[Senate Hearing 111-27]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-27
STRENGTHENING U.S. DIPLOMATIC
CAPACITY IN AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
April 21, 2009
__________
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Feingold, Hon. Russ, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin................. 1
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator From Georgia.................. 3
Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., Adjunct Fellow for Africa Policy,
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC................... 11
Prepared statement......................................... 13
Pickering, Hon. Thomas R., Former Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC......... 4
Prepared statement......................................... 6
Wolpe, Hon. Howard, Director of Africa Program and Project on
Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson Center,
Washington, DC................................................. 19
Prepared statement......................................... 21
(iii)
STRENGTHENING U.S. DIPLOMATIC
CAPACITY IN AFRICA
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TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. This hearing will come to order. On
behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African
Affairs, I welcome you all to this hearing, entitled
``Strengthening U.S. Diplomatic Capacity to Anticipate,
Prevent, and Respond to Conflict in Africa.'' I'm honored that
I'll be joined by the ranking member of the subcommittee,
Senator Isakson, and I will ask him to deliver some opening
remarks when he arrives.
Today's topic is one that has come up again and again in
the hearings of this subcommittee, in my own travels throughout
Africa over the years. I've seen, firsthand, the dedication of
our diplomats, their resourcefulness, and their hard work. I've
also--but, I've also seen how they are overstretched and lack
the necessary resources and authorities to fully pursue
comprehensive strategies.
The gaps in our diplomatic capacities are especially felt
when it comes to work on defusing regional conflicts, a
priority set by the National Security Strategy of 2006. As that
strategy notes, these conflicts often spread or devolve into
humanitarian tragedies, as we've seen in Congo, in Sudan, and
can be exploited by outside parties, such as al Qaeda, as we
are seeing, to some extent, in Somalia.
Defusing conflict starts with anticipating them beforehand
so that we are not constantly reacting.
At his confirmation hearing, CIA director Leon Panetta said
he is concerned that we aren't allocating enough intelligence
resources to various parts of the world, including Africa.
While we must address these gaps, we must also recognize that
much of the information our country needs on Africa, everything
from civil conflicts and instability and potential terrorist
safe havens, can sometimes be obtained overtly through
increased diplomatic reporting. I've been concerned, for a long
time, that we have little to no political presence in key parts
of Africa, such as the Central African Republic, Northern
Nigeria, or Eastern Congo. As a result, we lack eyes and ears
to gather information and anticipate emerging crises or fully
understand existing ones.
In addition, we need to help our diplomats get outside
their embassy compounds in foreign capitals to interact with a
range of non-national governmental actors. This was a goal of
the Bush administration's transformational diplomacy
initiative, but their rhetoric was not followed by much action.
We need to make good on that vision, which includes ensuring
our ambassadors in Africa have sufficient authority and
flexible resources, and looking to establish more permanent
out-of-embassy posts. This must all be part of an overall
integrated interagency collection-and-analysis strategy.
Last year, Senator Hagel and I introduced legislation to
establish an independent commission to address the lack of such
a strategy. This legislation was passed by the Intelligence
Committee last year. And, although Senator Hagel has retired, I
intend to reintroduce this legislation this year, and hope that
my colleagues on this committee, the Foreign Relations
Committee, will also support it.
Now, once we get the information, the next question is,
What do we do with it? I've supported the use of special envoys
in different cases, but we need to ensure that they are used
effectively and remember that they are just a short-term
enhancement to our diplomacy. In the long term, we need to
rebuild and reposition our diplomatic capabilities to engage in
conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
At the same time, we can't do this all ourselves, nor
should we. The State Department's strategic plan for 2007-2012,
emphasizes regional solutions to regional problems. To that
end, we need to look at how we can better partner with strong
regional actors, such as Nigeria and South Africa, and help
Africa's regional organizations develop new capabilities to
address conflict.
I probably do not need to remind anyone that, over the past
few weeks, there's been increasing concern about the spate of
piracy attacks off Somalia's coast. I've been worried, for some
time, about the piracy problem, which is an outgrowth of the
collapse of Government in Somalia, and I'm working with the
chairman of the full committee to hold special piracy and
Somalia-related hearings as soon as possible. But today's
hearing is very relevant because it addresses our ability to
address this and other problems, which is, in fact, handicapped
by inadequate tools and already strained capacity. The
administration must make a more serious and sustained
diplomatic push to stabilize Somalia, including appointing a
senior envoy for the Horn of Africa. But, these obstacles may
make that even more difficult.
Finally, I hope to hold a confirmation hearing, as soon as
possible, on the nomination for Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs. I know, from conversations with him, that Ambassador
Carson recognizes the importance of strengthening our
diplomatic capacity, and I hope today's hearing will provide
some recommendations for him to consider, if confirmed.
Now, I certainly feel that we have an all-star lineup of
witnesses here with us today, all with intimate knowledge and
extensive experience with their diplomatic capacity.
First, we'll hear from Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the
former U.S. Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to
the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria,
the Kingdom of Jordan, and the United Nations. Time magazine
has called him ``the five-star general of the diplomatic
corps.'' Ambassador Pickering now serves as the chairman of the
board of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and recently was a
member of their Genocide Prevention Task Force.
It's, of course, an honor to have you with us today.
We'll then hear from Ambassador Princeton Lyman, former
U.S. Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria, and former
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs. Ambassador Lyman is now a senior fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations, and has written and commentated
extensively on developing a more strategic U.S. approach to
Africa. And I have benefited tremendously over the years from
his insights and his knowledge.
And I'm very glad to have you here today, as well.
Finally, we'll have Dr. Howard Wolpe, a man who knows what
it feels like to be in my seat up here. Congressman Wolpe
represented Michigan's 3rd District from 1979 to 1993, and, for
many of those years, served as the chairman of the House
Subcommittee on African Affairs. In addition, though, Dr. Wolpe
brings the unique experience of having served as a special
envoy; during the Clinton administration, a Presidential envoy
to the Great Lakes region of Africa. He now works as the
director of the Africa Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center,
and director of its Project on Leadership and Building State
Capacity.
I am grateful to all three of you for joining us here
today, and I look forward to hearing your brief testimony and
having a lively discussion. I note, with a great deal of
pleasure, that Senator Corker has joined us today.
And now, of course, it's my pleasure to turn to the
distinguished ranking member, Senator Isakson, for his opening
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold, and
thank you very much for calling this hearing today. I want to
welcome the witnesses. I won't make a long statement, except to
repeat what the chairman has heard me say, and others, before.
I think, in the 21st century, Africa is the continent for
the United States of America, and I think it is very important
for us to understand what our diplomatic capacity is, and to
strengthen it wherever we can. It is a very diverse, very
interesting, very rich, and very challenging continent. Senator
Corker and myself will be going to five African countries at
the end of May to try and raise our presence there, and to
convey to those countries our interest in them and the entire
African continent.
We appreciate your being here. I am familiar with each and
every one of you. Your reputations precede you, and I'm looking
forward to learn a great deal from you, and appreciate your
willingness today to make a commitment to this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I thank the ranking member for his
statement and for his very cooperative approach to, and role
on, this committee.
Unless Mr. Corker has a comment, I would now turn to
Ambassador Pickering for his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Isakson, Senator Corker. And it's a pleasure to be with you,
and an honor to testify before this subcommittee on the
important subject of anticipating, preventing, and responding
to conflict in Africa. I'm delighted to join two old friends
and colleagues, to my right, in this testimony, and I have
written testimony, which I hope will be useful in the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Ambassador Pickering. Today, I want to do two or three
things in my testimony. I want to sketch out the nature of
conflict and some of the issues which lead to conflict in
current-day Africa. I want to point out some of the steps and
ideas that will contribute to anticipating and preventing--
responding--conflict in the continent. And last, I want to try
to answer some of your specific questions.
With respect to conflict, while Africa, over the years, has
had more than its share of conflicts and problems, which might
lead to further strife, a careful review of some of the current
issues and problems in Africa will set out some of the kinds of
issues which Africans and those outside the continent
interested in resolution will now face, and will face in the
future. In this testimony, I won't be able to review all of the
issues; however, it draws heavily on the work of the
International Crisis Group, where I am cochairman of the board,
and I believe I can provide information broadly representative
of the current questions and issues to set the stage. I then
discuss a number of conflicts, including Somalia, the coming
elections in South Africa, and other things.
Certainly, the two big questions for us at the moment
remain the Congo, which has undergone some dramatic change.
Eastern Congo has been the subject of a longstanding conflict
with Rwandan-backed and -supported groups, and the army of the
Congo Republic, among other things. Rwanda has recently shifted
its position, and this has led to some political change, as
well as to some change in the region, and it's called, I think,
for even further work on behalf of the peacekeepers and,
indeed, those who are dealing directly with the political
problems in the Eastern Congo.
The Sudan, if anything, is more complex. As you know,
President Omar Bashir has been indicted by the International
Criminal Court. And Darfur remains a terribly troubled and
extremely difficult problem, and the issue is further
complicated by the fact of the North-South Peace Agreement and
the pending referendum, in a couple of years, which will decide
whether the country stays unified or divided.
All of these issues, and many more, indicate that increased
capacities and activities of the United States and others can
play a useful role.
First is the collection of intelligence, which you just
have mentioned. Africa has traditionally been seen only as a
peripheral part of U.S. strategic interests, even at the height
of the cold war. And weak intelligence collection, I think, and
weak analysis, has tended to characterize the Africa scene.
Embassies were in the forefront of collection, and remain so
today, and their reporting, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, remains
very, very important to move the question ahead.
A second set of capacities relates to our diplomatic
toolbox, if I can call it that way. We must have experienced
personnel, trained in local languages, knowledgeable and ready
to move, to deal with these issues in order to pick up the
opportunities that are provided to us by political openings,
and specialized teams ready and able to deploy could help us
with a number of the problems in Africa over the years.
Anticipating, preventing, and responding to conflicts
requires active and effective public diplomacy, and I'll point
out some of the ways in which this might be improved.
Similarly, foreign assistance, both humanitarian and
developmental assistance, has diminished over the years, and
this has further exposed us to vulnerabilities with respect to
our friends in Africa and conflicts and tensions that might
hurt, there.
I think, finally, our capacities in similar areas, the
military area, among others, are important. A document called
the Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, prepared in 2008 by
the American Academy and the Stimson Center, provides for a
number of very, very important ideas that might help. It helps
to strengthen our core diplomacy by asking for another thousand
positions, at a cost of $510 million, between now and 2014. It
seeks to engage nontraditional actors, the nongovernmental
organizations. It looks forward to 100 positions in dealing
with multilateral diplomacy, 20 additional to help shape
international law, 80 in the economic area, and 175 in
interagency coordination. Not all of these would be devoted to
Africa, but my view is that Africa should receive more than its
proportionate share.
Similarly, it suggests that ambassadors should have funds
to deal with crisis, perhaps up from the current 25,000 to
$250,000 per ambassador, as a way to empower the ambassador on
the scene to deal with some of the questions that are out
there.
In public diplomacy, it recommends a major increase in
personnel--but, even more important, 100 percent increase in
academic exchanges, 50 percent in visitor grants, 25 percent in
youth exchanges--as ways to address, and indeed face, some of
the underlying problems that lead to tension and conflict.
Foreign aid personnel have declined, over the last 25 or 30
years, from 4,300 to 2,200. And this particular approach
recommends significant increases in direct-hire foreign aid
personnel to avoid the notion that the aid agency has become a
contract management operation and not actually engaging.
Stabilization and reconstruction, both before and after
conflict, are extremely important, and here it recommends 562
positions plus two reserve corps of 2,000 each, a bill which
has already moved through the House and, I believe, still
pending here in the Senate. But, these are important steps,
obviously, to strengthen the capacity of our diplomacy to move
these particular questions ahead.
You have asked a number of questions, and I will just
briefly respond, in the remaining time, to a few of them.
One, Do the State Department and the international
community have sufficient capacity to anticipate long-term
threats and genocide? The genocide report says no, and it
recommends both increases in the executive branch capacity to
analyze and follow these issues, and, as well, a special
interagency committee to remain on the alert, to signal, early,
when issues may well descend to that kind of tragedy.
What additional programs, expertise, and, indeed, resources
can add the most value? I would say mediation and negotiation
teams, specialized in conflict prevention, a special economic
team to assess weak and declining countries and recommend
programs for us and our allies and friends to help to build
against deterioration, rapid response capability and
humanitarian and economic assistance programs, specialized
military training programs, where necessary, to bolster and
strengthen African peacekeeping, and conflict prevention and
special public diplomacy efforts to deal with those issues.
What areas are being most neglected? Somalia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, Madagascar, and
probably, in West Africa, Nigeria.
Do our ambassadors have sufficient authority? No. They need
the additional funds I mentioned. The President needs to write
a permanent executive order setting out the authorities of
ambassadors over all U.S. Government employees, except forces
reporting to a combatant commander, and to define the
relationship, in the latter case, between the combatant
commander and the ambassador.
How do we get our folks out of the compounds and maximize
security, still? Follow the advice in the Embassy of the Future
report. Train our people, and equip them to deal with risk
management, recognizing that risk avoidance is not compatible
with their being able to do the job. This involves improved
training in issues like surveillance detection, secure driving
practices, physical-security best practices, and situational
awareness.
Thank you for the chance to testify. This is an important
subject, and I believe that many recommendations made in a
number of recent reports will help significantly, in Africa and
elsewhere, to improve our capacity to anticipate, prevent, and
respond to conflict.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas R Pickering, Former Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased and honored
to be asked to testify before the subcommittee this afternoon on the
important subject of anticipating, preventing, and responding to
conflict in Africa.
Over the years I had the privilege of serving our government and
people on three separate occasions in Africa. First, I was assigned as
a naval officer in Port Lyautey (Kenitra), Morocco from 1957 to 1959.
Later I served as a Foreign Service officer in Tanzania as Consul in
Zanzibar from 1965 to 1967, and then later as Deputy Chief of Mission
at our Embassy in Dar es Salaam from 1967 to 1969. Subsequently, I was
Ambassador to Nigeria from 1981 to 1983.
Later I served as Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the
State Department from 1997-2000 where I dealt frequently with African
issues. These assignments have given me a good basis to understand
Africa and African developments, particularly as they relate to
conflict.
Recently, I had the pleasure of participating in several relevant
studies and panels including the Prevention of Genocide, a Foreign
Affairs Budget for the Future, The Embassy of the Future, former
Secretary of State Rice's Panel on Transitional Diplomacy, a Study of
China, the United States and Africa among others. These helped also to
give me a firmer understanding of the challenges and the solutions.
