

**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE
U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ: THE COALITION OF THE
WILLING, THEN AND NOW**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 9, 2007

Serial No. 110-38

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

35-307PDF

WASHINGTON : 2007

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TOM LANTOS, California, *Chairman*

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California	ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York	CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa	DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey	ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California	DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida	DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York	EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts	STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York	THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
DIANE E. WATSON, California	RON PAUL, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington	JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri	JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee	MIKE PENCE, Indiana
GENE GREEN, Texas	THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California	JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas	JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas	J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York	CONNIE MACK, Florida
DAVID WU, Oregon	JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina	MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California	TED POE, Texas
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia	BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California	LUIS G. FORTUÑO, Puerto Rico
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey	
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona	
RON KLEIN, Florida	

ROBERT R. KING, *Staff Director*

YLEEM POBLETE, *Republican Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, *Chairman*

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri	DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey	RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York	JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York	

CLIFF STAMMERMAN, *Subcommittee Staff Director*

NATALIE COBURN, *Subcommittee Professional Staff Member*

PHAEDRA DUGAN, *Republican Professional Staff Member*

ELISA PERRY, *Staff Associate*

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Mr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service	6
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, Government Accountability Office	26
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation	48
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
Mr. Kenneth Katzman: Prepared statement	9
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: Prepared statement	28
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	51

**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR
THE U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ: THE COALITION
OF THE WILLING, THEN AND NOW**

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2007,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D. Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The hearing will come to order. If we could have that door shut over there. Thank you.

Today we are looking at reviewing, if you will, the “coalition of the willing.” This is the term that the Bush administration coined in 2003 to refer to those nations that supported Operation Iraqi Freedom; in other words, the invasion of Iraq.

According to the State Department, 48 countries joined this coalition and helped us in some way with troops, logistical help, economic assistance, or political support. This hearing will review the evolution of the coalition since its creation in 2003.

From the outset of the war, we were told that other nations were providing troops to support our efforts. Well, how many actually did, and who paid for them? And how many of these troops were actually involved in combat operations?

We will also examine the financial support that was pledged to Iraqi reconstruction efforts, and who delivered on those pledges. Now, some 4 years later, what has become of the coalition? Are other nations still willing to support us militarily in Iraq? Have nations been providing aid to Iraq? With the situation there worsening, who is still with us?

We have had a series of hearings on foreign opinion about the United States. As my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, has noted, we have done everything but Antarctica at this point in time, and we are focusing on that very soon.

But we repeatedly heard from well-regarded professionals who conduct surveys and polls that people across the globe no longer view the United States as they once did. They accuse us of hypocrisy. As others claim, we speak about the rule of law and talk about international cooperation, but our own actions say something different.

Mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo has undermined our credibility as to the rule of law, and the war in Iraq demonstrates the extent to which we are willing to do it on our own.

The limited support we have received in our course of action in Iraq stands in stark contrast to the Gulf War of 1991. In that conflict, we were reimbursed some \$74 billion, in terms of 2007 dollars, from others for our efforts there. Now we practically shoulder the burden alone, a cost that stands today to the American taxpayer at barely under \$400 billion, and obviously in terms of 2007 dollars. And of course that does not include the nearly \$100 billion more that will be needed to reconstruct Iraq, according to a survey done by the Army Corps of Engineers.

And instead of roughly 160,000 coalition troops that joined the operation in 1991, the only large military contingent came from Great Britain, with 45,000 troops for the invasion. And since then coalition forces supporting peacekeeping operations have numbered no more than 24,000.

One only has to examine or review or look at the two graphs to my left. One is the estimated cost to the U.S. taxpayers for a very revealing graphic, and next to that stands a graphic relating to United States military deaths. Some 299 died in combat or during combat in the first Gulf War, and today, tragically, American military personnel deaths are in excess of 3,300.

And now even the residual support seems to be evaporating. Nations are pulling out troops. Current levels of coalition forces stand at about 12,600. Even the British, our staunchest supporter, recently announced that it is pulling out more of its troops. No more than 5,500 British troops will be left in Iraq come this fall.

Where does this leave us? Standing alone. Standing alone with a troubled and disintegrating Iraq.

Our witnesses today are Dr. Kenneth Katzman from the Congressional Research Service, Joseph Christoff from the Government Accountability Office, and Dr. Nile Gardiner from the Heritage Foundation. Welcome, gentlemen.

And before I introduce these witnesses, let me turn to my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Rohrabacher, for any comments.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Clearly, the two of us are looking at the same world, but we are perceiving a far different message from what we are looking at.

I know that we have covered, for example, at hearings, talking to us. And I don't have this pessimistic approach that you seem to be portraying today. And I know that we have gone through all the polls to indicate how bad things are the last couple months. You know, I always say the polls are the grain of salt, and I think the election in France should tell us just that.

I mean, we were presented by evidence to this committee just about 6 weeks ago, while the people of Europe were so disgusted with the United States. Yet, by a sizeable majority, the people of France just elected a pro-American candidate who pledged to what? To actually work closer with the United States of America, over the candidate who has taken a hostile position.

So I think that sometimes we can talk ourselves into, again, the glass is half full or the glass is half empty, and talk ourselves into

an analysis that, you know, while glum and pessimistic, may not be really the way things are going. For example, when we talked about, a few moments ago you talked about standing alone in a disintegrating Iraq, and some of our allies are now withdrawing some of our troops. What is clear to a lot of people who I have talked to is that in much of Iraq, there is a, you know, much of Iraq is pacified. And in those areas of pacification where there are not bombs going off every day, and where the people are not being brutalized, and our troops are not under attack every day; in those areas, a lot of those were areas controlled by the British and other of our allies.

Yes, we were then carrying a heavy burden, but now they perhaps aren't as needed as much as they were before. That is one way to look at it.

Another way to look at it is everybody is trying to jump off a sinking ship. I think that we left out one factor there when we look at standing alone in a disintegrating Iraq. We are not standing alone. Not only do we have allies there—I think there are 12,200 non-U.S. troops in Iraq today, and that is a pretty sizable force considering that most countries don't have anywhere near the defense budget that we do, so that represents quite a commitment—but it also leaves out the fact that we are also standing beside millions of Iraqis. Millions of people in Iraq who are on our side, and many hundred thousand of them who are now in their armed forces and taking casualties at a much higher rate than our casualties. And to the degree that it hurts us every time we see one of our young people being killed over in Iraq, remember the Iraqi soldiers are losing at a much higher rate, and they have a much smaller country. And their families are at risk.

So I think it is not an accurate picture for people to suggest that we are standing alone in Iraq, and forgetting about those sacrifices of the anti-radical Islamic and anti-Baathist Iraqis. They are doing so at tremendous risk and tremendous cost, and they deserve to be patted on the back, not ignored.

And as far as the British, as they say, there are 7,100 British troops there. Thank goodness for the Brits. That is a heavy commitment for Britain. Britain had, I guess there were 2,000 British troops there before, and I am trying to figure out the exact number.

Forty-five thousand? Forty-five thousand British troops there before. And now we are down to 12,000, and that is going to be going down to 7,100. I think that commitment by the British was a very fine commitment, and I am sorry that they are leaving a little early. But I agree with you and the critics of our policy that we should be expecting the Iraqis to step up. And perhaps that is what this signifies, is that there are Iraqis who are stepping up to this job, and that is exactly what we wanted them to do.

And by the way, one other thing. Again, we saw the polls, you know, indicating—

Mr. DELAHUNT. If my friend would yield. You point to those charts—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, they were all over—

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. But those aren't polls. Those are hard data.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And the data, at least in the first one, because my eyesight is failing, indicates the American taxpayer—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are picking up this.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Has expended some 400 billion of their hard-earned dollars, while in 1991 it was \$9 billion or \$10 billion.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And we can talk about the costs, which there are costs to these things, no doubt. We will talk about that, and that is what this hearing is about.

But when those charts were replaced by polling charts, as I say, it did suggest that the people of Europe were such a negative result that they were going to become anti-America; here they elect in France, which is one of the countries that was signified as really anti-American, a pro-American leader.

But also, let me note this. As you stated in your opening statement, it was mistreatment of our prisoners in Guantanamo and elsewhere, Abu Ghraib, that has turned public opinion against us. You know, I am sorry, but we are up against an enemy that is slaughtering civilians by the hundreds every week. You know, hundreds of civilians are out-and-out slaughtered intentionally by the people that we are fighting in Iraq.

And okay, I am not sure exactly how much mistreatment we have had at Guantanamo. We know we have had people there who Amnesty International, the Red Cross, everybody in there inspecting that. Most of the prisoners, most of the prisoners actually gained weight, et cetera. Abu Ghraib, some prisoners were mistreated, they were humiliated; that was all wrong. People were prosecuted for that. The prisoners who were being mistreated were former soldiers. And that doesn't excuse mistreating people who are in your custody, but we are up against an enemy that slaughters thousands of civilians.

And if people want to turn against us because of that, and basically then say, "Oh, we are the bad guy, and the guys slaughtering the civilians are wrong," well, if that is the way the world things about it, I am not going to judge my decisions based on that type of value system.

Now, today I am very anxious to hear about what has been going on. I know that there have been a lot of mistakes. In every endeavor that has ever been worthwhile, there have been a lot of mistakes made. And maybe we can correct those mistakes by shining light on them, rather than saying that the mistakes mean that we shouldn't have started the endeavor in the first place.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, and I am going to yield some time to our distinguished colleague from Texas, Dr. Paul. But before I yield the time, I want to note for the record that it was good to hear from Mr. Rohrabacher his enthusiastic support for the French elections. It is really a remarkable day.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Vive la France. [Laughter.]

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be a little bit briefer on my statement.

I would like to raise one point. It was in October 2002 that we had a crucial vote which transferred to the President the power to go to war, in contrast to the Congress assuming the responsibility

and deciding one way or the other whether or not we should go to war.

And I just want to pose a hypothetical question to those who supported the war at that time, if they had had a crystal ball and realized what the real cost would be. If we, on the House floor getting ready to vote, would have known how many men and women would be killed, how many dollars would be spent, how many innocent Iraqi civilians would die in the chaos that resulted in the Middle East in Iraq, the price of oil, the increase in the debt that we have accumulated here. If every Member of Congress knew what the real cost would be and where we would be after 4½ years, I wonder how many of them would say, "Oh, sure, that is not a big deal. I will vote for it."

My prediction is that it wouldn't get 10% of the vote. And I think that is what we are really dealing with. Of course, you say well, you can't have a crystal ball, and that is true. But there were some analyses made by very important people, both in the United Nations who have been to Iraq before, as well as in our CIA, as well as in very important places in our Government, that suggested that this would not go easy. And their predictions came out much closer to being on target.

But I have posed this question to several Members of the Congress, who are very, very energetic about the war. And they said well, if I knew exactly how much this would cost, I wouldn't be able to vote for it. And I think that is the real issue.

And I yield back.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman. And now let me introduce our distinguished panel.

Let me begin with Dr. Katzman. He is a specialist in Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. In this capacity he has served as a Senior Middle East Analyst for the U.S. Congress, with special emphasis on Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf States, Afghanistan, and terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia.

He has also written numerous articles in various outside publications, including a book entitled *The Warriors of Islam, Iran's Revolutionary Guide*.

Dr. Katzman earned his Ph.D. in political science from NYU in 1991. Before joining CRS, he worked as an analyst at a private defense and intelligence consulting firm. From 1985 to 1989 he was a Persian Gulf Analyst at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Joseph Christoff is Director of the Government Accountability Office International Affairs and Trade Team. In this position he directs GAO's work at U.S. agencies responsible for non-proliferation, export control, and international security issues.

He also leads GAO's efforts reviewing reconstruction and security issues in Iraq. Prior to this position, he managed GAO reviews that focused on the operations and programs of the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Transportation.

He has a master's degree in public administration from American University here in DC, and he received his bachelor's from Miami University of Ohio, and is the recipient of numerous GAO awards, including the Distinguished Service Award and the Meritorious Service Award.

Dr. Nile Gardiner is a director of the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. His key areas of specialization include the Anglo-U.S. special relationship, the United Nations, post-war Iraq, and the role of Great Britain in Europe, and the U.S.-led alliance against international terrorism and rogue states, including Iran.

Before joining Heritage in 2002, Dr. Gardiner was a foreign policy researcher for former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Working in her private office, he assisted Lady Thatcher with her latest book, *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World*.

He received his doctorate in history from Yale in 1998. In addition, he has several other master's degrees from Yale and Oxford University.

Let us begin with Mr. Katzman.

STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH KATZMAN, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to thank the committee for asking me to appear at this hearing on how the international community has been supporting the United States effort to stabilize Iraq. I would ask that the full statement be included in the record.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Without objection.

Mr. KATZMAN. And I appreciate your asking me here.

I have been asked first and foremost to analyze how changes in partner contributions of troops and funds have, over time, affected the United States effort to stabilize Iraq, and to try to analyze the reasons for changes to the international level of effort in Iraq.

I will first address the diminishing contributions to the peacekeeping coalition. As far as the original invasion force that entered Iraq in 2003, the bulk of the troops were from two countries: 250,000 approximately were United States forces, and 45,000 were British.

This is largely still the case in the peacekeeping mission: 145,000 United States so-called boots on the ground today in Iraq, and the British are by far the largest non-U.S. foreign contingent at about 7,100. However, foreign forces are now dwarfed by Iraqi forces, police and army, which now exceed 333,000 for both services. Although I will address a little bit about the contribution made by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

According to one view, the reduction in international contributions reduces international force coverage in parts of Iraq, and presumably increases the burden on United States forces to provide peacekeeping strength in those areas. That view would interpret that thinning out of international forces as a difficulty.

The administration view, on the other hand, is that the reduction of international forces is a sign of progress. According to the administration, areas of Iraq that have been turned over to Iraqi control are relatively stable, and ISF forces are increasingly capable of maintaining security without United States without foreign help.

There does not appear to be clear and unequivocal support for either view, judging for evolutions in the patterns of violence in Iraq. We have not seen a noticeable upsurge in violence in the provinces

turned over to ISF control since they were handed over; and thus far, four provinces have been handed over: Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Najaf, and most recently, Maysan Governorate was handed over by Britain, actually.

Najaf has been considered to be relatively stable. It was handed over, as I mentioned. Yesterday, however, there was a bombing in Kufa, which in some ways might put a damper on that assessment. Kufa is very close to Najaf. Kufa is the city from which Moqtada Al-Sadr delivers his Friday sermons. So the bombing yesterday could have been a message to him, we don't know.

This observation might appear to support the administration view; the fact that the provinces that have been turned over are fairly stable. However, these cases do not offer clear indications one way or the other, because these provinces have been relatively stable all along since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Some might argue that partner forces were purposely placed in relatively safe areas where these forces would not take significant casualties. Many made that argument with respect to South Korea's troop contingent in Irbil in northern Iraq.

As we saw just today, however, Irbil has been considered relatively stable, but we had yet a major bombing in Irbil today, of the Kurdish Interior Ministry. Quite a surprise, I would say, in that Irbil has been very stable.

As shown in my chart in my prepared statement, very few partner forces, coalition partners, are in the five most restive provinces: That is, Baghdad Province, Al Anbar, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh Province. The conclusion one could draw is that partner forces are not much of a factor on the actual battlefield per se, if one defines battlefield as combat primarily against Sunni insurgents. The bulk of actual combat is conducted by American forces, with the Iraqi security forces in a supporting role, and, I would argue, very much in the background on the combat.

This is not to argue that partner forces are irrelevant. In 2004 and well into 2005, there was a strong sense that the Basra Amarah area, policed by Britain, was quiet and stable. Britain was taking few casualties there, and it appeared to be relatively stable.

However, a dynamic has now taken hold in the Basra area that has proved costly. Militia violence has contributed, I believe, to Britain's decision to draw down in southern Iraq, and in turn, the turnover of bases in territory by the British to the Iraqi Government has emboldened Shi'ite militias to assert themselves there.

Britain's gradual turnover of territory in its sector is an important case study, because it shows how, as partner forces thin out, things might evolve. And social and political life, particularly in Basra, are instructive. We are seeing more fighting now these past few months among Shi'ite militias fighting each other, and we are also seeing growing Islamization of Basra and the surrounding areas.

Another question that arises is why has the coalition diminished. Spain began a minor exodus in March 2004. There was a change of government there that did not agree with the original invasion. Other governments left after the December 2005 elections in Iraq, claiming that political transition was complete. Others drew down

after claiming that their areas were secure, and they were no longer needed. So there are different reasons in each case.

I will now turn very briefly to the issue of financial contributions, which is different than peacekeeping forces, because they are obviously far less risky. There is no actual blood at risk, only funds. And I would like to just briefly look at some of the Middle Eastern states, because that is the most instructive. Iraq is in a neighborhood where if you watch how its neighbors act, you might have indications as to the attitudes about how Iraq might evolve.

Of the greatest significance I believe are the Persian Gulf monarchy states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. All are led by Sunni Muslim regimes, although Bahrain's population is majority Shi'ite. Although the Gulf States allowed at least some use of their facilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom, none contributed actual forces for O.I.F., or for post-Saddam peacekeeping.

As shown in the table in my testimony, Kuwait is the only Gulf State that has fulfilled most or all of its financial pledges to Iraq. The other Gulf States, following the Saudi lead, appear to be holding back their funds until the Maliki Government completes the so-called benchmark measures of political reconciliation designed to ease the Sunni-Arab sense of humiliation and exclusion in Iraq.

The United States has had somewhat more success in obtaining Gulf State commitments on debt relief, particularly from Saudi Arabia, which, in mid-April 2007, provisionally agreed to write off a large part of the \$18 billion in Saddam-era debt owed to the kingdom. The converse is the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is on the record for a pledge of only \$10 million. However, Iran has, it is widely reported, and Iran has said and Iraq has said, that Iran has extended Iraq a credit line of \$1 billion. The credit is being used to build roads in the Kurdish north, and a new airport near Najaf, a key entry point for Iranian pilgrims visiting the shrines there. Iran also reportedly provides cooking fuel and 2 million liters per day of kerosene to the Iraqis.

