

**Advance Questions for Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN
Nominee for Commander, U. S. Pacific Command**

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

1) Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

2) If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Duties

3) What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, to fight and win. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.

4) What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Thirty-six years of military training and experience, to include previous combatant command of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, have prepared me for assuming command of the U.S. Pacific Command. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, I planned and executed coalition and joint warfighting missions. As Director of the Joint Staff, I have gained invaluable insights into the conduct of joint operations, the duties of a combatant commander and interagency cooperation. In

addition, I gained regional experience as Commander of Carrier Group Five in Yokosuka, Japan and, additionally, on several operational deployments to the Pacific theater.

5) Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance my knowledge of our relationships with our allies and partners across the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and military and civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in the region.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, to the following officials:

6) The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the Command to carry out its missions.

7) The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his absence. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major issues.

8) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Under secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands' requirements. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic policy issues involving the Asia-Pacific region.

9) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the Command's intelligence requirements.

10) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

While the Chairman is not in the chain of command that runs from the President and the Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders, his role as the senior uniformed military advisor is critical. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, supports the chain of command as directed in Title 10 and communicates with the Chairman to enable him to perform his duties as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

11) The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates with the secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip Pacific Command forces are met.

12) The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, communicates and exchanges information with the chiefs of staff of the Services to support their responsibility for organizing, training and equipping forces. Successful execution of U.S. Pacific Command's mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the service chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for combatant commanders.

13) The other combatant commanders

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships, which are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

Major Challenges and Problems

14) In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

Traditional security challenges include ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and influencing cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. We must also address other security issues, especially the threat of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and transnational crime such as narcotics and human trafficking and piracy

15) Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will posture our military forces to dissuade, deter, or defeat any potential adversary. I will work with other DOD organizations, agencies of the U.S. Government, and our many friends and allies to assure the region of our strong resolve and lasting commitment to stability, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific.

Homeland Defense

16) What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of U. S. Pacific Command in homeland defense?

USPACOM responsibility is to deter attacks against the Homeland as early and as far away as possible, defend the USPACOM domestic AOR, and work with and provide support to civil authorities when requested. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command's HLD plan complements and is integrated with planning for the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Security and other relevant activities.

17) What is your understanding of how U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Northern Command work to ensure that their overlapping missions in this area do not create “seams” that might be exploited by our adversaries and how this process might be improved?

In October 2003, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander, U.S. Northern Command signed a Command Arrangement Agreement, to “establish procedures and delineate responsibilities” between the two commands. This agreement also prescribes employment of U.S. Pacific Command forces in support of U.S. Northern Command missions and the control of forces operating in Northern Command's Area of Responsibility. In my experience, the agreement between combatant commands has been highly effective. If confirmed, I intend to continue the close working relationship between the two commands.

18) What is your assessment of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and what steps should be taken to improve upon it?

The Regional Maritime Security Initiative was developed to foster coordination among participating states to address transnational threats collectively. The themes and goals of the initiative continue to gain momentum in the Asia-Pacific region as the “Global Maritime Partnership.” Its effectiveness can be increased through better information sharing and investing the time and effort to improve understanding of the challenges and

needs of the partner nations. USPACOM should continue to encourage multilateral and interagency approaches to the challenges.

19) How could U. S. Pacific Command forces and expertise contribute to more effective homeland defense capabilities?

U.S. Pacific Command's military and intelligence activities in the western approaches to the continental United States contribute to the Nation's active, layered defense and enhance situational awareness. Improving our capabilities in this regard will require continued efforts to collect actionable intelligence, exercise and train our forces, and engage actively with nations of the Asia-Pacific.

Global Defense Posture Review

Perhaps more than in any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U. S. Pacific Command are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict.

20) In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of U. S. Pacific Command to execute its operational contingencies, and did the Global Posture Review appropriately take this into account?

Forward basing is essential to the USPACOM shaping and warfighting strategy. Forward presence in the AOR assures friends and allies and dissuades potential adversaries. Because posture changes resulting from Global Posture Review shift forces away from a garrison orientation and toward a more flexible force, I believe USPACOM is well-positioned to respond with necessary military forces in the event of crises or contingency.

21) What do you see as the implications of the proposed global force structure changes with respect to U. S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in Korea and Japan?

I support alliance transformations currently underway in Japan and the Republic of Korea. In general, I see the changes as effective from a mission perspective and an example of the healthy state of our alliance with both nations.

