

**NEW BEGINNINGS: FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES  
IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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## **NEW BEGINNINGS: FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION**

**WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman (chairman of the committee) Presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order.

Just before we get into the hearing I just want to reiterate our committee's policy on handling protests. We have no objection to audience members wearing T-shirts and hats expressing their views. But to maintain order in the hearing room we request that audience members do not hold up or wave signs, make gestures to attract attention, stand up in protest, shout or yell your views or otherwise disrupt the hearing. We will ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone from the room who violates this policy, and it is the policy of the Capitol Police to arrest anyone ejected from the hearing room.

It is a great pleasure to welcome Secretary Clinton to the committee this morning for her first appearance before Congress as Secretary of State. We know you have an extremely busy schedule, Madam Secretary, and we very much appreciate your taking the time to be here.

Normally, the Secretary's first appearance before the committee would be to present the administration's budget for the next fiscal year. But given the transition and the understandable delay in preparing the Fiscal Year 2010 budget, I have asked her to testify today on the administration's overall foreign policy agenda and to discuss the broad outlines of the budget request. In a few weeks, the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Jack Lew, will appear before the committee to discuss the Department's detailed budget proposal.

I now yield myself 7 minutes for an opening statement.

Madam Secretary, I want to commend you and your excellent team for taking immediate steps to address the dangerous lack of capacity at the State Department and USAID.

From her first days in office, the Secretary has directed a comprehensive review of our chronically underfunded diplomacy and development capabilities. She then developed a plan to restore these critical components of our national security infrastructure; and, finally, she fought to ensure that the administration's Func-

tion 150 budget request provided adequate resources to implement that plan.

Madam Secretary, I couldn't agree with you more that we desperately need to reinvigorate our civilian foreign affairs agencies. To the extent diplomacy and development can help avoid conflicts before they start, it will save us billions in the long run. It will also help prevent the continuing migration of development-related programs to the military, thus relieving the burden on our brave men and women in uniform.

I am committed, and I know many of my colleagues on the committee are as well, to doing everything that we can to ensure that the budget request is fully funded. We will also do our part by marking up and passing a State Department authorization bill, hopefully on a bipartisan basis, very soon after we receive the detailed budget; and later this year we hope to pass foreign assistance reform legislation to rationalize our various foreign aid programs and provide the administration additional flexibility to ensure that the most urgent needs are being met.

I want to make sure my colleagues have plenty of time to ask questions, so I am not going to run through the entire laundry list of foreign policy challenges we now face, but I do want to touch on a couple of issues.

Madam Secretary, several of my colleagues and I returned just yesterday from a trip to India and Pakistan. I think I can speak for all of them in saying that we were encouraged by the dramatically improved United States ties with India but deeply concerned about the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan.

In recent weeks, extremists based in the western border regions have turned their guns on the Pakistani state, launching dramatic suicide attacks in the population centers of Islamabad and Lahore. Equally troubling, the Pakistani Government has cut a deal with the extremists that overran the Swat Valley—the latest in a string of failed agreements that has only emboldened the radicals. To make matters worse, the Pakistani Supreme Court just ordered the release of Maulana Abdul Aziz, the radical Red Mosque cleric who has renewed his call to kill Westerners and place all of Pakistan under a rigid and intolerant form of Islamic law.

The United States has an enormous stake in the stability and security of Pakistan. We cannot allow al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group that threatens our national security to operate with impunity in the tribal regions, nor can we permit the Pakistani state—and its nuclear arsenal—to be taken over by the Taliban or any other radical groups or otherwise be destabilized in a matter that could lead to renewed conflict with India. So it is very alarming that we are now hearing predictions from a number of leading experts that Pakistan could collapse in as little as 6 months.

Madam Speaker, I know you take these issues seriously; and I want to commend you and your team for developing a comprehensive Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. I completely agree with your assessment that the security of these two countries and their neighbors is inextricably linked, and I strongly support your conclusion that strengthening the civilian democratic Government of Pakistan should be a central part of our overall efforts.

In the next few weeks, our committee will consider legislation to massively expand assistance to Pakistan, including funds to strengthen the capacity of Parliament, the judiciary and the public education system. The bill also calls for the administration to make a series of reasonable determinations to ensure that military assistance is used to meet both United States and Pakistani national security interests.

Ambassador Holbrooke will testify next Wednesday to provide the administration's views of the legislation and to discuss the larger Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

I also would like to say a few words about Iran's continuing efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. As you are well aware, a nuclear-capable Iran would pose a dire threat to the United States and our allies in the region; it would act as a hegemonic power in the Middle East and cause a cascade of proliferation. In short, we can't allow Iran to acquire this capability.

Regrettably, the previous administration's policy failed to impact the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior. And there is no reason to believe that doing more of the same will result in a different outcome. We need a new approach to dealing with Iran—one that offers direct engagement in a bilateral or multilateral format. I believe this is reflected in the administration's recently completed Iran policy review.

But such engagement can't be open-ended. Indeed, Tehran continues to enrich uranium and every day moves closer to the nuclear threshold. I would urge you to seek support in advance from key members of the international community to impose crippling sanctions—the kind that would compel, or at least maximize the chances of compelling, a change in the regime's current course—if engagement does not yield positive results.

Finally, after 25 years of grappling with the enormous economic losses caused by intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting, I would urge you to put this issue high on the list of the State Department's economic agenda.

Madam Secretary, I am excited about the prospect of working with you on the many challenges facing our Nation.

I am now pleased to recognize my friend and the ranking member of the committee, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for her statement.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Madam Secretary, I also welcome you to our committee. Thank you so much. It has been a pleasure and an honor to have worked with you in your time as Senator and as First Lady as well.

This is an era of profound challenges and also one of important opportunities to advance our agenda of freedom, of prosperity, and security. However, if this weekend's Summit of the Americas is any indication, we are off to a troublesome start. The Summit served as a forum for despotic leaders to attack democratic values and our free-market principles and for proclaiming their radical vision as the way forward for the hemisphere. Many of those repressive leaders decided to make the Cuban dictatorship's return to the Inter-American System the pillar of their agenda. The OAS Secretary General supports this proposal, ignoring the fact that the Cuban

regime is in violation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights.

Sadly, some responsible nations failed to counter the efforts by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, by Nicaragua's Ortega, and their fellow rogues and enablers to subvert our freedom agenda, while diverting attention away from their own assault on democratic institutions, their own assaults on freedom of the press and association, and the opposition in their own countries to their leadership.

The Summit reminded me of the discussions at the U.N. Human Rights Council or the Durban II conference which has taken place this week in Geneva. Despite clear indications that Durban II would be a reaffirmation of the anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, anti-freedom hate-fest of its predecessor, many waited until the last minute to announce that they were boycotting. Indeed, for some, it took Iran's Ahmadinejad spewing his venom to awaken them from their stupor.

The U.S. cannot stand idly by and allow such manipulation to take place, particularly when U.S. taxpayer funds are at stake. Many Americans are struggling to make ends meet. We must, therefore, ensure that we can justify our funding for international organizations and foreign affairs activities.

The recently submitted supplemental is a case in point. The request for \$95 million to provide heavy fuel oil and unspecified energy assistance to North Korea and over \$34 million for dismantling efforts is troublesome. Years of negotiation with the North Korean regime have resulted in an increase rather than a reduction of the threat that it poses, as underscored by its April 5th rocket launch. Pyongyang's announced intention to resume its plutonium bomb-making efforts, combined with its uranium enrichment, clearly demonstrates that North Korea has viewed the Six-Party Talks as a means of advancing its nuclear weapons.

But North Korea's weapons drive has implications beyond Pyongyang. Syria was reportedly close to completing a nuclear facility built with North Korean assistance when an Israeli strike destroyed it in September 2007. There have also been ongoing reports about North Korea and Iran missile cooperation; and, just a few weeks ago, news reports cited Western intelligence concerns that a ship that traveled from North Korea to Iran may have had tons of enriched uranium hidden in its cargo, materiel that could be used for nuclear weapons.

Iran and Syria are closely watching how we deal with North Korea. Will they conclude that we will treat them as generously as we have treated Pyongyang in the proposed supplemental?

Another item of grave concern is the administration's plan to provide more than \$900 million in aid for the West Bank and Gaza. In Gaza, this is tantamount to a bailout for Hamas. Reassurances that the aid will go through NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, and not to Hamas ignores the reality that there is only one ultimate distributor and guarantor of aid in Gaza, and that is Hamas. Dumping money into Gaza reconstruction enables Hamas to reconsolidate its political standing in Gaza without cost, freeing up Hamas funds to buy rockets and other arms. NGOs and international organizations do not have the proper vetting and internal controls to ensure that aid is not going to extremists; and the



United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) continues to do business with banks that the United States has targeted for laundering Islamist militant money.

I am also concerned about the seemingly broad interpretation in the supplemental of the Palestinian Antiterrorism Act waiver and the implications for a Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. It appears to ignore requirements for the dismantling of the Islamist militant infrastructure and the halting of incitement before a PA effectively controlled by Hamas could be eligible for U.S. funds.

In Afghanistan, Madam Secretary, we all share the goal of ensuring that sanctuaries and safe havens no longer exist for those who wish to do us harm. However, it appears from the G-20 summit that many of our European allies are unwilling to assume any real burden to help prevent that from happening.

I welcome the administration's release of its strategic review of United States policy in Afghanistan and the President's outline of the next steps. I am committed to ensuring that our personnel on the ground have the support and the resources necessary to succeed in their mission.

Madam Secretary, however, I am greatly concerned about reports that the administration may have changed our policy on investigating and possibly prosecuting former administration officials. This is an extremely negative development when we need to work together to counter extremist Islamic militants who seek our destruction. As Edmund Burke would say, all that is required for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing.

Ultimately, we must not miss any more opportunities to prove to rogue regimes and tyrants that the goal of U.S. policy is to foster and defend freedom and democracy world wide. I have faith that this administration, with your leadership, Madam Secretary, and our President, will do exactly that, promote our freedom agenda overseas.

Welcome again, Madam Secretary; and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. And, without objection, any opening statements by other members will be placed in the record.

Madam Secretary, without objection, your full statement will be made part of the record; and the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. Greetings to many friends and former colleagues. It is a pleasure to be here with you this morning. This committee has been the source of many advances in our Nation's foreign policy, and I look forward to working with you to continue that tradition.

When I appeared before the Senate—that is that other body on the other side of the Capitol—I spoke during my confirmation hearing of a commitment to pursue a policy that would enhance our Nation's security, advance our interests, and uphold our values. Today, nearly 100 days later, I am pleased to report that we have begun making progress toward achieving that goal.

I want to begin by recognizing and thanking the men and women of the State Department and USAID who are serving our country around the clock and around the world. I am extremely proud of their work. With their talents and under President Obama's leadership, we have put forward a new diplomacy powered by partnership, pragmatism, and principle.

Our priorities are clear. We are deploying the tools of diplomacy and development along with military power. We are securing historic alliances, working with emerging regional powers, and seeking new avenues of engagement. We are addressing the existing and emerging challenges that will define our century: Climate change, weak states, rogue regimes, criminal cartels, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, poverty, and disease. We are advancing our values and our interests by promoting human rights and fostering conditions that allow every individual to live up to their God-given potential.

Now, I know that many of your questions today will deal with longstanding concerns: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, certainly the Middle East, the fallout from the global financial crisis. I will speak briefly to those, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

As you know, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the President has outlined a strategy centered on a core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent their safe return to havens in Afghanistan or Pakistan. We combined our strategic review with intensive diplomacy, and nations from around the world are joining our efforts. More than 80 countries and organizations participated in the International Conference in The Hague, and a donor's conference just concluded in Tokyo raised over \$5 billion.

In Iraq, we are working toward the responsible redeployment of our troops and the transition to a partnership based on diplomatic and economic cooperation. We are deploying new approaches to the threat posed by Iran, and we are doing so with our eyes wide open and with no illusions. We know the imperative of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. After years during which the United States basically sat on the sidelines, we are now a full partner in the P5+1 talks.

In the Middle East, we engaged immediately to help bring the parties together to once again discuss what could be done to reach a two-state solution. We are maintaining our bedrock core commitment to Israel's security, providing economic support, security assistance; and we are also doing what we can to bolster the Palestinian Authority and to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

More broadly, we are working to contain the fallout from the global financial crisis. Our efforts at the G-20 focused in large measure on the poorest and most vulnerable countries. We need to provide support for the International Monetary Fund. We need to provide direct assistance to countries such as Haiti, where I traveled last week. These resources will help democratic, responsible governments regain their economic footing and avert political instability with wider repercussions.

Now, these challenges demand our urgent attention, but they cannot distract us from equally important but sometimes less com-

elling or obvious threats ranging from climate change to disease to criminal cartels to nonproliferation.

In today's world, we face challenges that have no respect for borders. Not one of them can be dealt with by the United States alone. None, however, can be solved without us leading. All will have a profound impact on the future of our children.

As daunting as these challenges are, they also offer us new arenas for global cooperation; and we are taking steps to seize these opportunities.

First, we are pursuing a wide-ranging diplomatic agenda premised on strengthening our alliances with democratic partners in Europe, Asia, Africa, and our own hemisphere. We are cultivating partnerships with key regional powers. We are building constructive relationships with major nations that will have a lot to say about what happens in the world to come: China, Russia, India. We are working with long-time allies like Japan and South Korea to address not just regional concerns but a host of global issues as well.

I want to say a special word about Asia. Advancing our relationship with India, which I know the chairman and the ranking member and others mentioned, is essential. It is the world's largest democracy. It is an important ally in so many efforts. I made my first overseas trip as Secretary of State to Asia, a signal that we are not just a transatlantic power but also a transpacific power and that Asia will be an indispensable partner in years to come.

But we haven't forgotten our traditional allies. We have worked hard with the European Union and with NATO. And then, just a few days ago, we did go to Latin America to meet with nations who share a common home, a hemisphere, a heritage, and a common future. We discussed a new energy partnership, fighting drug trafficking and the drug cartels, consolidating democratic gains, and so much more.

We are also building closer ties with regional anchors, including Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey. These are not only partners but they can be leaders on issues ranging from deforestation to democracy.

We will work with China and Russia wherever we can, and we will be candid about our areas of disagreement. We will be starting a strategic and economic dialogue with China very shortly. We will be working with them to develop technologies to reduce the world's dependence on fossil fuels, and we have committed ourselves to working with Russia on finding a successor agreement to the START arms control agreement.

But we also understand that redefining diplomatic engagement is not just between governments. Policies and political leaders change over time, but ties between citizens, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, universities, NGOs, all of those endure. These are very effective tools of diplomacy, and we are committed to engaging these groups.

And so, finally, we will work to expand opportunity and protect human rights, strengthen civil society, live up to the ideals that define our Nation, work to advance education and health care, the rule of law and good governance, fight against corruption, expand

opportunities for women and girls and those on the margins of society.

As we promote responsible governance abroad, we have to invest more in our tools here at home. As the chairman said, I am working hard to create a more agile, effective department with the right staffing and resources to fulfill the President's agenda. That is why I have filled for the first time the position of Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources.

I have also challenged the Department to reform and innovate and save taxpayer dollars, returning our ambassadors into in-country chief executives with authority and responsibility for the programs on the ground. We are consolidating IT support services that will yield savings of tens of millions of dollars. We are deploying new media technologies to carry our message more effectively.

And I am determined to see that the men and women of our Foreign and Civil Service get the resources they need to do their job safely and effectively. Even Secretary Gates has pointed out our country has underinvested in diplomacy. That must end. Just as we would never deny ammunition to American troops headed into battle, we cannot send our diplomats into the field in today's world with all of the threats they face 24/7 without the tools they need. If we don't invest in diplomacy and development, we end up paying a lot more for conflict and all that follows.

So, Mr. Chairman, we are pursuing these policies because they are the right thing to do. We believe that no country benefits more than the United States when there is greater security, democracy, and opportunity in the world. Our economy grows when our allies are strengthened and people thrive.

And no country carries a heavier burden when things go badly. Every year, we spend hundreds of billions of dollars dealing with the consequences of war, disease, violent ideologies, and vile dictatorships. So let's invest in the type of world that we want.

We have no shortage of challenges or opportunities. The world is looking for leadership and looking to see how this new administration meets this moment. I believe if we follow our plans and our principles we will succeed. We can lead the world in creating a century that we and our children will be proud to own, a century of progress and prosperity for the whole world but especially for our beloved country.

But to achieve these goals we need your help, we need your advice, and we need your support. And I look forward not only to the formal hearing today but to the informal, ongoing dialogue that I have started with some of you and look forward to having with all of you. We are in this together. We have to row in the same direction for the benefit of our country and our children.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]

**SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON**  
**CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY**  
**HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE**  
**APRIL 22, 2009**

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and Members of the Committee, it's a pleasure to be with you this morning. This Committee has been a source of many advances in our foreign policy and I look forward to working with you to continue that tradition.

When I last came before the Congress at my confirmation hearing, I spoke of my commitment to pursuing a foreign policy that would enhance our nation's security, advance our interests, and uphold our values. Today, nearly one hundred days later, I am proud to report that we have begun making progress toward that goal.

The men and women of the State Department and USAID are serving their country around the clock and around the world. I am extraordinarily proud of their work.

With their talents, and President Obama's leadership, we have put forward a new diplomacy powered by partnership, pragmatism, and principle.

Our priorities are clear. We are deploying the tools of diplomacy and development along with military power. We are securing historic alliances, working with emerging regional powers, and seeking new avenues of engagement. We are addressing the existing and emerging challenges that will define our century: climate change, weak states, criminal cartels, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, poverty, and disease. And we are advancing our values and interests by promoting human rights and fostering conditions that allow every individual to live up to their God-given potential.

I expect many of your questions today will focus on longstanding concerns: the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the need for a responsible end to our military presence in Iraq; Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons; conflict in parts of the Middle East; and fallout from the global financial crisis.

I will speak to these subjects briefly, but I also want to address the broader issues and opportunities on our global agenda – issues that I will come to in a moment.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the President has outlined a strategy centered on a core goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda, and to prevent their return to safe havens in Afghanistan or Pakistan. We combined our strategic review with intensive diplomacy, and nations from around the world are joining together to address this urgent challenge. More than 80 countries and organizations participated in the international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague, and a donors' conference for Pakistan raised over \$5 billion.

In Iraq, we are working toward the responsible redeployment of our troops and the transition to a partnership based on diplomatic and economic cooperation. We are deploying new approaches to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. After years during which the United States distanced itself from the process, we are now a full partner in the P5+1 talks.

In the Middle East, we engaged immediately to help achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. We are maintaining our bedrock commitment to Israel's security and providing economic support, security assistance and humanitarian support to the Palestinian people – an effort to which the Administration has pledged \$900 million.

More broadly, we are also working to contain the fallout from the global financial crisis. Our efforts at the G-20 focused in large measure on the poorest and most vulnerable countries. In addition to providing support to the International Monetary Fund, we are seeking resources for direct assistance to countries such as Haiti, where I travelled last week. These resources will help responsible governments in developing countries regain their economic footing and avert political instability with wider repercussions.

These challenges demand attention, but they must not distract us from equally important – but sometimes less obvious – threats ranging from climate change, to disease, to criminal cartels, to non-proliferation.



In today's world, we face new challenges that have no respect for borders. Not one of them can be dealt with by the United States alone. None can be solved without us. All will have a profound impact on the security of our citizens.

As daunting as they are, these challenges also offer new arenas for global cooperation. And we are taking steps to seize these opportunities.

First, we are pursuing a wide-ranging diplomatic agenda premised on:

- Strengthening our alliances with democratic partners in Europe, Asia, Africa and our hemisphere,
- Cultivating partnerships with key regional powers, and
- Building constructive relationships with China and Russia.

We are working with our longtime partners in Japan and South Korea, to address not just regional concerns, but a host of global issues, from the financial crisis to climate change.

And we are advancing our relationship with India, the world's largest democracy. I made my first overseas trip as

Secretary of State to Asia, to signal that we are not just a trans-Atlantic power, but a transpacific power, and that Asia will be an indispensable partner in years to come. We are also working closely with our NATO allies and our friends in the European Union, building on partnerships forged in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup>. And we are working with the nations of the Americas, with whom we share a common home, hemisphere and heritage, to pursue a new energy partnership, fight drug trafficking, and consolidate democratic gains.

We are building closer ties with regional anchors, including Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey, who can serve not only as partners, but as leaders on issues ranging from deforestation to democracy.

The President, Vice President, and I are all working to establish constructive relationships with China and Russia, and candidly address our differences where they persist.

We are making progress with Russia on finding a successor to the START arms control agreement and with China on developing technologies to reduce the world's dependence on fossil fuels. We will continue to work on such mutual priorities.

Second, we are redefining diplomatic engagement to move beyond government alone. Policies and political leaders change over time. But ties between citizens, non-governmental organizations, and businesses endure. They are the most effective – and lasting – tools of diplomacy we know. For this reason, President Obama and I are personally committed to engaging these groups directly, as I have done already during my travels. These relationships, combined with new technologies, will form the foundation for future diplomatic initiatives that are broader and more ambitious than traditional efforts of the past.

Third, we are working to expand opportunity and protect human rights, strengthening civil society, and living up to the ideals that define our nation.

This starts with a development agenda that provides people with the raw materials of progress: from education and health care to sound institutions and the rule of law. I am particularly committed to improving the lives and expanding the

opportunities of women and girls, and those on the margins of society.

Fourth, as we promote responsible governance abroad, we are trying to live up to our own principles at the State Department and USAID. We are working hard to create a more agile, effective department with the right staffing, resources, and authorities to fulfill President Obama's agenda. That's why I have filled – for the first time – the position of Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources.

I have also challenged the Department to reform, innovate and save taxpayer dollars. We are turning our ambassadors into in-country chief executive officers, with authority and responsibility for all programs on the ground.

We are consolidating our IT support services, yielding cost savings of 15 to 20 percent – tens of millions of dollars – and implementing human resources reforms that will save \$22 million over five years. We are deploying new media

technologies to carry our message to the world more efficiently and computerizing many of our consular services.

Even as we work to stretch taxpayers' dollars, I am determined to see that the men and women of our Foreign and Civil Service get the resources they need to do their jobs safely and effectively. As Secretary of Defense Gates has pointed out, our country has underinvested in diplomacy. That must end. Just as we would not deny ammunition to American troops heading into battle, we cannot send our diplomats into the field without the tools they need. If we fail to invest in diplomacy, we will eventually spend far more paying for that mistake.

Mr. Chairman, we are pursuing all of these policies because it is the right thing to do. It is also the smart thing to do. No country benefits more than the United States when there is greater security, democracy, and opportunity in the world.

Our economy grows, our allies are strengthened, and our people thrive. And no country carries a heavier burden when things go badly. Every year, we spend hundreds of billions of dollars dealing with the consequences of war, disease, violent ideologies, and vile dictatorships.

Investing to create the type of world in which we want to live is good for the countries and people we help – but it is also in the national interest of the United States.

In this time of change and uncertainty, we have no shortage of challenges. But we also have an extraordinary opportunity. The world is looking for leadership – and looking to see how the United States will meet this moment.

If we follow our plans and our principles, we will succeed. We can lead the world in creating a century that we and our children will be proud to own – a century of progress and prosperity for the whole world, but especially the United States.

To achieve these goals, we need your help. We need your advice. And we need your support. I look forward to our discussion this morning and to working with you on these issues in the months ahead.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

We will now, just your luck, go into a period of questioning from members of the committee; and we will strictly observe the 5-minute rule, which includes the questions and the answers. So if you intend to have an answer to your question, pace yourself. And in order of seniority based on members who were here at the time that we started the hearing.

I yield myself 5 minutes for a few questions.

Madam Secretary, as I noted in my opening statement, I do support a policy of engagement with Iran. At the same time, I can't get away from the fact that Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability keep going ahead and that this engagement can't be so open-ended that we essentially pass the threshold that we are seeking to avoid by virtue of the engagement.

So my two questions: One, what kind of time frame do you have in mind for the Iran engagement? And the second question is based on the assumption that the engagement is more likely to work and to work in a reasonable time if the regime understands that a failure to respond to our efforts will result in truly crippling sanctions and to get that level of sanctions we can't do it ourselves. This is going to have to be an international effort. And I am curious, I would like to know, are we pursuing the default position, the leverage that I think will make the engagement more likely as we deal with key members of the international community and the Security Council?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your question very accurately describes the efforts we are undertaking.

We have concluded that it is going to be a more successful engagement if our partners around the world understand that they must work with us and support our efforts, including tougher sanctions; and I have had a number of conversations over the course of the last 90-plus days with allies, partners, and other nations concerned about Iran's continuing ambitions for nuclear weapons.

I think there are three points I would make, Mr. Chairman:

One, the fact that we are engaging, that we have fully participated in the P5+1 process actually gives us more leverage with other nations.

Number two, I think the fact that we have been willing to go even beyond the P5+1 and to reach out to Iran, to invite them, as I did, to the Conference in The Hague on Afghanistan increases even further our ability to ask more from other nations.

And, finally, I think our engagement, which we have no illusions about, as I mentioned to you, puts us on much stronger international footing.

So I want to assure you that we will be operating on dual tracks. Yes, we are more than willing to reach out to the Iranians, to discuss a range of issues, assuming they are willing to reach back. As the President said in his inaugural address: We will hold out our hand. They have to unclench their fist. But we are also laying the groundwork for the kind of very tough, I think you said crippling, sanctions that might be necessary in the event that our offers are either rejected or the process is inconclusive or unsuccessful.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much.

I yield back the balance of my time, and I will recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, welcome. And I would like to yield my time to Mr. Burton, and I hope that he will yield 1 minute to Mr. Smith.

Mr. BURTON. Welcome, Madam Secretary.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. One of the things that concerns me and my colleagues is the ability to extract information from terrorists so that we can protect this country. And if you look at what the terrorists are doing—cutting off heads, cutting off arms, blowing up the World Trade Center, threatening to blow up buildings in San Francisco and elsewhere—and you listen to what the Vice President said the other night on television, that the memos that he has seen show that the tactics that we have employed to extract this information have protected the American people and stopped some terrorist activity.

I am very concerned—and I hope that you will take this message to the President. I am very concerned that we are tying both hands behind our backs, because we are saying that there are limitations—very strong limitations, even within the law, in interrogating these prisoners.

I have seen Guantanamo. My colleagues have. We know that they are treated fairly. We haven't been being unhumanitarian to these people, but we have used very strong techniques to extract information from them. And those techniques were cleared with the leadership of both the House and the Senate. They knew about them. And yet the President of the United States yesterday said that he was leaving it up to Attorney General Holder to see whether or not some of the people of the previous administration could be prosecuted for those activities.

Now, I believe in obeying the law. But when it is cleared with the Congress and the administration, to go to the CIA and say we might prosecute some of you or some of your leaders at the Justice Department that recommended these techniques is just, in my opinion, crazy.

We are in a war against terror. I don't care what they call it in the administration. They have changed some terminology. We are in a war against terrorism; and we need to use within the law every single aspect, procedure, that we possibly can to stop this terrorism. And I have heard people say that we have, in effect, scared so many of the leaders of the CIA and others who were at the Justice Department before that they may not use tactics that they even could employ in order to stop terrorist activity.

We need both hands untied with our intelligence agencies to really stop terrorism in the United States; and I hope that the President of the United States and you, Madam Secretary, will reevaluate the situation and not be prosecuting people at the CIA or the Justice Department who were just doing their job to try to protect this country. I mean, that is what it is all about.

And, with that, I don't have any other questions. I just hope that you will take that message back to the President and the administration, and I thank you very much for your attention. I yield to my colleague.



Mr. SMITH. I thank my good friend for yielding.

First of all, Madam Secretary, let me thank you for the work you have done on behalf of David Goldman in the reunification with his son, Sean. As you know, that Brazilian case is one of the most egregious human rights child abduction cases I think there has been, although there are many of them. So I want to thank you personally for raising that with Brazilian authorities. I would also like to thank our Consul General, Marie Damour, and others who are doing a wonderful job.

I would like to ask you, with everything within my being, to press for the release—the unconditional, immediate release of all political prisoners in Cuba. Dr. Oscar Biscet in 2003, as you know, got a 25-year harsh, totally unjust prison sentence. Many of us are concerned that he and the other human rights activists who languish in prison today are subjected to extreme tortures and deprivations; they need to be released or some will die. So any further movement with the Cuban Government, please.

Dr. Biscet—just so everybody knows very clearly who he is—has been sentenced to 25 years in prison. His daughter and others have cried out for his release. He has been put in solitary confinement over and over again; and, like I said, he may be close to death. And I would hope that we would immediately demand that the International Committee to the Red Cross be asked to see and ascertain the health or lack of it and well-being of the prisoners. We must continually press for their release.

Also, Mr. Wolf and I have tried repeatedly to get into the prisons, as we have done in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the Peoples Republic of China right after Tiananmen Square. We, however, have been turned down every time and have not been granted a visa. Others get it. They don't go to the prisons, however. I think all of us on both sides of the aisle, regardless of one's ideological perspective, we need to say "free the prisoners."

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the ranking member has expired; and the vice chair of the committee, the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, a gentleman I believe you know from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Madam Secretary. You make all your New York homies very, very proud.

I had to look up for a moment. I thought we were in the Judiciary Committee and had the Attorney General in front of us, listening to some of the remarks a moment ago.

I don't think we have to lecture you or remind you. Besides some of the political prisoners, besides some of the terrorists we have in the prisons, besides some of the miserable people that are intending to do damage to our country, the Constitution of the United States is also a very high-valued target. Let's all do our job and protect it first. Everything else will surely follow.

If I can follow up on the chairman's concern, which I think is one that is overwhelming, and it is the issue of Iran. Are we prepared—talking about sanctions. Because, as we know, in order for them to be effective, they have to be comprehensive, and they have to be complete, and they have to be participated in by almost the

entire world for it to work. Are we prepared to place sanctions on some of our friends and allies if they don't conform to a sanctions regime, which is, as the chairman says, the preferable default position, rather than the unthinkable default position?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, we believe that we can make a very strong case for exactly the kinds of sanctions regime that you and the chairman have referred to. We actually believe that by following the diplomatic path we are on we gain credibility and influence with a number of nations who would have to participate in order to make the sanctions regime as tight and crippling as we would want it to be.

So I think the short answer is, it is our expectation that we will be able to put together such a comprehensive sanctions regime in the event we need it; and it is our commitment that we will pursue that if we are either unsuccessful or stonewalled in our other approach.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Peace process, Middle East, Israel, Palestinians. The Saudis have indicated that they are trying very hard, which means withholding all of the pledges that they have made for the Palestinian people, unless they have a unity government and unless Abu Mazen places Hamas back in the government yet again. What will be our position? Will we continue to deal with the Government of the Palestinian Authority if they include a recognized terrorist organization in their government?

Secretary CLINTON. The President's policy, as described in the supplemental, is very clear: We will not deal with nor in any way fund a Palestinian Government that includes Hamas, unless and until Hamas has renounced violence, recognized Israel, and agreed to follow the previous obligations of the Palestinian Authority. And that is our policy, and that is exactly what is guiding us. But we want to leave open the door that that can happen.

I mean, we don't know, Congressman. We are not betting on it. But we put waiver authority in for the President vis-à-vis funding for the Palestinian Authority or any successor government if those conditions are met. Now, from everything we hear, there is no intention on the part of Hamas to meet those conditions. But these are not just American conditions. These are the conditions that were adopted by the Quartet, which consists of the United States the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. These are actually the conditions embodied in the Arab Peace Initiative.

So in every conversation that I have had with any Arab leader or any European leader I have made it clear that the United States cannot work with, cannot recognize, cannot in any way fund a government, including any group that did not meet those conditions.

Mr. ACKERMAN. In trying to wrest Syria away from the Iranian orbit, would—

Chairman BERMAN. Unless you can wrest them real quickly.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would just urge you not to pay any deal off with Syria in Lebanese coin.

Secretary CLINTON. I agree completely. We have assured the Lebanese of that.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary, in receiving Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger's award in Houston on March 27, you said that you were in "awe" of Margaret Sanger. You said that Sanger's "life and leadership" was "one of the most transformational in the entire history of the human race" and that Sanger's work here and abroad was "not done."

With all due respect, Madam Secretary, Sanger's legacy was indeed transformational but not for the better if one happens to be poor, disenfranchised, weak, disabled, a person of color, an unborn child, or among the many so-called undesirables Sanger would exclude and exterminate from the human race.

Sanger's prolific writings drip with contempt for those she considers to be unfit to live. I have actually read many of Sanger's articles and her books. Sanger is an unapologetic eugenicist and racist who said, and I quote: "The most merciful thing a family does for one of its infant members is to kill it."

She also said on another occasion: "eugenics is the most adequate and thorough avenue to the solution of racial, political, and social problems."

In her book, "The Pivot of Civilization," Sanger devoted an entire chapter which she entitled, "The Cruelty of Charity," to explain a shockingly inhumane case for the systematic denial of prenatal and maternal health care for poor pregnant women. "Such benevolence is not merely superficial and nearsighted," Sanger wrote, "it conceals a stupid cruelty" and leads to a "deterioration in the human stock" and "the perpetuation of defectives, delinquents and dependents."

So it is extraordinarily difficult how anyone could be in awe of Margaret Sanger, a person who made no secret whatsoever of views that were antithetical to protecting fundamental human rights of the weakest and the most vulnerable and suggests that her work remains undone around the world.

As I think you know, in 2007 alone, Planned Parenthood killed over 305,000 children by abortion in the United States alone and millions more worldwide.

So as part of Sanger's work that remains undone, here is my question: Is the Obama administration seeking in any way to weaken or overturn pro-life laws and policies in African and Latin American countries, either directly or through multilateral organizations, including and especially the United Nations, African Union, or the OAS, or by way of funding NGOs like Planned Parenthood?

And, secondly, and so we can have total transparency—and you know as a former lawmaker, we always have definition pages when we write legislation. Definitions do matter—does the United States' definition of the term "reproductive health" or "reproductive services" or "reproductive rights" include abortion?

I yield to the distinguished gentlelady.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I deeply respect your passionate concern and views, which you have championed and advocated for over the course of your public career. We obviously have a profound disagreement.

When I think about the suffering that I have seen of women around the world—I have been in hospitals in Brazil where half the women were enthusiastically and joyfully greeting new babies and the other half were fighting for their lives against botched abortions. I have been in African countries where 12- and 13-year-old girls are bearing children. I have been in Asian countries where the denial of family planning consigns women to lives of oppression and hardship.

So we have a very fundamental disagreement. And it is my strongly held view that you are entitled to advocate, and everyone who agrees with you should be free to do so anywhere in the world, and so are we. We happen to think that family planning is an important part of women's health; and reproductive health includes access to abortion that I believe should be safe, legal, and rare.

I have spent a lot of my time trying to bring down the rate of abortions, and it has been my experience that good family planning and good medical care brings down the rate of abortion. Keeping women and men in ignorance and denied the access to services actually increases the rate of abortion.

During my time as First Lady, I helped to create the campaign against teenage pregnancy. And while we were working to provide good information, access to contraception, and decision-making that would enable young women to protect themselves and say "no," the rate of teen pregnancy went down. I am sad to report that after an administration of 8 years that undid so much of the good work, the rate of teenage pregnancy is going up.

So we disagree. And we are now an administration that will protect the rights of women, including their rights to reproductive health care.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from American Samoa, the chairman of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, Eni Faleomavaega, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I want to congratulate you on your appointment to Secretary of State and commend you for the admirable work you are doing to address our most daunting problems around the world.

I think your decision to visit Asia on your first overseas trip sent precisely the right signal about the importance we place on the Asian Pacific region and our commitment to our treaty allies and Japan and Korea and our intent to reengage the ASEAN countries and our plans to foster a positive, constructive dialogue with the People's Republic of China.

Madam Secretary, thank you for joining us today and thank you for your tireless efforts in serving our country. For the sake of time, I am submitting a series of questions for the record and would appreciate your written responses.

These two questions, Madam Secretary, are not trick questions, but today I would like to ask you about two matters of particular concern to this Member: The current situation in Papua, West Papua in Indonesia, and the current crisis in Fiji.

First, will the administration review the current political status of West Papua and the extent to which the Government of Indo-

nesia has implemented and included the leadership of the people of West Papua in the development and administration of the special autonomy law? And will the administration hold Indonesia accountable for continued human rights abuses in this region of the world?

Second, having just returned from Fiji for discussions with the interim prime minister of Fiji and with the other community leaders of Fiji, I submit to you the situation in Fiji is more complex than it appears. I commend our current U.S. Ambassador's efforts to continue the engagement with the leaders of the interim government. And, unfortunately, in my view, Madam Secretary, for too long we have had no coherent policy toward some 16 Pacific Island nations, very indicative of the fact that we have not had USAID presence in the Pacific region for how many years now. And for too often and for too long, Madam Secretary, in my view, we have permitted Australia and New Zealand to take the lead even when Canberra and Auckland operate with such a heavy hand that they are counterproductive to our shared goals.

It makes no sense, Madam Secretary, for the leaders in New Zealand and Australia to demand early elections for the sake of having elections in Fiji when there are fundamental deficiencies in Fiji's electoral process which gave rise to three military takeovers and even a civilian-related takeover within the past 20 years, these people having to live often with three separate constitutions.

Basically, Madam Secretary, that is the gist of my two questions, West Papua, Indonesia, and the crisis in Fiji. I think I totally disagree with the nasty accusations that the leaders of New Zealand and Australia have made against Fiji, given the fact that it is more than what it appears; and I would appreciate your response to those.

Secretary CLINTON. I really appreciate your question.

I think your specific questions are embedded in a larger problem, is that we do have these 16 island nations, many of whom are among our staunchest allies. Palau, for example, has voted with us in the United Nations. Its young men go off to war under the American flag. So we need to have a more comprehensive approach, an American approach to these islands; and I would welcome your advice about that. I think it is very important, Representative.

As to West Papua, we believe that it does need to be supported in its efforts to have a degree of autonomy within Indonesia. We support some of the steps that have been taken and—to realize that, and we will include our concerns in our dialogue with Indonesia because we understand the delicate nature of what is at stake here, that it is part of sovereign Indonesia, but it deserves more support, respect, and certainly protection from many human rights abuses.

With respect to Fiji, I would welcome your advice about Fiji. Because our coverage of what is going on from our own Ambassador, and as you point out, from Australia, New Zealand in particular, does paint a picture of turmoil and chaos and antidemocratic behaviors by the ruling parties. So what we want is to restore democracy. We want a functioning democracy in Fiji that can deliver for its people. And if you have advice as to how we can pursue that, I would welcome it. And I will invite you—we will have the State

Department follow up, and we will bring you in, and we will talk more broadly about the Pacific Island region.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, you were a member of the Armed Services Committee in the Senate for 6 years, and you have also taken a great interest in foreign policy for many years even before that. Is there any information about the interrogation of prisoners that you believe was kept from you as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, as you recall, during the years I was on the Armed Services Committee I was not in the leadership of that committee, nor was I in the leadership of the Senate, nor did I serve on the Intelligence Committee. So a lot of the information that has come out in the last several years was not shared with me.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So do you believe that information was not shared with the leaders of your committee?

Secretary CLINTON. I have no information on that, Congressman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, today, you are not confirming for us the charge that we have heard over and over again that the leadership of the House and the Senate were always kept informed as to the interrogation techniques that are now under attack?

Secretary CLINTON. I have no information.

You know, I think that the position that the President has adopted is in keeping with our values as a Nation and in keeping with laws that the United States had either promulgated itself or agreed to internationally.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The administration has released information that is somewhat detrimental in terms of as it makes it appear that we were doing some things during this war against radical Islam and the terrorists of radical Islamic terrorists that makes it appear at least that we were off base. We were doing things that were not correct. And that information apparently is—there are senior intelligence officers who are suggesting that release of that information may end up damaging our ability to thwart terrorist attacks. Do you have any comment on that?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, let me make three points.

First, there is no doubt that our highest priority in terms of our national security is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the networks of terrorists who target the United States, our friends, and our allies, people of humanity, and civilization across the world; that we must do what is required within the law to achieve our objectives.

You referenced the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee has issued at least one, maybe more, reports that have found that many of these actions or techniques were actually counterproductive. Now, I am not expressing an opinion on that. I am just referring to findings by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

So let me just repeat finally what the President said.

Number one, no one will be prosecuted who acted within the four corners of the legal advice that was given, following that advice, to perform any function that that person believed was legal. However, those who formulated the legal opinions and gave those orders should be reviewed; and the President has referred that to the Attorney General and has also said that there may be an opportunity for a nonpolitical bipartisan—I might say nonpartisan—review to get all of this out in the open in the way that we function best as a democracy.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Madam Secretary, getting it all out in the open, Dick Cheney says that the documents that have been released by the administration tend to show a negative picture of those people who are protecting us against terrorists, and he says there are several specific documents that are being kept classified by the administration that would show that any time there was a problem, people tried to correct it.

Are you in favor of releasing the documents that Dick Cheney has been requesting be released?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, it should not surprise you I don't consider him a particularly reliable source of information.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Madam Secretary, I asked you a specific question.

Dick Cheney has asked for specific documents to be unclassified. We are not asking you your opinion of Dick Cheney. About those documents, if you want to maintain your credibility with us, what is your position on the release of those documents?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I believe we ought to get to the bottom of this entire matter. I think that is what is in the best interest of our country, and that is what the President believes, and that is why he has taken the actions he has.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Payne is the chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Madam Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee in your new role of Secretary of State. I would like to begin by commending President Obama's administration and your leadership in the meetings of the G-20 where a whole new tone was shown there with the meetings in other parts of Europe, even close to old Europe. We had a great meeting in the recent Summit of the Americas. I think you set a great tone there. I was there, and we had an opportunity to talk with heads of state who were so glad about the new U.S. policy and the willingness to listen.

I would like to ask some specific questions with regard to Africa. As you know, I had a recent trip to Somalia. I visited Mogadishu. I think I was the first American to go to Mogadishu in close to 15 years. However, I do think there is a great opportunity for us to assist that nation that has had no government for close to 15 years. As a matter of fact, the young hijacker that is going on trial, they say he is about 16, they haven't had a public school system for at least that long. We know there are a lot of underlying problems there. So we need to focus on that.

Two areas that I would like to mention, though, in addition to Somalia. One, quickly, Sudan, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, North-South Agreement, is not going as well. Darfur, the refugees are still in Chad, and we have a Special Envoy. What do we intend to do there?

Secondly, in Western Sahara, they have also, as with Mr. Faleomavaega's question about West Papua, there has been a question about the status between Morocco, and as you know, when Spanish Sahara, when the Spanish left, Morocco said it is theirs. So there should be some kind of referendum to let the people decide. I would like to see you look into that.

Finally about Somalia, the government there, and I have encouraged Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who is the current President of Somalia, I met with him last year. He was selected through work of the U.N. in Djibouti several months ago. They feel that they can deal with the so-called piracy on the ground. They can't deal with it at sea, but it needs to be terminated where it emanates from.

There is going to be a conference in Brussels tomorrow where the United Nations and the European Union are coming together to have a donors' conference. They need to have 6,000 troops. They need to have 10,000 policemen. There is a goal of \$260 million. Ban Ki-Moon himself will co-chair this meeting. Will we be participating? Could we have a robust appearance? I think if we can take the lead and help this 2-month old government. I had excellent meetings in Mogadishu. I met with civil society women's groups, the Education Minister, the Prime Minister. Of course, on the way out, I think it was so successful, the ones that didn't like the success tried to create a little chaos, but that is a desperation thing, I believe.

So could you in the little time remaining respond? Thank you.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, we are glad you are home safely. I really commend you for your dedication to Africa and the work you have done over many years.

We will be sending a high level envoy to the Brussels meeting. We agree with you that we should be supporting Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's government, doing the best we can to support his efforts.

We know that you cannot just interdict pirates at sea. Of course, once you interdict them, you should keep them, which is something that we have been talking to our Dutch friends about, to change the rules of engagement so anyone who is captured will actually be brought ashore and tried. But you do have to go after the land bases.

We look for cooperation with the Federal transitional government, with others who are concerned about the increasing piracy, but also about the condition of Somalia. So we are very focused on that, and we welcome your ideas.

Chairman BERMAN. I hate to cut you off, but this is the way I have to do it. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROYCE. Madam Secretary. I was in Pakistan with Chairman Berman this past weekend, and I hope the administration's desire to have flexibility in its plan are not efforts to placate Pakistan, and I say that because a Taliban spokesman has invited Osama bin



Laden into Swat. Also because a girl's school that I have visited in the past up in the North-West Frontier has now been blown up. And this is a country with nuclear weapons.

So in the meetings we held, some top Pakistani officials told Chairman Berman and myself, and this was over this weekend, that basically to express their concerns, let's just say that they painted a very dire situation and we had better be prepared on that front.

Second, I wanted to bring up the fact that the Commerce Department has established now a whole apparatus of conferences to encourage United States investors to China, and I think in these conferences, they are quite blind to the corruption that eats many of our business people alive. Nancy Weinstein, who runs a small southern California business, told our subcommittee about how an unscrupulous landlord in China and complicit local police in Shanghai had cost her millions and millions of dollars in a foreign investment nightmare that is very parallel to many stories that many of us on the committee hear.

So Chairman Sherman and I have introduced a bill to require the State Department to report on unfair business practices that are overseas, and establishes what we would call investment warnings. Since the State Department has a warning system for U.S. travelers, our thought is why not for U.S. investors? At the very least, it might offer a counter toward what we see as naive boosterism toward China and other countries by our Government. I look forward to your support on that initiative.

Lastly, you mentioned in your testimony the need to deal with criminal networks. Here I think the United States has a key case pending. It is a request with Thailand for extradition of international arms dealer Viktor Bout. Bout is to stand trial here in the United States for conspiring to provide weapons to a terrorist organization, in this case the FARC in Colombia. The Russians are pressing hard to see him released, and they are using underhanded means to do this. Let us not lose this one. I understand that you are going to meet with the Thai Foreign Minister later this week. Please stress the importance of this case. This is a man who has killed countless civilians, armed child soldiers in Africa, and created instability across the globe.

And I wanted to yield 30 seconds to my colleague from California at his request.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what these hearings are all about. It is supposed to be a dialogue and a source of information for the American people. This goes to the heart of whether or not we can expect to have transparency and openness in this administration.

Are you going to support the release of documents which Dick Cheney now tells us will give a more complete understanding of the interrogation issue? Or are you going to refuse to answer the question?

Secretary CLINTON. I support whatever decision the Obama administration makes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What will be your recommendation?

Secretary CLINTON. I am not going to share that with you because I don't know any facts that support what you are describing.

But I do want to talk about Pakistan, which poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world. I want to take this occasion in this public forum to state unequivocally that not only do the Pakistani Government officials but the Pakistani people and the Pakistani diaspora, many of whom are extremely successful Americans here in academia and business, the professions and so much else, need to speak out forcefully against a policy that is ceding more and more territory to the insurgents, to the Taliban, to al-Qaeda, and to the allies that are in this terrorist syndicate.

I think that we cannot underscore the seriousness of the existential threat posed to the state of Pakistan by the continuing advances, now within hours of Islamabad, that are being made by a loosely confederated group of terrorists and others who are seeking the overthrow of the Pakistani state, which is, as we all know, a nuclear-armed state.

I don't hear that kind of outrage or concern coming from enough people that would reverberate back within the highest echelons of the military and civilian leadership of Pakistan.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.

I have so many questions I hope you will respond for the record. I want to echo Mr. Royce's comments about the need to warn American businesses about the places where they will face unfair government practices.

As on the Iran Sanctions Act, we have had through the past administration this strange approach to the rule of law where they say, well, the Iran Sanctions Act is not law because we don't agree with it.

The law requires the State Department to identify those situations in which there are investments of over \$20 million in the Iran energy sector. It then allows the administration to either impose or waive sanctions. I would hope that the administration, and especially the State Department that is so dedicated to talking to other countries about the importance of the rule of law, would not follow the practice of the past administration, which was to claim that they didn't get their copy of the Wall Street Journal on those days in which the Wall Street Journal reported a \$20 million investment in the Iran energy sector.

I would hope that you would at least identify the companies as required by law, and then waive the sanctions, if you choose. Better yet, I hope you impose sanctions.

Also, I hope you would take efforts to discourage firms from selling gasoline to Iran and, perhaps more importantly, discourage firms from selling refining equipment technology to Iran.

I know it is difficult to deal with Iran. Here is an easier one, Canada.

Canada was found by the OECD to be the number one Western country in violation of intellectual property, and I hope you have a chance to talk to our friends to the north about the importance

of protecting intellectual property, both for their own businesses and for ours.

As to the United Arab Emirates and the 123 Agreement, before you move forward with that agreement, I hope that you get much better enforcement by the UAE of their laws to prevent transshipment and diversions, particularly from the port of Dubai to Iran. The UAE has become the home of literally hundreds of companies affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard. They have passed a good statute, perhaps, but they have no lead enforcement agency, no regulations, and no real enforcement.

There is talk that this nuclear cooperation agreement will mean a lot of jobs for Americans. But without liability protections in place, such as those in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation, no U.S. company will bid on the contracts. All of the contracts will go to the French and the Russians which are state-owned companies which claim sovereign immunity and so they don't worry about liability. So if we are going to tell the American people that there are jobs in this deal, there should be the Convention on Supplementary Compensation as part of the deal.

As to Armenia, the Bush administration tried many times to cut aid for Armenia. I hope we see an increase, and I hope that the administration would either eliminate military assistance to Azerbaijan or at least maintain parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan as to military aid.

As to Sri Lanka, I hope you would oppose IMF loans to the Sri Lankan Government until that government agrees to allow journalists and human rights officials to inspect the displaced persons camps where Tamils are being held, and to generally respect human rights.

As to Darfur, I think your bargaining position will be strengthened if we don't tell the Sudanese Government in advance that we are dismissing out of hand any military or lethal option. We should not dismiss out of hand the idea of a no-fly zone and the idea of using our Air Force to hit the Sudanese Government, or even the possibility of providing assistance to insurgent groups in Darfur.

And finally as to Istanbul, the Halki Theological Seminary was raised by President Obama when he was in Turkey, and I hope that the State Department would follow up until that school is allowed to reopen.

I realize I have left almost no time for response.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, this is a very important list, and we are paying close attention to each and every matter that you mentioned.

I will also follow up on the legislation that you and Congressman Royce have introduced regarding unfair business and government practices that affect our investors and businesses abroad.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you. Welcome, Madam Secretary.

I have a general question that I want to ask about foreign policy, but I would like to mention first that the election had something to do with bringing about change in tone with our foreign policy, and I think there have been some very positive changes in tone.

