1990 Reports

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
Preemptive Military Strikes: A Viable Option Against International Terrorism? by Major Dirk R. Ahle, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The United States must be prepared to use military power, including preemptive strikes, in its national strategy against terrorist targets in countries that support international terrorism.
C-17, Candidate For The Budget Axe? by Major Kenneth K. Alexander, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The C-17 has a valid requirement for both the current and foreseeable future world situations. Alternatives are not viable from cost or capability standpoints. The program must be financially supported relative to development and production progress as assessed by the defense acquisition management system.
Marine Corps Doctrine: Can The Ace Support It? by Major Lawrence W. Astyk, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Marine aviation must adapt to the current Marine Corps doctrine of warfare by maneuver. The secret to this adaption is real integrated training with the other elements of a MAGTF.
Amphibious Or Ambiguous? Is The Corps Caught In The Confluence? by Major Alfred E. Burkhard Jr., USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The implementation of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM 1 and implement the MAGTF Master Plan.
U.S. Policy Towards Israel: The Special Relationship by Major Cozy E. Bailey, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] U.S. policy towards Israel has been contradictory, unfulfilling and defined and driven by special interest groups.
Marine Corps PSYOP? by MAJOR JOHN E. BLAIR, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Our maritime expeditionary forces that are essential for credible deterrence and warfighting across the spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct psychological operations (PSYOP).
Amphibious Assaults: Obligatory Or Obsolete? by LCdr James J. Bird, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] An austere defense budget climate will cause a re-examination of the necessity and feasibility of amphibious warfare.
Airborne Electronic Warfare by Major James R. Brubaker, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] As the next century approaches, the requirement to have a dedicated airborne EW platform within the Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF commander.
Use Of And Future Of The CH-46 Assault Helicopter In The United States Marine Corps by Major Kenneth D. Bonner, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The United States Marine Corps has a dilemma in deciding what to do about the medium lift replacement for the CH-46 as they approach the end of their designed service life in view of the Department of Defense decision to cancel the MV-22.
Fighting The MAGTF: A Doctrinal Vacuum by Major Leonard A. Blasiol, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but the Corps lacks a truly workable body of doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the capability of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast mental resources on this challenge.
Combat Engineer Battalion: A Time For Change by Major Larry W. Berquist, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Combat Engineer Battalion of the 1990's must be equipped and organized to meet the increased mobility and survivability requirements of the battlefield of the future.
Strategic Sealift Shortfall Solutions by Major Michael D. Boyd, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] There exist solutions to remedy the ongoing decline of the American flag fleet that can be executed to provide the strategic sealift necessary to both deploy U.S. forces to contingency areas and to give the American economy the cargo shipping it needs to enhance economic growth.
Expansion Of American Persian Gulf Policy By Three Presidents by Major Randy B. Bell, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] American policy in the Persian Gulf has been progressively expanded by three presidential administrations -- Nixon, Carter, and Reagan -- culminating in the United States reflagging over 30 combat and support ships in the Gulf to escort the reflagged tankers
Tryannosaurus NATO Rex? NATO In The 21st Century by Major Simon T. Beet, United Kindgom Royal Marines, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The pressures at work in the world today mean that the NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all.
Low Intensity Conflict: The United States And The Future by LCdr. Thomas Bjelica, Argentine Marine Corps, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The United States will be involved directly or indirectly in the future low intensity conflicts of the third world.
A View On Counterattacks In The Defensive Scheme Of Maneuver by Major David C. Chamley, Australian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If a defense is to be successful, we must place a higher priority on applying the considerations for conducting a counterattack; because it is the key to an effective defensive scheme of maneuver.
Amphibious Warfare Procedures And Assets Must Be Improved by LCdr. Garrat E. Cooper, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The current philosophy in the Marine Corps is to deploy as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, the Navy's priorities are not the same as the Marine Corps' and as a result amphibious warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved to support the Marines.
Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine - The Gallipoli Connection by Major Karen L. Corbett, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The British experiences in the Gallipoli campaign have had a significant, and lasting, impact on Marine Corps amphibious doctrine.
