1989 Reports

• Tarawa: Testing Ground For The Amphibious Assault by Major Douglas F. Ashton, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] From lessons learned during the battle of Tarawa, the Marine Corps refined its amphibious warfare doctrine resulting in one of the most significant military concepts of the Second World War. the amphibious assault.
• Elite Forces Past And Present by Major George A. Biszak, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Special units since World War II have added a new dimension to warfare. Often overlooked in favor of larger campaign studies their value has only recently come to light in view of potential involvement in a low-intensity conflict or terrorist act. The military must make an all out effort to maintain these units at a high state of readiness.
• Low-Intensity Conflict And The Marines: A Seabased Solution by Major Andrew J. Budka, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The purpose of this paper is to examine low-intensity conflict, believed by the Marine Corps to be the most likely form of war it will face in the 1990's.
• Comabat Engineers And The MAGTF by Major Bruce Bissett, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] In order to more effectively employ combat engineers, the Marine Corps needs to focus the efforts of the combat engineer battalion on combat support tasks, transfer existing combat service support responsibilities to other units, and reassign staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the G/S-3.
• The Challenge Of The Post-World War II Era: The Marine Corps, 1945-1957 by Major Bill R. Beachamp, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The purpose of this paper is to examine the events immediately following World War II that influenced changes in Marine Corps doctrine and organization.
• The Operational Level: Vital Knowledge For Today's Officer by Major Charles Bauland, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The American officer has an obligation to understand and appreciate the operational level of war and its implementation through campaign planning.
• The Caribbean Basin: A Strategic Concern by Major David Burgess, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Our national security is inextricably tied to that of our neighbors in this hemisphere. We must focus greater attention to the region, particularly those nations of the Caribbean Basin or risk jeopardizing future national security.
• Commandos-By Anybody's Definition by Major Jeffery W. Bearor, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that Marines will become "Commandos- by anybody's definition." Although small, specialized units can be trained to the standard of "Commando", it may be impossible to train the entire Corps to such a standard.
• Korea-Alliance In Transition by Major Larry D. Beaver, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] With growing economic and military capability, South Korea is ready and able to assume greater responsibility for its defense. In light of the Republic of Korea's growing nationalistic pride and fervor, the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance must adapt to accommodate this maturing Northeast Asian partner.
• Technology's Impact On The Navy by LCdr. M. C. Braunbeck, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Throughout modern history technology has greatly impacted the development and operation of the United States Navy.
• Air Land Battle And Maneuver Warfare: Do We Need Both? by Major Mark L. Broin, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Considering the need for interoperability between the Army and the Marine Corps, the similar nature of their actions, and the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, can their parochial service attitudes, which have resulted in the uncoordinated rewriting of their service doctrines, be justified, or, in the interest of interoperability, can the Army and the Marine Corps use the same caps tone doctrine?
• The Communist Party Of The Philippines/National Democratic Front Network Abroad by LtCol. Orlando Buenaventura, Philippine Navy, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] To give the reader an understanding of the history, operations, internal organization, external support, and objectives of the Communist Party of the Philippines/National Democratic Front networks abroad.
• C4I2: A Command Dilemma by Major Charles E. Cooke, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] C4I2 burdens commanders through tactical limitations, enemy technology thefts, logistical support, human interaction, and tactical employment; however, C4I2 systems are force multipliers that provide the tactical commander with state-of-the-art equipment to control and maneuver his forces.
• The Korean Commitment - "Now More Than Ever" by Major Paul J. Chase, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The single most important factor in achieving national interests in the Republic of Korea is the maintenance of a healthy and vigorous alliance relationship. Although some people advocate a major withdrawl of United States military personnel from the Republic of Korea, we must continue their presence since this area is so vital to our national interests.
• United States National Security Strategy For The Next Century by Major Richard A. Conty, Jr., USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The U.S. use technology to "annihilate" enemies rather than following its current policy of maintaining a large standing army to fight other large standing armies by conventional means.
• Battlefield Navigation: Ancient Problems, Modern Solutions by Major Conrad G. Dahl, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] To date, tests have demonstrated that many of the problems of battlefield navigation, command and control, and communication can be alleviated through the professional planning and use of PLRS.
• Maritime Prepositioning Forces--Are They What They Seem? by Major Douglas A. Darling, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] MPF doctrine is in need of updating to reflect the most likely type and place of employment in the future.
