

GLOBAL POLLING DATA ON OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICIES, VALUES AND PEOPLE

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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GLOBAL POLLING DATA ON OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICIES, VALUES AND PEOPLE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D. Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The subcommittee will come to order, and let me apologize to our witness for our tardiness. However, there were some unanticipated votes that were held, and my hope is that we have concluded unanticipated votes for another hour or 2, and we can now proceed.

It was just about 2 years ago that the Government Accountability Office noted that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening around the world. What was particularly disturbing about this GAO report was that it acknowledged that anti-Americanism has significant costs associated with it, such as an increase in foreign public support for terrorism directed against the United States.

This was the GAO's conclusion. In addition, it could impact the effectiveness and cost of our military operations. Furthermore, it could weaken the United States' ability to align with other nations in pursuit of common policy objectives, wherever they may be.

And it could also put at risk foreign public's enthusiasm for American business services and products. Now there have been multiple polls taken that seem to confirm that America's image is suffering, and that this decline has the potential to harm our national interests.

These surveys have been conducted in different countries, in different regions of the world, and at different times, and there seems to be a consistency. Has there been an improvement since the GAO report was issued in April 2005, or as a recent headline proclaimed has America's image gone from bad to worse.

We have had several hearings on this particular issue, and we will continue to have hearings to review the work product of highly respected professional pollsters and organizations that are responsible for gathering empirical data pursuant to commissions by executive agencies of our Government, and by nonprofit groups that are interested in the implications of this anti-American sentiment.

Our purpose is to establish an empirical record to stimulate a discussion, to identify problems, to attempt to analyze those causes provoking this anti-American sentiment, and craft solutions.

The consequences in this area can be clearly so profound that it is important to try to establish a baseline of how our policies are working, in terms of global perception, a reality check if you will, predicated on data and facts, and not just simply on opinions or antidotal accounts.

There are plenty of opinions in this institution. We do not have a polity of opinions, but all too often we have a dearth if you will of data and evidence based on some methodology that can assure us that our opinions merit attention, and attract the legitimacy that American policy makers are to give to the facts and to the reality.

And today we are particularly fortunate to have with us Andrew Kohut, one of America's premier pollsters, who has done extensive work in this area. He is the president of the Pew Research Center in Washington, DC.

He also acts as director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, formerly the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, and the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Mr. Kohut was president of the Gallup Organization from 1979 to 1989. In 1989, he founded Princeton Surveys Research Associates, an attitude and opinion research firm, specializing in media politics and public policy studies.

He served as founding director of surveys for the Times Mirror Center in 1990 and 1992, and was named its director in 1993. Mr. Kohut is president of the American Association of Public Opinion Research from 1994 to 1995, and he was president of the National Council on Public Polls from the period of 2000 to 2001.

He has an incredible resume, and I could go on and on, but needless to say, we are very grateful to have him here today to give us the results of his work. And before asking him to testify, let me turn to my friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to note that as we went through our last hearing, which concerned public opinion in different parts of the world on the United States, and specifically about President Bush, the last briefing we had dealt with Latin America, and their attitudes toward us.

And what do you know? Since the briefing, we seem to have events that seem to verify some of the findings of that polling. So I won't compliment you on being one step ahead of everyone, but the fact is that it was very fascinating to go through the statistics of countries in Latin America, and then to note as President Bush made his way through Latin America, the type of reception that he was receiving.

And I will pay just as much attention to the witness today, and I am looking forward to hearing his observations of public opinion, and how people think about us, and I am sure that it will be just as valuable as what we heard during the last hearing. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I would just acknowledge the arrival and the presence of the gentleman

from Missouri, the vice chair of this subcommittee, Mr. Carnahan. Mr. Kohut, would you proceed.

**STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW KOHUT, PRESIDENT, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER**

Mr. KOHUT. Thank you. I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak to the committee to help you better understand the image of the United States all around the world. I am not here to give you my opinions, or tell you how to fix the image of the United States around the world, but to give you as much information as I can about the problem.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project is the largest ever series of multinational surveys that tracks attitudes toward world issues. We began in June 2001 when we were given a grant to study globalization and democratization.

Well, September 11 happened and the focus of the polling changed. We did in fact cover democratization and globalization, but the image of America, the issues that came about as a consequence of those attacks, the war on terrorism became the principal subject of what we have been doing.

I am here to tell you what we have learned about the image of the United States, however, and in the course of doing these surveys we have conducted a 110,000 in-depth interviews in 50 countries. So there is a good deal of information and I just need a few minutes to try to summarize really a body of knowledge.

I think it is fair to say that over the course of these years that we have become the first and probably the foremost chronicler of a very sad story, and that is the decline of the image of the United States all around the world.

And I can give you the empirical record that you have spoke of in the broadest of terms just by reading the headlines of our poll. The first poll was released in December 2002, and our headline was that the image of the United States was slipping all around the world, but a reserve of good will toward the United States existed.

We had 43 countries, in 29 of which we had a track record. We had trend information. And in 29 of those, 23 showed a statistically lower rating for the U.S., but still on balance the U.S. image was pretty good. But this was only 1 year after the September 11 attacks, just barely a year in fact.

We went back in May 2003 and the headline of the report was quite different. It was that the image of the United States had plummeted all around the world. The poll was obviously conducted after the war in Iraq, and the numbers went down.

And we can talk a little bit more about numbers specifically. In March 2004, it was the third wave of our survey and we were expecting better things. The situation in Iraq was going well. The insurgency really had not taken hold. We did not have Abu Ghraib for the world to hear about.

Yet, the ratings were even lower in March 2004 in many of the countries or in most of the countries in which we did our polling. In 2005, the surveys found some improvement in the image of the United States, but by and large the word that we mostly used in describing anti-Americanism was entrenched, because it seemed to

us then and now that the issue of anti-Americanism, or anti-Americanism as a phenomenon, is an entrenched phenomenon.

In the poll that we did in 2006, we in fact saw some backsliding, even as the publics of the United States, and other publics all around the world, especially among allies, agreed on problems such as Iran, and the victory of Hamas in Palestine.

There is a lot of agreement about issues, but the image of the United States was still very low, and the subhead of our poll was that the war in Iraq was continuing to drag down the image of the United States.

In fact, in all of the countries in which we have done polls, almost all of them at least, the publics of these countries do not think the world has been made safer by the removal of Saddam Hussein by force. In fact, they say the world has become a more dangerous place.

The United States is the exception to that or at least was in June or May 2006. The impact of the war has not changed now in almost 4 years. We are about to do another range of polls in 45 countries, and I suspect that it will continue to be unchanged.