Many of us have argued for more diplomacy rather than more threats. So many of us are pleased with that. It goes back to the old saying of speaking softly and still being willing to carry a big stick. But sometimes I wonder whether that big stick doesn't get wielded a little too often.

I do want to caution all of us that what we say is very important and can be very beneficial, but what we do is also very important, and so that may cancel out the benefits of speaking more softly and being willing to talk and negotiate.

Some people say that we shouldn't talk to our enemies, but I remember the Cold War rather well, and we did talk to Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung when they were great threats to us. So sometimes I think that when we look at how we stood up to tens of thousands of nuclear weapons that we should be cautious as far as what we might do in Pakistan and put it into a proper perspective.

But my big concern is whether or not we can reverse the empire mentality that I think we have adopted over these many, many decades; and also the relationship of this to our financial burden.

Although we are speaking more softly and would like to get some troops home, the first thing that was done was our DOD budget was increased by 9 percent in a time when our national debt in the last 12 months went up \$2 trillion. All great nations have been brought to their knees for economic reasons. We didn't have to fight the Soviets, and the Afghanistan adventure that the Soviets were involved with was very significant, and I don't know how we can ignore that.

So I would like to ask the question about whether or not you can give me some signs or indication or some encouragement that maybe we shifted policies in the slightest manner? Have we brought any troops home? Are we less involved in Iraq? Will that war ever end, or are we really going in the opposite direction because we are seeing Pakistan, we need more troops, more expansion, more money, more DOD funds.

So coming from my perspective, I can't see the difference even though, like I said, I am pleased that there is a willingness to talk and try to work things out, and I think that is very positive. I always think that people who are not willing to talk are insecure. This whole idea that we are so strong, to me it seems like we lack confidence if we can't talk to people. We are strong enough. Nobody is going to attack us militarily. I think it is very important that we change our tone.

I think it is good you got rid of the term "war on terrorism." How can you have war against a tactic? It doesn't make any sense; but I am not sure that "overseas contingency operation" is more specific. Can you address that and maybe give me some hints as far as maybe seeing some shift in our policy?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Congressman.

I think the President's actions in these nearly 100 days do match actions with words, although I admit there is a lot more to be done. We are still sorting out everything that we inherited and trying to make sense of it. We want to protect America's national security, but we think there are better and more effective ways of doing that.

So we are ending the war in Iraq. There is a definite end date for our troops to be there. The President did close Guantanamo. The President is looking for ways to engage with those nobody wanted us to talk to, which is a sea shift in how we are proceeding.

Words and actions both matter. At the end of the day, actions count more. But you have to begin by at least articulating a new approach.

In our budget, we have asked for more money for diplomacy and development. The Budget Committee in both the House and the Senate cut back the President's request. It is kind of old thinking, in my view.

The Secretary of Defense has said that there are fewer Foreign Service diplomats posted overseas than there are sailors and Marines on one aircraft carrier. There are more musicians in the military bands than there are diplomats across the board. So we are trying to shift this gigantic ship of state, Mr. Paul. We are looking for your help to do so.

At the risk of going over our time, I just want to say, having campaigned during the last Presidential election, you had the most enthusiastic supporters of anybody I ever saw.

Mr. PAUL. I love to hear that.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, my goodness, everywhere I went they were literally running down highways holding your signs. I never had a chance to tell you that. But your message obviously resonated with a lot of people.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. You are going to encourage him.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Engel and I were just talking to each other and saying that we think you are an extraordinary Secretary of State, and I am absolutely confident that you are destined to be one of our Nation's finest diplomats. I don't think there is any question about that.

If I can raise three issues. One is an issue that is of great personal importance to me, and I know you are very familiar with it. Robert Levinson, a former FBI agent who is being held in Iran, my understanding is that Ambassador Holbrooke gave a letter to Iranian officials recently. I was hoping you could provide an update.

Two, with respect to Turkey and Armenia, both you and the President have visited, and I was hoping you could comment on the potential for an extraordinary breakthrough in terms of the normalization of relations, the possible opening of borders, and the possible bridging some extraordinarily difficult issues between the Turkish and the Armenian people. And if you could quickly comment in terms of Azerbaijan, the potential possibly with respect to the Nagorno Karabagh conflict, what is happening.

Third, if I may quickly mention Indonesia. I think there was an Economist magazine that on one of the headlines said, "Indonesia: A Model for Muslims."

Mr. Burton and I not too long ago started an Indonesia Caucus because of the extraordinary potential for American-Indonesian relations, the fact that President Yudhoyono is a democrat in the fin-

est of historical ways. He has turned around his country in a remarkable feat given the humanitarian crises that Indonesia has endured. I was hoping you might tell us in terms of what prospects there are with American-Indonesian relationships in terms of yet another very positive election in Indonesia.

Secretary CLINTON. First as to Mr. Robert Levinson, yes, we did continue our efforts to try to obtain information about Mr. Levinson. His family, as you know, has suffered deeply because there is absolutely nothing coming out of the Iranian Government. He was mentioned in the letter that we passed on to the Iranian Government in The Hague, and we are going to continue to press this at every turn.

As well, Roxana Saberi, who is being held in an arbitrary and terribly unfair, unprecedented unjustified way, she should be able to come home. We hope that we can achieve that.

With respect to Turkey and Armenia, I have been very encouraged by the bold steps that have recently been taken in this direction by Turkish and Armenian leaders to reconcile their countries with each other and with their shared and painful past. I believe that the steps that Turkey and Armenia are taking toward normalizing relations and opening their borders will foster a better environment for confronting that shared tragic history.

The Turkish and Armenian Governments have sought United States support and encouragement of their reconciliation efforts. And following that request, both the President and I have supported them fully.

We have also assured the Government of Azerbaijan that we will intensify our efforts to resolve the conflict over Nagorno Karabagh and other outstanding issues between Azerbaijan and Armenia. There is a Minsk Process, as you know, that we are going to be deeply engaged in. We already are. We have sent a State Department official to Azerbaijan I think two times in the last 3 weeks, and we hope there will be some resolution in the next few months.

Thank you for mentioning Indonesia. As I said in my opening remarks, I see Indonesia as an anchor country, a regional power. When I was there on my first trip as Secretary of State, I said if you want to see a country where democracy and Islam and secularism and women's rights coexist together, that is Indonesia. It is a young democracy, but President Yudhoyono and his government have made enormous strides. I think the United States has to continue to work with Indonesia and support their democratic and economic development. I think it is a very big piece of business for the United States, and I applaud you and Mr. Burton for starting the Indonesia Caucus.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I want to follow up on what Dr. Paul mentioned, and praise the administration for its act of diplomacy, in particular for the action that has been taken on Cuba, to allow Cuban Americans to visit family as frequently as they would like

to. I think that is both humane and the right thing to do. I think that is the right thing to do.

My concern moving forward is that there have been certain signals from some in the administration that we may want to condition future action on Cuba based on what the Cubans do. The administration has stated that the embargo has not worked; it has not had the desired effect. I think that is quite self-evident after 50 years.

But to then say so we are going to condition and not move any further until the Cubans take certain action, I think that many of us have been convinced, or certainly not convinced, for example, that the Cubans want the travel ban to be fully lifted. If you remember during the Clinton administration when action was taken where it looked like normalization of relations might happen, a plane was shot down. A few years ago when we moved legislation through the House and the Senate to lift the travel ban or to prohibit enforcement of it, detainees were taken, 75 of them. So every time it seems we have taken a move, the Cubans have pushed back with something else. And I fear if we take the same position which has been I think the trap that previous administrations have fallen into, then we will have the same result.

To the extent we have dialogue with the Cubans, we ought to say something like this: We have relaxed restrictions on Cuban Americans. We want to relax restrictions on all Americans, and if you don't start releasing political prisoners, we are going to lift the whole embargo. Because truly, I think that is what they fear worse than anything. So why should we condition future action based on what they do or they don't do. We should do what is good for America. In this sense, I think it is also good for Cubans. But I would love to hear your response.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, that is an interesting formulation I have never heard before. Look, I think that Congressman Smith and certainly the ranking member are very strongly expressing the opinions of many Americans, not just Cuban Americans, that a regime which is so dug in and unwilling to exercise the normal functions of a government, to have a judiciary that is independent, to have the rule of law, to release political prisoners, is one that is very difficult to move. I understand that.

But on the other hand, I think that the President's actions did draw a response from Raul Castro which was then contradicted today by Fidel Castro saying that my brother really didn't mean that we would talk about political prisoners and human rights. So I think you can see there is beginning to be a debate. This is a regime that is ending. It will end at some point. We need to be ready to do that, and we have responded to Raul Castro's comments by saying that we would consider a discussion that would include human rights and political prisoners.

As you know, the embargo is part of our law. The President cannot lift the embargo. That has to be done by an act of Congress. If the Congress decides that is in America's best interest, obviously the administration will abide by that.

But we are going to proceed very carefully in this process because we know what has happened before. I will remember when those two small, unarmed planes doing nothing more than drop-

ping pamphlets were shot down by the Castro regime. I believed then, and I think you said it well today, it was done to prevent us opening. But it was also an act of such aggression and violence that you can't let it go unanswered either.

So this is a difficult calculation. Our goal is for a free, independent democracy that gives the people of Cuba a chance to have the same opportunities that their sisters and brothers and cousins and my sister-in-law, who came to this country from Cuba, that they have in our country. And so we are looking at it, and we welcome your advice.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New York, just back from the Summit of the Americas, Mr. Engel, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did just come back from the Summit of the Americas. We met with more than 20 heads of state in private meetings. Madam Secretary, every leader I met with had nothing but praise for you and President Obama. I congratulate you. I was pleased to lead a delegation to meet with you at the summit. I think we are well on our way of reestablishing engagement in the area, and a policy where our brothers and sisters in the region feel that we are partners, we care about them, and we are not neglecting them. I thought the way you conducted yourself was great. As a longtime supporter of yours and a New Yorker, I just cannot express how proud you make all of us. Thank for your work for our country.

I wanted to comment on a few issues and then let you respond.

I want to say in terms of Cuba, we should absolutely condition what we do on Cuba based on what they do. If they are willing to talk about human rights and not just talk, we don't want talk, we want action, and democracy and political prisoners, then we should respond in kind. I don't think short of that we should open up and give them what they want. They have been a repressive regime, and we need to make sure that democracy comes to that country, as it will, but we need to encourage it.

I want to talk about the Merida Initiative for Mexico. We have had conversations about this, and I am a strong supporter of Merida. I hope the Congress gives more money toward it than we have.

I met with President Calderon of Mexico. The frustration is that the moneys are not flowing. They have to go and get helicopters elsewhere, and other things. The bureaucracy is impossible. I would like you to talk about how we can speed up that process.

When I met with President Calderon and Prime Minister Golding of Jamaica, both of them said the same thing, that 90 percent of the crimes committed in Jamaica and Mexico, and I am sure other countries, are committed with United States weapons. We need to stop the flow of U.S. weapons south of our borders.

In my recent letter to President Obama, which was signed by 52 of my colleagues, I urged him to return to enforcement of a ban on imported assault weapons. These are imported—this is not about Second Amendment rights. This ban was enforced by President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton, and I think we should go back to it. I would like your comment on that.



At the summit, I was pleased to hear yours and President Obama's announcement of \$30 million in security assistance for our Caribbean neighbors, the CARICOM nations. I believe that the CARICOM nations should also be granted money under Merida because if we are successful in stopping the drugs coming up from Mexico, and Merida, at my insistence along with others, was also extended to Central America. We don't want them moving to the Caribbean. Perhaps \$30 million should be linked to that.

So those are my questions in terms of the Western Hemisphere.

Now two other issues that we have worked with when you were a Senator. That is Kosovo. Saudi Arabia recently became the 57th country to recognize Kosovo. I am wondering, and I am glad this administration is pushing nations to recognize them, and I am just wondering if you can comment on that and what you expect to happen in the International Court of Justice.

Finally, I want to express the concern that the ranking member expressed vis-à-vis Gaza aid, that it doesn't fall into the hands of Hamas; and particularly in response to what the Israeli Prime Minister and the new government has said, that they are going to put a priority on negotiations with Iran before they move forward with the Palestinian situation.

I know that is a lot, but I would be grateful for any of your comments.

Chairman BERMAN. And you have 1 minute and 3 seconds.

Secretary CLINTON. I will talk as fast as I can.

On the Merida Initiative we have to get the money flowing. Honestly, I don't understand why it is so hard. We are really digging deep to figure this out. In the supplemental there is money for three Blackhawk helicopters for Mexico. I urge everybody to support this.

During my visit, it became abundantly clear that the Mexican Government and the police and the army, they are outgunned by the drug cartels. We need to try to right that balance.

On assault weapons, we are looking about the ban. We are also sending to the Senate the Inter-American Convention on the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, known as CIFTA. It is an attempt for us to try to help staunch the flow of all of these very powerful weapons. We are giving more security aid to CARICOM. As you heard at the Summit of the Americas, the Caribbean countries are suffering so much from drug activity.

And we are working on Kosovo recognition; and we will not give aid to Hamas.

Mr. ENGEL. What a great Secretary.

Chairman BERMAN. I didn't think you could do it, but you did.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MACK. Madam Secretary, it is great to have an opportunity to speak with you a few times recently, and I appreciate all of those times.

There is so much to talk about, so my guess is I will be sending you a letter with some questions because I don't think that we can cover it all in 5 minutes.

I wanted to talk a little bit about Cuba and associate myself with the conditions that must be met by Castro. This is really not an issue about the United States lifting the embargo, it is whether or not Castro wants to lift the embargo. If he releases the political prisoners, if there is freedom of expression, if there are free and fair elections, I believe it is the law of the United States that that is what will trigger the lifting of the embargo.

I think it is also important that we don't lose context about Castro. I know that you are very familiar with all of this, but we can't forget the Cuban missile crisis and the murders that took place on that island. And we can't forget the depriving of the people of Cuba human rights, hope and opportunity.

So I think this is part of the discussion that is being lost right now. In an attempt to try to engage, I think we have lost part of the discussion about why it is that Cuba and Castro are in the position that they are in right now. And it is at their own hands, not at the hands of the United States.

So I hope that we can continue the dialogue, and there are people on both sides of the aisle who feel strongly about the political prisoners and the freedom of expression and elections in Cuba.

I also wanted to mention quickly my kind of takeaway from the summit. That is that there is a small group of countries, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Argentina, that really took the opportunity to try to hijack what could have been a very productive summit. They came into the summit putting Cuba up as the issue and, frankly, hijacking what could have been a very good Summit of the Americas.

My concern with this small group of countries is what it is that they are going to try to do outside of the Western Hemisphere. If you look at Hugo Chavez and the relationships that he is building with Iran and North Korea and Russia and the purchasing of weapons, my concern is that we will find ourselves in a position, if you believe that Hugo Chavez looks up to Fidel Castro, we could find the same scenario where we did with the Cuban missile crisis, where you have Iran using Venezuela as an access point in our hemisphere to put pressure on the United States. It is something that I am very, very concerned about.

The last thing I wanted to just put a little tidbit out there about the Merida Initiative. As I told you before, I am very supportive of the Merida Initiative and what the administration and yourself have been doing. I do have an issue with the guns. I think once a statistic gets thrown out we tend to run with it. So we hear 90 percent of all of the guns are coming from the U.S. I don't believe that is accurate. It is 90 percent of those that we are able to track. I saw a report recently that talked of the total number of which only 17 percent of those guns are U.S. guns.

So I think it is important to have the opportunity to talk with the President of Mexico. I think it is clear the issue is our border. Mexico wants to stop the flow of guns and money moving south. Frankly, we want to stop the flow of drugs and criminals north across the border. So it really comes about securing the border for the benefit of both of our countries and our hemisphere. I hope that we can move in a way that doesn't blame U.S. for these problems but works in a partnership.

Last, because I have 10 seconds, trade.

Chairman BERMAN. No, you have minus 10 seconds.

Mr. MACK. Okay. Every country that we do trade with is a supporter of the United States, so I hope we will support the Colombia and Panama Free Trade Agreement.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is delightful to have you, Secretary Clinton, be here today. It is an absolute delight to see you in the Summit of the Americas, and how you and the President represented this country very well. It is in fact bringing us back so we are not isolated as a country against everybody else. We are now beginning to respect other countries again, and listen. As the President indicated and you indicated while at the summit, you were there to listen.

I think when we listen, we hear a lot of things and we understand a lot. Traveling with my good friend, Mr. Mack, who his last statement is something I agree with, Panama and Colombia, some of these trade agreements. I disagree with some of his former comments. I think we listened to all of those small nations, and we learned a lot from that.

Given that, what President Obama said at the G-20, he said in an era of integration and interdependence, if we neglect or abandon those who are suffering in poverty, that not only are we depriving ourselves of potential opportunities for markets and economic growth, but ultimately that despair may turn to violence that turns on us.

I couldn't agree with his statement more. When we look at poverty all over the world, I like to especially look at it in the Western Hemisphere where we just came back from, I believe one of the mechanisms by which we can resolve some of that is some of these trade agreements. However, what has to be done or contained therein is trade capacity building. I don't know whether or not we have focused enough on that issue to make it clearly defined as to the success of trade capacity building.

So my question to you is this: In the 109th Congress in the foreign operations bill there was a proposal to create a Trade Capacity Enhancement Fund, at that time it was for \$522 million, and an Office of the Director for Trade Capacity Enhancement within the USAID. This new office would have been responsible for USAID's trade capacity building programs, as well as coordinating government-wide trade capacity programs to all U.S. agencies. These changes in the funding and management would have represented an initiative to make trade capacity building a higher priority.

So my question to you is: What are your thoughts about creating this Director of Trade Capacity? What do you think would be the best way to promote and to evaluate the effectiveness of capacity building? And do you think that there should be some innovative ideas so we can try to combat the problem of poverty because if you talk to particularly the indigenous and Africans, people of African descent in Latin America, someone like an Evo Morales talk about, and others, who I don't think we need to demonize, we need to un-

derstand from whence they come and why they take some of the positions that they take. I would love to hear your opinions on that.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman Meeks, your question suggests the need for a much more in-depth discussion about trade. It is not enough to say we are for it or against it. We are for the right kind of trade that does enhance the well-being of our own country and other countries. And deep into those countries, as you say, marginalized people, indigenous, African descent and Latin American. So I am very open to exploring what we can do to build trade capacity.

Specifically with respect to Panama and Colombia, we had numerous conversations, as many of you who were there at the summit did with representatives of those two countries, and made it clear that there were steps that they had to take in order to enable the Obama administration to fight for and support those trade agreements.

But I think you have put your finger on the deeper question, how do we make sure that the benefits of trade really get below just the upper echelons of any society? That is our question for what happens abroad. And here at home, what do we need to do to enhance our own social safety net and our capacity to make sure that as commerce moves, our people are not left behind? That is the kind of discussion we should have.

So I would welcome your ideas about how to do this either with a fund or some other steps we can take.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I also welcome you to the committee. I did appreciate your opening remarks. I also appreciated the brief dialogue that we had after President Obama's speech to the Joint Session of Congress regarding the potential development of nuclear weapons capability in Iran. As I said then, I extend a hand of friendship and I stand ready to work with you in any creative way to work toward some solution on that most pressing difficulty and the other seemingly intractable issues throughout the Middle East.

A number of us also met with Ambassador Mitchell recently, and I appreciate the good work that he is doing on your behalf on the Israeli-Palestinian question.

However, Madam Secretary, my heart is also deeply conflicted. While I do appreciate your observations overseas of women suffering from deplorable conditions, I am deeply grieved by your response to Congressman Smith's question. Your remarks last month when you called Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood, a person whom you enormously admire, were stunning to me. Margaret Sanger clearly embraced bigotry and racism. She advocated for the elimination of the disabled, the downtrodden and the Black child. In one of her writings she said, "Today, eugenics is suggested by the most diverse minds as the most adequate and thorough avenue to the solution of racial, political and social problems."

I don't believe these ideologies have a place in our pluralistic society. And you went on to say that you will use American foreign

policy in your position to further reproductive rights, which includes abortion, across the globe.

Madam Secretary, I don't believe we should use American foreign policy to export abortion. This will undermine, in my view, our foreign relations in many areas throughout the world, including Latin America and Africa, and among Muslim people. Promoting the international abortion industry is an imposition of our own woundedness upon others. Abortion has caused tremendous grief in this society, and its export, I believe, will be seen as a form of neocolonialism that is paternalistic and elitist and an assault on the dignity of especially the poor and vulnerable. I believe women deserve better, women throughout the world deserve better.

Madam Secretary, I urge you to consider another way, one that upholds the genius of womanhood and the life nestled within her. And no matter how difficult the circumstance, I believe we should be big enough and bold enough to celebrate the beautiful gift of life. Then we will truly make a change in the world for the greater good. And I am convinced we would create an extraordinary amount of goodwill with this perspective versus forcing U.S. taxpayers to fund abortion overseas.

Finally, I ask that you turn to a true heroine of international development and human empowerment, Mother Teresa, whom I believe you had a chance to meet with. She fought abortion by adoption, by care of the mother and adoption for her baby. And she also said, Come, we will take care of you. We will get a home for your child to those in need. She said that any country that allows abortion is not teaching its people to love but to use violence to get what they want. This is why the greatest destroyer of love and peace is abortion.

Again, Madam Secretary, I urge you to consider a kinder way forward, one that truly cares for the woman and her child and does not consider abortion as an integral component of U.S. diplomatic and international development initiatives.

I live with six women. Let me clarify that. I have a wife and five daughters. Part of trying to raise them well and empower them to be successful, I believe, is inculcating them with the noble idea that all persons have inherent dignity, and therefore rights.

So I have to ask you, is forcing U.S. taxpayers to fund abortion in keeping with the highest values of the United States of America?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, let me say with respect to your comments about Margaret Sanger, you know, I admire Thomas Jefferson. I admire his words and his leadership, and I deplore his unrepentant slave holding.

I admire Margaret Sanger being a pioneer and trying to empower women to have some control over their bodies, and I deplore statements that you have referenced. That is the way we often are when we look at flawed human beings. There are things that we admire and things that we deplore.

We have for 8 years followed the policy that you have described, and I think we have gone backwards. We have gone backwards in the real, genuine care that we have given to women.

I admire you for raising five strong daughters who will be able to make their own choice, and most likely, given your guidance, will be very staunchly pro-life. But that is a choice that they will

be able to exercise as free, independent American women. That is what I want for all women.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for providing this time.

Secretary Hillary Clinton, you are a breath of fresh air. I have watched your movements around the globe, and you are talking peace. And I carry the attitude that peace will not come at the end of a gun, but only with us negotiating and, as the President says, listening, and I have heard you say that many, many times, learning, and then leading.

We want to provide for you the policy tools that you will need to continue your diplomatic efforts globally. I am concerned about the staffing shortages you are going to face as we start to leave Iraq. We know that we have a greater responsibility left behind. How do we help that nation rebuild and how do we help it stabilize? I am hoping that we can come up with a way to support your staffing of the Embassy there.

As you know, under the former administration we were building the largest Embassy in the world and looking to hire 5,000. Well, we stopped that because I didn't think that we needed to invest \$1 billion. If we were going to build the largest Embassy in the world, it should be in China or India or in those areas of the world.

What can we do to enhance your ability to continue to spread peace and continue the listening?

And then I also want you to comment, we went just a few weeks ago to Ethiopia to an Inter-Parliamentary Union. We pulled our membership out in 1997. When we arrived there as observers, five of us, we were welcomed with open arms. They were so glad to see Americans participating on the world stage. There were 150 nations involved. We pulled out in 1997. We were sent to assess the value of reentering the group. But I can tell you, the conversations we had outside, the bilateral conversations we had while there, and people who came up to me after I talked about the condition of adolescent girls and women in the world. I had a woman come up with a full burqa on with only her eyes showing, Saudi Arabian, and another woman coming up and saying please, help us empower our women.

So how do you feel about us rejoining the IPU, and what tools can we then provide you so you continue your policies of peace?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Congresswoman. Your question about Iraq is incredibly important. We finally were able last evening to get an ambassador confirmed. Ambassador Hill is on his way to Baghdad. It is very difficult for a lot of countries to understand our system, that it would take so long for us to have ambassadors or confirmed high level appointees. But thankfully, we will have a very experienced, seasoned diplomat leading our mission there. And our work will be guided by the strategic agreement between the United States and Iraq as to how we will work together on a number of issues ranging from supporting their civil society and good governance and anti-corruption and the oil industry and so much else.

We are going to have to work extremely hard, though, because, as you say, this Embassy has been on a war footing, and how we begin to transition to peace and stability and a long-term relationship between the United States and Iraq will be quite challenging. But we are determined to do that, and we will undertake it under Ambassador Hill's leadership.

With respect to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, I am reminded of Winston Churchill, one of the great war leaders of all time, who famously said it is always better to jaw-jaw than war-war. Talking forums, you can learn things. And occasionally, as we saw with the Conference against Racism, when it is hijacked by vile and unacceptable rhetoric, then you have the option of walking out and showing your displeasure, or not participating, as we chose not to do. But I think that it is always in our interest to try to explore and test the waters and see what we can accomplish together.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, in February during your Asia tour, you said we have to continue to press China on Taiwan, Tibet and human rights. How about forced abortion?

Secretary CLINTON. In 1995, I was the first person to speak out against forced abortion in China at the fourth annual United Nations Women's Conference. I consider any governmental imposition that imposes government policy on women to be absolutely unacceptable. I feel strongly about forced sterilization, forced abortion, or any other egregious interference with women's rights.

Mr. INGLIS. Why didn't you say that in China?

Secretary CLINTON. I did say it in China. I said it in China 14 years ago.

Mr. INGLIS. But why didn't you say it in February?

Secretary CLINTON. Because they knew I had already said it. They are very well aware of that. When I made that statement, the Chinese Government turned off the television so that their people could not hear me say it. I have said it consistently. I have written about it. I am on record as saying that over and over again.

Mr. INGLIS. 14 years ago, you were First Lady. Today, you are Secretary of State. There is a big difference. Why didn't you say it as Secretary of State?

Secretary CLINTON. I just did.

Mr. INGLIS. That is helpful, I guess. Because the thing that concerns me is if you look at the 2008 State Department Human Rights Report, it says, "China's human rights record remain poor and worsened in some areas."

In addition, since 1999, the Secretary of State has designated China as a Country of Particular Concern for egregious—a word you just used—egregious abuse of religious freedom. China is clearly still one of the world's worst violators of human rights, including religious freedom.

Can the United States tolerate those things while we seek, what you said, global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and security crises—can we ignore those other things while we address with them the things that you mentioned when you were in

China? Or does their failure on human rights and things like forced abortion mean that really we must press them on those things in order to get to the global economic crisis, the climate change crisis, and the security crises?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, they are all part of our comprehensive engagement with China, and it is part of what I and others representing the United States raise with the Chinese. We are going to have a bilateral human rights dialogue with the Chinese in all of the matters, and others that you mentioned will be part of that.

But I think that, just as we did in previous years going back many decades, we had ongoing dialogue with the Soviet Union when they were threatening to annihilate us. We have had normalized diplomatic relations with nations who engage in policies that we certainly deplore. And I think, with China, it is a complex relationship. We are putting it on a very strong footing so it can be positive and cooperative and comprehensive. And human rights will be a part of that.

Mr. INGLIS. You referenced the Soviet Union, and our engagement with them is I think instructive. I think it nearly drove the State Department folks crazy when Ronald Reagan said, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall." But it was moral authority that he was using there. And, of course, I think that it helped bring down that wall.

So if America engages countries like China, don't we have to use our moral authority? Of course, we have to examine our own hearts and our own circumstances to see how we are doing. But don't we have to speak with moral authority, and use that moral authority when we engage countries like China?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, we certainly do. And President Reagan continued to negotiate arms control agreements. He continued to press for economic investments in the former Soviet Union. So it is a broad engagement that we have with large and complex countries like that; and so, similarly, I think that we will pursue this.

There is always and must be a moral dimension to our foreign policy. That goes back to our founding. That is why it is so important what the President is doing, which is reasserting the moral authority of the United States so that when we raise these issues we can be taken seriously, and that is what we intend to be.

Mr. INGLIS. And I appreciate that. The thing that I would just encourage you to do is, as Reagan went there and spoke at the wall, when you are in China next I hope you will speak to these issues of religious freedom, of human rights, of forced abortions, these egregious violations.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I did speak about religious freedom and other matters when I was there.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I apologize for calling you Senator when I first saw you. I wish it had been a higher title.

I just want to speak a little bit about Cuba. And I think it is perfectly normal to put conditions on Cuba. This country has been doing that to other countries all its history, it will do that again, to promote democracies and to promote human rights. And let me



say, as someone who lived there, I experienced at the age of 11 how to take apart and put together a Slovakian machine gun. I experienced the people knocking on my house door because they thought my father was carrying contraband on the black market. I remember the military coming to my house and taking inventory just before I left, and having lived in New Jersey with the mother of the sons that were killed on the plane as they were rescuing people leaving the totalitarian government.

So I don't want to belittle the point, because everybody has raised the issue of Cuba many, many times. But there is nothing wrong with putting conditions. And may I add that all those people that are in prison today were part of—they were born, raised, and schooled in Cuba, all those political prisoners. They didn't come from Miami to Havana. They are a product of the revolution. And there are maybe 300, but there were 5,000 classified differently that are put in jail because they can't speak about the government.

So conditions are perfectly fine, and I hope that the President will take that into consideration.

But I want to raise two other issues that are important. I want to talk a little bit about the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, and I want to talk about Cyprus and Turkey's 43,000 troops in Cyprus. Can you just comment a little bit about that?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, I certainly can, Congressman. And thank you for your eloquent and heartfelt description of why we always have to be promoting human rights and freedom.

I have met twice with the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus and I have met once with Mr. Talat representing the Turkish Cypriots. The United States strongly supports a bizonal, bicomunal resolution to the Cyprus talks, and we have told each side that we support their very diligent efforts to try to resolve these matters, including security issues and troop presence.

So we are going to do everything we can to support the Cypriots reaching their own resolution. I think that previous efforts have, unfortunately, resulted in a feeling by certainly the Greek Cypriots that things were attempted to be imposed on them, and we want the parties to reach an agreement. And that is what we are supporting.

Mr. SIREN. Can you talk a little bit about Colombia?

Secretary CLINTON. The Colombia Free Trade Act, which several of you have referenced, was a subject of intense conversations at the Summit of the Americas between us and the Colombians. Several Members of Congress, including some on this committee and other committees, have been in Colombia in the last several days trying to figure out what is it the Colombians would be asked to do in order to move the Free Trade Agreement forward.

The Obama administration believes that the right kind of free trade agreement is very much in the interests of both Colombia and the United States. The steps that have been taken by President Uribe and his government to not only deal with the insurgency and the terrorists, but to clean house with a lot of the abuses that were unfortunately present within the military and other instruments of government have been very impressive. There is still more work to be done.

So we are intensely discussing with the Colombians how we can come to a resolution that would enable us to move forward.

Mr. SIRES. I have 1 minute. Can you talk a little bit about the handshake that Chavez gave?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I must say he is very adept at knowing where the cameras are.

You know, we had sat down for a discussion with the Presidents and heads of state of the South American countries, and the President—our President—was at the head of the table, you might say. I was sitting behind him. And it was one of those hollow squares, and the cameras came in to do the photo spray. And as soon as the cameras were set, President Chavez got up, came around, presented the book and, as you noted, held out the cover so that it could be easily seen.

You know, I found it somewhat amusing, to be honest. I mean, I know some people have reacted. But I think President Obama was right in saying, why should we be afraid of shaking somebody's hand? Now, that doesn't mean that we are going to agree, it doesn't mean that we are going to give up our principles. But let's try to see whether there is any opportunity to move President Chavez away from the influences that others were speaking about.

Look, it is a serious matter if any country in our hemisphere falls under the sway of Iran or someone else who is inimical to our interests. We buy a lot of their oil. Let's see whether we can begin to turn that relationship. It might or might not be possible. The handshake was not the end of anything, but the beginning of seeing whether that could be done.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield time to the ranking member.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Bilirakis.

Madam Secretary, illustrating the perilous security situation in Mexico, I have a constituent of my congressional district, Felix Batista, who disappeared in Mexico in December 2008. And I will hand this letter to you to respectfully request your help in assisting so many of our constituents who have disappeared in Mexico.

Also, Madam Secretary, regarding Haiti. That is so important, not only to our entire hemisphere, but very much of importance to south Florida. You announced \$300 million in assistance to Haiti, including a pledge made at the Haiti Donors Conference. And we want to make sure that we have taken proper steps for transparency, for accountability, and making sure that we can show sustainable progress for Haiti.

The supplemental has \$300 million in food aid, but Haiti is not mentioned as a recipient of that provision, and I hope that we get some aid for Haiti in that provision.

And I will have some other time as well. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis, for that time. And I yield back to you, sir.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. I have a couple questions, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Madam Secretary. Can you generally state the administration's policy toward Greece? Could you expound on the issues

related to Greece's acceptance into the visa waiver program and Greece's relationship with FYROM? And then I have one more question.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much.

Greece is a close ally, a partner within NATO, a country with whom we cooperate on a range of important regional issues. I have met several times with the Foreign Minister and also with the Prime Minister, along with President Obama, during the European Union-U.S. Council in Prague.

We have discussed the visa waiver issue. We are working with Greece. There are certain requirements that they are working to fulfill that we hope we can be able to bring to resolution.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How about on the mutually acceptable resolution on the name issue with FYROM?

Secretary CLINTON. We very strongly support efforts for a mutually accepted name. And we understand Greece's sensitivities. I have discussed this with our NATO partners, also in my meetings at the EU. And we have urged all the parties to come to a resolution that is acceptable.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. I have one more question with regard to Cyprus. As you know, the Annan failed because it contained provisions that prohibited Greek Cypriots from purchasing property in one part of their own country and constitutionally established Turkish troops permanently on Cyprus.

It is my belief that this was bad policy to try to impose an Annan type plan that would be unacceptable to Western democracies on the Cypriot people.

Can you state with any degree of certainty that this administration will not be advocating similar settlement provisions in any future settlement agreements for the reunification of Cyprus.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think your description is accurate; that, as you know so well, the plan was rejected because it was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots.

We have taken the position that this must be a settlement that the two parties agree to themselves. We don't intend to impose anything. We intend to support, insofar as we are able, the negotiations between the parties for what we believe is the best outcome, a bizonal, bicomunal federation that would represent fairly the interests of both communities.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary CLINTON. In my remaining time, may I just quickly respond to the ranking member's comments?

We will do everything we can on any missing constituent. And also with respect to Haiti, we did deliver \$50 million in food aid, Madam Congresswoman. We are going to look at what else we can do. We will keep you informed about a comprehensive approach we are setting up for Haiti.

Mr. ACKERMAN [presiding]. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahan.

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I believe it would be unbecoming for a Member of Congress to gush publicly, and even a new Member. But let me say, the people of Staten Island and Brooklyn, New York, and

all of New York, are just so proud of what you did for us in the United States Senate, particularly in my district, as you know, feeling for the forgotten people of New York. And what you did for us and what you now do for our Nation and people around the world now who were forgotten feel that they have a champion. And I applaud you, and President Obama for his selection of you.

I also applaud your ability to gracefully deflect the distracting and sometimes personal slings and arrows of political and special interests hurled at you, and your ability to stay focused on the important international issues we face as a nation. It gives us great pride to see you even here in this room be able to exemplify a great American spirit, and we are just so privileged and honored to have you here.

One of the reasons I sought a seat on this committee was because I knew that under Chairman Berman we would be working with you as you revamp our image and our power around the world with a stronger State Department.

Specifically, I want to ask questions about Sri Lanka. If I could first commend the State Department's April 16th call on both the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers to allow the over 140,000 trapped Tamil civilians to escape the conflict zone. We also support the Department's appeal to the Sri Lankan Government to enforce international humanitarian standards in the IDP camps, to grant visas to international aid groups, and to permit entry into Sri Lanka of international monitors and media access to those camps. The conflict has been brutal, as you know, and we are concerned with the prospects of post-conflict resolution for the Sinhalese and the Tamil people.

Madam Secretary, does the State Department have any post-conflict plans for the region? And, if so, what are they?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, this is such a terrible humanitarian tragedy, and we have been pressing the Sri Lankan Government for a halt in the fighting so that we could secure safe passage for as many of the trapped civilians as possible.

As you know, there was a very short lull, but then the fighting has continued. There seems to be very little openness on the part of the Tamil Tiger leadership to cease their efforts so that we could try to get in and help the people. So we are beginning intensive post-conflict planning. We have discussed this with a number of our other allies and partners who share our concerns. I think that the Sri Lankan Government knows that the entire world is very disappointed in its efforts to end what it sees as 25 years of conflict. It is causing such untold suffering.

We have made it clear that as soon as there is some lull in the fighting or an end to the fighting, that there has to be not only massive humanitarian aid but a political resolution. The people who have been waging this internal insurgency for all these years are going to have to be brought into the political process in some way. So we are determined to do what we can, along with others, to be ready.

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you. Just briefly to the issue of Cyprus. One avenue it seems to me possible to follow is, for instance, the USAID has worked with Cyprus to develop a power grid which is not integrated from the north into the south. Is that an area that

perhaps we could, as we give aid in that area, to force integration, if you will, first in the power grid, then hopefully in the bizonal agreement?

Secretary CLINTON. I think that is an excellent suggestion, and we will certainly share that with the Cypriot community on both sides.

You know, let me say that Cyprus is so strategically located. If this problem can be resolved in a way that is satisfactory to both communities and, as you say, bizonal, bicomunal agreement, I think that the future for Cyprus is unlimited, economically, and as a player in Europe and the Middle East. It is in everyone's interest. It is also very much on the minds of many of those who are involved in the negotiations.

So we will take a look at this power grid idea and get back to you.

Mr. McMAHON. Thank you very much. And just in the area of foreign aid, we know what an important issue it is. So many folks on this committee are fighting to keep it in the budget, the higher amount that you had requested. Just to let you know that we are working with you, and any way we can help you just please let us know. Thank you again.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Madam Secretary, I don't want to belabor this point. It has been discussed by a number of members. But I really believe our intelligence agency, the CIA and the FBI, if there are prosecutions because of the tactics that were employed to extract information from terrorists or suspected terrorists—if they are prosecuted for that, first of all, I think there is going to be a tremendous amount of animosity from across the country to the administration for that. But, in addition to that, if there is a terrorist attack and people remember that they were prosecuting people who were trying to protect this country with tactics that may or may not be questionable, then I think that there will be a terrible backlash on the administration.

I am not here to protect the Obama administration. But if there is a terrorist attack and we are prosecuting people that try to get information to protect this country, people are going to be madder than hell.

Now, I have two questions or three questions, and you can answer them in tandem if you would like.

Regarding Taiwan, I would like to know if the administration is still absolutely committed to the Taiwan Relations Act and protecting Taiwan in the event of an attack.

Second, the Colombian Free Trade Agreement, which has been discussed by my colleagues. I think that, regarding immigration, drug trafficking, terrorists, and gangs that come into the United States, I think a Colombian Free Trade Agreement and a Panamanian Free Trade Agreement will help stem the tide of that. Conversely, if the economies start to go south down there because we don't have a free trade agreement, along with the other things that are bringing people illegally into the United States, I think we can

see more people coming into the country. So I hope that we will press on with that.

The Six-Party Talks regarding North Korea, I would like to know what the prospects are of resuming those talks, and whether or not we can expect some results, because North Korea really hasn't been paying much attention to us.

And, finally, I think all of us are concerned about Mr. Chavez's attention and association with Russia, China, and Iran. They have had flights back and forth to Tehran from Venezuela, and I think I and many of my colleagues are very concerned that there may be a coalition that is formed that may threaten not only the security of Central and South America but the United States as well.

And so I will let you answer those. And, if I have time left, I am going to yield to my colleague. Thank you.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

Our policy with respect to Taiwan remains one China policy, Taiwan Relations Act, three communiqués. There is no change in our approach. We have been very consistent about that.

As I said, the Colombia and Panama Free Trade Agreements are ones that we are looking very hard at and working with the Panamanians and the Colombians.

Regarding the Six-Party Talks, we have made it clear that we are prepared to resume the Six-Party Talks. The Chinese and Russians, the Japanese and South Koreans have equally made that clear. As you know very well, the North Koreans have not demonstrated any willingness to resume the Six-Party process.

I was pleased by the strong statement that we got unanimously from the United Nations condemning the missile launch, saying that it was in contravention of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. And I think the strong support that we see among the parties against what North Korea is doing will eventually yield fruit, but I think we have to be strong, patient, persistent, and not give in to the kind of back and forth, the unpredictable behavior of the North Korean regime.

And, finally, you know, the Chavez relationship you describe is a result of 8 years of isolating Chavez, and I don't think we believe it has worked very well. We have isolated him, so he has gone elsewhere. I mean, he is a very sociable guy. He is going to look for friends where he can find them, and so he is finding friends in places we would prefer him not to find friends. So 8 years of isolation has resulted in the kinds of outreach that I think both you and I find troubling.

You know, our belief is, if it hasn't worked, why keep it going? Let's see what else might be possible. And during our encounters with President Chavez we agreed to consider exchanging ambassadors. I think that is a positive development, and we will see what else can possibly arise from looking for ways that we can perhaps work together.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here. I want to echo what everyone else has said about the breath of fresh air and the tone that is being set.

Let me talk a minute about NATO, if I could. I am worried that 2009 is a critical year both for NATO and for our efforts with respect to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I was on active duty during the Vietnam days, and a country can only sustain an overseas military expedition so long without a critical mass of popular support behind it at home, and we got derailed during the last administration with the Iraq matter, which very much cut into that critical mass support in Europe by constituents. And we in the NATO parliamentary assembly are trying to do everything we can to rebuild that as it relates to Afghanistan and Pakistan, because the two, even though they were interchanged in a word by the previous administration, are completely different in our view. And so if one believes that we have to show some progress in Afghanistan, Pakistan this year to maintain that critical mass of public support from our European allies, I think we have a window of opportunity to do that but we have to act and act quickly.

Since I left you in Strasbourg Kehl, I went to Lithuania, Ukraine, and Georgia, and then back to Brussels to talk to them about the fact that they didn't get in the MAP, but to keep working at their reforms. What I guess I am trying to do and the American delegation is trying to do in NATO PA is to convince them that even if they cannot do as much as hard power maybe as we would like, they can certainly do more soft power, and it is in their interests every bit as much as it is ours to stem the flow of heroin and sow poppies, and so forth.

That ties in to then our evolving relationship with Russia and our dependence in some ways, I believe, on our Western and now Eastern European allies to help us with whatever leverage they can provide to help us.

And, finally, on the strategic plan that NATO is working on, we are working on it as well in NATO PA, and will be submitting that to you. And I would hope that maybe at some point I could come down to your office or we could talk further about what is going on, because everybody that I have talked to from General Joulwan, who used to be SACEUR, to General Wes Clark to General Jones, who is National Security Adviser, and General Craddock now to a person knows that hard power alone won't get us where we want to go in this new world.

Thank you.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, congratulations on becoming the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the speech that you gave, which I told you in Strasbourg I thought was an excellent one. I mean, you just outlined some of the serious challenges facing NATO at this time in its 60th year. Those of us who have passed that landmark age know that you have to take stock of where you are and where you are going, and we need to do that with NATO. And certainly we need to do it vis-à-vis these very important commitments that have been made in Afghanistan by ISAF and by our NATO members. I think all of the points you made are ones that I would really welcome the chance to discuss with you.

I personally was quite encouraged by the commitments made both in NATO and then later in the EU. We have all of the forces

and support we need for the election, which is a critical milestone in Afghanistan. We need a fair, free, credible, legitimate election process. We are attaining additional troops. Somewhere north of 5,000 I think will be added to our overall total in Afghanistan. But, as you point out, the additional support for training the Afghanistan National Army, for training the Afghan National Police, for helping mentor government officials, for working on anti-corruption and good governance and rule of law, for trying to do more with agricultural production—Afghanistan used to be a net exporter of agricultural goods, it needs to be again—of working with people in the local provinces. So there is a lot of good work being done, and I would love to discuss it with you.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, it is good to see you again. I want to zero in on the firearms situation in Mexico. It has been reported by the administration that 90 percent of the guns that are recovered and firearms recovered in Mexico are from the United States. It seems that ATF has recalculated that and says that it is an error, that it is only 90 percent of the traceable guns, which turns out to be 17–20 percent of those guns.

There are reports that Mexico is an arms bazaar with grenades from South Korea, AK–47s from China, and shoulder-fired rocket launchers from Spain, Israel, and even the former Soviet Union, that the Russian Mafia is also involved in arms and drug trafficking in Mexico. And, in 2006, Amnesty International said that China was providing arms to Mexico and many other Latin America countries.

And two other statistics. The Mexican army has had desertions of over 150,000 of its own soldiers in the last 6 years, and many of them take their M–16s that are made in Belgium with them when they leave the Mexican military and go work for the drug cartels. And just recently, in March, Guatemala seized 500 grenades and AK–47s on its border that were going into Mexico.

So my question really is, Mexico seems to have borders that are porous for firearms, not just from the United States. And we are trying to help Mexico get a grip on the drug cartels, which are tremendously affecting their economy, our economy.

So my concern is that our aid that we give to Mexico in the Merida Initiative doesn't turn out to be used against us, whether in the corruption process or whether these weapons turn out to go to the drug cartels and be used against Americans.

I recently just this weekend was on the Texas-Mexico border with the Air National Guard, flew up and down the Rio Grande River as they caught two drug smugglers coming into the United States. And that seems to be the concern of law enforcement on this side, that much of this money or equipment is going to be used against us because of the corruption.

Can you help me out a little bit with that and tell me what precautions are being made by our administration to make sure that all this equipment that we are sending doesn't end up in the wrong hands and used against us?



Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I obviously think that we have to be as careful and accountable as we possibly can be. I think that the threat to Mexico by these drug cartels is one that we want to respond to and we are responding to it. And the Merida Initiative is the organized approach adopted by the prior administration which we want to continue and make even more effective. And I believe that the Mexican Government, from my visit there and the President's recent visit, is very focused on this. They know what they have to do, and they are seeking our help, which is something that will over the long run strengthen our relationship.

We have to defeat these drug cartels. I mean, we have to defeat them, we have to disarm them, we have to capture or kill them. We have to rid the people of Mexico of this scourge. And we have to support President Calderon, who is showing enormous courage. I mean, the bravery that man shows every day getting up and going to work is very impressive. So we will just have to work together to make sure that we put in appropriate safeguards. And I know the Mexican Government has every interest in ensuring that whatever equipment we provide ends up in the right hands.

With respect to where the drug cartels get their guns, I have no doubt that they are shopping in the international bazaar. But there is a considerable number of these weapons that do come out of our country, and I think we ought to be smarter about how we at least can prevent whatever the contribution percentage is from crossing the border and adding to the woes of the Mexican army and the Mexican police.

Mr. POE. Would it not be the responsibility for us to protect our border from drugs as it would be for Mexico to protect their border from guns? It just seems to me that neither border is being protected by either country, because guns are going one way and drugs are going the other way.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, you are right. We haven't done a very good job, have we? None of us have. And we have got to do a better job. The administration just appointed Alan Bersin, who was the U.S. Attorney along the San Diego border during the Clinton administration, had an excellent record of securing the border. We are going to take every step we can. Any ideas you have, I am sure the administration would welcome.

Mr. POE. I will be glad to pass those on.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Woolsey.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, you just don't know what a joy this is to be here and be proud of you and hear the depth and breadth of concern and knowledge you have on every single issue and question that has come up today. Thank you very much.

I spent part of the Easter break in Tanzania, and the focus of our trip was maternal mortality. And I can say without a doubt that if the women of childbearing age—it is hard enough to live in a third world country. I cannot imagine being a woman of childbearing age. But their lives and the dignity of their lives and their future and their children's future would be much improved with

family planning and options made available to them. So thank you for your statements regarding that.

You are such a committed woman for women's rights all over the world. So I would like to talk about CEDAW, the convention to eliminate all forms of discrimination, of which is the U.N. convention that has been ratified by 95 percent, 185, United Nations members, but not the United States of America, over the last 30 years, leaving us in the company of Iran and Sudan of all things. It is time to move beyond this embarrassing and shameful distinction, and every single Congress since the 102nd Congress I have introduced CEDAW ratifying language, although it has to actually take place in the Senate. But this year H. Res. 22 has over 120 members cosponsoring.

So, what can we do to work together to get it out of the Senate and signed and ratified by the President, by President Obama?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Congresswoman Woolsey. And the administration is forwarding CEDAW along with other priority treaties to the Senate with the hopes that this could be the year that we would finally ratify this convention that really does recognize and support the rights of women. And I hope that Members of Congress, led by you and others who care deeply about this issue, will make your views known to your Senate colleagues, because we need to move on this. I agree with you. I find it embarrassing we are in the company of the countries that you named.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, thank you.

Now I have a less friendly question. The President refers to diplomacy development over military power, or along with military power in addressing Afghanistan. Yet, in the supplementals there is a 10-1, 7-1 investment for the Department of Defense, as compared to foreign affairs, foreign assistance, and the State Department.

Earlier this year, myself and 10 of my colleagues sent a letter to the President requesting more information about his and the administration's Afghanistan policy. We haven't gotten our questions answered. We want to know about clear authorization for the use of military force. Has it been established? Is he going to come to the Congress? How do you find the goals, objectives, and benefits of the United States' involvement in Afghanistan? What are the human and financial resources necessary to carry out the administration's plan? What is the timeline for redeployment of our troops and military contractors? How about NATO and the U.N., what is their role, and other international partners? And how long will the immediate humanitarian economic needs of the Afghanistan people be addressed? That was our letter. I don't know if you have seen it.

Secretary CLINTON. I have not seen it, but I understand the concern behind your questions. And let me just say, Congresswoman, we conducted a very thorough review of the policy we inherited, and we can't go back and wish things had been done differently. We have to start with what we see right in front of us.

We think that there is an important national security interest on behalf of the United States to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, extremists, and those who would export violence against the United States, our friends and allies, and who

would turn Afghanistan backwards, again particularly when it affects the role of women.

But our primary goal in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. And as someone who represented New York on September 11th, I take that very seriously, and am absolutely committed to doing everything I can as Secretary of State to make sure we are not attacked again, and to go after those who attacked us and attack the friends and allies of America.

Chairman BERMAN [presiding]. The time of the gentlelady has expired. And, therefore, I am going to recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you very much. And it is so good to have you here being from Arkansas. I just want to relay how proud the State is of you being in this position.