Better High Frequency Communications by Major Michael G. Chlebik, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Through improved planning of high frequency spectrum usage, the MAGTF Commander can achieve better command and control through his use of high frequency communication links.
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: History And U.S. Marine Involvement by Major William D. Claytor, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] All Marine officers assigned to UNTSO must prepare themselves not only by studying the history and culture of the area, but by obtaining an insight into UNTSO's history to include U.S. Marine participation in the organization.
Maneuver Warfare: Can The Ace Adopt This Philosophy Of War? by Major Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr., USMC & Major Gorden C. O'Neill, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The ACE can successfully adopt maneuver warfare and all that it represents. In order to accomplish this task, Marine Aviation must enhance its MAGTF training programs.
Aircraft Hardening: The Archilles Heel Of The MAGTF by Major Arthur L. Deal, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Marine Corps in an attempt to solve the problem of rear area security in particular the air base, has left out a critical element of the equation--that of hardening aircraft, equipment, and critical installation facilities.
Use Of The United States Army National Guard In Latin America by Major Bruce E. Davis, USARNG, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Use of The United States Army National Guard in Latin America For humanitarian aid and nation building projects offers a way to begin truly building the western hemisphere into a democratic and economic stronghold that could remain competitive with emerging economic coalitions.
Ironies Of Maneuver Warfare by Major Douglas C. Duncan, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we had better be aware of the larger contradictions and implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend to militate against our success.
Military Reorganization: Challenge And Opportunity by Major David D. Dyche, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The present military structure of three and one half (the Marine Corps) services, with their many overlapping functions and encroaching roles, no longer reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget. Now is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along functional lines into five separate military services.
The Death Of Airborne Electronic Warfare? by Major Lester A. Daugherty, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Although the "death of the Prowler" could result in the loss of Marine Corps airborne electronic warfare capability, it might also open the door to our first multi-mission V/STOL capability.
The MEU(SOC) Airfield Seizure by Major Scott G. Duke, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Although there exists a scarcity of information on how to conduct airfield seizures, the currently configurated MEU(SOC) units possess the assets and operational capability of conducting this special operations mission.
Air Attacks: Making CAS Responsive by Major Theodore E. Dailey, Jr., USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its technological base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on coordinated and highly developed interactive human performance factors; therefore, future success for the Marine Corps depends on acquiring effective technology, designing functional command and control relationships to support effective CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective between both partners, air and ground, in the successful accomplishment of the mission.
Marine Aviation - Time For Change by Major Thomas M. Davis, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The aviation combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force should be reorganized and trained in peacetime as it is expected to fight in time of war.
The U.S. Army: America's Strategic Land Force For The 1990s And Beyond by Major Harold A. Graziano, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] While ongoing events in the world will require changes in the United States' military structure, the U.S. Army with its highly trained mixture of light, heavy, and special operating forces is well poised to continue as America's strategic land force in the 1990s and beyond.
Understanding Guerrilla Warfare by Major Johnie Gombo, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Unless a Marine Air Ground Task Force Commander understands guerrilla warfare, conflict with a belligerent who uses guerrilla warfare will cause a problem.
The Air Land Battle - The Right Doctrine For The Next War? by Major Thomas J. Gill, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Air Land Battle Doctrine of the U.S. Army, endorsed by the U.S. Air Force, is well designed and can be adapted to all levels of conflict in the operational continuum. The current threat to the doctrine is not from those critics who view it as too narrow in scope, but rather, from instablity in the defense budget. The Air Land Battle Doctrine must be tailored to fit the capabilities of the force which will fight using it.
A Need For A MAGTF FSCC by Major Tommy S. Gray, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Along with the responsibility to command, the MAGTF commander must coordinate the supporting arms for the complex structure of today's MAGTF, thus a need exists for a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) at the MEB and MEF level.
National Security Strategy: The Threat Is As Great As Ever by Major Duane V. Hegna, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Although the Soviets current National Security Strategy appears to reflect a "new thinking" in terms of its outlook towards the United States and its allies, the Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever been.