Let me just give you some sense of the magnitude of what I am talking about. I will use just a few numbers. In Germany in 2000, 78 percent held a positive view of the United States. We saw this slipping in 2002 to 61 percent. It is still pretty good. Today, it rests at 37 percent. In France, the situation is very similar. In Spain, it is much worse. Only 23 percent of the Spanish have a favorable view of the United States.

And in Turkey, and in much of the Muslim world, it is even worse. In Turkey, our NATO ally, only 12 percent of the Turks that we questioned had a good view of the United States. That was 52 percent or the mid-50s back in 2000.

What I would like to do rather than focusing just on the raw numbers, and you have probably seen a lot of these numbers, is try to give you what we have learned about anti-Americanism over the years. Here is what we know.

First of all, this is a worldwide phenomenon. It is not just a rift with our allies, or dislike of the United States in the Muslim world. It is found in Latin America. It is found in Asia, and to a certain extent even in Africa.

Obviously it is worst among Muslims, and after the war in Iraq, anti-Americanism became a global Muslim phenomenon. Prior to the war in Iraq, we saw a negative attitude toward the United States in the Middle East, but after the war in Iraq, we saw in Indonesia that the favorability rating was 61 percent in 2002, and it fell to 15 percent in 8 months.

Among Muslims in Nigeria, it went from 71 percent to 38 percent, and it has gone further in more recent polling. After the war in Iraq, Muslims saw the United States not only with loathing, but with fear and loathing. Most Muslim publics have told us that they think the United States represents a military threat to their country, and even in a NATO country such as Turkey, a majority of people hold this view.

So it is bad in the Muslim world. The second quality of this anti-Americanism, which distinguishes it from past rounds of anti-Americanism, is that it is intense. The eye opener for me didn't

come from my polling. It came from Gallup polling in 2003 when the EU did a 15-nation survey of their members.

Fifty-three percent of the people in that survey said that the United States represented a threat to world peace. That was the same percentage that associated that with North Korea and Iran. Unbelievable that Western Europeans would look at the United States, Iran, and North Korea in the same way. The depth of attitudes is really striking.

A fourth element of this round of anti-Americanism or the phenomenon that we are studying is that it is not just the country. It is also the people. The image of the American people is lower than it once was around the world.

Past bouts of discontent with our policies have not led to disliking the American people or less favorable views of the United States. In our 2005 poll, we found that in 9 of 14 countries where we had a trend, the image of the people had slipped.

We have done a fair amount of in-depth polling about the image of Americans. We are seen in a positive way as innovative and hardworking. On the negative side, we are seen as violent, greedy, rude, and immoral by large percentages of the publics of the world.

I would note that many Americans also characterize the American public as greedy and violent, but the biggest disconnect has to do with religion. Americans think we are not religious enough. Europeans by and large say America is too religious, and that has some implications for the image of the United States.

In the Muslim world, one of the rare convergences between American opinion and Muslim opinion is that they, too, think that we are not religious enough. Let me consider causes of what we find for anti-Americanism. We have to take two cuts at this.

First, in the Muslim world, the perception of the way that the United States handles the Israeli-Palestinian situation is an 800-pound guerilla. In every country in the Middle East or in the Muslim world, that is seen as unfair. Even in Kuwait where we are very well regarded, Americans are criticized for that.

The second thing is that the war on terrorism is not seen as a legitimate war on terrorism. It is seen as America picking on Muslim countries, and having other motives, which we can discuss.

Iraq has worsened all of this, and the anger is pervasive. Very small percentages of Jordanians and Pakistanis, and I have told you about Turks, have a positive view of us.

Therefore, we see support for Osama bin Laden. Not majorities of people, but significant minorities of people saying that they have a positive view of Osama bin Laden; a fair amount of support for suicide bombing aimed against Americans and allies in Iraq, and even significant support, general support, for suicide bombing that targets civilians.

One of the pieces of good news in this polling is that we have seen some support for terrorism go down over the course of the years that we have done this polling, but not with respect to Americans in Iraq.

Looking at the causes of anti-Americanism more broadly, there are three that stand out with respect to policies. Number one, the one that is most important and that correlates the greatest is a sense that the United States acts unilaterally, and does not take

into account the opinions of other countries and the views of other countries in making its policies.

This was there in 2002 and it really crystallized after the war in Iraq. Secondly, the United States does too little to deal with global problems. The American public disagrees with that.

The third factor. U.S. policies added to the gap between the rich people and the poor people, and there we see in fact some agreement with the American public. Beyond these policies, I think it is also implicit in these polls, and there are clear findings that we can point to, that the issues are not only our policies, but also views about our power, which may have been exacerbated by opinions about our policies.

There is real discomfort with American unilateral power. I got the first sense of this in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. We did a survey of 250 opinion leaders around the world, and we asked them what they thought the publics would think about the United States.

We are trying to come up with ideas for questions, and the answers came back. Our publics are sympathetic about the losses that your people have received, but as prevalent as the sympathy was the view that it is a good thing that the Americans know what it is like to be vulnerable.

And this was the tip-off to me that it was not only policies, but also power, and we have seen suspicion of that power with regard to our motives, and to reduce it in a simple way, many of our critics overseas think that we want to rule the world.

We want to control the world, and control oil, but basically have our own way with the world, and that has to do with power, perhaps related to policies. Other factors in Europe. With the Europeans, we have very different attitudes toward the use of force.

There has been consistently more American support for the use of force to deal with international problems than is the case in Europe, and that represents a real divide between America and America's traditional allies.

A third factor is globalization. People all around the world like our products. They like our technology. But they say there is too much America in their countries, and this anti-globalization is conflated with anti-Americanism.

Much has been made about the values gap and I won't go into it in any great detail. There is a values gap. I wrote a book about it. Americans have different values than people in other countries, especially people in other developed countries.

These gaps have been around for a long time. I did a series of surveys in 1991 that parallels the one that we did in 2002. The gaps then were the same as they are now. The problems that we have are not specifically a consequence of differences between values of Americans and values of our allies.

The value differences add something to the mix. When President Bush talked about the axis of evil, secular Europeans really took exception to that. They took exception to the policies generally, but the notion of America being too religious and having religious zealotry is also an issue. So the value gaps don't create the problems, but they exacerbate them.

Looking forward, there are few signs that the Europeans want the kind of relationship that they once had with us. We have box car majorities of the European public saying they want a separate and independent foreign security policy.

All of this may sound pretty bleak. We have seen over the course of these 4 or 5 years some good signs. We saw the world respond positively in Indonesia and particularly to our aid to tsunami victims.

The Indonesian numbers went from 15 percent, where they had fallen, back up to 38 percent. They have come back a little bit since. We have even seen a modest improvement in Pakistan last year, and a recognition among the Pakistani public that we were helping in response to the earthquake.

But I guess the message there is some American policies can make a difference. A dent, but at least a dent, if not a transformation. I would just conclude by saying that these surveys have brought home to me the task that America faces in restoring the image of the United States.

