 46°08'E	10,007x148 ft asphalt	C141	Fuel available.	-----
Jubail	27°03'N 49°24'E	13,123x165 ft	C5	Fuel available.	-----
King Khalid Int'l	24°58'N 46°43'E	13,779x197 ft asphalt	C5	Fuel available.	-----
Rafha	29°38'N 43°30'E	9,843x148 ft asphalt	C5		
QATAR: Doha	25°16'N 55°56'E	15,000	C5	All weather; NAVAIDS available. Maintenance available but limited.	Close to support.
IRAN: Bandar Abbass	27°13'N 56°23'E	12,020	C5A	All weather; NAVAIDS in disrepair. Limited ramp space.	
KUWAIT: Kuwait International	29°14'N 47°59'E	11,152x10 ft	C5A	All weather; NAVAIDS; maintenance, fuel available.	Close to support.

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Enclosure 1 to Appendix 2, Tab H. PORT DATA

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UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
OMAN: Mina Al Fahal 23°40'N 58°30'E	Natural	None	Extensive in winter	1-6 ton	Petroleum and limited lighterage only.	Road; limited trucking.
Port Raysut 16°56'N 54°01'E	Natural w/jetty	12	3 barges serve as anchorage. Maximum length: 91m-5.2m draft	1-70 ton 1-30 ton 2-7 ton	Grain-30,000 tons; Cement-6,000 tons.	Road; limited trucking available.
Port Qaboos (Muttrah) 23°37'N 58°35'E	Natural protected	8-9 mtr draft; 4-4 mtr draft; max length: 168m	None		Grain-30,000 tons; Cement-6,000 tons; Cargo-60,000 sq ft; Cold Storage-5,000 tons; Refrigeration-5,000 tons; 20 acres-open storage.	35 km to Seeb Int'l. Under-ground conveyor belt at berth; 3 for bulk cement and grain; tractors available for RO/EO container ships.
Masirah Island 22°N58'E	Jetty Man-made channel	3-10 meter draft draft from pier	Extensive; but subject to extremely bad weather from Apr-Sep; lighterage needed.	3-25 ton; 1-60 ton floating crane	10 acres open storage; Petroleum storage for 25,000 BBL; Cold storage-5,000 tons; Refrigeration-5,000 tons.	Road from port to airbase; pipeline to storage tanks at air base.

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Ref 9-H-1-1-49

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Ref 9-H-1-1-50

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Ref 9-H-1-1-51

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Ref 9-H-1-1-52

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
KENYA: Mombasa 4°04'N 39°40'E	Has two harbors on both sides of Mombasa Island	16-11m draft; max length 315m.	12-all classes; 4-27m draft; 2-VLCC at oil terminal.	2-3 ton; 9-7 ton; 1-60 ton floating crane.	Cold store-4,000 cu ft Cargo-93,000 sq ft Coal-12,000 tons Petroleum-420,000 BBL.	By road large quantity vehicles available at refinery.
SOMALIA: Berbera 10°26'N 45°01'N	Sheltered bay.	2-8.8m draft; 2-8m draft; 1-11.5m draft (for POL).	Extensive	2-5 ton; up to 25 tons.	Cargo-15,750 sq ft; Open store-10 acres; Petroleum-20,000 BBL.	Two roads off wharves.
Mogadiscio 20°N, 45°E	Natural w/man-made jetty.	2-9.5m draft; 2-8.5m draft; 1-11.5m draft (for POL).	Extensive	1-40 ton; 2-3 ton.	Open storage-50 acres; Cargo-20,000 sq ft; Petroleum-120,000 BBL.	Vehicles by road; US embassy compound near port capable of open storage up to 50 acres.
Kismayu 0°23'S 42°32'E	Sheltered bay; L-shaped pier	4-8.5m draft	Extensive	3 cranes up to 25 tons	Cargo-10,000 sq ft Open storage-15 acres	Vehicles by road.
BAHRAIN: Mina Sulman 26°12'N 50°37'E	Jetty; man-made channel.	10-8.23m draft; 6-11m draft (2 of these berths are container capable).	Extensive	3-6 ton (mobile); 2-6 ton gantry cranes.	Cold store-5,000 cu ft; Cargo-100,000 sq ft; Petroleum-500,000 BBL; Silos-10,000 tons.	Road-limited.
QATAR: Doha 25°17'N 51°33'E	Natural	4-9.14m draft; 4-8.5m draft.	10	Mobile: 2-3 ton; 1-5 ton; 2-10 ton; 1-20 ton.	Cold Store-500 tons; Warehouse-14,480 sq mtrs; Open storage-23,780 sq meters.	Multiple roads; local trucking available.