Iran's reasons for generosity are readily apparent. Iraqi politics are now dominated by pro-Iranian parties that subscribe, to greater or lesser degrees, to the ideology of the founder of Iran's revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Many of Iraq's Shi'ite Islamist elite were in exile in Iran from the time of Saddam's crackdown on Shi'ite Islamists in 1980 until his fall in 2003.

Some might argue that the current Iraqi political structure gives Iran strategic depth in Iraq, and it is in Iran's interest to maintain Iraq's current government in power, even if doing so involves substantial financial costs.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

**Memorandum**

May 7, 2007

TO: House International Relations Committee/Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight
Attention: Natalie Coburn

FROM: Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

SUBJECT: Statement for May 9, 2007 Hearing: "Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq: The Coalition of the Willing, Then and Now."

I would like to thank the Committee for asking me to appear at this hearing on how the international community has been supporting the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq. I would ask that the full statement be included in the record.¹

I have been asked, first and foremost, to analyze how changes in partner contributions of troops and of funds have, over time, affected the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq, and to try to analyze the reasons for changes to the international effort in Iraq. I will first address international peacekeeping troop contributions. It is clear that the international coalition (non-U.S. component) performing stabilization and peacekeeping missions in Iraq has diminished. The analytical questions, some might argue, are 1) why has the coalition shrunk in both number of contributing countries and overall number of troops contributed?; and 2) what effects, if any, has the shrinkage had on the international peacekeeping mission?

The original invasion force that entered Iraq numbered about 300,000 from some 30 countries.² The overwhelming bulk of the force were from two countries: 250,000 were U.S. forces, and about 45,000 were British, and some of the remaining forces were

¹ The sources used in this testimony include various press reports; the State Department "Iraq Weekly Status Report" from current and past time periods; websites maintained by the defense ministries and other institutions of contributing countries; and U.S. government documents such as the Defense Department's "Measuring Stability in Iraq" report, published quarterly.

² Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat. A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the coalition of the willing. See *Washington Post*, Mar. 27, 2003, p. A19.

considered by their governments as humanitarian in nature. Of the remaining substantial contingents, there were: 2,000 Australian troops; 900 Spanish soldiers for "health and humanitarian tasks," 150 Bulgarian "non-combat" soldiers; chemical decontamination forces from Slovakia; a submarine and a medical team from Denmark; and 200 Polish soldiers and special forces.³

In mid-2003, when the "peacekeeping" mission began following President Bush's May 1, 2003 declaration that major combat operations had been completed, there were 33 other countries contributing a total of about 29,500 forces throughout Iraq. The largest contingent was from Britain, which had about 11,500 forces mostly in southern Iraq, the sector of the battlefield that Britain was assigned to capture during major combat operations. Four years later - as of May 4, 2007 - there are 25 other countries contributing a total of 12,200 troops, according to the State Department's "Weekly Status Report." In terms of numbers of international partner forces contributed, that is a decrease of about 60%.

The key question is - how has the reduction in foreign military contributions affected the stabilization mission, if at all? According to one view, the reduction in international contributions reduces international force coverage in parts of Iraq, and presumably increases the burden on U.S. forces to provide peacekeeping strength in those areas. If this view were accurate, we would expect to see more U.S. forces heading into areas that international forces have vacated. Or, we might expect to see an increase in violence in those areas if they are left relatively unprotected by international forces.

The Administration view is quite different: namely, that the reduction of international forces is a sign of progress. According to the Administration, there are fewer international partner forces because areas of Iraq that have been turned over to Iraqi control have become relatively stable and because Iraqi security forces (ISF) are increasingly capable of maintaining security without foreign help in those areas. From this perspective, the ISF is now an increasingly capable "international contributor" to Iraq's security, and foreign forces are no longer needed in some areas.

There does not appear to be clear and unequivocal support for either view, judging from evolutions in the pattern of violence in Iraq. For example, Najaf province was turned over to Iraqi control in December 2006. The province was turned over because Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I) said it judged the civilian authorities of the province able to manage their own security and governance duties. On January 27, 2007, ISF forces in Najaf discovered a large formation of armed elements, purportedly extremist Shiite gunmen opposed to the government, although their exact motives are still not known. The U.S. view is that the ISF performed admirably for detecting the buildup and then calling for MNF-I back-up, which ultimately helped turn back the challenge. It could be argued, however, that the ISF should have detected a buildup - particularly in a relatively populated area near Najaf - much earlier, and that the challenge became much more serious than it would have if international forces were still present in significant numbers there.

³ Puzanghera, Jim. "America's 'Coalition' is Largely Symbolic; Only Handful Offer Arms or Troops for Iraq Campaign. Mercury News, March 23, 2003.

We have not seen a noticeable upsurge in violence in the three other provinces turned over to ISF control since they were handed over - Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and, most recently (April 2007), Maysan. This observation might appear to support the Administration view. However, these cases do not offer clear indications one way or the other because these provinces have been relatively stable ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, the capital of Muthanna Province, was casualty free and nearly incident free. Dhi Qar, the capital of which is An Nassiriyah, close to the major Al Tallil air base, has similarly seen relatively low levels of violence.

The jury is very much still out on Maysan Province, the latest province to be turned over. There has been no major pattern of consistent violence here in recent months. However, the power of Shiite militias, particularly the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr, has been demonstrated in the province. In Maysan, the capital of which is Amarah city, the Mahdi Army has shown the ability to assert itself as coalition partners draw down their forces. As an instructive example, in October 2006, following an altercation with the Badr Brigade militia of the rival Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Mahdi Army virtually took over Amarah for about two days. The city had earlier been vacated by the British military. The ISF was unable to prevent this Mahdi rampage. Two months earlier, the British military evacuated a camp in Amarah, Camp Abu Naji, leaving it under the control of the ISF. The following day, thousands of Iraqis, backed by Mahdi and other militias, overran the ISF left in charge of the base and stripped it bare.

Patterns of Partner Force Deployments. Some might argue that the relative stability of the areas turned over to the ISF reflect the patterns of deployment of partner forces. Specifically, some believe that partner forces were purposely placed in relatively "safe" areas because partner countries did not want their forces serving in restive areas where these forces would expect to take significant casualties. Many have made that argument particularly with respect to South Korea's troop contingent that has served since 2004 in Irbil, in northern Iraq. Irbil, controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government, is about as safe as it gets in Iraq; there have been virtually no security incidents against Korean forces there. Irbil has not only seen significant investment and reconstruction but now has its own airport capable of handling international flights. Some argue that 1) Korean forces were not needed there to begin with given the security situation there; or 2) that the province is, if anything, more qualified to be turned over to Iraqi control than those provinces that have been turned over in southern Iraq. Yet, about 1,300 South Korea troops remain there, although it is down from a high of 3,600. The conclusion many draw from Irbil is that South Korean forces remain there primarily to demonstrate solidarity with the United States, whose help South Korea needs on North Korea and with which South Korea wants a free trade agreement, rather than to serve any pressing security or reconstruction need in Iraq.

The converse appears to also hold - that the United States has perhaps been reluctant to press its allies to deploy forces in regions where there is consistent and often heavy combat. The five most restive provinces are Baghdad, Anbar, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh. Yet, there are very few partner troops deployed in any of these provinces, compared to the size of the U.S. combat forces in these areas. There is a 120 troop Albanian contingent in the Mosul area, an area that sees regular combat. There are about 150 Bulgarian troops helping guard the People's Mojahedin (Iranian opposition) fighters

at Camp Ashraf in east Diyala Province, although the camp itself has not been attacked. About 150 forces from Azerbaijan are serving in the highly restive city of Haditha, in Anbar Province. The 850-person contingent from Georgia has served in Baghdad. When the U.S. "troop surge" is fully in place, there will be about 40,000 U.S. forces in the city, with another 40,000 Iraqi forces. Compared to these forces, the Georgian contingent is very small.

Further strengthening those who argue that international coalition partner forces are mainly symbolic is that partner forces are thinly spread, with a few exceptions. Of the 12,200 partner forces in Iraq, well more than half (7,100) are from one contingent - the British - based in Basra. Basra is restive from combat between Shiite militias, but it is not nearly as violent as the Sunni provinces and Baghdad province. Aside from the British forces in the south and the South Korean contingent in Irbil, there are only about 3,800 other partner forces deployed in the entire rest of Iraq. Of these remainder, many are associated with the 900 Polish troops (down from a contribution high of about 2,500 one year ago) deployed in and around Diwaniyah and Hilla. Neither province is fully stable, and Hilla continues to witness Sunni insurgent - possibly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) - suicide bombings against Shiite civilians at markets, in ritual processions, funerals, and like gatherings. There were significant clashes between U.S. forces and Mahdi Army militiamen in Diwaniyah on April 8, 2007, a culmination of far less serious clashes over the past several months, but the bulk of the fighting was done by U.S. forces, with limited if any Polish involvement.

The conclusion one could draw is that partner forces are not much of a factor on the actual "battlefield" per se, if one defines the battlefield as combat primarily against Sunni insurgents. The bulk of the actual combat in places such as Ramadi, Fallujah, Baqubah, and parts of Baghdad is conducted by American forces, with ISF generally in a supporting or intelligence gathering role.

Britain and Basra. This is not to argue, however, that partner forces are irrelevant. In 2004 and even well into 2005, there was a strong sense that the Basra-Amarah area policed by Britain was "quiet" and "stable." Britain was taking few casualties there and appeared to be steadily building ties to local political leaders and factions. However, a dynamic took hold in the Basra area that has proved costly for British forces - about 50 killed since the summer of 2006 and eleven killed in April 2007 alone. The growing violence in Basra reportedly contributed to the British announcement in February 2007 that British forces will start to draw down by about 25% by the summer of 2007. On the other hand, the Administration view, articulated at the time of the British drawdown announcement, is that Britain is drawing down because Basra, even with the new trends in violence, is more stable than most of the areas patrolled by U.S. forces, and no longer in need of as much British help.

Basra is an important case study because it provides indicators of the effects of the thinning out of partner forces in Iraq. To quote Prime Minister Blair when he announced the British drawdown earlier this year, "...the next chapter in Basra's history can be written by Iraqis." In Basra, there are very few Sunni Muslims, and therefore very little Sunni-Shiite violence. However, there are a number of intersecting currents that have contributed to substantial violence in the city, and for the upsurge of violence against British forces since 2006, although the number of incidents there are nowhere near what U.S. forces face in Anbar, for example. In the first instance, there has been a scramble

for power and money among Shiite factions in the Basra area, perhaps not least of all because Basra is Iraq's primary oil producing province at this point. Broadly drawn, the competition for influence is between a small party called Fadilah, the Sadr movement, and the mainstream Shiite parties SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Da'wa. Fadilah and the Sadr trend are usually aligned against SCIRI and Da'wa, but in Basra they are opposed to each other because of this scramble for power and money. In Basra, with power comes the ability to divert oil exports, smuggle them out, and pocket the proceeds. In addition, Fadilah and the Sadr trend compete for the allegiance of the lower class Shiites. In April 2007, the Sadrists conducted protests in Basra to try to persuade the provincial governor, who is a Fadilah member, to resign. Basra is also an area of significant Iranian influence because it is next to Iran, separated only by the narrow Shatt al-Arab waterway, and a key route for Iranian pilgrims to visit the Shiite holy sites in southern Iraq. A similar multi-tiered power struggle is at work in Diwaniyah, the violence in which was discussed above, where SCIRI controls the provincial council and the governorship and is trying to marginalize the Sadr trend.

Effects of Militia Control. The case studies above provide a glimpse of what tends to happen as international forces thin out around Iraq and turn over territory to ISF control. Southern Iraq, including Basra and Amarah, show us how Iraqi social and political life – putting aside militia-inspired violence – develops when militias grow in strength. Some examples of the growing Islamization of Basra and surrounding areas are contained in the State Department's human rights country report on Iraq for 2006, released on March 6, 2007. According to the report, professors at Basra University who were considered secular received written threats and demands to depart Basra. During 2006, a series of killings targeted professors in Basra (as well as Baghdad). The report also says there were "Serious reports of torture and killings [] leveled at [the Ministry of Interior's] Serious Crime Unit detention facility in Basra...."

Although not limiting its discussion to Basra, the State Department report presents trends in gender discrimination. Several press accounts over the past few years have described trends in Basra similar to those in the State Department report. In particular, the report says that:

in practice conservative societal standards impeded women's abilities to exercise their rights. Throughout the country, women reported increasing pressure to wear veils. Many reported the presence of flyers in their neighborhoods threatening women who refused. Women were targeted for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car, talking on a cell phone, and wearing trousers, in an effort to force them to remain at home, wear veils, and adhere to a very conservative interpretation of Islam. In addition to societal pressures, there were several reports of women at government ministries being told to wear a veil or lose their job.

Although the State Department report does not specifically attribute such intimidation to Shiite parties or militias, press reports about Basra have consistently suggested that it is Shiite militiamen, particularly Mahdi Army members, that are conducting the intimidation discussed above. Other reports have said that Mahdi and Badr militiamen have beaten students publicly displaying affection and have attacked sellers of alcohol.

These trends suggest that, although Sunni-Shiite violence might be a relatively minor feature in Basra, human rights and basic freedoms are being eroded there. One might anticipate that these trends will accelerate once British forces, as expected, turn over Basra Province to ISF control later in 2007.

Why Are Coalition Partners Leaving?

The other question that was posed is why the international coalition has diminished. In assessing changes to the peacekeeping coalition, some might consider it instructive to analyze decisions by certain countries to withdraw or reduce their contingents in Iraq.

The foreign contributions began to shrink noticeably in 2004. That process began with Spain's May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war effort. Several Spanish-speaking countries followed Spain's lead – Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, withdrawing a total of about 900 personnel. By September 2004, according to the State Department, there were 29 other contributing countries fielding about 25,000 forces in Iraq – a decrease of almost 5,000 forces since mid-2003.

The size of the foreign contingent in Iraq fell further during 2005 as Iraq held a series of elections that produced a full-term government and a permanent constitution. Some governments, particularly Ukraine, maintained that the elections signaled a completion of the political transition process in Iraq and represented an appropriate milestone for the withdrawal of their forces. Ukraine subsequently withdrew its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections. The Netherlands withdrew 1,300 of its troops in 2005, virtually its whole contingent. By the end of 2005, the size of the coalition stood at about 20,000 forces from 26 other countries – a decrease of about another 5,000 troops during 2005.

During 2006, several other countries drew down their forces, claiming progress and the ability to turn over control of territory to the growing ISF. However, the reductions were from areas of Iraq that have tended to witness relatively few attacks on a daily basis. For example, as noted earlier, South Korea withdrew 1,000 forces from Irbil in May 2006, and a further drawdown in early 2007 brought its current troop level to about 1,300. In July 2006, Japan completed withdrawal of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent from Samawah, which is in a relatively stable area of southern Iraq. Simultaneously, all of Muthanna province, of which Samawah is the capital, was handed over to ISF control. Italy completed the withdrawal of its 2,000 contingent in December 2006 after turning over Dhi Qar Province to ISF control. By the beginning of 2007, the non-U.S. peacekeeping force had fallen to about 16,000 personnel from 25 countries.

On the other hand, the Georgian contingent is expected to expand to 2,000 by June and move out of Baghdad to help guard the Iran-Iraq border.⁴ Although this announcement would appear to contradict assertions that the coalition is leaving Iraq, Georgian leaders made clear when they announced the buildup that Georgia hoped the contribution would boost Georgia's chances of being accepted for membership in NATO.

⁴ Beeston, Richard. "Georgia Doubles Its Iraq Commitment." *The Australian*, April 26, 2007.

Financial Issues5

The issue of financial contributions is substantially different from that of the provision of peacekeeping forces, and, to some governments, might represent a substitute for contributing forces. Financial contributions to Iraq reconstruction are far less risky to allied and other governments than is putting troops and other personnel in potential harm's way. However, an examination of financial pledges to Iraq reconstruction might still assist an analysis of international attitudes toward the U.S. stabilization mission and the Iraqi government there. In the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, two countries that, for constitutional and other reasons, did not join the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait, made significant financial contributions to offset U.S. costs to fight that war. Those two countries were Germany and Japan, contributing, respectively, \$6.4 billion and \$10 billion to the approximately \$60 billion incremental costs of the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

The 2003 war differs from the 1991 war because hostilities did not end with the main goal of the operation accomplished - the fall of Saddam Hussein. International peacekeeping and stabilization efforts continue. While Germany has continued to keep its troops out of Iraq, Japan, as noted above, did contribute forces to keep peace in southern Iraq, although their publicly announced mission was reconstruction. In line with their differing approaches and attitudes toward the conflict, Germany has only pledged \$10 million to Iraq reconstruction, but Japan has pledged almost \$5 billion in both loans and grants. Aside from the United States, Japan is by far the largest contributor to post-Saddam reconstruction, and it has obligated all of the grant money and at least half of the \$3.5 billion in loan portions of its pledges.

Middle Eastern States.⁶ It is perhaps more instructive to analyze the implementation of financial pledges by states in Iraq's region. The degree to which Middle Eastern states have or have not fulfilled their aid pledges to Iraq provides indication of their attitudes toward the post-Saddam Iraqi power structure. Many believe that an analysis of regional contributions to Iraq reconstruction is highly significant because the regional states have the most to gain or lose from success or failure in Iraq. It appears that many of these countries are withholding implementation of their financial pledges unless or until the Iraqi government appears more inclusive of the Sunni minority or takes steps these countries are insisting on.