Multiple Launch Rocket System: Hope For The Future by Major James F. Honeycutt, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The USMC must acquire an artillery system that is available to the MAGTF commander 24 hours a day under any weather condition with the capability of causing confusion and destruction in the enemy's rear which will enable the commander to influence the battle.
Deception: An Integral Part Of Warfare by Major Jack L. Hughes, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The MAGTF commander must actively pursue deception operations, not only as a force multiplier but also as an integral part of warfare.
The Northern Tier Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact: An Assessment by Major Ole Martin Hojem, Norwegian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] As a member of an alliance, the purpose of which is not so much to defend themselves as it is to defend the Soviet Union, the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states approach their alliance responsibility with varying degrees of enthusiasm and confidence.
Historical Applications Of Maneuver Warfare In The 20th Century by Major Peter E. Higgins, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Future Maneuverist can better appreicate the utility and effectiveness of this approach to warfare if shown examples of its approach in past applications.
Maritime Support Force - Is The S.O.S. Too Late? by Major Thomas A. Heffner, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The national security in recent years of the U.S. is directly linked to the ability of its maritime support forces, (i.e. naval strategic fleet, merchant marine fleet, and shipbuilding base) to project and sustain combat forces overseas; however careful analysis reveals the current maritime situation to be an "Achilles Heel" to the national defense.
El Dorado Canyon: Strategic Strike, National Objectives by Major Ralph J. Jodice II, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national security objectives of the United States.
Marine Maneuver Warfare And The Omnibus Agreement by Major Frederick J. Klauser, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If the MAGTF commander is expected to employ the ACE in maneuver warfare during joint operations, then he must have a thorough knowledge of Marine aviation capabilities and employment.
U.S. Bases In The Philippines by Major Michael F. Kimlick, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] With all the pros and cons being discussed in maintaining bases in the Philippines, the one argument being ignored and needs to be given higher priority is that a MAGTF afloat needs a place to train to maintain its warfighting skills.
Security Assistance Forces (SAF): A US Military Option For Counterinsurgency by Major Philip T. Klapakis, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Security Assistance Forces (SAF) Concept must be reinstated as an primary US military option for counterinsurgency in order for the United States to successfully conduct Low Intensity Conflicts operations in the Third World in the future.
Command And Control: As It Applies To Maneuver Warfare by Major Thomas M. Kinnear, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Commanders in the Marine Corps must have a clear understanding of command and control as it applies to Maneuver Warfare to be efficient and effective in combat.
MV-22 Osprey: The Best Solution To The Marine Corps Medium Lift Requirement by Major Lenn M. Lanahan, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] With the CH-46 approaching its twenty-sixth year of service life, a long term replacement, such as the MV-22 Osprey, must be acquired to fill the Marine Corps medium lift requirement well into the twenty-first century.
Strategic Mobility: The Crumbling Cornerstone? by Major Paul L. Ladd, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone of both current and future U.S. policy.
Surface Warfare On Wings by LCdr Brian T. McCann, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The US Navy can continue its maritime strategy and reduce both manpower and blue dollar requirements by procuring more PHMs.
Understanding Revolutionary Warfare by Major Dennis I. Merritt, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] It is essential for civilian and military leaders to have some knowledge of revolutionary warfare theory, strategy, tactics, and causation.
United States Power Projection Capability: A Time For Change by Major Henry W. Mauer, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] As the United States seeks to redesign its strategy for military power projection in the face of a rapidly changing domestic and international political environment, it should restructure its military forces with an emphasis on strategic and operational mobility.
Developing A Continuous Operations Capability by Major Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Developing a continuous operations capability is vital to sustaining the performance of Marine forces because it will slow down or negate the degrading effects of continuous operations, preserve the fighting capabilities of Marine units, and reduce the potential for battle fatigue (BF) casualties among Marines and leaders.
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Deterrence In Decline by Major Matt R. Morrison, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The U.S. defense industrial base, a key ingredient to deterrence and national security, is deteriotating.
Credible Mobilization Crucial For The Defense Of The Nation by Major Rosemary L. McCammond, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Refocus of energies are required for long term rewards vice short term gains. Legislation and policies are needed to promote new long term approach and self-sustainment in national emergency.