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Ref 9-H-1-1-53

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Ref 9-H-1-1-54

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

					<p>Cold store-4,000 cu ft Cargo-93,000 sq ft Coal-12,000 tons Petroleum-420,000 BBL.</p> <p>Cargo-15,750 sq ft; Open store-10 acres; Petroleum-20,000 BBL.</p> <p>Open storage-50 acres; Cargo-20,000 sq ft; Petroleum-120,000 BBL.</p> <p>Cargo-10,000 sq ft Open storage-15 acres</p> <p>Cold store-5,000 cu ft; Cargo-100,000 sq ft; Petroleum-500,000 BBL; Silos-10,000 tons.</p> <p>Cold Store-500 tons; Warehouse-14,480 sq mtrs; Open storage-23,780 sq meters.</p>	
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USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Ref 9-H-1-1-55

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
Ref 9-H-1-1-56

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Abu Dhabi 24°33'N 54°20'E	Natural; channel man-made	5-9.75m draft; 1-10.50m draft; 6-11.5m draft; 3-5.8m draft (lighterage only).	Limited.	3x5-5 ton; 1x1-10 ton; Lighterage available, mobile cranes up to 80 D.W.T.	Warehouse-20,600 cu mtrs; No cold storage available.	Multiple roads; limited trucking.
Jebel Ali, Dubai 25°01'N 55°02'E	Man-made	72-14m draft	Limited.	2 container cranes.	Unknown; see Port Rashid.	Multiple roads; some trucking.
Port Rashid 25°16'N 55°16'E	Natural 6-9.0m draft	74-deep water	Limited.	Mobile: 3-5 ton, 5-10 ton, 3-20 ton, 9-40 ton, 2 container cranes 35 ton.	Warehouse-163,724 sq mtr; Open storage-10 acres.	Multiple roads (some Dubai congestion); local trucking.
Port Khalid Sharjah 25°22'N 55°22'E	Natural	12-deep water	Limited.	Cranes up to 200 tons.	RO/RO facilities for containers Cold storage-4,500 tons Warehouse-18,300 sq mtrs	Multiple roads; local trucking.

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

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Ref 9-H-1-1-58

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
Mina Sagr, Rasal Khaima 25°58'N 56°03'E	Man-made	12.2m draft	Extensive.	Self-sustaining vessels only	Warehouse-size unknown; no refrigerated storage	Single road; limited trucking available.
Abu Dhabi 24°33'N 54°20'E	Man-made	27-5.18 to 12.9m	5	3-5x5 ton 1-1x10 ton	Petroleum-250,000 BBL; Cold store-25,000 tons; Cargo-200,000 tons; Refrigeration-25,000 tons; 15 acres-open storage.	Multiple roads; trucking available.
IRAN: Bandar Abbas 27°8'N 56°12'E	Natural.	6-10.5m; 1-10-5 (Oil berth); 1-10.5 (Ore loading berth).	Unknown.	Mobile: 1-25 ton, 1-18 ton, 1-7 ton, 1 floating crane 60 tons.	Cargo-160,000 cu ft; Cold storage-25,000 tons; 10 acres-open storage; Petroleum-100,000 BBL.	Four forklifts; 2 tractors w/a 10-ton trailer and a 30-ton trailer.
Bandar Khomeini 30°26'N 49°05'E	Natural (Land-locked).	3-8.53m	-----	None.	Coverage storage--94,000 tons; Open yard-15,000 tons; Open storage-1 acre.	Railroad single road.
Bushire 28°59'N 50°50'E	Man-made channel.	A single quay for loading/offloading.	Limited for ships less than 9.14m draft and 170m length.	6-5 ton (mobile); 1-7 ton (mobile - electric).	Open storage only.	Lighterage available for unloading/loading. Limited to a single road.