In deference to my ranking member, and then the ranking member on my committee, I would like to yield 1 minute to Ms. Ros-Lehtinen very quickly.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Madam Secretary, in response to an earlier question, you said correctly that United States policy was not to provide funding to a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas unless and until Hamas meets the obligations, including recognizing Israel. I agree with that. However, that is not what the language in the supplemental says. And I just encourage you to take a second look at the supplemental when it talks about power sharing agreements, that talk about Palestinian Authority governments, including ministries, agencies, and instrumentalities. I think it is going to leave room there for Hamas to get the funding.

I thank the gentleman for the time. I don't wish to take up time, and I would like to yield back to you. Thank you. So if you could take a look at that again, Madam Secretary, for any possible changes in the supplemental language.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I yield to Congressman Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I thank Congressman Boozman for yielding.

Madam Secretary, I believe that words on behalf of the Chinese women need to be backed up by deeds. And as you know, the U.N. Population Fund has actively supported, co-managed, and whitewashed the most pervasive crimes against women in human history, yet the Obama administration has given a \$50-million check and has failed to enforce the Kemp-Kasten anti-coercion law.

Secretary CLINTON. I am sorry. Could you let Mr. Smith start again? I couldn't hear what you said. I want to hear what you are saying. Is that all right, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SMITH. That would be fine.

Words on behalf of the Chinese women who are beleaguered by their own government and by nongovernmental organizations and others who are enforcing the one child per couple policy need to be backed up by deeds. The point that I am making is that in China today with the UNFPA enabling every day of the week, including UNFPA-backed countries, women are forcibly aborted. Brothers and sisters are illegal. They are missing at least 100 million girls, gendercide, because of the preference for males. And if you are only allowed one, that one is more likely to be a boy than a girl, so girls are singled out, the girl child, for forced abortion. There are about

500 suicides a day—not a week, a month—a day in China. And some experts attribute that in whole or in part to the forced abortion policy.

In 2008, the U.S. Department of State found that the UNFPA had violated the anti-coercion provisions of Kemp-Kasten and reprogrammed every dollar to maternal health and to family planning, but not to the UNFPA.

My point is and my concern is that rather than demanding reform—and I do believe the Obama administration, had you continued the Kemp-Kasten denial of funds to UNFPA, especially given the position that this administration takes on abortion, that would have had a profound impact on the Chinese Government as well as on the UNFPA itself—and yet we have written them a \$50-million check, maybe deducted a few dollars, maybe, maybe not. But we have written them a very large check. And that sends a clear non-ambiguous message to the Chinese Government that coercion really doesn't matter.

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, could I respond to these very two very important questions? I think that the point that the ranking member made really deserves a response, because the administration is very firm that we should not and will not deal with Hamas. We will not deal with a power sharing Palestinian Authority Government that includes Hamas that does not meet the criteria of recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and agreeing to all prior agreements entered into by the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. And what we have said is that assistance will not flow to Hamas and any entity controlled by Hamas, and will only be permitted any power sharing government in which Hamas participates if the President certifies that the power sharing government has met the three principles I just outlined.

So if the language is not as clear as we intend it to be, because as I have just described it is our intention, you know, we will look at that.

Furthermore, all NGOs, any organization applying for any grants to do any humanitarian work in Gaza have to certify before any award is made that they do not provide material support to Hamas or other terrorists. I obviously feel very strongly about this. That is our intention, that is our policy.

With respect to what Congressman Smith is saying, Congressman Smith, the questions previously jogged my memory. When I was in China, I met with a group of women. Once again, I spoke out about the forced one child policy. I share your horror and absolute rejection of such a policy. I also think it is bad for China. The imbalance between girls and boys is a ticking demographic bomb that is going to explode within their society. This is a bad policy from any angle you look at it. And I don't believe that there are any grounds for our being connected to any policy that supports it, but I will look into the point that you made.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think there is no doubt, Madam Secretary, that your commitment to human rights is above reproach. And we thank you for the sin-

cerity of your presence here today. Very proud of you. But more importantly, we are proud of the bold leadership that you have already shown in conjunction with the new message of the Obama administration.

Several things I am going to put on the record, and then focus in narrowly on some issues.

First of all, thank you for what you are doing for the Iranian American reporter. Count us as your partners. We demand her release immediately. We certainly welcome that there should be a fair trial. But my position is that she is innocent and she should be released immediately. Thank you for those bold words.

Again, the work that has been done by appointing the envoy for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and for the Middle East are part of the bold leadership.

I want to focus in on our recent visit. But as you well know, the number of visits that I have made to Pakistan co-chairing the Pakistan Caucus, this is not the Pakistan of Benazir Bhutto, who respected you and you respected her. In my meetings or conversation with her, her dream when I last spoke before her assassination was for this new revived Pakistan.

My question is that we need to continue and to accelerate the pressure on the civilian government. You are right, the voices of Pakistani Americans, brilliant people committed to our country, need to be raised with the civilian population. I know there is fear, but sometimes you have to go against fear.

I would ask, for example, we just gave \$1 billion at the donor conference for conditions that include this: One, they must find a unified government, whether it is Sharif working with Zardari, Prime Minister, there must be a strong unified government that can confront the issues and swat the use of the Sharia law that is killing women, bloodying individuals. And I would appreciate your comment on that.

Second, let me quickly go to a unified Africa policy that would include the comments of my chairman, Mr. Payne, but also Liberia. And when I say that, that is two opposites, so that we can enrich Africa in its totality.

And lastly, this issue of a global national strategy for development, I think that will cover South and Central America, it will cover the crisis in Mexico with drugs, it will cover Africa and the Mideast. It will cover the South Asia. I would hope that that would be something that we would be looking at very quickly so that included in that we can recapacitate, reprofessionalize USAID, which by the way we saw in India. It was fabulous to see them dealing with maternal health.

And I would appreciate your comments on those questions. Thank you again for your leadership.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Congresswoman. And thanks for your leadership on behalf of the Pakistani Caucus, because I agree completely with you. We need to hear those voices, and I think that could be a very helpful addition to our efforts.

I also appreciate your raising Liberia. I had a long meeting yesterday with President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. What she has done in such a short period of time in Liberia deserves our full support. I am so committed to doing everything I can to help her on security,

on infrastructure. And I think it has to be a public-private partnership. We need more American corporations and NGOs to invest in Liberia and assist President Sirleaf in her efforts to rebuild that war ravaged country.

I also appreciate your talking about USAID, often the unsung heroes and heroines of our policies. When Congresswoman Woolsey was talking about maternal mortality, those are the kinds of interventions that literally save lives and put us at our very best, give us a chance to talk with people not in a political way but sort of person to person, which builds connections. And I look forward to discussing with all of you and particularly under the leadership of the chairman how we can do foreign aid better, how we can streamline it, how we can get better results, how we can be more effective. So your ideas about that are going to be very welcomed.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I very quickly just ask the issue of Sharia law in Pakistan and Afghanistan and how we can put pressure on their thoughts about that.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, we are hopeful that the law that was passed by the Parliament in Afghanistan will be taken back. We have some reason to believe that that will happen, and we have urged it to occur expeditiously.

I think that the Pakistani Government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to extremists. But look at why this is happening. If you talk to people in Pakistan, especially in the ungoverned territories, which are increasing in number, they don't believe the state has a judiciary system that works. It is corrupt. It doesn't extend its power into the countryside. So the Government of Pakistan, however it is constituted, which is of course their business, not ours, must begin to deliver government services. Otherwise they are going to lose out to those who show up and claim that they can solve people's problems, and then they will impose this harsh form of oppression on women and others which we find unacceptable.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. And thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here today. Let me say at the onset, I commend the focus that you have on the Pakistan-Afghanistan area. After all, Pakistan is the country that brought us Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber, his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In my view, the tribal area in Pakistan was not given proper attention over the past several years, and I think that we are beginning to see as we travel back from Pakistan that that is a terrorist training haven. It is the epicenter in the war on terror, and it has to be the focus on our foreign policy in terms of how we deal with that area. If bin Laden is alive, surely that is where he is. It is the biggest threat to our soldiers in Afghanistan, and it is perhaps the biggest threat to our homeland security. And I would encourage you to keep up the focus in that area. I would hope that we are doing a lot of things behind the scenes in terms of dealing with that particular area, the FATA.

My question regarding that as it relates to Congress is a funding issue. There has been about \$7.5 billion in nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan. You know, we have the coalition funds that reimburse

Pakistan. And then we have the A.Q. Khan issue, A.Q. Khan, who is a master proliferator to countries like Iran and to Syria and to North Korea, the first atomic bomb in Pakistan, which is another issue.

Shouldn't we be trying to condition this support and this aid and somehow tie this aid to a security agreement with Pakistan that they will no longer allow this area to fester, and will provide the security necessary to take out al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the FATA? And shouldn't we also condition that on the ability of the United States to be able to sit down with Mr. Khan, Mr. A.Q. Khan, and get information from him about what could have been one of the largest proliferations of nuclear armament in history.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, thank you for the bipartisan approach that you exhibited in your questions, your question concerning Pakistan, because it is a concern for America and we have got to figure out the best way to deal with it. And we have to try, insofar as it is possible, to overcome any partisan differences, and we welcome your advice and suggestions.

We do think that there needs to be the right kind of conditions. You know, it is a little bit like the Goldilocks story: If they are too weak, we don't get changes. If they are too strong, we get a backlash. So we have to figure out sort of what is the area that will influence behavior and produce results. We are creating measures of performance that we will share with the Congress so that you and we can follow whether or not we are getting the kind of positive outcomes that we are attempting to achieve.

With respect to A.Q. Khan, there is no doubt he is probably the world's greatest proliferator, and the damage that he has done around the world has been incalculable. We have made it very clear that the network had to be dismantled, and it was. There are people who were connected with A.Q. Khan who are out of business or who were imprisoned. And there are ongoing efforts to continue to obtain useful information.

As we develop with the Congress the kind of conditional statements that we want, we have to just be careful that what we put into legislation doesn't stop cooperation instead of further cooperation. And so let us work with you and others to try to figure out exactly sort of what is the sweet spot here? How to we get results? We are not interested in putting money into doing what hasn't worked, and we have seen the situation deteriorate over the last 8 years in Pakistan. And even before, it has been a very difficult country for us to get our arms around and figure out what our ongoing relationship would be like.

But we are convinced that the democratically elected government in Pakistan shares our goals with respect to the terrorist threat. We just have to figure out how we can best support them in actually getting results.

Mr. McCAUL. If I could just close with, I am the ranking on the Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee. Jane Harman is the chairwoman. We are both very interested in this issue and working with the administration.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. And I appreciate your comments on this issue, Madam Secretary.

And the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, as I said to you last week, I truly applaud your bold steps in reshaping America's image and role in the world; and I look forward to working with you and the President in tackling these enormous challenges which oftentimes are seen as opportunities. I will submit to you the many questions I have for the record.

Let me go to Cuba first. Yes, I firmly believe that we should promote freedom, human rights, democracy, encourage elections throughout the world. But remember, though, that recent history under the Bush administration shows us that we did this with the Palestinians and we ended up with Hamas. So sometimes it backfires.

With regard to Mr. Mack's point about remember the history; well, yes, we do have to remember the history. And we also cannot forget the Bay of Pigs, assassination attempts, Guantanamo, the dictatorship of Batista. There are many, many issues that also have to be included in this history.

You mentioned the Cuban plane flying over—the American plane flying over Havana. Well, I am not so sure if a Cuban plane entered United States airspace what our response would be.

I raise these questions because these are two sovereign countries which have serious, serious issues to address on both sides; and I recognize that it is going to be very difficult as we move forward.

Last week, week before last, as you know, I led a delegation of Members of Congress to Cuba with one specific purpose and that was to assess whether or not Cuba wanted to move forward with the dialogue and whether or not all issues, such as political prisoners, human rights, the plight of Afro Cubans, would be placed on the table if in fact discussions would move forward. Of course, President Raul Castro communicated to us, "yes."

And I applaud yourself and the President for moving forward with the family reunification efforts. This is the right thing to do in the steps that you are taking to help reunite Cuban Americans and Cubans.

I wanted to ask you if there are any other plans, any other policies you are considering looking at; and do you agree with lifting the travel ban for all Americans to travel to Cuba?

Also, I remember back in 1998 there was a report by the Pentagon that said that Cuba did not present a national security threat to the United States. And so I am wondering, from your administration's point of view, why is Cuba still on the list of state sponsors of terror? And what can or should Cuba do anything to be removed from the list of state sponsors of terror?

And, finally, I have to thank you for your response to my questions regarding the investigation of my constituent, Tristan Anderson, who was seriously injured when he was shot in the head by tear canisters by an Israeli soldier in the West Bank of Ni'lan. I hope that the State Department will insist that the Israeli Government hold those responsible accountable and that the family and Tristan receive an apology. I will send you additional questions to that issue.



Thank you very much. Good to see you again, Madam Secretary. Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Congresswoman.

You know, we have taken the actions that you know so well in addition to the remittances and the travel for family members. We also have opened up telecommunications investments in Cuba. We are taking a hard look at this in the response that we received from Raul Castro. And we are available to engage with the Cuban Government if they are willing to do so, but we don't yet know whether they really are or not.

And I have to say I think that if two small, little, unarmed planes had gone into our airspace, they would have been forced down. I don't think they would have been shot down.

I think that there is such a stake that the Castro regime has in making the United States the excuse for everything that goes wrong inside Cuba that they are going to have to really have a change in attitude about how and under what circumstances they would want to really have that discussion that you described, that you were assured that Raul Castro said everything would be on the table. But we are considering what they might come back with, but so far we don't really see any movement. But, as the President said, we are open.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and, again, welcome, Madam Secretary.

Madam Secretary, I would like to focus on Africa, if I may. I just returned yesterday from Africa. I have two lines of questioning.

The first line of questioning sort of impacts the first part of my visit into Burkina Faso and into the Congo. The point of my question will be not only the funds that we are sending in there, but I have serious questions that they are being utilized properly and that they are reaching and helping the people where they need the help the most. I say that particularly because of the line of corruption and many times the monies that we are sending don't get down.

If we take Faso, for example, and go in there, it is the poorest country on earth. It has a 77 percent unemployment. We are sending over there, just in the Millennium Challenge alone, about \$500 million. There are questions about where that money is going. And when you look at the countryside, where is it going?

We visited the other areas. We left there and went into the Congo into a place called Goma. And if that is not Ground Zero of the deprivation center of the world, I don't know what is. We took a helicopter in there. We visited the refugee areas. One of those areas had about 42,000 people in it, over 20,000 of them children. It is just deplorable, those conditions. And it is the only health care that they get.

So my question is, what are we doing specifically to make sure that the money that we are spending for these humanitarian efforts are getting to that source?

The second line of questioning comes into the security area around the Horn of Africa where we went into Kenya. And, of course, Kenya and Yemen also balance that area. There my ques-

tion is, how are we going to really effectively thread the needle in being able to bring some stability to that region, especially when we have the Al-Shabab faction working so expeditiously to undermine the existing fragile government?

If we go in, we have a problem. If we stay out, we have a problem. If we use the allies to make it a regional problem, we have a problem, because Kenya being our most important ally over there has such internal intrigue going on where they have a two-headed monster government where they are fighting each other. And Al-Shabab, quite honestly, is getting strong support from al-Qaeda and certainly has those training camps right near the Kenyan border.

Madam Secretary, Africa is an extraordinary explosion that is soaring in magnitude and consequences if we in the United States don't apply our resources appropriately in terms of the humanitarian effort as witnessed in Goma and Faso and our efforts to stabilize that area given the terrorist threat in Kenya and in Somalia.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman Scott, I am very happy that not only you visited there but you have so graphically and dramatically described what you saw.

I would underscore the feeling I am getting from you. Africa is a matter of great national security concern to the United States. This is a continent of such diversity, such promise, and such peril; and you have highlighted two of our biggest challenges.

I am committed to doing a better job on the aid we deliver, because I share your concerns. I don't know where a lot of it ends up. And our transparency and our accountability measures are not adequate. We waste way too much money on contractors. Fifty cents on every dollar doesn't even end up—it is not even in the pipeline to end up serving the people it should serve. And once it is on the ground, it is really hard to make the case that our aid over decades has made the difference it should have made in the lives of the people of so many African countries.

I think we have to start over, Mr. Chairman. I think we have got to ask ourselves, what are we doing and how do we do it better? How do we define our mission? And how do we have mechanisms that we can say to the American people are working and look to see the results in so many places elsewhere?

With respect to the Horn of Africa, if you look at the map, Yemen is just off the coast of Somalia. The nexus between Al-Shabab and al-Qaeda is growing, and we have to have a strategy for the Horn of Africa that includes trying to stabilize Somalia and help this new Federal transition government.

So I know my time is up. But this is one of the most important areas for our concern, and we have got to be smart about how we are going to approach it.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I would like to ask you to share your views on the possibility of lifting or at least reviewing the policy prohibiting U.S. Government employees from all travel to the Gaza strip. I would like you to do that, because—to review that policy. Because

as we talk about addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza along with the concerns that no money flow to Hamas, I think it would reassure Members of Congress and—if members of the administration could go there.

So could you share your views on that? I think there are changed circumstances, a new administration. I know the convoy that was attacked in 2003, that is a legitimate reason to pull back, but perhaps maybe it is time to review it.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman, I have to look into that. Because I know not only have Members of Congress including yourself gone to Gaza, but USAID workers have gone into Gaza. They have as part of our surveys of what we are trying to determine is the best approach for our aid. There have not been high-level administration visits. But we are member of the Quartet; and Tony Blair, who is the Quartet representative, has gone into Gaza several times.

So I will look into this, and I will determine whether my understanding is accurate, and we will get back to you.

Mr. ELLISON. I just mention that, Madam Secretary, because after we left Gaza, as you point out, I did go there. We did go there. We met with members of USAID, and we asked them what they thought about what was happening there. And they said, well, we are not allowed to go. So that is—so thank you for looking into that.

My next question is, I believe that the—I would like to ask you to consider working with your counterparts in Israel about the opening up of the crossings. I know that humanitarian aid does flow, and I understand Israel has legitimate security concerns regarding the crossings. But I think that, as the crossings are so tightly controlled, what ends up happening is that most of the goods and services that end up in Gaza flow through the tunnels. And I think that if the crossings opened, we could enlist average citizens in helping close the tunnels. But because the crossings are closed, people have to depend upon the tunnels, which, of course, contraband goes through. So do you have any views on how you might approach that subject? What do you think about that?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, the crossings are no longer completely closed. There are many items that are being transported through the crossings.

There are, as you know, some items that the Israeli Government does not permit to cross. We have urged the Israeli Government on several occasions to open the crossings as much as they are able commensurate with their legitimate security needs which you recognized.

The best way for us to help the people of Gaza is for Hamas to cease its rocket firing on Israel, to abide by the Quartet principles and the same principles that were adopted by the Arab Peace Initiative which I have reiterated several times here today.

Mr. ELLISON. Reclaiming my time. Yes, you have, Madam Secretary; and I appreciate you reiterating that. But, you know, 750,000 of the people living in Gaza are under 18 years old. The Gaza and Hamas are not the same thing. There are a lot of people who have nothing to do with Hamas and Gaza and wish Hamas

would go away. But they are living under this same—under these closed crossings.

And just to point out to you, Madam Secretary, there is a very tight definition of what constitutes humanitarian aid. I have been there; and I have seen it is essentially sugar, flour, cooking oil. Even things like macaroni, lentils, and tomato paste and fruit juice were barred.

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman, I know that those lists have changed, because I have monitored this. I think when you went, which was somewhere early in January, if I am not mistaken—

Mr. ELLISON. February.

Secretary CLINTON. We have looked at the lists, and a lot of what has been said was not permitted to cross is just not accurate. But I am not speaking for the decisions that are made by the Israeli Government in pursuit of their own security. I think what we want is to get back to a process, an effort, and negotiations that would lead to a two-state solution.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired; and the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized.

Before we start the clock up, Mr. Pence, let me just indicate the Secretary has been here for 3 hours and 20 minutes, not counting the time she had to talk to us in the other room. And she has, I think very generously—I haven't quite seen this yet from a Secretary of State—agreed to stay until 1:30, but at 1:30 this hearing ends.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for coming before this committee.

Secretary CLINTON. I am sorry, Mr. Pence. I am looking at some old friends from Arkansas over your head. I don't mean to be interrupting. Don't count this time against Mr. Pence.

Chairman BERMAN. The Arkansas time. We will give you credit on the other side.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Secretary, I had assumed that that warm wave was not directed to me.

Secretary CLINTON. Don't assume that, Mr. Pence, please.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you for your service to the country in this post and over many years.

I want to raise an issue with you that has come up in this hearing before, and I want to raise it with great respect to you and to the President of the United States of America that you serve.

In testimony before this committee earlier, I know that the issue of the President being photographed with the virulent anti-American Socialist dictator of Venezuela came up. And I know that, according to testimony that was handed to me, that you indicated that you found it "rather amusing." But let me say with the deepest respect, Madam Secretary, I am not amused; and I want to speak to that issue. And what I—and get your sense as an American who is both known and respected around the world about the wisdom of the leader of the free world being seen in that kind of a setting with that kind of a Socialist dictator.

Hugo Chavez, is, we all know, a Castro wannabe in the region. He has oppressed the media. He has bullied economic interests in

the country. He has blacklisted political opponents from state agencies. There are reports, of which you are well aware, of his lack of cooperation on our efforts to confront narcoterrorism in the region. There are reports of worse by that government. And, of course, he has openly supported Iran's nuclear ambitions and has referred to the predecessor of the 44th President as some sort of a demon, which would not be inconsistent with his long history of spewing vile intentions toward the people of the United States of America.

You made a comment that I quote with great respect in July 2007 in another context, I want to admit, in which you said, and I quote, with regard to potential meetings with North Korea, Venezuela, or leaders of Cuba. You said: "I will not promise to meet with these leaders during my first year because. . ." you said and I quote, with much agreement, "I don't want to be used for propaganda purposes."

And so my question, Madam Secretary, is, in light of your previously stated insight, isn't it true that having the President of the United States be seen on the world stage warmly greeting a virulent anti-American Socialist dictator, that intentionally or unintentionally our President was used for propaganda purposes, to borrow the phrase that you used?

And isn't it also true that, as Natan Sharansky observed memorably in his book, "Case for Democracy," there is almost nothing more demoralizing to people that are fighting for freedom in their own country than to see the leader of the free world in friendly association with the very people that are oppressing them? Sharansky said we could "never fully prepare ourselves for the disappointment that came from seeing the free world abandon its own values in that context."

And so in a very real sense I wanted to invite in a respectful way your thoughts about that, recognizing that you serve this President, but also expressing to you my profound concern that this administration allowed itself, intentionally or unintentionally, to be used to prop up and promote the image and the interest of a virulent, anti-American Socialist dictator in Venezuela.

Chairman BERMAN. I am going to give the Secretary a little bit of time to—because you characterized an earlier comment that she made—to respond.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Mr. Pence, I have lived a long time now. I grew up at the height of the Cold War when we were on the hair-trigger alert of nuclear war. I remember virulent anti-American Communist dictators threatening our country on a regular basis; and I remember our Presidents meeting with them, shaking their hands, and negotiating. They did not do so without conditions or without strong principles, but they did so.

I have also seen us establish normal relations with Vietnam. I have seen the 30 years of normalized relations with China. And I don't think there is any contradiction between standing strongly for our principles and our values and pursuing the give and take of diplomatic encounter and negotiation where appropriate.

I think that your strong feelings about Hugo Chavez are certainly understood, because he has clearly been someone who has behaved in ways that don't accord with our values and our prin-

ciples. But so were the Soviet leaders and so did so many others with whom we eventually created an environment in which we could see some changes that benefited the United States of America.

That is my bottom line, Mr. Pence. My bottom line is I am here to serve my country, which I have loved ever since I was a little girl; and I am going to support my President because he is committed to doing whatever he can in the time he is given to serve to make this a better, safer, more secure world.

There are different approaches. I respectfully say we spent 8 years trying to isolate Chavez, and what has been the result? I don't think it has been in America's interest. So we are going to try some different things.

And I respect your disagreement. We want as bipartisan a foreign policy as possible; and we have, wherever we can, reached out and will continue to do so to members of this committee and others. We want your constructive criticism. We want your feedback.

But President Obama won the election. He beat me in a primary in which he put forth a different approach. And he is now our President; and we all want our President, no matter of which party, to succeed, especially in such a perilous time.

So I appreciate your strong feelings, but I think that we are pursuing a course that may very well open up some additional opportunities that we hope will be in our interests and advance our values and protect our security.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, for 5 minutes.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this important hearing; and, Madam Secretary, congratulations for a fresh start and for the good work you have done so far.

My questions to you are regarding the Department of State's use of soft power and your thoughts and your ideas in that direction.

But, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like, since many of my colleagues have indicated to the Secretary that they intend to send you a letter, I actually sent you a letter in February; and I would like to submit it for the record.

Chairman BERMAN. It will be included in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

**JIM COSTA**  
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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER AND POWER

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**  
February 12, 2009

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSERVATION, CROPPING, ENERGY AND RESEARCH  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LIVESTOCK, DAIRY AND POULTRY  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton  
United States Department of State  
2201 "C" Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Clinton:

Congratulations on your recent appointment as our nation's 67<sup>th</sup> Secretary of State. You are following in the footsteps of great Americans who have represented our nation abroad and forged important alliances with other nations that have lasted for generations. I serve on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and would like to relay some of my concerns as you and President Obama develop our nation's new foreign policy.

During my time in Congress, I have had the opportunity to travel the world to peaceful, developed democracies and to third-world, impoverished nations. America made great strides using soft power to combat AIDS and malaria in Africa during the last six years, but I do not believe the last Administration went far enough to use our tremendous soft power in other parts of the world. For example, we must balance the use of hard and soft power in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as throughout the region. This means the State Department and USAID must reassert itself, when necessary, for building water and sewer systems, schools, and roads. It is also vital we work with our NATO allies to develop a new strategy to combat the opium poppy production in Afghanistan. Our military is badly stretched and using them as part of our soft power and counter narcotic strategy is unwise. I know that a better use of soft power around the globe fits perfectly in the "smart power" strategy you mentioned during your confirmation hearing.

As you probably know, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is starting to work on rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. I expressed to Chairman Berman that my interests lie in combating the scourge of world hunger and lack of clean water in impoverished nations, and tying this together with my work on the House Agriculture Committee. I was very happy to hear you discuss world hunger in your confirmation testimony. As a Senator, you represented a state with diverse farming and I currently represent three of the top fifteen agriculture producing counties in the nation. Farmers in California, New York and across the nation are ready and able to feed hungry nations, but we need a strategy that not only promotes US agriculture around the world, but eases food transport from our ports to foreign nations. There is absolutely no reason food should sit on a dock or on a cargo ship and rot when food is desperately needed in parts of the world. Secondly, California confronted numerous water issues during its history; therefore my state is home to many water experts. I believe their vast knowledge of overall water management could greatly benefit nations suffering from drought.

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By any reasonable standard, it is established history that between 1915 and 1923 the Ottoman Empire systematically killed an estimated 1.5 million Armenians and drove hundreds of thousands of others into exile from their ancestral homeland. The record of this atrocity is well documented in the United States Archives and has been universally accepted in the International Association of Genocide Scholars and the broader historical and academic communities. Many of the constituents I represent in Congress are decedents of Armenian Genocide survivors. Growing up in Fresno, California, I heard stories shared by genocide survivors about being forced to leave their homes, being marched long distances, and the random murders of Armenians. Clearly, they believed there was a systematic approach to eliminate the Armenian communities where their homes and farms had been for centuries. My friends and constituents believe this systematic approach was among the first genocides of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and so do I. While Senator, you represented a vast Armenian constituency and were a strong supporter of genocide recognition. President Obama also made statements while campaigning which supported recognition if he won the Presidency. It is vital you continue your support of recognizing the Armenian Genocide in your new position, and the President follow through on his campaign statements to recognize the genocide. Our nation must end the denial of the Armenian Genocide, and recognize it as such.

Since the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, immigrants from around the globe moved to California's San Joaquin Valley. Some of these immigrants left their homeland to escape persecution, but others, like my grandparents, came to seek the American Dream. Today, the Valley is home to the descendents of these immigrants, and the Valley still continues to attract people from around the world to start a new life. What sets aside the many ethnic communities in the Valley from other groups in our nation is their continued strong ties to their homeland. For example, I represent a group of Afghan-Americans who have worked to build a much needed hospital just outside of Kabul. Their efforts draw upon the quintessential American ideal of helping people in need, whether that is in Fresno or halfway around the world. I strongly believe that our Valley is a wonderful reflection of the hundreds of ethnic groups across America.

Please feel free to contact me on these issues, or if I can be of any help to you. Thank you for your time and I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,  
  
JIM COSTA  
Member of Congress



Mr. COSTA. And your office did call us yesterday and indicated that you do intend to respond, and I appreciate that and will look forward to the answers.

Many of us have taken numerous visits to the Middle East and the hot spots that we are dealing with; and we see the wonderful men and women and Americans in uniform doing work that involves building schools, building bridges and roads, teaching democratic values for local government and state government, all important, important work that needs to be done in these places of the world where we are trying to develop partnerships and establish stability in those areas. But, frankly, in my view, more appropriate the role of the Department of State than necessarily the Department of Defense.

So my questions to you are the following:

How long will it take for the State Department to ramp up and build a robust effort toward soft power? How much in the way of resources will you need and what kind of resources will you need and how can we help you in that effort?

And, finally, and I guess this is always important even in our own form of democracy, and that is the expectation gained. Realistically, what should be our expectations in terms of the State Department's implementation of a robust ability to develop soft power in the parts of the world where it could complement all of the other efforts that we are pursuing?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Congressman Costa, that question is music to my ears, because, obviously, I think that the use of every tool in our foreign policy toolbox is essential if we are going to be successful.

I think we have a lot of work to do. I said in my confirmation hearings that USAID has been decimated. It has lost personnel. It has lost authority. It is like a contracting agency. And it is heartbreaking. Because, like you, I have seen the results of USAID projects and the dedication of the men and women who serve there, but we haven't served them well in their efforts to promote American values.

Mr. COSTA. Not at all. And everywhere we go we see the successes of those USAID projects even under the limited support that we provide.

Secretary CLINTON. That is right. But because we are too bureaucratic, we are too overwhelmed by paperwork and contracting and all the rest of it, it is a lot easier for the military to get out in the field and do something.

You know, I said in my confirmation hearing that those of us who have traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan and met with our young soldiers know that a young captain in the beginning of the Iraq war was literally given a fund, a commander's fund of money, an emergency response fund, sometimes as much as \$25,000, \$50,000. If they needed a road prepared, they would get the road prepared. If they needed to open a factory, they would open it. Whereas it would take weeks, if not months, to take money that was appropriated by this Congress actually into the State Department and into USAID and then into the contracting process.

So people just said, Wait a minute, we need to move fast; and that is one of the reasons why during the last 8 years the authorities began to migrate over to the Defense Department.

Mr. COSTA. So how much time are you going to need, what kind of resources, to ramp up to have a realistic implementation?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think that we are trying to get positioned to be able to make progress immediately. A lot of it depends upon the budget we have. Because so much of what we are asked to do in our budget is determined by not only the administration but by Congress making decisions.

So it is going to take a couple of years. I can't promise that we are going to get it done next year, but we are going to try to start on the right path and then work very closely with the Congress to get the authorities and the appropriations we need to deliver, and I want to have strong outcome measures so that we can figure out whether what we are doing is working.

Mr. COSTA. I also mentioned this to you at the end of the State of the Union last month, but we have private sectors. We have people—Americans—who are actually providing their own resources in parts of the Middle East. We ought to support those efforts and add value to those efforts.

Secretary CLINTON. I want many more public-private partnerships, Congressman Costa. I think you are absolutely right.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KLEIN. Congratulations, and I am just very, very impressed with the leadership that you have taken in the short time you have been in office. So thank you for your service.

The Summit of the Americas I think was a great opportunity. And being from Florida, we have looked for many years at the original summit that your husband actually presided over in Miami and since then, but even for the last number of years there has been sort of a vacuum of interest. It is trade but so many other things that make up for a strong relationship.

But one of the specific areas that I have some concern about has to do with hurricanes, believe it or not. And as hurricane season approaches, and these hurricanes start off the coast of Africa and move across and come into the Caribbean area, and we have hurricane hunter planes which are Air Force and NOAA planes that help us understand the intensity and the direction so that we can narrow that cone of where the hurricane will make landfall. It has everything to do with the number of lives saved, the amount of dollars lost, and all those kinds of very important things.

There is a gap in the area where hurricane hunters can fly; and it was pointed out recently by the World Meteorological Organization, an agency of the United Nations, that there are countries in our region, Venezuela being one of them, that are prohibiting us from flying into those areas through our NOAA planes. Other countries who share this information through the World Meteorological Organization, including Cuba, help us all provide for that safety; and I just wanted to ask you if you can take a look at that and, of course, take that up with your colleagues on a world level, of

course. This is about safety and security for all of our countries in terms of getting the best data possible.

Secretary CLINTON. Absolutely. I am glad you brought this to my attention. It is not an issue that I was aware of, Congressman Klein; and we will immediately take a look at that and see if we can't remove any barriers to the hurricane hunters.

Mr. KLEIN. It is certainly in the best interest of all the countries, including the ones that are prohibiting the airspace. There were actually seven storms that formed and intensified over this area.

Second, and if I can on a different subject. The conference—the Durban II, if you will, conference that took place, I would like to extend appreciation that we did not participate, unfortunately. Because the underlying purpose, of course, is a very legitimate purpose, but it was hijacked once before; and, unfortunately, as we saw by Mr. Ahmadinejad's comments, it was virulent, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic in many ways.

But as we move forward with status with the U.N. Human Rights Council, we, of course, believe very strongly as Americans in the importance of human rights. Can you share with us your thoughts on how we can reform this Council, make sure that this in itself does not move in a direction of just focusing on anti-Israel behavior or anything else but really focuses on the importance of human rights worldwide?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, that is exactly why we have concluded that we will stand for election and resume a role at the Human Rights Council if we are successful. Because we have been very disappointed at the behavior and the priorities of the Human Rights Council.

There are so many important human rights issues that literally go to life-and-death survival matters all over the world of horrific abuses, some of which we have discussed today, that never get raised. Nobody ever talks about them in the Human Rights Council, and I think that is a grave disservice to so many people who are hoping that they will be recognized for what they are suffering.

And yet we have got to be very aware that any of these organizations, if you have a political ideological agenda, can be hijacked. That is why, after serious effort trying to see whether there was any way to salvage the Durban process, we concluded no; and you could see why we were right. It is so unfair that something as serious as racism, discrimination, and xenophobia would be so totally overtaken by an agenda that didn't talk about the racism that exists all over the world that we should be focusing on.

So I think, Congressman, we are going to enter this again with a very clear-eyed view that we know it is not an easy structure to interact with. We don't know whether we're going to be able to influence it. But I have had some conversations with some other countries, and we are going to try our best to form a critical mass that will make the Human Rights Council focus on the vast array of human rights problems that exist around the world.

Mr. KLEIN. And I thank you for that. We all believe very strongly as Americans of the importance of human rights as part of our international and international agenda. I am one of these people, as you do, who believes in engagement. We can always say no. We can always have other consequences. But we need to try first.

Thank you very much.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I want to add my congratulations to your new position and just congratulate you on your service. I had an opportunity to be at your swearing in at the Harry S. Truman Building, appropriately named for the man from Missouri who was a strong internationalist, believed in engagement, and had a great appreciation for history; and I know that you will follow that great tradition.

We have seen just in the first few months of the new administration, dramatic and positive changes in the U.S. image around the world, and there is a new reservoir of good will out there that we can use in that diplomatic toolkit that you have spoken about so often and so well.

I had a chance to see that firsthand with our congressional delegation at the IPU conference in Ethiopia. Congresswoman Watson mentioned that. But our delegation was not just received openly. They were actually received with genuine and broad enthusiasm. So it was a very big shift from what we have seen in past years; and there is a great enthusiasm for us to be reengaged in international organizations and initiatives from the economic crisis, climate change, poverty, and disease. The list goes on.

Mr. Costa covered a lot of my questions about the use of smart power. But I just want to make an editorial comment. I would hope that we can eliminate the term "soft power," because I think there is nothing soft about smart power. I want to be sure that we are giving the budget priorities to that new approach in diplomacy in our country.

The other issue I wanted to cover was in Bosnia. I represent one of the largest populations of Bosnian Americans in the country in the St. Louis area. With Chris Smith, my colleague, we have formed a Bosnian Caucus in the Congress. It is a society there that has a history of multicultural existence and multiethnic existence. They are in need of constitution reforms. There hasn't been much movement since the days of the Clinton administration, and I would hope that we can put some renewed emphasis there to get Eastern Europe right. I would like to hear your comment about that.

And, finally, we also stopped in Cyprus on the way back. Congressman McMahon mentioned the power grid potential to cooperate. We also saw a unique operation. The U.N. Committee on Missing Persons had unique cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on one of the most sensitive issues on the island. I think that also is a great model in terms of going forward with reconciliation.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Congressman Carnahan. And I love your quote. I wrote it down: "Nothing soft about smart power." That is exactly our belief.

And thank you for mentioning Bosnia. The western Balkans are a matter of great concern to us. I have spent a lot of time both with our colleagues at NATO and at the EU talking about what we can and should do with respect to Bosnia and other countries in the

Balkans. I applaud you and Congressman Smith for creating a caucus on Bosnia, and I would love to have an opportunity to get any ideas you have.

We still have work to do. We have not adequately established a democratic functioning government or in any way approached a reintegration of society in Bosnia. So I hope that you will be part of what we do going forward to try to figure out how we are going to address Bosnia and the western Balkans.

And, finally, on Cyprus, there are a lot of opportunities for cooperation. This is another one that I wasn't familiar with, and I will look into it as well. But I just appreciate your emphasis on the kind of model of internationalism that is smart, is very clear-eyed but engaged.

Let's look for opportunities. Let's figure out how we influence behavior. We lost a lot of ground as a country the last 8 years. We really ceded moral authority in a way that I think has undermined our security, our financial crisis woes, and our dependence on a country like China to hold their treasury instruments. This is a very complex world in which we are operating, and we think that a better approach is to try to build up that reservoir of good will, because we are certainly going to have to probably see it paid down over time.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And it is great to see you again, Madam Secretary. I last saw you at George Mason University in the fall. And I just also wanted to say, I honestly believe that President Obama's election and your selection as Secretary of State have done more to restore U.S. credibility abroad and to give us open, new opportunities for U.S. diplomacy than anything I can think of in living memory. Incalculable damage was done to the United States' interests in the last 8 years with a unilateral cowboy diplomacy, with a bullying technique, neither of which, frankly, are worthy of a great power.

And the idea that some might criticize the President for shaking a hand when every single President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt had no compunction of shaking the hands of people who might be unsavory characters but with whom we wanted to be engaged is truly clutching at straws to try to find something apparently to be critical of and perhaps to distract our attention from the damage done the last 8 years. I applaud what you and President Obama are doing. You are a breath of fresh air, and I thank you for your leadership.

Madam Secretary, let me ask. You have recently visited Turkey. There are some who would say that it is very much in our interests that Turkey becomes a member of the EU. It stabilizes that critical corner of the world, and it really rewards a secular Islamic form of government that is a model so desperately needed in other parts of the world. It is a critical NATO ally. It has been a military ally of the United States on many, many occasions. What is the position of the United States Government with respect to the issue of the accession of Turkey to the EU membership?

Secretary CLINTON. Congressman Connolly, when President Obama was recently in Turkey, he spoke to the Turkish Parliament; and he reiterated the United States Government's support for Turkey's accession to the European Union. When I was in Brussels meeting with the European Union and the European Commission, I also underscored our support for Turkey's membership in the EU. We believe that it is exactly as you described, in the best long-term, strategic interests of Europe, of the region, and of the United States. So we strongly support it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Madam Secretary, some observers of the new President have noted that perhaps the proliferation of special envoys, Ambassador Holbrooke, Former Senator George Mitchell, very talented individuals, as well as some other envoys might have the unintended consequences of fracturing the execution of U.S. foreign policy and making it harder to coordinate and speak with one voice. I wonder if you could address that issue as the Secretary of State.

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Connolly, I believe strongly in the use of special envoys. Upon my selection by President Obama back in December, I in my first meeting discussed with him what I saw as the opportunities available for the use of special envoys. He obviously agreed, and we have appointed some extremely talented people.

I think the terrain in which we are operating and the complexity of the environment in which we find ourselves that we inherited has meant that we could not possibly have addressed in depth each of these challenging issues from Afghanistan to Pakistan to the Middle East and beyond without the concerted attention of a special envoy and a team drawn from not just the State Department but trying to put together interagency teams that come together to provide the expertise and experience needed to advise me and advise the President. I do not see it at all as fracturing. I see it as intensifying the ability of our Government to move quickly.

And, of course, there is another element; and that is the very long time it takes to get senior officials in our department or any department confirmed. I have very few confirmed positions. If we were to wait for a confirmed secretary, assistant secretary or under secretary to pursue some of these hot button issues, we would still be waiting; and I don't think we can afford that.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I look forward to working with you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

If we lock the doors now, then the next member will be the last member to question, the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was getting a little nervous as I looked up at the clock, but I am delighted to have an opportunity to welcome the Secretary.

I know that many of the Congress people from New York have expressed their great pride in having you here. As a former New Yorker and a Nevadan by choice, let me echo what they have said and thank you for being here and thank you for the remarkable job that you are doing on behalf of our great Nation.

There are three points that I want to touch on very quickly, because I know that my time is limited.

A number of people have commented on the fact that perhaps President Obama should not have shaken the hand of President Chavez when he approached him. I can tell you that, as an American, I would have been mortified if our President had done anything other than what he did. I have no doubt that was a setup. President Chavez is a very clever fellow. He knew exactly what he was doing, and I think that our President behaved in a manner that could make all of us very proud of him.

The second thing is I just returned from leading a delegation of Congress people to the 66th Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, which is an ongoing discussion between Members of Congress and our European Union Parliament counterparts. Prior to attending the meeting in Prague—and this is the 33rd year that this dialogue has been going on—we also went to Estonia, Lithuania; we met with dissidents from Belarus, and then we went to Prague.

Two points. One is the Estonians, the Lithuanians, and, of course, the dissidents from Belarus reaching out to the United States, very grateful for our steadfast support for creating their fledgling democracies. They are having, as you know, serious financial problems in that part of the world but are very grateful to the United States; and it was a pleasure to meet with all of their government officials.

The second thing is that it is my understanding that, prior to the last administration, whether they were Republicans—whether it was a Republican administration or a Democratic administration, there was tremendous support of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue by the administration and their secretaries of state. That did not happen in the last 8 years, and I am hoping that I can work with somebody in your office to bring this Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue up to the level that it once was. In the 33 years that this dialogue has been going on, I can't think of a time that it is more important to engage with our European allies than it is now. So, upon reflection, if you could give me a name, I would appreciate it.

The third and last thing that I would like to talk about is the two-state solution in the Middle East. I have been a proponent of the two-state solution, but it has always been prefaced on the three issues that you discussed initially when Mr. Ackerman spoke of the situation in the Gaza: Recognizing Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state; recognizing and enforcing all of the previous agreements; stopping the terrorism and the rockets coming into Israel and raining terror on innocent Israeli civilians.

I would add a fourth; and that fourth would be getting the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, back to his family and his loved ones. I think that would be very important.

To me, I worry about creating the two-state solution. At this particular moment in time, I fear that Abu Mazen is a very weak—I am hesitant to call him a leader—a weak President that does not have the faith and allegiance and support of his own people in the West Bank and certainly not the Gaza. I worry that giving him additional aid will not be helpful to us insofar as that it is very hard to track any of the aid that we have ever given and see where it has been productive and helpful to the Palestinian people. I worry also about providing aid to the Palestinians that live in the Gaza

or the West Bank through UNRWA, because that, to me, has proven very unsatisfactory in the past as well.

I would like to get your opinion on that, and thank you again for being here.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, thank you, Congresswoman.

Let me just quickly say of course we will work with you on the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue and thank you for going to Estonia and Lithuania and talking with the dissidents from Belarus. They need to be absolutely assured that the United States stands with them. We take our Article 5 responsibilities in NATO very seriously, and we hope for better times for the people of Belarus.

Let me just add quickly that I am very impressed with Salam Fayad, who has served as the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. I think the reforms he has implemented should give us all a much greater sense of security. There is a transparency and accountability measure that has never been present before. We have made it clear both to the Palestinian Authority and my visit in Ramallah as well as to friends and interested nations that we do want to support and build up the Palestinian Authority. Obviously, we want to see changes, but we want to applaud the changes that Salam Fayad has made.

So it is a challenging course, but we don't see any alternative to a two-state solution. We think it is not only in the best interests of the Palestinians that they have a sovereign state but that it is absolutely critical to Israel's security that we proceed on this path.

But I look forward to discussing with you some of the concerns that and you others have expressed.

Ms. BERKLEY. And with the last minute—I don't have a minute? Chairman BERMAN. You have 1 minute and 25 more than 5.

Ms. BERKLEY. But her response was so long.

Chairman BERMAN. Her response was so good.

Ms. BERKLEY. Yes, it was. Excellent as always.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

We would ask, Madam Secretary, if you would be willing to, to respond for the 230 or so questions that must have been asked for the record because they never gave you time to respond to them. And members will have until Wednesday, April 29, to submit questions for the record; and the record will stay open to receive them.

And, Madam Secretary, all I can say is a very impressive performance here.

The hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

**FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE**  
***Committee on Foreign Affairs***  
*U.S. House of Representatives*  
*Washington, D.C. 20515-0128*

**Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman**

April 14, 2009

**TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building**:

**DATE:** Wednesday, April 22, 2009  
**TIME:** 9:30 a.m.  
**SUBJECT:** New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
**WITNESS:** The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton  
Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State

**By Direction of the Chairman**

*The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.*

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**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date 4/22/09 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 9:35 A.M. Ending Time 1:25 P.M.

Recesses  ( to )

Presiding Member(s) Howard L. Berman (CA), Chairman; Gary Ackerman (NY)

**CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:**

Open Session       Electronically Recorded (taped)   
Executive (closed) Session       Stenographic Record   
Televised

**TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP:** (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration

**COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**  
see attached

**NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**  
n/a

**HEARING WITNESSES:** Same as meeting notice attached? Yes  No   
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)


**STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD:** (List any statements submitted for the record.)  
Letter dated Feb. 12, 2009 to Secretary Clinton from Congressman Jim Costa on Foreign Policy.

**ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP:** (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

**RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP):** (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

Subject                      Yeas              Nays              Present              Not Voting

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE \_\_\_\_\_  
or  
TIME ADJOURNED \_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director

**Attendance - HCFA Full Committee**  
**New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration**  
**Wednesday, April 22, 2009 @ 9:30 a.m. , 2172 RHOB**

Howard L. Berman (CA)	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (FL)
Gary Ackerman (NY)	Christopher H. Smith (NJ)
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (AS)	Dan Burton (IN)
Donald Payne (NJ)	Elton Gallegly (CA)
Brad Sherman (CA)	Dana Rohrabacher (CA)
Robert Wexler (FL)	Donald Manzullo (IL)
Eliot L. Engel (NY)	Edward R. Royce (CA)
William D. Delahunt (MA)	Ron Paul (TX)
Gregory W. Meeks (NY)	Jeff Flake (AZ)
Diane E. Watson (CA)	Mike Pence (IN)
Russ Carnahan (MO)	Joe Wilson (SC)
Albio Sires (NJ)	John Boozman (AR)
Gerald E. Connolly (VA)	J. Gresham Barrett (SC)
Michael E. McMahon (NY)	Connie Mack (FL)
John S. Tanner (TN)	Jeff Fortenberry (NE)
Lynn C. Woolsey (CA)	Michael T. McCaul (TX)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX)	Ted Poe (TX)
Barbara Lee (CA)	Bob Inglis (SC)
Shelley Berkley (NV)	Gus Bilirakis (FL)
Joseph Crowley (NY)	
Brad Miller (NC)	
David Scott (GA)	
Jim Costa (CA)	
Keith Ellison (MN)	
Ron Klein (FL)	

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Verbatim, as delivered

April 22, 2009

**Chairman Berman's opening statement at hearing  
with Secretary of State Clinton, "New Beginnings:  
Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama  
Administration"**

It's a great pleasure to welcome Secretary Clinton to the Committee this morning for her first appearance before Congress as Secretary of State. We know you have an extremely busy schedule, Madam Secretary, and we very much appreciate your taking the time to be here.

Normally, the Secretary's first appearance before the Committee would be to present the Administration's budget for the next fiscal year. But given the transition and the understandable delay in preparing the fiscal year 2010 budget, I've asked her to testify today on the Administration's overall foreign policy agenda and to discuss the broad outlines of the budget request. In a few weeks, the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Jack Lew, will appear before the Committee to discuss the Department's detailed budget proposal.

Madam Secretary, I want to commend you and your excellent team for taking immediate steps to address the dangerous lack of capacity at the State Department and USAID.

From her first days in office, she directed a comprehensive review of our chronically under-funded diplomacy and development capabilities. She then developed a plan to restore these critical components of our national security infrastructure. And finally, she fought to ensure that the Administration's Function 150 budget request provided adequate resources to implement that plan.

Madam Secretary, I couldn't agree with you more that we desperately need to reinvigorate our civilian foreign affairs agencies. To the extent diplomacy and development can help avoid conflicts before they start, it will save us billions in the long run. It will also help prevent the continuing migration of development-related programs to the military, thus relieving the burden on our brave men and women in uniform.

I am committed -- and I know many of my colleagues on the Committee are as well -- to doing everything that we can to ensure that the budget request is fully funded. We will also do our part by marking up and passing a State Department authorization bill -- hopefully on a bipartisan basis -- very soon after we receive the detailed budget. And later this year, we hope to pass foreign assistance reform legislation to rationalize our various foreign aid programs and provide the Administration additional flexibility to ensure that the most urgent needs are being met.

I want to make sure my colleagues have plenty of time to ask questions, so I'm not going to run through the entire laundry list of foreign policy challenges we now face. But I do want to touch on a couple of issues.

Madam Secretary, several of my colleagues and I returned just yesterday from a trip to India and Pakistan. I think I can speak for all of them in saying that we were encouraged

by the dramatically improved U.S. ties with India, but deeply concerned about the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan.