The challenge is to reverse the impact of images of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and regain the public's trust. I can think about young people, who have more negative views of the United States than older people; their views of the United States are being shaped by these images, as our impressions were shaped, or the impressions of our generation were shaped, by what the United States did in the 20th century in dealing with the Fascists and the Communists. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohut follows:]

Testimony of Andrew Kohut
President, Pew Research Center
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
March 14, 2007

I am delighted to have this opportunity to help this committee better understand how the United States is perceived throughout the world. I am not here to make recommendations about how to solve America's image problem, but to provide you with as much information as I can about the nature of that problem.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project is the largest ever series of multinational surveys focusing on worldwide issues. The project began in June 2001 with a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct an international survey on globalization and democratization. However, following the tragic events of September 11th, much of our focus shifted – we became primarily concerned with how America is perceived abroad and with global attitudes toward the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

I am here to tell you what we have learned over these years about international opinion of the U.S., including views of its policies, values, and people. Since our first poll in June 2002, we have interviewed in depth about 110,000 people in 50 countries. I believe it is fair to say we have been the first and foremost chronicler of the rise of anti-Americanism in the 21st century. Indeed, the headlines of our annual reports on America's image tell the story:

- December 2002 – America's image slips, although goodwill towards the U.S. remains
- June 2003 – U.S. image plunges in the wake of the Iraq war
- March 2004 – No improvement in U.S. image, some worsening in Europe
- June 2005 – U.S. image improves slightly, although still negative in most places; and anti-Americanism is becoming increasingly entrenched
- June 2006 – Show little further progress – in fact some back sliding. Even as the publics of the world concurred with the Americans on many global problems.

This survey highlighted the extent to which the Iraq war is a drag on perceptions of the U.S., even among publics of our oldest allies who largely agree with the U.S. on any number of threats to global stability including Iran and North Korea.

To give you some sense of the magnitude of the problem, favorable attitudes toward the U.S. declined in Germany, from 78% in 2000 to 37% currently. The numbers are similar in France, but even worse in Spain, where only 23% have a favorable view, and in Turkey, where it is 12%. Most people in these countries held positive views of the U.S. at the start of the decade.

Features of Current Anti-Americanism

Beyond the bottom line percentages I would like to describe to you what we have learned about nature of the anti-Americanism we see today.


First, it is worldwide. This is not just a rift with our European allies or hatred of America in the Middle East. It is a global slide, and positive views of the U.S. have declined in other regions of the world, particularly in Latin America and Asia. Our 44-country 2002 poll found America's image slipping in seven of the eight Latin American countries surveyed, while our 2006 survey revealed declines in Japan and India, two still relatively pro-American Asian powers. Other polls international polls, such as BBC and Gallup have confirmed the continuing world-wide nature of America's image problem.

	1999/ 2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Great Britain	83	75	70	58	55	56
France	62	63	43	37	43	39
Germany	78	61	45	38	41	37
Spain	50	--	38	--	41	23
Russia	37	61	36	47	52	43
Indonesia	75	61	15	--	38	30
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	30
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23	27
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21	15
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23	12
Nigeria	46	--	61	--	--	62
Japan	77	72	--	--	--	63
India	--	54	--	--	71	56
China	--	--	--	--	42	47

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State

Second, while anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon, it is clearly strongest in the Muslim world. For instance, in all five predominantly Muslim countries included in our 2006 study, fewer than one-third of those surveyed had a favorable view of the U.S. Moreover, with the Iraq war, anti-Americanism spread to parts of the Muslim world where the U.S. had previously been relatively popular. In Indonesia, for example, between 2002 and 2003 America's favorability rating dropped from 61% to only 15%. In Turkey it plunged from 52% in the late 1990s to 15% by 2003.

After Iraq, many in Muslim countries began to see the U.S. as a threat to Islam, and what had perhaps been loathing for the U.S. turned into both fear and loathing. A 2005 Pew study found that in all five majority Muslim countries surveyed, solid majorities said they worried that the U.S. might become a



military threat to their country. This includes 65% in Turkey – a longstanding NATO ally.

Third, among many people, anti-Americanism is an intensely held opinion, which makes it difficult to change. The first eye opener for me was a 2003 European Union poll that 53% of people in EU countries saw the U.S. as a threat to world peace. Strikingly, Europeans were as likely to say this about the U.S. as they were to say it about Iran and North Korea.

The 2006 Pew survey had similar findings. The British, French, and Spanish publics were all more likely to say the U.S. presence in Iraq poses a great danger to regional stability and world peace than to say this about the current governments of Iran or North Korea.

% saying 'great danger'	US in		North	Israeli-Palestinian
	Iran	Iraq	Korea	conflict
U.S.	46	31	34	43
Great Britain	34	41	19	45
France	31	36	16	35
Germany	51	40	23	51
Spain	38	56	21	52
Russia	20	45	10	41
Indonesia	7	31	4	33
Egypt	14	56	14	68
Jordan	19	56	18	67
Turkey	16	60	6	42
Pakistan	4	28	8	22
Nigeria	15	25	11	27
Japan	29	29	46	40
India	8	15	6	13
China	22	31	11	27


A fourth feature of contemporary anti-Americanism is that it is no longer just the U.S. as a country that is perceived negatively, but increasingly the American people as well, a sign that anti-American opinions are deepening and becoming more entrenched. In countries such as Spain, Jordan, Indonesia, and Turkey, favorable views of Americans have declined significantly in recent years.

In 2005, we asked people around the world about the kinds of characteristics they associate with the American people, and we found a somewhat mixed picture. On the positive side, we are widely seen as hardworking and inventive. On the negative side, in most of the countries surveyed, fewer than half said Americans are honest, while majorities said we are greedy and violent. Significant numbers also considered Americans rude and immoral.

	% very/somewhat favorable				
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Great Britain	83	80	73	70	69
France	71	58	53	64	65
Germany	70	67	68	65	66
Spain	--	47	--	55	37
Russia	67	65	64	61	57
Jordan	53	18	21	34	38
Indonesia	65	56	--	46	36
Egypt	--	--	--	--	36
Pakistan	17	38	25	22	27
Turkey	31	32	32	23	17
Nigeria	--	67	--	--	56
Japan	73	--	--	--	82
India	58	--	--	71	67
China	--	--	--	43	49

One note about American greediness and our own self-image while publics in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere characterize Americans as greedy, we Americans are actually more likely than any other public to say we are greedy and many Americans think the description immoral fits too.

However, the biggest gap between American self-perceptions and how others perceive us is with regard to religiosity. In much of western Europe, the U.S. as a country is considered too religious – our 2005 poll found that majorities in France and the Netherlands and pluralities in Britain and Germany see the U.S. this way. By contrast, a 58% majority of Americans say their country is not religious enough. On this point, Muslims find themselves in rare agreement with the American public; majorities in Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan all believe the U.S. is not religious enough.