• Offensive Air Support And Maneuver Warfare: Do The Military Reformers Understand Them? by Major Eddie A. Daniels, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an extensive modernization program of its aviation units to meet the demands of offensive air support and other missions critical to the MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some military reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions and to utilize Marine aviation safely and effectively.
• Artillery- A Different Perspective by Major J. S. Dill, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Although Marine Corps Artillery effectively supports a conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails, however, to adequately support a mechanized force that is employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high mobility environment.
• Logistical Employment Of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) by Major Michael J. Dooley, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] New capabilities provided by LCAC continue to challenge Navy and Marine Corps planners as they decide how to best utilize these new craft in a variety of situations. Both doctrine and LCAC operational planning must address craft employment in logistical support roles. A review of air cushion vehicle development, Army experience with air cushion vehicles, LCAC characteristics and existing doctrine will provide a foundation upon which to base sound decisions.
• The Ace As A Maneuver Element by Major Steven B. Donnell, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is more than just a supporting arm for the Ground Combat Element (GCE) , it's an additional maneuver element that can assist the MAGTF commander in winning on the battlefield.
• Beyond The Horizon by LCDR. Glen F. Erickson, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The LCAC will preserve the significant military capability of Amphibious assaults but not without its shortcomings.
• Remember Midway by Major B. T. Fenlon, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] In spite of the fact that the Japanese Navy possessed overwhelming combat power at Midway, it lost the battle because of a plan built on erroneous assumptions, tainted by a sense of invincibility, and supported with in-adequate intelligence.
• Does Our Nation's Security Strategy Address The Real Threats? by LCDR. Charles J. Fairchild, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Deterrence remains the framework from which the United States Security Strategy is structured. Low-intensity conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and diminution of presidential prerogative represent serious challenges to the success of national security strategy and the protection of our freedom in the future. The national security strategy must appropriately address these threats and effectively promote changes to thwart them.
• Peacetime Combat In Garrison by Major Gerald J. Flotte, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Although most people think of leadership challenges only in combat situations, Marine leaders are faced with many leadership problems during peacetime in garrison that must be elimated to insure our Marines will be effectively combat ready.
• United States Foreign Policy In Southern Africa--A Closer Look by LtCdr. Armstead J. Galiber, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Although the accelerating trend in southern Africa toward a major extension of regional conflict has been slowed by the recent peace agreement between South Africa, Cuba and Angola, United States foreign policy in southern Africa has encouraged a build up of Soviet and Cuban influence in the area. United States import vulnerability has forced it to take foreign policy positions that compromise its integrity as a world power.
• White Knight Or White Elephant: The M1A1 "Abrams" In The Marine Corps by Major Karl J. Gunzelman, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Marine Corps has procured a main-battle tank (MBT) that fails to adequately support its doctrinal missions as an infantry support weapon and as an element of a maneuver force.
• Understanding And Combating Terrorism by Major S. M. Grass, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] In order to combat terrorism we must be able to understand a type of warfare that cannot be defined within a set of rules or principles.
• National Security Strategy. Time For A Change? by Major C.S. Huddleston, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Current U.S. National Security Strategy does not place adequate emphasis on the Pacific Basin region.
• Underway Replenishment by LtCdr. Donald D. Hill, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The US Navy underway replenishment program has come through the time of forced development to an evolving doctrine that will adequately serve the fleet.
• Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept by Major George J. Hayn, Jr., USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC)is a concept that provides the aviation logistics support for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE). However, in order to be a credible concept, MALSC must be bully and continually exercised in realistic training scenarios.
• U.S. Policy In Central America: Time For Decisive Action by Major J. M. Hughes, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Central American countries are vital to America's national defense; yet our national strategy lacks a feasible plan for protecting democracy and its future in Central America.
• The U.S. Can Defeat Trans-National Terrorism by LCDR. Ralph E. Haney. USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The only way to beat a terrorist group is to utterly destroy their capability to wage warfare (unconventional or otherwise). This includes a multifaceted approach to the problem, attacking them simultaneously in the economic, political, and military arenas
• Operation "Urgent Fury": Military Police (MP) In Grenada by Major Wayne Hicks, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Operation URGENT FURY is the first real test of MP combat support since Vietnam and provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate doctrine relative to mission, organization, equipment, and training of both division and corps MP assets.
• The Causes Of The War Of 1812 by Major W.W. Harney,USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] An analysis of the causes of the War of 1812 shows the importance of maintaining military capabilities that are compatible with our national goals.