In recent weeks, extremists based in the western border regions have turned their guns on the Pakistani state, launching dramatic suicide attacks in the population centers of Islamabad and Lahore. Equally troubling, the Pakistani government has cut a deal with the extremists that overran the Swat Valley – the latest in a string of failed agreements that has only emboldened the radicals.

To make matters worse, the Pakistani supreme court just ordered the release of Maulana Abdul Aziz, the radical Red Mosque cleric, who has renewed his call to kill westerners and place all of Pakistan under a rigid and intolerant form of Islamic law.

The United States has an enormous stake in the stability and security of Pakistan. We cannot allow al Qaeda or any other terrorist group that threatens our national security to operate with impunity in the tribal regions. Nor can we permit the Pakistani state – and its nuclear arsenal -- to be taken over by the Taliban or any other radical groups, or otherwise be destabilized in a manner that could lead to renewed conflict with India. So it is very alarming that we are now hearing predictions from a number of leading experts that Pakistan could collapse in as little as six months.

Madam Secretary, I know you take these issues seriously, and I want to commend you and your team for developing a comprehensive Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. I completely agree with your assessment that the security of those two countries and their neighbors is inextricably linked. And I strongly support your conclusion that strengthening the civilian democratic government of Pakistan should be a central part of our overall efforts.

In the next few weeks, our Committee will consider legislation to massively expand assistance to Pakistan, including funds to strengthen the capacity of parliament, the judiciary and the public education system. The bill also calls for the Administration to make a series of reasonable determinations to ensure that military assistance is used to meet both U.S. and Pakistani national security needs. Ambassador Holbrooke will testify next Wednesday to provide the Administration's views of the legislation, and to discuss the larger Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

I also would like to say a few words about Iran's continuing efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

As you are well aware, a nuclear-capable Iran would pose a dire threat to the United States and our allies in the region, act as a hegemonic power in the Middle East, and cause a cascade of proliferation. In short, we can't allow Iran to acquire this capability.

Regrettably, the previous administration's policy failed to impact the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior. And there is no reason to believe that doing more of the same will result in a different outcome.

We need a new approach to dealing with Iran – one that offers direct engagement in a bilateral or multilateral format. I believe this is reflected in the Administration's recently completed Iran policy review. But such engagement should not be open-ended. Indeed, Tehran continues to enrich uranium, and every day moves closer to the nuclear threshold. I would urge you to seek support in advance from key members of the international community to impose crippling sanctions – the kind that would compel, or at least maximize the chances of compelling, a change in the regime's current course – if engagement does not yield positive results.

Finally, after 25 years of grappling with the enormous economic losses caused by intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting, I would urge you to put this issue high on the list of the State Department's economic agenda.

Madam Secretary, I am excited about the prospect of working with you on the many challenges facing our nation. And I am now pleased to recognize my friend and the Ranking Member of our committee, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her statement.

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**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA  
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REGARDING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES  
IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION**

**April 22, 2009**

Madam Secretary:

I want to congratulate you on your appointment as Secretary of State and commend you for the admirable work you are doing to address our most daunting problems around the world.

I think your decision to visit the Asia Pacific on your first overseas trip sent precisely the right signal about the importance we place on the region, our commitment to our treaty allies in Japan and Korea, our intent to reengage the ASEAN countries and our plans to foster a positive, constructive dialogue with the People's Republic of China.

Madam Secretary, thank you for joining us today and thank you for your tireless efforts in serving our country. For the sake of time, I'm submitting a series of questions for the record, and I would appreciate your written responses.

I would also like to ask you about two matters of particular concern to me regarding the current situation in West Papua, Indonesia, and the crisis in Fiji.

First, will the administration review the current political status of West Papua regarding the extent to which the government of Indonesia has implemented and included the leadership of the people of West Papua in the development and administration of the special autonomy law? And will the administration hold Indonesia accountable for continued human rights abuses in the region?

Second, having just returned from Fiji for discussions with the interim Prime Minister and with other community leaders of Fiji, I submit that the situation in that country is more complex than it appears. I commend our current U.S. Ambassador's efforts to continue engaging the leaders of the interim government. Unfortunately, in my view, Madam Secretary, for too long, we have had no coherent policy towards some sixteen Pacific island nations. Very indicative of this lack of coherence is the fact that we have not had a USAID presence in the Pacific region for many years now.

And for too often and for too long, Madam Secretary, we have permitted Australia and New Zealand to take the lead even when Canberra and Wellington operate with such a heavy hand that their behavior is counterproductive to our shared goals.



It makes no sense, Madam Secretary, for the leaders of New Zealand and Australia to demand early elections in Fiji just for the sake of having elections, especially when there are fundamental deficiencies in Fiji's electoral process -- deficiencies that have given rise to three military takeovers and one civilian-related takeover within the past twenty years. After all, Fiji has had three separate constitutions during this period.

I totally disagree with the nasty accusations that the leaders of New Zealand and Australia have leveled against Fiji, particularly given the fact that the situation there is far more complicated than it appears. I would appreciate your responses to my questions about Fiji and West Papua.

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Opening Statement  
*Congresswoman Diane E. Watson*  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Wednesday April 22, 2009  
2172 Rayburn House Office Building  
9:30 a.m.

*“New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration”*

Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding today’s hearing on Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration. I appreciate Secretary Clinton for taking time out of her busy schedule to appear before this committee.

As our country moves forward with its new Administration in place, it is important to remember that we pursue policies that advance the goals of public diplomacy and development, and ensure that the Secretary has the tools she needs to effectively carry out the President’s responsibilities.

I look forward to hearing Secretary Clinton’s testimony, specifically concerning staffing shortages within the State Department and how she would best utilize and position any new diplomats.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.

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**CONGRESSWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS**  
**STATEMENT BEFORE THE**  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
**“NEW BEGINNINGS: FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE**  
**OBAMA ADMINISTRATION”**

**APRIL 22, 2009**

Let me first thank Chairman Berman his leadership in bringing forth this important hearing. I want to also thank our renowned witness and my friend, Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Madam Secretary, as you may know, I recently traveled with our Chairman and many Members of this Committee to Cypress, India, and Pakistan. We met with Ambassadors and Foreign officials and saw for ourselves the need for continued diplomacy and aid in these regions.

**WOMEN’S GLOBAL ISSUES**

Women’s rights around the world are an important indicator of understanding global well-being. Many may think that women’s rights are only an issue in countries where religion is law, such as many Muslim countries. Or even worse, some may think this is no longer an issue at all.

As women in this country, we may still face a glass ceiling or have to fight like Lily Ledbetter for equal pay, but we have a process by which we can petition our government and our courts for redress. And often like Lily Ledbetter, we can eventually succeed in these efforts. Yet many of our sisters around the globe are suffering. These tumultuous times are not only slowing women’s progress but in some countries, reversing it altogether.

In the Middle East, women and children face much daily prejudice due to their gender. Recently, we learned of deadly attacks and destruction of girls schools by the Taliban in Pakistan near the Afghanistan border along with the brokering of Sharia laws. We read that women in Somalia’s third-largest city, Baidoa, have been ordered to wear Islamic dress starting this week or face jail time, according to a resident and Somali media reports.

There are concerns that Islamic law, which has numerous interpretations and variations, could lead to government-sanctioned human rights abuses in Somalia. As you know, the strict interpretation of Sharia forbids girls from attending school, requires veils for women and beards for men, and bans music and television.

In Iran, we have the cases of Roxana Saberi and Esha Momeni, Iranian-American citizens who were detained, as well as the many women in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that are seeking freedom from oppression. They seek not simply women’s rights but human rights.

In Mexico, where the drug wars are heating up particularly along border states such as California, Arizona, and the great state of Texas, we see women and children caught in the cross-fires. Not to mention, the massive rapes and sexual exploitation of women and girls in the Sudan, and the Congo.

Women and children also suffer disproportionately from poverty. Research and experience have also shown that women in poor countries are more likely to use their income for food, healthcare and education for their children, helping to lift entire communities out of poverty. However, women face unequal social and economic barriers that prevent them from earning a living and supporting their families.

These reasons are why I have consistently pushed for going beyond military force and strategies, to include and expansion of democratization, expanding USAID and other Foreign Assistance Programs that are necessary steps toward enhanced national security, international economic stability, combating poverty, and reducing the spread of devastating diseases. Humanitarianism and foreign assistance programs create a diplomatic framework for improving relationships with other countries and will revitalize America's Global Leadership.

#### **FOREIGN ASSISTANCE**

Foreign assistance allows the United States to export democracy globally. Through humanitarian assistance, we can reach out to the women and girls in particular providing. Providing a peaceful framework for stabilizing fragile states and ensuring sustainable development and is critical to prevent instability, violence, and genocide by integrating civilian and military tools to create sustainable and peaceful democracies worldwide.

As we have seen with our prior administration, terrorism and violence cannot simply be deterred and contained through purely military means. Rather, by educating women and girls, fostering international cooperation, and building partnerships with developing nations, we can not only ensure security of millions of people overseas, but we can ensure stability within our own borders.

For instance, medical missions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia are starting points for military relations that prevent the rise of conflicts due to diplomatic tensions. Our foreign assistance to Pakistan, South Africa, The Horn of Africa, among other places has stabilized tenuous regions and bridged cultural gaps.

Additionally, humanitarian foreign assistance is the crucial lynchpin to fight global poverty and the spread of infectious diseases. More people die from poverty and diseases in developing nations every year than in every war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Providing access to life-saving anti-retroviral drugs and medication to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and a litany of other public-health threats will save millions of lives and prevent young children from becoming orphans, a crisis that is occurring at an alarming rate.

Disease surveillance networks can monitor the further spread of diseases and prevent catastrophic outbreaks of epidemics such as avian flu and SARS, and foreign assistance can create sustainable hospitals and health-facilities that create jobs, save the lives of millions, and improve the foundation of impoverished societies.

Foreign assistance is a fundamental tool for globalization that creates economic opportunities and foster growth that not only pull people out of poverty, but open new markets for trade and economic relations.

I believe that foreign humanitarian assistance is also a path to further environmental protection. Aid programs in Central and South America, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa allows the transfer of farming technology and methods that prevent deforestation and loss of biodiversity in environmental rich regions.

By combating, disease, violence, and terrorism, and encouraging environmental responsibility and education, we can begin to take steps towards creating better environments for nations, particularly women and children. Humanitarian assistance is also a first step in reaching out to women and girls who are subject to the Shariah law or other oppressive laws or regimes.

It results in not just monetary assistance, but also education and training assistance that ensures effective and efficient programs. Working not simply through USAID, but rather

broadening our initiatives internationally can ensure a cooperative and diverse aid system that can save lives and foster international stability and cooperation.

**CONCLUSION**

I would like to once again thank our Secretary Clinton for coming here today. I am looking forward to your testimony Madam Secretary and seeing where you believe the Administration stands on the plight of women and girls, the increase in foreign assistance and democratization funding, and the path forward for the this Administration as it builds or rebuilds our relationship with the rest of the world, I yield back the balance of my time.

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Rep. Shelley Berkley  
Questions Submitted for the Record  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
April 22, 2009

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

**Smuggling into Gaza.** Earlier this year, the U.S. and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) about arms smuggling, with the U.S. committing to interdict arms flowing from Iran into Gaza. We also committed to work with our allies on interdiction.

1. What is the status on implementation of the MOU?

**Answer:**

Implementation of the MOU will be a continuous process. We have made progress across all aspects of the MOU, including through increased cooperation with regional governments to combat smuggling into Gaza. In addition, the United States has spearheaded the development of a nine-country international effort to interdict weapons smuggling farther afield. The consortium – The Gaza Counter Arms Smuggling Initiative – has met twice, in Copenhagen in February and in London in March. With the U.S. in a leadership role, the consortium has developed a plan of action, intended to enhance coordination of information and intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, and military and law enforcement activities. The next working group meeting will be held this month in Ottawa, at which partner states will participate in a table-top exercise to help assess capacity and authorization related to interdiction activity.

The Department of State continues to work with the Department of Treasury to identify and designate supporters and funders of Hamas.

The United States and Israel have met to review progress on the MOU, and we will discuss it again during an upcoming bilateral discussion on military cooperation, as ascribed by the MOU.

2. We've seen at least one case where the U.S. boarded a ship and found weapons, but then let the ship go. What are we doing – at the UN and in other fora – to make implementation of the MOU more effective?

**Answer:**

In January, the U.S. Navy conducted a consensual boarding and inspection of the M/V Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged vessel chartered by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). The M/V Monchegorsk, which was bound for Syria, was subsequently ordered to Cyprus by Cypriot authorities, where they conducted detailed

inspections of its cargo and discovered arms-related materiel. Cyprus reported its findings to the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee in February. The Committee has since reported the transfer as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1747 and has sent letters to the governments of Cyprus, Iran, and Syria requesting additional information. While the Monchegorsk itself has been released, the cargo remains in the custody of the Cypriot authorities.

The U.S. Government continues to work closely with both the Israeli and Egyptian authorities to curb the flow of illegal weapons to Gaza. The Government of Egypt has reported that it has discovered and disrupted over 200 tunnels this year and has made key arrests of smugglers and tunnel facilitators. To address arms smuggling farther afield, the United States is also working with a group of nine governments (including European partners and Canada) that is coordinating activities among like-minded states to prevent arms smuggling into Gaza. The group, known as the Gaza Counter Arms Smuggling Initiative, has developed a plan of action intended to enhance coordination of information and intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, and military and law enforcement activities. At their upcoming meeting in Ottawa, Gaza Counter Arms Smuggling Initiative partner states will participate in a table-top exercise to help assess capacity and authorization related to interdiction activity.

3. Can you comment on the flow of arms from Iran, through Egypt and into Gaza? Clearly, sophisticated weapons are once again entering Gaza. What more can be done now to stop Hamas from rearming?

**Answer:**

Egypt publicly announced it has discovered and disrupted over 200 tunnels this year, and has made arrests of smugglers and tunnel facilitators. These actions, combined with targeted Israeli strikes against tunnels, appear to have deterred attacks.

In spite of this, the flow of illicit weapons into Gaza – from Iran and other sources – continues to be an issue of concern. The U.S. – Israel memorandum of understanding signed by the former administration, which we remain committed to implementing, lays out various means to prevent Hamas from rearming, including increasing cooperation with Israel's neighbors to combat smuggling and working with like-minded governments to interdict weapons farther afield. Both of those efforts are ongoing.

4. Are you satisfied with Egyptian efforts to counter the smuggling of contraband into the Gaza Strip? What is the U.S. doing to help Egypt counter smuggling into Gaza by land? What is the status of U.S.-European efforts to counter smuggling into Gaza by sea?

**Answer:**

We have seen clear improvements in Egyptian efforts to deter smuggling. Egypt reports the closure of more than 200 tunnel openings since the beginning of this year, a

figure confirmed by the Government of Israel. The Egyptian government has also stopped Hamas couriers trying to smuggle sizeable amounts of cash into Gaza.

We confer intensively with the government of Egypt on this question. Egypt views smuggling through its territory as a threat to its own national security and has described to us its commitment and actions aimed at preventing the flow of weapons to Hamas and other terrorist organizations through its territory. Egypt is working on several fronts to improve its ability to detect and deter illicit shipments to Gaza.

The Egyptian authorities share our view of the danger posed by Hamas. They understand that the smuggling of arms to Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza undermines the prospect of reaching a durable ceasefire and undermines security and stability for the entire region.

To address the issue of smuggling farther afield, before it reaches Gaza, and as part of our efforts to implement the January 16 Memorandum of Understanding with Israel, we have worked with the governments of Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK on means to enhance cooperation on the interdiction of the flow of arms and related materiel to Gaza. On March 13 in London, we joined these governments in agreement on a Program of Action to enhance coordination of information and intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, and military and law enforcement activities. Participating governments will next meet in Canada on June 10-11 where they will take part in a table top exercise to develop a better understanding of existing authorities and capabilities under a range of scenarios.

**Iran.** Iran's rapid pursuit of nuclear weapons capability and its ongoing defiance of the international community make Iran a problem that must be dealt with urgently. Public sources state that Iran has enough Low Enriched Uranium that it could enrich to nuclear weapons grade material for one nuclear weapon in a matter of months. Further, we know that Iran is developing an advanced missile delivery system and President Ahmadinejad claims that they have mastered the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran has used previous negotiations to effectively stall for time in order to advance its nuclear program.

5. How will you avoid the Iranians using the cover of talks to continue making progress on their nuclear program?

**Answer:**

The President has said direct diplomacy is the preferred means to resolve international concerns about Iran's nuclear program and diplomacy will take time. But the window of opportunity will not last forever. Direct engagement is not an end in itself, nor a cover under which Iran can ignore its international legal obligations through its continued expansion of its uranium enrichment program and other nuclear activities. Iran has a responsibility to meet its legal, international obligations to the United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency and restore international



confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program without further delay.

Our goal remains the same: to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapons capability and that Iran complies fully with its responsibilities under its international, legal nonproliferation obligations.

6. How will you ensure that the talks aren't open-ended?

**Answer:**

We intend to pursue engagement with the genuine desire to succeed - but we have also made it clear that this window of opportunity for engagement will not last forever. As the President has said, we must use all elements of national power to hold Iran to its international nonproliferation obligations and to prevent Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Our primary task now is to use all the diplomatic tools at our disposal to achieve a more productive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to achieve these goals. We have not exhausted the power of sustained American diplomacy to resolve these issues.

While there is a new emphasis on the engagement track, we will continue to hold Iran to international standards of conduct, including compliance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and other international obligations. Continued pressure on Iran under existing legal authorities and obligations, in response to continued illicit Iranian policies, remains a key component of U.S. Government policy.

7. Are we working with our allies to ensure a unified view of what constitutes success and failure? Are we working toward a unified response if the Iranians remain intransigent?

**Answer:**

We are working closely with our international partners to address our concerns with Iran's nuclear program and to prevent Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. This is a central goal we share with our international partners. We are unable to dictate the end state of this process. What we do know is that the policy of non-engagement did not produce results. Our aim remains - in coordination with allies - to find the right combination of engagement, incentives, and pressures, to provide the atmosphere and opportunity for Iran to change its policies of concern and become a constructive international player.

Our commitment to engaging Iran is matched by our steadfast commitment to our allies in the Middle East, Europe, and around the world. As we pursue this approach, we will consult closely with our allies and continue to take measures to enhance their security and counter unacceptable Iranian actions. Engagement will not come at the

expense of our friends and allies; nor do we expect to achieve success without their unified and vigorous support.

**Lebanon.** Since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was supposed to ensure that Hizballah would not rebuild its weapons capabilities. However, during his testimony on the emerging national security threats, Admiral Dennis Blair said that Hizballah's position has strengthened and they are a stronger threat today because they have rebuilt their weapons stocks that were used up in the 2006 Lebanon War. In fact, reports indicate that they now have 60,000 rockets in their possession; rockets more powerful than what were used in 2006.

8. Would you support expanding the mandate of UNIFIL to more effectively prevent the rearmament of Hizballah?

**Answer:**

The problem is not UNIFIL's mandate, but actions on the ground by parties in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1701. We remain concerned that weapons continue to flow from Syria into Lebanon in violation of the arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council resolution 1701. UNIFIL's deployment to the Lebanese-Syrian border, as allowed by resolution 1701 "at the request of the Lebanese government," could be of some help. However, smuggling will remain a serious threat to the stability of the region as long as several conditions persist.

Syria and Iran continue to provide weaponry and other material support to Hizballah in violation of resolution 1701's arms embargo. This is an important component of our dialogue with Syria. Hizballah's weapons prevent the Lebanese government from exercising full control over its territory and borders, and provide the group a veto-by-force over decisions of the Lebanese government, as seen in May 2008. This undercuts Lebanese political will to confront weapons smuggling. Lebanon's ambiguous border with Syria and the presence of militia bases along the border have also hindered efforts to prevent Hizballah's rearmament. We continue urging Syria and Lebanon to delineate their shared border.

Despite these obstacles, we have worked with the UN and other donor nations since 2006 to help the Lebanese government secure the country's borders, including by targeting our own security assistance to provide capabilities useful against weapons smuggling such as surveillance drones. We continue to urge Lebanon's leaders to more assertively address the problem of cross-border smuggling, and to call upon Syria and Iran to comply with resolution 1701 and end their material support for Hizballah and other militant groups in Lebanon. We would support a request by the Lebanese government for additional assistance in securing Lebanon's border.

9. Another problem continues to be Iran and Syria providing financial assistance to their terrorist proxy. What can the U.S. do to crack down on this flow of money to Hizballah?

**Answer:**

Since Hizballah's initial designation as a terrorist organization in 1995, the United States government has been engaged in a wide-ranging effort to identify and disrupt its financial and material support networks, including its sources of support in Iran – Hizballah's patron and primary state sponsor. This multifaceted and global campaign has resulted in the designation of a major Iranian bank (Bank Saderat), various Iranian parastatal organizations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a number of Lebanese firms engaged in financial management and reconstruction activities on Hizballah's behalf, the terrorist group's media and propaganda arm and a network of individuals and entities in the Tri-Border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Syria has also been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism because of its support for Hizballah. Hizballah is a global organization and, accordingly, our efforts to disrupt financial support to Hizballah extend beyond the group's core support base in the Middle East to include action against its overseas network.

**Syria.** Executive Order 13338 established a state of emergency and imposed a number of sanctions on the Syrians, but it is set to expire in May. It was originally issued in 2004 and renewed last year because of Syria's support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its missile programs and its efforts to "undermine U.S. and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq."

10. Will the President renew the state of emergency and sanctions against Syria under Executive Order 13338?

**Answer:**

On May 7, the President continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, with respect to Syria. The continuation of this national emergency maintains International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) sanctions and sanctions authorities under Executive Order 13338 and Executive Order 13460.

**Europe.** In recent years, the United States has sought to work closely with our European allies to address a range of current international problems in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Balkans among others. The transatlantic dialogue has sometimes stumbled over disagreements about what constitutes a primarily 'American' or 'European' problem as well as which countries should be expected to shoulder most of the burden.

11. Could you please give us an indication of how the Obama Administration plans to address this challenge in its efforts to strengthen ties with the EU?

**Answer:**

The Administration considers Europe a natural and necessary partner for tackling a range of international problems—regional problems in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Balkans, for example, as well as global issues such as climate change, trade, and the international financial system. In order to be a credible partner in tackling these problems, Europe must be willing to shoulder its fair share of the burden.

The question of burden sharing is a serious one. We look to our European partners to take the lead in managing problems in Europe's own neighborhood. Only Europe can complete the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans. Only the EU can diversify European energy networks in order to strengthen Europe's energy security and reduce Europe's dependence on politically volatile suppliers. As one of Iran's largest trading partners, Europe has a key role to play in sharpening Tehran's choice between international integration or isolation. The EU took the lead in negotiating a ceasefire to the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. We look to the EU to support and stabilize the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe in the face of volatility, and to nurture democratic and free market institutions in Eastern Europe, as through the EU's new Eastern Partnership initiative.

At the same time, we consistently urge the EU to further develop the capabilities needed to tackle problems on a global scale. As it complements NATO, we support the development of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which to date has deployed 27 missions to theatres as diverse as Chad, East Timor, Kosovo, Georgia, and Afghanistan. The EU is currently undertaking its first ESDP naval mission—Operation Atalanta—to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. We urge Europe to work through the EU and NATO to further expand its military capabilities.

Burden sharing is also an issue within NATO. Some have spoken of a "multi-tiered Alliance," with some Allies deploying troops to conduct heavy fighting in Afghanistan, while others deploy under caveats that limit their troops' operational flexibility. At NATO's sixtieth anniversary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl this April, President Obama emphasized that the NATO alliance is the cornerstone of transatlantic security. Allies re-committed to the ongoing transformation of the Alliance to meet today's security challenges. All Allies must do their share.

We cannot effectively address global problems such as climate change, trade, global finance, or nuclear proliferation without Europe. Nor can Europe effectively address these problems without the United States. The Obama Administration is working hand in hand with European counterparts to develop and implement strategies for tackling these problems, both bilaterally and through multilateral fora such as the G-20, the Major Economies Forum, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations.

12. How can the Congress help to enhance your efforts to build a better relationship with the EU?

**Answer:**

We greatly appreciate Congress' support for our initiatives to build a stronger relationship between the United States and Europe, coordinate with Europe on global issues, and continue the task of building a Europe whole, free, and at peace. We look forward to continuing our close coordination with the Congress in this regard through such fora as the semi-annual Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue. We think this is a very useful forum for building Parliamentary and public support for our joint agenda.

13. Will the State Department continue to help with the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue?

**Answer:**

The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue is an important tool in our country's efforts to build closer, practical cooperation with Europe. The State Department is eager to assist the Congress in any way we can to ensure the Dialogue is as productive as it can be.

**Belarus.**

14. In your opinion, was it helpful for the European Union to issue an invitation last week to Belarusian President Lukashenko to attend the Eastern Partnership summit in May?

**Answer:**

We understand that on April 17, Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg handed Lukashenka an invitation for the "Government of Belarus" to attend the May 7 Eastern Partnership summit in Prague. EU officials have indicated that they do not believe Lukashenka will attend the Prague summit.

We would encourage the EU to base its interaction with the Belarusian authorities on measurable steps toward respect for democracy and human rights in Belarus.

15. Zeltser Affair: What efforts are being made by the U.S. Administration to persuade President Lukashenko to release imprisoned U.S. citizen Emanuel Zeltser from jail on humanitarian grounds given his poor health as well as the questionable circumstances of his arrest and judicial proceedings?

**Answer:**

The Department of State, including the U.S. Embassy in Minsk, continues to call on Belarusian officials at all levels and at every opportunity to release Mr. Zeltser on humanitarian grounds before this situation takes an irrevocable turn.

**Taiwan.** In 2004, President Bush signed legislation (P.L. 108-235) that mandates the U.S. support Taiwan's observer status in the World Health Assembly (WHA) and each year the Administration must report to Congress on steps taken to assist Taiwan in that effort. In your nomination hearing on January 13, 2009, you responded to Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Senator David Vitter (R-LA) that "I believe that it is appropriate for the United States to support Taiwan's efforts to expand its international space, such as observer status at the World Health Assembly."

16. How will the Administration assist Taiwan in gaining observer status to the WHA this year?

**Answer:**

On April 29, 2009, Taiwan authorities announced that the World Health Organization (WHO) Secretariat had invited Taiwan to attend the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer under the name "Chinese Taipei." Following the announcement, the State Department issued a statement welcoming this development and reaffirming U.S. support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in the World Health Organization.

Last October, as presidential candidate, President Obama welcomed the Bush Administration's approval to sell \$6.4 billion worth of advanced weapons to Taiwan. Then-Senator Obama also stated in a letter to President Ma Ying-jeon last May that "the US should continue to provide the arms necessary for Taiwan to deter possible aggression."

17. Can you reaffirm that President Obama remains committed to providing Taiwan with the arms necessary to protect itself consistent with our commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and especially in light of an increasing gap between China's capabilities and Taiwan's ability to defend itself?

**Answer:**

This administration is fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan the articles and defense services needed to maintain a sufficient self defense capability.

**Six Assurances.** In 1982, the United States agreed to “Six Assurances” with Taiwan. Namely, 1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; 2. The United States would not hold prior consultations with the People’s Republic of China regarding arms sales to Taiwan; 3. The United States would not play a mediation role between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan; 4. The United States would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5. The United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and 6. The United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

18. Would the Administration consider reaffirming of the Six Assurances to once again clarify U.S. policy towards Taiwan?

**Answer:**

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is very clear. The United States is fully committed to a vibrant unofficial relationship with Taiwan, and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. We will continue to strengthen commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

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**HFAC Hearing**  
**New Beginnings:**  
**Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration**  
**Wednesday, April 22, 9:30am**

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Gerald E. Connolly

1. The U.S. Agency for International Development was designed to be the US's primary development apparatus. However, the organization needs to be revitalized to maximize its effectiveness and carry out its mission to facilitate US foreign policy goals through aid. What are your plans to revamp USAID so it can take its rightful place as a key US foreign policy arm?

**Answer:**

To meet the expanding challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, one of my top priorities is to secure the necessary resources to enable the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to rebuild its workforce, organizational strength and development leadership. With increased staff and streamlined, more efficient processes, USAID will be able to respond quickly and collaborate more effectively with other USG and international agencies and will have the strengthened capacity to plan and deliver development assistance, while regaining its position as a leader in international development.

The President's FY 2010 request includes a 45 percent increase in USAID operations to support adding an additional 350 new permanent USAID Foreign Service Officers and related capital improvements under the Agency's Development Leadership Initiative. The FY 2010 budget puts us on the path to double the number of USAID Foreign Service officers by 2012. The request includes the resources needed to train the expanded workforces of both State and USAID with the language, diplomatic, development and managerial skills necessary for their mission, and that allow us to increase civilian presence and leadership in critical priority countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Iraq, among others.

We will build USAID's capacity to meet expectations by investing in three key areas: increasing the Agency's human capital base; standardizing and automating business processes including rebuilding knowledge management systems; and expanding overseas facilities that are functional and safe for officers and local employees. As we work toward the goal of doubling our USAID Foreign Service personnel by 2012, with more limited increases in civil service ranks, we will increase investments in technical and skill training, not just for new hires but for the entire Agency. USAID is using its business transformation council to launch a reform initiative to map the Agency's key processes and identify functions that can be streamlined and automated. We will also expand USAID program evaluation functions while strengthening knowledge management structures to ensure best practices are continually applied to the design



and implementation of development programs. These reforms, which will expand the workforce, incorporate new technologies, and increase secure overseas facilities, are designed to enhance efficiency and improve Agency effectiveness. Rebuilding USAID so that we can effectively respond to the increasing challenges of international development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century also requires a steadfast commitment to a long-term vision that supports peace, creates prosperity and increases the standard of living for impoverished people around the world. This sustained investment in rebuilding USAID, supported by a firm commitment to broad-based, sustainable development, will help ensure our Government's broader foreign policy agenda is achieved.

2. A great threat, if not the greatest threat, to our national security is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is why I, along with Congresswoman Harman, Congresswoman Tauscher and Congressman Royce, introduced H.R. 1463 to condition future military aid to Pakistan on presenting A.Q. Khan for questioning to US authorities. What is the status of A.Q. Khan's whereabouts, and what are the State Department's plans to ensure accountability for the world's most notorious nuclear proliferator?

**Answer:**

We believe Khan remains in Pakistan and we have sought and received assurances from the Pakistani government that it would take every step available to ensure that Khan does not pose a proliferation risk.

3. Last month, the Pakistani government capitulated to extremist factions and transferred power of the Swat Valley to local Taliban forces. The Valley is now ruled under a strict interpretation of Shari'ah. I believe the Pakistani government's actions are a cause for grave concern. What plans will you undertake to decrease the influence of extremist factions in Pakistan?

**Answer:**

**Supplemental answer to inform the Congress, as of July 8, 2009:**

Since early May, Pakistan has undertaken military operations in the Swat Valley and other border regions, and has indicated that it plans to conduct ground operations in South Waziristan. We see these operations as a useful and necessary step toward the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan. President Obama has made clear that we expect Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and other violent extremists within its borders. Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will require sustained counterinsurgency operations, followed by coordinated "hold and build efforts."

We are coordinating with the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistani military to implement a cohesive counterinsurgency strategy. The military operations will be followed by dedicated outreach efforts to the local population to strengthen their ties to government authorities and reestablish the writ of the state. It is critical that the current military operations in

the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as any future operations in the border region, be followed by the re-establishment of civilian security structures, and assisting internal refugees reconstruct their homes. We will support international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to conduct damage assessments and compile cost estimates. Already Pakistani civilians are returning to some areas, including Lower Buner and Lower Dir, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees will assist others to return by providing transportation and supplies of basic needs.

4. During your visit to Turkey, you issued a joint statement “reaffirming the strong bonds of alliance” between the United States and Turkey. To what extent is Turkey’s admittance to the European Union in the United States’ interest?

**Answer:**

Anchoring Turkey into Euro-Atlantic institutions has been a bipartisan U.S. goal for decades. Although we are not a member, we believe it is in Turkish, European, and U.S. interests to have Turkey as a full member of the European Union (EU).

The prospect of membership in the EU has had a transformative effect on many parts of Europe. We have encouraged implementation of the political and economic reforms required for EU membership to improve the lives of all Turkish citizens and support a vibrant, pluralistic democracy – a goal that Turkey also shares. These reforms also enhance our ability to increase commercial and business ties between our two countries, as President Obama has pledged to do. Turkey’s membership in the EU would also improve cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Turkey has already implemented a number of difficult political reforms not simply because they are good for EU membership, but because they are right for Turkey. President Obama has welcomed these changes and has pressed Turkey to accelerate the pace of its reform process, recognizing that full respect for freedom of religion and expression, commitment to the rule of law, and robust minority rights will further strengthen Turkey and its civil society.

5. Defense Secretary Gates has warned against a “creeping militarization” of US foreign policy and has urged that there be more resources provided to the State Department to engage diplomatically with other countries. I myself am concerned that the 150 function of the budget remains inadequate. What are your plans to strengthen the foreign affairs function (150) of the budget to ensure a proactive, vigorous diplomacy?

**Answer:**

I am committed to ensuring that foreign assistance is well- managed and implemented. I take seriously the need to further modernize how we deliver foreign assistance so it is as strategic, effective, and coordinated as possible. We have not yet completed our review of foreign assistance reform. We are thinking through these issues in a thoughtful and deliberative manner and are coordinating with a broad range of stakeholders.

The focus in these first few months has been on securing the necessary resources to implement a “smart power” agenda. I remain committed to improving and streamlining our delivery of foreign assistance and look forward to consulting closely with the Congress in the weeks ahead.

One of my top priorities is to increase the State Department budget so we wholeheartedly welcome Secretary Gates’ efforts to advocate for increased resources for State. Secretaries Gates and I concur that we must enhance and expand our civilian capacity to do results-oriented, hands-on diplomatic and development work.

While this process is ongoing, we are moving forward with requesting the funding necessary to build the civilian capacity at the Department of State and USAID. The President’s budget makes a significant investment in the future of U.S. diplomacy and development. It will add over 1,200 positions for the Department of State. Roughly 70 percent of the Foreign Service positions will be overseas, with the bulk of the remainder of the new positions focused on training in critical 21st Century skills and supporting overseas programs. The budget also provides resources for 350 new USAID Foreign Service positions – necessary to strengthen the management and oversight of our foreign assistance programs. The budget also builds the civilian capacity to manage and lead efforts in post-conflict states through the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which, in conjunction with the Stabilization Bridge Fund, allows the United States to respond to crises more holistically. And, importantly, this request also puts the Administration on track to double foreign assistance by 2015, thereby providing the resources we need to help the world’s poorest states reduce poverty, combat global health threats, develop markets, and strengthen civil society.

The International Affairs budget represents a fraction of what our government spends each year on national security. Yet today, diplomacy and development are ever more essential to safeguarding the security and prosperity of our people and our nation. While military force is an important part of our national security, so too are our diplomatic and development efforts, which are often the central means by which America can promote stability, confront security challenges, advance economic transformation, respond to humanitarian crises, and encourage better governance, policies, and institutions. Expenditures on diplomacy and development represent an investment that in the long run is less costly in terms of lives and dollars than defense spending that would otherwise be required.

6. The President has appointed two special envoys, one to the Middle East and one to Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are Special Envoys within the Department of State as well. This is in addition to the multiple actors involved in the two major US theaters of war. How do we coordinate these myriad activities to ensure a consistent foreign policy and a unified voice for the US in these areas?

**Answer:**

The challenges we face in the Middle East and Southwest Asia are volatile, complex, and dangerous. The Special Envoy for Middle East Peace and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan appointed by President Obama are at the forefront of the Administration's efforts to address these challenges and help achieve peace and security in the region. They are working to develop integrated strategies by coordinating with senior officials and a broad range of bureaus and offices in the development and formulation of new policy approaches; and they participate, at the request of the Secretary, in inter-agency activities related to the region. The Special Envoy and Special Representative are employees of the Department of State. Both report to, and are under the direction and supervision of the Secretary who, under the President, is responsible for the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

7. Recently, North Korea withdrew from the UN six-nation talks and expelled IAEA inspectors. All this occurred after their test launch of a long-range missile. What are our prospects for diplomacy with North Korea, considering Pyongyang's recent actions?

**Answer:**

The United States continues to pursue our goal of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, the DPRK, Japan, Russia, the ROK, and the United States. While we currently face a difficult moment, we are still working closely with our allies and partners, especially within the Six-Party framework, to hold North Korea to the commitment in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Parties to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

We continue to seek the full implementation of that Joint Statement, under which North Korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA Safeguards.

The United States continues to be willing to engage bilaterally with North Korea in the context of multilateral engagement.

8. Recently, Congress celebrated the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. How would you classify its effectiveness, and would you contemplate any changes to the Act?

**Answer:**

The United States and Taiwan have been well-served by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA serves as the basis for the vibrant economic, cultural, educational, and other ties between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan. We remain fully committed to the TRA and do not believe any changes to the Act are required.

9. Madam Secretary, on April 30 we will remember, and certainly the Vietnamese community in my District will remember, the fall of Saigon (now called Ho Chi Minh City). My question is twofold. First, how would you assess our current relations with Vietnam, and second, what progress have we achieved with regard to Vietnam's respect for human rights?

**Answer:**

Vietnam's relations with the United States have improved dramatically since we normalized diplomatic relations in 1995. Bilateral ties have expanded in parallel with Vietnam's own tremendous economic growth and opening to the outside world. We are working with Vietnam on a growing range of priorities, from health, education and the environment, to rule-of-law and respect for human rights, including religious freedom. We also continue to cooperate in our efforts to fully account for Americans missing from our conflict with Vietnam.

Human rights are the most challenging issue in our relationship. Vietnam has made significant progress in expanding religious freedom, passing new laws to protect freedom of worship, and registering many new religious groups. The government continues, however, to impose serious constraints on political freedoms. People cannot choose their government or form independent organizations, risk detention for peaceful expression of their political views, and are denied fair trials. We continue to engage actively with Vietnam on these concerns at all levels, including through our annual Human Rights Dialogue.

10. For the last half century, Kashmir has been a contentious issue affecting the security of the South Asian subcontinent. What actions can the United States undertake, in conjunction with India and Pakistan, to ensure Kashmir does not become a major flashpoint in the region?

**Answer:**

We have consistently supported bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan that seeks to resolve their outstanding differences. That dialogue made some important progress before the Mumbai attacks including improving trade and communication and advancing people-to-people ties between these two important countries. We hope that dialogue can be resumed and will continue to make progress. Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan is both in their interests and ours.

While the United States does not seek a mediator role, we support high level dialogue between Pakistani and Indian officials. We support a settlement between India and Pakistan that takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009 @ 9:30 a.m.  
Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Jim Costa

1. Unfortunately, President Obama did not recognize the Armenian Genocide on April 24, 2009. The last Administration often said that the Armenian Genocide “should be resolved not by politicians, but through heartfelt introspection by historians, philosophers, and common people.” In 1998, a group of 150 scholars of history, theology, and law encouraged their governments to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide as such. While I believe Turkey and Armenia should have an open dialogue to confront challenges facing their nations, I do not believe that simply looking forward without learning from past events is a positive step in improving relations between these two countries. Also, I am unclear as to why our nation cannot have a foreign policy that accurately reflects history. Simply calling the slaughter and exodus of 1.5 million Armenians a “great atrocity” is inexcusable. Please explain why our foreign policy refuses to properly recognize the Armenian Genocide as such.

**Answer:**

The President’s views on this matter are on the record and have not changed. Similarly, I have never hesitated to make clear my personal belief that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or driven from their homes during the Ottoman Empire. I have repeatedly and publicly called for more open recognition – including within Turkey – of this reality. I have also, like the President, argued that what is most important is the way that the Turkish and Armenian people deal with the past, and that the best way forward is a process that is honest, open and constructive. Like President Obama, I believe that if Turkey and Armenia can move forward and come to terms with a difficult and tragic history, the entire world should encourage them.

2. Are State Department employees free to speak openly and honestly about the Armenian Genocide in public or would they suffer negative consequences like Ambassador John Evans did, after honestly speaking about the Armenian Genocide?

**Answer:**

This administration encourages alternative views in internal policy discussions. Indeed our internal processes are designed to elicit the full range of insights and opinions from foreign policy experts and interagency colleagues. But once a policy has been set, we expect our Ambassadors and other representatives to articulate that policy. To do otherwise would invite confusion and misunderstanding.

3. Afghanistan is going to offer you and President Obama challenges of all shapes and sizes. I am happy to see the President approve more troops for Afghanistan, as I believe the country is center to our war on terrorism. However, we still are not focusing on some of the small problems. We lack people who can speak the many languages floating around Afghanistan. We have not found a way to deal with the thousands of small villages and “tribes” in rural Afghanistan. Our intelligence is hit and miss, and opium production is still a huge cash crop for Afghani farmers. It seems that many of these issues have lingered for the last 7 years and were never addressed. If we do not address them now, I feel our work in Afghanistan will be that much more difficult. What do you and President Obama have planned to improve our soft power in Afghanistan? Can we help in any way?

**Answer:**

As you know, the President has defined our core goal in Afghanistan as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda and preventing their return to Afghanistan. This is a daunting task and requires a new way of thinking about the counterinsurgency challenge before us. We have developed a diplomatic strategy to build support for our efforts through public engagement in the region and at home, work with our international partners and the integration of “hard” and “soft” power.

In Afghanistan, for the first time, we are resourcing the mission adequately to defeat the insurgency and address the conditions that enable it to fester. Our civilian up-lift will enable us to address more effectively the challenges you highlight by reaching out to Afghans in both urban settings and small, remote villages, enabling Afghans to take a greater role managing their country's security and economic development.

The doubling of U.S. civilian positions underway in Afghanistan underscores our commitment to leveraging “soft power” in Afghanistan. We are placing talented civilians with very specific skill sets – including agricultural and irrigation, development, and engineering – in the provinces and districts, where they will have maximum impact for reconstruction and development, which is a critical component of our strategy. Many of these positions are language-designated, and we are investing in training more officers in Dari, Pashto and Farsi in the coming year to serve in Afghanistan.

Agricultural sector job creation is already beginning to undercut poppy cultivation by offering alternative livelihoods. We have spurred this through our civilian staffing increase of USDA, USAID, and other experts in agriculture and economic development. At the same time,

our interdiction efforts, now aimed at traffickers and not farmers, are pressuring those that profit most from poppy cultivation while preventing us from alienating the rural population.

As Secretary Clinton highlighted September 21, we must work on helping the Afghan government increase its credibility, deliver services, and combat corruption.

In a country that is 70 percent rural, and where the Taliban recruiting base is primarily among under-employed youths, overhauling our civilian assistance strategy will assist the Afghan government's credibility and ability to deliver services to its people and better provide for security.

4. Recently, many experts have noted that to bolster U.S.-Russian economic cooperation it is essential to graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Law of 1974. In the context of the dismal Russian domestic situation of lack of human liberties - such as press, assembly, and religion - as well as a dire human rights abuse record, wouldn't the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment whitewash those travesties of basic human freedoms in Russia for the hope that "goodwill" and economic cooperation will be sustained in the future?

**Answer:**

Section 402 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, part of the so-called "Jackson-Vanik" amendment, denies countries eligibility for Normal Trade Relations status as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom of emigration, unless a country is granted a waiver from this requirement. The intent of the amendment was to put pressure on certain Communist countries to allow free emigration and in particular to encourage the former Soviet Union to permit emigration of its Jewish citizens. The situation in Russia with regard to freedom of emigration has changed significantly since 1974. Since 1994, U.S. administrations have consistently found Russia to be in full compliance with the freedom of emigration provisions of Jackson-Vanik and thus, Russia continues to meet conditions for receiving normal trade relations status.

The Obama Administration is reviewing its current policy on the application of Jackson-Vanik to Russia. Ending the application of Jackson-Vanik to Russia would allow the United States and its firms to take full advantage of the commitments and concessions of Russia's eventual WTO membership, which the U.S. Trade Representative is currently negotiating. For example, if Jackson-Vanik is still applied to Russia after Russia's accession to the WTO, the United States will not be able to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to resolve bilateral trade concerns.

Russia's behavior on human rights is a matter of concern to the State Department. We continue to engage with Russia on these issues and look forward to working with Congress on more effective ways to positively influence Russia's attitude toward human rights.



5. During his campaign, The President called for immediate steps to halt to the genocide in Darfur. Do you see this as an attainable goal? What are the current obstacles standing in the way of bringing a stop to the war in Darfur and how can the U.S. lead the way in overcoming them?

**Answer:**

The violence in Darfur is significantly reduced from when it was at its height in 2003-2004. This being said, there is still much to be done in order to bring peace and stability to the people of Darfur. Reaching a political settlement to end the violence in Darfur is one of the top priorities for Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration.

There are many challenges to achieving this goal. Recent violence along the Chad-Sudan border highlights the regional nature of the conflict as well as the poor state of relations between the Sudanese and Chadian governments. Cross-border support for each other's rebel groups continue, which only exacerbates the tensions in the region and hinders efforts aimed at achieving peace.

Despite difficulties in bringing various parties to the table, negotiations in Doha, Qatar are continuing, with a ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Darfuri rebel groups being the immediate goal. Thanks to Qatar's recent efforts to mediate a solution between the various parties in Doha, progress has been made. JEM has agreed to return to the table despite ongoing concerns about the humanitarian situation in Darfur in the wake of the expulsion of 13 international NGOs. The status of ongoing talks, however, remains fragile. Libya and Qatar are also trying to facilitate talks between Chad and Sudan to reduce tensions between the two countries.

Peace and security in Darfur are a top priority for the Special Envoy. He continues to work closely with the international community and important Sudanese and regional actors to achieve this goal. To this end, Special Envoy Gration will travel to Doha on May 27 to meet with Special Envoys to Sudan from France, UK, China, Russia, and the EU. He will lead discussions on the courses of action and ways to improve the coordination of multilateral/multinational actions for greater impact. To foster support for a more inclusive process, Special Envoy Gration plans to meet with Abdul Wahid Al Nur, a key Fur rebel leader, who commands a strong popular support among the IDP camps but remains outside the peace process.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009  
Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

**Rep. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega:**

**Question:**

Will the U.S. Department of State support removing conditions on foreign assistance to Kazakhstan for FY 2010? Since 2003, the Appropriations on Foreign Operations has included language, most recently found in Section 7075 of the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations, allowing the U.S. to provide assistance to Kazakhstan only on the condition if the U.S. Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Kazakhstan has made significant improvements in the protection of human rights, etc.

The U.S. Department of State has not requested this reporting requirement, nor does the Government of Kazakhstan wish to receive funds with this kind of stigma attached by a previous U.S. Administration. The reality is, since achieving independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has reaffirmed the worth and advanced the rights of the human person by working cooperatively with the United States to voluntarily dismantle the world's 4<sup>th</sup> largest nuclear arsenal, and most recently in blending down 6,600 pounds of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium, or enough to produce up to 25 nuclear warheads, as to prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. Kazakhstan has also signed amendments to a bilateral agreement on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction which has moved the U.S and Kazakhstan towards a new level of cooperation in preventing the threat of bio-terrorism after 9/11, Kazakhstan responded quickly to support U.S. coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Kazakhstan allowed over-flight and transshipment, and U.S. accords were signed in 2002 on the emergency use of Kazakhstan's Almaty airport, and on other military-to-military relations. Kazakhstan also deployed a unit of mine sweeping engineers to Iraq which destroyed over 4 million deadly fragments that could have endangered the lives of U.S. troops. Kazakhstan is a participant of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and a new bilateral 2008-2012 military cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Kazakhstan is being put into action.

Kazakhstan has also made great strides towards democracy, earning the support of 56 member nations to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. As a direct result of having worked with Kazakhstan's former Ambassador to the United States, now Secretary of State, for some seven years during his tenure in Washington, I spearheaded an initiative in September 2007 recommending Kazakhstan to Chair the OSCE in 2009 in recognition of Kazakhstan's achievements under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has taken bold steps to bring Kazakhstan out from under the yoke of communism. A number of my colleagues supported my initiative and joined me in sending a letter to Secretary Rice asking her to also support Kazakhstan's

bid. I am pleased that a compromise was worked out among all parties, and that Kazakhstan's bid was accepted for 2010.

On several occasions, I have personally met with President Nazarbayev, here and abroad, and I am fully aware of his efforts to strengthen and promote democracy. In 2007 and 2008, President Nazarbayev introduced sweeping reforms, and his work has been recognized even by Britain's former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. While President Nazarbayev faces many challenges and while Kazakhstan's record is not perfect, Kazakhstan's democracy is young and only 18 years in the making. As David Wilshire, Head of the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, noted, "Building a democracy is a long and hard task," and given the time it has taken America to elect its first African American President, I tend to agree.

In his inaugural address, President Obama emphasized that "America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more." I echo President Obama's sentiments and believe it is time for America to recognize Kazakhstan's progress so that we may work together as friends rather than oppose each other as foes.

At every turn, Kazakhstan has proven itself to be a key ally of the United States and, today, Kazakhstan has become the most stable and prosperous nation in Central Asia. Now, at a time when U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is increasing, I am hopeful the U.S. will return Kazakhstan's friendship and acknowledge its progress by eliminating language conditioning U.S. support on certification requirements.

**Answer:**

The State Department generally opposes Congressional determination requirements that limit the President's ability to conduct foreign policy.

Since 2003, the Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary has determined and reported annually to Congress on whether the Government of Kazakhstan has made significant improvements in the protection of human rights and civil liberties under the terms of the legislation. In 2003 and 2004, the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary determined that the Government of Kazakhstan had made such significant improvements. Since 2005, the Department assessed that the Government of Kazakhstan had not made significant improvements, but, as provided in the legislation, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary waived the determination on U.S. national security grounds. There has been no effect on the provision of assistance to Kazakhstan since the requirement was imposed.

**Question:**

The EAP, or East Asia and the Pacific, region remains the smallest regional recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Foreign aid to the region fell after the Cold War and has increased only since 2001 largely due to funding for counter-terrorism efforts in the Philippines and Indonesia, both of which are home to several insurgency movements and radical Islamist organizations with ties to Al Qaeda.

While I support counter-terrorism efforts, I believe the U.S. must focus more attention on its long-time allies including Pacific Island nations. In 1994, USAID closed its office for the South Pacific, citing budget constraints and shifting strategic priorities. However, at the time, the U.S. was only spending \$12 million annually in the Pacific Island countries.