Causes of Anti-Americanism

There are a number of factors driving anti-Americanism around the world. Among Muslims, first and foremost is thinking that American policy is too supportive of Israel at the expense of Palestine. Even in Kuwait – an Arab and Muslim country that is relatively pro-American – 77% in a May 2003 poll said the U.S. favors Israel too much.


The U.S.-led war on terrorism is also perceived quite negatively throughout much of the Muslim world. Our recent polling has found declining support for America's anti-terrorism efforts in many parts of the globe, but the war on terror has always been largely unpopular in Muslim countries, where it is seen as an American campaign specifically against unfriendly Muslim governments. For instance, a May 2004 Pew survey showed that 53% of Jordanians and 51% of Pakistanis believe the real purpose of the war

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
	%	%	%	%	%
Britain	69	63	63	51	49
France	75	80	50	51	43
Germany	70	80	55	50	47
Spain	--	63	--	26	19
Russia	73	51	73	55	52
Jordan	13	2	12	12	16
Indonesia	31	23	--	50	39
Egypt	--	--	--	--	10
Pakistan	20	16	16	22	30
Turkey	30	22	37	17	14
Nigeria	--	60	--	--	49
Japan	61	--	--	--	26
India	65	--	--	52	65
China	--	--	--	--	19

on terror is to target unfriendly Muslims governments and groups.

And of course, widespread opposition to the war in Iraq has intensified anti-American sentiments among Muslim publics. Our 2006 poll showed that majorities in Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan believe the war has made the world a more dangerous place.

All of this has created a situation in which anger at the U.S. is pervasive throughout much of the Muslim world. Overwhelming majorities in countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey continue to dislike the United States. And dishearteningly, America's most visible enemy, Osama bin Laden, is viewed favorably by a significant number of people in many places, including nations such as Pakistan and Jordan that are key partners in America's efforts to combat al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups – the 2006 Pew poll indicated that 38% of Pakistanis and 24% of Jordanians have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs.




The 2005 Pew poll found that many in Muslim countries believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Just over half of Moroccans (56%) and 49% of Jordanians think such attacks are justifiable. Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is unpopular and support for terrorism is generally low, about one-in-four say suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners in Iraq can be justified.

But, as we have documented, anti-Americanism is the case in much of the world, not just Muslim countries, and certain aspects of American power and American policy are central to this. First, there is a general perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally in the international arena, failing to take into account the interests of other countries when it makes foreign policy decisions. Our polling since 2001 has shown a growing perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally, and the war in Iraq has crystallized that opinion. In 2005, only 18% of the French, 19% of the Spanish, and 21% of Russians said that the U.S. takes into account the interests of countries like theirs when making policy.

In many countries there is a consensus that the United States is doing too little to help solve the world's problems. Americans however, disagree; in fact a plurality thinks we are doing too much. America's image also suffers from the perception that U.S. policies contribute to the gap between rich and poor countries. In 2002, majorities or pluralities in 38 of 43 countries, including a plurality of Americans, said U.S. policies add to the rich-poor divide.

When we ask people who have an unfavorable view of the U.S. whether this is mostly because of President Bush or a more general problem with America, in most countries they have tended to say it is President Bush but less so since his re-election, according to our 2005 poll. Clearly, President Bush and his administration's policies have been lightning rods for U.S. criticism. At the same time, however, it is clear that this problem seems bigger than the feelings people may have about President Bush and his administration. Underlying much of the anti-Americanism we are witnessing is a broad discomfort with unrivaled American power.

Many people are resentful of American power. This came home to us well before the U.S. image plummeted in response to the war in Iraq. Shortly after the September 11th attacks we interviewed elites in 24 countries, and overwhelmingly they told us that many or most of the people in their countries were sympathetic to us over our losses, but as many said their publics "think it is good that Americans now know what it is like to be vulnerable."



People are also suspicious of American power. In a 2004 Pew poll, majorities or pluralities in seven of the nine countries surveyed said the U.S.-led war on terrorism was not really a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. This was true not only in Muslim countries such as Morocco and Turkey, but in France and Germany as well. The true purpose of

the war on terrorism, according to these skeptics, is American control of Middle East oil and U.S. domination of the world.

There are other factors that contribute to the rise of anti-Americanism. Looking at the divide between Europe and the U.S., it is particularly stark on questions about using military force, especially preemptive force. While Americans generally prefer containment to preemption, they nonetheless are much more willing to accept preemption than are Europeans. And our 2004 poll found sharp differences over the importance of multilateral approaches to the use of force while majorities in Britain, France, and Germany think that when countries are faced with an international threat they should first get UN approval before using military force, a plurality of Americans disagree. Overall, Americans are more likely than Europeans to regard military action as a legitimate means of achieving international justice.

Our polling also indicates that in much of the world there is a rejection of "Americanization" the wide diffusion of American ideas and customs fueled by globalization. On the one hand we find admiration for our science and technology and eager consumers of our popular culture, but on the other global complaints about Americanization. In 2002, majorities or pluralities in 35 of 42 nations said the spread of American ideas and customs to their countries was a bad thing. As we repeat these questions in coming months, I have little doubt that we will find a similar love-hate view of American exports.

In seeking to understand anti-Americanism, many commentators have emphasized differences between the U.S. and other countries over basic values, particularly the "values gap" between the U.S. and Europe. And it is true that Americans are different. We are more individualistic and we feel a stronger sense of personal empowerment than people in most countries. We are more likely to resist government efforts to restrict personal freedom. Consistent with our history as an immigrant nation, we have more positive attitudes about immigration than do citizens in much of the developed world. And our religiosity sets us apart the U.S. is by far the most religious rich country in the world.

At the same time, compared to Europeans, we are more suspicious of the power of government, more nationalistic, much less supportive of a social safety net and less willing to sacrifice to improve the environment.

However, the values gap is no greater now than it was in the early 1990s when the U.S. was broadly popular. And while global publics acknowledge value differences with Americans, Europeans say their real problem with the U.S. is policy, not conflicting philosophical or ideological beliefs about politics and society.

I believe the true significance of the values gap is that it exacerbates policy differences. For instance, European reactions to President Bush's "Axis of Evil" State of the Union speech in 2002 revealed serious foreign policy differences with the United States – differences that were intensified by a general unease among secular Europeans with the speech's rhetorical mixture of political and religious themes.