Of perhaps greatest significance are the Persian Gulf monarchy states - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. All are led by Sunni Muslim regimes, although Bahrain's population is majority Shi'ite. Kuwait was overrun by Saddam Hussein in 1990 and all of them perceived a major threat from his regime, even though he was a Sunni ruling over a majority Shi'ite population. With oil prices over \$60 per barrel, virtually all - with the exception of Bahrain and Oman which are small oil exporters - are widely judged to have significant available funds to contribute to causes and efforts that they perceive will ensure their national security. Saudi Arabia and the

⁵ Much of the information in this section is taken from the website of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning. Viewed on April 11, 2007. The Ministry maintains a list of country pledges to Iraq reconstruction and funds actually remitted.

⁶ See also, CRS Report for Congress RL33793. Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy. Last updated January 12, 2007, by Christopher Blanchard (Coordinator).

UAE contributed \$16.8 billion and \$4 billion, respectively, to the 1991 Persian Gulf war effort. Occupied Kuwait, drawing on funds outside Kuwait, contributed \$16 billion for its own liberation in 1991. All of the Gulf states, including Kuwait with about 8,000 soldiers that escaped Iraq's invasion, participated in the 1991 Gulf war as part of the "Joint Arab-Islamic Force."

In the 2003 war, all of the Gulf states, although shying from publicity, allowed at least some use of their facilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).⁷ Kuwait closed off its entire northern half to host the entire invasion force for OIF. However, none of the Gulf states – nor any Middle Eastern state – contributed actual forces for OIF or for post-major combat peacekeeping in Iraq. The following is a discussion of Gulf state financial pledges to Iraq reconstruction:

- Saudi Arabia pledged \$500 million in loans and a \$500 million line of credit for exports to Iraq at the 2003 Madrid conference. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning does not credit Saudi Arabia with providing any funds under the pledge, and Saudi Arabia has not publicly contradicted that assertion.
- Kuwait has pledged a total of about \$565 million. Although the Ministry of Planning of Iraq says Kuwait has only fulfilled \$10 million of a \$16 million grant pledge, press reports and fact sheets distributed by Kuwait's Embassy in Washington indicate that Kuwait has largely fulfilled the \$500 million in "in-kind assistance" pledge, consisting mostly of supplies and provisions channeled through a "humanitarian operation center" (HOC) that Kuwait set up in the pre-2003 invasion period. Some of the assistance total includes a water line that Kuwait built into Iraq. Kuwait also has provided assistance (fuel, water, other supplies) to the Polish-led security sector in Hilla and Diwaniyah and, as is widely known, Kuwait continues to host U.S. forces that rotate into and out of Iraq.⁸
- Of the other Gulf states, the UAE was the largest grant donor, pledging \$215 million. Qatar has pledged \$100 million, of which \$10 million is grant aid and \$90 million is to be loans; and Oman \$3 million. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning credits Qatar with remitting \$5 million of the grant aid. The UAE and Oman reportedly have remitted none of what each pledged. No pledges have been recorded for Bahrain.

The United States has had somewhat more success in obtaining Gulf commitments on debt relief.⁹ In mid-April 2007, the United States obtained a provisional agreement from Saudi Arabia to write off 80% of the \$18 billion in Saddam-era debt owed to the Kingdom by Iraq, although press reports after the May 3-4, 2007 regional conference on Iraq in Egypt said the Saudi government did not specify a level of

⁷ Sirak, Michael. "USA Looks to Expand Bases in Oman and Qatar." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 17, 2002

⁸ CRS conversations with Kuwait Embassy Washington D.C. diplomats. 2004-2007.

⁹ Slackman, Michael and Helene Cooper. "Concern Is High and Unity Hopes Are Nil at Talks on Iraq." *New York Times*, May 3, 2007.

Iraq debt relief at that meeting. Kuwait's government had previously agreed to an 80% write-off of its \$15 billion Iraqi debt, but Kuwait's National Assembly has not ratified that arrangement, suggesting substantial resistance to the idea, and Kuwait did not announce a firm debt relief pledge at the regional conference. Prior to the meeting in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates reportedly pledged to forgive 80% of its \$4 billion Iraq debt. Some might argue that the Gulf states have little hope of collecting these funds in light of Iraq's financial situation, and that the rewards of writing off the debt outweigh the costs of insisting on repayment.

The pattern of Gulf state pledges and fulfillment of their pledges might be explained by their views of how post-Saddam Iraq has evolved. Kuwait was severely shaken by Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation, and Kuwaiti leaders were widely viewed as willing to accept virtually any result in Iraq as a replacement for his regime - even the current Shiite-dominated government. Kuwait, therefore, has been more willing than the other Gulf states to help stabilize the post-Saddam government, and Kuwait believes that forging good relations with the Shiite leaders in southern Iraq would ensure that Kuwait's border with Iraq remains quiet. Kuwait has stopped short of contributing forces, however, largely on the perception that they would not be welcomed by most Iraqis. Several Kuwaiti truck drivers and humanitarian workers have been killed or attacked in southern Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Not only has Saudi Arabia hesitated to contribute funds, but, in April 2007, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE refused to receive Maliki in a visit he made through the region, attempting to build support for Iraq in advance of the regional conference in Egypt during May 3-4, 2007. A recent op-ed by noted scholar Fouad Ajami might explain why Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have, to date, refused to respond to U.S. urgings that it provide the loans and credits pledged. According to Ajami¹⁰:

[Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's] first trip beyond Iraq's borders had been to Saudi Arabia. He had meant that visit as a message that Iraq's "Arab identity" will trump all other orientations. It had been a message that the Arab world's Shia stepchildren were ready to come into the fold. But a huge historical contest had erupted in Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate had fallen to new Shia inheritors, and the custodians of Arab power were not yet ready for this history.

The converse has been the position of Iran. According to the report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Iran is on record for a pledge of only \$10 million. However, it is widely reported that Iran has extended Iraq a line of credit of about \$1 billion. The credit is being used to build roads in the Kurdish north and a new airport near Najaf, a key entry point for Iranian pilgrims visiting the Imam Ali Shrine there. Iran reportedly also provides cooking fuels and 2 million liters per day of kerosene to Iraqis.

Iran's reasons for its generosity are readily apparent. Iraqi politics are now dominated by pro-Iranian parties that subscribe, to greater or lesser degrees, to the ideology of the founder of Iran's Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Many of Iraq's Shiite Islamist elite were in exile from the time of Saddam's crackdown on the Shiite Islamists in 1980, until his fall in 2003. Some might argue that the current

¹⁰ Ajami, Fouad. "Iraq in the Balance." *Wall Street Journal*, April 11, 2007.

Iraqi political structure gives Iran "strategic depth" in Iraq, and it is in Iran's interests to maintain that government in power, even if doing so involves substantial financial costs to Iran.

Some other Arab countries could be discussed - in particular, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. However, with the exception of Jordan, none has pledged funds for Iraq reconstruction. All three are inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims, although Syria's ruling family, the Alawite clan, is believed to be an offshoot of Shiite Islam. Jordan has pledged \$1.5 million in grant aid, according to Iraq's Ministry of Planning, and it has thus far provided about \$75,000.

Although Syria is aligned with Iran regionally and despite its ruling family's identity, Syria - as far as Iraq policy goes - is "acting" as a Sunni state. Several former Iraqi regime members reportedly took refuge there after the fall of the regime and U.S. officials continue to assert - as recently as April 11, 2007 - that Syria is an entry route for Al Qaeda suicide bombers to enter Iraq. The leaders of both Egypt and Jordan have warned of a developing Shiite "crescent," to paraphrase their concerns, consisting of Iran, Iraq's Shiite factions, Syria (more generally), and Lebanese Hezbollah.

Another pertinent state is Turkey, a long time U.S. ally and a member of NATO. It is inhabited by Sunni Muslims, but Turks are ethnically not Arabs. Turkey has pledged \$50 million for Iraq, but, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, has expended only about \$1.3 million of that. Turkey is wary of the pro-Iranian Shiite parties that dominate Iraq's government, and believes that Iran is able to extend its political and strategic influence through its close relations with these parties.

Turkey's primary concern, however, is the disposition of the Kurdish region, particularly the possibility that the Kurdish region might try to become an independent state. Such an action, Turkey fears, could serve as further inspiration for separatism among Turkey's Kurds, and would further jeopardize Turkey's efforts to insist that the Iraqi Kurds expel guerrilla fighters from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that are present in some refugee camps in northern Iraq. The three Kurdish inhabited provinces of Iraq - Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah - form a legal "region" in post-Saddam Iraq with its own administration, parliament, and security forces.

Current State of US Coalition Forces

This table was created from information found in both American and international newspapers, U.S. government websites, country embassy websites, etc. Information is the most current available at this time.

Country	Troops	Location	Total Deaths (2003-07)	Status or Issues
Albania	120	Mosul, Nineveh province. Multi-National Brigade North	0	Increased troop level to 120 from 70 in 2005, remained fairly stable since that time. Seeking admittance to NATO in 2008.
Armenia	46	Al-Kut, Wasit province. Multinational Division (MND) Central-South	0	No discussion of withdrawing troops. Serve under Polish command. Troops are non-combat. Approved to stay until end of 2007.
Australia	550	Tallil air base near Nassiryah in Dhi Qar province, southern Iraq. MND South-East	2	Prime Minister Howard staunch US supporter of Iraq War - no plans to withdraw despite growing pressure at home. Involved in training Iraqi forces.

Country	Troops	Location	Total Deaths (2003-07)	Status or Issues
Azerbaijan	150	Haditha, Anbar province. MND West	0	Protects hydroelectric power station. No plans reported to remove troops.
Bosnia-Herzegovina	36	MND North-Central	0	Sent soldiers for a demining mission to Iraq in 2004, and Bosnian unit may be used to destroy improvised devices. Bosnia wants to cultivate image as a contributor to international security and hopes to join NATO.
Bulgaria	155 (120 non-combat; 35 support personnel)	Ashraf Refugee Camp, north of Baghdad MND Central-South	13	In February 2007, voted to extend mission for another year. Bulgaria had withdrawn its light infantry battalion consisting of about 450 troops in 2005 after the deaths of 13 soldiers and 6 civilians and strong public discontent over the Iraqi war.
Czech Republic	99	Basra area MND - South East	0	Not considering withdrawing its troops as of February 2007 and will stay until at least the end of 2007. Training Iraqi policemen. Level of troops has remained relatively stable.
Denmark	460	Basra MND South-East	6	Announced that it will withdraw its troops in August 2007 and will send helicopter unit to replace ground troops. Prime Minister claims that the withdrawal decision illustrates progress made in southern Iraq.
Estonia	35	Baghdad	2	No plans for withdrawal. Defends involvement as not an occupation of Iraq, but at the request of Iraq government. No significant change in troop levels since 2003.
Fiji	280	Baghdad UN security force	0	Troops serve in the UN guard unit protecting UN headquarters. Fiji became one of the coalition partners in 2003.
Georgia	850 elite troops ~ 50 other troops	Baghdad - protecting Green Zone	0	Georgia aspires to join NATO. Decision to increase troop levels to 2000 by June 2007 to protect border between Iraq and Iran and assist Baghdad security plan.
Hungary	150	Baghdad	1	

Country	Troops	Location	Total Deaths (2003-07)	Status or Issues
Kazakhstan	27	MND Central-South	1	No withdrawal plans.
Latvia	125	Diwaniya MND Central-South	3	Troops to be withdrawn by June 20. Will send additional troops to Afghanistan.
Lithuania	60	Basra MND South-East	0	Current troops deployed on six month mission which began February 2007. Polls show public support favoring withdrawal.
Macedonia	40	Taji MND North-Central	0	No withdrawal plans. Will keep troops in Iraq as long as US is there, according to statement May 1, 2007 by Chief of Staff Stojanovski.
Moldova	11	MND Central-South	11	Troops returned home in January 2007. In April 2007, Parliament approved sending another 11 member team of bomb-diffusing experts to Iraq on a six month tour.
Mongolia	160	MND Central-South	0	Part of Polish led sector. Current levels approved through July 2007.
Netherlands	15	Baghdad - NATO training mission	2	According to Defense Minister Henk Kamp, contingent likely to stay until early 2009.
Poland	900	Diwaniya MND Central-South	20	Concentrates on reconstruction and security forces training. No plans to withdraw. In April 2007, President Kaczynski stated that Polish troops will not be driven out of Iraq and that mission may change as insurgent attacks have increased in southern areas of Iraq.
Romania	500	Southern Iraq under British command - mostly in Tallil and Basra MND South-East	2	Withdrew 99 troops from southern Iraq in April after UN mission in south ended. Prime Minister Tariceanu has called for withdrawal of remainder by end of 2007. Withdrawal must be approved by Supreme Defense Council chaired by Romanian President. President, however, has been suspended though on constitutional abuses (referendum to be held on May 19th).

Country	Troops	Location	Total Deaths (2003-07)	Status or Issues
Slovakia	6	Two in Baghdad - Four with Polish-led forces MND Central-South	4	In April 2007, withdrew five troops who were working with NATO forces training Iraqi military. No plans to withdraw remaining six servicemen.
South Korea	1,300	Irbil MND North-Central	0	Gradually drawing down. Reportedly will have timetable set up by July 2007 for withdrawal.
United Kingdom	7,100	Basra MND South-East	147	Reducing force level to 5,500 by end of summer.


Source: CRS table created by Kim Walker Klarman. May 2, 2007.

Amounts Pledged vs. Remitted to Iraq Reconstruction by Coalition Partners

This table was created from information available in the database of Iraq's Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. It reflects figures pledged to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility, and total pledges might, in some cases, exceed those listed. Figures do not reflect results of the international meeting on Iraq at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on May 3, 2007.

Country	Amount Pledged (US\$)	Amount Remitted (US\$)
Australia	81,169,111	40,253,296
Austria	5,700,000	
Belgium	11,815,789	3,803,351

Country	Amount Pledged (US\$)	Amount Remitted (US\$)
Bulgaria	1,300,000	
Canada	286,085,242	178,238,910
China	25,000,000	
Cyprus	120,000	
Czech Republic	14,700,000	
Denmark	68,082,297	18,042,189
Estonia	80,000	
European Community	687,815,006	693,953,460
Finland	8,835,000	8,835,000
France		32,288
Germany	12,820,513	807,660
Greece	5,414,458	3,614,458
Hungary	1,200,000	
Iceland	3,200,000	2,700,000
India	11,000,000	7,500,000
Iran	10,000,000 (figure does not reflect \$1 billion line of credit Iran says it has extended)	
Ireland	3,534,568	1,234,568
Italy	273,753,133	35,732,540
Japan	Grant 1,500,000,000 Loan 3,500,000,000	1,529,643,666
Jordan	1,500,000	75,000
Korea	260,000,000	168,334,627
Kuwait	Grant 16,200,000 To be specified 500,000,000	10,000,000
Luxembourg	2,563,298	2,323,298
Malta	270,000	
Netherlands	21,929,596	15,929,596
New Zealand	7,178,378	3,378,378



Country	Amount Pledged (US\$)	Amount Remitted (US\$)
Norway	24,018,692	23,186,046
Oman	3,000,000	
Pakistan	2,500,000	
Qatar	Grant 10,000,000 To be specified 90,000,000	5,000,000
Saudi Arabia	Loan 500,000,000 Credit Line 500,000,000	
Slovenia	420,000	
Spain	220,000,000	188,406,287
Sweden	58,424,464	68,193,148
Turkey	50,000,000	1,300,000
United Nations Development Programme		12,501,897
United Arab Emirates	215,000,000	
United Kingdom	1,062,962,963	375,989,111
World Bank		240,000

Source: CRS table created by Kim Walker Klamon, May 3, 2007.

Source of map: BBC News.

Location of Coalition Ground Forces in Iraq**Multi-National Division - North Central**

Light Infantry Platoon Estpla-13 - Estonia
 Infantry Battalion - Georgia
 Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoon - Bosnia and Herzegovina
 U/I Brigade, Zaitun Division - South Korea
 Contingent, Ranger Bn, SOF Unit - Macedonia

Multi-National Brigade - North (Mosul, Irbil)

U/I Unit - Albania

Multi-National Division - South East (Basra)

20 Armored BDE - United Kingdom
 Joint Task Force - Australia
 Multiple Units - Romania
 elements - Denmark
 U/I Military Police Unit - Czech Republic
 U/I Unit - Lithuania

Multi-National Division - Central South (Najaf, Hilla, Diwaniyah)

1st Warsaw Division - Poland
 U/I Unit - El Salvador
 U/I Unit - Bulgaria
 U/I Unit - Latvia
 Peacekeeping Operations BN - Mongolia
 U/I Engineer Unit - Slovakia
 U/I Support Unit - Armenia
 U/I Engineer Unit - Kazakhstan
 U/I Unit - Moldova

Multi-national Division - West (Anbar)

United States
 U/I Infantry Company Azerbaijan

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Katzman. Mr. Christoff.

**STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE TEAM, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thanks for inviting GAO to this important hearing.

My statement today is based upon prior GAO reports, as well as original research that we completed for this hearing.

You asked us to provide information on three things: The number of coalition countries and troops in Iraq; the costs to sustain these troops; and financial support from international donors.

In summary, here is what we found. First, coalition countries are currently providing 8% of all security forces in Iraq.

Second, since 2003, the United States has spent about \$1.5 billion to support troops from 20 other countries in Iraq.

And third, Iraq can expect \$15.6 billion from international donors. However, most of this assistance is in the form of loans that Iraq generally has not accessed.

Let me discuss the first point about the coalition troop levels in Iraq. In 2003, the “coalition of the willing,” as defined by the administration, consisted of 49 countries, including the United States, that made a public commitment to the war effort. This commitment took several forms, including combat troops, over-flight rights, or humanitarian aid.

Over time, the number of coalition countries supporting United States efforts in Iraq has declined. Both charts that we provided show that in December 2003, 33 countries were contributing 24,000 troops to the effort in Iraq. Since then, coalition troop levels have declined by 48%. As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops, and further reductions in coalition support are expected this year.

In contrast, the United States has 145,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, or about 92% of all security forces.

Despite the decline in coalition troops, three countries—the United Kingdom, Poland, and South Korea—lead operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. The United Kingdom leads coalition operations in southern Iraq. It provides the largest number of coalition troops, currently at 7,100.