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Ref 9-H-1-1-59

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
Chah Bahar 25°17'N 60°37'E	Natural.	3 jetties for ships of 12 mtr draft; 1 container terminal	Extensive; in winter subject to winter swells.	-----	Cargo-54,000 sq mtr; Cold storage-5,000 tons.	Limited to a single road; limited trucking available at present time.
Kharg Island 29°14'N 50°20'E	Man-made.	3-16.76m; 10-10.5m; sea island terminal closed due to ext war damage.	Extensive to 20.81m draft	Destroyed by war	Petroleum-1,000,000 BBL; Open storage-10 acres.	Pipeline only; some lighterage available. Rate of 100 5 tons/hr for petroleum.
Port of Mahshahr 30°27'N 49°11'E	Man-made.	6-12.0m; extensive war damage 6-11.73 tanker terminals.	Limited; high winds from June to August with accompanying dust.	10-10 ton (mobile).	Bunkering facilities each berth.	Rate of 2,000 tons/hr for fuel oil and 500 tons/hr for RO/RO capability at jetty.
SAUDI ARABIA: Damman 26°30'N 50°12'E		25-14.0m draft; 2-9.0m draft; 1-12.0m draft.	Limited.	6 container cranes; 63 portal cranes; 131 mobile cranes of 13.51 to 155 tons; 380 forklifts.	Warehouse-170,850 sq mtr; Open storage-2,655,000 sq mtrs.	Multiple roads; trucking available.

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Ref 9-H-1-1-60

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PORT	HARBOR	ALONGSIDE BERTHS	ANCHORAGE	CRANES	STORAGE	CLEARANCE
Jeddah 21°28'N 39°14'E	Natural.	19-11m draft; 4-8.0m draft (RO/RO only); 20 under develop- ment.	Extensive.	1-35 ton; 26 mobile cranes of varying sizes.	Warehouse-400,000 sq mtrs.	Multiple roads; trucking available.
Jubail 27°01'N 49°40'E	Man-made.	8-12.0m draft; 8-14.0m draft.	Limited.	Mobile: 6-20 ton, 4-50 ton, 2-100 ton.	Covered storage-18,300m; Open storage-10 acres; 180,000 sq mtr RO/RO container area.	Multiple roads.
KUWAIT: Mina Abdulla 29°01'N 48°12'E	Man-made.	10-10.6m draft; 2-3.23m draft; Off-shore onloading.	Limited.	24-3 ton; 8-6 ton; 1-90 ton mobile; 1-100 ton floating; 2-30 ton.	Covered storage-42,900m; Open storage-211,425m available.	Multiple roads; rail; trucking.
Mina Al Ahmadi		Tankers only.	-----	-----	-----	-----
Mina Saud		Tankers only.	-----	-----	-----	-----

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Ref 9-H-1-1-61

SAMPLE JOPES MESSAGE And ORDERS FORMATS

Reference 10

**U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-6900**

SAMPLE OPREP-3 COMMAND ASSESSMENT Message Report

{PRECEDENCE (FLASH/IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY/ROUTINE)}

FROM: USCINCCENT//BRIGHT STAR//

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED}

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/**OPREP-3PCA**/USCENTCOM/001//

REF/A/VMG/HQ USCENTCOM/030056ZOCTXX//

AMPN/PINNACLE VOICE REPORT FM FWD BRIGHT STAR ELEMENT TO NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/**COMMAND ASSESSMENT**/

1. () DAMAGE TO BLUELAND A/C. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 030056Z OCT _____.
2. () THE BLUELAND XXX TACTICAL FTR WG REPORTED AT 030030Z OCT REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO ALL A/C.
3. () ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. () INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
5. () NO DAMAGE OR INJURY TO US FORCES OR EQUIPMENT IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
6. () ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3P REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//
DECL/OADR//

SAMPLE OPREP-3 CINC's ASSESSMENT Message Report

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT//

REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/120050ZAPRXX//

AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. () REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUELAND A/C AT DESERT WEST AB.

VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 120050Z APR _____.

2. () USCINCCOM FWD {BRIGHT STAR} HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO

BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE A/C.

3. () ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.

4. () INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

5. () US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.

6. () SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.

7. () ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//
DECL/OADR//

SAMPLE CJCS WARNING ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
 USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
 USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
 DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
 CSA WASHINGTON DC
 CNO WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
 OPER/BLUENOSE//
 MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
 AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
 ORDTYP/WARNORD/CJCS//
 TIMEZONE/Z//
 ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT..XXX//
 HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNITLOC	/CMNTS
/JTF HEADQUARTERS	/	/
/JCSE (JTF SUP DET)	/	/
/198TH MECH BRIGADE	/	/
/2ND ARMOR BRIGADE	/	/
/112TH PSYOP CO	/	/
/CVBG	/	/
/MARITIME PREPOS SHIPS	/	/
/MEB	/	/
/123RD COMP WG	/	/
/91 TAS	/	/
/312 COMPAERWG	/	/

AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS
 OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING//

NARR/() **THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT COMMANDERS
 ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA**

CONSIDERATION BY 231000Z NOV_____. USTRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE
 PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO
 THE SUPPORTED CINC UPON REQUEST.//
 GENTEXT/**SITUATION**/

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

1. () THE SITUATION IN ORANGELAND IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY PRO-YELLOWLAND REBELS ON 20 NOV. THE CAPITAL REMAINS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, BUT EL ASSID AIRFIELD SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL HAS FALLEN TO REBEL FORCES. YELLOWLAND, RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR AID BY THE REBELS, FLEW IN ELEMENTS OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD AND HAS CONDUCTED TU-22/BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS FROM EL ODD AGAINST THE CAPITAL. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AGAINST THE CAPITAL IS AS YET UNDETERMINED. PRESIDENT NOSS OF ORANGELAND HAS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM BLUELAND UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN

AT A HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. COL HOMM SUPPORTED AN EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT IN MID-FEBRUARY AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS INCREASED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO REBEL FORCES WHILE DETAINING DISSIDENTS IN CAMPS WITHIN YELLOWLAND. THE LATEST COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWS IN THE WAKE OF HOMMS CALL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUELAND EFFORTS IN ORANGELAND.

2. () THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

3. () EASTLAND MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING ACCESS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.//

GENTEXT/**MISSION**/

4. () WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

5. () **COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS:** ASSIST IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

OPERATIONS (NEO), CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

A. () USCINCPAC. THE 15TH MEB AND MPS SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX ARE NO LONGER ALLOCATED TO USCINCPAC.

B. () USCINCLANT. PROVIDE ONE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF AN AMPHIBIOUS MEB AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO USCINCPAC.

C. () USCINTRANS. PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO PROVIDE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.

D. () DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

E. () DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

F. () OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. EACH COA SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECRECY REQUIRED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. IN ADDITION TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) DELINEATED IN THE REF, YOUR OPSEC PLANNING SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING EEFI: (PROVIDE ADDITIONAL NCA AND CJCS EEFI, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION).

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE

- A. () PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT
- B. () PSYOP OBJECTIVES
 - (1)() PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.
 - (2)() PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.
- C. () PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS
 - (1)() US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.
 - (2)() US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.
- D. () PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID
 - (1)() STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.
 - (2)() PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.
- E. () PSYOP OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 - (1)() DATE TO INITIATE IN-THEATER PSYOP.
 - (2)() OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
 - (3)() TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.
 - (4)() COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

7. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

8. () COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

9. () CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE.

- A. () CA MISSION STATEMENT.
- B. () CA OBJECTIVES
 - (1)() FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.
 - (2)() ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.
 - (3)() DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.
 - (4)() ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.
 - (5)() SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS.
 - (6)() FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.
 - (7)() COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES IN AN OCCUPIED OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.
- C. () CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS
 - (1)() OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
 - (2)() TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.
 - (3)() COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.
 - (4)() COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.

10. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- A. () TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR. 210001Z NOV ____.
- B. () TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR. 290001Z NOV ____.
- C. () ANTICIPATED D-DAY. 1 DEC ____.
- D. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
- E. () DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.
- F. () KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
- G. () NO CHANGE IN USCINCCENT ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF IS EXPECTED.
- H. () SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS. FOR EXAMPLE, USCINCTRANS WILL PROVIDE AIR-REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.
- I. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.
- J. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () TRANSPORT.

