

**UNCLASSIFIED
FINAL**

STATEMENT BY

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

BEFORE THE

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Thank- you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the National Guard's role in Homeland Defense. In addition to the overseas fight, you can rest assured, the National Guard stands ready to protect the homeland and provide military assets to assist civilian authorities at the request of the Governors or the President, through a rapid, integrated response across the nation. Geographical distribution, community integration, and other traditional strengths make the National Guard an effective and cost efficient force for many Homeland Defense (HLD) and civil support requirements at both the State and Federal levels. In preparing for these missions, the National Guard has examined the emerging threats and searched for capability gaps we must overcome to be successful. I want to stress meeting these needs does not demand a dedicated Homeland Defense force structure, rather, they can be addressed through enhanced capabilities for existing war fighting force structure.

The National Guard is a balanced force which operates across the full spectrum of military engagement from close order combat to military support to civil authorities. Training and preparation for the overseas warfighting mission provides National Guard forces with the vast majority of the preparation required for HLD and civil support. These requirements do not focus solely on material solutions; they also identify needed cultural changes—specifically regarding coordination and unity of effort across multiple agencies and intergovernmental

seams. The emphasis of our Homeland Defense mission is on prevention, pre-event deterrence, and responding within hours after a major incident.

As I'll discuss in a moment, the National Guard's response to Homeland Defense since 9-11, and more recently during Hurricane Katrina has been tremendous.

Still, there is room for improvement. Capability and synchronization gaps between local first responders and follow-on state and federal forces exist and must be addressed to ensure a fully secure America. In June 2005, the Department of Defense published the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* followed shortly in August by *Joint Publication 3-26 Homeland Security*. This document emphasizes the need to "Lead, Support, and Enable" by executing missions to prevent and repel attacks; working with civil authorities as part of a national response to attack or disaster; and sharing expertise with domestic as well as our international partners. This broad Homeland Security direction on Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS) focuses reliance upon National Guard capabilities within an active, layered defense strategy for the United States.

Homeland Defense is mission one for the National Guard. Governors count on the National Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event, which makes resourcing critical. The National Guard must be able to support the Governors' requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the right capabilities, to the right location, at

the right time. The States have indicated to the National Guard Bureau that there are certain capabilities they feel they need to meet emergencies. At the National Guard Bureau we express these in the following list of 10 essential capabilities each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia must maintain at all times: (1) Aviation (2) Engineering (3) Civil Support Teams (4) Security (5) Medical (6) Transportation (7) Maintenance (8) Logistics (9) Joint Force Headquarters and, (10) Communications.

We are seeking to further leverage the capacity currently existing in these 10 essential capabilities to address identified gaps through the development of the following initiatives and concepts.

- (1) **Joint Force Headquarters—State (JFHQ-State).** JFHQ-State is a joint command and control entity in each State and territory. It is integrated into national consequence management and contingency planning structures. JFHQs provide situational updates (common operating picture) information to national level headquarters before and during any contingency operation and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Movements, and Integration for all inbound military forces. Federal law provides a mechanism whereby a National Guard officer can command federal troops. Such a commander at the head of a Joint Task Force—State (JTF-State) can assume tactical control of all military units –State NG, other NG forces, Active Component and Reserves. JTF-State

commander can be a dual-hatted commander of both Title 32 and Title 10 forces as demonstrated in the 2004 G8 Summit, Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

(2) **Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Centers (JFHQ JOC).** The JOC is a network composed of the National Guard Bureau JOC and a JOC in the 54 States and Territories. JFHQ JOC serves as the primary entity for coordinating, facilitating, and synchronizing efforts in support of their states, information requirements of NGB and customers at the Federal level during natural disasters, National Special Security Events (NSSE), exercises and domestic activities. Each JFHQ JOC has redundant connectivity: DoD architecture of NIPR and SPIR; a High Frequency (HF) network with classified and unclassified voice and data information; and commercial systems.

(3) **National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (NG CERFP).** The National Guard developed and fielded 12 NG CERFP teams to provide a regional capability to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological or high explosive threats. Each team is designed to rapidly (less than 96 hours) provide the capability to locate and extract victims from a CBRNE incident site and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination and medical triage and stabilization. The CERFP augments the capabilities of the Civil Support Teams (CST). The incremental training and equipment for this capability is specialized,

compatible with the first responders, and interoperable with the incident command system. Congress provided direction and, for FY'06, funding to establish an additional 5 teams bringing the total to 17.

(4) Critical Infrastructure Program- Mission Assurance Assessments

(CIP-MAA). National Guard CIP-MAA teams – formerly referred to as Full-Spectrum Vulnerability Assessment teams – execute the pre-planning needed to educate the civilian agencies on basic force protection and emergency response. Additionally, these teams are building relationships with first responders, owners of critical infrastructure and National Guard planners in the States and Territories. CIP-MAA teams deploy traditional National Guard forces in a timely fashion to assist in protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure, including vital elements of the Defense Industrial Base. Currently, six "pilot" teams staffed by 14 specially trained National Guard personnel conduct vulnerability assessments.

(5) National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF). Being based in so many communities, the National Guard has proven time and again that it can muster forces and be on the scene of an incident within hours. Each of the 54 States and Territories is currently training a battalion size reaction force that can respond anywhere in the state with an initial 75 to 125 person element within a minimum of four to eight hours. So, generally, we can get a company of troops on the ground within hours and a battalion in place overnight. These reaction forces provided crucial support to law enforcement in the response to Hurricane Katrina. The NGRF is task-

organized from existing units and can provide Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), site security, and security and support during CBRNE contingency operations.

(6) **Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE).** The National Guard has successfully established a JCCSE nationwide. Each JFHQ established Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN is an unsecured collection of Department of Homeland Security systems designed to facilitate information sharing and collaboration. Additionally, each Joint Force Joint Operation Center (JF JOC) has secure/non-secure real-time operational network linkages in addition to secure video teleconference capabilities. This is critical to providing real time operational connectivity as well as a common operating picture to local, state and federal agencies.

(7) **Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).** Include 22 Army and Air National Guard- Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel organized, trained and equipped to enter contaminated areas and identify contaminants within a short period of time. They have extensive reach-back communications capability to facilitate off-site evaluation and support from various laboratories. They are equipped with mobile laboratories capable of providing identification of chemical or biological materials. To date, the National Guard has fielded 36 CSTs and will have 55 teams by FY07.

(8) Aviation Security and Support (S&S) Battalions. As part of the Army's overall aviation transformation, the Army National Guard has been able to convert and grow some valuable dual-purpose aviation structure that will be readily available and responsive to Homeland Security/Defense needs, in addition to their normal Army operational mission. The ARNG officially activated six of these 24-aircraft S&S Battalions on 1 October 2005 and placed them in readily responsive locations across 44 states.

We are, once again, on point to test many of these measures as we are fast approaching another hurricane season. In this post-Katrina era we find that the best preparation for the next potential disaster is history.

With that said, I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard's efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four hours of Katrina's passing. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing from every state and territory responded to calls for support of the affected region.

This response was phenomenal; however, it is the "lessons learned" from Katrina that require—in fact, *demand*—our immediate attention. Through conversations with troops on the ground, commanders, Senate and House hearings, and most recently the White House's February report, *The Federal Response to Hurricane*

Katrina Lessons Learned, released by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the National Guard has three major issue areas that need to be addressed— resourcing, interoperability, command and control of all military forces, and training.

RESOURCING

Even prior to 9/11, the National Guard did not have all of the equipment it is required to have. The pace of combat has placed even further challenges on us. In order to ensure that deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the world, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support of these missions. This situation has presented the National Guard with challenges in keeping our inventories here at home fully supplied with critical items such as trucks, radios, and heavy engineering equipment. With the help of Congress and the President, we have made an excellent start in filling these equipment gaps, and the President's Budget will allow the National Guard to continue on the road to recovery. Over the FY06-FY-11 timeframe, the Administration plans to invest \$19.2 billion and \$4.4 billion in the Army and Air National Guard, respectively, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to providing the resources necessary to protect our homeland.

We are also addressing this through force structure rebalancing and the use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as an essential force multiplier. This agreement among the States enhances a Governor's response

capabilities by providing access to regional forces and equipment. Without question, EMAC enabled the National Guard to overcome many of the equipment/resource obstacles faced during Hurricane Katrina and Rita. The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center (NGB JOC) served as the coordination point for the various EMAC requests before sending the requests out to the states and territories. We provided needed advice and assistance to Governors in identifying, selecting, requesting and deploying Guard forces needed in the affected states.

Maintaining essential capabilities across the National Guard, amid on-going overseas operations, AC/RC rebalance, modularity conversions, and National Strategy adjustments is an evolving task. Nevertheless, the National Guard Bureau attempts to synchronize all of these activities to ensure at least 50 percent of a given state's National Guard is always available for state missions, and HLD operations.

INTEROPERABILITY

The recently released White House report, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned* spoke to the need for interoperability. It said, "lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment." As for the National Guard forces, the first 48 hours after the hurricane made landfall saw the Guard literally using boats and helicopters to

communicate. Our specialized C4 packages, though limited in number, were able to bridge the frequency gap between military and civilian personnel in many locations. An in-depth look at interoperability is on-going and there is a “sense of urgency” inside the Army and the Defense Department about meeting the National Guard’s equipment needs.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The infusion of the active duty forces into the Hurricane Katrina response effort presented some challenges at the operational level. There were some gaps in communication, coordination and integration into ongoing National Guard and Emergency Response operations already underway by the affected states. The situation was occasionally exacerbated by incompatible communication systems, lack of familiarity with the local area, and lack of involvement in the pre-Hurricane planning.

The efficacy of the creation of the Joint Forces Headquarters-State was proven in the National Guard portion of the response as both of the affected states were able to integrate forces from 53 other states and territories and the District of Columbia. Further, the Joint Forces Headquarters-State could have provided reception, staging, and onward integration for the federal forces deployed by NORTHCOM to support the civil authorities in the affected states.

In addition to the benefits of JFHQ-State I've already discussed, a Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State) can, with state-federal concurrence, assume tactical control of all military units ordered to respond to a contingency operation or disaster. This includes all state National Guard, other National Guard forces, Active Component as well as Reserves. The JTF-State commander can be a dual-hatted commander of both Title 32 and Title 10 forces giving unity of command within the military forces. The JTF-State can act as a subordinate Command and Control headquarters for US NORTHCOM if required. The effectiveness of dual-hatted command was proven in 2004 at the G8 Summit, Operation Winter Freeze as well as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. These were landmark achievements. For the first time in our nation's history, the military attained unity of command for all forces operating in support of a major event. In each case, from one Joint Force Headquarters, a single National Guard officer commanded Guard units from multiple states operating under Title 32 authority, as well as Active Component Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps title 10 forces in a joint, intergovernmental, interagency environment.

TRAINING

I'd like to transition into training and the National Guard's determination to take advantage of opportunities to share training and planning expertise with civilian partners and the importance that these efforts be institutionalized. The above-mentioned White House report recommended that each Federal agency a

homeland security professional development program. We are pleased to say that we are already heading in that direction. The National Guard's Joint Interagency Training Center in West Virginia, serves as a model that demonstrates how joint training capacity can be expanded and how the military and civilian communities can train and work together. We are working with the Joint Forces Command to institutionalize this Center within the Departments process for joint education and training. This will allow us to increase the overall effectiveness of the national effort through standardized operational concepts, shared experiences, and enhanced interoperability.

These four areas of concern -- resourcing for personnel and equipment, interoperability, command and control of all military forces, and training -- must be addressed as they are crucial to ensuring an effective response for Homeland Defense and civil support. Identifying and correcting these concerns will only improve the National Guard's already high state of readiness in supporting HLD as training received to support our other mission, overseas warfight, provides the vast majority of preparation required for HLD.

The successful integration of civilian and military cultures and capabilities has long been one of the strengths of the National Guard. Our members live in both worlds. Our forces operate in both worlds. We are proud to be able to bring these communities, cultures and capabilities together and render to our fellow citizens essential help when it is needed most.