With a budget of well over three trillion dollars, it seems preposterous to me that USAID had to close its doors to the Pacific Island nations citing an inability to offer a measly \$12 million in annual assistance to the people of the Pacific who fought side by side with U.S. Forces during WWII. From 1946 to 1958, the U.S. also used the Pacific Islands as a nuclear testing ground and, for that alone, in my opinion, these island nations deserve U.S. assistance forever more as we cannot ever repay the damage done, the lives lost, or the sacrifices made so that America could be free.

Under your leadership, will the U.S. State Department restore USAID to Pacific Island countries?

**Answer:**

We deeply appreciate the sacrifices Pacific island nations have made in the cause of freedom, as well as their strong support for U.S. positions in the United Nations. USAID closed its regional mission in the Pacific in 1996. This was due to both funding constraints and the fact that Pacific island nations' GDP per capita generally exceeded the income levels for countries to which USAID provides assistance.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Government retains several development assistance programs in the South Pacific, including:

- Under their compacts of free association with the United States, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RM) combined receive USG assistance of over \$200 million annually (chiefly from the Department of the Interior), a per capital level of well above \$1,000, higher than that of any USAID program in the world.
- Under the terms of the South Pacific "Tuna Treaty," 14 Pacific island states receive a combined \$18 million annually from the U.S. foreign assistance budget.
- Vanuatu has a five-year, \$65 million Compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which entered into force in 2006 and focuses on improving transportation infrastructure.
- Papua New Guinea (PNG) has a \$2.5 million bilateral USAID assistance program that focuses on that country's very serious HIV/AIDS program. PNG also benefitted from \$481,000 in FY 2008 USAID assistance programs for coral reef and tropical forest protection from our Bangkok-based USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA).
- The Solomon Island benefitted from \$160,000 in FY 2008 USAID/RDMA assistance for coral reef issues.
- The Pacific island nations also received approximately \$175,000 in FY 2008 USG foreign assistance funds for small environmental and democracy projects.

- The Peace Corps has programs in the FSM, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, and Vanuatu.
- USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided disaster assistance to Fiji, PNG, and the Solomon Islands thus far in FY 2009. OFDA also has assumed responsibility for disaster preparedness activities in the RMI and FSM formerly carried out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- Since 1995, OFDA has supported the Pacific Islands Disaster Program, implemented by The Asia Foundation. Its objectives are to improve the capacity and performance of local and national disaster management agencies and individuals; develop and adapt training materials relevant to the region, and; strengthen the capacity of Pacific island nations to organize and conduct disaster management courses. Its Phase II, 2004- 2008, continued activities begun in 13 states, to adapt USAID-developed training materials for Pacific countries. Total funding through FY 2009 is over \$4.0M.
- The U.S. Navy fleet's 2008 "Pacific Partnership" program provided medical treatment to 20,000 people in PNG and 17,000 in the FSM. This year's Pacific Partnership ship visit program will provide medical, dental, veterinary, and engineering assistance to the Marshall Islands, Tonga, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Samoa.

Nevertheless, we recognize that the Pacific islands face a variety of serious development challenges, including infectious diseases; the impact of global warming; high energy and transportation costs; and the effects of the global economic crisis. Hence, although we are not prepared at this time to make a commitment as to how USAID might expand its programming in the Pacific, we are taking all of these factors into account in our global planning for appropriate U.S. foreign assistance programming and USAID staffing over the coming years.

**Question:**

Several studies estimate that from 1961 to 1971 the U.S. military sprayed more than 11 million gallons of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Agent Orange was manufactured under Department of Defense (DOD) contracts by several companies including Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Dioxin, a toxic contaminant known to be one of the deadliest chemicals made by man, was an unwanted byproduct and is thought to be responsible for most of the medical problems associated with exposure to Agent Orange.

At the time, the U.S. military claimed the use of Agent Orange was necessary to defoliate Vietnam's dense jungle in order to deprive the Viet Cong of hiding places. However, declassified documents uncovered in the U.S. National Archives indicate that as early as 1967, the U.S. knew that although "defoliation itself was successful," the use of Agent Orange had "little effect on military operations."

According to Hatfield Consultants, the documents also suggest that the chemical companies and DOD knew as early as 1967 of the potential long-term health risks, and sought to "censor" relevant news reports, "fearing a negative backlash from government and the public."

A 1983 *NY Times* article by David Burnham entitled, "1965 Memo Show Dow's Anxiety on Dioxin." Mr. Burnham reports that in 1965, "scientists from four rival chemical companies attended a closed meeting at the Dow Chemical Company's headquarters. The subject was the health hazards of dioxin. According to the report, Dow did not want its findings about dioxin to be made known fearing a "Congressional investigation."

More than 30 years later, while research clearly shows that Agent Orange was much more hazardous than anyone would admit, U.S. and Vietnamese victims have not been adequately compensated, and Vietnam has not been cleaned-up. To this day, Agent Orange dioxin remains in the ecosystem. Studies conducted in Vietnam by Hatfield Consultants from 1994-2000 show that "nearly 30 years after cessation of hostilities, dioxin remains at alarmingly high concentrations in soils, foods, human blood and human breast milk in adults and children inhabiting areas in close proximity to a former U.S. military installation."

Despite these findings, the U.S., according to our State Department, has only provided \$2 million for technical and scientific activities to help clean up Vietnam. While P.L. 110-28 set aside \$3 million for environmental remediation and to support health programs in communities near those sites, as of March 2008, the U.S. State Department had not released those funds, or determined how they would be spent.

In contrast, from 2003 to 2006, the U.S. appropriated \$35.7 billion for Iraq reconstruction. For Germany, according to the Congressional Research Service, "in constant 2005 dollars, the United States provided a total of \$29.3 billion in assistance from 1946-1952 with 60% in economic grants and nearly 30% in economic loans, and the remainder in military aid." Total U.S. assistance to Japan for 1946-1952 was roughly \$15.2 billion in 2005 dollars, of which 77% was grants and 23% was loans.

Will the Obama Administration do more to assist Vietnam?

**Answer:**

As a result of our rapidly expanding bilateral relationship, the United States and Vietnam work closely together to address a wide range of environmental and health concerns in Vietnam, including dioxin contamination. Agent Orange/dioxin environmental remediation and health activities are an important part of the U.S. foreign assistance program in Vietnam.

Of the \$3 million set aside in P.L. 110-28 for "environmental remediation and health activities" at "hot spots" in Vietnam, we have spent \$1 million on three health projects to help residents of Danang access health services and gain skills that enable them to overcome disabilities to find gainful employment. In September 2008, the grants, which are managed by USAID, were awarded to three organizations: Save the Children, East Meets West Foundation, and Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped. We also utilized a total of \$550,000 for support costs, staffing to implement the Dioxin/Agent Orange program through FY 2010, and invitational travel to Vietnam for U.S. experts in dioxin remediation. The remaining \$1.45 million has been budgeted for environmental containment and remediation planning at the Danang airport. We

are now coordinating with the Government of Vietnam on logistics in order to move forward on the project.

The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2009 designated an additional \$3 million for Agent Orange/dioxin activities in Vietnam; we are finalizing plans for how best to integrate these funds into existing health and remediation programs to ensure our programs have the greatest impact.

In planning for all Agent Orange/dioxin-related U.S. foreign assistance programs in Vietnam, the United States government coordinates with the Vietnamese government, as well as the other foreign governments, multilateral organizations, and donors involved in Agent Orange/dioxin activities in Vietnam. We all share a common goal: a clean, safe environment for the people of Vietnam. Communication channels, such as the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Advisory Committee, which will next meet in September and includes Vietnamese and U.S. government officials, ensure close cooperation as we move forward to address Agent Orange/dioxin issues.

**Question:**

From 1964-1973, it is estimated that the U.S. dropped more than 2 million tons of ordnance over Laos, double the amount dropped on Germany during WWII. The number of unexploded sub-munitions in Laos range from 8 million to 80 million, with less than one half of one percent destroyed.

According to some estimates, unexploded ordnance (UXO) have killed or maimed 12,000-13,000 Laotians, and continue to kill men, women and children on an annual basis. Cluster munitions have also hindered economic development in the agricultural country, with approximately 25% of Laotian villages affected. In 2004, U.S. government officials estimated it would take 24 years to clear high-priority agricultural land, and complete clearance of the country would take over 100 years.

Providing an annual average of only \$2.8 million, the United States Government is the single, largest contributor to UXO clearance operations. Also, although Laos is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, it is one of the smallest recipients of U.S. assistance.

Will the U.S. Department of State increase assistance for UXO clearance operations and support efforts to provide the People's Democratic Republic of Laos with military maps and records more accurately pinpointing the locations of U.S. bombing campaigns as a means to more adequately address cleanup efforts?

**Answer:**

As we expand our bilateral cooperation, the United States and Laos are working closely on a range of humanitarian issues, including recovery of service members missing in action and UXO clearance operations. UXO clearance operations are an important part of the U.S. foreign assistance program in Laos.

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the State Department will provide a total of \$3.25 million from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account to Laos for mine and UXO clearance in FY 2009. Laos has made very good use of the U.S. assistance it has received for UXO clearance, and although the country's capacity to utilize additional resources effectively is limited, additional funding would support well-planned and effectively conducted clearance operations. The Administration has not yet determined future funding requests for UXO clearance in Laos.

Accurate strike data is important for the national UXO clearance planning that Laos conducts, and the data the U.S. military provided in 1998 has been useful in establishing priorities for clearance operations funded through the Department of State and other donors. We understand that the government of Laos is preparing a request that the United States update that strike data, specifically to include information declassified subsequent to the original research. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is prepared to work with the Department of Defense after receipt of such a request from Laos to ensure that clearance operations in Laos are being conducted based on the best data available.

**Question:**

On March 3, 2009, nine of my colleagues joined with me in sending a letter to you regarding UN reform and our need to affect reform by obtaining the support of member states. We specifically drew your attention to the Pacific Island nations which cast 12 votes in the UN General Assembly. Given the strategic geographic importance of the Pacific Island nations but recognizing the lack of support they have received in recent years from the United States, we asked if you would support a humanitarian assistance program regarding diabetes prevention which could be implemented immediately for less than \$1,000,000.

On April 17, 2009, your Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs responded that the State Department would not support this effort, and cited assistance being provided through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to the U.S. Territories and Freely Associated States. I believe he missed the point of our letter. Our request is for program assistance to the independent Pacific Island nations.

In the Pacific Islands, diabetes is now a major debilitating illness. Medical services presently available in the region are not adequate to provide the help needed by persons afflicted by this disease or to educate young people on lifestyle changes that could prevent its occurrence. Outside help is needed both for treatment and prevention. We have good reason to believe that Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem is ready to implement such a program, and that such a program would also support the Administration's goal to rebuild our alliances and advance American interests, including UN reform.

I believe there are overriding reasons of national interest that fully justify an allocation of funds for this effort. Will you personally support this initiative?

**Answer:**



Thank you for your continuing interest in the issue of diabetes in the Pacific island nations. As noted in Acting Assistant Secretary Polt's letter of April 17 we are engaged in the Pacific region in a number of ways, including on diabetes issues in the U.S. Pacific territories and the three independent Pacific island nations that are freely associated with the United States. We are providing other health assistance to Pacific island states as well. USAID has a \$2.5 million HIV/AIDS assistance program in Papua New Guinea. The U.S. Navy fleet's 2008 "Pacific Partnership" program provided medical treatment to 20,000 people in Papua New Guinea and 17,000 in the Federated States of Micronesia. This year's Pacific Partnership ship visit program will provide medical, dental, veterinary, and engineering assistance to the Marshall Islands, Tonga, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Samoa.

In addition, countries such as Australia and New Zealand, island nations with substantial ties to the developing states of the Pacific, share much of the development assistance burden, and we welcome their generosity. We applaud Hadassah Hospital's efforts to date and would welcome additional Israeli non-governmental or governmental support for diabetes and other development issues in the Pacific.

Unfortunately, the Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) Account, which would be the appropriate U.S. funding source for such an activity, is largely earmarked for specific diseases. The use of virtually all non-earmarked GHCS funds is determined by how they advance the Millennium Development Goals for health, in which diabetes does not play a major part. We are not prepared to fund this program from other foreign assistance accounts at this time.

**Question:**

With Pres. Hu's pending visit to the U.S. this summer, can you give us an update on the status of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and particularly its focus on climate change and other environmental issues? I note that the "Roadmap for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change" published by the Asia Society and Pew Center for Global Climate Change included a number of important suggestions for bilateral cooperation. As the two largest GHG emitters, I applaud the suggestions of the roadmap and note that a number of its contributors – Steven Chu, Todd Stern, Jeff Bader – are holding key positions in the Obama Administration.

**Answer:**

The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) will likely take place at the end of July. As demonstrated by the Ten Year Framework for Energy and Environment Cooperation, we believe the S&ED provides an important opportunity to promote and facilitate cooperation between China and the U.S. on clean energy and climate change, and we plan to increase cooperation in this area.

**Question:**

North Korea remains a terribly frustrating country to deal with, but you and the rest of the Obama team deserve enormous credit for crafting a UN Security Council condemnation of Pyongyang's provocative missile test – your ability to bring the Chinese and Russians on board is testament to how important engaging the region in the issue is. One obstacle to greater cooperation with Japan, however, is the abductee issue. As terrible as North Korean behavior has been in this regard, and as much as the Japanese public is horrified over what happened, I think the problems posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions is a clear danger. Dealing with historical problems can always be difficult – for example it took until 19XX before the U.S. took responsibility for its actions in deposing the Hawaiian monarchy. But I wonder if there is any way out of this so that the Japanese can more fully engage on the North Korean nuclear issue. What will your policy be regarding the abductee issue?

**Answer:**

The United States remains committed to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. As called for by the UN Security Council in the April 13 Presidential Statement, we continue to seek the full implementation of the Six-Party September 19, 2005 Joint Statement under which North Korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA Safeguards. We continue close consultation with our allies and partners in the Six-Party Talks to discuss the problem of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

We strongly urge the DPRK to address Japan's concerns regarding the Japanese abductees without further delay. The United States wholeheartedly supports Japan's position on the abduction issue. I met with the families of abductees during my recent trip to Japan and learned first-hand the suffering of the families of the Japanese abductees. We will not forget the abductees and their families and will continue to raise the issue at every opportunity.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing  
New Beginnings:  
Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
Wednesday, April 22, 9:30a.m.

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Barbara Lee

**Question 1a:**

Cuba

Cuban Americans are celebrating their restored right to travel to see their families and to assist their families with remittances. I was pleased that the President also saw the benefit in allowing increased communications with Cuba as well.

I hope that these are just the first steps in ending one of the last remaining remnants of outdated Cold War policies in the Western Hemisphere and that the United States can move quickly to normalize relations with our nearest Caribbean neighbor.

Madam Secretary, I have a few questions regarding several other aspects of the United States' policy toward Cuba.

The State Department lists 3 main reasons for maintaining Cuba on the list of State Sponsor's of Terrorism list.

Cuba did not support the Bush global war on terror and that they took no direct action against al-Qaida.

Cuba may or may not be developing biotechnology for offensive weapons.

And lastly that Cuba refuses to extradite fugitives from the US, most of whom entered Cuba during the 1970's.

The final line of the State Department's own findings regarding Cuba as a sponsor of terrorists simply states that "The United States is not aware of specific terrorist enclaves in the country."

Back in 1998, the Defense Intelligence Agency released a report that flatly stated that "Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the U.S. or to other countries in the region. Cuba has little motivation to engage in military activity beyond defense of its territory and political system."

I recently traveled to Cuba with the first delegation to Cuba to meet with the New President and we saw no sign that Cuba was at all hostile to the United States or any of her neighbors. *Madam Secretary, do you believe that Cuba currently poses a significant threat the America's national security?*

**Answer:**

Cuba continues to provide safe haven to members of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations within its territory. As indicated in the recently released *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, we observed the Cuban government's support for and tolerance of non-state terrorist groups, including designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN), and Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in 2008. Cuba's provision of safe haven to members of such organizations is contrary to the national security interests of the United States.

**Question 1b:**

*Do you believe that it is necessary to keep Cuba on the list along with Iran, Sudan and Syria?*

**Answer:**

Given the high threshold for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, it is appropriate that a designation remain until a state sponsor has proven over a period of time its commitment not to support international terrorism. By law, a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation can be rescinded only after the President has certified in a report to Congress that the government of the country in question, in this case, Cuba, is no longer supporting international terrorism and the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Our diplomacy is strengthened by the discretion to consider a variety of relevant factors, in addition to the ones required by the statute, in determining whether a state sponsor designation should be rescinded.

While Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world, the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several members of terrorist organizations, as indicated above. The Cuban authorities have also continued to allow some fugitive members of U.S.-based militant groups accused of criminal acts in the United States, such as hijacking, murder, and bank robbery to remain in Cuba. These factors, among others, would be considered in any evaluation as to whether Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism should be rescinded.

**Question 2:**

I, along with Chairman Rangel, requested a study by the Government Accountability Office, (GAO) on the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), at the Treasury Department, and their efforts in enforcing the trade and travel ban with Cuba.

The GAO found, (in their report GAO-08-80) that OFAC's efforts at enforcing the travel ban to Cuba was not a sound, risk based allocation of their assets and had an especially negative impact on the ability of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials to effectively screen travelers from countries because of their focus on Cuba travelers. *What are the next steps that the Administration is considering in thawing the relationship with Cuba and will the President sign the bill lifting the travel ban for all Americans if it passes the Congress?*

**Answer:**

As we review and change current practices relating to travel and remittances, we hope to see evidence that the Government of Cuba has committed itself to addressing disparities among its citizens in the enjoyment of human rights and economic opportunity in Cuba.

The United States remains focused on the need for democratic reforms and improved human rights conditions in Cuba. We will continually evaluate how best to promote these key objectives, as well as promoting the right of the Cuban people to chart their own future.

**Question 3a:**

*Darfur*

Madam Secretary, I would like to commend the Administration's appointment of General Scott Gration as special envoy to Sudan, who will provide special attention to the ongoing genocide in Darfur, full implementation of the CPA, and the pressing humanitarian crisis.

This appointment of this important position, which I recently encouraged in a letter to President Obama, will help to spark dialogue and move us past the stalemate that has allowed violence to persist and humanitarian conditions to worsen in Sudan.

As you well know Madam Secretary, the situation in Darfur, Sudan continues to deteriorate, and at a rapid pace. The recent expelling of many non-governmental aid organizations has placed more than 1 million lives in jeopardy. *What is the United States doing, whether diplomatically or operationally to fill the vacuum in critical humanitarian relief services in the wake of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's decision to compel the departure of prominent international aid organizations in March*

**Answer:**

We are working closely with the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other key donors, and relevant elements of the Government of Sudan (GOS) to identify, track, and quickly address the most critical humanitarian gaps

left by the Government's decision to expel the NGOs. USAID moved immediately to fund expanded NGO and UN operations and continues to work with our international partners, including the UN, to ensure that we address the most critical humanitarian gaps.

Our new Special Envoy to Sudan, Major General J. Scott Gration (Ret.), traveled to Sudan in April and made encouraging progress negotiating with in the GOS to improve the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Sudan. Finally, the United States (represented by SE Gration and senior USAID officials) and other key donors agreed to press the GOS to provide a more predictable, accountable, and effective aid delivery system and to adhere to prior humanitarian commitments.

USAID's Acting Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance actively participated in the Special Envoy's engagement in May in Sudan, to help give specific content to the Administration's policy and commitment to remove constraints on humanitarian and peace-building efforts in Sudan. Meanwhile, the United Nations humanitarian agencies have assumed much of the responsibility for filling short-term gaps in key areas, such as the provision of food and water.

**Question 3b:**

*What is the United States doing, whether diplomatically or operationally to restore a basic level of stability and security for civilians, aid workers, as well as African Union and United Nations peacekeepers*

**Answer:**

The United States is committed to supporting peace efforts aimed at ending the conflict in Darfur and promoting regional stability. Full stability and security for civilians and aid workers in Darfur will only come when all parties to the conflict cease their provocations and violent actions. The United States is working closely with UN/AU Mediator Djibril Bassole to urge the parties to join the Doha peace process immediately. Furthermore, the United States welcomes the Qatari and Libyan-sponsored bilateral talks in Doha between Sudan and Chad as a positive step forward and calls on the two countries to end all cross-border violence.

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is providing safety and security to the extent that it can to these groups. The mission has increased its patrols in key areas to reinforce the protection of civilians. The U.S. has supported these efforts both through the payment of our assessments through the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account and with \$150 million in bilateral Peacekeeping Operations funds to train and equip over 6,000 Darfur-bound peacekeepers from Rwanda, Senegal, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and other UNAMID troop and police contributing countries.

**Question 4:**

As you know, during its brutal war in Southern Sudan, the Government of Sudan had cut off access to humanitarian aid with devastating effects for civilians. *What steps is the United States prepared to take if the Government of Sudan does not reverse the humanitarian expulsions? How does the US intend to change the status quo in Sudan?*

**Answer:**

The Administration has publicly and consistently condemned the Government of Sudan's reckless decision to expel thirteen international relief groups and to revoke three national aid groups' registration to operate. Immediately after the expulsion decision, the United States began coordinating closely with the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other key donors, and relevant elements of the Government of Sudan (GOS) to ensure that the most critical humanitarian gaps are filled.

Special Envoy to Sudan, Major General J. Scott Gratton (Ret.) made addressing the humanitarian issue his top priority during his two trips to Sudan last month. His efforts resulted in a negotiated compromise with the GOS to improve the operating environment for humanitarian actors in Sudan.

During his second trip to Sudan and the region, Special Envoy Gratton continued to push forward with the GOS to find ways to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the expulsion order. The GOS has since stated it will allow new NGOs to register in Sudan to help fill key gaps.

The Special Envoy in close coordination with other donors will continue to press the GOS to quickly fulfill its commitments to improve the humanitarian situation and to develop and implement a framework that will allow NGOs and UN agencies to operate in an environment that allows them to effectively meet the needs of the people of Sudan.

**Question 5:**

The African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) force continues to operate well below capacity, some reports indicate as low as 60% of its intended strength. *What can the United States do to ensure success of the AU/U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur?*

**Answer:**

As of 31 March 2009, the UN had deployed 13,134 UNAMID military personnel, 67 percent of UNAMID's total authorized military strength. Deployments continue; if all scheduled units deploy as currently scheduled, UNAMID will be 92 percent deployed by the end of 2009. There are several things the United States can do and is doing to ensure UNAMID's success. We have provided over \$150 million in training and equipment to

African Troop and Police Contributing Countries and we provided the UN with airlift assistance to move critical equipment into Darfur. We highlight UNAMID as a priority in every appropriate international forum. We actively encourage potential donors to help fill critical equipment and asset gaps, such as helicopters. We are prepared to deploy expert military advisors into key leadership roles in UNAMID when/if their visa requests are granted by the Government of Sudan.

**Question 6:**

*Afghanistan*

I would like to address recent reports indicating that the United States currently has 18 Foreign Service officers who can speak Pashto—the language of ethnic Pashtuns who represent about 42% of the population and traditionally have governed Afghanistan. Only two of these officers are now serving in Afghanistan, in the capital of Kabul.

These numbers are particularly striking when compared to the number of U.S. officials who had learned Vietnamese by the end of the Vietnam War—somewhere near 5,000 individuals. *Can you confirm the number of Foreign Service officers or State Department employees working in Afghanistan that are proficient in Pashto? Are there any such employees working outside of Kabul?*

**Answer:**

Foreign language skills are critical to the success of our mission overseas and the Department is developing a base cadre of Dari and Pashto speakers among our Foreign Service staff, supplemented by native-speaker local staff. Two officers proficient in Pashto are currently working in our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and, as of May, we have sixteen students in Pashto-language training.

In addition to these language-trained officers, virtually all of our officers serving in the provinces in the PRTs have native-speaker local staff who provide translation/interpretation work as well as cultural and political insights and guidance. For those officers at PRTs without State-hired local staff, either USAID or the military have local staff that fulfills these roles.

**Question 7:**

*What languages are spoken by the other 58% of the Afghan population and how many employees does the State Department have in Afghanistan proficient in speaking these languages? How many language proficient officers do you believe we need on the ground in Afghanistan to accomplish the President's mission?*

**Answer:**



The Ethnologue, the authoritative source for information on language use, lists 47 languages actively spoken in Afghanistan. Because many of these languages are only spoken by a small numbers of speakers, the Department makes best use of its limited resources by training our officers going to language designated positions in either Dari or Pashto, the two official languages of Afghanistan. Currently serving in Afghanistan, we have two officers proficient in Pashto and 20 proficient in Dari.

In addition to our language-trained officers, the Embassy has translating staff and virtually all of our officers serving in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have native-speaker local staff who provide translation / interpretation work as well as cultural and political insights and guidance.

As to how many language proficient officers are needed on the ground in Afghanistan to accomplish the President's mission, the Department has designated 51 key positions as requiring language proficiency - 36 positions for Dari, 10 for Pashto, and 5 positions for either Dari or Pashto.

**Question 8:**

*If the Administration hopes to win this war by utilizing significant elements of soft power, shouldn't we be dedicating significantly more resources to bolster important diplomatic capabilities such as language proficiency?*

**Answer:**

Increasing our diplomatic capacity, especially in an area like language proficiency, is one of our priorities. With Congress' assistance, we have been able to begin hiring additional personnel in FY2009, which will allow us to develop a "training complement" (i.e., to develop sufficient personnel numbers to both train AND staff our positions). We are focusing on specialized training and professional development needs, most notably competency in critical languages and increased cooperation with our military colleagues.

The Department's foreign policy objectives have led to a proliferation of language-designated positions. The 300 language training positions funded in FY 2009 and the 180 new positions requested in the FY 2010 budget are critical to our continued success in expanding and improving training in critical needs languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Korean), particularly those that require two years of training to meet professional proficiency standards. Full-time Chinese training has more than doubled since 2001 and Arabic enrollments have tripled. We expect continued growth in the need for these critical languages, along with Dari, Farsi, Pashto, Hindi, and others spoken in countries of growing engagement.

**Question 9:**

*Do you believe the Administration is currently able to effectively utilize all tools in the foreign policy tool belt? Where do deficiencies lie, if any?*

**Answer:**

Your question goes to the heart of the Obama Administration's "smart power" strategy for global engagement—a critical priority I have signaled since my confirmation hearing in January 2009. We have been focused in the past year on building our capacity to use the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. This "smart power" strategy has translated into specific policy approaches:

- We have been actively creating new vehicles for cooperation with a broad set of partners, leveraging more effective partnerships through our power to convene and connect, such as with the President's Global Engagement Initiative and our Food Security Initiative;
- We have pursued principled engagement with those who disagree with us, as in our diplomatic overture to North Korea;
- We are integrating civilian and military action in conflict areas, as you have seen in our "Three D" strategy in Afghanistan; and
- We have been leveraging key sources of American economic power and leadership by example, as in the US prohibition of torture and movement to close the Guantanamo detention facility and in acknowledging the US role in Mexico's burgeoning narcotics problem or in global climate change.

A critical new "smart power" approach to foreign policy has been the elevating of development as a core pillar of American power. Two important and closely coordinated reviews of our nation's development policy are now underway. The inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that I have ordered is led by officials from USAID and State (and is being coordinated with similar processes at Defense, CIA and Homeland Security.) The Presidential Study Directive on U.S. Global Development Policy is led by the White House and includes representatives from more than 15 agencies that contribute to our global development mission.

We are working to improve the coordination of diplomacy and development across Washington. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many government agencies have to think and act globally. Treasury, Justice, HHS/CDC, EPA and many others all have a role to play in global issues. But, as a growing number of agencies broaden their scope internationally and add important expertise and capacity, even working on the same issue from different angles, coordination has lagged behind. The result is an array of programs that overlap or even contradict one another.

This is a source of growing frustration and concern, but it is also an opportunity to create more forceful and effective programs. The challenge facing the State Department and

USAID is to work with all the other agencies to coordinate, lead and support effective implementation of the Administration's strategy.

Indeed, this is our core mission. Through our permanent worldwide presence, our strategic vision, and our charge to advance America's interests abroad, we can help align overseas diplomatic and development efforts with our strategic objectives and national interests. This will not be easy, but it will make our government work more effective, efficient and enduring.

**Question 10a:**

*No Permanent Bases in Iraq or Afghanistan*

Madam Secretary, on six occasions Congress passed and President Bush signed, legislation that included provisions prohibiting permanent or long-term military bases in Iraq (i.e., PL 109-289, PL 109-364, PL 110-28, PL 110-116, PL 110-161, PL 110-181). I believe you and President Obama supported this position when you served in the Senate. *Am I correct in assuming that the prohibition against permanent bases is still Administration policy now that both of you are in the Executive Branch?*

**Answer:**

U.S. forces are continuing to return and close bases as security improves throughout Iraq. As of February 21, 2009, U.S. forces had a total of 50 large bases, including Contingency Operation Bases (COB) and Contingency Operation Sites (COS), and approximately 202 Contingency Operation Locations (COL) and 134 additional training facilities and sites. Since July 2008, U.S. forces have returned or closed 36 bases in the International Zone and across Iraq and are scheduled to return or close 11 COSs, 49 COLs, and four other facilities over the next six months. The remaining bases will be returned as conditions permit until all bases are returned in accordance with the Security Agreement, no later than December 31, 2011.

**Question 10b:**

*Is it also the policy of the Administration to disavow permanent military bases in Afghanistan? If not, why?*

**Answer:**

The United States has a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future. While an increased deployment of U.S. troops is underway, we are shifting the emphasis of our mission in Afghanistan to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. We are assisting Afghanistan to be able to take responsibility for its security so that we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.

**Question 11a:****Iraq**

Last month marked the sixth anniversary of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war and occupation has claimed the lives of more than 4,000 servicemen and women. More than 31,000 others have been wounded.

This war has caused serious damage to America's international reputation, and created a generation of future enemies incensed by the endless occupation of their country by a foreign power.

I am encouraged by President Obama's plan to end the war in Iraq, and withdrawal all combat troops by August 31, 2010. However, I do have serious concerns regarding the President Obama's plan to leave as many as 50,000 troops behind well into the year 2011.

Ending the war and occupation means redeploying all troops and all military contractors out of Iraq. It also means the United States must not leave behind permanent bases and renounce any claims upon Iraqi oil. *Will U.S. combat troops remain in Iraqi cities beyond the proposed deadline on June 30<sup>th</sup> should the Iraqi government request it?*

**Answer:**

The United States plans to implement fully its obligation under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement to withdraw all U.S. combat forces from cities, villages, and localities no later than June 30, 2009. U.S. combat forces are on schedule to leave all Iraqi cities, villages, and localities in all 18 governorates – including Ninewa and Diyala – by the June 30 deadline. In fact, U.S. combat forces have already begun leaving Joint Security Stations in Baghdad and are dismantling or turning over to Iraqi Security Forces facilities in other cities in preparation for the withdrawal. In coordination with the Iraqi government, and consistent with the Security Agreement, non-combat forces such as trainers will remain in some locations.

**Question 11b:**

*Will U.S. troops remain in Iraq beyond 2011 should the Iraqi government request it?*

**Answer:**

Under the Security Agreement between the United States and Iraq, all U.S. forces will re-deploy from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As President Obama announced on February 27, "I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011."

**Question 12:****Haiti**

I want to turn now to Haiti and commend you Madame Secretary for drawing attention to the current crisis just off our shores. I applaud the Administration's pledge of an additional \$57 million in foreign assistance to Haiti, particularly those funds directed towards Haiti's debt service obligations and to the rebuilding of roads and other infrastructure. The latter, of course, is essential to not only spurring economic growth but to providing basic services like healthcare and education, especially in rural and remote areas throughout the country.

In addition to these essential contributions, Haiti holds a real and pressing need for capacity development at all levels of government and within the private sector, specifically in the realms of economic governance, resource management, infrastructural development, agriculture, healthcare, and education. In order to successfully utilize aid dollars, the Haitian state and private sector must possess the basic know-how and resources to channel this aid effectively and efficiently.

For this reason, I have introduced H.R. 417, the Next Steps for Haiti Act of 2009. With the support of USAID – and in partnership with the Government of Haiti and civil society – my legislation would create a professional exchange program that would place U.S. professionals, particularly Haitian-Americans, in Haiti in the fields of education, healthcare, and engineering. *Would you agree that such an initiative would significantly strengthen efforts to promote Haiti's long-term development and stabilization?*

**Answer:**

Haiti's political and socio-economic development is one of the Administration's top priorities in the Western Hemisphere and capacity-building is an important component of our assistance. The U.S. Government strongly supports additional opportunities for exchanges and cooperation between U.S. and Haitian professionals, including those that involve Haitian-Americans, if new human and financial resources are appropriated. Existing professional exchange programs include a journalist exchange on cross-border issues and a Social Studies Educators Summer Seminar between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as well as the International Visitors Leadership (IVLP) and Fulbright Visiting Scholar programs between Haiti and the United States. Another example of existing government support in this arena is the expanding U.S. Fulbright Specialist Program. A U.S. Fulbright Specialist recently led a successful seminar in Haiti around the themes of environmental preservation and engineering, and water quality management.

Haiti also makes excellent use of the IVLP, with both Regional and Multi-Regional Projects. In addition, the United States provides training for teachers and school administrators, funds more than 70 Haitian government health clinics, and

supports capacity-building programs in government ministries, the President's office, parliament, and political parties. The United States provides advisors to key ministries and in 2008 supported anti-corruption training for more than 700 officials. The United States also supports police training, judicial and prison reform, greater coordination between the judiciary, police, and prisons as well as counternarcotics assistance to the Haitian National Police. The U. S. government also supports work with local organizations to promote civic education and the growth of civil society. These efforts demonstrate the Administration's commitment to the kind of professionalization that this legislation seeks to promote as an important element of Haiti's development.

**Question 13:**

On a related note, at the Haiti Donors Conference last week you expressed the Administration's intention to create a nonprofit organization that would aim to pool and coordinate the vast resources of the Haitian Diaspora within the United States. U.S. remittances to Haiti average \$1.7 billion per year, or more than one quarter of Haiti's annual income. Given that these represent only a fraction of the total earnings of Haitian-Americans, the nonprofit idea seems to be an intelligent means of tapping into the vast potential of the Haitian Diaspora, and of enhancing or multiplying the poverty-reducing effects of said remittances.

*What are the Administration's current plans in relation to this proposed charitable organization for Haitian-Americans? How can we make sure such an organization empowers, not inhibits, the Government of Haiti to provide basic services and promote economic development? What are the ways in which such an organization may work in tandem with the professional exchange program outlined by my Next Steps for Haiti bill?*

**Answer:**

In the absence of specific statutory authority, the State Department is prohibited from establishing or acquiring a corporation by the Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9102, but we could encourage private individuals to form such a corporation. We are working closely with the office of the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, former President Bill Clinton, to encourage active participation by members of the Haitian Diaspora in the Envoy's investment missions to Haiti. Another option for supporting Haiti's economic development and leveraging the skills of the Haitian Diaspora is promoting the Haitian Diaspora Marketplace, a USAID initiative designed to encourage Haitian Americans' direct investment in Haiti.

**Question 14a:**

Gaza

Madam Secretary, in March of this year you pledged \$900 million in U.S. assistance to the Palestinians. I applaud the Administration's commitment to address critical post-conflict and chronic humanitarian needs in Gaza. In the Administration's recent FY09 Supplemental

request, you requested \$840 million for the West Bank and Gaza, including \$125 million from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account. *Can you tell us how much of that assistance is specifically targeted for Gaza?*

**Answer:**

Out of the Administration's \$840 million FY 2009 supplemental request, \$156 million is specifically targeted for humanitarian assistance to Gaza through USAID. In addition to the funds in the supplemental request, USAID intends to program \$18 million for humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza from the FY 2009 omnibus bill. Finally an additional \$125 million is requested to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for its emergency humanitarian assistance activities in the West Bank and Gaza.

**Question 14b:**

*What in your opinion is the current state of humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, and how has this been impacted by the blockade of much-needed supplies and resources? What steps can the United States take to remove obstacles to aid delivery and to improve access to reconstruction materials and basic necessities including food, fuel, and water?*

**Answer:**

U.S. officials are working with the Government of Israel to expand the range and quantity of humanitarian goods allowed into Gaza and to ensure adequate liquidity for the formal banking sector. At the same time overall USG efforts on Gaza are focused on consolidating a durable ceasefire that would lead to sustained improved access.

Israel continues to maintain strict control of goods, including humanitarian assistance, entering Gaza. USG partner organizations, mainly U.S. non-governmental organizations and International Organizations (including United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the UN World Food Program, and the International Committee of the Red Cross), report that the humanitarian needs in Gaza are greater following the recent conflict. In Gaza today, there is an estimated 1.3 million (close to 90 percent of the population) reliant on food distribution for survival, 45,000 homes damaged, and over 100,000 people are without access to regular supply of potable water.

USG partners report that while some cash and humanitarian goods are entering Gaza, many goods that can be categorized as basic humanitarian commodities (including food, medicine and construction materials, considered by the Israeli government to be dual use items) continue to be restricted. There are also limitations on access for humanitarian workers and limitations on the transfer of banknotes from the West Bank to Gaza.

Despite these limitations, the USG is committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza and has provided over \$70 million directly to Gaza since December 2008.

**Question 15:**

*Would these efforts benefit from the appointment of an officer or representative at the State Department tasked solely with oversight, coordination, and facilitation of aid to the West Bank and Gaza?*

**Answer:**

At this time, we do not feel that that appointing a State Department official charged with oversight, coordination and facilitation of USG foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is necessary. All USAID assistance to West Bank and Gaza is directly overseen by the USAID Mission Director who sits in Tel-Aviv with an office of approximately 120 U.S. and local staff.

Special Envoy George Mitchell is currently assembling a team in the field that will serve as a coordinating mechanism for all USG assistance programs in the West Bank and Gaza, including programs implemented by USAID, the State Department, and the U.S. Security Coordinator's team. There are already frequent meetings to ensure that USG assistance is being utilized efficiently and in the intended manner.

In Washington D.C., Deputy Secretary Lew and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance are charged with the coordination of all U.S. foreign assistance, ensuring that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy objectives.

**Question 16:**

**West Bank**

The goal of a two-state solution that we share is made more difficult to reach by the construction of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Halting these settlements is not a new challenge. But obviously a new solution is needed because what has been tried in the past has not worked. *What should be done to discourage the construction of settlements by Israel on Palestinian land by Israel, so as to promote the solution of two states living together side by side in peace? Is the carrot or the stick the better approach to bring about progress in this area?*

**Answer:**

We have repeatedly emphasized to the Government of Israel that continued expansion of settlements and announcements of new housing starts undermines



confidence between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and others in the region. Both Israel and the Palestinians have obligations to create an atmosphere conducive to successful peace negotiations and to undertake actions that encourage mutual confidence. Settlement activity is a key issue that Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell is discussing with all of the parties.

**Question 17:**

*Global Health, HIV/AIDS*

Secretary Clinton, The Global Fund has been an important and integral component in the U.S.'s response to HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. In a short period of time, it has achieved significant results – putting over 2 million people on AIDS treatment, 5 million being treated for TB and 70 million bed nets distributed to prevent malaria.

The Global fund provides nearly a quarter of all international financing for HIV/AIDS, and is the largest funder of both malaria and TB efforts worldwide - financing approximately two-thirds of all international programs. These are significant numbers that have a dramatic effect on countries, and certainly, on the lives saved.

The Global Fund's performance based approach to funding grants has successfully scaled up capacity at the country level to deliver prevention, treatment, and care. This scale up of technical expertise has also led to stronger grant proposals to save lives, and subsequently larger demand to capitalize on previous investments.

In fact, the Fund received 174 proposals totaling over \$5 billion in the most recent grant round. Unfortunately, due to funding constraints, they were only able to approve \$2.7 billion in new grants, and in fact still have a funding gap of about \$264 million to fully fund these approved grants. In 2010 the Fund anticipates nearly \$8 billion in demand for ongoing and new grant rounds.

While the US has been the most generous donor to the Fund, the anticipated contribution of \$900m in FY 2009 will have to be significantly increased if the Fund expects to fully fund approved grants and meet the dramatically increased demand anticipated for 2010. If the Fund reaches a level of \$8 billion in new programs, the US share should be approximately \$2.7 billion. *What level of commitment can we expect from the new Administration to address the existing funding gap, and the dramatically increased need for 2010?*

**Answer:**

The success of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) remains a key USG priority, and the USG remains by far its largest financier. USG contributions to date are \$3.5 billion, and additional pledges reflect a total anticipated contribution of \$5.3 billion by the end of FY09. The Administration's request for an FY 2010 contribution to the Global Fund of \$900 million represents the largest request made in a President's Budget to date. Beyond financing, the USG also provides critical

leadership to the governance of the Global Fund, as well as technical assistance and financial support to improve grant operations at the country level.

In November 2008, the Global Fund Board approved in principle all proposals recommended for funding by the Technical Review Panel, with an upper ceiling for the first two years of US\$2.753 billion. While the Board was aware that funding decisions for all Round 8 proposals would likely spill into 2010, this approval was based on confirmed pledges as well as a projection of future assets, and the Board agreed to approve tranches of the Round 8 proposals as assets became available. The USG FY2010 pledge will assist the Global Fund in seeking approval for this final tranche toward the end of this calendar year, and USG bilateral programs in HIV, TB and malaria are working closely with countries affected to ensure there is no gap in services.

With respect to future funding rounds, it is important to note that the Global Fund is entirely demand-driven and responds to all requests determined to be technically sound, regardless of, for example, how many other Global Fund grants may be operational in a country. In response to anticipated funding challenges, the Board has now established a working group to provide recommendations to amend existing policies and establish parameters to prioritize funding in a resource-constrained environment. Prior to the November 2009 Board Meeting, the group is also tasked with considering future resource-allocation policies, as well as options for an urgent resource-mobilization effort. The USG views this effort as essential and is committed to working with the Fund through this process, and we look forward to continued dialogue with Congress on the appropriate level of support for this important multilateral approach as we move forward.

**Question 18:**

*Foreign Aid Reform*

As you know, we're just over halfway to the 2015 deadline for achieving the 8 Millennium Development Goals. Access to health services, the threat of global climate change, and increasing levels of poverty and inequality are challenges shared by the entire global community, and we all know they will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable populations around the globe.

It is with this great moral imperative in mind that I would like to discuss your thoughts on reforming the foreign aid process. Foreign assistance processes are fragmented across numerous bureaus and domestic policy agencies and this fragmentation has led to a lack of comprehensive or coherent programming that is necessary for maximum development impact, accountability, and transparency.

Some analysts believe the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) controls too small a portion of foreign aid to effectively coordinate development assistance programs, much less bring cohesion to a broader range of U.S. foreign aid activities. For instance, in FY 2007, obligations of the State Department and USAID represented approximately 65% of total U.S. foreign economic aid obligations that year.

Proponents of foreign assistance reform have cited the need to refocus programs on more defined goals, even calling for a macro-level Global Development Strategy to guide U.S. foreign assistance policy. *Do you feel a macro-level review and codification of a United States global development strategy would improve the coordination, transparency, and efficiency of foreign assistance activities?*

**Answer:**

I am committed to making sure that Foreign Assistance is properly managed and implemented. I take seriously the need to modernize how we deliver foreign assistance so it is as strategic, effective, and coordinated, as possible. We have not yet completed our review of Foreign Assistance reform. We are thinking through these issues in a thoughtful and deliberative manner and we are coordinating with a broad range of stakeholders.

**Question 19:**

*Would efforts to improve global health and combat the threat of disease pandemics also benefit from the development of a cohesive global health strategy?*

**Answer:**

Yes. The President will request \$63 billion over six years to address some of the biggest global health challenges, and has tasked the Department of State to lead an effort to develop an integrated strategy that builds on current successes to expand reach and amplify impact. We now have the opportunity to take an extraordinary step to save the lives of more women, children and families in the developing world. In addition to continuing the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, our budget will increase resources for maternal and child health, family planning, and neglected tropical diseases. Through these investments, we will cost-effectively contribute to political stability in a way that enhances our national security while advancing our core humanitarian values.

This is an example of what we can do when we invest in smart power through development and diplomacy.

Some of the health issues that have had the most negative impact on quality and length of life are those which we already have the knowledge and tools to eliminate. Research shows that a handful of neglected diseases could be eliminated with relatively modest resources and a sustained commitment. Basic obstetric care can exponentially reduce the number of mothers and children who die in child birth. The most basic health interventions for things like anti-diarrheal disease can dramatically decrease the mortality of children under five.

We need to harness the energy and focus that has made such a difference in addressing HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB to tackle this broader range of health care challenges. In many parts of the world the United States has responded, often at high cost, to situations

of conflict that result from the cycle of poverty and disease. As I have often said, disease and poor health are both a cause and consequence of poverty. Our investment today in building partnerships to share our knowledge and expertise in scaling up the simple solutions that can save many millions of lives, and in laying the foundations of basic and preventive health care are all ways in which we seek to address problems today, to avert costly crises tomorrow.

The State Department looks forward to leading an effort, working closely with other agencies like USAID, PEPFAR, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and with our partners outside of government and with other nations, to develop a coordinated approach so this global health initiative can be implemented upon enactment of the 2010 budget.

**Question 20:**

The U.S. continues to spend a disproportionately small amount on non-military foreign affairs programs relative to their importance. That is why I have introduced H.Con.Res. 63, a resolution which recognizes the critical importance of foreign assistance programs to our national security and expresses support for attaining the goal of providing, on an annual basis, an amount equal to no less than 1 percent of United States gross domestic product (GDP) for non-military foreign assistance programs. *Would a substantial increase in non-military foreign assistance funding better serve U.S. interests and local interests abroad?*

**Answer:**

One of my top priorities is to increase resources for the State Department and USAID. I have been a strong advocate for such increased resources, and the Administration has pledged to double foreign assistance, laying the foundation for that effort with the FY 2010 request. Secretary Gates and I concur that we must enhance and expand our civilian capacity to do results-oriented, hands-on diplomatic and development work.

The FY 2010 request for International Affairs represents a fraction of what our government spends each year on national security. Yet today, diplomacy and development are ever more essential to safeguarding the security and prosperity of our people and our nation. While military force is an important part of our national security, so too are our diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts, which are often the central means by which America can promote stability in key countries and regions, confront security challenges, advance economic transformation, respond to humanitarian crises, and encourage better governance, policies, and institutions. Expenditures on diplomacy and development represent an investment which in the long run is less costly in terms of lives and dollars than defense spending that would otherwise be required.

The FY 2010 International Affairs request reflects the President's commitment to strengthen the tools of diplomacy and foreign assistance to address current and future challenges that impact the security of the United States. The request significantly increases the core programming, policy, and management capabilities of the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and related agencies to fulfill their robust diplomatic and foreign assistance mission.

International Affairs agencies must be fully empowered and funded to confront multidimensional challenges – from working with allies to thwart terrorism, to spreading health and prosperity in places of human suffering. To meet these challenges, the request puts the United States on a path to double U.S. foreign assistance by 2015 through helping the world’s weakest states reduce poverty, combat global health threats, develop markets, govern peacefully, and expand democracy worldwide. The request also prioritizes funding to expand diplomatic and development operations by increasing the size of the Foreign Service at both the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, reflecting the critical nature of the work that the dedicated men and women of our civilian corps conduct every day, often under extreme, hazardous conditions.

**Question 21:**

*What foreign aid reform measures do you plan to pursue? How will reform affect the foreign operations budget?*

**Answer:**

I am committed to ensuring that foreign assistance is well- managed and implemented. I take seriously the need to further modernize how we deliver foreign assistance so it is as strategic, effective, and coordinated as possible. We have not yet completed our review of foreign assistance reform. We are thinking through these issues in a thoughtful and deliberative manner and are coordinating with a broad range of stakeholders.

The focus in these first few months has been on securing the necessary resources to implement a “smart power” agenda. I remain committed to improving and streamlining our delivery of foreign assistance and look forward to consulting closely with the Congress in the weeks ahead.

**Question 22:**

Madam Secretary, both you and Secretary of Defense Gates have both decried the deficiencies in civilian capacity at USAID, which continue to hamper our nation’s ability to effectively carry out development functions around the world, one of the so-called three “D’s” of U.S. foreign policy. *What affect has the recent expansion in DOD resources and authorities for foreign assistance activities had on an already degraded civilian capacity within relevant US agencies such as USAID? Are we compounding the civilian capacity crisis with this approach?*

**Answer:**

The Department of State and USAID appreciate the Congressional enactment of the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act that significantly increased resources to expand the civilian capacity to undertake diplomacy and development. USAID had begun the process in FY 2008, with 120 additional Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)

recruited and trained. With the increased resources in FY 2009, USAID will recruit an additional 300 FSOs and rebuild its core capabilities and expertise to provide development leadership and transfer technical knowledge to build host nation capacity and ownership for legitimate, responsive, and accountable governments that can articulate their own development plans and priorities. With additional officers, USAID plans to expand its presence from the current 89 cities in 85 countries to approximately 113 cities in 104 countries by 2012. All these efforts will begin to address the deficiencies in civilian capacity and rebuild our nation's ability to effectively carry out development functions around the world. This is a good start for rebalancing the "3Ds" – diplomacy, development, and defense – of U.S. foreign policy along with a critical review of respective roles and responsibilities, resources, and authorities, so that we have the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – and we have the capability to be agile, flexible, and proactive in using the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. DoD expansion in resources and authorities for civilian recruitment assists the USG to respond to the immediate and extraordinary staffing needs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. As the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies gain greater capacity, it may be appropriate to re-assess the continuing need for DOD resources and authorities for civilian recruitment in the context of the 3D approach.

**Question 23:**

*Couldn't it be argued that these are dollars lost on recruiting, retaining, and deploying civilian experts who are more knowledgeable of local customs and urgent needs, and whose mission is grounded in U.S. development policy rather than what many consider to be short term-military goals?*

**Answer:**

The deficiency in civilian capacity has been well-recognized, including by Secretary of Defense Gates, who supports our efforts to increase resources for recruiting, retaining, and deploying civilian experts who are more knowledgeable of local customs and urgent needs. Since 2005, USAID and Department of Defense (DOD) have strengthened their relationship to ensure sound U.S. development principles are considered on the ground, and to complement each organization's comparative advantage in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals. These efforts include the exchange of Senior Officers/Advisors between USAID, the Pentagon, and each of the Combatant Commands, and undertaking joint planning and evaluation. One positive influence of this cooperation is DOD's adoption of USAID's Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) for field assessments that considers, for example, local customs and cultures, and host country ownership of problems and solutions. Understanding the need for further coordination, the work of a sub-Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Civilian-Military Cooperation (co-chaired by State, DOD, and USAID), is expected to provide clearer understanding of respective roles and

responsibilities, authorities, and resources, so that the right mix of resources and capabilities are used to achieve longer term U.S. policy goals.