With regard to Europe, there are few signs that Europeans want the kind of close relationship they once had with the U.S. Our 2005 survey found that the Spanish, British, Dutch, Germans, and French all wanted Europe to take a more independent approach from the U.S. on security and diplomatic affairs. And while the 2006 poll found strong agreement between Americans and Europeans about common threats such as Iran and Hamas, these shared concerns are not translating into greater trust in America among Europeans. Strikingly, China now has a better image than the U.S. in most of the European nations we surveyed last year.

	% Western Europe should be more independent				
	April 2002	March 2003	May 2003	March 2004	May 2005
	%	%	%	%	%
France	60	67	76	75	73
Germany	51	52	57	63	59
Britain	47	48	45	56	53
Spain	--	60	62	--	50

Conclusion: A Difficult Global Environment, But Some Hopeful Signs

Our surveys have brought home to Americans and their leaders the challenges the United States faces in restoring our country's image and its influence overseas. The U.S. continues to meet with widespread antipathy in many parts of the world, and in particular it faces strong and growing opposition to key aspects of its foreign policy. Nonetheless, our polling has also uncovered some hopeful signs, even in Muslim countries where the U.S. faces some of its most daunting challenges.


One frequently cited example of the U.S. turning around its image in a difficult environment is Indonesia, where U.S. humanitarian assistance following the horrific December 2004 tsunami helped improve America's image in the world's largest Muslim country. Prior to the tsunami, favorable attitudes toward the U.S. had plummeted in reaction to the Iraq war, however after the tragedy and the influx of American aid favorable views of the U.S. more

Feelings toward the US	U.S. tsunami relief effort	
	More favorable	Less favorable
	%	%
Canada	69	17
Great Britain	44	24
France	51	33
Germany	66	23
Spain	46	23
Netherlands	62	23
Russia	61	6
Poland	43	8
Turkey	34	24
Pakistan	26	21
Indonesia	79	14
India	54	27

than doubled, jumping from 15% to 38%. Recently, we have seen a similar, although more limited, pattern in Pakistan where American aid following the October 2005 earthquake helped drive favorable opinions of the U.S. up slightly, from 23% in 2005 to 27% in 2006.

Of course, the impact of this humanitarian assistance should not be overstated – most of the same misgivings about America seen throughout the Muslim world can be found in Indonesia and Pakistan, and solid majorities in both countries continue to have a negative impression of the U.S. Nonetheless, these examples suggest that American policies can make a difference. Indeed, given the magnitude of negative attitudes towards the U.S. in the Muslim world and elsewhere, America’s image will only improve significantly if there are more positive international reactions to major American policies.

The real issue is the restoration of trust. The challenge is how to reverse the impact of images of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo that now shape the views of young people all around the world, as favorable depictions of America as defender of freedom in the 20th century did then.



Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Kohut. Before I go Mr. Rohrabacher, I just wanted to make a comment that I am astounded by some of your testimony. For me to comprehend that a NATO ally, Turkey, that there is a majority of opinion in that country that reflects a concern about the United States intervening militarily in that particular nation, is just inexplicable.

And I don't know how we go about addressing it, but it is with profound unease with which I hear that testimony. And your other observation regarding the transformation of animus, the negative image about the government to the American people, that evolution if you will is also something of grave consequence.

And your conclusion about attitudes being formed worldwide among younger generations, generations that will assume leadership positions worldwide, is particularly disturbing because it doesn't auger well for the United States and its role in the international community, particularly in a global economy, and in a world that is constantly in flux, with spikes of great volatility.

I will have some questions, but I just wanted to throw those observations out for a beginning, and I will now call on Mr. Rohrabacher for as much time as he may consume.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The findings that you have presented to us; let me ask you this. Forgive me if I missed this, but as compared to the 1970s and 1980s, when there was a Communist system that was opposed to our system, was the perception dramatically better at that time?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, there is not as much polling from the 1970s that we wish we had. We do have polling from the 1980s. I did some of it for *Newsweek Magazine* when I was at Gallup.

And opinions about the United States, there would be discontent with American policies. President Reagan's tough stand with the Communists was not well received in Europe at the time, but the reaction was not as broad and as deep as it is here.

You didn't see any change in the attitudes of the American people. The opinions in Germany are really very interesting because they never fell very far. The French have had on and off positive opinions about us, but the Germans, who are on the receiving side of the Soviet threat never fell.

I mean, I think that the decline, if you had to pick one country that you would say was most significant in what we see now is the way the Germans have a different view of us. But that was a different world. That was not a world in which there was one super power. There were two super powers.

And so during the war in Vietnam, when our policies were not popular, and here I am only speculating because there really were not polls, that would only go so far because there was recognition that the United States represented a counter-weight to Soviet imperialism, but that does not exist anymore.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. When people have something evil to compare a flawed person to, and it is again like trying to select your spouse, and the fact is that if you really want to compare every person that you meet to the ideal spouse that is in your mind, you are going to be single for a long time.

And as compared to actually juxtaposing real people and saying everyone is flawed, and looking at the flaws, as well as the positive sides, because you have someone real to compare it to.

During the Cold War, the comparison between the Soviet system and the more democratic capitalist system I think worked in our favor. And I might add that I worked in the White House during that time period, and again your observations that people opinion was very hard on Ronald Reagan in Europe at that time. Very hard on Ronald Reagan.

And he was portrayed as a cowboy and a gunslinger, and someone who is going to get us into war, and do you believe that that type of situation, meaning that Reagan was leading the world toward a result, and thus it was uncomfortable. And once the result happened and the Berlin Wall came down, all of a sudden Reagan's numbers are a way of a lot higher in Europe than they were. And would that not be true with the United States today in the middle of this war with radical Islam?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I have a couple of answers I think about that. One, if we had been successful in Iraq, I think these numbers would have been much better, but I don't think that they would have gone back to where we were in 2002 or in 2000.

Because we can see that even before the war got going we saw the seeds of discontent with American power, and the comparison with the 1980s is a good one, but the comparison with the 1990s is a good one as well, because America was the sole super power during that era, and the image of the United States was very positive.

But I think when America went to war, and when America went on the defensive and on the offensive, the issue of its power became more salient and more relevant.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, when you use power, which wasn't used in the 1990s, as compared to what we are doing today—

Mr. KOHUT. We did not face a threat then, that is right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right, and we faced a threat from Bosnia, and perhaps that is a lot different than facing a threat from radical Islam, which blows up your buildings and murders your people by the thousands.

So there is something in that, and not to say that public opinion—well, what is this faction in the general population of the world—

Mr. KOHUT. I am sorry, but I did not hear that question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What is the general thing where people will just be against the big guy? That happened in the United States as well I might add, but whoever is the biggest guy in the block, you are going to be against them.

Mr. KOHUT. Well, to be candid with you, I think there is probably that quality in looking at the kid with the best toys on the block, and there is always a little bit of envy, right?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. KOHUT. I don't think the kinds of numbers and the attitudes that we and others have portrayed over the years reflect just concern about the fact that America is the sole super power.

I think it has to do with reaction to these policies which have created concern about power, because the power was there before

we got into the period of 2001 to 2005, or 2007. So it is a combination of those things, and it is very hard to tease out.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman would yield for just a moment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What I found that supports—and I can understand the basis for Mr. Rohrabacher's question, I think there always is a David and Goliath element, and Goliath is always the bad, and David, we are always rooting for the underdog. We do that here in this country in sporting events and elsewhere.

But at the same time, the numbers that I find striking are the concern that other people have regarding the potential for military intervention by the United States. I mean, I alluded to the statistics that I saw while reading your testimony, and that about 65 percent of the people in Turkey have a concern about us invading their country.

That to me goes to the depth if you will, and the intensity, and you mention intensity in your remarks. That is what concerns me.

Mr. KOHUT. Well, it is very hard to look at these numbers and not say, wow. I mean, in the 2006 poll, we had a finding in Europe and in much of the world, that the United States presence in Iraq was rated as negatively as the new government in Iran, and the Hamas victory in Palestine, which had just happened.

And President Bush, when he was questioned about this, was just stunned by it, and it is hard for an American to say how could we be equated to situations like this, but that reflects the way in which we are being seen in a very, very exaggerated and very negative way. Invade Turkey? I don't think so.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But a lot of people believe that.

Mr. KOHUT. A lot of people believe that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And again if the gentleman will continue to yield. You also in your testimony indicate that it has transformed from loathing, and envy if you will, to fear, and other nations react differently from fear than they do simply because there is a disagreement over trade policy, for example or values gap.

But what you are saying for me confirms the conclusions reached by the GAO about the deepening and broadening sentiment of anti-Americanism that puts us at risk in many different levels.

And you mentioned that it is becoming entrenched. Can you expand on how entrenched it is, and is it susceptible to being turned around quickly. And I can see two parallel efforts to deal with it.

One, take a look at our policies, and determine what is in our national interest, and amend or change our policies where it is in our national interest, or can we do it through better communication, that being enhanced or reenergized public diplomacy.

And I guess that I am asking for an opinion, and I indicated at the beginning of this series of hearings that I was not going to really seek opinion, but I think of all of the testimony that we have solicited, and things in your particular testimony really have struck me as a significant concern.

And I use that 65 percent of the Turkish people, and if it is true in Turkey, clearly it is true elsewhere. We have strained relationships with other nations in other regions, and we hear them speak about concern of American invasion, or interference, and we, including myself, tend to pooh-pooh it.

We know that is absurd, but it is what they are thinking that causes them to, if you will, craft a policy that can be hostile to the United States.

Mr. KOHUT. Well, let me try to answer those questions. I think the dangers, as dramatic as the Turkish numbers are, if you ask me to think about a number that I find most troubling, are the numbers in Africa.

The fact that so many Nigerian Muslims have such negative views of the United States that have developed over the past 4 years, a majority of them say that they have a favorable view of Osama bin Laden.

I mean, these are places where a lot is at stake, and the impressions of the United States have become extremely negative, and we have to be very wary of that. Whether good communication can help that, I think money spent on—whatever we spend on public diplomacy, I am sure that it is money well spent, but the problem is so enormous.

But do not expect that better communication can move the needle on these kinds of attitudes, because big events created these kinds of attitudes, and big events and major policies will be required to make a change.

And I think the change won't be overnight. Whoever the next president is, that president is going to get a bit of a honeymoon from our allies at least. I would not suspect in many Muslim countries in the Middle East, where we are really very disliked, that there is going to be much change, a propensity for much change.

But the next administration or this administration will have to demonstrate some policies that will change people's attitudes, or attitudes will remain the same. I am not suggesting, however, that policy should be tailored to public opinion.

But caonly policies will change the kind of negative attitudes and negative situation that the United States is viewed. Now there are places where we have success. In that chart, at one point in the past few years, 71 percent of the Indians had a favorable view of us. Fifty-six percent do.

We have good trade relations with India. The Japanese still have a relatively positive view of us. It is not in every country. There are still a number of countries where the United States has a good view because it has good connections, and the policies, and the things that we do in exchange with these countries are indeed positive.

But for much of the world, not only are these attitudes things for us to consider, they play into the politics of these nations. Schroeder's election in Germany, that campaign involved the image of the United States, and the issue of the war in Iraq.

I don't know about the British election and how Iraq will play in the coming election next year, but certainly in the Spanish election, the United States was at issue. So public opinion is more of a world force than it has ever been because there is so much polling.

And the rest of the world has sort of caught up with us with respect to the role that opinion polls play in campaigning and the outcome of elections.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I agree with your statement that we cannot craft our policy to satisfy world public opinion. That makes no sense. We have to be concerned about our national interests, but the relationship between our national interests and how we are viewed is significant.

Again, I go back to this one GAO report that clearly states that there is a nexus between how we are viewed and how our national interests are served, and we have to I would suggest take that into account.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would just note on the observation that the chairman just made, I have seen a lot of paintings over the years of David and Goliath, and although there is no rational reason for this, David is always a very handsome man and Goliath is really ugly.

I mean, think about it. Throughout history people have assumed that the biggest guy on the block is really the big ugly guy, and there is something enduring about the little guy, and who knows what the reality of that is.

Sometimes little guys actually are pretty horrible people, and the big guys that they are picking on are not quite so bad. And I would think that the people who flew the planes into the buildings on 9/11 certainly fall into that category.

I have been to several countries where surprisingly enough—for example, in a very Muslim country that has an enormously positive view toward the United States. In fact, when I would go into different restaurants and they would be told that a group of Americans were there, they would stand up and cheer in Kosovo.

And those people related directly to American policy that came to save them from the Serbs back in the 1990s. So policy certainly had a lot to do with that, even though these people are all Muslims. Well, not all of them, but 90 percent are Muslims.

And so anyway I found a lot of your observations to be fascinating. The fact that a lot of Muslims believe that we are not religious enough, and Europeans who believe that we are too religious. There is some truism there as well for us to chew on.

And let me just again note, which I did in the first hearing that we had concerning public opinion, and you have already touched on this, just as the chairman has touched on it, in terms of making policy based on what is going to be popular.

The most hated politician in American history was Abraham Lincoln. There is no doubt. If you take a look at Abraham Lincoln prior to the last 6 months of his administration, he was the most hated man, and now the biggest monument that we have to any president is to Abraham Lincoln.

And he is again dietified, perhaps a little bit more so than he deserves, in the sense that he is a real human being, and had real flaws, just like any other human being.

But he took a stand, and he was leading people in a direction that was a moral direction. He was trying to cure one of the real evils of our society, and in doing that, it makes people mad at you.

So anyway with that in mind, I am hoping that if we are successful in the war against radical Islam, and when I say if, I believe we will be, I would hope that our European friends and others who hold us in low esteem, moderates within the Muslim world will

take a look at us and say, well, you know, actually it was much better—and like the people of Afghanistan have—it was much, much better to have the American pro-Western type of people here than it was to have these evil radical extremists running our country.

So, anyway, with that, thank you for your testimony, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I want to assure Mr. Kohut that we are not suggesting that you did the polling on Abraham Lincoln.

Mr. KOHUT. I was an intern then.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You were an intern. Well, with that, I will call on the vice chairman, Mr. Carnahan, for as much time as he may consume.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the ranking member as well, and thank you for being here. This is fascinating and depressing at the same time to hear this news.

But I think it is important that we hear it. Many of us can relate to stories when we have traveled or that I have heard recently this week. I met with a group of doctors that for years have gone on international trips, and exchanges, and they said that in the past few years, they have noticed a dramatically different attitude toward them when they travel.

There is a raised amount of suspicion about Americans in general, and they are not automatically invited to some of these things that they have been invited to in the past. Last week, we had John Zogby in, and he pointed out an important distinction that I wanted to ask your opinion about.

He said that even though some of these numbers were compelling and negative, that there still seemed to be in the polling a distinction made between the United States administration and individual Americans, and between some of our policies, and some of our traditional values that we have generally promoted around the world. Are you seeing those same kinds of distinctions?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I think he is right. The attitudes toward the American people are in fact more positive than the attitudes toward the United States at large, but the attitudes toward the American people are not as positive as they once were.

And in the past when we have seen the image of the United States slide, mostly with respect to what it represents as policy to the United States Government, we have not seen it affect the image of the people.

And so I think this is still relevant. And are there things that people admire about America? Yes, I think there are still many things that people admire.

Certainly one of the things that we see when we ask about Western style democracy in every Muslim country in which we have done polling, and we have done polling in quite a few, is that there is a great desire for many of the things that are characteristic of America.

But these publics nonetheless remain very critical of us on the basis of many of the other things that we have been talking about.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I also wanted to get a comparison. I know that you have covered at least recent years, but I wanted to ask: Is it

fair to say that we are at the lowest point we have been in history in terms of this polling data being done?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, the polling data has really only been around in any great detail since the 1980s, and this is the most negative over the course of that period, and if somehow we could magically go back and travel in time, we might find other periods where we were poorly regarded, but I would not want to speculate about that. But certainly over this 25-year period, this is a low point.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Have you done any polling on the renditions issue, and in particular in Italy after the recent indictments, or in Germany, after they started legal action? Is there any indication that those have changed?

Mr. KOHUT. No, not about that, the renditions specifically, but what I was struck by in the polling, and I believe that we did it this year, and it was in the 2006 polling, was how much more attentive foreign publics are to stories about abuse at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo than the American public.

And that is what I was referring to earlier when I thought about young people growing up around the world seeing those images, and how that will represent a problem for us for years to come. Very different than the images that people around the world grew up with 20 or 30 years ago.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If my friend would yield for a moment. There has been a debate here in the United States on those issues. At times contentious, and there are disagreements on renditions, and what occurred at Abu Ghraib, et cetera.

Is there any indication in the data that the world is aware of the fact that the United States, its Government, is not monolithic in terms of these issues, and that given our democracy, and our ability to debate, and to be heard, and sometimes it requires a little extra effort to be heard, but do they give us credit if you will for Members of Congress, or the public, or the press, for raising these issues in the first place?

To me, I have very strong feelings about these issues, but I think our democracy demonstrates its vibrancy if you will because we debate it and we become passionate about our own views, and it is out there in the open, where in many societies it is not.

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I wish I could give you a good answer to that question because it is a terrific question. But I just don't know how much of a sense informed publics around the world, and we would only be talking about the informed slice of these publics, have a sense of the debate about these and other issues that bear on American foreign and security policies. I just don't know.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would just note that it is unfortunate that C-SPAN isn't worldwide, because on many occasions, they could find myself and Mr. Rohrabacher pounding the desk and having a divergence of views on issues.

And I think that demonstrates that all is not lost, that the United States clearly has its imperfections, but we work at them, and we attempt to resolve them. We are doing oversight, and that the American people may be on occasion—it takes time, but American public opinion catches up and demands that its representatives that we ask questions, and that we have a debate.

The disagreement is what makes us healthy, but how do we get—and maybe we need another series of experts in terms of how we get that message out to the rest of the world. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I wanted to continue to look at your research on page—the chart on page six that I have that is broken down into four different motive categories.

Mr. KOHUT. It is this third chart over here.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes. Which of these categories, if your research indicates, do you think is the most powerful or persuasive in terms of creating the negative perceptions, or is this similarly more powerful than others, or is it also more of a cumulative impact of all of those?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I think that not necessarily with respect to this question, but with respect to the research generally, in the Muslim world the issue of Israel and the Palestinians is the issue that probably has the most impact on perceptions of the United States, and that plays into the war on terrorism, and ultimately the war in Iraq, a sense that the United States is unfair.

We have done surveys not only about the United States, but about the West more generally, and Muslim publics tend to have a very aggrieved view of the world, that a lot of the problems in that part of the world are a consequence of the West. But on this particular issue, I would say that it is the most important issue, and that it ties in with oil, which is thought to be the American motive.

I would say if I had to speculate generally, the issue of world domination, that the United States wants to rule the world, is a really powerful sentiment, and we have been asking the question: “Would the world be a better place if there was another country that was equal in power to the United States militarily?”

And in the United States, we have asked: “Should our policy be to maintain our military superiority?” Well, all around the world, we get the opinion that this would be a better world, but when we ask people about candidates for rivals to the United States, we don’t get any, even though the Chinese have a pretty good image these days in Europe, for example.

There is not a great desire anywhere in the world to see the Chinese rival American power, but there is this undercurrent of concern that America’s power is unchecked, and that it wants to be dominant. So, I would say in response to your question, that in many other places it is that criticism that the U.S. wants to dominate the world.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Let me jump to Africa. It seems as I looked at this that the most positive region for opinion, and what is that about, and what is different about Africa than some of these other spots around the world?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, I think that what we did find in 2002, when we did a very extensive survey of Africa, and we are about to repeat that, was that in the non-Muslim countries, and the publics that are not Muslim within countries that are divided ethnically or religiously rather, there is a relatively positive view of the United States, about the way America practices its democracy, the way

that it does business, a much more positive view than in other parts of the world.

America is more of a model to these African nations than elsewhere. I have to say that we have seen other polls and other organizations saying that since our poll, the numbers are not that great, and have not been sustained that great in Africa, and we have seen that in Nigeria.

And we will know more about this in a few months when we do a major survey in Africa, but I think this idea that America still represents a good model is what is at work in those numbers.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And those numbers are from 2002 and you say you are about to redo those?

Mr. KOHUT. Correct. That is correct.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Great. One or two more questions. And I guess to try to wrap up, and maybe I am delving into the realm of opinion here, but does this indicate to you opportunities for us to reverse this trend? What would be the major factors in trying to turn some of these numbers back around?

Mr. KOHUT. Well, it is very difficult for me to be in the position to recommend policies, specific policies, to you, but—and this may sound trite, but success. I mean, if we had been successful in Iraq, these numbers would not have gone back to where they were, but they would not be nearly as bad as they are.

Being successful in that part of the world, presenting American policies in such a way that people in other parts of the world feel that they can invest in them, and that may sound like a very generalized answer, but it is the best one that I can give you, because there is a great deal of suspicion about what our motives are, and whether we listen, whether we listen enough. Giving a sense that we listen is a big part of this.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just note that what I find interesting is that there appears to be substantial agreement between the American public and those that you have polled in terms of obvious issues.

I am looking for your—I had written it down, but—

Mr. KOHUT. Iran, for example.

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, agreement on issues, but still this persistent entrenched anti-American sentiment. I mean, the reality, and please correct me, and feel free to interrupt me, but the reality is that there seems to be a growing agreement on a number of issues—and let us pick out global warming, for example—on the part of the American public in terms of attitudes elsewhere.

And yet this anti-American sentiment in this sense that we are greedy, and we are only about our own interests, without any consideration for others, seems to persist.

Mr. KOHUT. I think that is true. I mean, you are not misreading the polling. That is correct. And I think that has to do with the fact that there is still disagreement with the United States on many issues, and the number one issue is Iraq.

Just as Iraq is the number one issue domestically in the United States, and politically in any other way, it is the number one global issue with respect to the United States.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Iraq is obviously a huge drag, and I heard your response to Mr. Carnahan's. He raised the issue of renditions, and you alluded in your testimony to Abu Ghraib, and some other situations that was egregious not only to world opinion, but to American public opinion.

And I guess my frustration is that American attitudes toward these issues clearly represented our values, American values. And let me posit to you a premise that historically the world has admired the United States not for our military power—they might be envious of our military power and our economic strength, but for our claim, which to a significant degree I believe is justified, to a certain moral authority; respect for human rights, advancing causes that appeal to humankind.

And yet when we fail in terms of our actions to meet our own values that that is what generates this suspicion, or this disappointment. Am I way off base?

Mr. KOHUT. No, I do not think you are way off. I mean, I think if you look at American opinion, and you ask questions about some of these abuses, people say that these are isolated incidents, and it does not represent who we are.

If you look at global opinion though, they are snapshots that have a very big impression, and that is the real problem.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I looked at this what are America's motives, and what really strikes me is Western Europeans are convinced that we are out to control Mideast oil, and that was our motivation in terms of Iraq. One can understand Morocco saying that 63 percent of that population, but Germany, 60 percent? I mean, they are not believing us, I guess, is what I am saying.

Mr. KOHUT. I am sorry to interrupt you, but when we did our first survey in November 2001 or 2002, I went back and I did a quick survey across Europe about the war in Iraq, because it was looming and it was on the radar screen.

And I took people in the United States and in Western Europe, and Turkey, through a lot of questions about Iraq and Saddam Hussein, and the threats, and what he represented, and there was real agreement between the American public and the allied publics about the issues of Iraq and the dangers, and so on and so forth.

And we got to one question where we parted ways, and that is why would the United States want to remove Saddam Hussein, and in America the issue was because he represented a threat, and in the rest of the world—well, not the rest of the world, but the people that we polled in Europe and Turkey—because America wanted to control oil. It wanted the oil.

And it goes back to this question about suspicion of our power, and this was before the war in Iraq, not after the war in Iraq.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That would indicate why the Turks have that low opinion of the United States, because after all, we have been doing our best to establish the pistachio nut monopoly, and maybe we should be on a program aimed at self-sufficiency in pistachio nuts, and realizing that Turkey grows all of those pistachio nuts.

In other words, I think it is very easy for people to have delusions about how much we focus on them, and in fact your findings seem to indicate that, because it indicates that a lot of people are

afraid that we are going to invade them, when we don't even—you know, that would not even be considered in 1,000 years.

And I am going to ask one question, but let me just say it as an observation. It would be my observation that if we are talking about public opinion, and talking about the effect of Iraq on public opinion, that if we leave Iraq in a way that is perceived to be less than honorable, or less us say in what appears to be a retreat, my guess is that our polling numbers will actually go down in Europe and elsewhere, as in the Middle East and elsewhere, as compared to if the Iraq conflict seems to have been brought to a positive conclusion. Is that correct?

Mr. KOHUT. The best outcome is the United States is not there and things are reasonably okay.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But if we leave and it appears that it was a mess from the beginning, and we are left at worse than we went in, after we went in, then that would—I would imagine that our poll numbers would go even lower than what we are talking about. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would only respond to my friend from California by noting, and we hope to have somebody come in specifically on Iraq and probably after we come back from our district work period in April, that the Iraqi people according to a particular poll, the number is 75 percent that want the United States out, and in excess of 60 percent of the Iraqi people approve of attacks on American soldiers.

That is much more disturbing to me than even the 65 percent of the Turks who believe that we are prepared to attack.

Let me just further talk about oil for a minute, and maybe I can discuss this with the ranking member at some point in time, but as we are talking about the issue of our motivation, there is a memoir that was done by a noted journalist, Mr. Suskind, who was—and I believe still works for the *Wall Street Journal*, on the tenure of the former Secretary of Treasury, Paul O'Neill.

And it was only several months after the beginning of President Bush's first term where he recounts a meeting of the National Security Council, where the principals were all in attendance, where a map was produced by presumably the then Secretary Rumsfeld, about oil fields in Iraq.

And according to this memoir, there was a discussion about which countries would be permitted to bid for and have the rights to those particular oil fields that had not been developed again.

Now it is never discussed. I have never heard that particular antidote reviewed in this institution and in this congress, but I dare say that others elsewhere have most likely noted that. It was at the top of the *New York Times* best seller list.

And it becomes part of their dialogue, and maybe we should request that Mr. O'Neill comes before this particular subcommittee and explain to us what was that all about. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a great idea.

Mr. DELAHUNT. He is a terrific ranking member I have to tell you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Consider it done.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Kohut, thank you so much for your insights. It has been very, very informative. Believe me that I am confident

that we will call on you for consultation, and we look forward to receiving any additional surveys that you and your organization produce.

They really do help us and they clarify I think the realities of what we have to deal with to protect and enhance our American national interests, and with that, we are now adjourned.

Mr. KOHUT. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