Today I want to do several things in my testimony. First I want to
sketch out the nature of conflict and some of the issues which lead to
conflict in current day Africa. Then I want to point to some of the
steps and ideas that will contribute to anticipating, preventing, and
responding to conflict in the continent. Last, I want to try to answer
some of your specific questions.
conflict in africa
While Africa over the years had more than its share of conflicts
and problems which might lead to conflict, a careful review of some of
the current issues and problems in Africa will set out some of the
kinds of issues which Africans and those outside the continent
interested in conflict resolution face now and in the future. In this
testimony it is not possible to review all of the issues. However,
drawing heavily on the work of the International Crisis Group, where I
am cochairman of the board, I believe I can provide information on a
broadly representative sample of current questions and issues to set
the stage.
Let me begin in West Africa. Just a few months ago the important
country of Guinea underwent a transition with the death of President
Conte, a long-serving President of the country who had been in charge
for several decades and ran the country almost as a personal fief. His
death led to serious uncertainty and a difficult selection process for
his successor. The disappearance of autocrats in Africa without any
clear system for their successor is often a source of tension,
uncertainty, and potential conflict. The African Union, the Economic
Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) and friendly countries can
play a diplomatic role in easing those transitions and avoiding
conflict in the region. This requires good personnel in our Embassies
and strong ambassadorial leadership from knowledgeable and experienced
professional diplomats. A recent report setting out the needed funding
to make up for shortfalls in these areas in the State Department will
be reviewed in a following section of my testimony to point out some of
the way forward.
A second problem arose in the small country of Guinea-Bissau, a
former Portuguese colony before its independence some years ago. This
is not the first time Guinea Bissau has experienced troubles. Recently,
the Army Chief was assassinated and the head of state was later killed
during the ensuing confusion. It was clear to many observers that the
root cause of these problems was increased drug trafficking through the
country and the involvement of these elements in trying to influence
governing relationships to protect their own activities. In this case,
intelligence collection on site, strong leadership with good contacts
and an ability to work diplomatically with other foreign
representatives and to engage them in working together are critical
requirements and skills need to help avoid conflict or prevent wider
conflict.
In Zimbabwe over recent months the extensive crises leading to
starvation and a nearly unchecked cholera epidemic as well as economic
collapse and a dispute over election returns and the participation of
the opposition in governance and indeed the future of President Robert
Mugabe who has ruled the country since independence in 1980 all
impacted the country and raised the potential for extended internal
conflict.
What happened was the slow and painful working out of a potential
solution around creating a unity government with the opposition leader
as Prime Minister. This took a great deal of time and much political
skill, mainly on the part of African states willing to work closely
with both sides. It was an important example of how a political crisis
that could lead to open conflict was resolved, at least temporarily,
with a complex political solution involving both compromise and the
beginning of a transition from long-time one-person rule to a more open
leadership. The problems of Zimbabwe are a long way from full
resolution, but efforts to build a shared leadership, introduce the
dollar as the current currency, fight the epidemic, and open the door
for more trade have helped.
South Africa tomorrow will have national elections. The succession
in the African National Congress (ANC) has been disputed and fraught
with local difficulties. New parties have emerged to contest the ANC's
dominance of the political scene. The United States has to watch this
issue with care, understand the trends and issues, maintain close
contacts and on its own, and quietly speak to all the parties to insure
that a tense and difficult situation does not become worse. In these
kinds of situations, the U.S. is often not the major player and must
coordinate its actions carefully in quiet support of others who will
take the lead.
East Africa continues to present challenges. Many are increasingly
worried that in Kenya, the violence of the past year will emerge again
to dominate the scene as the two factions and tribal groups, Kikuyu and
Luo, show signs of preparing for further violence in the wake of the
deterioration of political cooperation. This is the time to begin to
take action, working with the parties to prevent a worsening of the
situation and working with others to help quietly seek and broker
political solutions to current difficulties.
Elsewhere in East Africa, Somalia is in more than just partial
chaos. The resignation of a President who had little influence in the
country is not the only sign of difficulty. Piracy off the coast has
grown and is a current major story which will require naval and
military cooperation as well as possible humanitarian assistance to
deal with.
And up until now we have not touched on the complex sets of
problems which impact two of Africa's giant states--the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sudan. Since each of these would take a
hearing in itself, I will only touch on some of the recent highlights
to give you an idea of some of the areas which must be addressed to
prevent further conflict and deal with the present and potential
humanitarian challenges.
Congo has undergone some of the most dramatic change. Eastern Congo
has been the locus of longstanding conflict between Rwandan-backed and
supported groups and the Army of the Congo. Rwanda has been sympathetic
to its fellow Tutsis in the Congo, the Banyamulenge. This situation
recently reversed itself when apparently Rwanda concluded that its
erstwhile Tutsi ally, General Laurent Nkunda, was causing more
difficulties than they could handle. Rwanda changed course, arrested
General Nkunda which led to the dispersal of his forces, joined the
Congolese Army and played an effective, leadership role in pushing some
6,500 former Hutu Genocidaires in the Eastern Congo further back into
the bush. Rwanda's motives were not all benign. It was beginning to
take heavy international heat for its relationship with Nkunda,
including from the United States. The process was helped by an active
role on behalf of the U.N. played by former Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo. Congo still has many unmet priority needs, including what to
do about a feckless national army, how to extend state authority over
the Eastern Congo, the introduction of accountability into the
government and how to improve governance and sustain regional
relationships in general.
Sudan is, if anything, more complex. The indictment of its
President, General Omar Bashir, by the International Criminal Court has
led to retaliation from Sudan through the expulsion of 13 humanitarian
organizations working with displaced persons and refugees in Darfur.
The situation is further complicated by growing pressure on the
North-South peace arrangement under which there will be a referendum in
2011 on whether the South will separate from the North. Difficult
questions in the likely event of such a move such as border alignment
need to be addressed. In addition, uncertainty and tensions over Darfur
and the indictment of the President have in turn brought about greater
pressures on the North-South peace agreement. This will require careful
international handling and close coordination of the various players if
we are to avoid new conflicts breaking out in Sudan.
anticipation, prevention, and response
The above review notes a number of capacities and activities which
can play a useful role in Africa.
First is the collection of intelligence. Africa has traditionally
been seen as only a peripheral part of United States strategic interest
and even at the height of the cold war and during the contention with
the Soviet Union and China in Africa we had a weak intelligence
presence in the continent. Embassies were in the forefront of
collection and reporting information on events likely to lead to
conflict. Often these were confused and unclear and our analysis
capability was focused elsewhere and did not deal with African events
on a timely basis. There were exceptions such as when we were
negotiating to remove Cuban and Russian forces from Angola and Nambia
and assisting with the independence of Namibia.
A second set of capacities relates to our diplomatic tool box. We
must have experienced personnel, trained in local languages,
knowledgeable and ready to move to deal with these issues in concert
with others. We need specialized teams ready and able to deploy to
assist in working some of the problems in Africa. Over the years we
have been hollowing out our diplomatic capabilities and Africa has been
low on the list of priorities. Shortly I will talk about some much
needed remedies.
Anticipating, preventing, and responding to conflicts in Africa, as
elsewhere, requires effective and active public diplomacy. In recent
years this capacity too has been scaled back. That too needs to be
reversed as I will suggest below.
Similarly, our capacities in foreign assistance for both
humanitarian needs and development have diminished quite remarkably.
Both the total amount of funding available as well as the personnel
trained and equipped to deal with these issues have diminished markedly
in recent years.
In the same fashion, until we stood up AFRICOM, we had fewer
resources and organizational capability to provide training and
assistance to African military forces for the peacekeeping and peace
enforcement missions of the African Union and the United Nations both
in and outside of Africa. While some have questioned our shift to a
larger military quotient in our African policy, there is a small but
significant role for our military assistance to play in preventing and
responding to conflicts in Africa and supporting African Union
peacekeepers. I suspect our present African Command, which I understand
has over 1,300 staff, is considerably larger than we need and will
convey a signal to our friends in Africa that we are militarizing our
policy.
In post conflict stabilization and reconstruction, we too have had
almost no capacity until recently. The new Office of Stabilization and
Reconstruction in the State Department has set about rectifying that
weakness.
what should we do now?
``A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future,'' a report prepared in
October 2008 by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L.
Stimson Center supported by the Una Chapman Cox Foundation provides
some answers. It was predicated on the need to provide additional funds
in the next five budget years to assure that the Department of State
and AID would have sufficient personnel and training to be able to
carry out their assigned tasks.
Let me review some highlights because they relate directly to the
areas singled out in the discussion above of African conflicts. While
we did not in specific terms provide direct recommendations on the
African area of staffing we felt strongly that it should receive at
least its traditional proportion of the increase, and because of past
stinting, perhaps an even larger than proportionate share.
In traditional core diplomacy, a function which includes
anticipating, preventing and responding to conflicts, the report
recommends an increase in 1,099 positions over FY 2008 levels by FY
2014 at a cost of $510.5m annually by FY 2014. The purposes served by
this increase include funds for proactive and preventive shaping
capabilities directly related to the purpose of this hearing, for
precrisis conflict mediation and resolution and for the development of
joint-planning and joint-response strategies and capabilities.
Engagement of nontraditional actors, especially in the
nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector is another element that bears
directly on the issues in this hearing and additional funds are called
for in this area.
Increases include 100 positions in multilateral diplomacy, 20
additional staff in helping to shape new international law, 80 staff in
the economic area, the analysis and reporting on which is often
critical in crises leading to conflicts, and 175 positions in all
aspects of greater interagency coordination in the Department of State.
In addition, it is proposed that funds made available to
Ambassadors to deal with crises be increased from 25k to 250k, as well
as up to $30m to deal with reconciliation conferences, civil society
and microdevelopment projects, the ability to deploy rapid mediation
and reconciliation teams, and similar rapid deployment capabilities for
civil police trainers and advisers who can deal with impending civil
strife.
A major problem has been training. There are few positions set
aside for this purpose and so to train people State has to pull them
out of operational tasks. The report proposes an increase in such
positions to 1,287 by FY 2014 at a cost of $309.8m in FY 2014 for all
areas of training including hard languages such as Arabic, Urdu, Farsi,
and Chinese.
Public diplomacy has been underfunded for years. The report
proposes an increase in personnel of 417 U.S. and 369 locally engaged
staff by FY 2014 at a cost of $155.2m. The report also recommends 100
percent increase in academic exchanges, 50 percent increase in visitor
grants and 25 percent increase in youth exchanges as well as an
expansion of English language training, 40 new oversea cultural centers
and increased support for our existing, now privatized, Latin American
cultural centers all at a cost of $610.4m in FY 2014.
Foreign aid is one of our primary tools in conflict prevention and
response. AID personnel declined from 4,300 in 1975 to 2,200 in 2007.
AID has only five engineers to work worldwide and 29 education officers
to cover 84 countries. AID has become a contract management agency.
The proposal is to increase AID direct hire staff by 1,250 above FY
2008 levels by FY 2014, offset by the reduction or conversion of some
700 contractors at a cost for the increase of $521m by FY 2014.
On Stabilization and Reconstruction, it is proposed to increase the
staff at State by 562 by FY 2014 including 500 to serve as an active
response corps to deal with conflict prevention and response actions.
In addition, it is proposed to establish a standby corps of 2,000
people working in Federal agencies and a civilian reserve of another
2,000 working outside the Federal Government. The cost for these
activities is high because it will require regular, on-going training
as new personnel are brought on board, equipment including vehicles to
support deployment, and security protection where security in
particular cannot be provided by the U.S. military.
Finally the report recommends the realignment of military
assistance authorities so that except for places in which we are
engaged in combat operations, the Secretary of State is responsible for
approving the countries to receive assistance and the expenditure
levels and the Secretary of Defense provides advice and implements the
programs. Where combat is going on the Secretary of Defense will carry
out the country designations and expenditure-level determinations with
the Secretary of State's advice.
We are pleased that FY 2009 budget decisions included a first slice
of many of these items and that we understand FY 2010 budget proposals
will similarly carry forward expanded requests. These should go far
toward improving our capability in Africa to anticipate, prevent, and
respond to conflicts.
questions and answers
Does the State Department or the Intelligence Community have sufficient
capacity to assess long-term threats and anticipate potential genocide
or mass atrocities?
Taking a leaf from the Genocide Report cited earlier. I believe the
answer is ``No.'' That report recommends setting up a special office to
cover, report on, and follow these developments closely and to support
a special interagency committee which is set up to deal with these
issues as they emerge. While the report makes recommendations, exact
staffing levels and arrangements should be the product of expert study
by the agencies concerned.
What kind of additional resources, expertise or programs can add the
most value?
The information provided above sets out a broad response. From my
perspective I think the following activities are most important--
mediation and negotiating teams specialized in dealing with conflict
and conflict prevention; a special economic team which can assess weak
and declining countries and recommend programs for the United States
and others to deal with this aspect of deterioration which might lead
to conflict; rapid response humanitarian and economic assistance
programs and military training programs to be used in cases where such
tools could play a constructive role in conflict prevention; special
public diplomacy teams which could deploy when required or be used in
cases where such support is required to explain to the public and the
regional and international community our policies and actions to
prevent or respond to conflict.
Specifically in Africa, what regions are being neglected?
East Africa--Somalia; Central Africa--Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Sudan; Southern Africa--Madagascar.
Do our Ambassadors in Africa (everywhere) have sufficient authority and
flexibility to carry out their missions appropriately?
No. They need access to larger funds ($250 thousand) to respond to
crises; the President needs to write a permanent Executive order
setting out the authorities of Ambassadors over all U.S. Government
employees except forces reporting to a Combatant Commander and to
define the relationship in the latter case between the Combatant
Commander and the Ambassador.
How do we get our folks out of compounds and still maximize security?
We follow the advice in the Embassy of the Future Report and train
our people and equip them to deal with risk management, recognizing
that risk avoidance is not compatible with being able to do their job.
This involves improved training in issues like surveillance detection,
secure driving practices, physical security best practices and
situational awareness.
Thank you for this chance to testify. This is an important subject
and I believe that the many recommendations made in a number of recent
reports will help significantly in Africa, and elsewhere, to improve
our capacity to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Ambassador
Pickering.
Ambassador Lyman.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT FELLOW FOR AFRICA
POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Senators,
for this opportunity. And I, also, would like my written
testimony submitted for the record.
I think it's important to look at Africa, for itself, in
analyzing the capacity of the department and the government to
deal with conflicts. And I think comparisons with other regions
are misleading.
You have 48 states in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of them are
weak, vulnerable states. Most of them are subject to the
spillover effects of conflicts in neighboring countries. We
have to recognize that conflicts will be part of the scene on
the continent of Africa for decades to come. That's why every
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa comes on board with a
broad agenda of development, environmentalist, good governance,
et cetera, but spends most of his or her time running from one
conflict to another, or maybe two or three at the same time.
The structure of the Department and its supporting structures
just don't fit this reality.