- A. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.
- B. () ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.
 - (1)() GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 17 NOV ____ IN SUPPORT OF EXECUTION OF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.
 - (2)() AIRLIFT. SUPPORTED CINC (USCINCPAC) FOR OPLAN XXXX MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT APPROXIMATELY ____ PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITY AT PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND CRAF STAGE II).
 - (3)() SEALIFT. USCINCPAC CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON USING ASSETS APPORTIONED BY JSCP, ANNEX J, IN THE APPROPRIATE TABLES UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS, INCLUDING USTRANSCOM AND ASSETS FROM THE RRF AND SRP.
 - (4)() THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD (JTB) HAS DETERMINED THAT A MINIMUM OF ____ PERCENT OF TOTAL AIR AND SEA-LIFT CAPABILITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOCS. FURTHER, IF REQUIRED, THE JTB HAS APPROVED TWO SETS OF LIFT ALLOCATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT AS FOLLOWS:
 - (A)() IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX IS IMPLEMENTED ALONE, USCINCPAC MAY PLAN ON ALL REMAINING CAPABILITY (____ PERCENT).
 - (B)() IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX AND USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ARE IMPLEMENTED CONCURRENTLY, USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW. USCINCCENT MAY PLAN FOR ASSETS MADE AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF DECLARATION OF

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III (AT APPROXIMATELY USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX C-DAY MINUS 4 FOR CRAF STAGE III). THE AIRLIFT ASSETS INCLUDE UP TO ___ WIDE-BODY CARGO, ___ WIDE-BODY PASSENGER, ___ NARROW-BODY CARGO, ___ NARROW-BODY PASSENGER, ___ C-5, ___ KC-10, AND ___ C-141 AIRCRAFT. IF REQUIRED, SPECIFIC PHASING OF THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE OUTLINED IN THE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ALERT ORDER. REGARDING AND SHALLOW DRAFT TANKERS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE A MODIFICATIONS TO USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX PLANNING, THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAF STAGE III ASSETS. REGARDING SEALIFT, CLEAN PRODUCT TANKERS LIMITATION; THE JTB DEFERS BY-TYPE ALLOCATIONS OF THESE ASSETS PENDING CLEARER DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF NUMBER AND LOCATION OF TANKERS

BY TYPE AND CAPACITY. USCINCTRANS AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPES AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JTB MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

(C)() USE JSCP, ANNEX J, TO DETERMINE LOAD PLANNING FACTORS, WITH DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN ALCON IF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARISE.

(D)() FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. ALL REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, MILSTAMP. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNIT(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-TIME TO RESPOND TO CINCS PRE-C-DAY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL. PRE-C-DAY MOVES PRIOR TO C-2 MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH ORGANIC AND NONMOBILIZED CAPABILITY AND EQUIVALENT CIVIL AUGMENTATION. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S). IF SUPPORTED CINCS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

12.() JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

13.() FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

14.() KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

A. () STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINC(S)

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. LESS THAN FULL MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.

B. () SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

C. () EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

15.() PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.

16.() CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUENOSE.

17.() REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30 AND CJCS MOP 53.

18.() CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

19.() PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

A. () PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA). PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131, OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. () PROVIDE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5405.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE. UPON APPROVAL BY OASD(PA), SUCH INTERIM GUIDANCE MAY BE USED IN THE EVENT OF AN INQUIRY REGARDING ANY PART OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPERATION, WHICH MAY HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE PUBLIC OR PRESS. IN GENERAL, THE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1)() A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

(2)() A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT. THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM PPAG SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ASSESSMENT REGARDING:

(A)() ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH (ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE).

(B)() REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

(C)() ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

- (D) () REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT.
- (E) () RECOMMENDATION FOR MEDIA ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (OPEN ACCESS VERSUS POOLING).
- (F) () ESTIMATES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES THAT MAY BE ACCOMMODATED.
- (G) () ANTICIPATED GROUND RULES, GUIDELINES, AND ACCREDITATION FOR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.
- (H) () ANTICIPATED SECURITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.
- (I) () ESTIMATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS.

20. () COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT

SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS: ATTENTION: JCCC ROOM 5A518 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000 (RACK 2) TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS: DSN: 227-2900 COMM: (703) 697-2900 PAGER: NONDUTY HOURS: COMM: (202) 542-2579/2533 (LEAVE NUMBER AND CALL WILL BE RETURNED.) FAX: DSN 223-4775 (703) 693-4775.// GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

21. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

22.() COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, USCINCSpace, USCINTRANS, CINCFOR, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSTRAT ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, DISA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.//

AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//

SAMPLE OPREP-1 COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

IMMEDIATE {OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE}

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC

CSAF WASHINGTON DC

CMC WASHINGTON DC

CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA

HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC

CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA

COMSC WASHINGTON DC

COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//

COMUSNAVCENT

CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

CG FMFLANT

CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

CG FMFPAC

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

{OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED}

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCCENT//

SUBJ/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE ()//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ___/___/NOTAL//

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//

REF/B/DOC/USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

RMKS/1. () MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).

2. () SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

A. () THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND, BLUELAND, AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN HIGH BECAUSE OF OVERT YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE COUP ATTEMPT, YELLOWLAND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REBELS, AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS AGAINST BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND BY YELLOWLAND

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

REQUIRE PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

B. () ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

C. () USCINCCENT HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS (COAS):

(1) () **COA 1.** DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND RECONNAISSANCE WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. 15TH MEB TO DEPLOY VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA.

SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.

(2) () **COA 2.** DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. HOLD MEB AND ARMY BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB.

3. () ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.

4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COAS.

A. () COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES, COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE 15TH MEB AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS, PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (___DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE. EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

B. () COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (___DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES. IT PROVIDES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA. ITS PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL. HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEB AND ARMY BDES COULD BE MINIMAL AS MPS AND MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL.

5. () DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 1.

6. () REMARKS. FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA
2) .//
DECL/OADR//

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

SAMPLE CJCS ALERT ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Ref 10-E-1

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/DOC/USCINCCENT/-//
NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//
ORDTYP/ALORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//

**NARR/() THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
SUPPORTED CINC OPOD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY
301000Z NOV ___.**

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

**3. () COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 1 AS
CONTAINED IN REF B.**

4. () MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.

5. () _____. USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT
AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

6. () OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.

9. () CI GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

10. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 290001Z OCT ___. REQUEST
USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM
C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.

B. () TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 1 DEC ___.

C. () SUPPORTING COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE
REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 280400Z NOV ___. MOVEMENT SCHEDULES
REQUIRED BY 290400Z NOV ___.

D. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS
REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

E. () OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS PER WARNING ORDER OR
PLANNING ORDER.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED
PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 17 NOV ___. AIRLIFT
PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE III (EFFECTIVE
PROPOSED C-DAY MINUS 4). SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON
USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE
REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE
RRF.

A. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. () ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III IS PRUDENT GIVEN THE LIFT

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. ACCORDINGLY, STRATEGIC ASSETS FROM CRAF STAGE III ARE MADE AVAILABLE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. AS NOTED IN THE WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER, USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAF III ASSETS. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE THAT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX FLOW.

12. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD). SEE CJCS WARNING AND PLANNING ORDER.

13. () THE USE OF JOPEs IS DIRECTED.

14. () FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

15. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

16. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

17. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS--IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

18. () CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

19. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

21. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

22. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE NCA HAVE APPROVED USCINCCENT EXERCISE OF OPCON OVER USCINCPAC AND COMACC FORCES TRANSFERRED FOR THIS OPERATION. FOR COMACC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON THEIR ENTRY INTO USCINCCENT AOR. FOR USCINCPAC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

SAMPLE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER
(WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR ALERT ORDER PREVIOUSLY
ISSUED)

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
CDRJCS MACDILL AFB FL
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

USACGSC—FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Ref 10-F-1

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/261000ZNOV__//

REF/D/ORDER/CJCS/261001ZNOV__//

REF/E/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__//

REF/F/ORDER/USCINCCENT/301000ZONOV__//

NARR/REFS A THROUGH F: CJCS WARNING ORDER, USCINCCENT COMMANDERS ESTIMATE, CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, CJCS PLANNING ORDER, CJCS ALERT ORDER, USCINCCENT ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS DIRECTED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () IN RESPONSE TO YELLOWLAND INCURSIONS IN ORANGELAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND. THE NCA HAS AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 1 CONTAINED IN REF B IS APPROVED.

4. () MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A.

5. () OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

7. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

8. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

9. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDERS.

B. () EXECUTE BY 1 DEC ____.

C. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS. TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.

D. () ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

E. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.

11. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE

12. () THE USE OF JOPEIS IS DIRECTED.
13. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
14. () MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.
15. () CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
16. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
17. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
18. () COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
19. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
20. () STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//
ANKLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//