U.K. forces have conducted combat operations, trained Iraqi security forces, and sustained almost 150 fatalities. The U.K. will reduce its troop levels this year, but has pledged to maintain a presence into 2008.

Poland leads operations in central-south Iraq, with 11 coalition countries under its command. The 900 Polish troops have conducted joint combat operations, trained Iraqi security forces, and provided humanitarian aid.

And South Korea leads operations in northeast Iraq, with 1,600 troops. They have provided medical, humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance. The South Korean Government intends to develop a timetable in 2007 for withdrawing its troops.

Next, let me discuss U.S. assistance to coalition countries. Since 2003, the United States has provided about \$1.5 billion to support 20 countries. According to DoD, these countries were not finan-

cially able to support their troops, or needed help in preparing their troops for deployment. About one-half of the funding directly reimbursed coalition countries for their support in operations in Iraq, and the other half reimbursed United States military departments for the costs they incurred to feed, house, transport, and equip coalition forces.

In terms of allocations by country, \$988 million, or about 66%, was used to support Poland and the 11 countries under its command. And in addition, \$300 million supported Jordan for border operations and other activities.

Finally, international donors have pledged \$15.6 billion for Iraq's reconstruction. The majority of the pledges—\$11 billion—is available in loans, primarily from Japan, the World Bank, the IMF, and Iran. However, Iraq has only accessed \$436 million in available loans.

Iraq has been slow to access these loans because it lacks a system for approving loan-based projects. And in addition, we previously reported that Iraq's large external debt, about \$93 billion, may affect the country's willingness to tap into additional loans.

On the other hand, Iraq has received two-thirds of the \$4.6 billion in donor-provided grants. Top grant contributors were Japan, the European Commission, and the United Kingdom. Grants from international donors have helped Iraq conduct elections, improve health and nutrition, and assist refugees.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, May 9, 2007

STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAQ

Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade



G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability

Highlights

Highlights of GAO-07-527, a testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight.

Why GAO Did This Study

In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 38 nations, identified as a "coalition of the willing," offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime.

This testimony discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to operations in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries' participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts.

This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

www.gao.gov/07/527/ga1p17CAO-07-527T

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the links above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-6979 or christoffj@gao.gov.

May 9, 2007

STABILIZING AND REBUILDING IRAQ

Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments


What GAO Found

As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with 145,000 U.S. troops, coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600; the number of coalition nations contributing troops decreased from 33 to 25. The United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordinance capabilities.

The United States has spent about \$1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about \$1 billion of the \$1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these countries. In terms of allocation by country, about \$388 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland and the countries under its command, and \$300 million, or 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States, through the State Department, has provided about \$1.9 billion in security assistance for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan since 2003.

As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about \$14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional \$744 million for a total of \$15.6 billion. About \$11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining \$4.6 billion in the form of grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about \$436 million in loans and \$3 billion in grants.

U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq



Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. support for non-U.S. coalition troops¹ in Iraq and international donor support for reconstruction in Iraq. In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 48 nations (in addition to the United States), identified as a “coalition of the willing,” offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime.

My testimony today discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to the multinational force in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries’ participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports and on data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified U.S. government documents. This limits the detail we can provide on coalition troop strength in Iraq since DOD classifies the specific troop levels for each coalition country that contributes to operations in Iraq. Accordingly, this statement only provides aggregate data on total coalition troop levels in Iraq.

We obtained financial data on the funding the United States has provided to non-U.S. coalition troops operating in Iraq from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. For troop levels from coalition countries, DOD and State provided data for December 2003 to April 2007.² However, the departments did not have information on coalition troops in Iraq from March to November 2003. We determined that the data we did receive were sufficiently reliable for estimating the U.S. contribution in support of coalition troops and the number of troops contributed by other countries. We obtained data on international contributions to Iraq reconstruction from the Department of State, the United Nations, and the World Bank. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for these purposes. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

¹For purposes of this report, non-U.S. coalition troops do not include Iraqi security forces.

²We obtained troop data for May 2007 from a publicly available document.

Summary

As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with the 145,000 forces from the United States, other coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq.³ From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of non-U.S. coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600, and the number of coalition nations contributing troops to military operations decreased from 33 to 25.⁴ Although the numbers of these troops are declining, three countries—United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea—are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some troops have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordnance capabilities.

The United States has spent about \$1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about \$1 billion of the \$1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these troops. In terms of allocation by country, about \$988 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland as the commander of Multinational Division (MND) Central South. However, the support provided Poland was not solely for its own troops, but for those from other countries under its command. In addition, \$300 million, or about 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States has provided about \$1.9 billion since 2003 for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan. State Department security assistance programs provided this additional assistance.

As of April 2007, international donors have pledged about \$14.9 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction. In addition, some countries exceeded their original pledges by about an additional \$744 million for a total of \$15.6 billion, according to State Department. About \$11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining \$4.6 billion in the form of

³In addition to U.S. and other coalition troops, the number of Iraqi military and police forces trained and equipped by coalition members totaled about 331,000 as of May 2007. However, GAO has raised concerns about these numbers. See *Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-612T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2007).

⁴In addition to multinational force contributions, seven countries contribute troops to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which supports training of Iraqi security forces. As of May 2007, these countries were Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Turkey.

grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about \$436 million in available loans and \$3 billion in grants.

Background

In March 2003, the United States—along with the United Kingdom, Australia, and other members of the coalition—began combat operations in Iraq. The original “coalition of the willing” consisted of 49 countries (including the United States) that publicly committed to the war effort and also provided a variety of support, such as direct military participation, logistical and intelligence support, over-flight rights, or humanitarian and reconstruction aid.³ The term “coalition of the willing” refers to those countries that declared political support for the war effort; not all of these countries contributed troops to multinational operations. Between December 2003 and May 2007, 39 countries (including the United States)—some of which were not original coalition members—provided troops to support operations in Iraq.

Three sources of funding help support non-U.S. coalition troops in Iraq: coalition support funds, lift and sustain funds, and peacekeeping operations funds. First, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003⁴ authorized DOD to use up to a certain amount of its operations and maintenance funds to reimburse countries for the logistical and military support they provided to U.S. military operations in Iraq. DOD refers to these funds as coalition support funds. Congress has continued to make such funds available in each subsequent fiscal year. Second, DOD’s annual Appropriations Act⁵ in 2005 authorized DOD to use funds from its operations and maintenance accounts to provide supplies and services; transportation, including airlift and sealift; and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq. DOD refers to these funds as lift and sustain funds. This authority has also been continued in subsequent appropriations acts.

³In March 2003, the White House reported the following countries in the coalition of the willing: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Republic of Korea, Spain, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uzbekistan.

⁴Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, P.L. 108-11.

⁵Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-287.

According to a DOD official, both coalition support funds and lift and sustain funds are used for any requirements that could be appropriately paid for from operations and maintenance accounts, including airlift, sealift, and sustainment services such as feeding and billeting for coalition troops, among other things. In addition, a DOD official stated that both of these funds are used to support nations whose economic conditions prevent them from fully funding their troops' presence in Iraq. The key distinction between the coalition support and the lift and sustain funds is that coalition support funds are used to reimburse countries for costs they incur, and lift and sustain funds are used to reimburse U.S. military departments for services they provide to support eligible countries.


Third, the State Department provided peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds in 2003 and 2004 to provide basic supplies and equipment such as armor and medical supplies to coalition troops in Iraq. These funds were used to make initial equipment purchases for countries participating in Polish and U.S.-led divisions in Iraq.

Many nations and various international organizations are supporting the efforts to rebuild Iraq through multilateral or bilateral assistance. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003, urged member states and international and regional organizations to support the Iraq reconstruction effort. On October 23-24, 2003, an international donors conference was held in Madrid, with 76 countries, 20 international organizations, and 13 nongovernmental organizations participating.

**Troop Contributions
from Coalition
Members Have
Declined and
Represent a Small
Percentage of Total
Forces**

As of May 2007, 25 coalition nations were contributing about 12,600 troops to multinational force operations in Iraq. This compares to the 145,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, for the same time period. See figure 1 for a comparison of U.S. and coalition troops from December 2003 through May 2007.

Figure 1: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq




Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Non-U.S. coalition troops represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq as of May 2007. Although the coalition has trained and equipped about 331,000 Iraqi army and police forces, we do not include Iraqi security forces (ISF) in our analyses. As we have reported, these data provide limited information on the forces' capabilities, effectiveness, and loyalties. For example, DOD reported in March 2007 that the number of ISF forces present for duty is one-half to two-thirds of the number trained and equipped.⁸

In addition, the number of coalition forces has declined by 47.5 percent—from 24,000 in December 2003 to 12,600 in May 2007, as shown in figure 2.


⁸See *Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-632T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2007).

Figure 2: Non-U.S. Military Forces in Iraq



Although the number of troops is declining, three countries—the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Republic of Korea—have led operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Organization of Multinational Force-Iraq



Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Multinational Force-Iraq documents.

Since July 2003, the United Kingdom has led operations in one of the seven sectors—Multinational Division-Southeast—in southern Iraq in the area around Basra. As of October 2006, coalition troops in this sector were from Italy, Japan, Australia, Romania, Denmark, Portugal, Czech Republic, and Lithuania. Since that time, Italy and Portugal have withdrawn troops from military operations in Iraq.⁹ The United Kingdom has provided the

⁹Italy and Portugal contribute trainers to the NATO training mission in Iraq.

largest number of non-U.S. coalition troops, peaking at 46,000 from March through April 2003, then declining to 7,100 in November 2006. British forces have conducted combat operations to improve the security environment and have trained Iraqi security forces, among other things. They had sustained 147 fatalities as of May 1, 2007. The United Kingdom announced that it will begin withdrawing troops in 2007 but has pledged to maintain a presence in Iraq into 2008.


Poland has led operations in the MND-Central South, which is south of Baghdad, since September 2003. As of May 2007, non-U.S. coalition troops in this sector were from Poland, Armenia, Bosnia, Denmark, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Romania, El Salvador, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Poland's highest troop level was 2500, declining to 900 by October 2006. Poland's troops have conducted joint combat operations and performed humanitarian, medical, advisory, and training missions, and have sustained 20 fatalities.

The Republic of Korea has led operations in MND-Northeast from Irbil City in the area north of Kirkuk since September 2004. Their peak number of troops was 3,600 troops in that year but declined to 1,600 in March 2007. Their missions have included medical, humanitarian, and reconstruction efforts. The Republic of Korea's government is to draw up a timetable in 2007 for withdrawing its troops from Iraq.

The number of contributing countries has decreased from 33 in December 2003 to 25 in May 2007.¹⁸ Figure 4 shows the countries that have contributed troops between 2003 and 2007. According to State Department officials and government press releases, the decline in the number of troops can be attributed to completion of missions, domestic political considerations, and the deteriorating security condition in Iraq.

¹⁸The 25 contributing countries do not include the seven countries that provide troops to the NATO Training Mission.

Figure 4: Non-U.S. Coalition Countries Providing Troops to MNF-I, December 2003 Through May 2007



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

As the figure shows, eight countries withdrew their troops from Iraq during 2004. For example, in mid-April 2004, the new government of Spain announced that it would withdraw its 1,300 troops from Iraq. The

government withdrew the troops much earlier than the United States expected, after violence escalated in the Spanish area of operations in Iraq. Shortly thereafter, Honduras and the Dominican Republic announced they would also withdraw their national contingents from the multinational force, which they did the same year.

The United States Has Provided about \$1.5 Billion to Support Coalition Troops in Iraq

Some countries that have provided troops to the multinational force in Iraq are not financially able to support those troops in the field for extended periods of time or may need assistance in preparing their troops for this type of operation. Since 2003, the United States has provided about \$1.5 billion to 20 countries. Of the \$1.5 billion spent to support these troops, about \$725.9 million was reimbursed to countries, and about \$702 million was reimbursed to U.S. military departments that provided support to non-U.S. coalition troops. See table 1 below for the total amount of support provided for non-U.S. coalition troops in Iraq.

Table 1: Total Amount Provided for Coalition Nations in Iraq, by Type of Funding and Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	Total
Coalition support ^a	\$151.7	\$274.3	\$245.6	\$54.3	\$725.9
Lift and sustain ^b	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$483.3 ^c	\$219.0	\$702.3
Peacekeeping operations ^d	\$50.0	\$16.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$66.0
Total	\$201.7	\$290.3	\$728.9	\$273.3	\$1,494.2

^aThese are DOD-managed funds that are reimbursed to countries for support they provided to operations in Iraq.

^bThese are DOD-managed funds that are reimbursed to U.S. military departments for support they provided to coalition troops in Iraq.

^cAccording to a DOD official, this number is relatively larger than the others because it represents costs incurred between 2004 and 2005, and was largely attributable to costs associated with preparing an operating base for MND-Central South.

^dThese are State-managed funds.

Since 2003, the departments used about \$1 billion of the approximately \$1.5 billion (71.5 percent) for sustainment services such as food, supplies, and base operations services such as communications and equipment. The departments used the remaining funds to support other operational requirements:

- About \$212 million to support Jordan's border operations;
- About \$43 million to support hospital operations; and
- About \$125 million to support lift requirements.

Nineteen coalition nations and Jordan received support from these funds.¹¹ As displayed in table 2, Poland received the largest amount of support—about \$988 million, or 66 percent of total funding—for requirements sustained in its capacity as Commander of the MND-Central South sector. However, the support provided Poland was not solely for its own troops but for the coalition troops under its command—Armenia, Slovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Table 2: U.S. Support to Non-U.S. Coalition Troops from March 2003 through March 2007, by Country (dollars in millions)

Country	Total	Percent
Poland ^a	\$988.4	66.2
Jordan	\$295.0	19.7
Other Nations	\$123.3	8.3
Georgia	\$63.1	4.2
Ukraine	\$12.5	.8
United Kingdom	\$5.6	.4
Romania	\$3.0	.2
Bosnia	\$2.0	.1
Mongolia	\$1.3	.1
Total	\$1,494.2	100

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Note: Of the U.S. support to other nations (\$123 million), \$114 million was reimbursed to U.S. military departments by DOD. The data were not arrayed by allocations to specific countries.

^aThis funding was not solely for Poland but for the troops from nations operating under its command.

According to a DOD official, as a matter of policy, it confined its support to those coalition countries that they deemed were less capable of absorbing the costs associated with participating in operations in Iraq. However, one exception to this policy was the decision in 2005 to reimburse the United Kingdom about \$5.6 million for improvements it made to Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Akrotiri on Cyprus to accommodate U.S. requirements for lift and refueling needs. Jordan was the next largest

¹¹The countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Romania, Slovakia, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Kingdom.

recipient of support, receiving reimbursement or services worth about \$300 million for border operations and other activities.

It is important to note that the United States also has provided security assistance funds to develop and modernize the militaries of several countries contributing to operations in Iraq. Security assistance has included military equipment, services, and training. From fiscal year 2003 through 2006, the United States provided about \$625 million in security assistance to 10 countries contributing troops to Iraq.¹² In addition, since 2003, the United States has provided Jordan about \$1.34 billion in security assistance.

**International Donors
Have Pledged Billions
of Dollars for
Reconstruction
Efforts in Iraq**

International donors have pledged about \$14.9 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction. In addition, some countries exceeded their pledges by providing an additional \$744 million for a total of \$15.6 billion, according to the State Department. Of this amount, about \$11 billion, or 70 percent, is in the form of loans. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about \$436 million in loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The remaining \$4.6 billion is in the form of grants, to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally; \$3.0 billion has been disbursed to Iraq. See table 3 for pledges made at Madrid and thereafter for Iraq reconstruction. In addition, 16 of the 41 countries that pledged funding for Iraq reconstruction also pledged troops to the multinational force in Iraq.

Table 3: Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction (dollars in thousands)

Donor	Madrid Pledges	Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges	Total
Australia	45,590	28,680	74,270
Austria	5,480	0	5,480
Belgium	5,890	0	5,890
Bulgaria	640	0	640
Canada	187,470	0	187,470
China	25,000	6,500	31,500

¹²These countries are Thailand, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Donor	Madrid Pledges	Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges	Total
Croatia	0	333	333
Cyprus	120	0	120
Czech Republic	14,660	0	14,660
Denmark	26,950	35,000	61,950
European Commission	235,620	685,685	921,305
Estonia	80	0	80
Finland	5,890	2,944	8,834
Germany	0	4,150	4,150
Greece	3,530	3,618	7,148
Hungary	1,240	430	1,670
Iceland	2,500	500	3,000
India	10,000	0	10,000
Iran	5,000	1,000,000	1,005,000
Ireland	3,530	0	3,530
Italy	235,620	0	235,620
Japan	4,914,000	0	4,914,000
Republic of Korea	200,000	0	200,000
Kuwait	500,000	0	500,000
Lithuania	0	30	30
Luxembourg	2,360	199	2,559
Malta	27	0	27
Netherlands	9,420	3,465	12,885
New Zealand	3,350	2,760	6,110
Norway	12,870	10,840	23,710
Oman	3,000	0	3,000
Pakistan	2,500	0	2,500
Portugal	0	600	600
Qatar	100,000	0	100,000
Saudi Arabia	500,000	0	500,000
Slovenia	420	0	420
Spain	220,000	28,000	248,000
Sweden	33,000	0	33,000
Turkey	50,000	0	50,000
United Arab Emirates	215,000	0	215,000
United Kingdom	452,330	198,000	650,330
Vietnam	0	700	700

Donor	Madrid Pledges	Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges	Total
Lower end of planned World Bank lending	3,000,000	0	3,000,000
Lower end of planned IMF lending	2,550,000	0	2,550,000
Total non-US pledges and donations	13,583,087	2,012,434	15,595,521

Source: State Department.

Note: Bolded countries also contributed troops to the multinational force.