The Africa Bureau is smaller than the East Asia Pacific
Bureau, smaller than the West Hemisphere Bureau, smaller than
the Europe and Eurasia Bureau. It lacks the surge capacity, the
capacity to mobilize teams dedicated to conflicts, like
Ambassador Pickering talked about, teams that can work, over
several years, seriously on each of these major issues.
The lack of depth in the Department, its ability to cover
important areas, can be illustrated just by Nigeria. As you
well know, Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, with a
serious conflict in the Delta region, unrest in the north, with
economic decline--yet there is only one officer assigned to the
desk for Nigeria.
Now, the reality is that, in Africa, a lot of the
conflicts, or potential conflicts, occur in small countries in
which our presence is thin. We can see potential conflict or
existing conflict in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Central
African Republic, Comoros, Mauritania, the Casamance region of
Senegal, et cetera. We can't assume that we can put huge
embassies or USAID missions in all these posts, but we can
supplemental these posts with access to some of the newer
diagnostic tools--Fund for Peace's conflict assessment tool,
Robert Rotberg and Mo Ibrahim's governance index, a number of
other diagnostic tools--but nothing substitutes for people on
the ground--people with language skills, people with
development resources, people who have travel funds, et cetera.
And that can be backed up if the department also draws upon
people outside the government to supplement the Department's
own staff with the skills that are available--former Peace
Corps volunteers and others, who can go out and help these
missions.
I would also call your attention to recommendations, in the
report that Ambassador Pickering spoke of, the Foreign Affairs
Budget for the Future, which talks of specific funding
authorities that the Department should have in ordere to
provide missions like the funds to bring people together,
undertake conflict resolution, and give those missions the
flexibility and the resources to address these problems early
on, before they blow up into major conflicts.
Now, when you get to the big conflicts, the major ones--the
DRC, Sudan, Somalia, et cetera--these are complex conflicts;
they are not only civil wars, they involve neighboring
countries; they involve international actors. And that, in
turn, requires worldwide diplomacy. It calls for sustained,
full-time teams that are dedicated to these situations.
Often we respond to these situations by naming a special
U.S. envoy, and that can be an extremely valuable thing. But,
an envoy who walks out around the world without backup from the
Department--and by that, I mean a sustained staff, following
up, sending out messages, staying in touch with allies, making
sure that the Department is behind that envoy--that envoy is
just not going to be able to do the job. And we have a lot of
examples of that.
We had a very skillful team dedicated to Ambassador
Danforth when he was working on the North-South problem in
Sudan. That team's long gone, and no other team has taken its
place, in spite of Darfur, in spite of the fragility of the
North-South Agreement. The capacity is not there to do it, and
it has to be created if we're going to be serious about the
Great Lakes, about Sudan, and about the looming crisis that you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in the Horn.
I would like to mention a number of other concerns. Some of
the crises that we have in Africa go beyond Africa. When you're
dealing with Somalia, you're dealing with a crisis that is just
as much related to the Middle East as it is to sub-Saharan
Africa. Yet, the Department is not well structured for moving
across bureaus. That takes high-level leadership in the
Department to say to the Near East Bureau, which has,
obviously, a lot of other issues, that they've got to work with
the Africa Bureau to help address the Somali conflict. If we
don't have Saudi Arabia and Yemen and Qatar involved, we are
not going to get solutions to the Somalia problems. The same is
true in the Sahel where North African countries, outside the
coverage of the Africa bureau, are intimately involved.
Another problem is that the State Department is not
organized for regional leadership in the field. AFRICOM can
bring together northern African states and Sahelian states
around the counterterrorism program. The Department isn't
structured for that. I'd call your attention to a study that
came out from the National Defense University last year which
made specific recommendations on how the Department, in the
field, can have comparable regional structures that can
interface with an AFRICOM or others to deal with these issues.
In addressing neglected areas, as you have asked, let me
call attention to one that I think is going to need a lot of
attention in the future, and that's the growth of
narcosyndicates in Africa. They are spreading rapidly in West
Africa, in Guinea-Bissau, in Guinea, and beyond. They have
tentacles in Senegal. They're one of the most dangerous
developments on the continent. They produce conflict, they
produce corruption, they undermine governance. We do not yet
have a strategy for dealing with them.
I'll touch briefly on some of your other questions, Mr.
Chairman, and come back to them in questions.
Ambassador Pickering has addressed the issue of how we get
out more, given our security considerations. I think we need to
move our staffs out, but I am very sensitive to the
requirements of protecting our staff in the field. I think we
need to do it, but I think we ought to ask our staffs to
volunteer for such duty. To move into the areas like the Niger
Delta or other insecure areas, I think it has to be with their
willingness, and that we provide them with the kinds of
protection that Tom talked about. But, I think, my own
preference would be ask for volunteers to take that on.
You have asked about coordination with major African
players. It's absolutely essential. There is no conflict in
Africa that is not settled if the neighbors are not onboard to
settle it. But, the reality today, Mr. Chairman, is that
African leadership is weak. Nigeria is not the same as it was a
few years ago, when President Obasanjo was active across the
continent. The new leadership in South Africa may not be as
committed to Pan-African cooperation as Thabo Mbeki was. And I
think the reality is, we're going to have to look for
leadership, and help promote it on the continent.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, no amount of staffing or structure
will do if our policies are divided internally. If you look at
Somalia over the last few years, we've been divided at what our
policy is. Is it to bomb terrorists? Is it to help create
stable Government in Somalia? Is it to work with the U.N.? Or
is it not? With that kind of a divisiveness, we can't be very
effective in these situations. So, one of the requirements of
dealing with complex conflicts like this is for leadership,
from the Department and elsewhere, to bring about unified
policies, and then back them up with the right structures.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
I welcome this opportunity to discuss the needs for strengthening
U.S. diplomacy for preventing and/or reducing the impact of conflicts
in Africa. As members of this subcommittee know well, conflicts have
taken a terrible toll in Africa, with millions of lives lost, terrible
human rights depredations, the weakening of authority and governance,
and the setting back of development for hundreds of millions still
living in poverty. These conflicts also open the door to criminal
activities that bear on U.S. interests, as in the case of Somali
piracy, or interruptions in the supply of energy as in Nigeria.
At the same time, we need to be aware that the number of conflicts
in Africa has been dramatically reduced over the past two decades, and
the lessons of those resolutions are pertinent to the subject today.
Wars in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi,
Cote d'Ivoire, and between the north and south in Sudan have been
brought to a close, some on a promising long-term basis, some with
fragile peace processes still under way. There are lessons to be
learned from those processes. Very serious conflict situations remain,
including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Darfur
region of Sudan, Somalia, parts of Ethiopia, the delta region of
Nigeria, and in both Chad and the Central African Republic. Several
other countries face internal unrest and potential outbreaks of
violence, including Guinea, Guinea Bissau, the Comoros, Mauritania, and
the Casamance region of Senegal.
distinguishing the skills required
Despite the dedicated efforts of many diplomats, envoys, and
consultants over the past several years, the U.S. capacity to address
this range of challenges is very weak. Senior officials run from one
emerging crisis to another--Kenya, Somalia, the DRC--but the ability to
mobilize and deploy a significant team of experts and resources to
follow up to address these situations on a consistent and adequate
basis is often not there. For example, the once significant and
dedicated team that backed up the negotiations to end the North-South
civil war in Sudan was disbanded and the capacity lost to competing
requirements in Iraq and elsewhere. Thus the work of special envoys for
Darfur has been hampered by inadequate backup capacity in the
Department and a confusion of roles and responsibilities. Conflict
management and resolution requires a dedicated effort, with strong
staff support, ready outreach to a wide number of international actors,
and strong embassies and other agencies on the ground. We also need to
remember these are long-term processes. Peace in southern Africa was
the product of nearly a decade of intensive, well resourced efforts
throughout the 1980s.
We need to distinguish here between the diplomatic capacity needed
to prevent or restrain conflict, including early steps in conflict
resolution, and that needed to respond to major crises situations. Much
of the recent writing on conflict diplomacy has related to the latter,
with proposals for surge capacity in such situations as Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. I applaud those recommendations, and I
commend to the committee's attention the report of the American Academy
of Diplomacy, ``A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the
Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness,'' October 2008. Included in that report
are detailed proposals for in-house and reserve surge capacities.
In Africa, do sweat the small stuff. In Africa, however, we need to
recognize that there are potential conflict situations spread across
Africa and involving in some cases quite small countries in which our
diplomatic presence is very limited. Keeping abreast of those
situations, and even more, assessing the imminence and importance of
threatening circumstances, is not easy. For these situations, we need
embassies with the capacity to tap into and utilize the several highly
developed IT systems for analyzing potential conflict situations, e.g.,
the Fund for Peace's system for anticipating failed states, Robert
Rotberg's governance index, Mo Ibrahim's governance index, and other
such systems. Embassies also need resources to respond early to signs
of stress, with flexible resources to help in conflict resolutions
exercises, assistance to weak governing institutions such as the
judiciary, and to be able to call on AFRICOM for help in training
security forces. Backup in Washington is essential, with analytical as
well as bureaucratic skills. Little of that presently exists. If a
country as large and important as Nigeria has but one person on the
Nigeria desk, you can imagine the capacity to do serious analytical and
backup work for the large number of smaller countries of the continent.
Major crisis situations. The current major crises in Africa--in the
DRC, Sudan, and Somalia--are exceptionally complex, involving not only
civil war but a host of regional and international involvements that
demand virtually worldwide diplomacy to address adequately. One
standard response to these situations has been (and is now being
reinvigorated) the designation of envoys. Having a high-level envoy is
a useful device: It demonstrates serious U.S. concern, brings often
higher level political attention to the situation, and attracts serious
responses from other interested countries. But all too often the
designation of an envoy is a substitute for the hard, long
institutional commitment to the crisis. Part-time envoys are in
particular ineffective if their work is not backed up on a full-time
basis by a team dedicated to that situation, sending out messages,
monitoring agreements, and doing their own diplomatic outreach. For a
crisis like that in the DRC, there should be staff as well in each of
the key European embassies designated as part of this team, keeping in
close touch on a daily basis with our European partners. That was done
throughout the southern Africa diplomacy of the 1980s.
I characterize envoys without such backup as ``going naked into the
jungle.'' They have neither the capacity nor resources to bring U.S
influence and resources to bear adequately on the situation.
With this background, let me address the specific questions raised
in the invitation to testify.
1. Does the State Department on collaboration with our Intelligence
Community, have sufficient capacity to assess the long-term
threats on the continent?
First, we must recognize that there is no sure science to assess
long-term threats in a timely action-oriented way. It is not hard to
identify the many potential causes of conflict in Africa, a continent
with generally weak states, poor governance, poverty, and in particular
weak institutions to channel political and social grievances into
peaceful resolution, e.g., Parliaments, courts, police, etc. One could
find these characteristics in most African countries. But identifying
in which countries over which timeframe these factors may produce
crisis or conflict is much harder. Liberia descended into horribly
brutal civil war in the 1980s, but only after more than 100 years of
inequitable class rule and general poverty. Mali is one of the poorest
countries on earth but has a functioning democracy; can it thus manage
the unrest among its northern Taureg population, egged on to some
degree by radical foreign elements, or will it suffer a growing crisis
in this regard? These are hard calls.
The answer to the question posed by the committee is, of course,
``No.'' But to counter this on a practical basis, the Department needs
to access, as recommended earlier, the several computer-based systems
for identifying potential sources of weakness and conflict. Staff needs
to be trained in these systems and have the equipment to access them on
a regular basis. But these only point to the potential causes. Nothing
takes the place of on-the-ground contacts, sensitivity, and outreach.
That takes staff, with language skills, travel money, and overcoming
some of the risk-adverse policies now in place. Finally, to avoid
having to ``cry wolf'' to seek to engage the attention of the
Department, embassies in these smaller countries need resources and
flexibility to address local conditions early without waiting for
serious conflict to erupt. Those resources today are quite limited.
The Department does not have to do this alone. There are numerous
think tanks, universities, and other nongovernmental organizations
which have the skills and means to assist in these analyses. The
Department utilizes some of these, some of the time, but not
consistently and not to study a single problem over a long period of
time. The early studies by CSIS on Sudan (Barton and Crocker) are an
exception worth reexamining.
2. Which regions are neglected?
Somalia
Up until recently Somalia was badly neglected. But our response
reveals other weaknesses. United States policy on Somalia, since the
takeover of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Movement in 2006, has been
divided. On the one hand, there are the diplomatic approaches to the
situation, fronted by State, led by the U.N. and for a time with the
support of a multilateral body led by Norway. But within DOD, and
within parts of State as well, the focus has been on getting at
terrorists within Somalia. This meant U.S. bombing raids, support for
the Ethiopian invasion that dislodged the ICM from Magdishu but
unleashed a long insurgency, and an inconsistent attitude toward the
moderate Islamists within the Islamist Courts movement. The recent
focus on piracy could produce a similar divide, but hopefully a more
comprehensive and well-directed policy will emerge. Without a clear,
unified policy, lack of capacity is only part of the problem.
Somalis illustrates another weakness in addressing conflicts in the
Horn of Africa. Somalia is a Middle Eastern as well as African problem.
The Africa Bureau, and indeed some of the other diplomatic efforts on
Somalia, have failed to engage seriously enough key Middle Eastern
players, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Yemen whose cooperation is
essential. The Africa Bureau is not well equipped, bureaucratically or
with sufficient personnel, to engage the Near East Bureau and other
elements of the State Department in a high priority regional diplomatic
effort. Only high-level direction, from the Secretary, can create the
necessary inter-Bureau structure to address this situation on a
continuing basis.
DRC
While the U.S. has played an important role in helping the eastern
regional neighbors of the DRC come together and overcome some of the
proxy warring within the DRC, and has supported financially the U.N.
force, MONUC, the DRC has not had the focus that it deserves. The DRC
influences much of central and eastern Africa, and its rich mineral
resources will always be attractive to outsiders, e.g., neighbors,
companies, or rogues, and usually all three. The war has also been the
most costly in terms of lives lost, nearly 5 million. The U.S. has not
been ready to support a more robust U.N. force, struggling to keep down
peacekeeping costs, and has not engaged at high levels with the
relevant players. In large part, the United States has left leadership
in this conflict to the U.N., South Africa, and the AU, and the
Europeans. That is not bad but U.S. support to the peace processes
could be much more vigorous. A new envoy is about to be appointed. But
the question will be whether this envoy is backed up by real commitment
of staff, time, and resources, or only sent out to show a U.S. face?
All too often in the past, this has been the fate of our Great Lakes
envoys, despite they having been exceptionally dedicated individuals.
Nigeria
Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and the fifth (sometimes
sixth) largest supplier of oil imports to the United States, is going
through one of its most difficult periods of governance and stability.
The conflict in the Niger delta has grown steadily more costly, with
Nigerian oil production reduced by as much as 500,000 bbl/d. Stolen oil
and other criminal activities finance the importation of ever more
sophisticated arms by the various militia. Unrest has spread to
neighboring countries, as militia attack oil facilities and carry out
kidnapping there. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea rivals that off the
Somali coast and endangers the entire Gulf of Guinea oil region.