22) What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in posture will have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

I do not anticipate any reduction in the command's ability to meet commitments to our allies.

The Army is proposing to add 65,000 personnel to its permanent force structure over the course of the Future Years Defense Program, including the creation of six additional active-duty combat brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing to add 27,000 personnel over the same period.

23) Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units should be assigned to commands located in the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility in order to meet Pacific Command's your requirements?

The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps allow us to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the optimum mix of forces to execute the National Military Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to study where force increases in the Pacific theater might be appropriate to enhance mission accomplishment and to share our analysis with the Department of Defense.

24) If so, to what extent do you believe these additional forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?

If confirmed, I will study the options and consider the evolving situation in the Pacific, as these expanded forces are brought online. Once I have formed my assessment, I will provide my views to the Secretary of Defense.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to U. S. national security interests in Asia.

25) What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

The missile launches and nuclear test conducted last year underscore the gravity of the North Korean threat. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. I am encouraged by the progress made at the Six Party Talks in Beijing last month. I believe one of the key roles of U.S. Pacific Command is to work closely with the countries in the region to facilitate the ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the threat, while maintaining a credible deterrent posture.

26) What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea's development of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities and potential proliferation pose a serious threat to the U.S. and our allies.

27) In your view, what, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

If confirmed, my focus will be on preserving the strength and resolve of our alliances. We must leverage relationships with other nations in the region to shape the strategic environment aimed at deterring aggression in Northeast Asia.

Republic of South Korea (ROK)

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship is currently undergoing significant change.

28) What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

The U.S.-ROK security relationship is an enduring partnership that has been the key to deterrence for over 50 years. Our alliance has evolved to become a global partnership with the ROK military's contributions to the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the upcoming deployment of ROK troops in support of the UN mission in Lebanon.

29) If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander of United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command to ensure there is no degradation in readiness or deterrence. I will ensure that U.S. Pacific Command supports the ongoing USFK transformation initiatives that are vital to enhancing the capabilities of our combined forces and facilitating the eventual transition of wartime operational control to the ROK military.

30) Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned to Korea for two or three years of duty and the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer tours of duty?

I have not yet studied the proposal in detail, particularly with respect to affordability. However, in general, I believe longer tours and more troops having their families accompany them are in the best interests of our alliance and our readiness on the Korean peninsula.

China

Many observers believe that one of the key national security challenges of this century is how to manage China's emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power.

31) How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with China?

From my vantage at NORTHCOM, I was encouraged by China's role in facilitating North Korean return to the Six-Party Talks. I see this as constructive and responsible. I also am aware of the lack of transparency regarding Chinese military modernization, which is a concern.

32) What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.- China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

Our military-to-military relationship is improving in terms of quality and quantity of events. If confirmed, I intend to advocate for an engagement program involving numerous events with measured but increased levels of sophistication. I believe this approach would help us learn more about the PLA, break down barriers to understanding, and reduce potential for conflict.

33) How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

I assess the situation as stable. However, I am also mindful miscalculation is possible. If confirmed, I will remain particularly attentive to any military quantitative and qualitative gap between China and Taiwan.

China's economy is growing by as much as ten percent per year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization.

34) In your view, what is China's intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

I believe it is clear China is seeking capabilities beyond those needed for a Taiwan situation, but the lack of transparency makes intent difficult to discern. If confirmed, I would seek to continue improvements with U.S.-PLA military-to-military interaction to better understand Chinese intentions.

On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with a U. S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U. S. personnel and resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot.

35) Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you believe may be necessary?

I understand that under Admiral Fallon's watch, PACOM conducted the first two Search and Rescue Exercise with PRC forces. Such events – which stress language independent protocols, fixed wing maritime patrol craft, and “free play” – increase safety of all sailors and airmen. I recognize this will be a long-term educational process. If confirmed, I would continue similar efforts in the future to expose as many PLA sailors and airmen as possible to these fundamental and inherently stabilizing procedures.

36) In your view, is there the potential for similar dangerous incidents with China to occur at sea or elsewhere?

There is always potential, however, I believe it is less likely than in the past.

37) If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to prevent incidents?

If confirmed, I would consider an international agreement similar to the “Incidents At Sea” (INCSEA) protocols we developed with the Soviet Union.

On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community.

38) What is your view of China's purpose in conducting this test?