Assume The Best: The North Korean Campaign Of 1950 by Major Richard P. Mills, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The American High Command made several critical assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty assumptions that assured defeat.
Terrorism: Challenges For The Marine Corps by Major William M. Meade, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Marine Corps has made progress combatting terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have caused problems which still require a solution.
Redefining Aviation Support Concepts by Major Phillip L. Newman, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] As the employment of Marine Aviation changed from WWII, through the 1960s and into the 1980s, the aviation concepts which supported it also changed. As the employment of Marine aviation now seems to be making a drastic change by the year 2010, it is again time to reevaluate the concepts which support it.
The Future Marine Corps; Expeditionary Force In Readiness Or Day Care Center? by Major Thomas M. Ochala, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The potential for the Marine Corps to realize a significant cut in end strength within the near future makes it essential to insure the force structure remaining is thoroughly professional and efficient.
Combat Engineers: Are They A Viable Asset In Today's Environment by Major Frank A. Panter Jr, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The role of the combat engineer as a key contributor for enhancing mobility, countermobility and survivability in MAGTF operations must be revisited, for properly employing the combat engineer as a combat multiplier enables the commander to master time and terrain.
Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, And The Marines In Vietnam by Major Frank D. Pelli, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Marine strategy for Vietnam contained many of the important elements necessary to effectively conduct a counterinsurgency war.
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet - Future Credibility by Major Jeffrey A. Porter, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] In the aftermath of airline deregulation, U.S. strategic airlift capability continues to undergo significant transformation and has reached the point where increasing shortfalls exist with little hope for improvement without federal intervention.
The MAGTF's Approach To Logistics In Maneuver Warfare by Major Paul J. Pisano, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Unless the MAGTF makes some major adjustments in its approach to logistics/CSS operations, the logistics wars that have plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style of warfare.
Employment Of The Selected Marine Corps Reserve Forces As Units: A Needed Commitment by Major Candace G. Quinlan, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Marine Corps should incorporate guidance into its mobilization plans which emphasizes the importance of employing Selected Marine Corps Reserve forces as units in order to gain their most effective use in future wars.
Fire And Ice: Preparation And Employment Of Marine Artillery In Cold Weather by Major Philip C. Rudder, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] To provide effective fire support, Marine artillery must be prepared to defeat the effects of cold weather through detailed planning, preparation and execution.
Training Infantry To Win In The Deadly Battlefield Of The Future by Major Paul D. Refling, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] All through the infantry training process, the Marine Corps must refocus and refine its practices if victory in battle is to be ensured and exploitation of its training weaknesses is to be avoided.
Marine Corps Electronic Warfare--A Combat Power Multiplier by Major Stephen C. Robb, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander is to gain control and manage the electromagnetic spectrum of the future battlefield, he must understand and integrate Electronic Warfare (EW) into his warfighting plans as a combat power multiplier.
The Assault Support Helicopter, What Will It Be In The Future? by Major David A. Salzman, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Marine Corps must continue to provide the best aviation troop transport aircraft to support future operations.
The "Army 2000", Today's Effects, Tomorrow's Technology and Future Strategy by Major David H. Schock, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] These powerful combinations of political, social, and economic forces will impact greatly on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next decade. In direct correlation with this reduction will come structural changes and personnel reductions. Combined with the rapid advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be a smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand Battle doctrine.
Air Interdiction--Focus For The Future by Major John A. Snider, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Air interdiction has a long history of effectiveness from the Second World War to the present day. To maintain and enhance that effectiveness in the face of increasingly mobile and lethal ground forces protected by increasingly sophisticated and effective air defense systems, the USAF and her sister-Service air components must improve both interdiction related systems and the procedures used in their employment.
War Reserve Stocks And Marine Corps Sustainability by Major Joseph L. Styons, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] While the foundation of Marine Corps War Reserve Policy is sound, the weaknesses associated with the acquisition, storage, maintenance, and ability to deliver these assets creates a long-standing, complex problem.