**Question 24:**

*Minority Contracting and Procurement*

In 2007, I had the pleasure of traveling with a delegation led by Congresswoman Lowey to Morocco, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and Uganda. During that trip, as we went from one location to another, I pointed out the complete absence of minority personnel and minority contractors providing services for USAID. *What are the existing State Department policies on minority business contracting and procurement?*

**Answer:**

It is the policy of the Department to provide maximum practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to small business, veteran-owned business, service-disabled veteran-owned small business, HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned small business concerns. The Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) ensure that all legislatively specified categories of small businesses in prime contracts and subcontracts are effectively utilized to the maximum extent possible. All Departmental contracts that are awarded domestically for performance overseas shall be subject to the Small Business Act as a matter of policy. In addition, these businesses must have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate as subcontractors of the contracts awarded by the Department.

The Department's complies with the policies on minority business contracting and procurement as described in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and follows detailed guidance from the Department's Foreign Affairs Manual 1 FAM 211.2i (17), the Department of State Acquisition Regulations DOSAR Part 619, and from the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization internet web site.

**Question 25:**

*Workforce Diversity*

*What steps has the State Department taken, or will it take, to maximize diversity in the workplace and improve the employment and advancement opportunities for women, minorities, and individuals with disabilities?*

**Answer:**

Our outreach and strategic recruitment goal is to develop a pipeline of qualified, diverse applicants who reflect the nation's professional workforce demographics and to increase the representation of underrepresented communities in the State Department.

We target diverse students and professionals through a combination of human-to-human and high-tech outreach including direct sourcing and a comprehensive online marketing campaign, social media networking (e.g., Facebook), and career and niche-specific sites (e.g., Black Enterprise, LatPro).

Our 16 Diplomats in Residence around the country and our Washington, DC-based recruitment team focus State's recruitment efforts on schools with significant minority populations, including many Historically Black Colleges and Universities. In addition, our Diplomats in Residence identify, inform, and encourage students especially from diverse backgrounds to apply for the Pickering Fellowship and the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Program – a unique collaborative initiative involving the Department, Howard University, and Congress – which provides opportunities for diverse and highly qualified minority undergraduate and graduate students interested in a foreign affairs career to learn more about, and ultimately join the Foreign Service. The Department also has participated in the Workforce Recruitment Program for college students with disabilities since 1995. The purpose of the program is to attract and refer talented students with disabilities to federal organizations.

State Department recruiters participate in career fairs offered by Members of Congress around the country, and we are conducting a series of recruitment outreach events thanks to the collaboration of the Department's Hill liaison office and such partners as the Congressional Black Caucus, Hispanic Caucus, etc.

Finally, the Department will pay for an additional 100 targeted internships in 2010 for students especially identified by our Diplomats in Residence to encourage greater participation by women, minorities and underrepresented communities and stimulate broader interest in deficit FSO career tracks (Management, Economic, and Consular).

**Question 26:**

*Is there a formal written policy in place to support the development and implementation of policies to achieve balanced representation and at all levels within the State Department?*

**Answer:**

Secretary of State Clinton has recently released a "Statement on Diversity and Equal Opportunity" which outlines the Department's commitment to promoting diversity and an overall culture of inclusiveness. Several programs currently exist to support this policy:

1. A Chief Diversity Officer (Director of the Office of Civil Rights) who is assigned to apply a "diversity-lens" to all programs at the Department. John Robinson, Director of S/OCR, is Chief Diversity Officer.



2. A Diversity Governance Council of Department-wide senior leaders to examine programs to ensure equity and fairness for all groups, chaired by the Under Secretary for Management and the Chief Diversity Officer.
3. A renewed SES Candidate Development Program to address the current lack of diversity in the SES and encourage people of all backgrounds to become SES.
4. A Leadership Liaison program through the Office of Civil Rights to match members of the Diversity Governance Council to employee affinity groups at the Department. The intent is to foster understanding and communication between the employee affinity groups and management.
5. Ten S/OCR recognized employee affinity groups including Blacks in Government, Disability Action Group, Gays and Lesbians in Foreign Affairs Agencies, etc. S/OCR Representatives are matched with groups to encourage development and make sure issues are addressed.
6. A new Disability Leadership Committee consisting of ten high-level employees, chaired by the Under Secretary for Management, to address disability-related issues at the Department.

Beyond these programs the Department annually completes Management Directive 715 and the annual Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program which include plans, targets, and goals for increasing diversity at the Department.

**Question 27:**

*Climate Change*

Madam Secretary, I would like to echo your comments made on a trip to China earlier this year with regards to addressing climate change and promoting clean energy. You expressed that this is not only a global environmental issue, but also a health issue, an economic issue, and a security issue.

I am encouraged by the appointment of a Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, and the reemergence of the United States in the process of developing a global response to climate change. Such challenges require truly comprehensive solutions and the task of reaching agreement on a new climate treaty will require a diplomatic strategy of enormous magnitude, difficulty, and complexity in order to bring all nations into the fight against climate change.

I would like to hear from you regarding a fundamental principle of the already-agreed upon climate treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that all nations have common but differentiated responsibilities. *Will the Administration's approach to upcoming climate negotiations reflect this "common but differentiated responsibility" of the United States?*

**Answer:**

I would like to see an outcome in the December UN climate conference in Copenhagen in which all countries set a long-term pathway and develop strategic actions that will collectively put the world on the road to a low-carbon future.

I fully recognize that countries have different national circumstances that will in turn dictate their approaches to climate policy.

While differentiation will be part of any agreement, it cannot extend to inaction on the part of any; we must all act to the utmost of our abilities if we are to solve the global problem.

**Question 28:**

*How important are U.S. contributions to international mitigation and adaptation efforts such as those administered by the GEF through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) to prepare at-risk populations for future climate warming?*

**Answer:**

It is critical that the United States demonstrate both leadership and responsibility in the fight against climate change. One area where we can make a difference is in helping to finance mitigation and adaptation needs in developing countries, particularly the least developed countries. It will be especially important in helping to build credibility with our international partners in the lead-up to climate negotiations in the UN climate conference in Copenhagen in December.

The Administration is seeking over \$1.2 billion in international assistance for the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Treasury for international efforts to combat the global climate change crisis and help the most vulnerable countries prepare for and respond to the impacts of climate change. These funds will support a major expansion of country-based bilateral assistance programs and new contributions to a range of multilateral assistance initiatives.

This request includes a \$280 million increase in funding for adaptation. \$50M would go to support adaptation through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). This would be the first time the U.S. has contributed to either of these UNFCCC funds and it will send a strong message of support for adaptation in developing countries and for building trust as we move towards the Copenhagen meeting. An additional \$80 million would be for the Pilot Program for Climate Resistance, a component of the Climate Investment Funds at the World Bank. Additional funds would be spent bilaterally and regionally.

With regard to mitigation efforts, the Administration has requested more than \$700 million for clean energy for FY2010, including a \$500 million contribution to the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), also one of the Climate Investment Funds at the World

Bank. The CTF is a multi-billion dollar effort to reduce emissions growth in developing countries by financing the additional costs of deploying commercially available cleaner technologies over dirtier, cheaper alternatives. The Administration is also requesting more than \$100 million to help developing countries reduce emissions from land use, including deforestation, which accounts for about 17 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

**Question 29:**

*Do you view them as a central component of negotiations between the United States and developing nations in order to reach a meaningful international climate change agreement?*

**Answer:**

Yes, as mentioned above, U.S. contributions to the LDCF would send a strong positive political message of U.S. commitment under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process of meeting the needs of least developed countries and would go a long way to building trust in the process.

**Question 30:**

Failure to take into account the different roles and responsibilities women and men have in their communities has been a central cause of unproductive international assistance in the past. *What steps would you propose taking to ensure that the State Department and USAID effectively integrates gender in all its programs, especially with regard to the development and negotiation of policies to address climate change, as well as international mitigation and adaptation programs?*

**Answer:**

Both State and USAID have long recognized the important role of women in community development and health, and gender equality is a high priority. Investing in women is one of the most effective development tools for poverty alleviation and a country's general prosperity. It remains a simple fact that no country can hope to get ahead if half of its citizens are left behind. In recognition of this imperative, the Administration has created an Office of Global Women's Issues at the State Department to ensure that our foreign policy programs, including our development initiatives, reflect the needs and perspectives of women and girls.

Climate change impacts men and women differently due to their traditionally differing roles, expectations and behaviors. Understanding how men and women are each affected by climate change is necessary to develop adaptation policies and measures that will successfully reduce vulnerability and combat climate change in the developing world. USAID is currently considering agency approaches for ensuring that interventions create greater awareness and understanding of the complex links between

equality and the environment to build the capacity of the poor, especially women, to adapt to the impacts of, and take action on, climate change. In international mitigation and adaptation programs, we are looking at ways to support improved data regarding roles of and impacts on women and how to better involve them in adaptation decision processes and address their specific needs.

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**Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009  
2172 Rayburn House Office Building  
9:30 a.m.**

***“New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration”***

**Questions for the record**

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Michael E. McMahon

**Middle East**

**Question:**

Madame Secretary, in terms of the United States' \$900 million pledge in foreign aid to the Palestinians and the \$815 million that has followed this pledge in the FY09 supplemental, the State Department proposes \$200 million to go directly towards budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in West Bank and \$156 million of USAID funding to go towards humanitarian assistance in Gaza. Given the growing tensions between Hamas and Fatah and the difficulty in forming a potential power-sharing government, how will US assistance be appropriately channeled and reach Palestinian civilians while avoiding the chaos (and corruption) of the divisions within the Palestinian Authority?

**Answer:**

The total FY 2009 Supplemental request for the West Bank and Gaza is \$840 million, of which \$556 million is Economic Support Funds (ESF), \$109 million is International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds, \$50 million is Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Program funds, and \$125 million is Migration and Refugee Assistance. It is important to emphasize that none of this aid will flow to Hamas or any entity controlled by Hamas. With our bilateral assistance, the U.S. only will work with a Palestinian Authority (PA) government that unambiguously and explicitly accepts the Quartet's principles: a commitment to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. In the remote possibility that Hamas should participate in a future PA government, the government and all of its ministers or the equivalent must adhere to these principles, and the government must speak with authority for all of its agencies and instrumentalities.

Our \$200 million request for budgetary assistance is designed to help the PA meet the needs of its citizens and strengthen it as a credible negotiating partner with Israel. According to the terms of previous transfer agreements, the PA only uses our money for budget purposes approved by us. We only approve payments to organizations we know and can vet, like Israeli energy and utility suppliers, and USAID retains auditing authority over the PA's use of the funds. Regarding USAID's request for \$156 million in humanitarian assistance for Gaza through ESF, USAID assistance is distributed to beneficiaries through its implementing partners, including Mercy Corps, ANERA, CHF, Relief International, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, IOCC, and CARE International, to address basic human needs. We deliver all of our humanitarian assistance in coordination with the PA and our implementing partners according to established safeguards that will ensure that our funding is used only where, and for whom, it is intended.

**Question:**

Madame Secretary, Iran's policy of expansionism in the Arab world, its growing nuclear-arms capability and its complete disregard for the rights of its own citizens, as well as Americans in Iran (as with the case of Roxana Saberi) clearly demonstrates that Iran is engaged in much more than merely an exercise in "hateful rhetoric." While the administration's decision to engage with Iran is welcomed, I feel that curbing Iran's influence also involves key regional players in the Middle East. Given the "tensions" between Syria and Iran in recent months, perhaps, re-engaging Syria in the stalled peace talks with Israel can accomplish this objective. How does the administration propose to re-engage President Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Bashar Assad of Syria in these negotiations?

**Answer:**

The U.S. is committed to comprehensive peace that sees the creation of a Palestinian state and the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including through Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace agreements. The President, recognizing that stability and security are impossible without a lasting peace, demonstrated his personal commitment when he appointed Special Envoy Mitchell on his second day in office to work toward these goals.

Special Envoy Mitchell is working with Israel and Arab governments to create a context for meaningful negotiations on all tracks. Progress on the Syria-Israel track is possible if both sides desire it and are willing to make the necessary commitments and take the necessary actions. Most importantly, progress on one track cannot undermine progress on the others. We have emphasized this point repeatedly to Syrian officials during our recent meetings.

Additionally, we have supported Turkey's efforts to mediate indirect negotiations and would welcome a decision by Syria and Israel to resume these talks or move to direct discussions.

At this point it is premature to speculate how and when the U.S. might get involved should talks resume.

#### **Assistance to Developing Countries in the FY09 Supplemental:**

##### **Question:**

Madame Secretary, the State Department is requesting \$448 million dollars in assistance to developing countries that are affected by the global financial crisis. I fully support this initiative and am particularly supportive of targeting countries in the World Bank's "low income" or "lower middle income" group, like Liberia whose post-conflict development in recent years can be an example to many other countries. I understand that the requirements for recipient countries will be based off of their general fiscal capacity and the relative impact that the crisis is having on those countries. I was wondering if the State Department was considering a range of more concrete selection criteria when choosing recipient countries for this aid. If so, what are they?

##### **Answer:**

To ensure that this assistance will have the greatest possible impact and benefits, we have identified six primary criteria for selecting the countries to which it will be directed:

1. 2007 per capita Gross National Income is \$3,705 or less (i.e., the funds will be directed only to countries in the World Bank's "low income" or "lower middle income" group);
2. a sharp slowdown in economic growth is expected as a result of the crisis;
3. the slowdown will be expected to have severe impacts on highly vulnerable, poor populations;
4. those impacts will significantly raise the risk of social and political instability;
5. the recipient government has demonstrated strong commitment to improving good governance, including transparent and accountable management of public resources; and
6. the government, however, does not have the fiscal capacity to mitigate the impact of the crisis on their most vulnerable populations.

The Department will be able to draw on a range of reliable cross-country indicators and data to identify and rank country priorities. For example, the World Bank's World Development Indicators provide current estimates of Gross National Income per capita (criterion #1), the International Monetary Fund's Quarterly Economic Outlook report measures the scale of the economic contraction in different countries

(criterion #2), and the World Bank has calculated and published data on countries' policy and institutional commitments (criterion #5) and their "fiscal resilience" and "fiscal space" (criterion #6). Based on these general country indicators, the Administration estimates that 30-35 low income and lower middle income might provisionally qualify for this assistance in terms of criteria 1, 2, 5 and 6, above.

Identifying more concrete local impacts on highly vulnerable, poor populations will require more qualitative cross country analysis, drawing on real time reporting from U.S. field missions, information provided by the governments of severely affected countries, media and other open source reporting, and consultations with the World Bank and other donors. It is important to recognize that comparable macroeconomic effects of the crisis may have differing impacts on poor and vulnerable populations. For example, the collapse of international copper prices has resulted in the loss of 15-20 thousand jobs in Zambia, while the collapse of international aluminum prices has resulted in the loss of less than a hundred jobs in neighboring Mozambique. On the basis of detailed, country-specific information like this, we have notionally identified ten countries, including Liberia, in which this assistance could be most effectively used.

Since the crisis is still unfolding and the severity of the impacts on different countries remains unpredictable, we intend to review the analysis and make a final determination on country selection at the time the funds are made available. We will of course notify Congress of these selections and the Department will stand ready to consult with you and other interested Members at that time.

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HCFA Full Committee Hearing,  
"New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration"  
April 22, 2009  
Question for the Record

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Brad Miller:

1. The problems associated with urban poverty and slums are complex, including challenges related to promoting tenure security, access to water and sanitation services, equitable national land policies and administration service, and functional housing markets. Given that U.S. foreign assistance has become what many experts describe as fragmented, uncoordinated, and incoherent how do you think our foreign aid programs can effectively deal with a complex development issues such as urban poverty and slums? What strategies and programs does the U.S. government have to address the impact of urbanization and the growth of urban poverty and slums?

**Answer:**

For the first time in history, cities are home to more than half of the world's population. As USAID moves into this new "Urban Century," it must recognize the place of cities on development's front lines. The implications for addressing poverty, fragile states, economic opportunity, and disaster management and response are significant and will affect the success of development initiatives.

The challenges related to poorly-managed urbanization in the developing world are inherently cross-sectoral in nature. As urban populations continue to swell, these problems will only become more pressing. The State Department, the Department of Housing & Urban Development, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation will all need to play an even greater role alongside USAID. Addressing the challenges will also require continued inter-agency collaboration.

Although urbanization is not currently defined as an explicit strategic objective by USAID, with the doubling of the Agency's Foreign Service Officers corps, USAID will be ramping up its technical capacity in areas such as environmental protection, engineering, and governance, which will greatly increase the Agency's ability to advance solutions related to urbanization and to work in difficult urban environments. This scale-up will build upon successful initiatives currently led by the Urban Programs team at USAID, located within the Office of Poverty Reduction. This team provides technical leadership to USAID in designing and implementing projects specifically targeting urban development issues. The Urban Programs team is implementing a strategy called

“Making Cities Work,” which addresses urbanization issues from the lens of local governments and as such is involved in many cross-sectoral issues facing cities around the world. Through Urban Programs’ contribution to the Cities Alliance, USAID has been able to sponsor grants in 24 cities to introduce more participatory local governance and address the needs of the urban poor. National programs in India, South Africa, Swaziland, and Morocco are now underway to institutionalize these participatory approaches to urban governance and development. As a field support team, Urban Programs provides different mechanisms to assist Missions assess, design and implement activities that improve the responsiveness of cities to their citizens.

2. One of the issues fueling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is control over mines containing “conflict minerals,” ores that are processed into valuable metals that are eventually used in a wide range of electronic products. What is the U.S. doing about this particular element driving the conflict?

**Answer:**

As I said during my confirmation hearing:

“We need to see if there is a way to create a regulatory framework that would give both protection and incentives to mineral-rich countries so that they would be able to stand up for their rights and then use the revenues in a very positive way to enhance the well being of their people.”

We are doing just that. Together with other friends of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the United States is leading an effort to explore how we might achieve these goals, including in the DRC. We are all committed to changing the mindset in the DRC from a war mentality to a development mentality, and getting a handle on the natural resource trade is an important part of that.

Since the beginning of this Administration, State Department and USAID representatives have participated in, and contributed substantially to, two international meetings on this issue, one in Brussels and one in London. The purpose of these discussions has been to examine how we – as supporters of the DRC peace process and also as end-users of many of the metals mined in the DRC – might cooperate with and assist the Congolese government in establishing greater regulation and control over the mining industry while maintaining sources of income for local people. A follow-up meeting is tentatively scheduled for June, and we will again send U.S. government experts.

Additionally, USAID recently completed an initial assessment of the inextricable link between land tenure and conflict in the DRC, and has identified several entry points for development which would enable a more cohesive regulatory process for land tenure and would begin to tackle some of the underlying causes of land-related conflict.

In addition, through the Tripartite Plus process involving the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda that we facilitate, we have helped make illegal mineral exports an important item on the regional agenda. Last December, for instance, these countries committed to work together to curb armed groups' illegal domination of mining and natural resource exploitation and to encourage legal economic activity. We will continue to pursue this discussion at the next Tripartite Plus meeting this summer.

We have also begun a conversation with the Ministry of Mines regarding adherence to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and are also supporting the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and its principles, which the DRC – now an EITI candidate country – is working to implement in order to increase transparency in its extractive industries.

3. Since 2003, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, of which the U.S. is a participant, supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. What is your assessment of this program? The DRC was accepted as an EITI Candidate country in February 2008 and now has until March 2010 to undertake validation. Do you think the EITI will be an effective tool in combating the exploitation of conflict minerals in Congo?

**Answer:**

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and natural resource revenue transparency are part of the USG's comprehensive anticorruption and international energy security strategies. The United States has been a strong supporter of EITI since the initiative began and the State Department will continue to play a leadership role in the EITI process. EITI is a unique, voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that brings together government, industry, and civil society to promote revenue transparency. The initiative is still at an early stage with nearly two dozen of the first EITI implementing countries working to meet a March 2010 deadline for EITI implementation.

Specifically regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), we remain concerned about the unregulated exploitation of, and trade in, valuable natural resources. Control of this trade by armed groups in the eastern DRC has allowed such groups to use the profits to arm themselves, exploit and abuse local populations, and perpetuate the tragic violence that has held the Congolese people hostage for more than a decade.

We are working closely with the DRC government and other international partners to explore multiple avenues for addressing this situation. The DRC is working to implement EITI, but suffers from weak political institutions that do not extend throughout the country's enormous territory. Exemplifying this, the DRC does not have a unified land policy and competing systems governing land access continue to fuel ongoing conflicts. Similarly, mining sites are not monitored systematically and are often

located in extremely remote and difficult-to-access locations. Border controls are almost non-existent.

Those hurdles notwithstanding, we hope that, over time and with appropriate outside assistance and guidance, including from the United States, the DRC will begin to make inroads against the unregulated natural resource trade. In that light, we recently participated in a Kimberley Process peer review visit to the DRC and note that, although serious challenges remain, the DRC has managed to make significant progress in bringing its rough diamond production under better control. Thus, as has happened with the Kimberley Process, we need to support the DRC government as it moves ahead with EITI.

4. On the issues of helicopters, I understand that the peacekeeping operations in Chad are lacking 12 helicopters, Sudan 18, and Congo 18. Funding in the FY09 supplemental for USAID includes money to buy 3 Blackhawk helicopters as part of the Merida program in Mexico. The conflict in Darfur and Sudan has been described as genocide and more than five million people have died as a result of the conflict in Congo. What are we doing about trying to get helicopters in these ongoing and brutal conflicts in Africa?

**Answer:**

Rising global peacekeeping requirements, as well as the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are putting a severe strain on the pool of available military helicopters around the world. The United States is working actively to attract contributions of helicopters for peacekeeping operations across Africa by engaging in targeted diplomatic outreach efforts. The Departments of State and Defense have conducted two joint assessments of potential helicopter donors that are helping to guide these diplomatic outreach efforts. These assessments took into account both the capabilities of the potential contributors and political considerations weighing against USG engagement. Outreach efforts have taken place at the highest levels, targeting potential contributors around the world. The USG has also sent interagency delegations to potential donors, including Ethiopia and Jordan, to assess capabilities and requirements. In the case of Ethiopia, a commitment of five attack helicopters has been made to the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and a final agreement between the Ethiopians and the United Nations is expected to be in place soon.

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**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**  
**HEARING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON**  
**APRIL 22, 2009**

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

**ASIA**

**Burma.** Only last July, Congress passed the “Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008” in response to the brutal suppression of the failed 2007 Saffron Revolution. Since then, the junta has continued its defiance, even refusing a humanitarian mission by the U.S. military following last spring’s cyclone. Will the Administration fully and robustly implement that Act? Or is the Administration considering waiving or seeking to overturn the sanctions recently imposed and strengthened by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, even though there has been no change in the repression since its passage?

**Answer**

We continue to implement the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 fully and robustly. Though the sanctions that the United States imposes against Burma, including those contained in the JADE Act, are an important part of our efforts, neither sanctions nor engagement alone has succeeded in bring about change in Burma. While we are currently reviewing our policy towards Burma, we aim to pursue the most effective means of encouraging progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights in Burma.

**North Korea.** In recent weeks Pyongyang has responded to the olive branch extended by this Administration by imprisoning two U.S. citizen journalists, expelling U.S. food aid workers, conducting a missile test despite repeated international warnings, vowing not to return to the Six-Party Talks, threatening our South Korean and Japanese allies, pledging to restart its nuclear program, allegedly shipping uranium materials to Iran, and kicking out IAEA inspectors. In this context, don’t the recent budget requests for well over a hundred million dollars in additional U.S. taxpayer funding for North Korean energy assistance and denuclearization support, as well as the waiver of certain proliferation-related restrictions, risk being interpreted by Pyongyang as proof that its aggressive stance has been effective in producing rewards? What is the reason to rush these provisions through without hearings in a Supplemental, when the prospect of further negotiations is so remote?

**Answer:**

The United States continues to pursue the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We have called on North Korea to cease its provocative actions and return to negotiations. North Korea's recent actions only underscore the urgency and importance of North Korean denuclearization.

The Administration's FY 2009 Supplemental request for funding for North Korean denuclearization activities is necessary to advance our denuclearization goals. Regardless of recent North Korean behavior, it is necessary to request these funds now so we can be in a position to act promptly if North Korea takes the necessary steps to meet its commitments as agreed in the Six-Party Talks.

The United States would only provide energy assistance to North Korea if it resumed action on denuclearization. The current request for funding is a prudent measure to ensure that the United States is prepared to take timely and effective action to implement the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities. It will also ensure the United States is in a position to provide North Korea with continued, timely energy assistance in conjunction with North Korea taking the steps needed to abandon its nuclear weapons and programs.

Legislation providing the President with authority to waive Glenn Amendment restrictions prohibiting certain types of assistance to North Korea in order to facilitate denuclearization has been enacted, but the President has not yet exercised this authority.

**North Korea/Human Rights.** Notwithstanding the proliferation of other new envoys, the Administration still has not announced any decision or funding requests for the statutorily mandated Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, whose role was reaffirmed and strengthened in Public Law 110-346, which was passed by the Senate without objection six months ago, when you were a member of that body. Does the Department plan to abide by the provisions of that law and, if so, when can we expect a nomination for that Ambassador-rank position, which was supposed to have reported to Congress by April 16? Given the lack of success in focusing solely on nuclear-related issues, how will you elevate the importance of human rights in future negotiations with North Korea?

**Answer:**

The Department hopes to have a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights in place as soon as possible. We remain deeply concerned about the human rights situation in North Korea. We continue to work closely with other governments, including our regional partners, to improve the human rights situation.

We will continue to make it clear to the DPRK that human rights are a top U.S. priority and will be a key element of any normalization process with the DPRK. We are also working to identify concrete ways to address the North's human rights abuses, including working with non-

governmental organizations, international organizations, and bilateral partners; increasing broadcasting efforts; and building the capacity of defector-led organizations.

**North Korea/Proliferation & Missiles.** Despite repeated efforts to halt North Korea's missile and nuclear programs through the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Agreed Framework, the Six Party Talks, and through the passage of United Nations Resolutions 1695 and 1718, North Korea has not only continued its pursuit of nuclear and ballistic weapons technology, but also proliferated them to Syria and possibly other countries. What is the Administration's plan to stop the proliferation and ballistic missile threats from North Korea?

**Answer:**

The United States continues to pursue our goal of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks. Despite, and indeed even more so because of, the recent threats and provocations from North Korea, we remain committed to achieving a peaceful, diplomatic solution. We continue to work closely with our allies and partners, particularly within the Six-Party framework, to hold North Korea to its commitment to denuclearize.

We take North Korea's ballistic missile programs very seriously. North Korea remains the leading proliferator of ballistic missiles and related technologies, and has a history of transfers to countries of concern, including Iran and Syria. North Korea's domestically deployed missile systems remain a threat to regional and global security.

To address these threats, we continue to work with our partners around the world to implement Security Council Resolution 1718 and prevent transfers to or from North Korea that pose ballistic missile-related proliferation concerns. We welcome the decision of the 1718 Committee to apply the asset freeze provision of that Resolution to three North Korean entities for their support to North Korea's ballistic missile program. We also welcome the Committee's decision to update the list of goods that could contribute to North Korea's ballistic missile program, and thereby to ban the transfer of such goods to and from North Korea.

We also continue to take steps to halt the threat posed by North Korean proliferation broadly. We continue to assist countries around the world establish and enforce effective strategic trade controls, to help ensure that sensitive items and technologies are not transferred to North Korea.

**North Korea/HEU Program.** Even if nuclear talks with North Korea resume and an agreement is reached to permanently dispose of its plutonium enrichment facilities and stock of plutonium, its clandestine uranium enrichment program will remain intact. Will the U.S. proceed in lifting restrictions on North Korea and offer it assistance without first requiring that Pyongyang acknowledge that it has a uranium enrichment program?

**Answer:**

We continue to pursue our goal of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks. This process cannot be considered complete until all outstanding concerns regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment activities have been resolved.

**China/Human Rights.** Madam Secretary, more than a decade ago, you famously said in Beijing "Women's rights are human rights." What about the human rights then of the Tibetan Buddhist nun shot dead in the snow by Chinese border guards two and a half years ago? What of the human rights of the wife of imprisoned Chinese human rights attorney Gao Zhisheng who had to recently flee with her children to Southeast Asia? What of the North Korean refugee women being trafficked as sex slaves in China today? What of young Uyghur women being forced to leave their homes to work in sweatshops thousands of miles away in eastern China? Do you plan to speak forcefully to the Chinese leadership regarding the human rights of these women? At what levels and in what ways will these and other pressing human rights concerns be raised?

**Answer:**

We continue to have concerns about women's rights, and human rights in China. Promoting human rights is a core objective of our diplomatic engagement with China.

Since my speech at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, I have developed long-term relationships with several women's rights leaders in China, especially those who fight against women's rights violations, including domestic violence, forced marriage, and trafficking of women for both sexual and labor exploitation. The State Department has funded some of these organizations and their programs to tackle those rights violations. During my first trip to Beijing as Secretary of State in February, I had the privilege to have a roundtable discussion with female civil society leaders who are at the forefront combating women's rights violations, some of whom I first met in 1995.

Our concern extends equally to the family members of Chinese dissidents. Our human rights report on China highlights the heavy price some family members of activists and dissidents pay in terms of job loss, loss of educational opportunities and heavy surveillance and, in some cases, house arrest.

We have been deeply concerned about Gao Zhisheng's case. We worked to facilitate the resettlement of Gao's family in the United States. Officers in the Department have met with Gao's wife since her arrival in the United States.

Our annual Trafficking In Persons Report (TIP) has been documenting the trafficking of North Korean women to China for forced marriage, forced labor, and forced sexual exploitation. Our Embassy and Consulates in China try to follow up on credible allegations of human rights and labor violations. The Department's 2008 and 2009 TIP reports covered these allegations, as well as specific reports of the trafficking of Uighur women. We also funded International Labor Organization (ILO) prevention programs that target women migrant workers.



We document our concerns about Human Rights annually in our Human Rights Report, and take every opportunity to pressure China to uphold the fundamental human rights of the Chinese people, consistent with China's own constitution and internationally recognized standards. We monitor individual human rights cases closely, and take every opportunity to raise them with our counterparts. President Obama discussed human rights with President Hu during his inaugural visit to China, and the two leaders agreed to hold the next round of our official Human Rights Dialogue by the end of February 2010.

***UNFPA/China.*** Just last year, the State Department issued a report that showed that UNFPA provides funds to the very population control agency in China that manages the coercive birth limitation policy, thereby providing support for and participation in the management of a program of coercive abortion. Yet on March 24, 2009, Robert Wood, Acting Department Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State stated that "The Department of State will contribute \$50 million to UNFPA in 2009, as provided in the Omnibus Appropriations Act." At our hearing, speaking of the Chinese policy, you said "I don't believe there is any grounds [*sic*] for our being connected to any policy that supports it, but I will look into the point that you made," indicating that you were not aware that by funding UNFPA the U.S. is now sending a strong signal of support for the brutal Chinese birth limitation policy. Please provide detailed information regarding this decision to fund UNFPA including the following:

- 1) What determination did the State Department, acting on behalf of the President, make regarding the application of Kemp-Kasten to UNFPA? Upon what specific information and rationale did you base your decision?
- 2) In deciding to fund the UNFPA, did you determine that UNFPA funds no longer flow to the Chinese National Population and Family Planning Commission, the Chinese Ministry of Health and/or the China Family Planning Association? If so, what information supported that determination, and what was the source of the information?
- 3) What affirmative efforts, if any, did the State Department undertake to obtain information from sources other than the UNFPA and the Chinese Government (or programs supported by the UNFPA and/or the Chinese Government) as to whether UNFPA is funding or in other material aspects cooperating with any of these Chinese agencies?
- 4) What amount has been dispensed to the UNFPA so far?
- 5) What actions have been taken to comply with Section 7079(c) of Division H of the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act which states that UNFPA may not spend U.S. funds in China?
- 6) What actions have been taken to comply with Section 7079(d)(1) of Division H of the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act which states that UNFPA may not receive funds unless it keeps separate accounts for U.S. funds?
- 7) What actions have been taken to comply with Section 7079(d)(2) of Division H of the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act which states that UNFPA may not receive funds if UNFPA funds abortions?
- 8) Section 7079(e) states that the Secretary of State shall submit a report indicating what amount UNFPA has budgeted for activities in China and that the contribution to UNFPA must be reduced by that amount. Has such report been submitted and has the contribution to UNFPA been reduced?

Answer

I strongly oppose China's coercive birth limitation policies. After a thorough review of the relevant law and the available facts surrounding UNFPA's programs, I concluded that UNFPA does not "support or participate in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization," the legal standard of the Kemp-Kasten Amendment. As a result, Kemp-Kasten does not preclude funding to UNFPA.

The available facts show that, although China is engaged in coercive family planning policies, UNFPA does "not support or participate in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization," and in fact has worked to eliminate coercive policies. Since the Kemp-Kasten Amendment was first passed in 1985, different Administrations viewing similar facts have reached different conclusions about whether the Amendment prohibits funding for UNFPA. I concluded that Kemp-Kasten does not restrict funding for UNFPA because the restrictions in the Amendment are not triggered by activities that are unintentional or remote or that only indirectly or marginally relate to a program of coercive abortion or sterilization.

Moreover, available facts indicate that UNFPA and its programs have had a positive impact in China. UNFPA regularly engages in policy dialogues with government officials to advocate for an end to coercive birth regulation policies. UNFPA has programs in 30 counties out of over 3,000 county-level jurisdictions in China. These 30 counties have all removed the requirement that couples obtain a permit for the birth of their first child. So far, three of these counties have eliminated the requirement for a permit for a second child, and UNFPA is continuing to advocate for this in the other counties in which it works.

At the insistence of UNFPA and as a condition for UNFPA to implement its program in 30 counties in different provinces, China's National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) agreed to significantly relax birth regulations in counties that have UNFPA programs. NPFPC agreed that the counties should work diligently to achieve the objectives of the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, which specifically opposes coercive family planning policies and calls for the recognition of individual rights. The United States was one of the 179 countries that adopted the Program of Action in 1994. NPFPC instructed counties with UNFPA programs to call for an "end to the occurrence of any instances of coercion." Not all the counties have eliminated all restrictions and penalties, but UNFPA estimates that 80% of the counties where it works have eliminated individual targets and quotas. UNFPA informs us that it is continuing to advocate for their elimination.

I am aware that UNFPA's implementing partners include the National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC), the Ministry of Health, and the China Family Planning Association. UNFPA provides funds or equipment to these and other implementing partners in accordance with specific project agreements, such as for training or capacity building; these projects do not support or manage programs of coercive abortion or voluntary sterilization. UNFPA does not provide funding to the general budgets of these entities.

In addition to reviewing documents provided by UNFPA, the Department reviewed previous Kemp-Kasten determinations by the Bush Administration and other Administrations and the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and obtained information regarding China's family planning policies from Department personnel posted in China and Washington.

To date, the Department has not provided any funds to UNFPA from the FY 2009 Appropriation. Both the Department of State and USAID are following standard procedures that include strict compliance with all applicable laws and legislative restrictions, including the prohibition of U.S. funding for a UNFPA program in China, the requirement for a separate accounts for U.S. funds, and the prohibition on funding UNFPA if UNFPA funds abortion (Section 7079 of Division H of the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act).

The Department has prepared the report on the amount of UNFPA's program in China and is preparing to submit the report to Congress.

**China/China Great Wall Industry Corporation Sanctions**. Please provide detailed answers to the following questions regarding the Administration's decision to lift sanctions against the China Great Wall Industry Corporation:

- 1) Was anyone in Congress consulted in advance of the Administration's decision? If not, why not? If there were consultations, with whom were they conducted and when?
- 2) Did the decision take account of serial proliferation behavior of China Great Wall, and the imposition of sanctions against the company on six separate occasions over the past 17 years? How can the Administration be assured that the company will not engage in that activity, again? Specifically, what are the safeguards, and the oversight, insight, and enforcement measures to be employed by the U.S., the PRC, and China Great Wall? How does the U.S. address the fact that China Great Wall operates under the control of the PLA?
- 3) Are there any investigations pending, involving illicit efforts by the Chinese to obtain U.S. or other western launch technology that could be employed by China Great Wall or the PLA?
- 4) Does the Administration intend to take the additional steps necessary to allow exports of U.S. satellites and of foreign satellites with U.S. components to China? What are those steps? Waiver of Arms Embargo against China? Reinstitution of security measures to protect U.S. satellites, components, and technologies exported to China? Reinstitution of a bilateral launch trade agreement to prevent China from unfairly cutting prices or otherwise distorting the market?
- 5) Does China have reason to expect the U.S. proceed with allowing exports for launch? Are there any agreements, understandings, or the like, in this regard? What is the timing?
- 6) Did the Administration consider the impact on U.S. launch service providers, and on other market economy providers of launch services? Did it consider that launch customers for future launches may wait for China to reenter the market, and along with China, leverage that prospect to reduce launch prices below sustainable levels in the West?

- 7) Did the Administration consider the impact on the EU's decision whether to lift the Arms Embargo on China? Were any other governments consulted? If there were, what were they?
- 8) Were there foreign policy reasons, not directly related to nonproliferation, which contributed to the Administration's action? If there were, what were they?

**Answer:**

The Department of the Treasury administers the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List on which China Great Wall appeared before the sanctions were lifted. The decision to remove this entity was also coordinated by Treasury. As a result, these questions can be better answered by representatives from Treasury.

**MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA**

**UAE Agreement.** The proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates is being promoted by the Administration as a model for similar agreements with other countries in the Middle East. However, the UAE has yet to meet the minimum preconditions for such an agreement, including the enactment and full implementation of the laws and regulations needed to effectively prevent its territory from being used as a transshipment point for nuclear-related and other materials to Iran. Why is the Administration rushing this agreement forward before there is even a minimal track record regarding the UAE's fulfillment of its pledge, especially given its key role in allowing Iran to circumvent the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council?

**Answer:**

The 123 Agreement is a significant nonproliferation achievement. In this agreement, the UAE has committed itself to pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation, safety and security, and in doing so the UAE has set a positive example for the region and beyond.

The UAE has demonstrated its commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is a strong nonproliferation partner. We believe the UAE government is taking positive actions to address the transfer of items to Iran that could support WMD or terrorism-related activities. During the past several years, the UAE decided at the highest political levels to take critical steps to ensure that it is not a source or transit point for onward proliferation. We believe that if the proposed 123 Agreement is adopted, it will advance our dialogue and encourage the UAE to continue taking positive steps to address these issues.

As Under Secretary Tauscher indicated in her statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the UAE continues to make progress to combat proliferation. The UAE passed and is enforcing an export control law; it is enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran and North Korea; it is actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and it is taking steps to combat proliferation and terrorist financing.

**Iran.** The New York Times recently reported that U.S. and European diplomats have considered allowing Iran to continue enriching uranium for some period while talks get off the ground. Concurrently, we have received reports that the Administration is considering in engaging in a freeze-for-freeze arrangements regarding sanctions for uranium enrichment suspension. Are these reports accurate? Please clarify and elaborate upon the Administration's policy regarding Iran's nuclear program.

**Answer:**

The negotiating proposal that the P5+1 tabled last summer was aimed at negotiations based on suspension for suspension. EU High Representative for Common and Foreign Security Policy Dr. Javier Solana introduced the idea of "freeze-for-freeze" as an interim step – a fixed period for a fixed goal, as a way of talking about how to get to negotiations. The intent of the freeze-for-freeze proposal is that for a fixed, short-term period of 6 weeks we would agree to freeze any new Security Council action against Iran, and Iran would not engage in any new nuclear activity.

The June 2008 package offered to Iran remains on the table. The package is linked to suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities, not a temporary freeze-for-freeze. Its contents make clear that the international community stands ready to assist Iran in developing a truly civil nuclear energy program, should concerns with Iran's nuclear activities be satisfactorily resolved. What is different today is that the President and Secretary have made clear that the United States is prepared to engage Iran directly without preconditions. We will join the P5+1 discussions with Iran from now on.

**Afghanistan/Civilian Surge.** While the Administration has been promoting a "civilian surge" in Afghanistan, it has provided conflicting numbers on the number of personnel it will require: The 400 in the initial request appears to be closer to 600 in the Supplemental. What are the correct numbers regarding civilian staffing needs? Why has progress concerning the creation of an Afghanistan Support Office (ASO) been so slow, despite the grant of temporary hiring authority over 3 months ago, in Executive Order 13487? Will the ASO be operational by the time this money for additional civilian hiring becomes available? If not, how will this be coordinated?

**Answer:**

The Afghan Support Office (ASO) was established by Executive Order 13487 in January 2009. Secretary of State Clinton approved the management structure for the ASO on March 17, 2009 and delegated to the Director of the ASO, who is a member of Ambassador Holbrooke's staff, the special personnel authorities applicable to ASO under 5 U.S.C. 3161. The Director of the ASO entered on duty March 23, 2009. ASO is a Washington-based office. It has been fully operational since March 2009; since March, it has been recruiting, hiring and deploying

temporary direct hire employees to Afghanistan. ASO also coordinates all other civilian staffing requirements and deployments with Embassy Kabul, the Department's Human Resources Division as well the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

At present we have over 900 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan and will meet the staffing target of 974 determined in July 2009 by the Deputies Committee in the next few weeks.

*Afghanistan/Herat.* The Supplemental requests funding for a Regional Embassy Office in Herat. Would you be able to provide the Committee with the proposed staffing levels, life support costs, and the reason why this is a Supplemental rather than a regular budget request?

**Answer:**

Herat was originally conceived as a small regional embassy office. However, subsequent to the submission of the budget, a decision was taken to establish a consulate in Herat with an initial total staff of 30 from State, USAID, USDA and Diplomatic Security. As the budget did not include costs for a consulate of 30, a request for funding was incorporated and funded in the FY 09 supplemental. Subsequent budget requests include annual life support requirements, projected at approximately \$4 million in FY2011.

*Afghanistan/Terror Financing & Narcotics.* What actions is the Afghan government taking to address money laundering and terror financing, and integrating these efforts into its broader counter-terror and counter-narcotics strategy? How closely is the Afghan Financial Intelligence Unit cooperating with US and international anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing efforts? What actions are you taking to address existing vulnerabilities such as the informal value transfer systems, such as the Hawalas and the transit trade? How would the establishment of the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell by the Department of Defense impact current operations?

**Answer:**

The Afghan Ministry of Interior's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) is a vetted unit dedicated to the investigation of complex counter narcotics matters. This unit is a corollary unit to the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the vetted, DEA-mentored, tactical unit operating throughout Afghanistan. The SIU falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and is mentored by two DEA Special Agents at the SIU's headquarters and 5-10 Special Agents embedded within the SIU's field elements. DEA's role within the SIU is a hands-on mentorship that augments the basic drug training provided to its members at the DEA Academy at Quantico, VA.

The SIU is the natural outgrowth of the NIU that effectively interdicts narcotics trafficking at the tactical level. The SIU provides a team of investigators dedicated to the development of intelligence and investigative support for narcotics cases. The SIU has

developed a Financial Investigative Team (FIT) dedicated to using financial data to develop intelligence and evidentiary support for “wire intercepts” and trial.

Although the financial sector has seen rapid growth in terms of customers, deposits, and transfers in recent years, Afghanistan’s economy is largely cash-based and characterized by a nascent and limited formal financial sector and a much larger informal financial sector. The limited number of suspicious transactions reports that financial institutions have filed with the Afghan Financial Intelligence Unit may indicate their lack of capacity to recognize suspicious activity. The U.S. Treasury Attaché based in Kabul is working closely to train the FIU and integrate them into our anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance efforts.

Afghanistan needs basic training and technical assistance in all areas related to combating illicit finance. The Embassy and Washington-based teams are working with the Afghan government and other international partners to create financial transfer systems that are more convenient, reliable, and transparent. We have a Treasury staffer at Embassy Kabul training the Afghans on capacity building. The newly formed Afghan Threat Finance Cell, in cooperation with the Embassy and Afghan law enforcement, is taking steps to better understand sources of Taliban and al-Qaeda funding, and to cut them off. This cell will also enable greater U.S. interagency cooperation and serve as a more effective and focused U.S. counterparts to our Afghan partners on this issue.

Since foreign funds are a significant source of Taliban funds, we are also working to identify and stop international threat finance. As the details of the on-going investigations are classified, we would be willing to brief you in a classified setting.

**Lebanon/Security Assistance.** The nearly \$100 million FMF (Foreign Military Financing) request for Lebanon includes items that have not been provided to Lebanon before. Can you clarify the references in the Supplemental budget justification for “new armored vehicles, artillery assets, and close air support aircraft”? What components are we providing Lebanon through FMF? Can you describe with specificity our vetting mechanisms for selecting the Lebanese security personnel we train? Does the CENTCOM-directed comprehensive training program referenced in the supplemental signal a greater role for the Department of Defense in our security assistance programs to Lebanon? Can you please clarify the border security missions that our FMF will be supporting in Lebanon, and whether they will be carried out by the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defense? Have we developed any contingency plans to implement a prohibition on security and military assistance to Lebanon if the March 8th bloc, including Hezbollah, wins the elections later in the year?

**Answer:**

The FMF funds requested for Lebanon in the FY 2009 supplemental will serve to professionalize the LAF and enhance its counterterrorism and border security capabilities. While we have recently provided the LAF with new capabilities via security assistance (such as Raven unmanned aerial vehicles and a Cessna Caravan close air support aircraft), FY09 supplemental

funding is intended to provide the LAF with additional numbers of equipment already in its inventory and the means to upgrade/sustain older U.S. origin equipment.

The LAF is in desperate need of vehicles to safely transport its troops. This supplemental will allow the LAF to purchase new lightly armored HMMVWs in addition to providing crucial upgrades for its current fleet of M-113 APCs. A significant portion of these supplemental funds will be used to procure two additional Caravan close air support aircraft. Finally, a number of 120mm mortars will be purchased, enabling the LAF to divest itself of outdated Russian and French versions of this weapon system.

FMF is the primary means the U.S. Government employs in providing security assistance to the LAF. FMF, along with a limited amount of Section 1206 funding, has been utilized to purchase a wide variety of components for the LAF.

We vet all LAF candidates for U.S.-sponsored training in accordance with the Department's Leahy Amendment guidance, including checking individual and unit names against open source and intelligence databases for evidence of gross human rights violations or terrorist connections. We have uncovered no derogatory information to date. Furthermore, the LAF has an impeccable record of control over its U.S.-origin equipment, with not a single incident of loss or misuse since we resumed FMF assistance in 2005. We continue to maintain strict end-use monitoring of all U.S.-origin equipment provided to the LAF, including enhanced end-use monitoring for sensitive equipment such as night-vision devices.

We anticipate that the CENTCOM-directed LAF training program will be largely contractor-implemented, with a robust oversight and management role for the Department of Defense. The program will fall entirely under Chief of Mission authority.

A portion of our security assistance is designed to support the LAF's efforts to secure Lebanon's borders against smuggling, as directed by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. Since 2007, we have worked cooperatively with the Lebanese government and international donors to help Lebanon institute a new border security regime, beginning with the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP) that was completed in 2008. Under the NBPP concept, which the Lebanese government plans to expand to its eastern border, the LAF (Ministry of Defense) and Internal Security Forces (ISF, Ministry of Interior) contribute jointly to a Common Border Force (CBF) under overall LAF command to monitor and combat smuggling along Lebanon's frontier, while the ISF, General Security Directorate, and Customs handle security at official border crossings. Our border-related FMF assistance supports only the LAF components of the CBF, in addition to other LAF units along the border that are not directly involved with the CBF.

Our assistance, including security assistance, to a new Lebanese government will be determined not only by the outcome of the June 7 elections, but by the shape of the new cabinet and its positions on critical issues including the implementation of UNSCR 1701. We will consult closely with Congress in determining the pace and scope of our assistance.



**West Bank/Gaza.** The West Bank and Gaza assistance programs, along with humanitarian aid to Gaza will total \$840 million. Combined with funding from the Omnibus, the proposed total provided to the Palestinians would be between \$15 and \$75 million above the \$900 million pledged at Cairo on March 2<sup>nd</sup>. Can you clarify exactly how much you are seeking providing to the West Bank and Gaza?

**Answer:**

The Secretary of State pledged more than \$900 million at the March 2<sup>nd</sup> Sharm al-Sheikh Donors' Conference. The pledge was designed to reinforce the U.S. leadership role and commitment to advancing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the U.S. pledge will respond to the immediate needs, this assistance is a fundamental part of our longer-term approach to fostering conditions in which a Palestinian state can be realized. The Administration seeks to meet the pledge through funds appropriated in FY 2009.

- Our Supplemental request contains the majority of our pledge in the following areas:
- Security sector reform and border security (\$109 million),
  - Development programs (\$188 million),
  - Palestinian Authority (PA) budget support (\$200 million), and
  - Humanitarian assistance (\$293 million).

Not all of the funding requested in the FY 2009 Supplemental funding will be programmed in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, \$53 million in security funding will be programmed in Egypt to support anti-smuggling efforts. We would be happy to brief in greater detail.

Our FY 2009 enacted budget of \$135 million, which can be attributed to the pledge, is comprised of:

- Development programs (\$75 million)
- Security sector reform (\$25 million)
- Humanitarian assistance (\$35 million)

**Palestinians/INCLE.** The \$109 million requested for INCLE security assistance to the Palestinians is described as including efforts to “sustain and expand security and law enforcement-related specialized training; develop a border integrity capability; and augment program development and support funding to address expanded logistical, administrative and related requirements of the program.” In addition to training National Security Force Special Battalions and Presidential Guard Battalions, and providing capacity-building initiatives within the Ministry of the Interior, who specifically will we be training, and what additional assistance will we be providing them? Which specific components of the Palestinian Security forces will we be training for the stated purpose of “help[ing] further stabilize and control [the Gaza] border”?

**Answer:**

Most of the \$109 million Palestinian Authority FY 2009 INCLE Supplemental request is planned for training, equipping, and infrastructure development (\$80 million) assistance to the National Security Forces (NSF) and the Presidential Guard (PG). A smaller portion (\$20 million) will be used to begin providing assistance for the first time to first responders, a need identified by the USSC. Assistance will be provided principally to fire and rescue forces, to enhance the Palestinian Authority's civil defense capabilities. These forces are integral to the West Bank's overall security requirements, but their needs have been largely overlooked by other donors. Enhancing civil defense capabilities has been a major objective of the Ministry of Interior and a focus of Lt. General Dayton's effort. Assistance will be used to provide specialized training for first responders (in the West Bank unless there are necessary political changes in Gaza), equipment enhancements, and possibly refurbishment and/or renovation of some facilities.