Experts disagree whether Nigeria teeters on the edge of breakdown
or is simply going through one of its many difficult transitions having
only restored civilian rule in 1999 and being a difficult country to
manage in the best of circumstances. But the delta crisis presents
serious challenges and is not being addressed effectively by the
Nigerian Government. Beyond the delta, the economic deterioration in
the north, Nigeria's Islamic center, with factories closing and large
number of unemployed youth, poses long-term threats to stability.
At present the United States has no presence in the delta, and its
staff is forbidden to travel there for security reasons. This greatly
limits U.S ability to assess and impact the situation. The Embassy also
has no consulate in the north. While vacancies have recently been
filled, almost all key positions in the Embassy are filled under grade.
One should recognize that assisting Nigeria in addressing any of
its issues is not easy. The government has spurned most offers to
assist with the crisis in the delta, including technical help from
AFRICOM to counter the illegal oil exports. The economic problems in
the north and elsewhere are due to long-term neglect of the power
sector and other infrastructure, the effect of overdependency on the
oil sector, and various governance problems. None of these are ones
that the U.S. is in a position to help, except perhaps for advice,
encouraging of investment, and support through the IFIs. But our
ability to play even this role is compromised by our lack of outreach.
In addition, high-level attention to Nigeria, and in particular to the
problem in the delta has been at best sporadic. AFRICOM has expressed
the most sustained concern, with visits and offers of assistance. But
the State Department, taken up perhaps with more immediate crises, has
not invested heavily in the Nigerian relationship.
The Sahel
This region has attracted special attention from DOD, first through
EUCOM and now with AFRICOM. The concern has been infiltration into the
region from Algeria's AQIM and the potential of radical elements
exploiting local grievances. The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Program
(TSCTP) is designed as an interagency, State-led program to address
this concern. But State has two disadvantages in matching AFRICOM's
concerns and resources: (a) Neither State nor USAID has sufficient
personnel or resources to address fundamental grievance issues in this
area, and (b) while AFRICOM has been effective in bringing north
African and Sahelian states together in this endeavor, here again State
has difficulty coordinating across Bureaus. Our counterterrorism
programs meanwhile risk running against the internal political needs of
the governments in this region, where sensitive political oversight and
better resource allocations are needed. Again, too, State and USAID
lack language skills for engaging the people in the area of most
concern.
The Narcotics Infiltration
If there is one new dangerous crisis in Africa it is the growing
infiltration of influence, money and power of narcotics syndicates.
They operate primarily from Latin America, using west Africa as transit
point for shipping drugs to Europe. In the process, they increase
addiction in these African states, corrupt governments, and grow their
role in the local economy. Poor and weak states, like Guinea Bissau are
prominently affected, but most west African states are involved. A
similar problem exits in east Africa, again using Africa as transit
point to Europe with the same corrupting effects. We know from Columbia
and Mexico just how destabilizing this industry can be. African states
are poorly structured to address it, and it takes place in some of
those countries where out diplomatic presence and aid programs are
small. The way to proceed may be to establish a high-level interagency
task force, under State leadership, which can work with individual
embassies and across regional boundaries, set up counter programs, and
if necessary greatly increase assistance to these states. Mobilizing
African opinion and support will also be critical. This is an emergency
and will take much effort to overcome if it can be done in time.
3. How to address security concerns
As a former Ambassador I am acutely aware of the responsibility of
every mission to protect its employees and their families. In the
field, the embassy relies on the assessment of the Regional Security
Officer in assessing the risks. We should send our diplomats and
assistance experts into possible danger only where our interests truly
demand.
In Africa today, as elsewhere, our interests do demand that we be
more in touch with a broad array of society. In areas where the danger
of radical infiltration exits, being able to reach those populations
involved and assess the reality of the threat is essential. For
example, without more direct knowledge of the so-called ``ungoverned
spaces'' in the Sahel, it is hard to assess the seriousness of the
threat and to see whether our counterterrorism programs are effective.
In Nigeria, without more direct contact with the areas in which the
unrest takes place, the United States is not in a position to offer
more than generalities to the Nigerian Government, and perhaps more
important, unable to interact with the oil companies, the local
communities, and local officials, to understand what really is going
on.
For these reasons, we need to provide employees with a better
framework for such activities. We must honestly assess the risks. We
need to compare our practices with those of the U.N., other countries,
and NGOs. For example, in Nigeria, many of these entities go regularly
to the delta. And we should be able to do likewise. However, I suggest
we not force employees to take such risks, but seek only volunteers for
such duty. We should also increase language training so that diplomats
can travel in remote areas with greater interaction with people and
maneuver better. We also can ask employees (as many now do) to
entertain more in local restaurants and in their homes, rather than
meet with counterparts in the rather forbidding surroundings of today's
fortress embassies.
We need to ask these same employees to be prepared to manage
consulates in less than fully secure areas. We need to fashion, with
Diplomatic Security, the technological and physical arrangements that
would make such posts relatively more secure, even if far from perfect.
4. Do our Ambassadors have sufficient authority and flexible resources
to carry out their mission appropriately?
Again I would refer the committee to the Academy of American
Diplomacy report, which details the additional authorities and
resources needed. Ambassadors need more flexible funds on the ground to
sponsor better communications within local societies, to provide
educational and professional travel, and to promote better governance.
The AAD report recommends in particular that the ``Emergency in the
Diplomatic and Consular Service'' fund be increased from $5 million to
$25 million and be used more for conflict prevention than only response
to crises once they have emerged. Other increases for authorities and
funds are detailed in the report.
One difficult challenge is that while AFRICOM can operate across
regions, like the Sahel, and indeed such regional approaches are
necessary, Ambassadors can approve or disapprove activities in their
own countries of assignment, but are not in a position to help shape
regional programs nor to monitor them. A study last year by the
National Defense University suggested that in particular where the U.S.
military is actively engaged, the Department arrange for one Ambassador
in the subregion to coordinate with his neighboring colleagues, with
the funds to bring them together, and that Ambassador or the regional
group have some authority to pass on regional programs operated by
other agencies. The Horn and the Sahel are good examples of where this
would be valuable.
5. How can we better engage with regional actors, like Nigeria and
South Africa, subregional organizations, and the African Union?
One of the lessons of the resolution of many of Africa's conflicts
is that African leadership, or very active involvement, was essential.
Particularly since the formation of the AU in 2000, African leaders
have been instrumental in bringing peace to Burundi, the early
agreements to end the civil war in the DRC, and to fashion efforts at
creating a government in Somalia. In west Africa, only when neighboring
states finally came to agreement that the conflicts in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, in which several of them were indirectly involved, was
costing them more than they gained, was ECOWAS and its peacekeeping
arm, ECOMOG able to bring peace to those countries. Indeed in virtually
every conflict on the continent, both internal and external actors are
involved, and only agreement by both will bring a conflict to an end.
Unfortunately, however, Africa currently suffers from a dearth of
strong and regionally committed leadership in key countries like
Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria's Obasanjo, who was personally
involved in overcoming coups in several west African countries and a
force behind the forward leaning policies of the AU, has been succeeded
by a President who is not well, and less inclined to be a major figure
on the continental scene. Thabo Mbeki is gone from South Africa,
depriving the AU and Africa in general of a leader who thought long and
hard about how to advance the continents' own peacemaking and
peacekeeping capacities and who used South Africa's resources, e.g., in
Burundi and the DRC, for that purpose. Another formerly leading player,
especially in the Horn, was Kenya. But Kenya is now absorbed in its
internal political crisis. The AU has itself suffered from setbacks in
its peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia. It is questionable
that the organization will take such forward leaning steps in the near
future, as it did in Burundi, Darfur, and Cote d'Ivoire, but rather
look to U.N.- or Western-led operations being initiated first in which
to participate. For the immediate future therefore we must recognize
that African leadership is relatively weak.
Nevertheless, in every conflict situation on the continent today,
active African participation in both the peace process and possible
sanctions or peacekeeping is essential. In some cases, however, as in
Sudan and Somalia, we will need to find a broader regional structure
than the AU, to bring in Middle East countries as well. The decision to
establish an Ambassador to the AU was a valuable step and thoughts that
the position should be absorbed with the Ambassador to Ethiopia would
be an unfortunate setback. Strengthening the AU's conflict resolution
capacities, its peacekeeping role, and its progress in implementing
other reforms as represented in NEPAD, are valuable investments. The
Ambassador's role might be enhanced, moreover, to take on the role of
coordinator of U.S. policy in the Horn, along the lines described
above.
Among the subregional organizations, ECOWAS stands out for progress
made in both conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Continued investment
in it is eminently sensible. SADC will only achieve effectiveness in
this regard after it resolves the situation in Zimbabwe and perhaps
reconciles relations more between South Africa and Angola.
South Africa itself remains key, but with the current economic
downturn, and the change in leadership, it is questionable how active
it will be beyond the southern and central region. Yet, the U.S. should
make a major effort to turn a new page in our relations with South
Africa following the election there.
The bottom line here is that African leadership will be less able
in the next few years. Conflict prevention and resolution will thus
have to combine African participation along with vigorous outside
participation. Each conflict will need to be surrounded by a group of
nearby affected African states, United States and European involvement
and help, and in several cases like Somalia, heavy reliance and support
for the convening and negotiating role of the U.N.
conclusion
Comparisons are misleading. Sub-Saharan Africa consists of 48
states, many weak and most subject to the spillover effects of conflict
in neighboring countries. Conflicts will be a part of the continental
scene for decades to come. That is why every Assistant Secretary of
State for Africa starts out with a broad agenda, of development, good
governance, regional integration, more trade, and improvements in the
environment, etc., but spends most of his or her time dealing with one
crisis after another or more likely several simultaneously. The
structure of the Africa Bureau, and other support units of the
Department, do not reflect this reality.
The Africa Bureau staff is smaller than that of the East Asia and
Pacific, Western Hemisphere, or the Europe and Eurasia Bureaus. It
lacks surge capacity, the ability to assemble teams of people to work
over years on serious, complex conflicts. Where active conflicts do not
exist, the staffing is thin. There is one desk officer for Nigeria, the
most populous and one of the most important countries on the continent.
The Office of the Coordinator for Post-Conflict Recovery and
Stabilization was supposed to supplement this capacity. It has to some
extent, but it, too, has been limited, and bureaucratic rivalries have
further limited its role. If we are serious about conflict prevention
and resolution in Africa, we have to recognize that this is a labor-
intensive effort, and that the labor assigned to the Africa Bureau has
to be appropriate to the task.
Naming special envoys can also be a diversion if not backed up by a
team of professional staff, with resources and the ability to manage a
complex diplomatic process on a full-time basis. We should not confuse
form with substance, nor saddle highly dedicated and competent envoys
with tasks that are not adequately resourced.
But no amount of staffing nor resources can make up for competing
or confused policies. U.S. policy in the Horn has long been pulled back
and forth between agencies and between elements in State, reducing our
leverage and confusing both partners and combatants. Our policy in the
DRC has at times been conflicted between the realities on the ground
and the desire to protect relations with neighbors who deny their
involvement. As AFRICOM takes a more active role on the continent, and
addresses more and more the security issues that affect the United
States, as it must, the situation cries out for dynamic and broadly
based leadership from State, at the Washington, subregional, and local
level. That will take strategic thinking, more and better trained
staff, and more resources.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ambassador, for your excellent
remarks, and I certainly appreciate the part about Somalia. I
have been begging for a policy towards Somalia for years, and
then people wonder why there's an unstable situation in Somalia
that can lead to this kind of piracy. The failure to act, a
failure to have a policy, does have consequences, and we're
paying the price right now.
Dr. Wolpe.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD WOLPE, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA PROGRAM AND
PROJECT ON LEADERSHIP AND BUILDING STATE CAPACITY, WOODROW
WILSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Wolpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would
ask that my testimony be submitted for the record.
I really welcomed this invitation to testify before your
committee, and want to particularly commend you on your focus
on the capacity to defuse or prevent conflicts. We give a lot
of lipservice to that concept, but we really haven't focused on
that in a very serious way.
My reflections this afternoon draw upon the 5 years I put
in as President Clinton's special envoy to Africa's Great Lakes
Region, where I was deeply involved in the Congolese and
Burundi wars and peace processes, and a number of post-conflict
reconstruction training initiatives in which I've been involved
for the past several years in such places as Burundi, the DRC,
Liberia, and East Timor. This combination of experiences has
led me to conclude that conventional approaches to
peacebuilding are deeply flawed, because they seldom involve
direct engagement with the key leaders of the belligerent
parties, and virtually ignore the mistrust, the suspicions, the
fears with which they enter the reconstruction process. We
spend considerable time focusing on structures and institutions
and establishing a multiparty electoral system, but the
fundamental challenge of divided societies, such as we face in
Africa, is not the absence of sufficient competitiveness;
rather, it is the absence of collaborative capacity. Leaders
that have been through years of conflict and war simply find it
difficult to get beyond a winner-take-all, zero-sum mindset to
identify common interests, or to rebuild the trust and
relationships required to enable them to work effectively
together in rebuilding their societies. Yet, our governance and
peacebuilding programs, such as those administered by NED and
NDI and IRI and so on, seldom have incorporated strategies or
processes to build collaborative capacity. As a consequence,
many peacebuilding initiatives are unsustainable, with
countries returning to war within a few years.
From this prospective, let me address, now, some of the
specific questions that you posed.
First, with respect to the diplomatic presence and
resources required to anticipate and prevent long-term threats,
I would submit that we need a new diplomatic paradigm. We need
instruments and processes that are less focused on imposing
Western institutional structures and more directed to assisting
nationals in divided societies develop a recognition of their
interdependence and of the value of collaboration, even with
former enemies.
Second, the implementation of such a paradigm requires a
new approach to the training of diplomats. Most diplomats, I
discovered during my time at State, have little or no expertise
in the techniques of institutional and conflict transformation,
and are minimally trained, if at all, as bizarre as it sounds,
in mediation and facilitation techniques. Diplomats tend to
think of sticks and carrots, of pressures and incentives, of
anything that will bring belligerent parties to the signing of
peace agreements. But if the belligerent parties feel they have
been manipulated into an agreement, and have little sense of
their ownership of the final product, the chances for
sustainability are greatly reduced.
The leaders of belligerent parties may well sign an
agreement, but that does not mean that, the day afterwards,
they see each other any differently than the day before or that
they are any more prepared to address the issues underlying
their conflict. In short, if we are serious about sustainable
solutions, processes that address the mindsets of key leaders
directly, their fears, their suspicions, their perceptions of
one another must be seen as a critical complement to
conventional diplomacy.