• "Task One": Airbase Survivability/Recoverability Assessment by Major David L. John, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Despite the importance we have placed on high technology aircraft and advanced air munitions in recent times we have failed to give equel attention to airbase vulnerabilities and preparation requirements for war. Our planners and air base commanders need an assessment methodology to determine appropriate active and passive defensive measures in a pre-attack environment and a guide for post-attack recovery operations.
• Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force by Major Lance D. Jordan, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Light infantry forces are often associated with low-intensity conflict, but they have an equally important role inthe mid- and high-intensity battlefield as well.
• Does The Marine Corps Need The EA-6B "Prowler" Aircraft by Major R. B. Johnson,USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Airborne electronic warfare (EW) is critical for the success and the survival of the MAGTF's aviation combat element on the modern battlefield.
• The Marine Corps Reserve: Times Are A Changin by Major David M. Kirkwood, USMCR, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The MAGTF Master Plan should be the foundation for all future plans to include the moblization plan. Additionally, the Marines should be realistic in its plans for employing reserves and stress individual skill proficieny vice unit proficieny.
• Infantry Battalion Training: Is It Good Enough? by Major E.L. Kent, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Infantry battalion training has suffered from a variety of ills, to the point that there can be a justifiable concern as to whether the training conducted by the infantry battalions of the Marine Corps is good enough to prepare them for combat.
• VSTOL Revisted by Major Joseph J. Krejmas, Jr., USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] With planned improvements to the engine, airframe, weapons system, and pilot training, the AV-8B Harrier will continue to provide the Marine Corps with the Offensive Air Support (OAS) necessary to win on today's modern battlefield. In addition and perhaps more significantly it will provide the operational experience necessary to develope third generation VSTOL fighter/attack aircraft for the year 2000 and beyond.
• Deception: A Neglected Force Multiplier by Major Michael B. Kessler, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] It stands as a reasonable assumption that a decisive advantage will be gained by those who understand and practice the art of deception.
• The Ace's Role In Maneuver Warfare And The Marine MAGTF by Major Michael W. Karnath, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Although maneuver warfare has been officially adopted as Marine Corps doctrine there still remains a lot of confusion concerning how to employ maneuver within both combat elements of the MAGTF, the ACE and the Ground Component Element.
• Ownership Of The Night by Major Bron Madrigan, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] With the introduction ov the AV-8B and the F/A-18D night attack variants, it is worthwile to take a look at where the Marine Corps has been with night specific missions to better predict where it is going.
• Vietnam: Lessons Learned by Major Clarence Mariney, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The U.S. civilian and military leadership failed to heed the lessons of the past during the Vietnam war. They underestimated the enemy and the nature of the war.
• "MLRS": A Rocket System For The Marine Corps by Major C. W. Morris, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Attention must be focused on both the acquisition and employment of an optimum number of rocket launchers to adequately support the Marine Corps and its concept of deployment as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and employment as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
• Complexion Of Engineer Support by Major Ed J. Maguire, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The complexion of Marine engineer task are not supported by present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization, although its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine Corps.
• Should Camp Lejeune Be Expanded by Major William A. Meier, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Currently, the amount of training landed needed to accomplish the required training task at Camp Lejeune are limited. To satisfy these training short falls the acquisition of 41,000 acres of additional land is needed.
• The Principles Of War - A Look Back To The Future by Major J. P. Niblett, Royal Marines, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The study of military history is an important method of understanding the relevance of lessons learnt through the actions of past military commanders on the battlefield. The application of these lessons which reinforce the fundamental Principles of War, is a valuable tool in the study of likely future conflicts.
• Gorbachev The Leader by Major David J. Pyle, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style and ability to portray the Soviet Union as the leading peace maker in the world is one of the greatest problems facing the Bush administration during the next four years.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act Of 1986: Resurgence In Defense Reform And The Legacy Of Eisenhower by Major Greg H. Parlier, USA, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Evaluates the implications of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
• MAGTF: Inefficient And Misunderstood by Major Harry D. Persons, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] GCE Commanders are ill prepared to make aviation related decisions.
• Single-Seat Fighters: A Question Of Survivability by Major Joseph A. Papay, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] In the case of the F/A-18 Hornet, the dual-seat design, integrated with today's modern technology, has a significant advantage over the single-seat Hornet in the areas of mission success and survivability.
• The Marine Helicopter And The Korean War by Major Rodney R. Propst, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] After World War II, the Marine Corps introduced a new dimension in the mobility of assault troops and supplies with the advent of the helicopter. Vertical envelopment was developed at the Marine Corps Base, in Quantico and proven during the Korean War.