Most Pledges Were in the Form of Loans

About \$11 billion, or 70 percent, of the \$14.9 billion pledged in support of Iraq reconstruction is in the form of loans. Pledging the majority of these loans were the World Bank (\$3 billion), the IMF (up to \$2.55 billion), Iran (\$1 billion), and Japan (\$3.4 billion), according to the State Department. In September 2004, the IMF provided a \$436 million emergency post-conflict assistance loan to facilitate Iraqi debt relief.¹³ The World Bank has approved loans for \$399 million from its concessional international development assistance program, which the Iraqis have not accessed.¹⁴ According to the State Department, the Iraqis lack a system for approving projects supported by donor loans, which has impeded efforts by the World Bank and Japan to initiate loan-based projects.¹⁵ In addition, Iraq has not yet accessed loans from Iran, according to the State Department. Further, according to IMF reporting as of February 2007, Iraq has received about \$39 billion in debt reduction from commercial and bilateral creditors.

Most Grants Have Been Provided

As of April 2007, international donors for Iraq reconstruction had pledged \$3.9 billion in grants to be provided multilaterally and bilaterally. In addition, some countries exceeded their pledges by providing an additional \$744 million, according to the State department.

¹³In addition to this loan, Iraq secured a \$685 million Stand-by-Arrangement with the IMF in December 2005; however, the Iraqis have not drawn upon this support, according to the State department.

¹⁴This loan is within a \$500 million program for concessional international development assistance.

¹⁵A proposed clause of Iraq's 2007 Budget Law that was intended to clarify matters for approving projects supported by donor loans was deleted by Iraq's Council of Representatives before the law was passed in final form, according to State department.

Of the total grants, donors provided about \$1.6 billion multilaterally to two trust funds, one run by the U.N. Development Group (UNDG) and the other by the World Bank.¹⁶ Donors have provided about \$1.1 billion to the UN trust fund and \$455 million to the World Bank trust fund. As of March 2007, the UN has disbursed about \$612 million to support, among other things, Iraq's elections, infrastructure projects, health and nutrition, agriculture and natural resources, and assistance to refugees. As of March 2007, the World Bank fund had disbursed about \$96 million to support, among other things, capacity building, school rehabilitation and construction, and health rehabilitation.

Donors provided about \$2.3 billion in bilateral grants for Iraq reconstruction efforts. As of April 2007, these grants have funded more than 400 projects as reported by Iraq's Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.¹⁷ According to State, these projects include about \$1 billion in grant assistance from Japan, \$775 million from the United Kingdom, \$153 million from Republic of Korea, \$110 million from Canada, and \$100 million from Spain. These funds have been provided as bilateral grants to Iraqi institutions, implementing contractors, and nongovernmental organizations for reconstruction projects outside the projects funded by the UN and World Bank trust funds.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have.

¹⁶On March 20, 2007, at the (IRPFI) International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq Donors Committee meeting in Istanbul, it was decided that the lifetime of the fund would be extended through December 2010 to allow adequate time to finance the existing projects through to completion.

¹⁷The Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation tracks donor assistance in a recently established Donor Assistance Database.

**GAO Contacts and
Acknowledgments**

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Muriel Forster, David Bruno, Monica Bryn, Dorian Herring, Lynn Cothorn, Judith McCloskey, and Mary Moutsos.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

GAO's Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are \$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000
TDD: (202) 512-2537
Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Christoff. Dr. Gardiner.

STATEMENT OF NILE GARDINER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. GARDINER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rohrabacher, and distinguished members on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, thank you for holding today's hearing on a very important issue: The role of the international coalition in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to present a brief summary of views, and submit my full prepared statement for the record.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Without objection.

Mr. GARDINER. It is fitting that today's hearing is taking place immediately after the highly successful state visit to the United States of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II. Her visit to America was a powerful symbol of the historic strength of the Anglo-American special relationship, the most enduring and successful alliance in modern history.

It is a partnership that must continue to flourish if the West is to defeat the scourge of global terrorism and defend the cause of liberty and freedom across the world.

American and British forces are fighting side by side in the main theaters of the war on terrorism. The United States and the United Kingdom lead the global battle against al-Qaeda and state sponsors of international terror. Washington and London also stand at the forefront of international efforts to prevent the emergency of a nuclear-armed Iran, and Britain has doubled its naval presence in the Persian Gulf alongside the U.S. Navy as a warning to the Iranian regime.

Over 45,000 British military personnel participated in the liberation of Iraq; by any measure, a huge contribution for a nation of Britain's size. More than 7,000 British troops are still based in southern Iraq, and 148 British soldiers have sacrificed their lives there.

The U.K. commands the Multi-National Division Southeast within the Multi-National Force, whose security responsibilities include Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, with a population of 2.3 million.

Since 2003, Britain has spent over \$8 billion, or £4 billion, on Iraq operations. Prince Harry, the Queen's grandson and third in line for the throne, will shortly be dispatched to Iraq, emphasizing the British commitment to the country. Prince Harry's decision to fight alongside his countrymen in the face of mounting threats from insurgent groups is a commendable display of courage and leadership that underscores the continuing importance of the monarchy in the 21st century.

More than 5,000 British troops are engaged in military operations against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, as part of the NATO-led international security assistance force, ISAF, and a further 1,500 are due to be deployed this summer. Fifty-three British soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan since 2001.

The English-speaking nations of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have contributed 23,000

troops to the ISAF mission, making up nearly two-thirds of the 36,000-strong NATO operation.

There are currently 25 countries with forces in Iraq, in addition to the United States, providing a total of 13,196 troops. A total of 272 coalition soldiers from countries other than the United States have been killed in Iraq. As well as the United Kingdom, the largest troop contributors are South Korea, Poland, Georgia, Romania, Australia, and Denmark. Poland commands the multi-national Division Central South, which includes the cities of Al Kut, Al Hillah, and Karbala.

Over 40 countries have pledged reconstruction aid to Iraq, totaling more than \$8 billion. In addition, the Paris Club of creditor nations, which includes the United States, U.K., Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland, have agreed to cancel 80% of Iraq's \$38.9 billion debt owed to those countries, with the remaining \$7.8 billion to be rescheduled over a 23-year period.

At its height in 2004, the Iraq coalition included 21 nations from Europe, and nine from Asia and Australia. Twelve of the 25 members of the European Union were represented, as were 16 of the 26 NATO member-states. The opposition of French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to the United States-led liberation of Iraq should not be perceived as representative of Europe as a whole. Indeed, a large number of European governments backed the United States decision to liberate the Iraqi people.

It is significant that Mr. Chirac and Mr. Schroeder are no longer powerful figures on the world stage. A number of major pro-American leaders have emerged since the heated international debates over the Iraq War. Angela Merkel took over as Germany's Chancellor in 2005. Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister of Canada in 2006. And Nicolas Sarkozy will become President of France later this month.

The Senate and House decision to support a timetable for the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq undermines and weakens the Anglo-American special relationship and U.S.-U.K. leadership on the world stage. The Senate and House votes send the wrong message, at a time when American, British, and coalition personnel are engaged in defending Iraq's fledgling democracy.

Congress is projecting a clear signal of defeat to America's enemies in Iraq, and across the world, which undercuts the United States' closest ally, Great Britain, as well as the Iraqi Government. This astonishing move will undermine morale in the international coalition in Iraq, and, if enacted, would make Britain's position in southern Iraq untenable.

In sharp contrast, Britain's House of Commons has not voted for a timetabled withdrawal of British forces from Iraq, and both of the U.K.'s largest political parties, Labor and Conservative, remain committed to maintaining forces in the country. There is a clear difference between the resolve of Britain's Parliament regarding Iraq and the defeatist approach of elements in the U.S. Congress.

The war in Iraq is not only America's war; it is Britain's, too. And the United Kingdom has played a major role in bringing relative peace and stability to huge waves of southern Iraq in the face of intense meddling by Iran.

I would like to emphasize that Britain is not pulling out of Iraq, as many have speculated. British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in February that British troop numbers would be cut this summer from 7,100 to 5,000. This will allow Britain to send an additional 1,500 troops to southern Afghanistan, for a total of 7,000 to fight the Taliban. The move is a reflection of mounting commitments in other theaters of the war on terrorism, as well as significant progress in training Iraqi security forces. It does not, as some United States politicians have claimed, represent a cut-and-run strategy for Iraq.

Blair's initial announcement has been ruthlessly exploited for political gain by those in Congress who saw it as a convenient battering ram to use against Washington's Iraq policy. There is, in fact, a huge gulf between the long-term vision for Iraq of British defense chiefs, and the short-sighted approach adopted by anti-war politicians on Capitol Hill.

Downing Street has flatly rejected a timetable for the complete withdrawal of British forces, and remains committed to working with Iraqi forces to advance security in the south of the country. Blair's likely successor, Gordon Brown, has given no public indication that he will reverse British policy on Iraq.

According to British defense sources, the U.K. plans to maintain several thousand troops in the country for another 5 years at least, with a projected battle group based west of Basra until 2012.

In conclusion, the United States, Britain, and other coalition allies must remain united in their determination to continue the fight against terrorism in Iraq. An early withdrawal of British or American troops would have catastrophic implications for the future of the country, and would be seen by many Iraqis as a betrayal of trust.

By liberating Iraq and removing one of the most brutal regimes of modern times, Britain and the United States made a powerful commitment to the future of the Iraqi people that must be honored. There should be no major pullout of allied forces from the country until key military objectives have been met, and Iraq is stable and secure.

The United States and the U.K. share a fundamental national interest in remaining in Iraq to defeat the insurgency. The Middle East would view an early withdrawal as a humiliating defeat for the West and an emphatic victory for those who represent al-Qaeda in Iraq. A pullout would be an unparalleled propaganda success for a barbaric terror organization that has murdered thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children.

The withdrawal of American, British, and other Western forces would pave the way for a civil war between Sunni and Shi'a groups, with bloodshed on a far greater scale than witnessed so far. Hundreds of thousands, even millions, could be displaced by ethnic cleansing, leading to a huge humanitarian crisis. Large numbers of Iraqis would inevitably lose their lives.

Iran would be a geo-strategic beneficiary of a British pullout from Shi'ite-dominated southern Iraq, where it already wields great political influence. A British withdrawal from Basra and a southern basis would create a power vacuum that dozens of Iranian-backed militia groups are ready to exploit. Tehran is already wag-

ing a proxy war against United States, British, and Iraqi forces. There is growing evidence that Iranian factories, run by the Revolutionary Guard, are producing roadside bombs that are killing British soldiers in southern Iraq, and that Iran is actively financing and training Shi'a militias.

Iraq today is the central battleground in the global war against terrorism, and, together with Afghanistan, is one of the only places in the world where American, British, and allied troops can actively engage al-Qaeda and its allies on the battlefield. Iraq tests the West's resolve to confront and ultimately defeat the al-Qaeda threat, and this epic confrontation must be fought and won.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gardiner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NILE GARDINER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION¹

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rohrabacher, and distinguished Members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight. Thank you for holding today's hearing on a very important issue: the role of the international coalition in Iraq.

It is fitting that today's hearing is taking place immediately after the highly successful State Visit to the United States of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Her visit to the United States was a powerful symbol of the historic strength of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, the most enduring and successful alliance in modern history. It is a partnership that must continue to flourish if the West is to defeat the scourge of global terrorism and defend the cause of liberty and freedom across the world.

THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

American and British forces are fighting side by side in the main theaters of the war on terrorism. The United States and the United Kingdom lead the global battle against al-Qaeda and state sponsors of international terror. Washington and London also stand at the forefront of international efforts to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, and Britain has doubled its naval presence in the Persian Gulf, alongside the U.S. Navy, as a warning to the Iranian regime.

Over 45,000 British military personnel participated in the liberation of Iraq, by any measure a huge contribution for a nation of Britain's size. More than 7,000 British troops are still based in southern Iraq, and 148 British soldiers have sacrificed their lives there. The UK commands the Multi-National Division South East within the Multi-National Force, whose security responsibilities include Iraq's second largest city, Basra, with a population of 2.3 million. Since 2003, Britain has spent over \$8 billion (£4 billion) on Iraq operations.²

Prince Harry, the Queen's grandson and third in line to the throne, will shortly be dispatched to Iraq, emphasizing the British commitment to the country. Prince Harry's decision to fight alongside his countrymen in the face of mounting threats from insurgent groups is a commendable display of courage and leadership that underscores the continuing importance of the Monarchy in the 21st century.

More than 5,000 British troops are engaged in military operations against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security As-

¹ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(C) (3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2006, it had more than 283,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2006 income came from the following sources: individuals 64%; foundations 19%; corporations 3%; investment income 14%; and publication sales and other 0%. The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.3% of its 2006 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

² British Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Key Facts and Figures, at <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/InDepth/UkMilitaryOperationsInIraq.htm>

sistance Force (ISAF), and a further 1,500 are due to be deployed this summer. Fifty-three British soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan since 2001. The English-speaking nations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have contributed 23,300 troops to the ISAF mission, making up nearly two thirds of the 36,750-strong NATO operation.³

THE BROADER IRAQ COALITION

There are currently 25 countries with forces in Iraq in addition to the United States, providing a total of 13,196 troops. A total of 272 Coalition troops from countries other than the U.S. have been killed in Iraq.⁴ As well as the United Kingdom, the largest troop contributors are South Korea (2,300), Poland (900), Georgia (900),⁵ Romania (600), Australia (550), and Denmark (460). Poland commands the Multi-National Division Central-South, which includes the cities of Al Kut, Al Hillah, and Karbala.

The other nations contributing forces to Iraq are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Slovakia and Ukraine. In addition, there are several NATO members who are supporting Iraqi stability operations outside of the Multinational Force—Iraq, including Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Turkey.⁶

At its height in 2004, the Iraq Coalition included 21 nations from Europe, and nine from Asia and Australasia. Twelve of the 25 members of the European Union were represented, as were 16 of the 26 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member states. The opposition of French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq should not be perceived as representative of Europe as a whole—indeed, a large number of European governments backed the U.S. decision to liberate the Iraqi people.⁷

It is significant that Messrs Chirac and Schroeder are no longer powerful figures on the world stage. A number of major pro-American leaders have emerged since the heated international debates over the Iraq War. Angela Merkel took over as Germany's Chancellor in 2005, Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister of Canada in 2006, and Nicolas Sarkozy will become president of France later this month.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

Over 40 countries have pledged reconstruction aid to Iraq, totaling more than \$8 billion. These pledges include \$4.9 billion by Japan, \$642 million by the UK, \$235 million by Italy, and \$222 million by Spain. Several Arab countries have also pledged significant contributions, including Kuwait (\$565 million), Saudi Arabia (\$500 million), and United Arab Emirates (\$215 million). The European Union has also pledged to provide \$900 million of aid for Iraq. In addition the World Bank has pledged \$3 billion, the IMF \$2.55 billion, and the Islamic Development Bank \$500 million, bringing the total amount of money pledged by the international community (excluding the United States) to \$15.2 billion.⁸ In November 2004, the Paris Club of creditor nations, which includes the U.S., UK, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland, agreed to cancel 80 percent of Iraq's \$38.9 billion debt owed to these countries, with the remaining \$7.8 billion to be rescheduled over a 23-year period.⁹

CONGRESS IS UNDERMINING THE IRAQ COALITION

The Senate and House decision to support a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq undermines and weakens the Anglo-American Special Relationship and U.S.–U.K. leadership on the world stage. Following a 218–208 House vote call-

³International Security Assistance Force Fact Sheet, at <http://www.nato.int/isaf/media/pdf/placemat—isaf.pdf>

⁴The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, May 3, 2007, at <http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>

⁵Georgia is planning to more than double its troop contribution to 2,000.

⁶The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, May 3, 2007, at <http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>

⁷See Nile Gardiner Ph.D., “The Myth of U.S. Isolation: Why America Is Not Alone in the War on Terror,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo #558, September 7, 2004, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm558.cfm>

⁸The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, May 3, 2007, at <http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>

⁹See Martin A. Weiss, “Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International Debt Relief,” Congressional Research Service, April 21, 2006, at http://austria.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/iraq_debt_relief.pdf

ing for a withdrawal timetable, the Senate voted by 51 to 46 to approve a war-spending bill that would force the exit of American forces starting in October 2007, with a target for complete withdrawal from Iraq by March 31, 2008. This vote sends the wrong message at a time when American, British and Coalition personnel are engaged in defending Iraq's fledgling democracy.

Congress is sending a clear signal of defeat to America's enemies in Iraq and across the world, which undercuts the United State's closest ally, Great Britain, as well as the Iraqi government. This astonishing move will undermine morale in the international coalition in Iraq and, if enacted, would make Britain's position in southern Iraq untenable.

In sharp contrast, Britain's House of Commons has not voted for a timetabled withdrawal of British forces from Iraq, and both of the U.K.'s largest political parties, Labour and Conservative, remain committed to maintaining forces in the country. There is a clear difference between the resolve of Britain's Parliament regarding Iraq and the defeatist approach of elements in the U.S. Congress.

The war in Iraq is not only America's war, it is Britain's too, and the United Kingdom has played a major role in bringing relative peace and stability to huge swathes of southern Iraq in the face of intense meddling by Iran.

BRITAIN IS NOT PULLING OUT OF IRAQ

British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in February that British troop numbers would be cut this summer from 7,100 to 5,000. This will allow Britain to send an additional 1,500 troops to southern Afghanistan, for a total of 7,000, to fight the Taliban. The move is a reflection of mounting commitments in other theaters of the war on terrorism, as well as significant progress in training Iraqi security forces. It does not, as some U.S. politicians have claimed, represent a cut-and-run strategy for Iraq.

Blair's initial announcement has been ruthlessly exploited for political gain by those in Congress who saw it as a convenient battering ram to use against Washington's Iraq policy. There is in fact a huge gulf between the long-term vision for Iraq of British defense chiefs and the short-sighted approach adopted by anti-war politicians on Capitol Hill.