Third, building a more effective approach to sustainable
peacebuilding requires the development of new partnerships
between diplomats, on the one hand, and specialists in the
techniques of institutional and conflict transformation, on the
other. Diplomats seldom know much about these techniques, but
they do have access to national leaders, they do understand the
politics of divided societies, and they do comprehend the
regional diplomatic environment. Trainers, on the other hand,
though having the skills required to transform conflictual
relationships, seldom have access to national leaders,
generally have little background on the politics of these
societies, and are generally not conversant with the diplomatic
environment. In short, trainers and diplomats need each other
if key leaders are to be drawn into the required training
initiatives.
Fourth, one means of building this new synergy between
diplomats and trainers would be to better integrate the work of
USAID's Bureau of Conflict Mitigation and Management, the
repository of most government expertise on conflict
transformation, with the State Department's diplomatic agenda.
Moreover, CMM knows the lay of the land with respect to the
conflict transformation profession. It's best positioned to
mobilize expert trainers to establish in-country training
initiatives designed to support our diplomatic objectives of
assisting states emerging from war or states threatening to go
to war, to strengthen state cohesion and the collaborative
capacity of key leaders.
And fifth, in a somewhat different vein and consistent with
some of the comments of my distinguished colleagues earlier,
we're often flying absolutely blind, with little solid
information about the various military elements involved in the
conflict or about their role of ethnic diaspora that are
financing and fueling many of the conflicts in Africa. There
were, when I was at State, simply too few intelligence assets
committed to African conflict zones. I'm hopeful, but
skeptical, that this situation has changed significantly, and
would argue for the resources required to enable the United
States Government to develop much more informed diplomatic
strategies.
And then, sixth, also, I think, mentioned briefly earlier,
related to the intelligence deficit, is an extraordinary
paucity of language skills, particularly African languages.
Seventh, one of the things that I discovered very directly
through my experience is the importance of close diplomatic
coordination with all of the countries engaged in a country's
peace process. One of the most important developments that
occurred as we were trying to address both the Burundi and the
Congolese conflicts was a very close partnership I formed with
my European Union counterpart, Aldo Ajello. We worked closely
together, ensuring that we were communicating precisely the
same message and could not be played off against each other by
the belligerent parties.
In addition, regular meetings were established involving
all of the key international players--the European Union,
Belgium, France, Canada, the United Kingdom. These meetings not
only facilitated important information exchanges, but they
enabled us both to harmonize our messages and to decide on an
appropriate diplomatic strategy as events unfolded on the
ground.
I have some additional comments on special envoys, but I
would simply associate myself with the remarks made earlier
about the need to recognize the supreme importance of special
envoys in multicountry situations, because sitting ambassadors
invariably end up reflecting the perspective of their own
capitals. You need someone that's able to have a much wider
view and is capable of doing the kind of shuttle diplomacy
required. In addition, that envoy must have the kind of support
of which Princeton Lyman was speaking.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wolpe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Howard Wolpe, Director of Africa Program and
Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson
Center, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the invitation to testify before your
subcommittee, and commend you for focusing in a timely way on a number
of issues that are central to America's diplomatic capacity--and
particularly to our ability to defuse or prevent conflicts within the
conflict-plagued Africa Continent. My reflections this afternoon draw
upon my 5 years experience as President Clinton's Special Envoy to
Africa's Great Lakes Region, where I was deeply involved in both the
Congolese and Burundi wars and associated peace processes, and a number
of post-conflict reconstruction training initiatives in which I have
been involved the past several years--in such places as Burundi, the
DRC, Liberia, and East Timor.
This combination of experiences has led me to conclude that
conventional approaches to peace-building are deeply flawed, because
they seldom involve direct engagement with the key leaders of the
belligerent parties, and virtually ignore the mistrust, suspicions and
fears with which they enter the reconstruction process. We spend
considerable time focusing on structures and institutions, and
establishing a multiparty electoral system. But the fundamental
challenge of divided societies is not the absence of sufficient
competitiveness. Rather, it is the absence of collaborative capacity:
Leaders that have been through years of conflict and war simply find it
difficult to get beyond a ``winner take all,'' zero-sum, mindset to
identify common interests, or to rebuild the trust and relationships
required to enable them to work effectively together in rebuilding
their societies. Yet, our governance and peace-building programs seldom
have incorporated strategies or processes to build collaborative
capacity. As a consequence, many peace-building initiatives are
unsustainable, with countries returning to war within a few years.
From this perspective, let me now respond to the specific questions
you have posed for consideration. First, with respect to the diplomatic
presence and resources required to anticipate and prevent long-term
threats--and, I would add, to implement post-conflict mitigation,
recovery, and transformation strategies to sustain peaceful transitions
to democracy--I would offer the following reflections and
recommendations:
First, we need a new diplomatic paradigm--one that
recognizes that the starting point for preventative initiatives
in Africa is a recognition of the divided nature of most
African societies. That means we need instruments and processes
that are less focused on imposing Western institutional
structures than in assisting nationals in divided societies
develop a recognition of their interdependence and of the value
of collaboration even with former enemies. Such initiatives
should be directed at changing the ``winner take all,'' zero-
game conflict paradigm that characterizes most elite
interactions, at building the trust and relationships among key
leaders, at building a new consensus on how power is to be
shared and organized, and at strengthening the communications
and negotiations skills of key leaders.
Second, the implementation of such a paradigm requires a new
approach to the training of diplomats. One of the things that I
learned during my 5 years at State is that most diplomats have
little or no expertise in the techniques of institutional and
conflict transformation, and are minimally trained (if at all)
in mediation and facilitation techniques. Diplomats tend to
think of sticks and carrots, of pressures and incentives--of
anything that will bring belligerent parties to the signing of
peace agreements. But if the belligerent parties feel they have
been manipulated into an agreement, and have little sense of
their ownership of the final product, the chances for
sustainability are greatly reduced. The leaders of belligerent
parties may well sign an agreement--but that does not mean that
the day afterward they see each other any differently than the
day before, or that they are any more prepared to address the
issues underlying their conflict. In short, if they are serious
about sustainable solutions, processes that address the mind-
sets of key leaders directly--their fears, their suspicions,
their perceptions of one another--must be seen as a critical
complement to conventional diplomacy. In this connection, I
welcome the proposal laid out by President Obama in the recent
campaign to establish a Mediation Unit at State--that would
bring together experienced diplomats and other practitioners to
build an inventory of peace-building best practices and
``lessons learned.''
Third, building a more effective approach to sustainable
peace-building requires the development of new partnerships
between diplomats, on the one hand, and specialists in the
techniques of institutional and conflict transformation, on the
other. Diplomats, as I have indicated, seldom know much about
these techniques, but they do have access to national leaders,
do understand the politics of divided societies, and comprehend
the regional, diplomatic environment. Trainers, on the other
hand, though having the skills required to transform
conflictual relationships, seldom have access to national
leaders, generally have little background on the politics of
these societies, and are generally not conversant with the
diplomatic environment. In short, trainers and diplomats need
each other if key leaders are to be drawn into the required
training initiatives.
Fourth, one means of building this new synergy between
diplomats and trainers would be to better integrate the work of
USAID's Bureau of Conflict Mitigation and Management--the
repository of most government expertise on conflict
transformation--with the State Department's diplomatic agenda.
Too frequently, however, the work of CMM is viewed as a
secondary enterprise, not central to the real work of
diplomacy. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth.
Moreover, CMM knows the lay of the land with respect to the
conflict transformation profession, and is best positioned to
mobilize expert trainers to establish in-country training
initiatives designed to support the diplomatic objective of
assisting states emerging from war, or states threatening to go
to war, strengthen state cohesion and the collaborative
capacity of key leaders.
Fifth, in a rather different vein, during my tenure as Great
Lakes Special Envoy I was struck by how often we were flying
blind--with little solid information about the various military
elements involved in the conflict, or about the role of ethnic
diaspora that were financing and fueling many of the conflicts.
There were simply too few intelligence assets committed to
Africa conflict zoners; this seemed to be a very low priority
for the Central Intelligence Agency. I am hopeful, but
skeptical, that this situation has changed significantly, and
would argue for the resources required to enable the USG
develop more informed diplomatic strategies.
Sixth, and closely related to the intelligence deficit, was
a woeful paucity of appropriate language skills. There are few
within the U.S. Government that speak indigenous African
languages--and when it came to the assignment of defense
attaches, several lacked even solid French. This linguistic
shortcoming greatly hampered their effectiveness in working
with the security branches of the host governments.
Seventh, during my tenure as special envoy, I was constantly
reminded of the importance of close diplomatic coordination
with all of the countries that were seeking to support the
peace process. One of the most important developments that
occurred as we were trying to address both the Burundi and the
Congolese conflicts was a very close partnership I formed with
my European Union counterpart, Aldo Ajello. We worked closely
together, sometimes even to the point of making joint
demarches. This insured that we were communicating precisely
the same message and could not be played off against each other
by the belligerent parties. In addition, regular meetings were
established involving all of the key international players--
most notably, the EU, Belgium, France, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. These meetings facilitated an important information
exchange, and enabled us both to harmonize our messages, and to
decide on appropriate diplomatic strategy as events unfolded on
the ground. In later years, Aldo Ajello observed that he felt
the international effort in the Great Lakes was compromised
when the United States did not reappoint a special envoy with
whom he could have collaborated.
Finally, it is well known that the Africa Bureau is severely
understaffed. Hopefully, this personnel deficit will be
overcome with the contemplated expansion of State Department
personnel--but there should be no question as to the importance
of this issue. In this connection, I would draw your attention
to the report issued on October 8, 2008, by the Stimson
Institute and the American Academy of Diplomacy outlining very
precise and reasonable staffing increases for State to ``expand
the diplomatic toolkit.''
Let me turn now to the second question the subcommittee has posed--
the role of special envoys, and how they interface with our Embassies
in the conflict zones in which they are engaged. I would offer two
principal observations:
First, I would underscore the importance of special envoys
in addressing situations involving more than a single state.
Sitting Ambassadors invariably come to reflect the perspective
of the capitals in which they are based; it is virtually
impossible for the Ambassador to Rwanda, for example, to fully
comprehend the Kinshasa perspective on the Great Lakes
conflict; nor do Kinshasa-based diplomats have a good
comprehension of the Rwandan perspective. Special envoys enjoy
the unique position of being able to view and understand a
conflict from all perspectives--thereby enabling the
development of a much more balanced and nuanced diplomatic
strategy. While Bureau heads in Washington do develop a broader
view of conflict dynamics, they simply have too much on their
day-to-day bureaucratic plate to undertake the required on-the-
ground diplomatic engagement.
Second, it is important, in my view, for special envoys to
work very closely with the various Embassies within their area
of responsibility--to insure that the sitting Ambassadors are
fully in the loop, and that there are no misunderstandings or
mixed messages. I always made it a practice to have the sitting
Ambassadors or Embassy political officers accompany me to my
meetings. Then, at the conclusion of a national visit, the
Ambassador would often host a gathering of the locally based
diplomatic community where I would provide a full debriefing on
the meetings I had held. This helped significantly to build
trust between the Embassies, and to harmonize both analyses and
messages.
Finally, the subcommittee has asked me to comment on what Embassies
might do to strengthen their information-gathering function.
Successful political, policy, intelligence and
representational functions of an American Embassy are dependent
on the officers of that Embassy--the Ambassador, the DCM, the
political and economic councilors and their staff officers--
understanding the politics, economies, cultures and histories
of the countries in which they serve. This can only be done
adequately if those officers get to know the leaders and the
people of their host countries. The relationships need to be
structured on the basis of openness and frankness, based on
mutual respect and trust, or they result in diplomats being
told what the nationals think they want to hear, rather than
what is their true situation. These relationships can only
develop from extended and egalitarian interactions with the
community. Of course, there are security constraints these
days, with Embassies and American diplomatic communities in
some instances being restricted to almost ``fortress'' like
existences behind secure walls and armored cars. Special
efforts need to be made to get beyond and outside of these
fortresses, both physical and conceptual.
During my diplomatic tenure, I was struck by the great
variation between Embassies in the amount of political outreach
that is undertaken. Some Embassies were outstanding in insuring
that the Ambassador and political officers were fully engaged
with diverse constituencies. This is very much a function of
the leadership provided by the Ambassador. The best Ambassadors
placed special emphasis on reaching beyond the often closed
circle of the diplomatic community, as much as security
concerns allowed, to mix professionally with the host
communities and, as a part of that, to engage in broad social
intercourse, which is often the foundation for good political
contacts.
I was also struck by the tendency of Embassies to develop
capital-centric perspectives. It is especially important, to
counter this natural tendency, for Embassy officials to travel
outside of the capital, to engage rural constituencies, and to
reach out to opposition and unofficial elements.
Finally, as discussed earlier, Embassies are often hampered
by very limited intelligence assets--and some of these
deficiencies in the allocation of both human and technical
resources need to be corrected--especially in volatile,
conflict-sensitive areas. This will greatly strengthen the
over-all diplomatic capabilities of our Embassies.
I hope these reflections have been helpful, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to any questions you might have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Dr. Wolpe.
I want to thank all the panelists. This truly--as I know my
colleagues know--is a very distinguished panel.
And I want to thank my colleagues for such excellent
attendance at this hearing. We're all very busy, but this is a
great showing. And, of course, I'm delighted my colleague
Senator Kaufman is here. He's new to the Senate, but not new at
all to this committee and these issues; he knows them very
well. And, of course, Senator Lugar, the ranking member of the
full committee--no one in the Senate has devoted more effort
and time to these issues of diplomacy and trying to solve these
problems.
So, I thank you all for being here. And I will start with a
round--7-minute rounds. And we can do more, if people want.
Ambassador Pickering, picking up on the American Academy's
paper you mentioned, one of the challenges we face is that some
in the Foreign Service do not believe that spending large
amounts of time on a difficult post in Africa will advance
their careers. How can we restructure the incentive and support
system to encourage diplomats to go to places like Chad or
Sierra Leone, both countries that are obviously hardship posts?
Ambassador Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I've never believed that the material rewards in the
Foreign Service, were the overwhelming incentive. What was an
important incentive, I think, for all of us was the fact that
you had a tough job, and you had an opportunity to do it very
well. In that sense, Africa is a collection of tough jobs.
And I had the pleasure and honor of having 8 years of my
career in Africa, in three different jobs, two in the Foreign
Service and one in the military. My sense was that it was those
difficult and challenging jobs that gave you the opportunity,
particularly as a young officer, to show what you could do, and
that, while it was a kind of make-or-break challenge in some
instances, it also helped to speed advancement and move things
ahead. So, very early on I volunteered for Africa. There was an
excitement about what was going on in Africa in the 1960s. That
quickly turned to crises after crisis, as we all know. That
challenged me and many of my friends and colleagues. And I
think we all benefited, to some extent, by being tested early
and tested often, if I could put it that way.