• Logistics For Low-Intensity Conflict by Major R. S. Patterson, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The current logistics system and procedures in place to operate and prepare for the "Big War" can provide the right kind of logistics for LIC if certain considerations are met in the various LIC environments.
• The 1973 Arab-Isreali War by Major Steven J. Piccirilli, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] If President Sadat was to end the status quo of ("no peace, no war") and to force negotiations, he had to resort to war.
• Maneuver Warfare And OTH Amphibious Assaults by LtCdr. Terry Pierce, USN, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Navy's inability to view an amphibious assault by any other means than at the tactical level has left it unaware that there is a need to conceptualize the OTH assault at the operational level of war in order to successfully coordinate the battle.
• German Submarine Research And Development During The Inter-War Years by Major Edward N. Rohloff, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Through relentless clandestine operations Germany would retain and actually improve her U-Boat technology base despite the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.
• The Ace's Rear Area Headache Airfield Security by Major Kenneth T. Reed, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] By training aviation units in the planning and execution of airfield security the mission can be accomplished and be established as doctrine within the Aviation Combat Element.
• Strategic Loss In Indochina - U.S. Policy In Laos by Major Michael E. Ruth, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] A study of the relationship between the United States and Laos from WWII to the signing of the Geneva accords in 1962, in order to address problems in U.S. strategy formulation and the use of national power.
• Embracing Maneuver Warfare And Preparing For War by Major P. B. Retter, Australian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Marine Corps has formally adopted the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine. The Corps must now put aside old prejudices and attitudes and incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for war. This will not be an easy process.
• The Role Of Hornet-D In The Marine Air Ground Task Force Air Combat Element by Major Ronald G. Richardella, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] As a more effective weapons delivery platform in both the strike and air-to-air arenas, the two-seat F/A-18D should play a major role in Marine aviation in terms of both force composition and mission allocation.
• Terrorism And Misconception Of Islam by LtCol. Taiseer Rahahleh, Jordanian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Most of the time people misunderstand and become confused between people holding an Islam's name and Islam. Whenever terrorists conduct one of their shameful actions, Islam is accused, is that true? The purpose of this paper is to clear the misconception for a better understanding
• Assault Amphibian Battalion: The Time For Change Is Now by Major Howard P. Schick, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Recent changes to the infantry organization and the addition of mobility missions necessitate a change to the Assault Amphibian Battalion structure.
• The Role Of Marine Aviation In Maneuver Warfare by Major John B. Saxman, USAF, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] In order to truly employ the tenets of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps' air combat element must operate as an independent maneuver unit synchronized with, not subjugated to, the operations of the ground combat unit.
• Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades by Major Joseph H. Schmid, U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces around permanent Marine Expeditionary Brigades.
• The Marine Corps Must Have Tanks by Major John R. Sykes, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The Marine Corps must have tanks, specifically the M1A1 Abrams, if the Marine Corps expects to win in combat when fighting outnumbered.
• MAGTF Air Defense And Maneuver Warfare by Major James E. Thigpen, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Can the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) defend itself from airborne attacks by a determined threat equipped with modern aircraft and helicopters?
• Hue: A 1989 Analysis by Major John M. Taylor, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Although the battle for Hue transpired twenty years ago, the military actions conducted then are in consonance with the fundamentals of maneuver warfare revitalized today.
• A Hedge Against Uncertainty: Command, Control, And Communications (C3) Technology by Major J.R. Thomas, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The commander's interaction with machine technology is less than perfect. However, an appreciation of C3 technology in the areas of communications and computers can reduce the uncertainty in battle.
• National Security Strategy And American Public Opinion by Major Larry D. Tarbet, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] The United States Government must inform the public of its national security strategy in ways that are clear, and credible, and likely to elicit support.
• The Situation In The Norwegian Sea Today by Major Odd F. Tangen, Norwegian Army, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] How important is the Norwegian Sea today, as seen from both the east and the west, and has it changed over the last years? If it did change, why and in what direction did it change?
• What's Wrong With America's Maritime Strategy? by Major Stephen M. Womack, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] Current U.S. Maritime Strategy is inadequate to guarantee Soviet deterrence from unacceptable global adventurism leading to conventional or nuclear war.
• Soviet National Strategy by Major Royce D. Zant, USMC, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1989] This is a country where Soviet national and strategic policy is undeniably offensive, offensive to the point of being preemptive in nature, and where this policy has been developed by less than six percent of the population.