I do not know China's purpose. However, the test was unfortunate and inconsistent with their stated peaceful policy. Chinese actions endangered international satellites, which support the world's economy, and created considerable debris that increase the risk to human spaceflight.

39) What do you see as the implications of this test for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

The foremost implication is confirmation that Chinese anti-satellite capabilities can be a threat to international space assets.

40) What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space?

Consistent with U.S. policy and international understandings, I support the rights of states to have unhindered passage through, and operations in space without interference. I also support our ability to defend and protect our space systems.

Taiwan

41) What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

If confirmed, I will remain fully committed to the U.S. obligation to provide Taiwan with the necessary capabilities for its defense. I would continue to focus on efforts to modernize Taiwan's defensive capability and improve the joint operating capacity of the Taiwan Armed Forces.

42) What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?

PACOM should focus on Taiwan's capability to defend itself and avoid characterizing the Taiwan military's modernization as offensive. A Taiwan that can defend itself enhances regional stability.

Republic of the Philippines

43) What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

Our relationship is good, and our long and consistent military engagement with the Philippines is bearing fruit in the form of Philippine counter-terrorism performance and success in the field.

44) What is your view of the effectiveness of the special operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

My initial assessment, based on recent successes on the island of Jolo, is the advice and assistance of Special Operations Forces have been effective in helping Philippine Security Forces (PSF) fight local and international terrorist groups over sustained periods in harsh environments.

45) What measures or guidelines will you employ, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

U.S. Forces are not authorized by either the U.S. or the Republic of the Philippines to conduct combat operations in the Republic of the Philippines nor to accompany PSF to locations where contact with the enemy by US forces is anticipated. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure current restrictions prohibiting a combat role for U.S. forces are well understood by our personnel at all levels. I will confirm in place procedures are sufficiently rigorous.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

46) What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism?

The Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. President Yudhoyono has enabled Indonesian law enforcement to form a successful CT center and make important arrests of terrorist operatives. I also view the Indonesia government's approach to religious tolerance as helpful.

47) Is it your understanding that the Indonesian Government is cooperating in the investigation into the murder of two American school teachers and one Indonesian school teacher in an ambush in Papua in August 2002?

Yes.

48) What is your view of the current state of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia?

USPACOM military-to-military relations with the Indonesian Armed Forces continue to mature and improve. U.S. support during the 2004 Tsunami and 2006 earthquake responses triggered new engagement opportunities for USPACOM.

49) Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

As a democracy with a moderate and modernizing vision of Islam, Indonesia is a natural partner with the U.S. It is important to assist with the development of their military. Engaging in areas of common interest while minding the political landscape, the U.S. and Indonesia can engage in a consistent programmed manner that does not outstrip Indonesia's ability to absorb U.S. assistance.

50) What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

I believe the Indonesian military is committed to education and training to improve adherence to human rights standards and enforcement of same.

51) If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and

accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I will ensure USPACOM engagements with the Indonesian military continue to encourage respect for human rights, accountability, leadership development, and legal education. I will also look for opportunities to expand bilateral education exchanges, research grants, and language training to help the present and future elites of the military.

India

52) What is your view of the current state of the U. S. - India military-to-military relationship?

President Bush has emphasized the U.S. partnership with India as among the most important in the region. If confirmed, I would seek to complement strategic initiatives with a military-to-military program characterized by increased dialogue and more frequent and sophisticated exchange and exercises.

53) If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, my priorities for the U.S. - India military-to-military relationship will be increasing the scope of exercises and exploring opportunities for expanded cooperation in peacekeeping, disaster response and maritime security. Our militaries need to continue to build trust and confidence and become more interoperable. We should establish agreements and procedures that will allow us to build shared doctrine and communications architectures.

54) What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

There are reported organizational relationships between armed groups conducting attacks in India and Afghanistan, specifically among Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT/LeT), al-Qa'ida (AQ), and the Taliban. However, I have not sufficiently studied the situation to determine relationships between the groups.

Missile Defense

55) What is your understanding of the current relationship between U. S. Pacific Command, U. S. Northern Command, and U. S. Strategic Command with respect to ballistic missile defense deployment and operations?

Commander, USPACOM supports Commander, USNORTHCOM for defense of the homeland. Commander, USPACOM is also responsible for providing regional missile defense for U.S. forces forward deployed in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility. Commander, USSTRATCOM has overarching responsibility for planning, integrating, and coordinating global ballistic missile defense. USPACOM coordinates with USNORTHCOM and USSTRATCOM in the performance of both the regional and global missile defense mission.