To deal with the problems of the Foreign Service, in terms
of compensation, it is a travesty, Mr. Chairman, that right now
the pay system, which, in effect, provides locality pay for the
Civil Service, which is much deserved, has now undermined the
Foreign Service's special provisions to pay extra amounts for
people who serve in dangerous places. So it is now much more
lucrative to serve in Washington than it is in Ouagadougou. And
to get people, particularly in their final years, when they are
building their highest 3-year salary for their pensions, which
is very important, to serve overseas in challenging places
means that we have to change. We have to make the base pay for
the Foreign Service the pay that people receive in Washington
in total, and then to calculate the allowances that deal with
danger and special circumstances, and all the other issues that
you all know so well about, as being on top of that. We've all
got it all, now, backward. It's not the fault of anyone, but it
is, frankly, if I could be a little bit direct, in your hands.
Senator Feingold. Fair enough. Very helpful comment.
Ambassador, let me continue with you. One of the issues
that I have repeatedly discussed in my travels throughout
Africa, and even other parts of the world, is something you
certainly alluded to, the Chief of Mission authority. I'm
concerned that this authority has eroded, limiting the ability
of our ambassadors to fully oversee and coordinate U.S.
activities in their own countries that they're in charge of.
And I'd be interested to know your thoughts on how we can
restore the Chief of Mission authority and ensure that it is
upheld by all U.S. agencies.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, and I am happy to address that.
The authorities began by being set out by President Kennedy in
a letter to ambassadors. That practice has died out. And so,
sometimes that letter came in the 8th year of an
administration, sometimes it didn't come at all. So, the first
thing I suggested to you in my testimony was that President
Obama craft an Executive order that will sustain itself across
administrations, and put into that all of the best statements
that his predecessors have included with respect to the role of
the ambassador. I think that that's extremely important.
The second point I made was that the ambassador is in
charge, except for the forces under a combatant commander, and
that's the kind of Afghan-Iraq situation. And there are good
reasons for that. But, nowhere has anybody sat down and defined
how those individuals relate to each other, when they're
centrally important. The military cannot do it alone; it needs,
in fact, the knowledge, experience, and backup of civilians in
their special skilled areas, whether it's humanitarian
assistance or regular diplomacy, to get all kinds of jobs done.
And so, in fact, we have to look at that universe, Mr.
Chairman, and work out how those things should be worked.
I, for one, would strongly favor, in the early days of a
military intervention, which, as you know, I believe has to be
the absolute last resort, that the military commanders should
be in charge, but be advised closely by the Ambassador. Now,
many of my friends would consider that a travesty. But, it has
to move over fairly quickly when it begins to appear that we
have to do the civilian jobs in order to make sure that the
sacrifices the military made have continued meaning and
importance, in terms of the national interest in that country.
And my feeling is that unity of command is worth the sacrifice,
particularly because we have seen, in many occasions, good
ambassadors and good military commanders know how to get along
together. Bad ones ought to be changed.
Senator Feingold. Very good. Thank you, Ambassador. And
I'll come back to you later.
I want to get started with Ambassador Lyman, by asking you
about the Washington side of this discussion. You've spent a
lot of time working in and with the Africa Bureau at the State
Department. You mentioned, in your testimony, it's one of the
smallest regional bureaus, and it's been under capacity for a
long time. In your view, how can we rebuild and reenergize the
Africa Bureau so it's not, as you pointed out, simply
responding to the crisis of the moment and putting out fires?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think there are several things to do. As I mentioned,
that you have to assume that there's going to be conflict as
part of the agenda for any administration dealing with Africa.
It isn't the only agenda item, by any means, but it's an
important one.
And we need to construct, either within the Bureau or in
support from an office like the Coordinator for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction and Stabilization, teams of conflict resolution
and conflict-addressing experts who will work within the Bureau
to backup any sustained peace effort in which we're involved.
And that team has to be allocated to the Bureau, has to be
available, and it has to be available as long as necessary,
which may mean for several years.
So, in the case of Sudan, we should have a team that's
working constantly on the range of issues which are
interrelated--that includes the CPA, on the one hand, and
Darfur, on the other. And we need the same for the Great Lakes
Region, and backing up that diplomacy.
The second important requirement is to deal with what I
call the ``cross-Bureau problem,'' in the Horn, crossing the
Africa Bureau and the Near East Bureau--and the same is true in
the Sahel--and having the Secretary direct that there be
creative joint structures that deal with these areas, and give
them the priority that they need. Quite frankly, the Africa
Bureau doesn't have the clout, alone, to command the attention
on the Middle East policy makers, and it needs that if you're
going to deal with the Horn or you're going to deal with the
problems of the Sahel.
The third requirement--and it is in the recommendations of
the the Foreign Affairs Budget Report that Ambassador Pickering
talked about--is for specific authorities and funding that
could be given to missions--and by that, I mean both embassy
and USAID missions--so that, on the ground, they can be working
to deal with a whole range of problems that are not going to
get the attention from the Assistant Secretary, but can prevent
a lot of the conflicts from growing larger. There are tools for
that if the authorities, funding, and training are made
available.
And the last would be to draw on the kind of expertise that
Howard Wolpe talked about; that is, the Department needs the
funding and the willingness to bring to bear expertise that's
outside the Department. I find the Intelligence Community does
this a lot. I've been to more intelligence conferences over the
last few years than I've been to State Department conferences,
and it's because the intelligence community does that all the
time. And I think the Department could do much more in bringing
skills to bear that it does not have in house.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor. I will come back to
you and to--excuse me--Ambassador and Dr. Wolpe, I'll come back
to you later.
Let me just tell you how delighted I am to hear you talk
about the interrelationship of Africa and the Middle East. I
have been trying to talk about this, for years. You almost
never hear it. All you have to do is listen to the statements
of al Qaeda, and their strategy, and you realize they're
thinking that way. Why aren't we? Why are we incapable of
understanding that interconnection and not focusing on it?
Ambassador Pickering. Could I make a brief point on that--
--
Senator Feingold. Very quickly.
Ambassador Pickering. [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I ought to----
Ambassador Pickering. I'll be very quick.
Senator Feingold. [continuing]. Yeah----
Senator Isakson. Go right ahead.
Ambassador Pickering. Over the years, Turkey was seen as
preeminently the same problem that Ambassador Lyman described
for the Horn of Africa. Over the years, at least some people
instituted a view that no policy recommendation with respect to
Turkey could come forward without full consultation with the
Middle East Bureau, and, when we had a separate Bureau for
Russian and Soviet Affairs, without that Bureau being involved.
Senator Feingold. Very good. Thank you.
And Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, you
know, following up on that series of comments: I was sitting
somewhere, watching television last week, when it was announced
that Somalia had adopted Shari'ah law, and it occurred to me at
that minute, the tie that you're talking about, the Middle East
and the Muslim faith in that part of the world, as far as
that's concerned. So, I--the light bulb just went off, and, in
listening to them talk, that it is important to get the Africa
Bureau and the Mid-East Bureau coordinating on Somalia, where
we have had no policy since Mogadishu, I guess, of any
consequence, I think that comment's outstanding.
Mr. Wolpe--is it ``Dr. Wolpe''?
Dr. Wolpe. Howard.
Senator Isakson. Professor? Howard? [Laughter.]
Howard, let me ask you this question. You were special
envoy for 7 years----
Dr. Wolpe. Five years.
Senator Isakson. [continuing]. 5 years. Chairman Feingold
and I wrote President Obama in February 2009, urging him to
appoint a special envoy to the Sudan, which he did, and we met
with him a few weeks ago. I am extremely concerned with what's
happeneing in Darfur, what appears to be the ineffectiveness of
the African Union troops to protect the NGOs, to deliver the
humanitarian aid. As a special envoy, I didn't think that Mr.
Williamson, who I think was the previous----
Dr. Wolpe. That's right.
Senator Isakson. [continuing]. Special envoy, if that's
correct, ever seemed to get the response that he appeared to me
to be asking for, so we need to give General Gration, in my
opinion, who is this new special envoy, that type of a--
support. What type of support did you get when you were a
special envoy?
Dr. Wolpe. When I was a special envoy, I had, basically,
three staff working with me--support staff, and then two
colleagues of mine, one in Washington and one that was usually
in the field with me. And that was very helpful. What I found
enormously frustrating at times was, we were in the middle of
two wars that involved nine countries, and there was, at times,
urgent need for some shuttle diplomacy between capitals. And to
try to do shuttle diplomacy by commercial aircraft in Africa is
a challenge, to say the least. There were a couple of instances
in which we were able to get the White House to make available
one of the defense attache planes in the region, but I cannot
tell you the numbers of times we were restricted in what we
could accomplish because we just did not have access to the
players. And that was ridiculous. To me, that was more
important, in some ways, than the kind of staffing.
Now, as we look forward to the Great Lakes or to the Horn,
you've got to look at these issues, not only in terms of the
immediacy of helping to stop the conflict, but also the longer-
term perspective of putting in place economically integrated
regions; for example, in Central Africa. At the end of the day,
the only hope for smaller countries, such as Burundi or Rwanda,
is to become part of a large economic region. We need to begin
to help the states of the region begin to talk about building a
new security architecture. That applies to Sudan, as well as
others. And that requires a set of experts and advisors that
ought to be available in support of the special envoy as we
craft policy and initiatives in the region.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much. I know the comment
was being made about attracting people to Africa to serve the
State Department there. I think one of the things that has made
that somewhat difficult has been the lack of infrastructure the
State Department has at these posts. I know my visit to
Equatorial Guinea a year and a half ago, the Embassy had a 10-
foot hole in the roof, and the Chinese, two blocks down the
street, were building what had to be a $4 or $5 million
Embassy. I think we've got to invest more in the
infrastructure, and, for that matter, the transportation
infrastructure, because it is difficult to get around.
Ambassador Pickering, you made reference to a $250,000
account, which I took to be a discretionary account for the
Ambassador to use to facilitate helping with problems within
the country they're designated to. Is that--does that exist
anywhere else in the State Department?
Ambassador Pickering. It exists, in the present format, at
$25,000 level, and has for many years. And, in fact, we now see
the state of the world, the conditions that prevail, the
difficulties of failed and failing states, and the needs, have
all changed radically. And while $25,000 was seen as a way,
maybe, to deal with the leading edge of an earthquake--a small
one, I have to add--none of that is, as we know, in this day
and age, adequate to do anything. In some cases, when
ambassadors have used the full extent of the money, it has
seemed so paltry and so cheeseparing that, in fact, it has
subjected us to ridicule rather than to the generosity that was
intended behind the effort to give the ambassadors on the spot
the ability to respond immediately. Obviously, there are some
crises that are in the $25,000 category still, but the notion
is that we, as a great country, would be seen to be able to
respond rapidly and intelligently, and I think, over the years,
this money has been used with care. I have not seen comments
from Hill staff or from the Hill that somehow ambassadors have
abused this authority. And that's quite important, because you,
sir, and I, know the degree to which contingency funding is
treated, up here, as something that nobody would like to touch.
In effect, of course, we have it in very large amounts in the
money we appropriate every year to AID to deal with
international crises. And, to some extent, I think we have now
built, I hope, a modicum of trust between the Hill and the
executive branch on these issues, and obviously you approve all
the ambassadors here in the Senate, so we should have a basis
for going ahead that I hope can help to move this.
Obviously, our first job is to convince the present
administration to propose to you that change. We haven't been
able to do that yet, but this is early days. But, my hope is
that that will come, and that can involve a number of kinds of
activities, from immediate relief of populations in emergency
circumstances, to evacuations where that is necessary, to
further involvement in all kinds of things that would not be
available because the other, regular processes take too long.
Senator Isakson. I was thinking, as you said that, when we
provided the PRTs in Iraq with the funds for a combination of
microloans and ultimately what became the $3 a day to The
Awakening, we turned the paradigm of the entire conflict, and
then our troops performed magnificently. So, that's pretty good
evidence that some discretionary money at the right place, or
the right crisis can make a world of difference in a very
underdeveloped part of the world.
Ambassador Pickering. It is, Senator Isakson. It's also
clear that the commanders Emergency Response Program for
military commanders has shown how those kinds of programs can
be very successful in difficult situations in the field. And my
feeling is that we, of course, need that on the civilian side,
as well, because, in fact, on the civilian side they're
supposed to be handling the bulk of those programs around the
world.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. I'd just like to comment on that. I just
returned from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the CERP funds are
incredibly helpful. And they're dispensed by the Department of
Defense, but they're primarily for the nonmilitary part of the
counterinsurgency. So, they're basically things that State
Department should have. We think it's important to do it in
places like that, I think it's important to do elsewhere. So, I
think the extent of the CERP funds makes a lot of sense.
In my travels in Africa, it seems to me the biggest problem
we have is corruption. I mean, it--you know, it just kind of
eats away at everything we're doing.
The strength of U.S. diplomacy to anticipate, prevent, and
respond to conflict in Africa seems, the prevention part--if we
could do something about corruption in Africa, it would go a
long ways toward preventing these things. Do you have any ideas
of how, diplomatically, we can improve our ability to deal with
corruption?
Ambassador Lyman. Let me try and deal with that, Senator.
And you've put your finger on a terribly, terribly critical
problem. I think there are several ways in which we can be
helpful.
One is promoting a free press and civil society, because
it's only by putting a spotlight on it and getting political
pressure on it that you make some headway in that regard.
Second, we have to be honest about prosecuting Americans
and getting our European friends to prosecute Europeans who
provide some of the bribes, because that clearly has been one
of the things that undermine things in South Africa, European
arms manufacturers that were at the heart of that big bribery
scandal.
I think, also--and I'm hoping this will be a theme of this
current administration--that President Obama will make that a
major part of his outreach to Africa. He talks a lot about
personal responsibility, and I hope he will say that to the
Africans, that we'll be looking for African countries who are
responsible, and their leaders are responsible.
I think the Millennium Challenge Account works well in this
regard, because it sets up criteria very specifically with a
corruption threshold and says, ``Countries that do well, we
will reward.'' I think that's an important element to retain in
the AID program.
And then, as I--I think, in general, promoting the
democratic institutions, the checks and balances, the--getting
parliaments to stand up and be stronger--those are the
elements, because it has to come very much within the country.
But, I think we can do a lot to encourage that.
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Dr. Wolpe. Could I just add a----
Senator Kaufman. Sure.
Dr. Wolpe. [continuing]. Just add an additional point? I
would agree with everything that Ambassador Lyman has offered,
but I would make one other point.