The \$3 million that is being requested to "help further stabilize and control [the Gaza] border," is assistance that will be provided as part of a broader effort with the Government of Egypt. These funds are to provide specialized border security training and associated equipment to Egyptian border and security forces to further secure the Egypt/Gaza border. The \$106 million requested in the FY 2009 Supplemental for the Palestinian Authority does include border integrity related assistance (training, equipment, and infrastructure development) to begin enhancing NSF and PG border control capabilities in the West Bank. The FY 2009 Supplemental does not currently envision Gaza border assistance to the Palestinian Authority because current political and security conditions preclude starting such a program.

**Gaza/UNRWA.** At this time of unprecedented economic distress, the Administration pledged to provide \$900 million in U.S. assistance to help Gaza. At least \$150 million of the total amount is going towards the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which is an organization that has a history of exercising lax controls regarding the employment of people with strong anti-American views. How will you ensure that none of the \$900 million in foreign assistance funding pledged for Gaza be used to benefit Hamas or other terrorist groups active in Gaza? Since there is an ongoing prohibition on U.S. personnel entering Gaza, how will effective oversight of this assistance funding be conducted?

**Answer:**

We have made it clear that we will not provide U.S. foreign assistance to Hamas or any entity controlled by Hamas. We provide our humanitarian and development assistance for the Palestinian people in Gaza through international organizations, established NGOs, and local vetted organizations with appropriate safeguards to ensure that our funding is used only where, and for whom, it is intended.

USAID provides all of our bilateral program assistance for Gaza through international organizations, U.S. non-governmental organizations, and local vetted organizations. All local sub-grantees are vetted to ensure that there are no terrorist connections. Before making an award

of either a contract or a grant to a local NGO, USAID checks the organization against lists maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of Treasury. The USAID Mission checks these organizations and the organization's principal officer, directors and other key individuals through law enforcement and intelligence community systems accessed by USAID's Office of Security. All NGOs applying for grants from USAID are required to certify, before award of the grant will be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists. Additionally, USAID's Inspector General annually audits all direct grantees, contractors and significant sub-grantees, and sub-contractors' local costs are subject to regular GAO audits. Finally, in order to safeguard U.S. investment and to ensure the funding is used only for agreed upon purposes, all grant recipients, contractors and subcontractors are required to submit financial reports to USAID on how funds are spent.

UNRWA takes careful steps to prevent its funds from benefiting terrorists through ongoing vetting and review of its staff, beneficiaries, and programs. UNRWA conducts criminal background checks on potential employees, shares lists of its staff with host governments, prohibits staff participation in political activities, and informs staff regularly on the strict UN neutrality policies and procedures. UNRWA also acts upon information received from host governments, international staff, and members of the local community about staff or beneficiaries who have allegedly engaged in inappropriate or illicit activities, immediately launching an investigation and, if warranted, terminating employment and contracts, as well as denying discretionary benefits such as cash and shelter assistance to beneficiaries who violate the rules.

In order to monitor and verify the use of our assistance, the USG funds UNRWA Operations Support Officers (OSOs) in the West Bank and Gaza, who regularly inspect UNRWA installations and report to UNRWA Headquarters if there is any inappropriate use, including political or militant activity. Based on monitoring by Department staff and UNRWA's international Operations Support Officers, we are confident that UNRWA deals effectively with staff or beneficiary violations of its own policies, and fulfills the condition required by section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act that no part of the U.S. contribution be used to furnish assistance to beneficiaries who have engaged in terrorism.

**India/Defense Technology.** Madame Secretary, U.S.-India relations have flourished in recent years, including with respect to high-technology trade and defense sales. One often hears our Indian friends suggest, however, that U.S. exports of high technology could be enhanced. To what extent, if any, are there remaining bureaucratic or policy obstacles in either country to enhanced U.S. high-technology and defense trade with India?

**Answer:**

Defense technology transfers are an essential part of the United States – India strategic partnership. These transfers provide unique opportunities for our government leaders, military services, and defense industry to engage at all levels of the Indian government and private sector to build mutual trust between our countries.

Defense trade exports have two requirements. First, there has to be a business case such that a U.S. company would desire such to pursue such exports. If the business case exists, U.S. companies have and do request export licenses, but the initial decision rests with the exporter. Second, once such a license has been requested, the Department conducts an interagency review to determine if the proposed export to ensure it is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy, as well as provides the assurances that the exports will be controlled as required by the Arms Export Control Act. On defense trade exports, the Department of Defense is routinely consulted for comment and has, on occasion, recommended limitations on exports in accordance with National Disclosure Policy decisions which the Department routinely supports. The United States and India also need to agree on End Use Monitoring. I would defer questions on these policies to the Department of Defense.

For information on exports of "high technology" that are under the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, I would defer to that Department. Certain international control regimes, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for example, do obligate the United States to conduct an enhanced review for certain exports destined to India as India is not an MTCR partner country.

**Kashmir.** Kashmir continues to be a core issue and a source of substantial tension between India and Pakistan. While President-elect, President Obama stated that "[the United States] should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that [Pakistan] can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants," and that he "will continue support of ongoing Indian-Pakistani efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem in order to address the political roots of the arms race between India and Pakistan." Please provide details about the Administration's plans to pursue these aims, including answers to the following questions:

- 1) Does the Administration view the reduction of tensions regarding Kashmir as integral to our efforts to encourage Pakistan to shift more attention from its Eastern border (India) to its Western border (Afghanistan)?
- 2) Does the Administration agree with the longstanding view that the future status of Kashmir must be ascertained in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the people of that territory? What is the United States doing to urge New Delhi and Islamabad to talk to the genuine leaders of the people of Kashmir?
- 3) Has the U.S. acknowledged or expressed support for recent developments involving nonviolent campaigns by the people of Kashmir, including peaceful campaigns for self-determination?
- 4) Does the Administration plan to appoint a special envoy on Kashmir? If so, who is being considered for that position?
- 5) What role should the United States play in helping to promote a resolution to the Kashmir issue, and what plans is the Administration making to fulfill that role?

**Answer:**

We have consistently supported bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan that seeks to resolve their outstanding differences. That dialogue made some important progress before the

Mumbai attacks including improving trade and communication and advancing people-to-people ties between these two important countries. We hope that dialogue can be resumed and will continue to make progress. Reducing tensions between India and Pakistan is both in their interests and ours.

While the United States does not seek a mediator role, we support high level dialogue between Pakistani and Indian officials. We support a settlement between India and Pakistan that takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

#### **WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

**Regional Trade.** Brazil and other members of Mercosur have moved to include Venezuela as a full member of that trading bloc. While other nations in Latin America move closer to integrating their economies, the United States has not yet passed implementing legislation related to the Panama and Colombia FTAs. Madam Secretary, please discuss your efforts in securing passage of implementing legislation and how the United States can continue its commitment to the people of Colombia and Panama.

#### **Answer:**

We have been working very hard with the Panamanian government in recent weeks to resolve outstanding issues so that the bilateral free trade agreement can be sent to Congress for consideration. We have had very productive discussions on both labor and international tax issues and our efforts are continuing.

Colombia is a friend and an ally, and the Administration is committed to deepening our economic relationship. There are some outstanding issues regarding labor laws and regarding violence against labor leaders that need to be addressed before we can move the agreement to Congress. The Administration will consult closely with Congress throughout the process.

**Latin America/Protecting Freedom.** During your most recent trip to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, you indicated that “[w]e obviously have disagreements with some of the leadership in certain countries in Latin America... Practically, we think that vibrant markets and open political systems and dynamic democracies and free speech and good governance and the rule of law are in the best interests of the people of all of these countries.” Although we agree strongly, a growing number of Latin American leaders, such as President Hugo Chávez, continue to undermine the democratic process. Please discuss how you plan to address the erosion of freedom, security, and prosperity throughout Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia?

**Answer:**

Our commitment to democratic ideals is rooted in the recognition that sustainable democracies do more than just have elections—now the norm throughout the hemisphere. Some countries throughout this region have held open, democratic elections, but have subsequently taken steps to undermine the democratic process and restrict basic democratic freedoms. We view the situations in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and El Salvador, as distinct and separate and we pursue our relationships with these countries on a bilateral basis. For instance, I recently attended the Presidential inauguration in El Salvador and was impressed by the handling of the transition. We are working with governments, and through people-to-people engagement to build vibrant civil society, promote accountability, the rule of law independent and capable judicial systems, and respect for human rights. We welcome a frank dialogue on a range of issues, including critical areas of democracy and human rights throughout the hemisphere. While we have important differences, we can -- and must -- work together in areas where we have mutual interests.

**Haiti.** Haiti is presently experiencing turbulent economic times. Can you elaborate on what the Administration is doing to help this government regain their economic footing and avert political instability?

**Answer:**

The overarching goal of the United States' foreign assistance strategy in Haiti is to promote stability. Our aim is to assist the Haitian government to achieve security through improved law enforcement; mitigate conflict and prevent violent crime; improve livelihood opportunities; meet citizens' expectations for basic services; and build capacity in government institutions upon which future progress rests. In February of 2009, when the Haitian government approached the international community for assistance above and beyond its existing commitments, the United States pledged \$57 million dollars for debt service, job creation, food security, and counter narcotics assistance in addition to the \$251 million already committed to Haiti for non-emergency development programs in FY2009. The U.S. government's \$304 million request for Haiti in FY2010 is expected to continue to help the Haitians to improve basic services, strengthen democratic institutions, and enhance prospects for economic development.

The participation of U.S. police in the UN stabilization mission (MINUSTAH) and the success of the U.S.-sponsored Haiti Stabilization Initiative led to a more secure environment in formerly gang-controlled areas, fewer incidents of civil unrest, and greater popular confidence in the Haitian National police. In addition, the United States' provision of \$3.8 million to support the country's April senate elections also helped to promote democratic principles and maintain stability.

Future development efforts will focus on strengthening Haitian government institutions at all levels; securing corridors of economic opportunity and effective governance; increasing emphasis on income generating activities for productive infrastructure; emphasis on food

security and natural resource management; addressing the “youth tsunami” and disaster vulnerabilities.

**Cuba.** One of the past month’s regulatory changes included “establishing a general license for banks and other depository institutions to forward remittances.” Is the Administration concerned that this type of access to U.S. banks could facilitate greater access to U.S. dollars by the Cuban regime and facilitate laundering of U.S. currency by the Cuban regime? Why or why not?

**Answer:**

The Administration believes that authorizing U.S. banking and other depository institutions to forward authorized remittances will result in a more regulated system that protects the value and ensures the delivery of U.S. remittances that would otherwise be handled by non-regulated, unofficial remittance forwarders.

**Cuba.** United States statute requires the President to “establish strict limits on remittances to Cuba...in order to ensure that such remittances reflect only the reasonable costs associated with [travel to the U.S.] and are not used by the Government of Cuba as a means of gaining access to U.S. currency.” (22 USC 6005(c)) However, the Administration’s recent announcement of policy change appears to allow for unlimited remittances. How does the Administration plan to avoid violating U.S. statutory restrictions?

**Answer:**

22 USC 6005(c) addresses emigration-related remittances, which are currently authorized in section 515.570(b) of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. The Administration is not lifting all restrictions on such emigration-related remittances, but will continue to limit them to levels that reflect the reasonable costs associated with orderly, safe, and legal migration from Cuba to the United States. The Administration did announce plans to remove limitations on other types of remittances—i.e. those to authorized family members—and we believe that policy change will help build connections among divided Cuban families, decrease dependency on the Cuban government, and ultimately encourage positive change on the island.

**Cuba/Human Rights.** At our April 22 hearing, you stated that “we will work to expand opportunity and protect human rights, strengthen civil society, live up to the ideals that define our nation.” Reports indicate that the Administration plans to have informal meetings with the Cuban regime, a regime that is one of the most brutal dictatorships in the world. Madam Secretary, please discuss these reports of informal meetings, the guidance that will be given by your Office as to the protection of human rights and the strengthening of civil society in Cuba. And, finally, please discuss the Administration’s efforts to free political prisoners in Cuba.

**Answer:**

The Administration believes that engagement is a vital tool for advancing U.S. objectives throughout the world, including in support of our efforts to encourage improved human rights conditions in Cuba. We communicate with the Cuban government through the U.S. Interests

Section in Havana and through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. and anticipate continuing to use these channels for future discussions. Senior Department officials have made clear in public statements that this Administration will approach Cuba policy in the context of our broader efforts to reinforce democracy and human rights throughout the hemisphere and to promote the observance of the rights enumerated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. This and other U.S. national interests will guide our engagement with the Cuban government.

In our public discussions on Cuba, we have emphasized the importance we place on Cuba's release of political prisoners. We have asked our partners around the world to urge the Cuban government to release the more than 200 prisoners of conscience in Cuban prisons and to provide international humanitarian organizations access to Cuban prisons. Our democracy assistance programs will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families. These actions are consistent with the Administration's strategy of reaching out to the Cuban people to provide them access to resources, humanitarian support, and information that they do not currently enjoy.

**Cuba/OAS.** The United States, along with 33 other Western Hemisphere nations, is a signatory to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which highlights the region's commitment to representative democracy. Recently, Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, indicated that Cuba should be readmitted to the OAS. Please address United States policy as to a potential re-admittance of Cuba to the OAS and what steps Cuba must take to be re-admitted?

**Answer:**

The United States looks forward to the day when Cuba can participate again in the OAS and the inter-American system in a manner that is fully consistent with the values of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The OAS has made a strong commitment to democracy and human rights. The Organization has underscored its members' commitment to promote and defend democracy as an essential element of their participation in the organization through numerous instruments, including the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

This was a hard won accomplishment, and the United States is committed to defending the region's core commitment to democracy and respect for human rights. Cuba's eventual reintegration into the OAS should not occur at the expense of this core commitment. It will depend on what Cuba is prepared to do to demonstrate its commitment to the Organization's core values and principles, including meeting the democracy and human rights commitments undertaken by all of the other countries of the region.

We have conveyed these views to our partners and to the OAS. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary Steinberg both underscored these points in their respective remarks at the Council of the Americas's annual conference on May 13.

**Western Hemisphere/China.** China has fervently attempted to isolate Taiwan by exerting its economic power with other nations. Reports indicate that China's recent aid to Costa Rica



reportedly was directly linked to the Central American country's establishment of diplomatic relations with China (and termination of relations with Taiwan) in 2007. Please address these reports, and China's newfound influence over Western Hemisphere capitals.

**Answer:**

Since 2004, three countries in the Western Hemisphere have established diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China (Dominica – 2004, Grenada – 2005, and Costa Rica – 2007), while one country established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Saint Lucia). Today, eleven of the 23 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are in the Western Hemisphere.

In the case of Costa Rica, the government officially established ties with China on June 6, 2007, breaking 44 years of relations with Taiwan. At a press conference that day President Arias characterized the move as “act of fundamental realism... (and) a wake-up call to the global context in which it is Costa Rica's turn to play a role.” The decision prompted criticism from many, who noted Taiwan's generous assistance to Costa Rica, totaling USD 8 million during the Arias administration alone. Taiwan contributed to large-scale infrastructure projects such as the USD 27 million Friendship Bridge in Guanacaste.

President Arias visited China in October 2007, leading China to declare Costa Rica a “preferred destination” for tourism, while Chinese President Hu reciprocated in November 2008, making his first-ever visit to Costa Rica (and to Central America).

Large-scale economic assistance typically flows to countries which decide to recognize China, and Costa Rica was no exception. China provided \$20 million in disaster relief to reconstruct damaged housing in the wake of severe flooding in Costa Rica last year. A Chinese firm will construct a new national stadium in San Jose, using a portion of a second tranche of assistance (\$28 million) pledged by China. In February 2008 China became the largest holder of Costa Rican bonds when it purchased \$300 million worth of such bonds. A Chinese firm is constructing a new, multi-million dollar national stadium and a business complex in San Jose. In addition, China delivered 200 new patrol cars to the Costa Rican national police in 2008. Both countries hope to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement in 2010.

China's growing profile in the region reflects its broader emergence as a global economic and political power. China's economic expansion, as well as its search for resources to fuel its economic development, have brought it greater influence around the world, including in Latin American and the Caribbean. This engagement presents the U.S. and our regional partners with challenges and opportunities, and underscores the need for the U.S. to maintain its own active economic and diplomatic relationships in the region. China's economic activity focuses on securing raw materials, food, and energy, and its demand for Latin American minerals, foodstuffs, and petroleum that has helped boost commodity prices and fuel economic growth in some sectors. However, China's exports to the region pose stiff competition for Latin American manufactures, especially textile producers. Some regional leaders have expressed concern about trade deficits and the ability of their economies to compete with China.

During his April 2006 and October 2008 visits to China, Assistant Secretary Shannon noted that there are areas where the U.S. and China can cooperate to ensure the economic and political development of Latin America. We believe there may be opportunities for the United States and China to cooperate with Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters affecting regional stability, transnational crime, counternarcotics, poverty reduction, and disaster preparedness. We are encouraging China to ensure that its engagement in the region supports the creation of prosperity and promotes transparency, good governance, and human rights.

During the past year, there appears to have been a lessening of the diplomatic competition that had traditionally been waged by the PRC and Taiwan. Recent cross-Strait dialogue and new travel, trade and finance agreements have helped lessen the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and in the diplomatic arena. We will continue to press both Taiwan and the PRC for transparency in their international development programs and funding.

**Venezuela/FARC.** Sources indicate the FARC kidnapped a total of 6,877 Colombian and foreign citizens between 1996 and January 2008. Reports further indicate that ties between high-level Venezuelan officials and the FARC date back to August 1999, when letters signed by high-level aides of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez revealed that the Venezuelan Government had offered fuel, money, and other support to the FARC. Please comment on the links, and the Department of State's efforts, related to the terrorist organization FARC and high-level Venezuelan officials.

**Answer:**

We are concerned about connections between senior Venezuelan government officials and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. In September 2008, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two senior Venezuelan government officials, Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, and the former Justice and Interior Minister, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC.

We also share the concerns of our hemispheric partners regarding the apparent presence of FARC guerrillas in Venezuelan territory. Like others in the region, we continue to urge the Venezuelan government to better police its borders and deny the FARC a safe haven.

Venezuela has also been designated, since 2006, as "not fully cooperating" with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Pursuant to this designation, defense articles and services may not be sold or licensed for exportation to Venezuela. We will continue to insist that the Venezuelan government end ties with the FARC, and fully support Colombia's fight against the FARC and other terrorist and drug trafficking organizations.

**Venezuela/Anti-Semitism.** As you know, on January of 2009, a Caracas synagogue was ransacked and vandalized and the assailants shattered religious objects, spray-painting "Jews, get out" on the temple's walls and stole a computer database containing names and addresses of Jews living in Venezuela. Can you comment on the current state of anti-Semitism in Venezuela

and how the Department of State intends to promote the protection of the Jewish minority in the country?

**Answer:**

In recent years, there has been a rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Venezuela. These incidents reached a peak during Israel's military operations in Gaza earlier this year, when the Venezuelan Jewish community was subjected to a substantial increase in hateful rhetoric, intimidation, and vandalism of communal and personal property. The most egregious act took place on January 30, when individuals broke into a historic Caracas synagogue and desecrated the Torah. Like other members of the international community, we called on the Venezuelan government to investigate the attack and prosecute those responsible. On March 26, Venezuelan prosecutors formally brought charges against eight police officers and three other individuals in connection with the attack.

During the Gaza hostilities, Venezuelan government rhetoric, including comments made on state-controlled media, was harsh and often appeared to single out the Venezuelan Jewish community. Of particular concern to us is the possibility that this rhetoric created a climate in which actions taken against the community appeared to be encouraged. Although these incidents have diminished since the end of these military operations, the United States will continue to work with our hemispheric partners to promote inclusiveness and tolerance in Venezuela.

Department officials remain in regular contact with representatives of U.S. and international Jewish organizations. In June 2008, the Department's Special Envoy on Anti-Semitism visited Venezuela to meet with Jewish community leaders and a Venezuelan government official.

At the Organization of American States' Permanent Council Meeting on February 4, the United States condemned the January 30 synagogue attack, and called on the Venezuelan government to investigate the attack and prosecute those responsible. The U.S. Embassy in Caracas also meets regularly with local Jewish community leaders and, after the synagogue attack, our Chargé met with synagogue leaders and a delegation from the American Jewish Committee.

**Merida Initiative.** Though the State Department has been designated as the lead agency on the Merida Initiative, DHS recently announced a new border security policy and DOD is potentially receiving \$350m for Merida-related activities under the Supplemental. How are these various streams of funding and activities being coordinated? Who is responsible for maintaining oversight of these programs?

**Answer:**

In Washington, the joint National Security Council/Homeland Security Council Inter-agency Policy Committee on the Southwest-Border and Merida Initiative coordinates interagency efforts on the Merida Initiative foreign assistance programs as well as related

domestic efforts to combat trafficking in arms, money laundering and reducing demand for drugs on our side of the border.

At the Department of State, the International Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INL) Assistant Secretary and Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Deputy Assistant Secretary for North American Affairs coordinate the State Department's lead role in the Merida Initiative with other agencies.

Overseas, our U.S Embassy Country Teams, under the direction of Ambassadors and Deputy Chief of Missions, are coordinating the implementation of the Merida Initiative assistance in partnership with our foreign partners.

**Mexico/Firearms.** Many, within the Government of Mexico and our own Administration, have been quick to blame the United States for the vast majority of firearms being used by the drug cartels in Mexico. However, it is clear from information made available by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives that only 17 percent of the firearms seized in Mexico have in fact been traced to the U.S. As the Congress continues to work closely with the State Department on the ongoing formulation of the Merida Initiative, it is imperative that we base our efforts on accurate information pertaining to the ongoing violence in Mexico. Has the State Department conducted a comprehensive review that considers the location of firearms being seized and traced in Mexico? Have efforts been made to consider the possibility that arms are arriving via the same drug cartel routes originating in Venezuela? Have any of the seized firearms been traced to official assistance the U.S. has provided to the Mexican military?

**Answer:**

The Merida Initiative provides us with a strategic opportunity to reshape our security cooperation relationship and expand dialogue with our partners on critical security and law enforcement issues. The principles of shared responsibility and partnership central to the Merida Initiative require action on our part. Many weapons employed by the criminal organizations against law enforcement agencies and innocent civilians in Mexico originate in the United States and are smuggled illegally across the border.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) is the lead agency in arms trafficking control and seizures. I defer to my colleagues at ATF in responding to questions related to the specifics of firearms seizures in Mexico as ATF can provide more detailed information regarding your particular questions. However, I would note that ATF has been a leader in combating unlawful firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexican drug cartels. My understanding is that ATF is unaware of data that may support the statement that "only 17 percent of the firearms seized in Mexico have in fact been traced to the United States." In fact, ATF testified in March 2009, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, that 90 percent of the firearms recovered in Mexico and submitted for tracing by ATF are U.S. sourced, i.e., either manufactured in or lawfully imported into the United States prior to their recovery in Mexico. As ATF has explained, this number reflects only a portion of firearms seizures, as ATF is able to trace only those firearms that

Mexico actually submits to ATF for tracing, and not the universe of firearms actually seized in Mexico. Regardless of the percentage, however, it is important that the United States enforce its laws so that illicit trafficking in guns from the United States will not continue to fuel violence in Mexico.

#### EUROPE AND EURASIA

**Greece.** Can you generally state the Administration's policy towards Greece? Could expound on the issues related to Greece's acceptance into the Visa waiver program and Greece's relationship with FYROM.

**Answer:**

This Administration looks to build upon our strong relationship with our NATO Ally, Greece. As part of this effort, we have energetically engaged with Greece at the highest levels very early in this Administration. I met with Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis on February 25 in Washington, President Obama met with Prime Minister Karamanlis on April 4 in Europe, and Secretary Gates will meet with Defense Minister Meimarakis on April 27 in Washington. We aim to use these meetings to address challenges ranging from Afghanistan to piracy to non-proliferation as well as regional issues.

The process of Greece's accession to the Visa Waiver Program is moving forward. We expect two of the three bilateral arrangements necessary for accession to be agreed upon shortly and we are continuing to make progress on the third. We are actively working with Greece to complete the process quickly, while ensuring U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration requirements are met.

We continue to support the UN-led talks between Macedonia and Greece on finding a mutually acceptable solution to their difference over Macedonia's name. We are urging both parties to reinvigorate negotiations aimed at a rapid resolution

**Cyprus.** With regard to Cyprus, the Annan Plan failed because it presumed to prohibit Greek-Cypriots from purchasing property in 1/3 of their own country and constitutionally establish Turkish troops permanently on Cyprus, forcing upon the Cypriot people a type of plan that would be unacceptable to citizens of Western democracies. Additionally, some are concerned that your meeting with Mehmet Ali Talat before your recent meeting with Foreign Minister Kyprianou, lent legitimacy to the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. Can you state with any degree of certainty that moving forward the U.S. will not be advocating similar settlement provisions in any future settlement agreements for the reunification of Cyprus?

**Answer:**

The Administration supports Cypriot-led negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's Good Offices Mission in pursuit of a just and lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. To support those efforts, I met with Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Kyprianou on April 5 in Prague and again on April 20 in Washington. In this same spirit, I also met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, on April 15 in Washington.

We recognize only one government on the island – the Republic of Cyprus – but maintain regular contacts with Turkish Cypriots in pursuit of a Cyprus settlement.

**Turkey.** President Obama's remarks recently before the Turkish Parliament, where he specifically called upon Turkey to reopen the theological school at Halki, were encouraging. Is the Administration going to maintain pressure on Turkey? And do you believe Turkey is likely to ease up on oppression of the Ecumenical Patriarchate?

**Answer:**

As President Obama said in his speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, we believe that freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that strengthens the state. Re-opening Halki Seminary would be an important signal in this regard. President Obama also had the opportunity to meet with the Ecumenical Patriarch as part of his outreach to religious leaders in Turkey during his visit to Istanbul on April 7.

Ambassador Jeffrey has raised the issue of reopening Halki Seminary at senior levels of the Turkish government since President Obama's visit. The Ambassador and his staff will continue to urge Turkey to work toward both reopening Halki and taking steps to resolve the other issues of importance to the Patriarch, including the confiscation of property and the elections to the Holy Synod.

The State Department remains committed to engaging the Government of Turkey to re-open Halki Seminary and will continue to urge the Turkish government to respect the ecumenical status and legal provisions relating to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as well as affording it the opportunity to train new clergy there. We encourage the Turkish government to allow, in law and in practice, the Holy Synod to select its members regardless of their citizenship and to restore confiscated religious property in order to prevent spurious legal challenges to Patriarchate property.

The recent selection of a new Turkish Cabinet of Ministers provides the opportunity to re-engage with the Turkish government on re-opening Halki Seminary. The State Department and the U.S. Mission in Turkey will continue to engage at all levels with the Turkish government to achieve concrete progress on all of the issues of concern to the Ecumenical Patriarch.

**Eastern Europe/Missile Defense.** There are serious concerns that a reduction in the funding for and a delay in the deployment of U.S. missile shield components in Europe—a system aimed at countering the potential missile threat emanating from rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea – will undermine the national security interests of the U.S. and our European allies.

- 1) Wouldn't such a shift in our policy on missile defense send the wrong message to officials representing our allies—Poland and the Czech Republic-- who previously committed to hosting missile defense components on their territories but who may well feel that the US has abandoned them on this effort?

**Answer:**

No final decisions have been made regarding missile defense in Europe. The FY10 budget preserves the Administration's flexibility to arrive at a future decision on missile defense in Europe by ensuring adequate funds are available. The Administration has explained our missile defense policy guidelines to officials in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as our other NATO Allies, and they await the completion of our policy review. We also have established mechanisms with Poland and the Czech Republic to expand our strategic discussions and military cooperation. We have regularly consulted with Poland and the Czech Republic on important milestones in the missile defense program in the past.

- 2) Isn't it also likely that cutting funding and delaying the deployment of a missile defense in Europe will send a message to other U.S. allies, such as Israel and Japan, that, given enough pressure by Russia or others, the US can be persuaded to give up on its missile defense efforts with them?

**Answer:**

In his Prague Speech, President Obama clearly described the factors that he would use in deciding on U.S. missile defense plans for Europe: "As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed." And as I noted on March 4, "We've made the point to Russia, and we will make it again ... that this is not about Russia." Finally, in response to the ballistic missile threat from Iran and other countries, the United States is continuing missile defense cooperation with Japan, Israel, and other allies and friends.

The Missile Defense Agency budget preserves the Administration's flexibility to arrive at a future decision on missile defense in Europe by ensuring adequate funds are available for any required near-term actions. The Department of Defense (DoD) will continue preliminary design work for the sites this year, maintaining the ability for construction to begin if a decision is made to do so. However, site construction remains subject to the congressionally mandated requirement that the necessary bilateral missile defense basing agreements must be ratified by the Czech Republic before radar site construction could begin, and ratified by both Poland and the Czech Republic before missile defense interceptor site construction could begin.

**Kyrgyzstan/Manas Base.** The President's supplemental request has language that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to \$30 million to the Department of State to provide a long-range air traffic control and safety system to support air operations in the Kyrgyz Republic. Although on February 20 Kyrgyzstan officially set in motion the process for closing the airbase, most recent reports indicate that the U.S. is still negotiating with Kyrgyzstan to keep the base open.

- 1) What is the current status of the negotiations with the Kyrgyz government?
- 2) Does the U.S. intend to fund the air traffic control and safety system if the Kyrgyz government closes the base?
- 3) Should the U.S. engage in a bidding war with Russia over the base in Kyrgyzstan? Why or why not?
- 4) What alternative bases are we currently considering to replace the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, if and when it closes, and what is the status of the negotiations with the countries in which they might be located?

**Answer:**

We continue to discuss U.S. military access to Manas with the Kyrgyz Government. If the Kyrgyz Government ultimately ceases U.S. military access to Manas, we do not intend to fund the air traffic control system. On alternatives, it's not appropriate to discuss operational issues in this setting. We are happy to address this in executive session if you wish. We are not engaged in a bidding war with Russia regarding U.S. military access to Manas.

**Russia.** Do you think that, in light of Russia's invasion of Georgia last August and its reported efforts to pressure Kyrgyzstan to close down U.S. access to the Manas base in the Kyrgyzstan, Moscow can be trusted to be a reliable partner in the efforts in Afghanistan? Why or why not?

**Answer:**

The United States and Russia face common threats of narcotics, extremism and instability in Afghanistan and the Russian leadership has publicly voiced its support for ISAF efforts to bring stability and security to Afghanistan. While we may disagree on some areas of our relationship, including Georgia, we can cooperate on areas where we share common interests such as Afghanistan, and we hope to continue discussions with Russia on this issue of mutual importance.

Afghanistan's stability, security and economic development require a regional solution, and we are committed to working with Russia and our Central Asian partners to halt the flow of narcotics and the spread of extremism from Afghanistan. In February 2009, the United States and Russia held bilateral consultations to deepen cooperation on promoting stability in Afghanistan, including through counternarcotics measures and increased Russian military and economic assistance to Afghanistan. In addition, Russia's arrangement with NATO to facilitate the transit of non-lethal equipment to Afghanistan, as well as the airlift and lethal equipment transit that it provides to some of our NATO ISAF partners is significant. The United States also



participated as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference on Afghanistan held in Moscow in March 2009.

**Russia/Democracy.** Considering that the Russian government, under Vladimir Putin, over the past decade has become more oppressive domestically – evident in crackdowns on independent media and new restrictions on opposition parties and NGOs – is the United States placing enough emphasis on democracy promotion and rule of law efforts there?

**Answer:**

The Administration believes that respect for human rights and the rule of law in Russia is of paramount importance, and is committed to working with the Russian government and Russian people to help advance democratic and rule of law principles in that country.

Using tools like the annual report on human rights practices and regular discussions with Russian officials and civil society groups, the United States closely monitors political and legal developments in Russia, and American officials at all levels raise concerns as they arise with their Russian counterparts. President Obama, during his first meeting with Russian President Medvedev, raised the case of an assault on well-known Russian human rights activist Lev Ponomarev, signaling our high-level interest in such cases of concern.

The United States also works with Russian civil society and government officials on programs to advance democratic and rule of law practices and promote respect for human rights. Nearly half of the foreign operations assistance appropriated to Russia this year promotes democracy and the rule of law. The vast majority of this supports non-governmental actors.

**Georgia.** In your supplemental request, the Administration is seeking \$242.5 million for Georgia, as part of the \$1 billion commitment made by the US, to help Georgia recover from the destruction caused by Russia's invasion last August. But there is nothing in the request regarding helping Georgia strengthen its defensive capabilities. Has the Obama administration made a decision as to whether it will support comprehensive initiatives to bolster Georgia's defensive capabilities in order to better prepare it to deter or defend against attacks on its sovereign territory? What is the scope of the assistance being considered?

**Answer:**

The \$1 billion commitment to Georgia did not include any military assistance. However, a portion of this funding will help bolster Georgia's border security and Coast Guard services that will improve Georgia's capacity to secure its borders by detecting and deterring trafficking in persons, weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, and other illicit materials.

The Administration is helping the Georgian military develop and modernize by providing security assistance through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, as well as through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In FY09, FMF funding for

Georgia is \$11 million, and the FY10 Administration request is \$16 million. IMET funding is \$1.15 million in FY09, while the Administration is requesting \$2 million in FY10.

The Obama Administration has not made a decision on the scope of supporting Georgia's military development. At this point, the United States is providing only non-lethal military assistance to Georgia.

Programs are being designed to improve the professionalism, training, defensive operations, and peacekeeping capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and assist their continuing progress towards NATO interoperability.

Resources will be used to develop the Georgian armed forces and assist Georgia to continue its support for coalition activities. To this end, our funding is going towards improvements to the training infrastructure at the Krtsanisi National Training Center; funding for a defense advisory team that assists Georgian staff at all levels in transforming to a NATO model; and improving the professionalism of Georgian military personnel through educational opportunities at U.S. military training facilities. The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership will also focus on security cooperation and reform.

***Moldova.*** Earlier this month, Moldova held parliamentary elections in which the Communist Party was declared the victor. The elections were followed by violence and protests alleging the falsification of the election results and the use of excessive force and torture against demonstrators and detainees.

- 1) Will the U.S. call for an independent investigation into the reported voter fraud and human rights abuses surrounding the election? Wouldn't the lack of such a demand likely be interpreted as a lack of U.S. commitment to promote and protect democracy and human rights in the region?
- 2) Is there any evidence to support accusations by Moldovan officials that Romania supported the violent demonstrations or, to the contrary, that some in the Moldovan security services may have sought to provoke the violence as a pretext for suppressing the democratic opposition?
- 3) Are the events that took place in Moldova earlier this month an indication that the leadership in that country, reputed to be engaged in corrupt activities, may be moving toward the kind of authoritarian political model we see in Belarus?

**Answer:**

Both publicly and privately, the Administration has called on the Government of Moldova to address, in a transparent and constructive manner, concerns raised by the opposition and international observers about the April 5 elections. In its initial report issued the day after the elections, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) in concert with the European Parliament and Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe found that Moldova met many of its international commitments, but identified numerous shortcomings. In the subsequent days and weeks, as more allegations surfaced regarding the conduct of the elections, including

concerns about the validity of voter lists, we made it clear to the Government of Moldova that we believe it is in its interest to take actions to increase confidence in the election result. Conversely, demonization of the opposition serves no purpose.

The Administration has condemned the violence that took place on April 7. Following reports that Moldovan authorities mistreated protesters, students, and journalists, we pressed the government to respect Moldovan law and its international human rights commitments. Embassy officers visited the detainees in prison and obtained first-hand knowledge of the conditions under which the detainees were held. The cause of the April 7 violence is unclear. The Government of Moldova is considering plans to establish a commission to investigate the April 7 events that would include participation by NGOs and members of the international community. Under the proper conditions, the United States could participate in such an effort.

Moldovan leaders have expressed their desire to continue down the path of European integration. We have stressed that continued good relations with the United States will be contingent on respect for the rule of law and human rights.

#### AFRICA

***Somalia.*** Is this Administration still committed to seeing a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia? If so, why? What resources does the State Department plan to bring to the table as we confront an increasing number of attacks against U.S. merchant vessels off the coast of Somalia, particularly following the sensational rescue of Captain Richard Phillips?

**Answer:**

Right now, we are focused on developing the Somalia security sector and supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We are committed to these efforts, with the goal of establishing security in and around Mogadishu and eventually in all of Somalia. We are also supporting the Transitional Federal Government in its political reconciliation efforts with other moderates, as well as looking at ways to support long-term economic development in all areas of Somalia.

The Department of State, working with the Department of Defense, will continue to provide significant technical assistance and training to strengthen maritime security capacities in the Horn of Africa. The Department is also amplifying its already-robust diplomatic engagement on Horn of Africa piracy, both bilaterally and within fora such as the United Nations, the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the International Maritime Organization and NATO. We are also closely engaged with the African Union and European Union on this issue. The Department is convening an urgent meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia on May 29 in New York to identify ways to bolster international military contributions and coordination in the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa. We will continue to work closely with other USG departments and agencies and the international community to improve industry implementation of best practices to reduce vulnerability to piracy and to ensure that suspected pirates face prosecution by affected states.

**Eritrea.** Given the support Eritrea has provided – and continues to provide – to the Islamist extremist al-Shabab network in Somalia, which has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, will Eritrea be designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism? If not, why not?

**Answer:**

Eritrea's support for al-Shabaab is a major concern. It undermines the counterterrorism policies of the United States and continues to hinder stabilization efforts in Somalia. Because of these concerns, the United States government has designated Eritrea as "Not Cooperating Fully" with U.S. efforts against terrorism.

The United States continues to impress upon the Government of Eritrea that it is necessary to end support for al-Shabaab if our bilateral relationship is to improve. The U.S. is considering a variety of policies to accomplish this objective. Designation of Eritrea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism is one option.

**Sudan.** How will you seek to balance support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan with the need to establish peace and confront genocide in Darfur? How does counterterrorism fit into the equation?

**Answer:**

The policy review process will culminate with a comprehensive strategy that provides a way forward for full Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation and resolution of the crisis in Darfur. Implementing the CPA and ending the violence in Darfur are both key priorities, and it is difficult to imagine peace and stability in Sudan if both are not achieved. Full implementation of the CPA is crucial to maintaining peace between North and South and avoiding the resumption of a war that resulted in more than two million deaths over 19 years. The United States is actively encouraging the parties to fully implement outstanding CPA commitments, and working to mobilize the international community to play a unified and constructive role in this endeavor. Ongoing violence in Darfur, particularly violence targeted at civilians, is unacceptable, and threatens to de-stabilize both Sudan and the region. A political settlement is the only long-term solution to the Darfur conflict, and we are working urgently to achieve this.

We value Sudan's cooperation on counter-terrorism. However, cooperation on this front does not obviate the need for Sudan to make significant changes in its behavior with respect to its actions on the CPA and Darfur. We continue to make this clear to them.

**Chad.** Chad's internal political instability continues to have devastating consequences on the peace processes in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), yet the State Department does not have a coherent Chad policy. Do you see the need for a regional approach toward dealing with the crisis in Sudan, which would include addressing Chad's internal crises?

**Answer:**

While the resolution of the crisis in Darfur remains a top priority for the Department, we recognize Chad's own internal stability is critical to our long-term objectives in the region. Any regional approach to the crisis in Sudan must include Chad-specific components, namely actions 1) to resolve relations between Chad and Sudan, 2) foster security for humanitarian operations in eastern Chad, and 3) promote good governance and political openness.

First, in order to address Chad's internal conditions, we must reduce tensions between Chad and Sudan. The events of the past few weeks – a cross-border assault by Khartoum-supported rebels into Chad followed by a Chadian military counter-attack into Sudan – resulted in new accusations and increased tensions between Khartoum and N'Djamena. This despite a May 3 agreement in Doha between the two governments in which both committed to normalizing relations and ceasing support for each other's respective armed opposition groups. Such cross-border hostilities threaten civilians and humanitarians on both sides of the border and harm efforts to negotiate a lasting peace in the region. We continue to support all diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations between Chad and Sudan, and encourage Chad and Sudan to recommit to the May 3 Doha Accord and previous agreements. We urge Chadian rebel groups to lay down their arms and while also pressing the Government of Chad to open the political space that will allow them to do so.

In addition, in order to enhance the protection for humanitarian operations in eastern Chad and the vulnerable populations they assist, we continue our support to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), which is tasked with protecting humanitarian relief operations and civilians in the region. Our assessed contributions to this mission are complimented by a voluntary contribution of two million dollars to support the training of Chadian gendarmes who form the Integrated Security Detachment (DIS), which is tasked to protect refugee and displaced persons camps in eastern Chad.

Finally, to directly address Chad's domestic political and economic situation, we are working with our international partners to promote political transparency and economic reform. Specifically, we provide political support and assistance to implement the August 13, 2007 political accord between the Government and political opposition, which lays the groundwork for national elections in 2010. With our limited assistance funds, we are providing support for a national and electoral census. In coordination with our European allies, we recently pressed the Government and opposition to resolve difference and move forward on key legislation to implement the August 13 accord. The United States also continues to encourage the Government of Chad to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and reform the country's public finance system and transparently manage Chad's oil revenues for the benefit of the Chadian people.

**Zimbabwe.** The supplemental budget request for FY '09 included \$45 million for Zimbabwe, which seems to reflect new thinking in the State Department about our ability to work with the new unity government. Is this an accurate statement? What is U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe at

this time? Will funds to support the unity government also be included in the FY'10 budget request?

**Answer:**

We wish the transitional government success and commend its early accomplishments in stabilizing the economy and reducing violence. However, challenges by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party hard-liners continue to test the resolve of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the international community. Much remains to be done by the transitional government in order to merit full economic reengagement and the full range of development assistance.

The United States can most effectively support progress in Zimbabwe by publicly conditioning reengagement and new assistance on progress toward major political and economic reform as incorporated in the Zimbabwe Economic Recovery Act, in internationally agreed principles for reengagement with Zimbabwe, and moreover as agreed to by the parties of the transitional government in the September 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA). While we have seen some positive change on the economic policy front, the transitional government has moved much slower in addressing human rights and rule of law issues.

The United States can also facilitate positive change in Zimbabwe by helping reform elements of the transitional government succeed in implementing the GPA through programs that can be provided under notwithstanding authority. These programs include areas such as good governance, human rights, independent media, rule of law, and strengthening the capacity of democratic political parties.

The Department's FY 2010 proposal for assistance to Zimbabwe includes programs to re-establish and strengthen democratic institutions, processes and systems; programs to support social assistance to protect vulnerable populations during the transition; and programs for economic revitalization, specifically for the agricultural sector.

The Department is cognizant of current legislative restrictions and will continue to be vigilant in ensuring that assistance does not fall into the wrong hands.

**Guinea Bissau.** Analysts warn that Guinea-Bissau is on the verge of becoming a narco-state, yet because the United States does not have a regular presence there we lack critical intelligence about what is happening on the ground. Is it time to open a United States Embassy in Guinea-Bissau?

**Answer:**

One of the Department's goals is to establish a greater diplomatic presence in Bissau as soon as possible. Initially, I favor a small footprint that would receive substantial regional support from Dakar, Senegal.

Our current presence in Bissau is seven full time Locally Employed Staff and frequent/regular visits by Dakar staff from several agencies.

**HIV/AIDS.** Given the lack of transparency and accountability in Global Fund programs – as most recently exemplified by the diversion of Global Fund dollars by the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe - should US contributions to the Global Fund be straight-lined or even reduced until the Fund succeeds in becoming more transparent and effective?

**Answer:**

We share your concerns about the recent diversion of funds in Zimbabwe and are working closely with the Global Fund Secretariat, our Embassy, and other donors to ensure Global Fund resources are adequately safeguarded. We are also working to strengthen the Global Fund's internal controls and oversight capacity, including the Office of the Inspector General. In response to USG leadership on this issue, the Global Fund Board adopted a decision at its 19<sup>th</sup> meeting in May 2009 reaffirming the Global Fund "does not tolerate corruption, fraud, misappropriation or abuse of any kind in relation to its grants," and requesting the Executive Director to restrict signature of new grants where there is credible evidence of fraud or corruption. The Global Fund Executive Director also has the ability to suspend disbursements under existing grants in affected countries, as was done recently in Zimbabwe. We will continue to work through our seat on the Global Fund Board to increase transparency and accountability in Global Fund programs, and do not believe this issue requires us to adjust our contribution level at this time.

**UNITED NATIONS**

**UN Peacekeeping/Arrears.** The supplemental budget request for FY'09 that was recently submitted to Congress included \$836.9 million for Contributions to International Peacekeeping (CIPA). The justification stated that a portion of the funds would be used to satisfy cap-related arrears and, if fully funded, the United States will have no arrears by the end of FY'09. Is this an accurate statement? If full funding is not forthcoming, how will the Administration prioritize payments – existing mission and current bills first, or arrears first?

**Answer:**

The FY 2009 supplemental request of \$836.9 million for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), together with the FY 2009 CIPA appropriation will sustain our contributions to UN peacekeeping activities through FY 2009. These funds also will address arrears from calendar years 2005 through 2008 caused by the statutory cap on U.S. assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. The Department may pay these arrears because its FY 2009 appropriations act increased the cap from 25 percent to 27.1 percent for assessments made during calendar years 2005 through 2008. The request represents the Administration's commitment to pay U.S. assessments in full and on time to support UN peacekeeping missions that help maintain and restore international peace and security. If the FY 2009 supplemental

request is not fully funded, we will make payments according to the peacekeeping priorities identified by the Department at the time of the payment.

**UN Peacekeeping/Assessments.** How do you plan to hold the United Nations to its word that it will progressively reduce United States assessments for peacekeeping to 25%?

**Answer:**

The UN peacekeeping scale is based on a methodology that consists of three steps: (1) the regular UN budget scale is used as the base; (2) discounts are applied to all member states except most developed countries, with countries divided into 10 levels (A-J); and (3) the P5 pay a premium equivalent to the total discount given to all other member states. Discounts for the 10 levels range from 0% (Levels A and B) to 90% (Level J).

The United Nations Reform Act of 1999 (Helms-Biden) made the reduction of U.S. dues for peacekeeping one of several conditions that had to be met before the United States would pay its arrears.

During the 2000 UN scale discussions, when the peacekeeping scale was established, our primary objectives were getting the regular budget scale ceiling reduced to 22% and our peacekeeping assessment rate reduced to 25%. Unlike the regular budget, the peacekeeping scale does not have a ceiling. Negotiations succeeded in reducing the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to just over 27 percent.

While the U.S. assessment rate for peacekeeping has not been reduced to 25%, we are pleased that it is now slightly less than 26% (25.9%) as compared to the rate of over 30% that we were billed prior to 2001. When the scale of assessments is considered this autumn by the 64<sup>th</sup> UNGA, we will work to ensure as advantageous an outcome as possible for the United States on both the regular budget and the peacekeeping scale.

**UN Development Program.** United Nations Development Program (UNDP) operations are pervaded by allegations of fraud and mismanagement, from North Korea to Burma to Zimbabwe. Most recently, the Treasury Department has had to authorize a collection agency to retrieve over \$7 million in USAID funds that were misspent or unaccounted for by UNDP in Afghanistan. Making matters worse, UNDP's governing board is chaired by Iran, and the UNDP has announced that it plans to return to North Korea – without meaningful safeguards – despite evidence that its past programs enriched the North Korean regime. Nonetheless, the U.S. gave the UN over \$200 million last year. (1) Will the U.S. condition future funding to UNDP on meaningful reform in that institution? (2) Given credible allegations of UNDP retaliation against whistleblowers, will the U.S. condition its funding to UNDP on that agency acceding to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office?



**Answer:**

In response to actions initiated by the U.S. over the past two years to improve the organization's transparency and accountability, UNDP adopted a new accountability policy in September 2008. The policy put in place a framework for strengthening accountability and transparency in the organization. Included in this framework are: Executive Board access to UNDP internal audits published after January 2008, a whistleblower protection policy, and the independence (from management) of the internal oversight functions such as the Office of Audit and Investigation, the Ethics Office, and the Audit Advisory Committee.

Last year, the previous Administration found that these and other actions by UNDP to improve transparency and accountability fulfilled requirements set out in the FY 2008 appropriations bill for release to UNDP of the full amount of the U.S. contribution.

Continued improvement in UNDP's transparency and accountability is an important issue for this Administration. UNDP's accountability framework is still largely an untested work in progress, and we will continue to monitor its implementation, particularly the key provisions regarding the independence of internal oversight functions.

We address every credible allegation of mismanagement and wrong-doing with UNDP management and the Executive Board. Recently, the Office of the Inspector General of USAID issued a report on apparent problems with UNDP's implementation of a Quick Impact Program (QIP) in Afghanistan, including alleged unauthorized withdrawals from a USAID letter of credit that is the subject of the Treasury collection. We have discussed these issues with UNDP and can report that UNDP and USAID are working vigorously and cooperatively together to figure out exactly what went wrong and to fix it, as well as to set better, more rigorous oversight and financial safeguards in place in future agreements. UNDP has committed to repay any amounts that USAID determines cannot be justified.

In June 2008, in response to a request by a majority of Executive Board members, UNDP management began considering the resumption of activities in North Korea. In January 2009, the Executive Board approved a proposal to resume the DPRK program based on UNDP's report that DPRK authorities had agreed to the Board's requirements for operating a program. UNDP obtained DPRK agreement for improved monitoring terms and more transparent hiring and payment practices for local staff. UNDP also agreed to prohibit direct transfers of funds to the DPRK and to make public additional information about its DPRK program.

We will continue to monitor this program closely as UNDP resumes its operations in the DPRK to ensure that all of these commitments are met.

**STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS**

***Foreign Service Pay Raise.*** Your budget requests incorporate more than a 21 percent base pay raise for non-senior Foreign Service Officers that would raise their pay to Washington, DC locality levels even while they're stationed overseas, where taxpayers already pay for their housing and educational expenses, and where the cost of living is often lower. Has the Department established that the lack of this pay raise is hurting its ability to hire and retain sufficient numbers of qualified officers? In addition to this pay raise, would officers still continue to receive the cost-of-living "post allowances," and the substantial increases for danger, hardship, and language skills that they can presently receive when posted overseas?