Downing Street has flatly rejected a timetable for the complete withdrawal of British forces and remains committed to working with Iraqi forces to advance security in the south of the country. Blair's likely successor, Gordon Brown, has given no public indication that he will reverse British policy on Iraq. According to British defense sources, the U.K. plans to maintain several thousand troops in the country for another 5 years, with a projected battle group based west of Basra until 2012.¹⁰

DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF A COALITION WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

- *A Propaganda Victory for Al-Qaeda and Its Allies:* Al-Qaeda would portray a U.S.–U.K. pullout as a massive victory. An early withdrawal would embolden al-Qaeda's terrorist network in Iraq and provide a huge boost to the insurgency. Al-Qaeda would link any British withdrawal to the July 7, 2005, London bombings, for which it has claimed responsibility, and assert that the attacks forced a change in British policy. This would set a dangerous precedent and greatly increase the likelihood of future terrorist atrocities on European soil.
- *Civil War, Ethnic Cleansing, and a Humanitarian Crisis:* The withdrawal of American, British, and other Western forces would pave the way for a civil war between Sunni and Shia groups, with bloodshed on a far greater scale than witnessed so far. Hundreds of thousands, even millions could be displaced by ethnic cleansing, leading to a huge humanitarian crisis. Large numbers of Iraqis would inevitably lose their lives.
- *The Boosting of Iranian Power:* Iran would be a geostrategic beneficiary of a British pullout from Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, where it already wields great political influence. A British withdrawal from Basra and its southern bases would create a power vacuum that dozens of Iranian-backed militia groups are ready to exploit—among them, Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army, the Badr Brigades, and the Mujahidin for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Tehran is already waging a proxy war against U.S., British, and Iraqi forces. There is growing evidence that Iranian factories run by the Revolutionary Guard are

¹⁰Thomas Harding and George Jones, "4,000 Troops Will Stay in Iraq 'for Five Years,'" *The Daily Telegraph*, February 22, 2007, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/22/niraq122.xml>

producing roadside bombs that are killing British soldiers in southern Iraq and that Iran is actively financing and training Shia militias.¹¹

CONCLUSION

The U.S., Britain and other Coalition Allies must remain united in their determination to continue the fight against terrorism in Iraq. An early withdrawal of British or American troops would have catastrophic implications for the future of the country and would be seen by many Iraqis as a betrayal of trust. By liberating Iraq and removing one of the most brutal regimes of modern times, Britain and the United States made a powerful commitment to the future of the Iraqi people that must be honored. There should be no major pullout of Allied forces from the country until key military objectives have been met and Iraq is stable and secure.

The U.S. and the U.K. share a fundamental national interest in remaining in Iraq to defeat the insurgency. The Middle East would view an early withdrawal as a humiliating defeat for the West and an emphatic victory for those who represent al-Qaeda in Iraq. A pullout would be an unparalleled propaganda success for a barbaric terror organization that has murdered thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children.

Iraq today is the central battleground in the global war against terrorism and, together with Afghanistan, is one of the only places in the world where American, British and Allied troops can actively engage al-Qaeda and its allies on the battlefield. Iraq tests the West's resolve to confront and ultimately defeat the al-Qaeda threat, and this epic confrontation must be fought and won by U.S., British, Coalition and Iraqi forces.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Gardiner. I am going to yield to the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Paul. But I would just note for the record, I am going to have to excuse myself for probably a half-hour. I will turn the gavel over to the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Carnahan.

But I would note that I found Dr. Gardiner's observations interesting, about the displacement of millions of Iraqis. My understanding is there are some 2 million that have already been displaced. It has become a humanitarian tragedy, and it has obviously best neighboring countries with an extraordinary burden.

He also refers to it could pave the way for a civil war between Shi'a and Sunni. I daresay some would indicate that that war has been ongoing for some time already. And he also refers to his concern, and I believe it is a legitimate one, and one that is obviously heartfelt, about increasing Iranian influence in Iraq. I would dare say that that influence already exists.

Our withdrawal from Iraq would not boost it, by any stretch of the imagination. And in fact, I would like to read into the record before I leave, and before I yield to my friend from Texas, a comment and an observation by not a Sunni or not a Shi'a from the south, not a Sunni from the triangle, if you will, but the President of the Kurdish Government in Iraq, regarding Iran.

And I think it is important that we put this out there, so that the American people understand what the reality is in terms of the relationship today between Iraq and Iran. And I am not being critical of the Kurdish President, but I think it is important that we hear it from him. And if I can find it, I will read it into the record. Ah, there it is.

¹¹Toby Harnden, "Three Iranian Factories 'Mass-Produce Bombs to Kill British in Iraq,'" *The Daily Telegraph*, August 21, 2006, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/20/wirq20.xml>

See also Matthew Moore and Paul Willis, "Blair Accuses Iran After Four Troops Killed," *The Daily Telegraph*, May 4, 2007, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/05/wiraq105.xml>

So let me read this into the record, for the benefit of my colleagues, as well as the panel. And I will be inquiring about Iranian influence in Iraq, since it is of such a concern, and legitimately so. But I don't think that a simple statement that withdrawal will boost Iranian influence in Iraq, because it already exists, and that is the reality and we better start dealing with reality.

This is from the President of the Kurdish Government in Iraq, and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. This statement was made May 8, which I think was yesterday, of 2007. These are his words:

“As a neighbor of ours and of Iraq's, Iran has always extended much help to us, especially during the hard times and difficulties. Whenever we needed help, Iran's doors have been open to us. Therefore, security of Iran is our security. And we may never allow our soil to be used for operations and plots against Iran.”

Now, I think that is a very interesting comment, but I think what it does, at least for me, is reinforce an already existing close relationship between the Iraqi Government and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And let us not deceive ourselves.

With that, I will yield to the good doctor from Texas, my friend, Dr. Paul. And I will ask the vice chairman to please take the gavel.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Dr. Gardiner, were you supportive of the invasion of Iraq in 2003?

Mr. GARDINER. Yes, I certainly was. I supported that invasion.

Mr. PAUL. Okay. Referring back to my opening comments, if you would have known at the time exactly what would happen in 4 years' time—first that the reasons for going weren't so, and that the cost would be very high in terms of life and dollars—do you think you would reconsider, if you had had that information in front of you when you were supportive of the invasion?

Mr. GARDINER. I think that I would still have supported the invasion. I supported the invasion not only over the issue of weapons of mass destruction; I believed strongly that the regime of Saddam Hussein should be removed from power, that Saddam Hussein should be held to account for his crimes against the Iraqi people.

And I think that the Iraq War was about far more than just the WMD issue. It was about the principle of taking on and removing dictators from power, brutalizing their own people. I think this does set actually a very good precedent, and it sends a warning signal to other dictators in the world, that the West will take action if necessary.

Mr. PAUL. Okay. That may be true, and that might be an afterthought; but the resolution stated that we were going in there because he had weapons of mass destruction and he was a threat to our national security, which nobody could claim today.

And the other reason was to enforce U.N. resolutions. It was very important that U.N. resolutions—those were the two main reasons we transferred this power to the President.

You know, the reasons that were given by the individuals who promoted the war turned out not to be so. They predicted an easy victory, and that it literally would be paid for, you know, with the oil revenues. None of that has come true. And now those same indi-

viduals who promoted the war are saying to us well, if we leave, such-and-such is going to happen.

So how can they have credibility if they were wrong on why we went in there and what happened? The consequences, the length of time? If they were wrong then, I am not sure why we in the Congress should be listening to advice of what might happen, because it is pretty chaotic there now.

You say stay until we have a military victory. What if the most serious precipitating issue of why there is chaos there is occupation? What would it be like if the Chinese occupied the United States? Do you think we would be unhappy? And what would we, as a people, do?

Yet we are a foreign power occupying them, and we believe, we are told, that we are going to stay until we have a victory, when having a victory is almost impossible to define.

But you also elude to one of the main reasons why we must stay is that it could be perceived as a betrayal of trust to the Iraqi people. And I keep thinking, well, who made this commitment? Did the American people make this commitment? What about betrayal of trust to the American people? I mean, it is the American people who are losing their sons and their daughters, and paying for it. I would say that we should have more concern about the betrayal of trust to the American people, because they seem to be the ones that are suffering. Of course, the Iraqis are suffering, but that is a consequence of us being there for so long.

But I just cannot see how any resolution can come about if we ever come to the understanding, which I so strongly believe and so many have come to this conclusion, that the real problem is that we are foreigners; we have come a long way; we are Westerners. We are not of their religion, we are not of their color, and we are occupying their holy land. How in the world can you ever expect a military victory under those circumstances?

Mr. GARDINER. Some very powerful points there. I think first that yes, mistakes have been made with regard to operations in Iraq and the running of operations there. And I think that important lessons will be definitely learned.

This does not mean, however, that we should be withdrawing from the situation. We should be staying there for a number of reasons, not least the fact that we made a pledge, I think, to the people of Iraq that we would ensure that we help create a country that is far better than the brutal regime of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. We made that commitment, to bring about liberty, freedom, and security in Iraq.

Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt you? When was that commitment made? And who made it, and who signed it?

Mr. GARDINER. Well, I would quote, for example, on numerous occasions, speeches by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, where he spoke about the war against Iraq being not only an issue of weapons of mass destruction, but also bringing liberty and freedom to the Iraqi people. And I think that President Bush has repeated that on numerous occasions, as well.

This was not just a war over an issue of national security. This was a war in the defense of the cause of liberty and freedom.

Now, also, of course, I think in Iraq we are fighting a battle against global terrorists here. And if we seem to be defeated in Iraq, this will send all the wrong signals to our very worst enemies on the international stage. This will be a humiliation for us. This will be seen as a huge defeat for us. It will be a massive propaganda victory for al-Qaeda. It will greatly increase, I think, the long run, the threat that we will face from global terrorism.

Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt again? What do you do with these reports that seem to me to be legitimate? Do you just totally dismiss it, when we hear reports from al-Qaeda and bin Laden, when they say they are delighted that we are there? It is easier to kill Americans; we are on their sand, is the way he puts it. And besides, their recruiting is better. They thrive on this.

This whole argument that we are really attacking al-Qaeda, if the real incentive for them to hate us and be anti-American is our presence on their holy land, I cannot see how we are attacking al-Qaeda. I think we have to pay attention to it when they say that they don't want us to leave. There have been reports that way; they like us there because it serves the al-Qaeda interests.

Mr. GARDINER. Well, I think that is certainly their propaganda. And let us not forget, the 9/11 attacks took place before the liberation of Iraq.

And we are dealing with a terrorist organization that will seek our destruction no matter what our foreign policy is. And one thing is for certain: If we pull out of Iraq, our enemies will be emboldened, and they will claim this as a massive propaganda victory. And we cannot allow them to get away with this.

We fight a battle here certainly, I think, for the very defense of Western civilization and the cause of liberty and freedom on the world stage, and we cannot retreat from the battlefield. We are fighting on a daily basis against al-Qaeda and their allies on the battlefield, inside Iraq and Afghanistan. And this is a war that we simply cannot walk away from.

Mr. PAUL. But, Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude with one statement. That is true, we were attacked before 9/11, but we had been bombing Iraq for 10 years. We had been involved up there for a long time.

And the reason given by Osama bin Laden was the fact that we had troops in Saudi Arabia, and we had already invaded the area and occupied their land. So this idea that just because it happened before 9/11, we antagonized, or policies had antagonized them plenty before that.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. CARNAHAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from Texas, and I want to recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to also continue, Dr. Gardiner.

In your opinion, how would we determine when there is victory, when we have won the war in Iraq? I mean, how do you envision, you know, we know when World War II, you know, the invasion of Normandy, and we finally had the surrender. We know what happened in the Pacific Region, where the war was ended there,

and signing the end of the war on the ship in the Pacific, because we had defeated the Japanese army.

Could you tell me when you would, you said that the Democrats want to, I guess, sort of cut and run in defeat, and those things. So that I would know, how would you be able to declare victory? What would it look like? How would Iraq look? I mean, where would their army be, and where would ours be? And who would sign the peace accord?

Mr. GARDINER. Well, this is a very different kind of war today to the one we fought in the Second World War. And we are fighting against a global network of terrorist organizations uniting around the al-Qaeda leadership. And this is a long war that will last for many, many decades, not over a 5- or 6-year period. So it is a very different kind of battle that we are engaged in.

With regard to Iraq itself, I believe that we should not be withdrawing until we have a stable Iraqi Government that is able to stand on its own two feet, where, by its own security forces, can take full responsibility for security operations.

We must be also sure that we leave an Iraq that does not act as a safe haven for the al-Qaeda organization. And I think those are some of the key strategic goals that we should be aiming for. We are certainly not at that stage at the moment. We are dealing with a highly volatile, extremely dangerous situation. But I think that the consequences of an early withdrawal would be disastrous, not only for the people of Iraq, but also I believe for the United States-led global war on terror, as well.

Mr. PAYNE. So we should leave when, what are the one or two or three items that they are able to secure? What were they again? When we have—

Mr. GARDINER. I believe that we should only be withdrawing once we have a stable and secure Iraq, with an Iraqi Government that is able to ensure the security of the Iraqi people. And also, a situation where we do not have the al-Qaeda organization using the country as a safe haven from which to launch terrorist attacks on other parts of the Middle East, as well as perhaps on Europe, and ultimately the United States, as well.

Mr. PAYNE. As you know, there were no al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq, correct? Before the invasion.

Mr. GARDINER. I am not sure actually whether there were or there weren't. There might have been; I think that is an ongoing investigation.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, were they welcome? I mean, were Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden buddies? I mean, they talked to each other? I understood they never even met each other.

Mr. GARDINER. I wouldn't describe them as best buddies. However, they both had a common interest, I think, in taking on Western global power.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, but did Osama bin Laden dislike Saddam Hussein? Didn't he call him an infidel? He didn't have religious beliefs? He was as the Americans were. But yet and still, you feel that they, what is it, the enemy, the enemy is my friend?

Mr. GARDINER. I think that basically we see a common cause between the al-Qaeda organization and a large number of the insurgent groups operating in Iraq today. And I think there is a common

cause between former Saddam loyalists and the al-Qaeda organization. And so we are fighting a common enemy here.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, but today is a result of the failed policy when al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden weren't welcomed in Iraq. Now it is the breeding ground. Yet you feel we should stay there until this job is complete.

You know, the other thing I think that was disingenuous was the fact that the President of the United States seemed to elude to the fact, even more than elude to the fact, that Saddam Hussein and Iraq was responsible for 9/11. Did you hear any of that in any of his presentations?

Mr. GARDINER. I can't comment on the views of the Bush administration with regard to possible links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. I am not in a position really to comment on it. I don't have direct knowledge of the intelligence information available at the time.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, maybe that is a good thing.

Mr. KATZMAN. I would like to speak to this, Mr. Payne, if I may, because I have done a lot of work on this.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, he was in Afghanistan at the time of September 11. When we expelled the Taliban from power, he fled, and he went to the town of Kurmal in northern Iraq. He may have gone through Baghdad, but he encamped with some other Arab fighters who had fled Afghanistan, and they encamped in Kurmal.

Kurmal was outside of the control of Saddam Hussein at the time. It was territory controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who the leader of that is now the President of Iraq. The September 11 commission found no operational relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaeda. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I guess my time probably has expired, so I will yield back. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Dr. Katzman and Dr. Gardiner.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I thank the gentleman, and would next like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Mr. Katzman, you just said that they found no operational relationship. Now, you were at the CIA prior to coming to the—and what area did you analyze for the CIA?

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, I was there a long time ago. I was working on the Iran-Iraq War in 1985 to 1989.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And then you left in 1989?

Mr. KATZMAN. Correct, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the operational relationship, you think that that is the only kind of relationship that is meaningful when you talk about a terrorist organization that operates like we know that al-Qaeda operates.

There are a lot of other supportive things that are done, both financial and informational and other supportive ways. For example, offering free transit in countries. Do you think we found those types of things that Saddam Hussein may have been doing for al-Qaeda?

Did Saddam Hussein, for example, provide free transit for al-Qaeda terrorists through his country?

Mr. KATZMAN. What the 9-11 Commission has found and others have found is there was some collaboration in Sudan, in the early 1990s.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Back to my specific question. Did Saddam Hussein, to your knowledge, provide transit through his country for various al-Qaeda operatives?

Mr. KATZMAN. There was, to my knowledge there was transit, but it is not clear whether that was governmentally approved.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, yes, it is not clear in this dictatorship. It should be very clear to everybody that Saddam Hussein hated the United States. And people who hate the United States, Saddam Hussein considered them to be his friend. And whether or not we can couch this in terms like there are no operational relationship or specifics, the bottom line is Saddam Hussein hated us, and so does al-Qaeda; and they probably did things together that you don't know and I don't know. And perhaps—and some things that are documented, and some things that are not known, but cannot be now made known to the public.

So with that said, I think my colleague, Mr. Payne, was right; there is some question as to the presence of genuineness when he made the argument about weapons of mass destruction and things such as that. And our chairman made that point. And I will concede that. And I am not here to defend the President when he did something that I disagreed with in terms of his approach.

But let us not in any way minimize not only the brutality of Saddam Hussein, but his contacts with those elements around the world who hated us. After all, we kicked him out of Kuwait and put him in a situation in his country. He had a blood feud with us, and would have, had he had time and effort, to consummate that blood feud he would have certainly done so. And more than likely, he was involved in some operations that he thought would hurt us, by supporting different things with al-Qaeda.

Mr. Christoff, how many, at this point, how many security forces, Iraqi security forces are there operating in Iraq? Iraqi security forces.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Iraqi security forces.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. There are 331,000 trained and equipped Iraqi security forces.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, 331,000.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, when you mentioned in your testimony that there was only 8% of those involved with security operations were non-Americans, that didn't include the 331,000, did it?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No, it did not.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that that is a pretty important factor, those 331,000 Iraqis? And maybe that gives a more accurate view, that we are not standing alone to count them into the equation when we are determining who is fighting and who is not?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I don't count them intentionally because of all the work that we have done looking at the effectiveness and the loyalty of Iraqi security forces. The 331,000, that is just the number that we trained and equipped. DoD reported last month that no more than one third to one half even show up for work.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Okay. So you have got 150,000 who may be active. Now, let me just note that during the Vietnam War, we had a very similar approach to the idea of what we were going to do. And we were going to—the Vietnamization concept. Now, that works against the grain of a lot of Americans because we have a lot of bitter memories about Vietnam.