From my perspective, the corruption ought to be perceived
more as a symptom than as a cause. It is fundamentally
symptomatic of this lack of cohesion, in most African states
and societies, in which everyone is existing in a world that is
seen as a zero-sum game, winner take all, and in which all your
political actors--and the classic case is Mobutu's Congo--are
acting as individual entrepreneurs, where the state is seen as
the means to wealth, and there is no sense of their--of the
value of collaboration with others who they see as potential
competitors. So, to the extent we can begin to strengthen state
capacities and cohesion by helping folks involved in these
divided societies recognize their common interests, see
themselves as interdependent, recognize the value of
collaborating with others as a matter of strengthening their
own self-interest, I think you'll begin to see a diminution in
the levels of corruption.
Corruption occurs primarily between people of different
groups, not from one's--not within one's own family or
traditional structure.
Senator Kaufman. Ambassador Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering. I would pick up on what both
Princeton and Howard have had to say, and I agree with them
all. I think that we need to help Africans begin to address the
question of totally inadequate compensation for responsible
jobs. I can remember, when I was in Nigeria, that customs jobs
were auctioned off at huge prices, but only for a year at a
time, because that was all that they were prepared to rent
those jobs for. And I think that's important.
I think, second, over the years, we have had experience in
dealing with very difficult criminal problems in foreign
countries, where we are able to get people to step forward in
law enforcement and go through a vetting process and stay as a
cohesive unit to deal with that issue; the Mafia in Sicily was
one example of that.
And, third, judiciary. It will not work, in fact, if the
judiciary is bought and paid for, and that comes with the
immunity that you buy through the corruption operation. It just
becomes a kind of continuous cycle. So, we also have to, I
think, work very hard to get courts that are responsible, that
can deal with cases of prosecution, and people know that there
is a penalty. At the moment, most of these people enjoy no
sense that there is any penalty for involving themselves in
corruption. As Howard said, it merely is a way, from their
point of view almost legitimate to advance their livelihoods,
their families, and their futures.
Senator Kaufman. I'd just like to associate with Mr.
Lyman's comments, and maybe someday we can have a hearing on
the press in Africa and how we get a free press, because I
think that's a secret to ending corruption, if we have a free
press, and I think it's incredibly important, and free press is
dying in Africa, right across the continent.
Let me just ask you a point that you raised, Ambassador
Pickering, but it goes to all things, and that is this whole
problem between outreach and security. I mean, this is really--
we are closing down our outreach opportunities, here. Is there
anything--any hope you can give--I know our ranking member has
spoken, and has a bill, which I've cosponsored on how to deal
with the libraries, for instance--is there any--can you give us
any hope on how we deal with this--I mean, just hunkering down
and not having outreach just doesn't seem to me to be the way
to behave, but I also am concerned about security. I'd like
someone to, you know, help me.
Ambassador Pickering. Senator, in my prepared remarks, and
in my oral remarks, I think, given before you had a chance to
join us, I talked about, in public diplomacy, some serious
steps that we recommend--100-percent increase in visitor
programs, and so on. I think that's important. We--I also, in
the prepared testimony, noted that we need to do cultural
centers once again, that we need to do all kinds of exchange
programs, and that one of the proposals is that--we privatized
our cultural centers in Latin America, they now need public
support to come up to standard. These kinds of things, of
course, have been thought of and have been worked on, and I
would not slight the past administration for totally ignoring
them, but they need to be regenerated and strengthened, in my
view, to get precisely at that outreach program.
Over the years, I think all of us have enjoyed working with
foreign officials who were educated in the United States, who
knew the United States. Now, some turned sour, but they were a
tiny percent, and the others were remarkably good to work with.
They understood us, they understood our national objectives,
and they understood our national principles, and they respected
them, in the main, and they were there for colleagues and
friends rather than, necessarily, opponents. They didn't sell
out their country, but they were looking for the best possible
joint deal.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing. I think this has been excellent.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
Senator Lugar.
Ambassador Lyman. I just want to add one thing to
Ambassador Pickering's excellent point, because--and all of us
have experienced this--the outreach that you get through both
cultural and public diplomacy is extraordinary valuable. It is
not just opening up lines of better appreciation of the United
States, but it allows you to help people be exposed to
different ways of approaching problems. And no one knows that
better than Senator Lugar. During that period when we were
working to see the end of apartheid, and those negotiations
were going on, having it under then-USIA, the resources to say
to South Africans engaged with various issues, e.g., federalism
which was a divisive issue in the negotiations, ``Here's how
you might deal with the federalism issue, here's an opportunity
to study the experience with it in the U.S. and other
countries.'' In other cases, to make available experts.
Flexible resources like that, just opened up lines of
communication and exchanges of ideas, for them and for us, that
were indispensable.
Senator Feingold. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank the chairman and ranking
member for this remarkable hearing. I just have appreciated so
much the testimony. I remembered a presentation given by the
Peruvian novelist Vargas Llosa over at the Woodrow Wilson
Center about 20 years ago, which was important for those of us
who heard it, because it was sort of the advent of all of the
United States interests in elections in Central America. Vargas
Llosa, as a novelist, was giving us insights into the history,
the prejudices, the passions, all the conflicts that were a
part of that situation which did not fit very neatly with any
of our classical democracy situations.
I also thought of it when we had a hearing here on Sri
Lanka which demonstrated very sharp opinions and a concern
about American diplomacy. As you pointed out, Dr. Wolpe,
perhaps American diplomats in those situations really need to
have business managers, development experts, people involved in
the intelligence services, and as Ambassador Pickering has
indicated a team of people. I wouldn't call them fixers, or
manipulators. They would understand, really, how the fabric of
that particular society has any hope of reconciliation and what
kind of concessions are going to have to be made.
We have many Senators coming and going from Afghanistan and
Pakistan who often come back and say, ``This is really bad.''
They don't say ``hopeless.'' We have a situation in which we're
grinding our way to something that might be called stability,
and that somehow or other the insurgents are going to be chased
down so that they're sort of out of the picture, and the
question then is whether Pakistan can remain stable in that
process. With Afghanistan, in which even more work and effort
has been made, but no one really has a very good fix on how
many or what kind of personnel are going to be required.
I'm encouraged that our National Guard is now sending out
agricultural personnel, farmers who are members of the National
Guard in Indiana and elsewhere, who are actually--know
something about agriculture. They're out there rather
inconspicuously working their way though too few numbers. As
many have noted, we have people who are pretty good in
reconciling others, doing the tradoffs, and bringing about
stability.
This leads to my question. What happens if, after the
contribution of our troops and our funds, countries I have
mentioned and countries in Africa come to a result that many
Americans, looking at liberal democratic traditions, say,
``This isn't exactly what we had in mind. As a matter of fact,
we think there are some deficiencies, in terms of civil rights,
human rights, maybe women's rights, education, ignored in all
this. Even though it is stable and people may have stopped
fighting the question then will be, ``Is this going to be
acceptable?'' In other words, one problem the Ambassador has in
representing the President now is that he sort of has to say,
``Well, this just isn't good enough, or, this really isn't
democracy, or, as a matter of fact, you're violating what most
Americans think is very important.'' How do we bring about the
evolution of situations in which the fixers, the development
experts, the intelligence community bring stability without, at
the same time, violating our own general principles?
Dr. Wolpe. Senator Lugar, that's a fascinating question,
and an enormously difficult one. I'd like to use, if I may,
though, an analogy to some of the work I've done elsewhere,
because, in some ways, we were facing the same kinds of issues.
For example, when we launched a training program in Burundi, I
had approached the World Bank--this is after I left the State
Department--and suggested to the bank that we try something
new, because they had had a peace agreement there, but no one
thought the agreement would stick. There was so much paranoia
on all sides, and so many suspicions. And so, we decided to
identify key leaders within the society. And we had Burundians
make that identification; we didn't make the selection. And
when they came up with about 100 leaders that represented all
the different sectors, there were some of these guys that had
done violence to everything we Americans would have subscribed.
They had done some terrible deeds earlier, were responsible for
some terrible human rights violations. And I was warned by
former diplomatic colleagues of mine not to involve them in our
process of building collaborative capacity, of training for
collaborative capacity, because they would only undermine what
we were doing.
Well, but when I saw both Hutu and Tutsi, in the instance
of----
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Wolpe. [continuing]. The warlord equivalents in
Afghanistan--but when I saw both Hutu and Tutsi, the enemies,
the rebels, and the government, identify the same people as
folks who could--were key to Burundi's future--they could
undermine it very easily--we made the decision to invite these
guys into the process. And it was the best decision we ever
made, because it turned out that what was driving these guys'
extremism and some of the bad things they had done was their
extraordinary insecurity, fear, and stereotypes they had of one
another. And once we could break through that, and they began
to look at each other in a different fashion, as individuals,
not seeing each other out of their ethnic or political lenses,
then when they sat down to construct solutions to the problems
that they faced in common, the environment, the context, the
ambience of the entire process was dramatically transformed.
At the end of the day, it seems to me we have two choices.
One is, we have to recognize that we cannot impose
institutional frameworks and solutions on others. If they don't
buy those solutions, they're never going to be sustainable,
they're going to be undermined. So, that's No. 1.
Second, if they end up with a solution that we're not
comfortable with as Americans, then we can always take the
position, ``We can't deal with you.'' I mean, it's just as
simple as that. ``In terms of our national interest, we cannot
have the kind relationship we'd like to have, unless X, Y, or Z
changes.'' But, then that's their decision to make, in terms of
the value--the extent to which they value our relationship.
So, I do think we need to separate out the peacebuilding
reconciliation task, on the one hand, from some of these other
judgments that need to be made subsequently about
accountability, about justice, and about the nature of the
relationships we need to forge with these countries.
Senator Lugar. My time's up, but I would just comment, I
think the explanation made is very important, and we have a
responsibility, as Senators or members of the House or what
have you, to understand enough of this to be able to explain
some of this to our constituents, to the press at home, as
opposed to getting on a high horse, becoming so moralistic that
we it's impossible for any of this to succeed----
Dr. Wolpe. I agree.
Senator Lugar. [continuing]. Which could undermine, then,
whatever the diplomacy is we're involved in.
Dr. Wolpe. Exactly.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I'll start a second round, start with Ambassador Lyman.
As you pointed out, I think the lack of capacity has been
one of the reasons we've had to rely so heavily on the use of
special envoys. But, I think until we rebuild that capacity,
we'll continue to need these envoys to bring high-level and
consistent attention to a crisis. As you look back at the last
few decades and the range of envoys that have been used in
Africa, what lessons can be drawn, in terms of effectiveness,
and what recommendations would you give to the Obama
administration as it deploys special envoys in Africa?
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think appointing a special envoy can be an
extraordinarily special contribution, because it puts a
spotlight on the issue and it shows that America has a special
concern with it. But, I think it only succeeds if it's backed
up by a serious policy with resources and staff and a
diplomatic outreach.
As I mentioned, when Senator Danforth took on the task of
Sudan, the North-South peace process, he had a very strong team
behind him, working with him, available to go to Khartoum when
he wasn't able to, to reach out. I watched that same strategy
during the 1980s, when Chet Crocker was doing Southern Africa.
He had a team of 10 people working with him day and night for 8
years. On the other hand, if you have a special envoy and there
isn't strong backing from the Department, and if there isn't a
unified policy that that envoy is carrying out--look, in Sudan
we have a tough time right now, because what do we do about
President Bashir, and the ICC indictment, and how do we balance
our outrage at what's going on in Darfur with the need to get
him to be part of the peace process? That takes a lot of
delicate, careful diplomacy. It has to be unified, has to be
unified between Ambassador Rice in New York and the State
Department so that the envoy is working with strong support all
around and there isn't a lot of backbiting. I won't go into
detail, but I know of two envoys in the last few years who had
more problems with the Department than they had with the people
they were dealing with abroad. I think that it is important
that the policy be clear and the envoy is given that authority
and backing to do it.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Wolpe, in your written testimony you
mentioned there are simply too few intelligence assets
committed to African conflict zones. I certainly agree with
that, not only from my work on this committee, but on the
Intelligence Committee. How specifically could the intelligence
community better support the State Department's efforts at
conflict prevent and peacebuilding in Africa? And what kind of
information is most needed?
Dr. Wolpe. Well, you're dealing with conflict, you
certainly want to know about the military capacities and the
internal operations within the military forces that are
involved. When we were dealing with the Burundi conflict, as an
example, we were flying really blind with respect to what was
happening either inside the military or inside of the rebel
organizations that were being financed and supported from the
diaspora scattered throughout Kenya, Tanzania, Europe, Canada,
and America. And we pleaded constantly to try to get some
commitment of resources to work with those communities. What
was even more shocking at times was when we had--occasionally
had some defense attaches assigned who sometimes did not even
speak French, much less the indigenous language, and therefore
were extraordinarily limited, in terms of their ability to work
closely with the militaries with whom they were associated. So,
these are the kinds of things that ought to change, and that
just require a commitment to begin to hire folks that speak the
languages, that are located where the conflicts are ongoing,
and that are--have access to folks that are relevant to those
conflicts.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, you've talked----
Ambassador Pickering. Can I make a brief point, Mr.----
Senator Feingold. Oh, please.
Ambassador Pickering. [continuing]. Chairman?
Senator Feingold. Yes, Ambassador.
Ambassador Pickering. We're into ``envoyism,''
``envoyitis.'' And it's extremely important that we recognize
that these folks, for reasons that Princeton Lyman related
early on, can make a real contribution, because, in fact, they
can bring in multiple aspects of a particular problem and help
to synthesize that, develop policy, lead the policy, and move
back and forth. But, we need to be careful at both ends; and
let me describe what the ends are that we need to be careful
about.
We need to be careful that, in an area like the Middle
East, where we have several envoys at work, we don't, in fact,
destroy one set of policies by being ``superjihadi'' on another
set of policies. Someone has to deal with the relative
priorities and the rough interrelationships that take place,
particularly around a very delicate situation like Iraq. And
this is very important. And I think people understand that, but
carrying it out is a lot harder than understanding it.
At the other end, you do not want to destroy your
ambassadors. Your ambassadors are there all the time, they
understand what goes on. They can help the envoy, they can fill
in the gaps. They know the players, and, in some cases, they
have great trust and confidence in moving the question ahead.
And so, it has to be a team effort, top to bottom and, if I
could put it this way, sideways, in order to make it happen.
And envoys are not the sovereign answer to all difficult
problems, they represent a very, very useful tool. But, it has
to operate with the rest of the toolbox, it can't operate
entirely alone and in an individual way that undermines our
other national priorities.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, that certainly rings true, in
terms of the experience I had in Djibouti in trying to meet
with the different Somali groups, and then seeing our
Ambassador to Djibouti, our Ambassador to Kenya, and thinking
about how this all works together.
Did you have another comment, Doctor?
Dr. Wolpe. I did say something about this in my written
testimony. What Ambassador Pickering says is so very important.
And one of the ways that I, as a special envoy, dealt with that
problem that was to constantly ensure that the ambassador was
always attending the meetings that I attended within the
country, so there was never any sense of the ambassador being
undercut.