**Answer:**

Entry and mid-level Foreign Service members (FS-01 and below) currently take a cut in basic pay of about 23% to serve overseas, despite the fact we are asking more of them to serve in difficult, dangerous and volatile environments. This disparity in base pay continues to grow, as it has each year since the implementation of locality pay in 1994, and is increasingly undermining existing incentives to service overseas. It is important to note that before the introduction of locality pay, the base pay of employees serving overseas was the same as the basic pay for those in Washington, DC.

Members of the Foreign Service serving overseas receive certain allowances and differentials, each of which serve a distinct purpose and should not be confused with locality pay, a benefit intended to close the gap between average federal and private sector salaries. Specifically:

- Cost of living allowance (COLA) ensures employees retain the same buying power overseas as when assigned to Washington, DC;
- Hardship differential compensates employees for extraordinarily difficult living conditions at foreign posts that differ substantially from those in the United States, including isolation, disease, harassment, pollution, and long term health conditions; and
- Danger pay compensates employees for the threat of physical harm or imminent danger from civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions.

Locality pay, by contrast, is intended to close the gap between average federal and private sector salaries for similar work in order for the federal government to compete for and retain top talent. COLA, hardship differential, and danger pay were not established by Congress to serve the same ends as locality pay.

Moreover, the loss of locality pay when assigned overseas undermines the effectiveness of authorized allowances and differentials. First, there are about 175 posts where the combination of hardship differential and danger pay is less than the 23% locality pay. At these posts these two important incentives to service overseas are entirely offset by the loss of locality pay. Second, hardship differentials and danger pay are calculated based on employees' base pay with no adjustment for domestic locality pay rates. Prior to the introduction of locality pay in

1994, the base pay of an employee serving in Washington and overseas was the same. Employees serving overseas therefore received these allowances based on (and in addition to) the equivalent of Washington, DC basic pay. In 2009, by contrast, for those serving overseas these allowances are calculated on basic pay that is now just under 23% less than base pay in Washington, DC. In other words, Foreign Service employees serving overseas take a double-hit: reduced effectiveness of incentives to service overseas (because the incentives are offset by the loss of locality pay) and reduced incentive rates (because they are calculated on the basis of a lower rate of basic pay).

While the Department still has a low Foreign Service Officer attrition rate, the issue of pay compatibility has become a significant concern, particularly in our mid-level ranks. Our 2006 Quality of Life Survey (our annual employee survey) found that of the mid-level officers with 6 to 10 years of service, 32 percent reported that they are considering employment elsewhere as a result of the pay comparability issue. In fact, in our 2007 Quality of Life survey, 52% of FS employees identified pay equity as the most important of 13 options in response to the question "In your opinion, which of the following areas need the most improvement in the DOS?" The next most important area came in at 40%. Although this dissatisfaction has not yet translated into increased attrition, it is clear that the Washington, DC-overseas pay disparity is a serious concern within the Foreign Service and is increasingly likely to negatively affect retention as the disparity continues to grow. The Department regards this potential affect on retention not only as a loss of experience, but also something for which there would be considerable replacement cost.

**"Hedge Fund" for Pakistan and Afghanistan.** Your Supplemental Appropriations request contains dramatically broad "notwithstanding" language that would permit the Administration to raid State Department Administration, International Organization, and International Commission accounts of up to \$250 million dollars, to support vaguely defined "emerging requirements" in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Does this transfer authority imply that those three accounts are over-funded? If not, wouldn't any use of this authority require a follow-on supplemental request to replenish those accounts? How does this unprecedented proposal -- described in a House-side briefing as a "hedge fund" -- fit into the Administration's commitment to transparency and bringing costs onto the regular budget cycle?

**Answer:**

The transfer authority has been requested to provide additional fiscal flexibility if funding requirements in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not match the funds available in the relevant appropriations and the needs in those specific countries are such that the time involved in additional requests for supplemental appropriations would preclude the Department from carrying out time-critical operations in those countries. None of the accounts referenced in the requested authority is overfunded. The requested authority to transfer funding among those accounts is intended solely to provide additional flexibility that would allow the Department to reallocate funding among the accounts should the need arise.

**NONPROLIFERATION**

**IAEA.** The General Accountability Office recently issued a report sharply criticizing the State Department for its lax or nonexistent efforts to monitor and limit the technical cooperation assistance the International Atomic Energy Agency provides to state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba, as well as to countries that are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to others that do not have safeguards agreements with the IAEA. At a minimum, U.S. law imposes sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism. Will State withhold an amount from the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation program equal to the amount provided by the IAEA to state sponsors of terrorism? What other measures is the State Department doing to correct this significant proliferation risk?

**Answer:**

The Department of State strongly opposes GAO's proposal that funds be withheld. The Department of State shares the GAO concern regarding state sponsors of terrorism, and notes that it will continue to deny extra budgetary funding for Technical Cooperation (TC) projects in state sponsors of terrorism that have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for which no immediate funds are available, and for which financing is sought from extra budgetary resources, so-called "footnote 'a'" projects. However, we oppose the specific GAO recommendation for the following reasons. First, this policy contradicts a separate GAO recommendation that states pay their full contribution to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). A payment by the United States of its contribution in full and on time helps to persuade less wealthy states to pay their share of the TCF. Second, the GAO's proposed policy would fail to achieve its objective, as the IAEA TCF is fungible. The result would reduce TC funding for all IAEA member states, and not be limited to IAEA TC projects in the targeted countries. This would call into question the U.S. commitment to the IAEA's statutory mandate to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to Article IV of the NPT.

I would note that both the IAEA Secretariat and the U.S. Government conduct thorough proliferation assessments of IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects. The U.S. Department of Energy and the national laboratories also review TC proposals for possible proliferation concerns and share the results with the Department of State. Furthermore, all new IAEA TC projects are subject to interagency review each year when the United States develops its position for the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors that approves each year's IAEA TC program. The Executive Branch also conducts an annual *ex post facto* review of the IAEA TC Program in certain sensitive countries and reports the results to the Congress.

Thus far, we believe none of the new IAEA TC projects benefiting state sponsors of terrorism have contributed to a WMD program. TC projects do not generally involve sensitive nuclear activities. We do not believe that there is a significant proliferation risk associated with these projects.

**USAID/FOREIGN ASSISTANCE**

**USAID/State.** In the past, there has been well documented tensions between USAID and the State Department, creating difficult situations and lack of cooperation at some posts. Do you see this as a continuing problem and if so, what is being done to remedy this situation?

**Answer:**

The men and women of the Department of State and USAID are serious, dedicated professionals, who are committed to the advancement of US national security goals. In many cases they put themselves in dangerous and challenging environments to carry out this important work. However, they currently lack adequate resources, training and support to succeed fully. I am committed to creating a more agile, effective State Department and USAID, staffing them well, and giving our people the resources they require to do their jobs. The President's FY2009 supplemental request includes \$747M to support State and USAID missions around the world. With the right resource support, I envision a diplomatic and development team that is results-oriented, can move with dispatch, and fosters an atmosphere of collegiality and cooperation, not only across State and USAID but the U.S. government as a whole.

**Mexico City Policy Reversal.** On January 23, 2009 President Obama rescinded the Mexico City Policy which differentiated abortion and family planning in U.S. international population programs. Since that policy is no longer in place, please provide detailed answers to the following:

- 1) How many new foreign NGOs (including subgrantees) have received USAID funding as a result of this change in policy? Please provide a list of the names of all new NGOs that are now receiving funding.

**Answer:**

On January 23, 2009, USAID waived the conditions of the Mexico City Policy. Foreign non-governmental organizations are no longer required to certify their compliance with the Policy as a condition for receiving USAID family planning assistance. Consequently, the Agency is unable to determine whether new partner organizations have received funding since January 23, 2009 as a result of the Policy change or for any other reasons.

- 2) How many foreign NGOs (including subgrantees) lost USAID funding or had their funding reduced as a result of this change in policy? Please provide a list of the names of all NGOs that have lost funding.

**Answer:**

USAID's decision to award funding to an organization is based on the Agency's programmatic needs, the strength of an organization's technical proposal in response to those needs, its programmatic capability, cost realism, and compliance with U.S. statutory and policy

family planning requirements. USAID's funding databases do not contain information on unsuccessful applicants.

Similarly, USAID's funding databases do not include the rationale behind annual incremental funding decisions for existing partner organizations. These decisions, whether resulting in an increase or decrease, are determined on the basis of available resources, the organization's proposed activities for the year, its level of unspent funds, and competing operating unit or program priorities. An organization may have received a lower funding allocation as a function of any combination of these considerations and not based on the Policy change.

- 3) Have the regulations or other guidance implementing the Mexico City Policy been replaced with new regulations or other guidance to grant recipients? If so, please provide a copy of such.

**Answer:**

As directed by the President on January 23, 2009, USAID immediately rescinded the Mexico City Policy restrictions. USAID also instructed agreement officers not to include the Mexico City Policy clauses in new family planning agreements and notified current grantees, as soon as possible, that these conditions were no longer in effect. As requested, we have enclosed a copy of the unilateral amendment released by the Agency's Senior Procurement Executive on January 26, 2009, which enacted the changes described above.



January 26, 2009


To all USAID Recipients:

The purpose of this letter is to amend the Standard Provisions of all grants and cooperative agreements involving any aspect of voluntary population planning activities and which contain the provision VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES - SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (May 2006). This provision is deleted and replaced by the new provision VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES - SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (January 2009) which removes the conditions relating to the Mexico City Policy that were set forth in the May 2006 version of the provision.

On January 23, 2009, President Obama rescinded the Mexico City Policy, noting that its conditions are not required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or any other law. In rescinding the policy, President Obama directed USAID to immediately waive the policy's conditions in any current grants and notify current grantees, as soon as possible, that these conditions have been waived. Accordingly, USAID waives the Mexico City Policy requirements effective January 23, 2009 for all existing awards. The revised provision removes the conditions relating to the Mexico City Policy that were set forth in the standard provisions for assistance awards.

USAID is prohibited from providing funds to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortion, as stipulated by the Helms Amendment enacted in 1973. This and all other statutory and policy requirements relating to family planning remain in effect and will continue to be reflected in the standard provisions set forth in the ADS Chapter 303 Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-Governmental Organizations.

Sincerely,

  
 Maureen A. Shauket  
 Director, Office of Acquisition &  
 Assistance and Senior Procurement  
 Executive

Attachment:  
 VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES - SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS  
 (January 2009)

**ATTACHMENT**

**VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES –  
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (JANUARY 2009)**

*APPLICABILITY: This provision is applicable to all awards involving any aspect of voluntary population planning activities.*

**VOLUNTARY POPULATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES – SUPPLEMENTAL  
REQUIREMENTS (JANUARY 2009)**

- a. Voluntary Participation and Family Planning Methods:
  - (1) The recipient agrees to take any steps necessary to ensure that funds made available under this award will not be used to coerce any individual to practice methods of family planning inconsistent with such individual's moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs. Further, the recipient agrees to conduct its activities in a manner which safeguards the rights, health and welfare of all individuals who take part in the program.
  - (2) Activities which provide family planning services or information to individuals, financed in whole or in part under this agreement, shall provide a broad range of family planning methods and services available in the country in which the activity is conducted or shall provide information to such individuals regarding where such methods and services may be obtained.
  
- b. Requirements for Voluntary Family Planning Projects
  - (1) A Family planning project must comply with the requirements of this paragraph.
  - (2) A project is a discrete activity through which a governmental or nongovernmental organization or public international organization provides family planning services to people and for which funds obligated under this award, or goods or services financed with such funds, are provided under this award, except funds solely for the participation of personnel in short-term, widely attended training conferences or programs.
  - (3) Service providers and referral agents in the project shall not implement or be subject to quotas or other numerical targets of total number of births,



number of family planning acceptors, or acceptors of a particular method of family planning. Quantitative estimates or indicators of the number of births, acceptors, and acceptors of a particular method that are used for the purpose of budgeting, planning, or reporting with respect to the project are not quotas or targets under this paragraph, unless service providers or referral agents in the project are required to achieve the estimates or indicators.

- (4) The project shall not include the payment of incentives, bribes, gratuities or financial rewards to (i) any individual in exchange for becoming a family planning acceptor or (ii) any personnel performing functions under the project for achieving a numerical quota or target of total number of births, number of family planning acceptors, or acceptors of a particular method of contraception. This restriction applies to salaries or payments paid or made to personnel performing functions under the project if the amount of the salary or payment increases or decreases based on a predetermined number of births, number of family planning acceptors, or number of acceptors of a particular method of contraception that the personnel affect or achieve.
- (5) No person shall be denied any right or benefit, including the right of access to participate in any program of general welfare or health care, based on the person's decision not to accept family planning services offered by the project.
- (6) The project shall provide family planning acceptors comprehensible information about the health benefits and risks of the method chosen, including those conditions that might render the use of the method inadvisable and those adverse side effects known to be consequent to the use of the method. This requirement may be satisfied by providing information in accordance with the medical practices and standards and health conditions in the country where the project is conducted through counseling, brochures, posters, or package inserts.
- (7) The project shall ensure that experimental contraceptive drugs and devices and medical procedures are provided only in the context of a scientific study in which participants are advised of potential risks and benefits.
- (8) With respect to projects for which USAID provides, or finances the contribution of, contraceptive commodities or technical services and for which there is no subaward or contract under this award, the organization implementing a project for which such assistance is provided shall agree

that the project will comply with the requirements of this paragraph while using such commodities or receiving such services.

- (9)
- i) The recipient shall notify USAID when it learns about an alleged violation in a project of the requirements of subparagraphs (3), (4), (5) or (7) of this paragraph;
  - ii) the recipient shall investigate and take appropriate corrective action, if necessary, when it learns about an alleged violation in a project of subparagraph (6) of this paragraph and shall notify USAID about violations in a project affecting a number of people over a period of time that indicate there is a systemic problem in the project.
  - iii) The recipient shall provide USAID such additional information about violations as USAID may request.

c. Additional Requirements for Voluntary Sterilization Programs

- (1) None of the funds made available under this award shall be used to pay for the performance of involuntary sterilization as a method of family planning or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any individual to practice sterilization.
- (2) The recipient shall ensure that any surgical sterilization procedures supported in whole or in part by funds from this award are performed only after the individual has voluntarily appeared at the treatment facility and has given informed consent to the sterilization procedure. Informed consent means the voluntary, knowing assent from the individual after being advised of the surgical procedures to be followed, the attendant discomforts and risks, the benefits to be expected, the availability of alternative methods of family planning, the purpose of the operation and its irreversibility, and the option to withdraw consent anytime prior to the operation. An individual's consent is considered voluntary if it is based upon the exercise of free choice and is not obtained by any special inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other forms of coercion or misrepresentation.
- (3) Further, the recipient shall document the patient's informed consent by (i) a written consent document in a language the patient understands and speaks, which explains the basic elements of informed consent, as set out above, and which is signed by the individual and by the attending physician or by the authorized assistant of the attending physician; or (ii) when a patient is unable to read adequately a written certification by the attending physician or by the authorized assistant of the attending

physician that the basic elements of informed consent above were orally presented to the patient, and that the patient thereafter consented to the performance of the operation. The receipt of this oral explanation shall be acknowledged by the patient's mark on the certification and by the signature or mark of a witness who shall speak the same language as the patient.

- (4) The recipient must retain copies of informed consent forms and certification documents for each voluntary sterilization procedure for a period of three years after performance of the sterilization procedure.
- d. Prohibition on Abortion-Related Activities:
- (1) No funds made available under this award will be used to finance, support, or be attributed to the following activities: (i) procurement or distribution of equipment intended to be used for the purpose of inducing abortions as a method of family planning; (ii) special fees or incentives to any person to coerce or motivate them to have abortions; (iii) payments to persons to perform abortions or to solicit persons to undergo abortions; (iv) information, education, training, or communication programs that seek to promote abortion as a method of family planning; and (v) lobbying for or against abortion. The term "motivate", as it relates to family planning assistance, shall not be construed to prohibit the provision, consistent with local law, of information or counseling about all pregnancy options.
  - (2) No funds made available under this award will be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilizations as a means of family planning. Epidemiologic or descriptive research to assess the incidence, extent or consequences of abortions is not precluded.
- e. The recipient shall insert this provision in all subsequent subagreements and contracts involving family planning or population activities that will be supported in whole or in part from funds under this award. The term subagreement means subgrants and subcooperative agreements.

[END OF PROVISION]

- 4) What, if any, oversight actions have been taken to ensure that U.S. funds are not used to directly subsidize abortions or abortion advocacy?

**Answer:**

All USAID family planning agreements contain the U.S. family planning statutory and policy restrictions, including the Helms Amendment which prohibits the use of U.S. funds to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortion. To ensure compliance with all family planning legislative and policy requirements, USAID engages in a number of activities, including routine communication with field Missions, support for the development of effective monitoring and reporting systems, and the systematic provision of training on compliance with the requirements for USAID and implementing partner staff. USAID undertakes annual interactive phone calls with all missions that have family planning programs, frequent training seminars for USAID and implementing partner staff; and, most recently, the design and rollout of an e-learning course on family planning requirements available to the public. In the most recent set of phone calls with missions, when discussing the rescission of the Mexico City Policy, USAID emphasized the continuing applicability of the Helms Amendment and other abortion-related requirements.

**INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS**

**Business Promotion/Trade.** At a time when the United States is facing the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, strengthening the promotion of American exports is increasingly important. The budget for the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service has experienced extreme strains in recent years, due in part to the Capital Cost Sharing Program and the International Cooperative Support Services mandated by the State Department, which will result in a real cut in the Commercial Service's flat-lined FY09 appropriations of \$237 million. These budget tensions have resulted in loss of Commercial staff positions that are, in part, being back-filled by State Department economic officers overseas. Today it is even more important that the State Department pitch in to help lead the way to promoting American made exports globally.

- 1) Out of the 500 new officers the State Department received under the rubric of "smart power," will you assign some of them to key American Embassies and Consulates to actively assist other agencies in promoting U.S. exports, particularly to overseas posts where there are very few or no Foreign Commercial or Agricultural Service officers?

**Answer:**

Commercial promotion is a priority objective for all U.S. Ambassadors overseas and we are very cognizant of the role that our State Department officials play in the promotion on U.S. exports. The FY09 plan calls for hiring 766 Officers (approximately 500 above attrition) nearly all of whom will be assigned to overseas posts on their first tour. Of the 766 new hires, the FY09 plan calls for 145 new Economic Officers. These numbers will allow us to greatly expand our presence overseas and enhance our ability to engage in the full range of U.S. economic interests.

- 2) Would you be willing to ask to reallocate some of the \$600 million the State Department received in the recently enacted economic stimulus package to eliminate or reduce the cost-sharing charged to the Foreign Commercial and Agricultural Services to stimulate U.S. exports?

**Answer:**

The interagency cost-sharing formulas were agreed on and have been in effect for many years. We do not foresee changing the cost-sharing process. Congress allocated stimulus funds to the State Department in order to address the pressing domestic infrastructure needs of the Department. Using these funds to subsidize other agencies' overseas programs would not be consistent with the intent of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

- 3) What are you doing to ensure that American goods and services are used in the hosting of international meetings in the United States, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2011?

**Answer:**

The Department will continue to comply with existing "Buy American" requirements for the contracts needed to support such events. As a matter of policy, the Department adheres faithfully to the Buy America Act principles in implementing all procurement processes and policies.

**Export Controls.** Under the Defense Trade Reform Directive (National Security Presidential Directive 56) signed in 2008, the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs is required to levy usage fees so that it becomes 75 percent self sufficient. To date, the State Department has not reported on how it is using these new fees to improve the entire defense licensing process. Will you commit to submitting a report to this Committee on how these fees are being used in support of licensing activity as well as for the modernization of DDTC operations? Do you have a timeline for continued implementation of the directive's other proposals? How will you prioritize the urgent need for a predictable, efficient, and transparent export control system?

**Answer:**

The directive required the Department to submit a plan to OMB outlining the resources the Department would need so that up to 75 percent of DDTC's mission would be provided from self-financing sources. The Department provided its plan, and OMB endorsed an amended fee structure that was put in place in November, 2008. The Department will provide the Committee with a report on the monthly revenues collected for the initial six months (November 2008 through April 2009), along with obligations to date. Fees are being used to support a predictable licensing process, and for implementing those proposals that can be accomplished under current

law, including the upgrade of DDTC's information systems. The Department already is prioritizing the need for a predictable, efficient and transparent export control system; improvements to date have resulted in an average turnaround time for each license application averaging 15 days, down 30 days per application 24 months ago. Improvement of the defense trade process is ongoing in many areas including those specified in the NSPD. However, State's ability to establish a firm timeline for full implementation of all activities directed by the NSPD is restricted because the Department lacks the statutory authority to apply any increased resources to all of DDTC's export control activities.

#### INDIVIDUAL CASES

**Drake Clayton Case.** In an extremely disturbing situation, an American child, Drake Clayton, has been abducted by his mother and taken to China. The situation is complicated by the fact that China is not a party to the Hague Convention, does not have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S., and bilateral law enforcement cooperation is very weak. Madam Secretary, in light of these serious obstacles, will you raise this case with the Chinese Government at the highest levels? What efforts will the United States make to help secure his return?

**Answer:**

I will ensure that our Embassy in Beijing and Consulate in Shanghai continue to work closely with Chinese officials to communicate our concerns, explore solutions, and push for action. I will raise this matter with my Chinese counterparts. I have enlisted the assistance of the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for East Asia Pacific Affairs, and other senior Department officials who meet with Chinese officials in an effort to address this case, the issues of child abduction, unlawful retention, and parental access.

The highest priority of the Department is safeguarding the welfare of U.S. citizens abroad, the most vulnerable of whom are our U.S. citizen children. China is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This makes securing the return of a U.S. citizen child abducted there more complex. The Department of State, together with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, have been working to gain assistance from Chinese (PRC) authorities in securing the return of Drake to his custodial father in the United States. These efforts have led to Chinese authorities denying issuance of a new work visa to Drake's mother, but we have not received any guarantees that PRC authorities will take definitive action to deport Drake and his mother to the United States. The State Department and Department of Justice have also conveyed to the Chinese government our assurances that the USG will pay the travel costs to bring Drake and his mother to the United States. We are committed to providing all appropriate assistance to Drake Clayton, and will continue to keep Mr. Clayton apprised of developments in this case.

**Brad Will Case.** Madame Secretary, Representative Manzullo wrote to you a few months ago seeking your assistance in resolving the murder of Brad Will, who's parents are his constituents. Do you have an update regarding the current status of the investigation?

**Answer:**

On October 16, 2008, the Mexican federal attorney general's office (PGR) arrested Juan Manuel Martinez Moreno, a member of the Oaxacan People's Popular Assemblies (APPO), in the case of the murder of Mr. Will, on the basis of testimony of two eyewitnesses. We understand the PGR has concluded its investigation of this matter and presented the evidence to the court that will decide the case. PGR contends Martinez may have shot Mr. Will to stop him from filming the confrontation between the demonstrators and the police. PGR arrested two other individuals on charges of being accessories after the fact (covering up for Martinez), but they have since been released on bail, though they remain subject to further legal proceedings.

On October 22, 2008, a local trial judge (*juez del fuero comun*) in Oaxaca ruled there was sufficient evidence to hold Mr. Martinez for trial. On January 20, 2009, a federal judge granted a formal petition Mr. Martinez had filed challenging elements of the evidence used to support his arrest and detention. The PGR appealed against that decision and, on April 28, a three-judge federal tribunal confirmed the federal judge's ruling granting Mr. Martinez's appeal. The three-judge tribunal then sent the case back to the trial court for further consideration. On May 7, the trial judge determined there was sufficient evidence to continue to detain Mr. Martinez pending a trial. Mr. Martinez has the right to submit a new petition challenging his continued detention and the charges against him.

**Question:**

Is the Government of Mexico considering a proposal to invite neutral third party investigators to review the extensive case file?

**Answer:**

We understand the governments of Mexico and Canada have discussed the possibility of Canadian forensic experts reviewing the evidence gathered by Mexican authorities. We do not know what, if any, arrangement they might have reached.

**Question:**

Can the State Department assure us that it will pursue a just resolution of Mr. Will's murder and not let the current violence in Mexico sweep it from consideration?

**Answer:**

The State Department deeply regrets the tragic death of Bradley Will. From the outset, the State Department has demanded a thorough investigation of all the evidence by Mexican authorities with a view to identifying and prosecuting the individual/individuals responsible for this act.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009  
Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

**Rep. Edward R. Royce**

**Question:**

Fostering a strong U.S.-India relationship is critical to our national security interests in South Asia. Historically speaking, defense cooperation between the U.S. and India is in the early stages of development. Since late 2001 security cooperation between our two countries has flourished. Military cooperation is among the most important aspects of our transformed bilateral relationship. Madam Secretary, what are your views on the role of defense technology transfers as part of the strategic relationship with India?

**Answer:**

Defense technology transfers are an essential part of the United States – India strategic partnership. These transfers provide unique opportunities for our government leaders, military services, and defense industry to engage at all levels of the Indian government and private sector to build mutual trust between our countries.

As India becomes an increasingly important partner in the global security network it is critical that they have the right kinds of technology to cooperate with us and to effectively neutralize current and future threats. In addition to building defense relationships, defense sales also create jobs here in America. India is emerging as one of the world's largest importers of military equipment, and supplying a share of those imports is important to our economy. We are working closely with American companies to ensure they are able to participate in India's military modernization and have encouraged the Indian government to consider American companies for their defense technology needs.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing  
New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009 @ 9:30 a.m.  
Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Brad Sherman

**Iran Sanctions Act, and Discouraging Gasoline and Refining Technology Sales to Iran**

The Iran Sanctions Act—originally created by Public Law 104-172, and extended in amended form by Public Law 109-293—requires the State Department to identify those situations in which there are foreign investments in Iran’s energy sector worth \$20 million or more. The law then allows the President the choice of either imposing or waiving sanctions. Unfortunately, both of the previous two Administrations failed to fully enforce the law; since 1998, no investment in Iran has been found to trigger the act’s requirement to either impose sanctions or waive them.

1. Will you commit to fully implementing the law by finding triggering investments when then occur, and either impose sanctions or waive them?
2. In addition to energy sector investment covered by the Iran Sanctions Act, will the Administration make a clear statement opposing the provision of refined petroleum and refining equipment and technology to Iran?

**Answer:**

As the President has made clear, the United States is committed to pursuing direct dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to address the challenge presented by Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. As we seek to engage, sanctions will remain an important tool to help Iran appreciate the important choice now before it and encourage Iran to take steps to secure a better future for itself within the international community.

While this Administration has not imposed or waived sanctions under ISA to date, we are constantly gathering information on reports of possible deals with Iran and are pursuing an aggressive diplomatic campaign, talking to CEOs and senior government officials, to discourage investment in Iran’s petroleum sector.

We believe it is critical to maintain the strong support of our partners in the international community and ensure that the pressure stays on Iran, not our allies. However, I must stress that our offer of engagement will not last forever.

**Canada and Intellectual Property**

Canada was found by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to be the number one Western country in violation of intellectual property.

3. Has the State Department spoken with the Canadian Government about concerns over Canada's enforcement to protect international property, and the need to protect intellectual property, both for Canadian and American firms? If not, then why not?

**Answer:**

Improving the protection of IPR in Canada is one of the Department of State's highest bilateral economic priorities in the U.S – Canada relationship. Embassy officials – including the Charge d'Affairs – regularly meet with and encourage Canadian Ministers, Members of Parliament, and officials to adopt laws that will better protect U.S. and Canadian intellectual property. We coordinate closely with private sector allies and other foreign missions in our efforts to realize increased IPR protection in Canada.

**Nuclear Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Nonproliferation Policy**

Four days before leaving office, the Bush Administration signed a framework agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). In this proposed agreement, the U.A.E. voluntarily committed itself to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, and recognized the right of the United States to terminate the agreement if it reneges on its commitment. Then-Secretary of State Rice publicly described this U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement as “a powerful and timely model for the world and the region.”

4. Has the Obama Administration undertaken a review whether the terms of the proposed U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement indeed serve as a “model” for future nuclear cooperation agreements in the Middle East and beyond?

**Answer:**

The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement would establish a firm foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation in civil nuclear energy. The UAE Agreement contains the strongest nonproliferation conditions of any negotiated by the United States. Of special note is the UAE's commitment to forgo indigenous uranium enrichment and reprocessing, fuel cycle activities that pose the most serious proliferation risks.

This Agreement would serve as a model for the responsible pursuit of civil nuclear energy development, in direct contrast to Iran's nuclear program, which remains

a matter of grave concern to the international community. The Agreement demonstrates the advantages of transparency, engagement, and cooperation. It also reflects the strong commitment of both countries to the development of civil nuclear energy in a safe and secure manner, as well as to the promotion of a strong global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

### **UAE**

Although the U.A.E. has passed an export control statute, it appears that they still have no lead enforcement agency, no regulations, and therefore no real enforcement of this statute on a day-to-day basis to regulate exports from the U.A.E..

5. Before submitting the U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperating agreement for Congressional review, how will the Administration commit the U.A.E. to fully enforcing their laws to prevent transshipment and diversions, particularly from the Port of Dubai, to Iran?

### **Answer:**

The UAE has made significant progress in the area of export controls and preventing transshipments of proliferation concern. While the UAE still has work to do, it is taking steps to implement a modern export control system. We believe that the UAE's export control law, passed in August 2007, provides a strong basis upon which to build an effective export control system. We understand that the law is being enforced and that the UAE is prosecuting cases under the law. The UAE recently formed the "UAE Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Control", an interagency committee chaired by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and reporting directly to the Council of Ministers. This Committee recently held its first meeting and will help facilitate effective implementation of the export control law.

The UAE has also committed to follow strictly the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, the application of which in its export controls will provide stronger tools to prevent proliferation and the illicit use of the UAE as a transshipment point for sensitive nuclear technologies. The United States will continue to work closely with UAE authorities to encourage and support their efforts to implement and effectively enforce comprehensive export controls to address problems regarding diversion of sensitive (dual use and military) technology from the UAE. We meet annually at the Assistant Secretary of State-level, through a bilateral Counterproliferation Task Force to further improve our mutual efforts to address proliferation issues of concern. We also engage at the expert level and continue to provide export control training through the Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS). Cooperation continues to improve on all related issues.

**UAE**

The U.A.E. has reportedly committed itself in writing to more stringent measures to verifiably assure the absence of enrichment, reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear activities within its territory and control than required by IAEA safeguards.

6. Does such a written commitment by the U.A.E. indeed exist?

**Answer:**

On April 9, the UAE signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which once in force will provide enhanced assurance regarding the absence of undeclared activities on its territory. Under the Additional Protocol, the UAE will be required to provide the IAEA with broader declarations of its nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities, with expanded access rights to declared locations. The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement provides that the UAE will bring the Additional Protocol into force prior to licensing of any export under the Agreement.

The UAE's stated policy on peaceful nuclear energy notes that the UAE has chosen to forgo any intention to develop a domestic enrichment and reprocessing capability, in favor of long-term arrangements for the assured supply of foreign-manufactured nuclear fuel. Should this policy change, the UAE would be required to notify the IAEA pursuant to Article 2.a(x) of the Additional Protocol, i.e., the declaration of general plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle. Should the UAE seek to pursue such a capability in a clandestine manner, the combination of the UAE's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol provides the IAEA with strong tools to detect such activity.

**UAE**

Supporters of the U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement claim that the agreement's passage will lead to more jobs for American workers. But, even if the U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement becomes U.S. law, there will be no possibility of any contracts with U.S. nuclear firms unless the U.A.E. implements nuclear liability protections along the lines of those enumerated in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. In contrast, the French and the Russian competitors are state-owned companies that may claim sovereign immunity and therefore do not have the same sorts of concerns about nuclear liability protections. They will be able to pursue nuclear contracts with the U.A.E. in the absence of CSC-level liability protections.

7. Has the State Department received a written commitment from the U.A.E., either as part of a revised U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement or in some other written form, that it will sign the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and expeditiously enact domestic laws or regulations that implement the provisions of the Convention?

**Answer:**

The UAE, in its White Paper “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” committed to accede to international liability conventions, including the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), if it decides to construct a nuclear power plant. The Administration has made clear to the UAE that it sees this commitment as very important and that we look forward to action at an early date. We will continue to press this matter. However, like other agreements of its type concluded over the past several decades, the nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE would not have any provisions relating to liability.

The Bush State Department reportedly made no formal effort to get other major nuclear suppliers to require, in their respective bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements or understandings with the U.A.E., the verifiable absence of enrichment, reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear activities.

8. What will the Administration do to secure agreement from France, Russia, Japan, Germany, and other nuclear suppliers that they will require—as the U.S.-U.A.E. civil nuclear cooperation agreement reportedly does—the verifiable absence of enrichment, reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear activities in their respective bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements or understandings with the U.A.E.?

**Answer:**

By legally obligating the UAE not to engage in enrichment and reprocessing in its territory, the proposed Agreement goes well beyond the civil nuclear export conditions and controls generally required by all major suppliers in accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines. While it is too early to gauge whether such a condition has the potential to become an accepted norm for civil nuclear trade by all suppliers to countries in the region, the United States is continuing to pursue efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. In the case of the proposed Agreement, the UAE’s obligation to the United States not to engage in enrichment and reprocessing in its territory would apply even if other suppliers did not similarly condition their supply to the UAE. Our efforts include working closely with other suppliers in support of this goal and promoting those mechanisms that seem most appropriate and are likely to have the greatest chance of success, including specifically our efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines as they apply to potential transfers of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology.

In *Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program* (GAO-09-275, March 5, 2009), the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the IAEA is not sharing with the United States enough information on the Agency's Technical Cooperation (TC) program. On page 23 of that report, the GAO stated that, in 97 percent of the cases between 1998 and 2006, the State Department, Department of Energy, and America's National Nuclear Labs had access only to the titles of the IAEA's various TC projects—and no other information whatsoever—in their efforts assess and make determinations on the proliferation risks of these projects.

9. What is the Administration doing to improve access to information about the TC program?

**Answer:**

We welcomed the recommendation of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that the Department of State establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and timelier information sharing on TC project proposals between the IAEA and the United States and other countries. Provision of such information might help identify whether dual-use technologies are being acquired to support a TC Project.<sup>1</sup> In that event, the United States and other concerned Member States could conduct a thorough proliferation-risk assessment before agreeing to any particular project. Where such risks are involved, the Agency should provide assistance only when appropriate arrangements for managing the risk have been put in place, and the benefits outweigh the remaining risks.

Such information sharing, however, can occur only with the recipient State's express approval, as the content would be considered confidential. Any requirement to implement this recommendation would be viewed as inconsistent with the IAEA Statute by many Member States (and the IAEA Secretariat) and would likely fail to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. A more achievable goal could be to request the IAEA publish its complete listing of projects earlier than has been the norm – for example, two months prior to the meeting of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee meeting, instead of the customary two weeks - and that the Agency provide additional information on the proposed projects, e.g., anticipated equipment requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> We are unaware of any recent cases where proliferation-sensitive equipment has been provided under an IAEA TC project.

Page 25 of the GAO's March 2009 report also says that the State Department's Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs lost nine (9) full-time equivalent personnel after the 2005 reorganization, making them less able to cover issues related to the IAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—such as the monitoring of developments in the IAEA's TC program.

10. Is the GAO's finding accurate?

**Answer:**

As a result of the 2005 reorganization, the Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation (NP/MNA) was merged with the Office of International Security Negotiations in the Bureau of Arms Control (AC/ISN) to create a new Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (ISN/MNSA). NP/MNA, which according to the staffing pattern at the time of the reorganization had 14 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, had been responsible for matters related to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including its technical cooperation (TC) program. At that same time, AC/ISN was staffed with 13 FTE, and was responsible for matters related to the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The office formed during the reorganization, ISN/MNSA, was responsible for all existing lines of business from its precursor offices, and was also given the lead on one new line of business, G-8 nonproliferation issues. The crosswalk prepared for the reorganization listed 18 FTE, a loss of nine positions; however, one of the 18 positions was detailed to the staff of the Under Secretary, resulting in a de facto staff of 17.

11. To what extent, if at all, has the personnel situation in the State Department's Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs changed in response to the GAO findings?

**Answer:**

There has thus far been no change in the personnel situation of this office in response to the GAO findings.

**Armenia**

The Bush Administration tried many times to cut aid for Armenia and disrupt military aid parity. While Congress has resisted these efforts, aid levels generally declined over the eight years of the Bush Administration.

12. Will the Obama Administration increase aid to Armenia and maintain military aid parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

**Answer:**

The Administration's FY10 development assistance request for Armenia (\$30 million) is actually 25 percent (\$6 million) above the previous Administration's budget request for FY09, which was \$24 million. As a result of Congressional action, the FY09 request was doubled, resulting in an appropriated amount of \$48 million.

The Administration believes that the FY10 request is an appropriate level that meets Armenia's development needs. The size of the FY10 request does not detract from the importance of Armenia to U.S. interests.

With respect to military assistance, the levels for both Armenia and Azerbaijan are carefully considered to ensure they do not undermine efforts for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Administration's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request for Armenia in FY10 is the same as both the FY09 request and the level directed by Congress in FY09 (\$3 million). Again, we deem this request for Armenia is an appropriate level of assistance for the Armenian military to absorb.

Our FMF funding for Azerbaijan increased from \$3 million in FY09 to \$4 million in the FY10 request. This increase is linked to U.S. priorities in peacekeeping outside the region and maritime security, particularly securing energy transit routes and countering proliferation and drug trafficking on the Caspian Sea. In addition, Azerbaijan has 45 personnel in Afghanistan, and also allows for blanket overflight and gas-and-go support at the airport.

Armenia supported U.S. Coalition efforts in Iraq with over 45 soldiers until the end of 2008. It has around 70 personnel in the NATO-led Kosovo force.

**Sri Lanka**

13. Will the Obama Administration condition assistance and oppose International Financial Institution Assistance to the Sri Lankan Government until that government agrees to allow journalists and human rights officials to inspect the displaced persons camps where Tamils are being held, and to generally respect human rights?

**Answer:**

We are gravely concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and the lack of access to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps by non-governmental organizations and journalists. Foreign Military Financing to Sri Lanka is currently restricted due to section 7092 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8). This provision states that Foreign Military



Financing may not be made available to Sri Lanka unless the Secretary of State certifies, among other conditions, that “the Sri Lankan government is providing access to humanitarian organizations and journalists throughout the country consistent with international law.” Such certification has not been made at this time and will not be considered under current conditions.

We anticipate that the Sri Lankan government will formally request large-scale reconstruction assistance once the current hostilities are over. The extent to which we respond favorably to this request – beyond short-term humanitarian assistance – will be contingent upon the government demonstrating commitment to human rights, allowing civil society organizations the ability to operate effectively, and establishing a meaningful role for Tamil and other minorities in national political life.

Sri Lanka is currently in the process of negotiating a Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We recognize the way in which the Sri Lankan government manages the humanitarian situation will have important implications for the credibility and effectiveness of any proposed macroeconomic stabilization plan. The Administration will carefully assess any proposed International Monetary Fund program. The State Department has been coordinating closely with the Department of the Treasury, which has the lead on International Monetary Fund issues, and other U.S. agencies on the matter.

#### **Darfur**

14. Given that acts of genocide in Darfur have claimed at least 300,000 innocent lives, and displaced as many as 2.7 million people, and that the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided in March 2009 to issue a warrant to arrest Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, has the Obama Administration prepared contingency plans to impose and enforce a no-fly zone, or even the possibility of providing self-defense assistance to resistance groups, to prevent future acts of genocide in Darfur?

#### **Answer:**

As the President has stated, “Sudan is a priority for this Administration.” In announcing General Scott Gration as U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, the President highlighted the situation in Darfur and expressed his concern for the “longstanding humanitarian crisis there, prompted by displacement and genocide that has been taking place.”

Special Envoy Gration is in constant communication with U.S. allies and others working intimately on resolving the situation in Darfur to include discussing all options that will ensure lives are saved. Special Envoy Gration and the Administration are also focused on how best to improve humanitarian assistance in Darfur, to support UNAMID,

to bring about a lasting political solution for peace in Darfur, and to bolster the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan.

The comprehensive Sudan policy-review, led by the NSC, will explore all options available before recommending a course of action to the President. Any recommendation will only be made after careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages (including cost and prospective implications for U.S. military assets) of such an action, and we would engage in close consultations with other members of the Security Council and other key actors such as humanitarian groups as appropriate. As you know, humanitarian NGOs do not support the concept of a no-fly zone because of the substantial, adverse impact on their operations and efforts to save lives.

15. What is the Administration doing to address the critical humanitarian assistance gap that is developing in Darfur? Senator Kerry recently indicated that the Sudanese government will allow aid organizations to address the gap, can you discuss the details of any agreement Sudan has made in this regard?

**Answer:**

The Administration is focused on filling gaps in the provision of assistance in Darfur and the Three Areas. I and senior members of my team have engaged with the Government of Sudan (GOS), other donors, and regional governments to urge Sudan to reverse its March 4 decision to expel 13 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and close three national agencies and to allow aid to flow unfettered to the people most in need. During his first visit to Sudan, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan (USSES) Gration stressed the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis unfolding, particularly in Darfur, as a result of the GOS' expulsion order. Special Envoy Gration pressed the GOS to reverse the expulsion order, which has put an extreme amount of pressure on remaining NGOs and the UN. USAID mobilized immediately after the expulsion to fund expanded NGO and UN operations in critical life-saving sectors. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice worked closely with her colleagues on the Security Council and at the UN to call for public briefings on the humanitarian situation from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and to urge the GOS to reverse its decision.

In the absence of these NGOs, remaining UN and NGO humanitarian agencies have done a tremendous job of meeting critical gaps in key areas, such as food and water. During his second trip to Sudan and the region, Special Envoy Gration continued to push forward with the GOS to find ways to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the expulsion order. The GOS has since stated it will allow new NGOs to register in Sudan to help fill key gaps.

We continue to work closely with the UN, NGOs, other donors and relevant elements of the GOS to identify, track and address these gaps. Special Envoy Gration also continues to engage the GOS to develop and implement a framework that will allow

NGOs and UN agencies to operate in an environment that allows them to effectively meet the needs of the people of Sudan.

16. Beyond addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis, what steps is the U.S. taking to lead the international community in an effort to secure a durable peace in Darfur?

**Answer:**

The USG and the contact group, the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Netherlands, Canada and the European Union, are firmly committed to achieving peace throughout Sudan and believe there can only be a negotiated political solution to the conflict in Darfur. The USG fully supports the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Djibrill Bassole leadership of the Darfur peace process.

The Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration is working closely with all interested parties to reenergize the peace process. One of the Envoy's top priorities in Darfur is the creation of a secure environment conducive to the development of peace and stability vital to development. Toward this end, the Special Envoy has engaged the parties in measures aimed at developing a comprehensive security framework. The SE traveled to the region and met representatives from regional actors - Chad, Qatar, Egypt, and Libya - with leverage on both Khartoum and the rebel movements; his meeting with Chadian President Deby facilitated the return of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to Doha to resume discussions with the Government of Sudan. JEM's return to the negotiating table is an important step forward. However, recent outbreaks of violence along the Chad-Sudan border have made it clear that there are still significant obstacles to achieving peace and stability in Darfur and the sub-region. The United States continues to engage the Government of Chad and urge it to cease all support to JEM. Additionally, we are working with both the Chadian and Sudanese governments in order to urge them to show restraint and work towards improving their relations.

The Government of Qatar has been actively collaborating with the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator in seeking a resolution to the Darfur conflict and facilitated a meeting between the Government of Sudan and the JEM that resulted in the signing of the "Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building for the settlement of the Problem of Darfur" on February 17<sup>th</sup> in Doha, Qatar. To show USG support for Qatar's efforts, SE Gration, with logistical facilitation from the Qataris, brought the JEM delegation back to Doha in early May to continue discussions that could lead to an agreement on the eventual cessation of hostilities and a timeline for substantive talks.

Special Envoy Gration will continue to work closely with the international community and the GOS to resolve the crisis in Darfur. The SE travels to Doha on May 27 to meet with Special Envoys to Sudan from France, UK, China, Russia, and the EU. He will lead discussions on the best courses of action available and ways in which we can better coordinate multilateral/multinational actions and efforts for greater impact. In conjunction with this, and to support a more inclusive process, the SE plans to meet with

Abdul Wahid Al Nur, a key Fur rebel leader, who commands a strong popular support among the IDP camps but remains outside the peace process.

17. What are we doing to ensure that UNAMID becomes a more effective peacekeeping force? Are there alternative means of providing mobility to the force should securing helicopters prove impossible?

**Answer:**

The Department of State is currently exploring several options available (including an assessment trip to Ukraine) with the UN and Department of Defense to meet the transport helicopter requirements to support UNAMID. Currently, the only alternative to utilizing troop transport helicopters is for the Troop Contributing Countries to use their internal troop carrying trucks/vehicles to respond to large personnel movement requirements in their assigned regions in Darfur.

The United States Government, through the Department of State, is also executing the delivery (Air Bridge) of approximately 400 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEU) of containerized, palletized and other cargo from El Obeid, El Fasher and Nyala to El Geneina. This is at the request of the United Nations and in direct support of the United Nations /African Union Mission to Darfur (UNAMID). Airbridge support is projected to run until late June 2009. Additional C-17 airlift support was provided by the Department of Defense to move outsized cargo and troops for the Rwandan deployment.

The Department of State continues to lead US efforts to provide vital equipment and training to over 11,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers deployed to or readying for deployment to Darfur in support of the UNAMID mission and the U.S. goals of ending the longstanding humanitarian crisis in Darfur. To support this action, we are on track to meet our commitment of \$100 million to help ready peacekeepers from Rwandan, Senegal, Ethiopian, Burkina Faso, and Tanzania. The Department of State aims to complete the majority of these additional programs, both in equipment delivery and training, by June 2009.

United States contributions have included, to date, delivery of over 2,000 tons of equipment including night vision goggles, global positioning devices, modified 4x4s, heavy transport and utility trucks, armored personnel carriers, generators, communications equipment, water purification units, engineering equipment, and spare parts.

Through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and other contract mechanisms, the Department of State trains Darfur peacekeepers in basic soldier skills, command and staff, mechanized infantry, light engineer, vehicle operation, and maintenance. African countries have been true partners in these efforts, working hand-in-hand with State to implement this assistance quickly and effectively.

18. Thus far there has been no official position from the Administration on the ICC arrest warrant for President al-Bashir. Can you tell me what the government's policy towards the arrest warrant is?

**Answer:**

The Administration supports international efforts for justice and accountability in Darfur, as the United States has done from the beginning of the conflict. We have made clear that we would oppose any effort in the Security Council to defer the ICC case against President Bashir. The United States remains committed to justice and accountability for those who have committed atrocities in Darfur.

**Turkey**

President Obama, in remarks before the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009, said: "Freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthens the state, which is why steps like reopening Halki [Theological] Seminary will send such an important signal inside Turkey and beyond."

19. In what ways has the State Department followed up with the Government of Turkey, and asked them to allow the Halki Theological Seminary to be re-opened? What specifically has been said? If the State Department has not followed up with the Turkish Government, then why not?

**Answer:**

Ambassador Jeffrey has raised the issue of opening Halki at senior levels in the Government of Turkey following President Obama's speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, and will continue to urge Turkey to work cooperatively toward a just resolution of the issue that fully respects the religious freedom of Turkey's Greek Orthodox citizens.

The State Department regularly engages the Government of Turkey on religious freedom issues and advocates for continued outreach and consultation with all religious minority groups, including those in the Greek Orthodox community, to ensure their individual rights are fully protected. The U.S. Mission in Turkey also promotes religious freedom for all faiths through programming and advocates for legal reforms to lift restrictions on religious minorities as part of our continued efforts to advance human rights. In this context, re-opening Halki Seminary is and has been a high priority for the Embassy for many years.

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**Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Wednesday, April 22, 2009  
2172 Rayburn House Office Building  
9:30 a.m.**

***“New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration”***

**Questions for the record**

Response from The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Rep. Diane E. Watson

**Question:**

Over the recess period I was apart of a U.S. Congressional Delegation that traveled to Addis Abada, Ethiopia to observe the 120<sup>th</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). As you may know, the U.S. withdrew its membership from the IPU some time ago, allowing for many missed opportunities for dialogue among many of our democratically elected counterparts.

As President Obama has stated in the past that “this is a new era of engagement,” how does this administration feel about the United States rejoining the IPU to continue in the practice of dialogue with our global counterparts?

**Answer:**

The IPU has done important outreach related to the establishment of representative democracies worldwide. However, following the 1994 elections, some members of Congress expressed concerns about the non-democratic nature of some of the IPU’s member states. As a result, the decision was made in the legislative branch to cease participating in the IPU. In 1997, the United States stopped paying its dues and formally withdrew from the IPU. The State Department is willing to consult with you on this important issue.

**Question:**

Madam Secretary, in 2011 the United States will possible withdraw from Iraq ending an eight year conflict. Currently, there are 15,000 U.S. and military personnel dedicated to foreign assistance and development issues. In 2011, 13,000 troops will be withdrawn only leaving 2,000 State Department officials to carry out the massive responsibility of foreign assistance and development. This withdrawal will leave a tremendous gap in moving Iraq forward.

What does the State Department plan on doing to address the Department's capacity problems in the Foreign Service and Diplomatic Corps?

**Answer:**

The Administration is aggressively working to increase the State Department's diplomatic capacity by expanding staffing, primarily for the Foreign Service. Starting with the FY 2009 appropriations, the Department has been working towards the goal of increasing the size of the Foreign Service by 25 percent by FY 2013. Appropriations for FY 2009 support the hiring of over 700 new members of the Foreign Service above attrition, and the expansion of the Department's training capacity for both new and existing staff. The FY 2010 budget request includes funding to support 750 new Foreign Service positions.

In order to meet the Department's hiring goals, the Foreign Service written and oral examinations are being offered more frequently throughout the year, the Foreign Service Institute is undergoing physical expansion, and has added training classes, which will provide greater capacity to commission and train junior officers. As the Department fills its priority positions, its Diplomatic capacity will expand, allowing for increased engagement not only in Iraq, but other important areas around the globe.

**Question:**

Madame Secretary, former Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condelezza Rice viewed the Department of State as being severely understaffed and both sought an increase in hiring levels. Colin Powell was granted an additional 1,069 staff and Secretary Rice's request for additional personnel was rejected.

In order to fully staff the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, if you were granted additional staff, how would you maximize their efforts and utilize new diplomats in these countries?

**Answer:**

I rely on the Ambassadors to determine the staffing needs at our Embassies, and I know that they will undertake this task soon after their arrival at post.