But when you look back and you see what happened, when the last combat troops left Vietnam, that we actually, for, I think it was several years, those forces that we had trained, and where they had the same kind of disparaging analysis of their capabilities before we left and they had to step up, they actually help off and actually had some great victories over their enemies over a 2-year period.

And let me add another parallel to this. It wasn't until the 1974 elections, in which a new breed of Democrat took over the House of Representatives—it was elected to be anti-Nixon, anti-war—that supplies provided, military supplies provided to the Vietnamese Army, were cut off. And then, surprise, surprise, those people who we had trained broke with an understanding the United States was no longer supporting their efforts, and no longer going to supply them ammunition for their weapons.

Now, I would hope that we are not sending that same kind of message to the 150,000, even if we take it by a pessimistic view, 150,000 individuals who are standing up today against brutal attacks, and whose casualty rate, I might add, is much higher than our casualty rate. And I am not sure if they are the best fighters in the world or not, but they are taking casualties. And they represent a much smaller army and force than we do. And they deserve some respect.

And if we don't respect these people, we can't expect them to stand up against the type of onslaught that we are talking about. And I certainly respect Mr. Gardiner, Dr. Gardiner's analysis. There are people all over the world in various countries that are dependent on the United States. If we weaken, there will be no one who will be able to stand up. It just happens to be that way now in history.

And we can try to find fault in everything that happens, and every great endeavor in human history had faults. If you only focus on faults, you are never going to be able to succeed in any of those endeavors.

Let me just note this. If the Chinese, as Dr. Paul suggested, would come into the United States, wouldn't we resent it? No. If the Chinese Army came to the United States and displaced a vicious dictatorship that had been slaughtering our people by the hundreds of thousands, displaced that and tried to help us organize a democratic system, we would be dancing in the streets with the Chinese.

And Iraq, let me note, is not a holy land for most Muslims. And let me also note, as I stated before, by looking at some of the mistakes we have made, and yes, some of the things that have been done that are wrong by our troops—troops do things that are wrong whenever there is a conflict. You are going to find in World War II they did things that were wrong. But we came in and tried

to punish them when we found it out, and we have done so in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.

If we think that what we have done is antagonized other people, you know, I just would have to suggest that, as I suggested in my opening statement, compared to the horrible brutality that is going on on the other side—I mean, we have the Zarqawis who slaughtered people, and now we have the militias on the Iranian side that are slaughtering innocent people. We are talking about coming in and killing women and children in great numbers, intentionally. And we are antagonizing the people of the Middle East by being there trying to stop them from killing each other?

Oh, yes, you can focus on a couple mistakes that, again, we have made, and admitted. But I don't buy that argument. And I don't buy that that is the way we should be making our decisions.

Let me note that the quote the chairman gave earlier on about the Kurdish views of Iran, that was not spoken by an elected leader, much less a national elected leader. It was a local, unelected political figure in Kurdistan.

And finally, let me see. Oh, yes. And finally, in terms of our people who are standing up with us. Mr. Christoff, you went through the different troops and things, and I think it was you or Mr. Katzman that suggested that, for example, the Koreans are expected to reduce their number of troops, correct?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Was that based on any analysis of what the future elections, the upcoming elections in Korea would achieve?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. All of my data was based upon information from the Departments of Defense and State.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But I can tell you that, well, I can't tell you. But obviously the answer to the question is no. It was based on Department of State, it was based on Department of Defense; it is not based on a projection of the political will.

We have had hearing after hearing talking about how the United States is really in the doghouse, and our popularity is going right down the drain in Europe. And we have, in Germany, a pro-American official elected. And now in France, a pro-American official elected.

And let me note that in Korea, you have a relatively anti-Western government now in power in South Korea. And every projection of the elections that I have seen is that Korea will be electing a very pro-American next government; and that that could have a lot to do with the troop levels that they decide upon.

So the projections that we are talking about have to be looked not only in terms of right now, but also what is potentially, or what is coming from the grass roots in those democratic societies, not just what is right now among leaders, political leaders of those countries.

With that said, I appreciate this. I appreciate the hearing. And I hope that Dr. Gardiner's statements about putting this in historical perspective and what this could do—Dr. Gardiner, the answer to all of those ominous predictions that you made that could happen seems to be that, well, it is bad already. Well, let me just note that that does not in any way undercut your predictions that it

could get a lot worse if we would act precipitously and do something that would encourage the type of monstrous tyrants and terrorists who hate the United States around the world. And hate your country and the people of all three democratic countries. And they hate the people in their own societies who want democracy.

If we just ignore those people and think that we can walk away from it, I think we are in for big trouble, a lot worse than what we have got now.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Next we will recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Yes, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for not being here much, and I apologize if this has been asked.

A question that has, or a statement that is often made is that if we aren't fighting them there, then we will be fighting us here. They will follow us home. This is different from Vietnam, we are told, because of that.

I would like to hear your reaction to that statement. Is there something to that? Or what do you make of that statement? First, Dr. Gardiner.

Mr. GARDINER. Yes. Actually, I do have an opinion on that.

I think the fact is that every day we are eliminating in Iraq al-Qaeda terrorists. And from time to time, we are actually killing some of their top military operational commanders. And we are making significant—I think we are getting significant results, I think, in terms of wiping out a considerable portion of their command and control by engaging them on the battlefield in Iraq, as well, and al-Qaeda is very active fighting alongside the Taliban.

And so I do believe that al-Qaeda on the battlefield itself, we can reduce long-term the risk to European cities, and ultimately also to the United States, as well. And this is a battle that is worth fighting. It is a battle that we simply have to win.

And I fundamentally disagree with those who say that the Iraq War is making the world more dangerous. What we are doing in Iraq is taking on the enemy head-on, and wherever we can, wiping out some of al-Qaeda's leadership. And we are saving lives in the long run by doing so.

Mr. FLAKE. Let me have just a quick follow-up, then I would like reaction from the others.

Assuming we are killing some, is this the most cost-effective way to do it? I mean, a lot of our time there some would argue has been spent policing sectarian struggles. Is this a cost-effective way, the most cost-effective way to do it?

Mr. GARDINER. I think it is cost-effective. I think that Iraq and Afghanistan are the only places in the world that we can actually draw out the enemy and actively fight them, in a battlefield setting. And we simply cannot do that, for example, on the streets of Europe. We are running certainly some very significant counter-terrorist operations in London, for example. But we are certainly eliminating a lot more terrorists on the battlefield in the cities of Iraq, and also in southern Afghanistan.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Christoff?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Flake, I don't think I can give you a direct answer, but I can offer you some data that might help you make some decisions.

We will have a classified report out next month that I think will help everyone. It tries to answer the question that I have always had: Who are we fighting?

And we will present to the members and to the committees classified information that will describe the different armed groups in Iraq, their levels of troops or the supporters that they have, and in effect, the different wars that we are fighting currently in Iraq. I think that would be very useful information for everyone to have. Once it is completed, I would be happy to come up here and give you a detailed classified briefing on that.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Katzman.

Mr. KATZMAN. I think the assessment of many Middle Eastern experts like myself would be, some al-Qaeda fighters have been attracted by the Iraq battlefield. Some, even now, there is some evidence, maybe leaving the battlefield to go elsewhere, to Europe, to their home countries, to continue their battles against their governments in the countries they come from. Egypt, for example, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, et cetera. So that there could be some of that. Others might go to Pakistan.

The Iraqi insurgents, the Sunni Iraqi insurgents I would say most Middle East experts, including myself, would say it is unlikely that they would try to come here to attack the United States. Their goal is to affect an Iraqi political outcome which, if they secure that, or they keep fighting for that goal, they would stay in Iraq.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Gardiner, Dr. Gardiner, the statement was also made, and I heard it made a little earlier, about we can't, this would be admitting defeat. It is the image thing. How much stock do you put in that? Is that reason enough alone to stay and keep doing what we are doing?

Mr. GARDINER. I think it is one very important part of the bigger jigsaw puzzle here. And I do believe that if the United States and the U.K. withdrew from Iraq next year, this would be seen across the Middle East, across the Islamic world, as a huge humiliation. And it would only embolden, I think, terrorist organizations, who will see us as weak. And they will be even more encouraged to take the war to us.

And I think that the kind of signal that we send in the global war on terror is extremely important here. And we have to impress upon our enemies that we are strong, that we have the stomach for the fight, that we are not going to be intimidated.

And if we withdraw from Iraq, we send a clear message of weakness that they will certainly exploit in the decades to come.

Mr. FLAKE. Five years from now, if there is no substantial change, if the government is still not formed, if we are looking at basically the same scenario, will the same argument hold? At what point does the argument change for you?

Mr. GARDINER. It is a very good question, actually. And without a doubt, we cannot stay indefinitely for decades in Iraq. We have to do our best to ensure in the coming years that we can make some real progress there. And I think it is all to play for the mo-

ment. Iraq could become successor in the long run. It could become an utter failure. But a lot depends, I think, upon our own willingness to ensure that we do everything that we can in order to make Iraq a successful state and a free society.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. And I am going to take an opportunity to ask some questions of my own at this point. And I believe Chairman Delahunt may have some additional when he returns.

I guess first, a comment with regard to your statements, Dr. Gardiner. You know, this committee has just had a series of hearings about America's image around the world. And I guess it seems when you look at that, when we are at historic lows in terms of the image of America around the world, if we are truly concerned about our image, I think that we really need to look at what we can learn from some of this polling and studies that have been done around the globe, in terms of how we can improve that. Because certainly, we are at a historic low point, based on what we have done up to today.

And I am going to, I see we have had another member join us. And before I go into my questions, I am going to ask if the gentlelady from Texas would like to question the witnesses.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you very much. I thought you were beginning a new set of questions here. And thank you for your indulgence. We have the Homeland Security Bill on the floor.

Let me just make some general statements about where we are. It is interesting that we would have this panel, because we are poised to be discussing the question of dealing with the continued funding of this effort in Iraq. And that debate will take place. Many of us have expressed a complete frustration with what is perceived not a failed action on the military, but a failed action on this mission.

And my question goes back to the declaration—excuse me, that is an incorrect term—the statutory authority which many of us are seeking to have expire. We believe that the authority has long since expired that the President is operating under. Many of us would like to see a debate on that question.

But this goes to how we started out. And I use as a backdrop the Persian Gulf War, which saw a huge, massive coalition of resources from around the world. Even when this effort started internationally, with no diminishing of those who stood up, they were diminished. Their resources were diminished. Any violent effort against one of their soldiers caused great uproar in their countries. They were pulling out. We probably have a longer list of those who pulled out than those who are still standing.

That doesn't bode well with respect to our resources, which anyone who has been to Iraq and Afghanistan, in this instance Iraq, knows that our soldiers are putting forth the greatest measure: Their life.

Why don't I just ask the question? What did we do wrong? I don't know if anyone has already testified to say that we have great support around the world, and we have great funding of the military effort. I know that NATO is not in Iraq; they are doing, holding

their own in Afghanistan, which is really the seat of where the war on terror initiated.

But if we look at the international family, what did we do, and where did we go wrong, with respect to the beginnings of this, if you will, debacle that started out with the misrepresentation of the intelligence, which caused so many in this country to believe that we simply had to give the authority to this President? Anyone wish to address that question?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we have made, I think, a lot of errors in judgment since the war began. I think it has been in terms of not fully recognizing the strength of the insurgency in late 2003. Clearly that was not an area that we had anticipated. In addition, for all practical purposes, we misdirected some of our dollars that have gone to reconstruction purposes.

When I have looked at the United States reconstruction effort in Iraq, in many respects it has been a Cadillac approach; trying to provide 21st century technology to a country that has had technology from the 1970s. And so there have been a lot of failed reconstruction projects because we tried to do too much.

So I think there have been a lot of errors along the way that have cost money and lives.

The extent to which the Baghdad Security Plan is going to address some of those problems I think is still unknown, particularly looking at some of the recent data that just came out on the attack levels, and the extent to which they have or have not gone down recently.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Katzman?

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you. In some of my work here at CRS I have tried to analyze, I think there was a misread of how the Sunni Arabs would perceive this intervention. There was a view that the Sunni Arabs were also oppressed by Saddam, and they would join with the Shi'a and the Kurds to create a new democracy.

I think that has been shown to be a flawed assumption. The Iraqis viewed it as basically a zero-sum game; the Sunnis did, anyway. In their view, the U.S. intervention resulted in the transfer of all power to the Shi'a Arabs, leaving them as a new underclass, so to speak.

And in my view, that is the source of their rebellion. And I would say my view is, we are not looking at just an insurgency by the Sunnis; we are looking at a Sunni rebellion. It is not just some gunmen. Because if it was just some gunmen, we would have been able to defeat them by now. It is a very broad rebellion in the Sunni community.

These gunmen, the Sunni gunmen, they have many places to go. If there is a troop surge in Baghdad, they can go to Anbar; they are going now to Diyala Province. They can go to the belts around Baghdad, which they are going to. Because the population that are Sunni in these areas support them. They will take them in, they will let them build car bombs in their garages, they will let them store weapons, they will feed them information.

So I think the mistake we sometimes make is to view this as a narrow insurgency by a few thousand gunmen. This, in my view, is a rebellion by the Sunni Arab community.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And if I may, and I know that, Dr. Gardiner, I am not ignoring you, but I know that you believe we should stay the course, and the 3,381 dead and no mission defined, I disagree.

And I think that you have hit the nail on the head in terms of drawing the coalition of the strong. We have used the “coalition of the willing;” I think we had the “coalition of the strong” in the Persian Gulf War. I was not here in Congress; people agreed, disagreed, but we went in with this coalition.

My concern is that you have hit the nail on the head, and that we also are raising the ire of Sunni governments, or Sunni-dominated governments, around this fueling crisis. And what we possibly could have done, even for those of us who were against it in the beginning, is to have understood the region better; to have developed coalitions with regional peer persons. So that when we did bring the Saddam Hussein Government down, Sunnis would not—because what we have represented to them is now we want a government where everybody is equal. They have a government where they are being dominated by a majority. And even in this country, where we might argue against the majority, we are supposed to give rights, arguably, to the minority. They have not done that.

And that peels away, I think, the strength of those who will be contributing to the military fight. Europe does not want to be in this kind of winner-take-all posture, and that is what we have here. And that is why we need to regroup, draw our troops out, let this resolution expire, so that we can truly have the reconstruction that I think would put a better face on America.

So I am frustrated, because they are not listening to you, Dr. Katzman. And I have not taken you to the next level; I didn’t ask you whether you agreed or disagreed with us being there. I have only said, “I think you have hit the nail on the head.”

I would like to be able to reconstruct Iraq. I would like to be able to have a democratic government. You cannot have it under your framework that has been so articulated here today.

And I hope that we can extract ourselves in this conflict, put a face of the region on it, begin to reconstruct. When I say in the conflict, I don’t mean that we have to totally leave the region, because a crisis may come where we are needed to intervene. We can be on the border, we can be in Kuwait. But we cannot continue to be there and think we will fix this problem.

Mr. Chairman—and I don’t know, Dr. Katzman, if you wanted to comment on that. I thank the chairman for his indulgence.

Mr. KATZMAN. Just briefly, I believe the explanation for the fact that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, have not acted on their pledges to the Iraqi, financial pledges to the Iraqi Government is indeed this reason. They feel that the Maliki Government is indeed very much supportive of Iran, influenced by Iran, and they want to see the reconciliation with the Sunni community before they would come forward with those funds.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We need to end it now so we can begin to build. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. I am going to go to the vice chairman next, but I would note—and you can confirm this for me, any one of you—that just recently, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia declined to meet with the Iraqi President. And pre-

sumably for the same rationale that you just articulated, Dr. Katzman. Am I correct in that statement? Could I hear a yes or no?

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the Saudi explanation, so to speak, was that it is deferred; that they will meet with him at some point. But I think everybody read it the way you explained it, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Am I inaccurate in making that statement, Dr. Gardiner?

Mr. GARDINER. Could you just repeat that?

Mr. DELAHUNT. You weren't paying attention. That was a test. I will save you from my own—

[Laughter.]

Mr. GARDINER. I missed that one, I am afraid.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. Let me go to the vice chair and express my gratitude to him for taking the gavel. While I was meeting, by the way, with an Iraqi member of Parliament, who just informed me that 144 members of their Parliament have signed a letter requesting a timeline for withdrawal. I want to say that publicly, so that the three of you can respond at any time to that particular action by the Iraqi Parliament, not the United States Congress.

Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I guess I want to start with Mr. Christoff. You testified we have provided foreign troops with a total of \$1.5 billion in coalition support funds, lift-and-sustain funds, or funds for equipment. And these have supported 20 coalition members, including Poland.

But I understand Poland's would have gone to support the 11 countries under its command. And there were a total of 33 countries. So does that mean we have paid some portion of expenses for 31 out of the 33 coalition partners?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then tell me how that math breaks down, then.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I am not certain I followed your math, but page 11 of my statement lists 11 countries that are part of the Polish command. Collectively, that command received support of about \$988 million.

Mr. CARNAHAN. But that is included or not included in the 20 coalition members that we are funding?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. We are talking about Poland, correct?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Correct.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. So let us go to page 11. On that page, you will see the countries that are part of the command that Poland is in. So you see those countries listed, those 11 countries.

At the bottom of page 11 are listed Poland plus 18 other countries that receive support from the coalition. In addition, Jordan—while not officially a member of the coalition—did receive \$300 million in support funds. So 19 plus one is 20.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Okay, that is helpful. Thank you for clearing that up.