The other thing that would usually happen is, the
ambassador would then host a meeting for all the diplomats in
the area, after every one of my special envoy visits, in which
the entire diplomatic community would be brought abreast of
what was happening. And that really helped to coordinate,
reduce tensions, and create a sense of unity.
Senator Feingold. You even did that when a Senator and a
U.N. Ambassador showed up when you were there, as I recall.
[Laughter.]
You've talked and written a lot----
Dr. Wolpe. I recall that.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, you've talked and written a lot
about the need to promote reconciliation and build
collaborative capacity. And I, of course, agree that it's
critical to creating lasting peace in many divided African
societies, but there's also a need for accountability and
breaking patterns of impunity. I'd like to know how you think
this fits within our efforts to defuse and prevent conflicts.
Dr. Wolpe. The issue of justice and accountability has been
very much central to both the conflicts in which I have been
involved. That issue has been present in Congo, in Liberia, and
in Burundi. There is no issue that is more difficult, in the
final analysis, to address than issues of justice, impunity,
and accountability.
I would argue, as someone who's been involved in the
peacebuilding side of this equation, that sometimes the effort
to move quickly to accountability and judicial determinations
of who was responsible for terrible earlier deeds can undercut
the peacebuilding process. My experience has been that the
stronger the political accommodation is, through the
reconciliation process, the less insistent are the belligerent
parties to find mechanisms of judicial accountability for past
deeds. They want to move on to the future. They're still
interested in truthtelling, so truth and reconciliation
commissions become very much part of the dialogue, but if you
try to move to justice and accountability prematurely, you can
end up with a situation where one person's justice is seen as
the other person's vengeance.
So, I would argue that you definitely first need a
political accommodation. The South African experience that
Ambassador Lyman helped to navigate is classic here, where
there were some decisions that were made to permit some
amnesty, to permit various kinds of mechanisms that would allow
the peace process to go forward before you moved into some of
the harder questions.
Senator Feingold. Not unlike some conversations we're
having domestically. [Laughter.]
Senator----
Dr. Wolpe. Yes.
Senator Feingold. [continuing]. Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Mr. Lyman, you--I think it was your testimony about the
narcotrafficking and the narcosyndicates in Africa. Is the
source of the narcotics--are they grown in Africa or are they
coming out of the Middle East?
Ambassador Lyman. They're actually coming from two
directions. On the west coast they're coming from Latin
America. These are largely, if not entirely, Latin American
syndicates. They are moving the narcotics from Latin America to
Africa to Europe--Europe is the market. And it's a very big
business, and it's growing very rapidly.
And the amount of money involved with--when you're dealing
with very poor, very weak governments, like Guinea Bissau, is
enormous. There are areas of Guinea Bissau that are virtually
owned by the narcosyndicates. There are whole neighborhoods in
Dakar that are owned by the narcosyndicates.
On the east coast of Africa, the drugs are coming from
Asia. They're not grown very much in Africa. Africa is a
transit point, a trading point, for most of this. The
vulnerability of Africa to this kind of insidiousness is
extremely great. The traffickers team up with other forms of
criminality, with corruption and undermine governance. It is
one of the most serious problems we're facing in Africa now,
and it's growing.
Senator Isakson. I assume, then, Africa is to Europe what
Mexico is to the United States. Is----
Ambassador Lyman. Yes----
Senator Isakson. [continuing]. That----
Ambassador Lyman. [continuing]. Exactly.
Senator Isakson. [continuing]. Fair analogy?
Ambassador Lyman. Exactly.
Senator Isakson. But, none of the Afghanistan poppy or
opium is coming into Africa or----
Ambassador Lyman. It is coming through East Africa. There
is a similar, if not quite as well-developed--but, similar
narco business coming in to East Africa. Now, one new drug that
is being now manufactured in Africa is meth. I don't know the
full long----
Senator Isakson. Methamphetamine.
Ambassador Lyman. That, I understand, is being manufactured
in east and southern Africa.
Senator Isakson. And that's worse--that's the worst of all
of them.
Ambassador Pickering, I was very proud of the decision that
the President made regarding Captain Phillips' capture by the
pirates off the coast of Somalia. And from listening to all
three of your testimonies related to Somalia, I am assuming
that the piracy is a reflection of the lawlessness in the
society of Somalia. Is that correct?
Ambassador Pickering. I would say yes and no. Of course
lawlessness plays a very significant role, but--few people have
mentioned it, but at least there is some serious evidence that,
with the disappearance of governance in Somalia, the distant
water fishing states exploited the economic zone, and literally
vacuumed it so that traditional Somali fishermen had no more
occupation. And obviously with the free gun trading that went
on in Somalia, they turned their skills to other purposes.
So, my own view is that, not only do we need effective
naval enforcement, but we also need two other programs, which
will sound totally contradictory, but are very important. We
need--and not only to convoy, in my view, in the major shipping
routes, ships out in the Gulf of Aden, away from the Somali
coast, but we also need to put naval forces in a place where we
can block exit and entry, to the greatest extent possible--we
know it's porous--and then we need to begin to establish food
aid, because these people have no substantial way of feeding
themselves. And over a period of time, my own view is that we
should keep foreign fishermen out of the Somali economic zone,
and we should begin to train and move Somalis back into the
fishing business, if that's where they're prepared to go and
that's how they want to deal with themselves. And it sounds
contradictory, but, in my view, we've got to look at the
problem from its various facets and move it ahead in that
direction, otherwise there will be an endless, I think,
exploitation of lawlessness for these people to continue to
find new ways to go further and further at sea with motherships
and all the other things that we have seen that's developed
into this effort. And I think we have to do this jointly. And
in order to get the authorities, my view is, we probably go
back to Security Council, which seems to be willing to help,
and get the authorities that are necessary to do these various
things that have to be done.
Senator Isakson. So, the Somalia waters were overfished,
and therefore, the fishermen didn't have any jobs, so they----
Ambassador Pickering. That's what I have----
Senator Isakson. [continuing]. Went to piracy?
Ambassador Pickering. [continuing]. Been told. And that may
not be the total story. We all know there are other pieces.
These are complicated things. But, it's a piece we shouldn't
ignore. Right now, of course, it's the total demonization of
Somali pirates for what they've done, and they justly deserve
it, but it wasn't necessarily just the free availability of
weapons and ammunition that put them in that position.
Senator Isakson. So, you would do two things. One, you
would convoy the traffic going through the Gulf of Aden. Would
you do that? And you refer to the Security Council under the
under the auspices of the U.N., or would you--how would you do
that?
Ambassador Pickering. If we think we need authorities to do
that--you can't force people to come into convoys, but I would
say--it's 500 miles between the outlet of the Red Sea and
Sockotra Island, around which you could then send vessels south
and be way offshore in--off Somalia. And my own view is--that's
a day and a half, 2 days, of reasonable shipping. There are
21,000 ships a year that make that trip. That would produce
significant convoys. I think you'd need, one, well-equipped
naval vessel with drones and helicopters and night-vision
devices to protect them. But, I think people would take
advantage of that. And someone even suggested you should charge
a small fee that you could pay for the food program. I don't--
you know, there are all kinds of things that are there. The
rest of it, I think you have to use your naval forces to keep
others out of the fishing zone and do everything you can to
keep Somali pirates in port to enforce this. And then, I think
you should begin the food program.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Yes, sir.
Ambassador Lyman. Can I add just----
Senator Feingold.lease.
Ambassador Lyman. [continuing]. Something----
Senator Isakson. Sure, Ambassador, go ahead.
Ambassador Lyman. [continuing]. To the very good proposals
from Ambassador Pickering?
There's a lesson in the Somali situation, and you learn it
also in the Niger Delta situation. If you leave a situation
long enough in chaos, criminality takes over and it becomes
much more profitable to be a criminal than to do something
else. And we see that with the militias in the Delta of
Nigeria. And then it's hard to turn people around and say,
``Well, gee, why don't you go back and do something other than
that?''
But, there is one other aspect of the Somali situation, in
that the piracy has become a big enough business that it's
being backed by some pretty significant businessmen. The Somali
business community is a very significant community. They don't
all live in Somalia. And the U.N. envoy Ould-Abdallah has,
several times, reached out to them to try to get them to
support the peace process. I think, in connection with what
Ambassador Pickering has been talking about, about
alternatives, one needs to reach out to that community and ask
them where they're putting their money and whether they can put
their money into something different than some of them are
doing in the piracy area.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Wolpe.
Dr. Wolpe. I would agree with everything that's been said,
but there's one additional point, I think, that needs to be
emphasized, given the debate that's taking place at least
within the media about where our policy should go. Right now,
as has been suggested, what we're seeing is basically criminal
activity with economic roots. It would not be difficult to
suddenly politicize what is now a criminal enterprise by
beginning to act in an indiscriminant way, militarily, in ways
that would only alienate the larger Somali population. I think
we have to be very careful and be much more nuanced and
discriminating in the way we approach that.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I want to just finish by following on
what you just said in this excellent conversation. This may be
not the precise topic of this hearing, but--we have this kind
of talent in front of us, so I want to pursue this Somalia
thing a little more.
Yes, there are Somalia businesspeople. I met with a number
of them in Djibouti; in fact, a whole lot of them are in
Wisconsin and Minnesota. [Laughter.]
We have the largest population there, and this is a
constituent matter, as well as a matter involving our relations
with Somalia and the threats. And I did hear the excellent
suggestions with regard to the water, and how we can protect
the water. But, the fact is, apparently, according to public
reports, that, when the Islamic Courts had control, that the
piracy was significantly down. Now, this is not an endorsement
of the Islamic Courts or of Shari'ah law, although there's
Shari'ah law and there's Shari'ah law. There is a Shari'ah law
that might be put forward by the TFG versus the Shari'ah law
that the al Shabab might put forward.
So, my concern about all of this conversation, not just
today, but in general, ever since this piracy incident, there
seems to be almost a reticence to talk about this nascent
government that's attempting to bring everybody together in
Mogadishu. When I was in Djibouti in December, I met with
Sheikh Sharif. I had no idea that he was going to end up being
the president. I did know that he had been, as I understand it,
in charge of the Islamic courts. But, here I was in the
American ambassador's home, meeting with him, so I obviously
assumed that we had concluded he is not necessarily one of the,
quote, ``bad guys.'' All right. So, we've had all this going
on, and I sent a letter to the President asking, why is it that
the President hasn't reached out to him? Why is it that
Secretary of State hasn't reached out to him? Maybe there's a
good reason. Maybe it wouldn't be good for them. Maybe it
wouldn't be good for us.
But, I fundamentally believe that understanding, of course,
the issues relating to the fisheries and the availability of
that--that the idea of an inclusive government in that area
would be about the best way to solve this problem instead of
having to police the water. So, I may be wrong about this, but
these are the facts that I've been studying very carefully the
last couple of months.
I'd like each of your reactions to this question: What
level of diplomacy, of contact by our government, would be
appropriate at this time with this nascent government?
Ambassador Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering. I guess I'm of the school that says
that you've got to deal with the people who are out there and
who can affect the outcome, and that diplomacy is a very useful
tool. You cannot do it without some leverage and without some
influence, and we obviously do not want to, in a sense, ennoble
and crown people who have been, in effect, the progenitors of
terrorism there and around the world. We want to find a way to
block that. And so, I think you need careful study as you move
ahead.
You need to know and understand what direction this
particular issue can take. And my own view would be that I
would start low-level contacts first, and see if you can begin
to define, and define which way this process will go. But, to
leave it in a diplomatic vacuum, in a diplomatic black hole, is
aserious mistake. I think we need to be----
Senator Feingold. Well, we're already doing that.
Certainly, you can't call them low-level contact, as our
ambassadors are--I met with----
Ambassador Pickering. Yeah.
Senator Feingold. [continuing]. Two ambassadors, and with
Mr. Sharif.
Ambassador Pickering. Yeah.
Senator Feingold. What about our--I mean, if that's
occurred, based on your assessment, is it time for a higher
level contact?
Ambassador Pickering. I don't think it's time for a higher-
level contact, and I don't think enough of the other has
occurred yet, but I could see it leading to the high-level
contact.
Senator Feingold. All right. Ambassador Lyman.
Ambassador Lyman. I think that we have to see--one thing
is, this is still a very fragile process being led by the U.N.
I think we could give more support to the UN envoy's diplomatic
effort. He's been out there almost alone working on this with
very mixed support, and he is knocking himself out to do it.
And I think we can lend support to that process, watching it,
as Ambassador Pickering says, to see if the new president is
capable of bringing a broad group together. It's not clear the
government has the outreach yet, but I think supporting that
diplomatic effort is extremely important, because it's reaching
out to a different constituency than the al Shabab.
The other possibility here is also to be in touch with
others, in different parts of Somalia, who are not part of the
government, but who are not part of al Shabab either, and
seeing whether one can make contact with them and encourage
them to separate themselves more from the more extremist
groups, and maybe eventually look toward a much more federated
agreement in Somalia. But, we haven't clarified where we are on
all these things, and I think we need to do so and let the U.N.
know where we stand, and act on it.
Senator Feingold. And, of course, this is why, also in
these meetings, I met with the leaders of Somaliland, and we
did that. But, Ambassador, what about the Secretary of State or
the President having some direct contact with Mr. Sharif?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it's not necessary, at this time,
if we send a strong signal through our ambassadors in the field
that we're supporting the U.N. diplomatic effort. At this
point, I think that already would give strong support to the
government, and then let's see how strong and well received
this government is, because if it has no real support anywhere
in Somalia, then you don't want to waste the Secretary's
credibility. I think his government has potential, but we
haven't seen it really prove itself.
Senator Feingold. Well, my judgment, having followed this
country for 17 years--you gentlemen have followed it longer
than I have--but, for some time, is that this is a much more
promising and believable group of people that are more
inclusive. So, I'm interested, finally, in Dr. Wolpe's
response.
Dr. Wolpe. Well, I share your view about that potential. I
think it's important also to recognize that we, in some ways,
are a little bit handicapped in our approach to Somalia because
of the earlier bombing activity, because of identification with
the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia. There are others that are
somewhat better positioned than the United States right now,
such as the Norwegians, who were playing a major role in the
earlier diplomatic effort, in partnership with the United
States at that time, that I think ought to be in the lead, in
some respects. I'm not sure that we're, at this stage, that
well positioned to play a very dominant role.
Senator Feingold. The only thing I'd say back to that is,
it's precisely because of the perception of what we did, vis-`-
vis the Ethiopian invasion, and the perception of what we've
done, that makes it a higher obligation for us, I think, to
show a support for this kind of a government----
Dr. Wolpe. That----
Senator Feingold. [continuing]. If possible, because we
need to dispel the notion that we don't want them to succeed.
Dr. Wolpe. Well, I----
Senator Feingold. Fair enough?
Dr. Wolpe. Fair enough.
Senator Feingold. All right.
On that note, I want thank the ranking member and
everybody, and that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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