Fighting The MAGTF: The Multiple GCE Dilemma by Major Luciano S. Silva, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If the MAGTF is going to be able to fight across the entire spectrum of war using combined, joint or uni-service GCEs it must establish doctrine for employment of multiple GCEs.
The U.S. Navy's Future In Drug Interdiction by LCdr Mark J. Salonia, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Present employment of U.S. Naval Forces in drug interdiction operations is ineffective and in need of revision.
The Future Of TACAIR In Joint/Combined Operations by Major Steven P. Schavrien, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint\Combined Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft (TACAIR), regardless of the nationality markings of the aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is assigned to - air or naval forces.
The Last Frog Pilot by The Last Frog Pilot, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] A thorough understanding of the assault support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on the future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required to meet the threat in the 21st Century.
The Boy Who Cried Wolf - The Death Of the Tank by Major Ralph L. Schutte, PPCLI, Canadian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Weapons developments could make armoured formations as they are currently structured obsolete. While the obsolescence of armour is by no means certain, it could provide some distinct advantages for technologically advanced nations.
Who Will Rescue Amphibious Search And Rescue? by Major Raymond S. Shelton, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The Navy does not now possess, nor does it plan to develop in the near future, a compatible SAR or dedicated active duty CSAR capability for the amphibious fleet.
DASC: The Proper Tool For The Job? by Major Rolf W. Sandbakken, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The role of the Direct Air Support Center in coordinating aircraft employment is vital, but placing that function in the Aviation Combat Element precludes the proper employment of all the supporting arms of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
The MACCS In Maneuver Warfare by Major Charles F. Triplett, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The traditional MACCS employment practices lag the technological capabilities and flexible employment initiatives required of modern MAGTF contingencies.
Sealift: A Problem Of The 1990's by LCdr Charles F. Thuma Jr, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Although substansial force reductions are inevitable because of the rapidly changing international scene, our sealift capability should be enhanced in order to allow the United States to meet continuing strategic commitments.
Marine Corps Main Battle Tank Force by Major John D. Theeuwen, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] If the Marine Corps is to maintain its capability as a force in readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict it will have to increase its main battle tank force capabilities.
Military Intervention: A Question Of Risk by Major John R. Turner, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Acceptable risk levels of operational clarity, certainty, and control were achieved for Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, and Operation Just Cause in December 1989, but not before or during the failed Panama Coup in October 1989.
The Gulf War by LtCol Mukram F. Tal, Jordan Armed Forces, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The conflict between Iraq and Iran has deep roots in the history of the Middle Eastern region.
Mobilizing The Deteriorating Defense Industrial Base by Major Michael J. Terry, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] The nation's industrial base is presently unable to support the needs of our country if we went to war today, and should current trends stay the same, the future as well.
Marine Aviation - Present And Future by Major Robert M. Thomas, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] There are 6 aviation functions that the air combat element performs in order to complete the mission of Marine Air. What present assets does the Marine Corps possess and what are the future assets required to perform these 6 functions? What are some of the limitations and capabilities of these assets?
FMFM 1 And Its Implications For USMC Air by Major David P. Westridge, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] This paper explores the possibilities and rationale of the Aviation Combat Element being a "maneuver element" as outlined within General Gray's concept published as FMFM 1, "Warfighting".
Prowler: Best For The Future? by Major Kenneth C. Watson, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Before Marines discard or degrade the ability to conduct airborne, manned electronic warfare (EW), they must carefully consider the real, long-term value of airborne support EW to the MAGTF.
A Marine Component Commander For Unified Commands by Major Raymond H. Young, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1990] Joint doctrine needs to be revised to explicitly establish a Marine component commander in each of the geographic unified commands, because misinterpretation of the present doctrine has created a system which fails to recognize the Marine Corps as a separate service with unique characteristics and does not serve the needs of the commander.
OPERATION JUST CAUSE LESSONS LEARNED
- VOLUME I. SOLDIERS AND LEADERSHIP
- Volume II: Operations
- Volume III: Intelligence, Logistics, and Equipment
Base Structure Report for Fiscal Year 1991 Department of Defense August 1990 [PDF]

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1990 Reports