Is there any indication of how many of these countries that received support would have participated had they not received these funds?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the premise of providing these funds to begin with was the countries indicated that they did not have the

financial resources to either get their troops to the theater, or sustain their troops once they were in theater.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And of these coalition members that have been listed, how many of these have been involved in actual combat?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Combat operations. It is hard to make clear distinctions in terms of the coalition members that are involved in combat. Clearly, the U.K., Poland to some degree, Australia to some degree. There are a lot of other smaller countries that have small contingents that have done things such a munitions removal, providing security. But the bulk of the combat operations in general I would say would be U.S. and U.K.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Okay. The other question I had with regard to resources, and going into this conflict. There was a lot of discussion about Iraqi oil.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And them having the third-largest reserves in the world, and that that was going to help fund costs and reconstruction. Where is that today?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. It hasn't funded reconstruction. Our economists have done quite a bit of work looking at the Iraqi budget—a \$35 billion budget. When you start removing the resources that Iraq has to use to pay for salaries, that some contend are salaries for a bloated bureaucracy; the rising costs of paying salaries for Iraqi security forces; continued subsidies; it doesn't leave much in terms of what the country can contribute for reconstruction. And that which they have set aside, they generally have not spent.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And what are the indications as to why the monies that are there have remained unspent?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Last year Iraq set aside about \$6.2 billion for what I would call capital projects, reconstruction projects. They spent about 20% of that. Some of the reasons that the senior advisors that I have spoken to have indicated are that they still have not put together good contracting and procurement procedures that would allow them to actually spend the money. They have a whole host of procedures from the former regime, from provisional governments, that complicate their efforts to contract out. Plus they spent our money first.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Surprise. I want to get Dr. Katzman to comment in particular about the Iraqi oil.

Mr. KATZMAN. Sir, my discussions indicate that the U.S. Government believes that much of the funds were unspent because the Maliki Government was hesitant to spend these funds in the Sunni areas of Iraq. The Sunnis believe that. Now, whether it is accurate or not, the Sunnis believe it, so there is a certain reality to it.

And this is why, as part of the President's Baghdad security plan, he demanded that Maliki Government set aside \$10.5 billion. And they have done so. They have budgeted, in the budget they passed 2 months ago, to spend that money, with the understanding that it will be spent in the Sunni areas, which are suffering.

Now, obviously security conditions may make it difficult to spend it there. But that is the understanding.

Now, the southern and the northern part of Iraq are being reconstructed in many ways with private investment funds—Iranian investment money, other investment money, the private sector—be-

cause those areas are safe, and there is a perception of profits to be had in those areas.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And in particular about the Iraqi oil. Again, great projections going in. You know, between the beginning of this conflict and today, what has happened?

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the Iraqis are, because oil prices are so high, even though they are not exporting, they are only exporting less than 2 million barrels a day, they used to export—they have only gotten as high as 2 million. Under Saddam they exported about 2.2 million. So even though they are under the export level that they want it to be, because oil prices are so high, they are earning actually more money than was anticipated. And they did generate the \$10.5 billion that is basically sitting in the development fund for Iraq, available to be spent for reconstruction. And they have agreed to spend it.

The problem is, for the reasons Mr. Christoff mentioned and I mentioned, it has not been spent yet.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Oil production exports are actually lower than 2 million. They are down to 1.6 million this month.

Mr. CARNAHAN. So the amount is down, but the projected—

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The price of oil has gone up.

Mr. CARNAHAN [continuing]. Dollar amount is where it was projected, just because of the rise in price.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. They are getting about \$60 a barrel for Basra light right now.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Next I would like to ask about, does GAO have any idea how many military contractors are in Iraq today?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No. And I wish DoD did, as well. And that is the bottom line of our report back in December 2006. We found that DoD does not have any centralized database by which it can know how many contractors are in Iraq. And that has, as we said, pretty important implications for force protection, as well as life support.

Now, I will say that we recommended that DoD do something about this. A couple months ago they told us that they were going to task this to the Army. Army has developed a database that they are trying to populate with the names of the contractors that they believe are supporting troops in Iraq. They are up to about 50,000 names, but we haven't really looked at the reliability of that data yet.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We have merely seen press reports that indicate between 50,000 and 126,000. Yet we think it is very important to get those figures.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I have heard those figures, too. But, quite frankly, no one really knows the total number.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Carnahan. That is absolutely stunning, that we don't know. I mean, this is a first-world country. I am not particularly computer literate myself, but I would hope that there are people in the government that could at least track those numbers, those contractors that are being paid by American tax dollars to perform a service.

It is beginning to sound like we have a private army over there. You know, if we are going to go into privatization of the United States military, I think it would have been, it should have

behooved us to have at least a discussion and a hearing on that. But I found that disturbing.

I thank the gentleman for bringing that out. And, Mr. Christoff, do we have an estimate of how much we are spending on this private army of contractors?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don't know.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Joe, if you don't know, then nobody knows. I mean, what a great comment on the conduct of this operation. I would hope, Dr. Gardiner, that the British are doing better in terms of tracking their expenditures and their investment in this war.

Mr. GARDINER. They probably are, actually. I am not sure the exact number of British private contractors, but I would imagine that the British Government would keep track of this sort of figure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. To go back to a point that Dr. Gardiner made. I think you said in your testimony that the British Government has committed to maintaining a presence or remaining in Iraq for 5 years. Is that accurate? Is my memory correct?

Mr. GARDINER. Well, this is what has been reported by the Daily Telegraph in London, based upon sources in the Ministry of Defense. I also checked with the Telegraph with regard to the sourcing for the story, because it is quite a claim. They stand by it. They believe the sources are highly reliable.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, this comes as a revelation. I would hope that in 5 years, the United States military is back here at home, and not in Iraq. And I daresay if our British allies are there, that would be a disappointment to some of us.

And I think it was you, Mr. Christoff, that indicated your understanding of the information that you have, is that the British have, are in the process of designing a plan through 2008.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Those are the South Koreans that are devising a plan to try to determine what their withdrawal plans would be in 2007. The Brits have announced, as Dr. Gardiner said, that they do intend to reduce from the 7,100 this year, but they at least will continue their commitment, my understanding is through 2008.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So there is a commitment through 2008. And yet Dr. Gardiner, through his sources at the *Telegraph*, has concluded that they will remain for 5 years.

Well, that is interesting information, Dr. Gardiner. You indicated earlier that, my ranking member indicated that he was pleased with the results in France. "Vive la France." He indicated earlier that he was pleased with the results, I believe, in Germany with the election of Angela Merkel.

But Dr. Gardiner, the truth is that an overwhelming number of British citizens do not approve of the United States' handling of Iraq. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. GARDINER. Oh, I think the latest polls do indicate that a majority of British people are not in favor of the Iraq War. I think that the British public is evenly divided over the issue of an immediate withdrawal of British forces.

At the time of the Iraq War in 2003, a majority of the British public supported the decision of the British Government to go to war. But we have seen a steady decline in British public support for the Iraq War, and also a rise in anti-United States sentiment

in opinion polls in the United Kingdom. I do show the concern of yourself and your colleagues with regard to the rise of anti-Americanism in Britain and in Europe I think is a huge issue. It should be a top-priority issue for the Bush administration to address. It has very important long-term implications for U.S. foreign policy and alliance building.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Gardiner. Just to refer to a poll that was taken by the BBC. And the question was posed to European citizens who strongly disapprove of the United States Government's handling of the Iraq issue. Great Britain was 57%, Germany 66%, Italy 63%, Portugal 61%, and France was 79%.

So the reality is, is that while these governments may or may not support our engagement, our involvement in Iraq, it is clear that there are growing majorities in these countries that do not support the American presence, and the corollary being the British presence, in Iraq.

And I daresay that despite my friend's enthusiasm for the new leadership in France, that I honestly doubt if we will see any contribution of either troops or francs or Euros to the effort, if you will.

You know, Chancellor Merkel has been very clear in terms of being unequivocal that the Germans will not participate in any way, shape, or form in Iraq.

So this is what I am talking about in terms of the coalition. In 1991 there was a totally different dynamic than exists today, and we find ourselves very much alone, with the obvious exception to date of the United Kingdom.

I am always interested in the conflation, if you will, between the war on terror and the war in Iraq. And I don't think that we have really achieved a clear understanding of that distinction. I don't think there is anyone in the British Parliament or the United States Congress—and Dr. Gardiner, you used the word defeat—I can assure you that there is no Member of the United States Congress that would not welcome the end of terrorism.

But we do make the distinction between Iraq and terrorism. There was an individual who testified here, oh, maybe 2 or 3 weeks ago, who has very passionate feelings regarding the rendition process. He and I disagreed. But he had this to say, and I am going to read some of his words to you, and hopefully elicit a response as to whether you are in agreement with Michael Scheuer, who was a Republican witness, and, as I said, proved to be somewhat, well, somewhat interesting in terms of his views on rendition.

But this is what he had to say:

“Without a doubt, in the war against al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein was one of our best allies. He was not going to permit Iraq to become a base, as it is today, for Sunni fundamentalists.”

I am not going to pick just on you, Dr. Gardiner, but let me see, or let me address this both to Dr. Katzman and Mr. Christoff, if you wish to respond, and to you, Dr. Gardiner. Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I believe that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both shared an intense hatred for the West. And I think the jury is still out with regard to whether or not there was coopera-

tion on the ground between the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda organization.

But what we do know is that both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden had and have an intense hatred for Western civilization. I think that it was certainly in our interest to remove Saddam Hussein from the picture. And the fact that we now see al-Qaeda terrorists in large numbers on the ground inside Iraq, finding common currency with Baathist loyalists, I think reinforces the fact that we are fighting a common enemy here.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Katzman?

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just simply quote George Tenet and others who have spoken in interviews and on the record since the invasion of Iraq, saying that the al-Qaeda-Saddam linkage is probably the weakest. And that is the argument that the CIA felt was the weakest. And Mr. Tenet talked about how he, I believe, toned down Secretary of State Powell's presentation at the United Nations on that point, and in other ways.

As I answered to Mr. Rohrabacher a while ago, there does appear to have been some flirtation in Sudan in the early nineties with chemical weapons and Iraqi intelligence linkages. There were some things going on which were found by CIA and the 9-11 Commission. But in terms of operational relationship, the idea that they were working together to a common goal, I think everybody who seriously studied this has said on record that that just wasn't going on.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, Michael Scheuer, for those that are unaware, was the Chief of the Osama bin Laden Unit in the CIA, confirms just what you said, Dr. Katzman. On "Hardball" back in November 2004 he was interviewed and said, "I happened to do the research on the links between al-Qaeda and Iraq, and came up with nothing."

In his book he had this to say:

"I was pleased because CIA's official position was reaffirmed in the analysis of Mr. Feith's unit was discredited. There was no information that remotely supported the analysis that claimed there was a strong working relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda."

Now, I understand the administration wanted that link, and was predisposed to find some evidence. But the professionals, those that were responsible for intelligence and whose views I want to emphasize are different than mine on a variety of issues, found nothing, as Michael Scheuer had to say.

In fact, in his book called *Imperial Hubris*, he has this to say about our policy. I guess we can call it the U.S.-U.K. policy:

"U.S. forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial, but incomplete, success since the early 1990s. As a result, I think it is fair to conclude that the United States of America remains Osama bin Laden's only indispensable ally."

So if you accept his analysis, Dr. Gardiner, our presence there is creating the conditions for more terrorism.

Well, in any event, I want to move on, if I can, because you have expressed concern about Iran. And that if we leave any time soon, there is going to be an upsurge in Iranian influence in Iraq. I note that you were present obviously when I read the quote of, I guess it was yesterday or the day before, by the President of the Autonomous Region in northern Iraq. And those words I would suggest are very warm toward Iran.

And my memory is—and any of you can help me—but recently—and I think it is important the American people understand that. That recently when there were five Iranian so-called diplomats that were arrested, what was the response of the Peshmerga, Dr. Gardiner? Are you familiar with that?

Mr. GARDINER. I am not aware of their response.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Katzman?

Mr. KATZMAN. There were two arrested in, first, in actually Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's compound. He is the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, which is actually the dominant party in the United Iraq Alliance umbrella. So they were at his compound, basically confirming or reaffirming the linkages between the Iranian kutz force of the posit Iran, the revolutionary guard, and the Supreme Council and its Batah Brigades militia.

The other five to which you are referring, Mr. Chairman, the U.S., I believe, arrested them and was taking them out of Irbil. And it didn't come to any clash, but the Kurds, I believe, at the airport in Irbil surrounded the U.S. forces. And there was a stand-off for a few minutes. And then the U.S. was indeed allowed to take them out of Irbil.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is my understanding of that incident. Again, I think it is important for us to be accurate in terms of what the current relationship is, without suggesting that by our withdrawal, we are going to enhance it. I just don't see that.

I mean, the reality is there have been a number of agreements reached between the Iranian Government and the Iraqi Government. Are you aware of those agreements, Mr. Christoff, Dr. Gardiner?

Mr. GARDINER. What I am aware of is the fact that the Iranians are playing an extremely disruptive role in Iraq. And that Iran is responsible for killing a considerable number of British soldiers in southern Iraq. And they have blood on their hands. That they are meddling in external affairs here, and they are playing a very dangerous game.

And I think that Iran is a deeply unhelpful player inside Iraq, funneling arms and funds to terrorist organizations there. And we will continue resisting Iranian interference.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, again, I am not obviously aware of the, you know, the intelligence. I don't dispute it. But I have had experience with intelligence that has been presented to this committee in the past regarding weapons of mass destruction, et cetera, et cetera, that has been proven to be seriously flawed.

Mr. Christoff, Dr. Katzman, are you aware of agreements that have been consummated between the Iraqi Government today and the Iranian regime? And if you do, can you give us just a few examples? Dr. Katzman?

Mr. KATZMAN. There have been a number of them. Some of them were signed when Ibrahim al Jaafari, the previous Prime Minister, was in power. There was a military cooperation agreement signed, although it is unclear exactly what the contents were.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can you please just say that again for my benefit? There was a military cooperation agreement signed.

Mr. KATZMAN. The early reports of that agreement was that it would provide for Iranian training of some Iraqi forces.

Now, the Iraqis denied that that was a part of the agreement, and it appears that, due to whatever, whether it is us or whatever, the Iraqis appear to have backed off that part of the agreement. And the way it has evolved is cooperation on intelligence sharing and border security across the common border, to prevent arms and other things from coming into Iraq, or out of Iraq into Iran. Although obviously if that is the intent of the agreement it has been unsuccessful, because we continue to hear, and even today, U.S. military briefings about EFP, explosively forced projectile, shipments from Iran into Iraq.

Some other agreements include the \$1 billion line of credit, water, electricity, over-the-border sharing, oil swaps, energy swaps, Iranian assistance to construct the Najaf Airport and revive some of the roads. And some of these agreements extend up into the Kurdish north. The Iranians have agreed to do some road improvements up in the north, electricity programs, et cetera. So it is a broad package.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Gardiner, if you were in a position, would you null and void these particular agreements?

Mr. GARDINER. I can't comment on the specific agreement, but I would emphasize once again that Iran plays an extremely unhelpful role in Iraq, particularly in relation to continuing attacks on especially British forces in southern Iraq. And the Iranians are interfering here in an area where they have no business interfering, frankly. This is not their territory.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is Iraqi territory.

Mr. GARDINER. This is Iraqi territory. They recently seized 15 British Navy personnel inside Iraqi sovereign territory. They are acting in an increasingly aggressive fashion, and we have to send a clear message to Tehran that this simply will not be tolerated, and there are consequences for this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I hear the message you want to send from the United Kingdom, and what about the message coming from Iraq? I would direct your attention to my left, if you can identify those two individuals.

Mr. GARDINER. Yes, I think we are familiar with both of those. I must say that is a very disappointing photograph.

Mr. DELAHUNT. For the record, could you identify the gentleman to the left?

Mr. GARDINER. Yes. We are looking at the Iraqi leader, and we are looking at the Iranian leader here.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The Iraqi leader's name, of course?

Mr. GARDINER. Mr. Maliki. And we are looking also at Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. I think that this is a very, very unfortunate photograph. No doubt for pragmatic reasons the Iraqi Government sees the need to enter into some sort of negotiation with the Iranians.

I certainly don't share that. I don't think the U.S. Government shares that position.

And I think that once again, Iran's role in Iraq is disruptive and unhelpful. I don't think the Iraqi Government frankly should be projecting this sort of image to the world.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, would you, therefore—Mr. Katzman?

Mr. KATZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just simply want, I just wanted to say we should not be surprised at that photograph. Let me just take a couple of minutes to—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure.

Mr. KATZMAN. The ideology that produced the Islamic revolution in Iran was forged actually in Najaf in the fifties and sixties.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Najaf, of course, is in Iraq.

Mr. KATZMAN. Iraq. By Moqtada Al-Sadr's great-uncle, Mohammed Bakr Sadr, and his associate, Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah had kicked out Khomeini in 1963, and he went to Najaf. And they forged this ideology of the Islamic revolution.

Mohammed Bakr Sadr was the founder of the Dawa Party. Maliki is the number-two leader of the Dawa Party. So the linkages between Iran and Maliki and the UIA bloc in Parliament are organic, and they are longstanding.

Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess what I am trying to suggest is that it is very important that we all educate ourselves, and educate the people whom we represent about the realities on the ground. One can string platitudes together and talk about defeat, talk about escalation, can use those terms.

I guess I should ask Mr. Gardiner, should we get rid of Maliki, like in the good, old colonial days?

Mr. GARDINER. I don't think we have that power. This is a democratically-elected government. We may not like some of the foreign policy arrangements of this government. This is a sovereign government. We simply can't just remove the Iraqi leadership because we disapprove of handshakes with Iranians.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And disapprove of bilateral military cooperation agreements between Iraq and Iran.

Mr. GARDINER. I don't think we should overplay hugely the significance of that bilateral agreement.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, if we don't overplay it, at least we should be aware of it, I would suggest.

There are votes coming. I want to thank all of you for illuminating us, informing us. And it has been an interesting afternoon. And thank you all for your contribution.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