56) What is your understanding of the arrangement whereby Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet will be made available, or dedicated, to ballistic missile defense missions, and what impact will this arrangement have on the capability of U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Pacific Fleet to fulfill their other missions involving Aegis-class ships?

Commander USPACOM and Commander USNORTHCOM have established clear command relationships regarding Aegis support to the Ballistic Missile Defense mission. Using a system of readiness conditions, both Commanders ensure the Aegis ship requirement is properly managed to support both the missile defense mission and other missions in the Pacific theater.

Over the past year, these relationships have been tested in several challenging real world and exercise scenarios involving regional and homeland missile defense missions.

57) If confirmed, how would you propose to strike an appropriate balance between missile defense and non-missile defense missions for ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

Missile defense is one of many missions tasked to the Commander, PACFLT. If confirmed, I will solicit recommendations from Commander, PACFLT, to posture the U.S. Pacific Fleet to execute the missions we expect the Fleet to perform. Additionally, I will continue USPACOM efforts to integrate Patriot Advance Capabilities-3 (PAC-3), Forward Based X-Band Radar Transportable (FBX-T), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to improve theater-wide capability and reduce the reliance on Aegis platforms.

Special Operations Command

58) What is your understanding of the requirements for coordination and cooperation between Special Operations Command teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Ambassadors in the relevant countries?

Coordination and cooperation between U.S. Pacific Command, Ambassadors, and Special Operations Command teams remains essential to success in the Global War on Terror. Commander, USPACOM assumes Operational Control (OPCON) of Special Operations Forces once those forces enter the AOR. In all cases, Ambassadors remain

responsible for activities in their respective country, to include Theater Security Cooperation activities involving Special Operations Forces. As a result, the military commander exercising OPCON is required to coordinate activities with the respective Ambassador.

Additionally, coordination with USSOCOM and Country Ambassadors continues even after OPCON has been assumed by Commander, USPACOM. In certain circumstances, USSOCOM may retain OPCON of forces conducting specialized missions or crossing Geographic Combatant Commander boundaries.

59) If confirmed, would you seek to change any aspects of these requirements?

If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending changes in the current command and support relationships.

60) Do you see the need for any changes in the assignment and operational control of Special Operations within the Special Operations Command area of operations?

The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command developed and the Secretary of Defense recently approved the Global Special Operations Forces Posture initiative, which significantly changes assignment and operational control of current regionally based special operations forces to a CONUS-based, forward rotational presence model. CDRUSSOCOM assesses this will provide Geographic Combatant Commanders with better trained Special Operations Forces while maintaining their regional expertise and reducing the current high Personnel Tempo. At this time, it would be premature for me to recommend changes.

Technology Priorities

U.S. Pacific Command has been active in the Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) process and currently has several projects on the transition list, including the future tactical truck system and theater effects-based operations.

61) If confirmed, what steps would you expect to take to make your requirements known to the department's science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long term?

If confirmed, I will support efforts to strengthen the relationship between the Command and the S&T community. In so doing, PACOM would help researchers better understand operational problems and the Command would gain better insight into solutions maturing through Service efforts. I plan to use the Integrated Priority List as the foundation for these discussions.

JCTDs will continue to be an important part of meeting S&T requirements but I plan to expand the approach. In particular, I will explore new relationships with S&T

programs worldwide to meet requirements. I expect these efforts will include cooperative technology development with countries in our AOR; participation of Services S&T personnel in USPACOM exercises; seminars with laboratories and warfighting centers for direct engagement with planners.

Exercises and Training

62) What is your assessment of the current U. S. Pacific Command training and exercise program, including those designed to train personnel for peace and stability operations?

My initial impression is the U.S. Pacific Command exercise program has been highly effective as evidenced by successful disaster relief operations, responsive support to War on Terror operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the improvements in the quality and capacity of regional peace support operations forces through the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

I recognize the importance of a rigorous training and exercise program. In U.S. Pacific Command, training and exercises will continue to receive emphasis because of their value in maturing U.S. readiness and capabilities and improving our ability to operate with allies and partners in the region.

63) Do you believe that the Pacific Command's training and exercise program currently has adequate funding and personnel resources?

I do not yet have a full appreciation of the funding and resource status of the U.S. Pacific Command training and exercise program. If confirmed, I will ensure resources are effectively used and advocate for additional resources, when necessary.

64) What are your views on how the Pacific Command, in concert with the Joint Forces command, could improve its training and exercise program, including training and exercises for peace and stability operations?

I view collaboration with USJFCOM and the continuous assessment such interaction fosters as central to improving the command's training program. I also anticipate the new Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC), when integrated into JFCOM's global grid of warfighting centers, will allow PACOM and JFCOM to continue to cooperatively develop transformational training concepts for traditional warfighting as well as peace and stability operations.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U. S. Pacific Command, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of

remains of U. S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continue to be a very high priority.

65) What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U. S. Pacific Command, and its relationship to the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office?

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) conducts operations to support accounting of personnel unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. U.S. Pacific Command provides higher headquarters support and direction, and interface between JPAC and the Joint Staff and OSD. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) exercises policy, control, and oversight within the Department of Defense. DPMO and JPAC coordinate directly on routine POW/MIA issues.

66) If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U. S. Pacific Command?

JPAC resources and accounting efforts are focused not only in the Pacific Command region, but throughout the world. If confirmed, I will encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce U.S. Government priorities and commitment in our accounting and recovery efforts with leaders of these countries and respective U.S. Ambassadors.

67) If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to assess the adequacy of resources available for this work?

If confirmed, I will provide JPAC the full support of the U.S. Pacific Command in the conduct of their mission, and continuously assess the adequacy of resources in the performance of this critical and important mission. I will also ensure existing resources maximize mission accomplishment.

68) What is your understanding of the status of the report due March 1, 2007 relating to the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, pursuant to Senate Report 109-254?

I understand the report has been drafted and is currently being staffed. If confirmed, I will review the draft document and will be prepared to provide comment.

Quality of Life

Combatant commanders are responsible for establishing and sustaining a high quality of life for military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.

69) If confirmed, how would you define and ensure appropriate resources are

available for quality of life programs for military members and their families within the U. S. Pacific Command?

Quality of life (QoL)/Quality of service (QoS) for our men and women is one of my top priorities.

QoS means providing high quality operating facilities, tools, and information technology necessary for our personnel to execute their missions and achieve their goals.

Achieving and sustaining QoL, however, will require both QoS initiatives and a continuous assessment of our facilities and our programs – housing, schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) programs/facilities, pay and entitlement programs, family and childcare programs. If such assessments identify QoS/QoL conditions that are less than our people deserve, I will work with the Department of Defense to solicit support and garner required resources to rectify the deficiencies.

70) What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the U. S. Pacific Command AOR (including adequate healthcare services and DOD schools)?

The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoS/QoL for our service members and their families while we realign our forces in theater.

Throughout the transition process, we should focus our efforts on maintaining quality housing, DoD schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain current levels of service during the transformation ‘out’ phase and ensure these systems are in place before families arrive in the area.

71) What steps do you believe need to be taken in Guam to ensure that adequate services are available to U.S. personnel and their dependents?

As we plan for increased military development in Guam, we must ensure organizations and agencies that provide services to U.S. personnel and their dependents are included in the planning process, and adequate funding for expansion of these services is provided.

The Joint Guam Program Office, established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and tasked with executing this comprehensive redevelopment effort, is leading the planning process and is engaging DOD Components and other stakeholders to program and budget for adequate services for U.S. personnel and their dependents in Guam. If confirmed, I will ensure JGPO is fully informed of U.S. Pacific Command QoS/QoL requirements on Guam.

Policies Regarding Sexual Assault

As a result of deficiencies in DOD and Service policies regarding sexual assault in

the Armed Forces, the Department and the individual Services are required under section 577 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to develop comprehensive policies aimed at preventing and responding to sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces and ensuring, among other things, appropriate law enforcement, medical, and legal responses, integration of databases to report and track sexual assaults, and development of victim treatment and assistance capabilities.

72) If confirmed as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, what steps would you take to ensure the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces under your command are appropriately implementing policies aimed at preventing sexual assaults and appropriately responding to victims of sexual assault?

I am strongly committed to ensuring we make every effort to protect our people from assault and offer direct, consistent, and appropriate response to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders at all levels continue to implement comprehensive measures to prevent sexual assault, provide responsive care and treatment for victims of sexual assault, and hold accountable those who commit the crime of sexual assault.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

73) Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

74) Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes

75) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

Yes

76) Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate

Committees?

Yes

77) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes