

THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. In Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. Good afternoon. The Europe Subcommittee will come to order.

The topic of today's hearing, the second in a series on transatlantic relations, is on "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: A View From Europe." We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel with us today.

At our hearing last week we heard that, by any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, "old or new," if you wish, is perhaps the most important foreign relationship we have. No two regions of the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. For the most part, our traditional and closest allies are in Europe.

In Europe, our core national interests are fully engaged. Our economy, our system of trade and our security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues than with any other region in the world.

These facts should lead us to conclude, as many have, that the partnership between the United States and Europe not only remains relevant but is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and strengthened.

Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric we heard on both sides of the Atlantic during the Iraq debate, particularly with respect to and from the leaders and media from a few nations of Europe, did damage the overall relationship between America and Europe and has raised concerns regarding an increase in long-term anti-American attitudes, especially in those nations which opposed United States policy in Iraq. We are already hearing within Europe concerns that the United States is seeking to split the European Union by working to ensure that a future common foreign and security policy does not develop. We also hear references to the desirability of a multipolar world and discussions, particularly by French President

Chirac, of a united Europe acting as a counterweight to the United States.

Therefore, it is important that we examine whether fundamental differences have emerged over our global or at least regional responsibilities and how these responsibilities should translate into future relations between the United States and Europe.

European attitudes and policies have been influenced by its history and culture, which of course is also true of America. However, because of Europe's unique history, its geography and its close proximity of so many strong nationalities, with all of their history of bitter wars and changing alliances, Europeans I think naturally have a predisposition today to support multilateral initiatives and institutions that limit the unfriendly or detrimental actions of individual nations on their neighbors.

I have a very difficult time, I am pleased to say, imagining the armies of these countries crossing borders for aggressive reasons any more.

This gradual and warm embrace of multilateralism in the 20th century has generally served Europe well, resulting in a level of integration and cooperation that Europe's forefathers could not have imagined. It has also helped the smaller, less powerful European states act collectively to reduce the unilateral options or use of power by some of the larger European states. Over the years, Europeans have given up increasing elements of their national sovereignty to the European Union and have certainly accepted a higher level of regulation and standardization than currently would be acceptable to the American public ever, or at least in the foreseeable future. As Philip Stephens wrote in his *Financial Times* column of November 23, 2001: Here—meaning in Europe—governments have few hang-ups about pooling sovereignty in the cause of greater security or even a cleaner world. They do it every day in the European Union.

Americans certainly do understand many of the benefits which membership in multilateral institutions or treaties can provide. However, we Americans are highly protective of our national sovereignty and, as such, have become more suspicious about international efforts that could be seen as setting limitations on our flexibility to use our power to defend the security of our citizens or our allies. As the world's sole remaining superpower, our world view and our global security responsibilities, especially after September 11th, 2001, will be somewhat different than that of many Europeans. We are sometimes regarded as the force of last resort, drawn upon when there is a deficit in international resolve or when all other avenues of conflict resolution fail.

The difference in attitudes on the importance of national sovereignty and multilateralism may be a big reason I think for the increasingly divergent attitudes, perceptions and actions between European nations and the United States. These differences should not be overestimated, underestimated or misunderstood, and they must be addressed or at least appropriately recognized. Some can't be addressed in a manner that eliminates those misunderstandings or—well, I will say different perceptions.

President Bush said recently in Poland that the United States is committed to a strong Atlantic Alliance joined by a union of ideals and convictions.

Today we ask Europe, especially those with whom we have had our greatest differences, if the same holds true for them. Today we ask what kind of a partnership does Europe wish to continue to have with America. Do they want, for example, a north Atlantic partnership, European and American counterparts, or do they really want to build a counterweight to the United States?

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

I am pleased to recognize the distinguished Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.

I know we have votes coming up, so I ask your forgiveness for proceeding without you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A VIEW FROM EUROPE

At our hearing last week, we heard that by any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, "old or new," is perhaps the most important foreign relationship we have. No two regions in the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. For the most part our traditional and closest allies are in Europe.

In Europe our core national interests are fully engaged. Our economy, our system of trade and our security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues than with any other region in the world.

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I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Chairman, in light of the votes, please let’s move to the testimony.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. We will at least get the very important comments about our witnesses here today—we will complete all of those.

I think we will go in this order. Ambassador Hugo Paemen is Senior Advisor for Hogan and Hartson. He serves as an Advisor to the German Marshall Fund and is Special Advisor to the President of the European Commission. From 1995 to 1999, Ambassador Paemen was the head of the Delegation of the European Commission in the United States. From 1987 to 1995, he worked as Deputy Director General for External Relations for the EC, now EU, and has successfully led the European negotiation team on the WTO-Uruguay Round.

Dr. Dieter Dettke has been the Executive Director of the Washington office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation since 1985. Prior to coming to Washington, he served as Political Counselor of the SPD Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag. He was a Research Associate at the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin.

Justin Vaisse is a Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and France of the Brookings Institution where he is focusing on United States foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Between 1997 and 2002, he served as an external consultant to the French Foreign Ministry policy planning staff; and from September, 1998, to July, 1999, he was Speech Writer of Defense Minister Alain Richard.

Mr. Radek Sikorski is Executive Director of the New Atlantic Initiative and a Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. He was Poland’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for 3 years, overseeing, among other things, the work of the United States interests section in Baghdad. He signed the agreement to abolish visas between Poland and Israel. He conducted political consulta-

tion with, among others, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iran. Sympathy. Congratulations on that. In 1992, as Deputy Minister of Defense in the first democratically elected government after the fall of Communism, he spearheaded Poland's drive to join NATO.

Mr. Gianni Riotta is Columnist for the widely read and influential newspaper *Corriere della Sera*. Mr. Riotta has worked for Italian public radio Rai and as Special Correspondent for the daily *La Stampa* based in Rome. He is a graduate of the University of Palermo and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, where he is a Fulbright Fellow.

All these gentlemen have written numerous articles and books, and we are reminded that Mr. Riotta just has received international acclaim in a number of countries on his recent book.

So, with those introductions, we will go as far as we can before we are interrupted. All of your written statements will be made a part of the record. We are going to ask you to summarize in approximately 6 minutes each.

Ambassador Paemen, we will hear from you first. You are free to proceed as you like. Thank you, all of you, for coming.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HUGO PAEMEN, SENIOR
ADVISOR, HOGAN AND HARTSON, L.L.P.**

Mr. PAEMEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, I am very honored to participate in this hearing, and I very much appreciate your initiative to organize this exchange. I will evidently speak in my personal name and not in the name of any organization I am associated with or was associated with in my previous capacity.

Mr. Chairman, as I explained in my written contribution, which is available, I think that we have to make a distinction, when we talk about the possible crisis between the United States and Europe, between the political difficulties—and I would call them geopolitical difficulties—and the economic reality, which has shown over the last years an increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy. This appears very clearly from the study that has recently been published by Joe Quinlan of Johns Hopkins University and which I quote in my text.

Even the idea of a trade war seems to have somewhat disappeared recently, probably thanks to the statesmanship of the people in charge; and there is good cooperation in a certain number of other areas, one being Afghanistan, for instance. But there is no doubt that, on the political side, if there is not yet a crisis, the relations seem to suffer from a serious—what I would call “lack of trust.” And what I am saying here is not based on scientific analysis. It is, rather, based on impressions and observations.

There is no doubt that the immediate cause of this situation and the different positions taken on the war with Iraq. On the European side it started with a lot of solidarity and sympathy after September the 11th and an attitude in favor of the action against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. But these were quickly followed by a lack of comprehension when it came to the strategy of the war against terrorism, which was perceived as somewhat vague, directed at an undefined enemy and often changing targets. This was accompanied by a kind of uneasiness about the so-called “Axis of

Evil” approach and what I would call the whole “good versus evil syndrome.” All this resulted in a general feeling—with at least part of the population in Europe—of suspicion about the war against Iraq, because the link with September 11 was not very clear and also the presence of WMD had not clearly been established.

It is my feeling though that the lack of trust which is obviously there, at certain levels and in certain parts of the population on both sides, is more emotionally loaded on the United States side than in Europe. There is, I think, in the United States a kind of sudden and relatively deep resentment felt at the absence of loyalty shown by the traditional allies, whose security the United States has been defending for so many years.

The lack of trust on the European side, I think, is rather based on a political assessment and less on disappointment, probably because of already existing divergences. One is a disagreement on at least certain aspects of the policy in the Middle East, which the Europeans see as being at the center of the issue.

Then there was also the openly announced new policy by the Administration, which was focusing on the national interest rather than on international commitments.

There are clearly deeper reasons than the war with Iraq, but I will come back to that a bit later.

I have structured my comments on the questions which had been handed over to me by your staff, and one of them concerned the perception of the threat and in how far it differed in the United States and in Europe. There certainly was a difference. Europe saw a much closer link between what happened on September the 11th and the Israeli-Palestinian issue than the United States would admit. Europeans, at least some Europeans—I don’t want to generalize—had a tendency to think that if what they considered to be the main cause could be eliminated, a large part of the threat would disappear.

Very important also was the difference of approach by the media in the United States and in Europe. One had the feeling sometimes that in the United States the media were almost pleased with having a war, because it offered them a lot of professional and probably commercial opportunities. I think, from having travelled between Europe and the United States now for quite a while, that the European journalists distanced themselves more from the events and at least tried to give a more balanced view, while being, for instance, quite critical of the so-called embedded arrangements of their American colleagues.

It can also be said that the general perception of a war is different in the United States and in Europe. In the United States, it is very often perceived and presented in the media as a heroic event, where the United States, with all it represents, can show what it is capable of doing, while for Europe, due to its history, a war evokes own cities being destroyed and innocent civilians being killed.

Perhaps one word on anti-Americanism. I don’t think that there is a general anti-Americanism in Europe. There is I think the phenomenon that the United States, being what it is, leaves nobody indifferent. From there on you have a whole range of feelings. You have great admiration. You have sympathy. You have gratitude but

also envy, frustration, need for protection but also need for independence.

So, I am convinced that if we have the statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic, we will overcome our present difficulties. But, also think we have to take care of the coexistence of somewhat different views of the future of the world system, and that will be the responsibility of our leaders in the coming months. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Paemen.

I am told that originally we had told the panel they would have 7 minutes, and so we will go to 7 minutes, and I allowed for that. [The prepared statement of Mr. Paemen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HUGO PAEMEN, SENIOR ADVISOR, HOGAN AND HARTSON, L.L.P.

Facts and perceptions

Among the decisive facts that have influenced the U.S.-European relationship recently are undoubtedly:

- the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of the U.S. as sole superpower,
- the further development of the European integration with the creation of the Euro, the E.U.'s Enlargement and the start of its Common Foreign and Security Policy,
- the U.S.-E.U. partnership in the Balkans,
- the disagreements on a solution for the Middle-East crisis, and most eminently
- the events of September 11 and their aftermath.

It is remarkable that nearly all these events belong to the "security" or geo-political side of the relationship. Does this mean that the time of the banana war and the G.M.O. disputes is over? Or rather that the new issues are of such compelling importance that the once predominant trade fights have been dwarfed? Has the combined statesmanship of Bob Zoellick and Pascal Lamy prevailed over the previous inclination towards litigation? Have the security battalions taken over from the trade warriors? Because even more remarkable is the gap that seems to exist between, on the one hand, the developments in the economic sector and, on the other hand, the security areas.

In a study, published a couple of months ago, on "The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy" Joseph P. Quinlan from Johns Hopkins University writes: "One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the past decade has been the increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between Europe and America than between any other two continents." Some of the many facts from the study show not only that both are each other's major trading and investment partner, but that:

- both continents are each other's most important market in terms of global earnings;
- in 2000 roughly 58% of corporate America's foreign assets were located in Europe and European firms accounted for more than two thirds of total foreign assets in the U.S.;
- about 7 million Americans owe their livelihoods to European investors; the corresponding European figure is 6 million.

The general thrust of his findings is that in the past decade "the transatlantic economy became even more intertwined and interdependent".

In contrast to this, It goes without explanation that the relations in the security area have developed in a different direction, at least with some countries and with a large part of the European public opinion.

Let's turn to the most recent developments on either side.

In 2000, the *European Union* introduced the Euro as common currency. This made the economic integration quasi irreversible. The three Member States of the E.U. that have stayed out will probably join in the near future. There was some skepticism and even some suspicion in the U.S. when the idea of a European currency was launched. This has now disappeared and the Euro is being treated as a normal international currency.

The next natural step in the European integration process is considered to be the establishment of a real Common Foreign and Security Policy. In that context the decision had already been taken to deploy a military force of 50 000–60 000 people capable of performing humanitarian and rescue tasks as well as peacekeeping and certain peacemaking tasks. As their first mission the Union forces have taken over the reins of peacekeeping mission “Operation Allied Harmony” from NATO. Matters of collective defense, however, are left to NATO, of which most E.U. countries are members. It has to be said that, although it was an indispensable part of the initial concept of the European integration, the idea of a common foreign and defense policy was only gradually, and even somewhat reluctantly developed.

On the enlargement of the Union, negotiations have been finalized aiming at the accession of 10 new countries to the Union in 2004. That will bring its population close to 500 million. It gives an idea of the Immense challenge this phase of the European integration implies.

In light of these fundamental developments and the challenges involved, the Governments of the Union have organized a Convention, which has been asked to formulate recommendations in order to increase the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the governance of the larger Union.

Nobody will deny that with all this Europe has taken on a full plate of its own recently and that, inevitably, its collective energy has been mainly devoted to the intricacies of one of the most decisive phases of the integration process.

On its side, the new *American administration*, which took over in 2000, had openly announced that its foreign policy would be more consistently focused on the national interest. As Condoleezza Rice wrote: “. . . it will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.” This led, in the early stages, to the renunciation by the U.S. of some multilateral agreements already in force or in the process of ratification (Kyoto Agreement, A.B.M. Agreement, Court of International Justice . . .). Because of its unique position of strength, it was inevitable that such retreats—as would do more pro-active initiatives—risked appearing as unilateral policies.

On the foreign trade side, the American government was instrumental, with the E.U. and others, in launching the new multilateral negotiations of the World Trade Organization in Doha. Congress gave—it is true, with a slight majority—the administration the authority to negotiate a global agreement. On the bilateral side, and in accordance with some campaign promises, the administration introduced a considerable increase of its farm subsidies and applied safeguard measures to protect the steel industry.

However, the dominating events during the last two years were undoubtedly the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and the subsequent American policy shake-up in the context of the war against terrorism. After the worldwide wave of sympathy and solidarity, reactions to the subsequent U.S. policy became more divisive in the world and more particularly in Europe. Within the U.S., somewhat inevitably, the focus on homeland security and on weapons of mass destruction has strengthened even more the fundamental priority given to the pursuit and defense of the national interest.

How deep is the gap?

Without going into the circumstances and deeper causes of the Atlantic divorce following the 9/11 events, it is worthwhile trying to understand whether the growing divide has been caused by irreversible forces, inevitable outside developments or whether it is the logical consequence of consciously taken options based on divergent views of a changing world. .

There are those who believe that the growing inequality of power, which they equate to military power, inevitably widens the gap between the two partners of the Atlantic Community. This theory says that a stronger U.S. will, quite naturally and inevitably, always want to fully exercise its power in a world where strength is the unique decisive yardstick between nations. Similarly and as inevitably, the weaker Europeans try to hedge their weakness by invoking rules or by concluding international agreements. How do those pundits explain that this anomaly has not appeared more openly before? Because, they say, the Cold War and the protective shield of NATO, essentially provided for by the U.S., made it possible for Europeans to build a kind of paradise based on idealistic but somewhat illusive concepts like international law, multilateral agreements, human rights, etc. These commentators have a tendency to consider the European Union as the apex of fairyland playing funny girls’ games and having even invented their own funny currency. Evidently, they consider that, in the new world order, this asymmetrical development can not go on much longer, if only because of the irrepressible need for the superpower to exercise its muscles in order to secure its eminence in a world of macho states.

The reality is probably somewhat different. But it does not mean that the concept of the rock-solid Atlantic Alliance, as it survived the skirmishes of the Cold War, is not being seriously challenged by the geo-political shifts that have taken place during the last fifteen years. Successive NATO summit meetings have wrestled with the seemingly irreconcilable requirements of the preservation, adaptation and enlargement of the Alliance. It is also far from clear what the role of an "adapted" NATO can be in the context of the new national security strategy of the U.S.. Sometimes it looks like preordained as a reservoir for possible ad hoc coalition-building wherever national interests are threatened. As Donald Rumsfeld said: the mission determines the coalition, not the reverse. As the present administration prepares the country for continuous leadership in the world based upon military superiority and balance of power between the major countries, some Europeans also ask themselves what in that scheme the role of the E.U. would be beyond that of a loyal NATO "dishwasher", the real menu nor the guests at the meal having been disclosed.

Some historians tell us that internationalism and introversion have always been two alternating, sometimes competing, features of American foreign policy. Based on what happened to the initial inclination of this administration, some question whether the increasing globalization of the world and the unique position of the US still leave a real option in that respect. Others foresee, not without serious apprehension, that the considerable external commitments, their costs and possible drawbacks, will inevitably generate a domestic reaction in the opposite direction.

On the other hand, it is also far from clear how prepared the Member States of the E.U. are to do what is needed for the establishment of a credible European military force that could really be in charge of the European home security as well as become what was once called the European pillar of the enlarged Alliance. As I said before, the building of a European defense capacity was always considered to come at the end of the economic and political integration process. The internal dynamics of the integration process and the recent developments will increase the pressure on the governments to add this dimension more clearly to the enormous challenge of the enlargement and institutional reform of the Union. As happened with the drive towards a common currency, the call for efficiency, coming from the outside world as well as from inside the Union, will increasingly urge for a more consistent strategic approach to the political and security challenges of the global world.

But their leaders will have to deliver more than plans if they want to convince their own citizens, the U.S. and the rest of the world of their strategic vision and be considered as relevant interlocutors and reliable partners.

Is there room for compromise?

Answers to these questions would in the first place presuppose that Europe and the U.S. can work out a concept and a "modus vivendi" of coexistence between two different views of the future world order. It is indeed unlikely that the European Union will ever, or at least in the foreseeable future, and this notwithstanding its relative economic, political and possible military weight, join the military competition in the world. The whole culture that led to the constitution of the Union, fed by the experiences of internecine wars, has been dominated by the concept of a community of law. It is unrealistic to think that in its external relations the Union would not try to gradually apply the same basic principles. This would imply a fundamental change in the history of international relations (as the E.U. has introduced already as far as its own member states are concerned). The only context in which this is possible is the system of the United Nations, which has excluded the use of force as a legal way to settle international conflicts short of situations of self-defense in compliance with existing rules. It does not exclude competition between nations but would subject all international exchanges to a legal system of multilateral rules. There are the schools of the realists and the neo-realists who, evidently, will look down with skeptical sympathy on these naïve "Kantian" visions.

The position of the U.S. on this issue will be decisive. Its monopoly of military power allows it to satisfy the requirements of a global strategic reach. But solitary action has become difficult in a unifying world and politically risky. Even if this unique position of strength can be maintained in the foreseeable future, it will encourage others to look for recognition based on the same standards and using the same elements of power. With the transfer of technology becoming increasingly fluid, monopolistic positions will be more and more short-lived. One does not need to be a doom-sayer to predict that without a genuine effort to curtail the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction every country in the world that wants to do so will soon dispose of such weapons. But only the United States is in a position today to launch a credible process not to stop the technology, which is already there, not to reserve their use to some privileged and self-designated coun-

tries, which will not be accepted by the others, but to gradually come to a system of rules that will be applicable to everybody and monitored and enforced by a credible authority. This authority, according to the Europeans, can only come, in one way or another, from the United Nations, where the U.S. is unmistakably the key player.

All this does not mean that Europe will give up its military ambitions and its reach for hard power. Nor should other nations do so. What many Europeans would like to see is that this moment of unique economic and military power of the Western world, and of the United States in particular, be used to establish some basic rules of the global game, based on the universal values they represent, and have them accepted and enforced by the world community so that they will survive a possible change in the relative balance of power, which is never to be excluded (if not for our children, perhaps for our grandchildren). They will only have some chance of success, though, if the effort is genuine and if their promoters themselves are ready to respect the rules. It was Dr. Henri Kissinger, in his role of historian, who wrote: "The test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms, That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times".

The globalization of the world has already led to a considerable increase of international agreements and arrangements at the governmental and non-governmental level. This is particularly the case between the U.S. and Europe as a consequence of the increasing integration of the two societies. These networks are not the result of the growing military power of the United States. They have rather expanded in the non-military sector, particularly since the strengthening of the E.U., as appears from the study by Joseph Quinlan I mentioned before. This also shows an interesting relationship between the so-called soft and hard power nations can exert. As there is no doubt that good diplomacy backed by some hard power capacity will be more effective, it is wrong to think that both are mutually supportive in all circumstances. It is easy to recall examples where too much or abuse of hard power has led to a less efficient diplomacy, as there are many examples of deficient diplomacy leading to military conflicts that could have been avoided.

Between the U.S. and the E.U. a wide framework of consultations has been set up since the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995. The general feeling is that it did not deliver what had been hoped for. It has been working well in the trade sector for quite some time, with ups and downs, notwithstanding the objective differences of interest in certain areas. It has also worked well in other sectors like certain aspects of the war against terrorism. But there is no doubt that the recent experience will lead to some thinking on both sides about how things went as wrong as they did and how this can be avoided in the future, if that is what they want, a goal that I would wholeheartedly endorse.

Mr. BEREUTER. Next we will hear from Dr. Dettke. Pleased to see you here and thank you for your willingness to testify today. You may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF DIETER DETTKE, PH.D., EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION**

Mr. DETTKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor for me to testify before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe.

Let me first say how much I appreciate that the Committee is really willing to include European witnesses here in its effort to examine the state and the future of transatlantic relations, and I think it is a great privilege for me to be part of this hearing.

This relationship is crucial, I believe, both for Europe and the United States; and I testify here as a German citizen. I would like to point out first that it is time I think to move on and to put our disagreements over the war on Iraq behind us. Fifty years of great partnership with such a broad political, economic, military, cultural foundation, with extraordinary successes such as the Luftbrücke, the Berlin airlift, the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification, the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, all this cannot

be undone by a political disagreement even of the dimension of the war in Iraq.

I think we must be able to isolate our disagreements and not let them spill over, chipping away at the core of our relationship. It is quite a unique experience in the history of German-American relations that a legitimate but limited disagreement leaves so much bitterness behind, that communication between the top leadership of our two countries died out for such a long time. We need to be able to move on.

I think a good start has already been made. The unanimous vote in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 and the lifting of U.N. sanctions against Iraq is an opening for European-American cooperation in the necessary rebuilding process of Iraq. Despite his opposition to the use of military force in the conflict with Iraq, Chancellor Schroeder immediately after the war committed Germany to providing humanitarian assistance, offering medical help, to providing shelter for refugees. He also expressed his willingness to support the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq under a U.N. umbrella. Resolution 1483, which Germany supported, is now the legal foundation for the international community to contribute to reconstruction and institution-building in Iraq.

Germany has substantial experience in post-conflict reconstruction. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, Serbia is a good example and so is Afghanistan, where both the German government and the German nongovernmental organizations helped in the necessary rehabilitation, including administrative and police training and the strengthening of civil society institutions.

More importantly, in the fight against international terrorism, Germany also plays an important military role and has committed some 9,000 troops as part of several military operations to fight international terrorism. We contribute to ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom, also with forces in Afghanistan, Fox CW reconnaissance tanks in Kuwait and patrol boats around the Horn of Africa; and there is even a small German anti-terror contingent in Georgia.

Together with KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia and Concordia in Macedonia, Germany's military commitment is not irrelevant. It is, in fact, the second largest deployment of troops abroad after the United States.

During the war against Iraq, Germany kept all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance: United States forces had full logistical support for all their operations in Europe; German troops helped to secure American barracks in Germany; Germany provided Turkey with military support; and Germany's support for Israel continued.

Mr. Chairman, you are particularly interested in the issue of anti-Americanism in Europe. Now, I can assure you, and I agree with Ambassador Paemen, Europe and Germany in particular is not anti-American. Germany is probably one of the most pro-American countries in Europe. Two-thirds of the German population or more would still say that they like Americans.

But this general positive attitude toward America has seen some dramatic changes. I have to admit that. Since 2001, the number of Germans who see the United States as the most important partner

has declined from 58 percent of the population in October, 2001, to 49 percent in June, 2003.

In the past, these numbers used to be always much more than 50 percent support for America as an important partner, and more than 80 percent of the Germans always thought that our relations with the United States are good. Today, only 39 percent think our relations with the United States are good. This is clearly a trend related to the war in Iraq, and the reason for such a strain is not anti-Americanism, but Iraq, the war and a rather strong aversion—Ambassador Paemen talked about it—to the concept of war. War is identified with catastrophe.

Now, I am not saying here that without the war everything would be fine between Europe and the United States. There are a number of issues beyond the war in Iraq that are controversial: The doctrine of preemption, the lack of salience of multilateral institutions for United States foreign policy and the trade and development issues and, of course, let me mention the rejection of the Kyoto protocol, just to name a few issues.

However, my central argument here really is that these issues are manageable even after the deep transatlantic rift over Iraq. Actually, the longtime prospects for the transatlantic relationship are quite good. There is hope that we will be able to address some of the key issues, transnational issues together. Terrorism, WMD, trade development, climate change, energy, all these issues I think could be most effectively in my view addressed jointly between the United States and Europe.

Now my last comment is about the future of our strategic relationship. As has been mentioned already, particularly in the context of the summit of the Four on April 29 in Brussels—the idea that Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg would be willing to give up the strategic partnership with the United States has really no basis. It is explicitly rejected. The communiqué clearly states that the transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe, and it also says the partnership is a precondition for security and world peace.

Chancellor Schroeder sees these initiatives that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg started not as an effort of decoupling but rather as an effort of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar. I think it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the Four is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union; and it is the old two-pillar concept that drives the ambitions, if you wish, of the Four and nothing else.

The contributions of the EU, in particular through its enlargement, to stability in Europe is enormous. It is important, and I want to say it is a contribution to our common security, not only European security. NATO and Europe are now committed to strategic adjustments in response to new threats and to meet the new security requirements. And so does Germany. Just recently, the German Defense Ministry released new guidelines. They see German security as a global issue, not only as a German national issue. It is an international defense concept. We have learned our lesson.

Mr. Chairman, I will come to a conclusion. One of the key questions of this Committee is whether Europeans can be pro-Europe and pro-Atlantic at the same time; and my answer, Mr. Chairman, is, yes, we should be able to cooperate on a common agenda. We recognize U.S. leadership. The issue is not that we have too much America in the alliance. The issue is that we have too little Europe. That is what we are trying to change, and so you should follow the advice of many Europeans and Americans: Let Europe be Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Dettke.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dettke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DIETER DETTKE, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION

THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS—A VIEW FROM GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

For Germany, a country in the center of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance has always been and will continue to be a crucial security lifeline. Precisely because of US-leadership after World War II, the Atlantic Alliance provided protection without submission and today: NATO is still alive, whereas the Soviet empire collapsed and the Warsaw Pact is gone. Freedom and common values—democracy and human rights in particular—just as much as a common threat have kept the Alliance together in the past despite political differences and economic conflicts. As a result, Germany is united and Europe is whole and free today. This remarkable, historically unique achievement of the West is also a solid foundation for a European-American partnership in the future despite the deep rift over the war in Iraq. As far as Germany is concerned the transatlantic relationship is not heading for separation. To be sure we will have to address a number of differences beyond the Iraq issue but they are manageable. The long-term prospects for the transatlantic relationship are actually quite good. There are a number of global and transnational issues that can best be addressed in a joint European and American effort: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, trade, development, climate change and energy just to name a few. In view of the new threats and different security requirements after September 11, NATO will have to make adjustments too, but there is no reason to believe that the alliance will not be able to succeed in taking on a common agenda in the future.

A good start to overcome the transatlantic rift has already been made. The unanimous vote in the UNSC for Res. 1483 and the lifting of UN-sanctions against Iraq is an opening for European-American cooperation in the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq. Fortunately, the war was short and not too costly as far as loss of human life is concerned. This will help in the difficult task of building the foundations of a liberal democracy in Iraq. Immediately after the war began, on March 20, 2003, despite his opposition to the use of military force in the conflict with Iraq Chancellor Schröder committed Germany

- to providing humanitarian assistance,
- to offering medical help and
- to providing shelter for refugees.

He also expressed his willingness to support the necessary rebuilding process in Iraq under a UN-umbrella. Resolution 1483 which Germany supported is now the legal foundation for the international community to contribute to reconstruction and institution building in Iraq.

I

Robert Kagan's advice that it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world is probably a good hypothesis to start with in order to find out how deep the transatlantic rift is in reality. For it follows from his realist's school argument that artificial disagreements should also be ruled out. It is true that we had difficulties before the war in Iraq and these differences also reflect larger issues such as a changing pattern of attitudes and values. The Iraq conflict revealed that we do have a conflict of world order concepts. Europe has indeed reached a post-national stage in its history and is quite willing to pool its potential and to live with rules that chip away at individual national sovereignty.

But Europe is not an empire and still far away from common power, let alone power projection.

Robert Kagan is right to point out the differences between European and American thinking with regard to world order concepts, in particular the European preference for policies of *persuasion* rather than *coercion*.¹ However, the concept of *power* and *weakness* can also be misleading because it suggests a permanence of divergence that is not necessarily warranted. A closer, more detailed look at the structure of European and American power reveals that Europe is not all about weakness and America is not all about strength. Even though the United States is by far the strongest military power ever, with a global reach far beyond any empire in history, and is dominant not only politically but also culturally, the US is no less vulnerable in economic terms than Europe or any other economic power. Whereas military power can be controlled nationally, economic power is beyond full national control. Economic power relies on markets and therefore is much more amorphous and less tangible than military might. Europe is in the same league as the United States on the level of economic power and to some degree even capable of matching US power. Finally, under the conditions of globalization, quite a number of issues are transnational in nature (the environment, drugs, crime, trafficking in persons) and inevitably need international cooperation for successful solutions. Although the US can go it alone militarily, it is much more difficult to achieve American economic objectives unilaterally.

A closer look at the growing European-American values gap also reveals that it is important not to dramatize the differences. These differences do exist. One only needs to examine differing opinions on social issues, religion, patriotism, family values and sexual orientation. How much social safety should the government provide? How to protect the environment? How to take care of the poor? Should homosexuality be accepted? How much religious tolerance are we willing to accept? What about minorities? The answers to these questions in the US and Europe can differ quite strongly, but in most cases it is more a matter of degree, not principle. This is even true for the death penalty, which is often cited as one of the most fundamental value differences. To be sure, a large majority of Europeans is against the death penalty, but the number of people in Europe and the US favoring or rejecting the death penalty is not totally different. Many Americans have very similar concerns about the death penalty. Our legal systems differ, but there is no clash of civilizations within the Atlantic Alliance as some have claimed.² In a pluralistic society value clashes are more or less a built in phenomenon. They are normal.

Add to this the broad areas of value commonality including:

- democracy,
- freedom,
- tolerance,
- pluralism,
- human rights and
- equality of men and women

and it is obvious that our differences emanate from a common foundation, and they should be manageable even if at times our interests and values collide. One example of colliding values is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The American opposition to the International Criminal Court is hard for Europeans to understand. They believe that in this case the radical protection of national sovereignty is excessive. Europeans see the ICC as an institution, which will help create and maintain civility in an era of globalization.

II

From a German perspective opposition to the war in Iraq is a legitimate but limited disagreement with the United States. It is a policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship. The differences began to surface in the spring and summer of 2002 when the German media—often reflecting the domestic debate in the United States at the time—took up the issue of a potential war in Iraq. This occurred during an election year in both countries: German national elections and US mid-term elections. Election pressures are not the best communication devices.

¹Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness, in: *Policy Review*, No. 113, June 2002. www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html

²Charles A. Kupchan: The End of the West, in: *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 2002, www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/11/kupchan.htm

It is important to remember that UNSC Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 led to an alliance consensus to disarm Iraq on the basis of a multilateral process administered in the UN Security Council. However one interprets the quality of this consensus, the Alliance was able to find common ground at this critical juncture. Why it fell apart in the early months of 2003 is the crucial question, which Europeans and Americans will certainly answer differently.

The German case is unique. There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use military force, the strongest one being our own history of warfare, militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for WWII and the Holocaust. Fifty-five million people died as a result. For a German of my generation to think of war is to think of catastrophe. This is another important difference to consider in the difficult debate in Germany and the US about the use of force. During the last decade Germany has come a long way from its civilian power paradigm to a more active policy of engagement commensurate with Germany's economic and political weight in Europe. Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, both men with quite pacifist pasts, prepared Germany for the use of force in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. German public opinion, like almost everywhere in Europe, was reluctant to use military force. Chancellor Schröder had to go through a vote of confidence in the German *Bundestag*. The country finally supported his policy course because in both cases fundamental values were at stake: humanitarian values in Kosovo and existential values in Afghanistan in the fight against international terrorism.

Only force could help avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo where Serb armed forces used violence against the predominantly Muslim civilian population of Albanian origin. To stand by and let this happen, as had happened before in Srebrenica and other places in the former Yugoslavia, was neither a politically acceptable nor morally justifiable option. Kosovo was the first time since WWII that German combat forces participated in a major military operation and the *Bundeswehr* is still present in Kosovo in fulfillment of a peacekeeping mission.

Only military force was able to bring the perpetrators of September 11 to justice who were responsible for an apparently civilian, but in essence really a war-like catastrophe. Traditional police forces and the instruments of law enforcement were utterly insufficient in a country ruled by the Taliban, an extremist and fundamentalist Muslim regime dominated by the same terror organization that planned and executed the September 11 attacks. For this reason Germany decided to participate in this existential conflict, again with substantial military forces. As part of several military operations, Germany has committed about 9,000 troops to the fight against international terrorism:

- ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, to protect the provisional government of Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai. Germany provides some 2,500 troops and took over the command of ISAF together with the Netherlands at the beginning of February 2003. Just a few days ago, 4 German service men were killed in Kabul as the result of the terrorist activities of al-Qaeda.
- *Enduring Freedom*, a military contribution in the fight against international terrorism, with German forces deployed in Afghanistan, with Fox CW reconnaissance tanks in Kuwait and patrol boats around the Horn of Africa. Altogether some 2,000 troops including Special Forces are participating in *Enduring Freedom*.
- Germany also maintains a small anti-terror contingent in Georgia.

Together with KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia and *Concordia* in Macedonia, Germany's military commitment is not irrelevant. In fact it is the second largest deployment of troops abroad after the US. In addition to this, Germany has a substantial capacity for post conflict civilian reconstruction. This capacity played quite an important role in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Serbia, where both the German government and German non-governmental organizations helped in the necessary reconstruction effort, including the strengthening of civil society institutions.

During the Iraq war Germany kept all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance:

- The US forces had full logistical support for all their operations in Iraq.
- German troops helped to secure American barracks in Germany.
- Germany provided Turkey with military support and aid.
- German support for Israel was never a question. There was public criticism of some of the military actions of the Israeli government during the second *intifada*, but the government's support for Israel was never in doubt.

Europe was quite willing to participate in the common task of disarming Iraq. What divided Europe into “old” and “new” as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested—not without condescension, if not even contempt—is in reality a demonstration of the impact of the *coalition of the willing*-concept in Europe. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is going to divide Europe on a permanent basis. The strong support for the EU in a recent referendum in Poland and the Czech Republic indicates that Europe remains a coveted objective not only for these two countries, but also for those who disagreed with France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the core European countries opposing the war. The lesson from its failure to come to a joint decision on Iraq is that Europe should not have to make a choice between the Atlantic Alliance and Europe. German foreign policy so far always succeeded in bridging its commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation—essential for European integration—with Germany’s Atlantic orientation. Ever since the Franco-German Treaty when German Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty of 1963 between Adenauer and de Gaulle, a key role for Germany was to prevent a collision between Europe’s foreign policy ambitions and American policy and interests. A better understanding of Germany’s role in Europe, particularly vis a vis France would have helped to avoid the kind of collision that unfolded in late January 2003 when France, Germany and Russia, up to this point rather loosely connected in their opposition to the war in Iraq, firmed up their opposition in view of the massive military build up in the Gulf region. In view of the size of US and British forces, in combination with open calls for regime change, this strategy in the perception of many Europeans seemed to make war the only possible outcome of the UN-disarmament process. How much room there was for American foreign policy to influence the position of France, Germany and Russia in the ongoing UN-process in an open question. Some commentators—on both sides—do not even exclude bad faith from the beginning. I disagree. Judging from available facts from today’s perspective this is not the case and in essence it is a mean spirited attack on the transatlantic partnership. In theory a compromise was possible, yet none was reached.

Differences over the correct policy in the case of Iraq will most likely persist. France, Germany and Russia will probably remain convinced that a policy mix of:

- inspections, backed by force and permanent if necessary,
- support for democratic Iraqi opposition groups and
- creating a war crimes tribunal to indict Saddam Hussein

could have been effective if given a chance. Containment worked in the case of the Soviet Union. In the case of Iraq, containment could have been successful in conjunction with enhanced weapons inspections—particularly if the US would have put its full weight and commitment behind such a strategy.

Arms control enforcement below the level of war but in combination with pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein would also have contributed to indigenous regime change, if not immediately, then long-term. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council did not get a chance to prove its effectiveness in implementing arms control stipulations. Arms control inspections will be an important part of any future non-proliferation policy. North Korea and Iran could be cases where the UN Security Council might have to play a key role again. The German government was also convinced that without war we would have had a better chance to prevent terrorist attacks and to protect our citizens at home and abroad. In fact, attacks of al-Qaeda or its networks continued after September 11, for example in Djerba, Tunisia; Bali, Indonesia; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Casablanca, Morocco; and most recently in Kabul, Afghanistan. The war against terror as of today is far from being won. The following concerns are also shared by many Americans:

- economic costs,
- loss of human life,
- new recruitment opportunities for terrorism including suicide terrorism and
- encouragement for anti-Western Arab nationalism.

III

In US government circles as well as in the media the concern was that during the German election campaign in the spring and summer of 2002 the Iraq issue was often discussed with anti-American overtones, and led to a new wave of anti-Americanism in Germany. There is no widespread anti-Americanism in Germany, but a strong anti-war sentiment. This is illustrated by the fact that more than 200,000 people showed solidarity with the US at the Brandenburg Gate immediately after

the attacks of September 11. And less than twelve months later you saw many people in Germany, Europe and all over the world demonstrate against a war in Iraq.

Anti-Americanism in Germany has never been a serious or long-term problem despite major policy differences such as the war in Vietnam in the 1970's or the Missile Crisis in the 1980's, when it was often difficult to distinguish between legitimate criticism of US policies and anti-Americanism. Germany is still one of the most pro-American countries in Europe. Two thirds of the German population or more would still say that they like Americans. But this generally positive attitude towards America has seen some dramatic changes. In the past, the vast majority of Germans believed the United States to be the most important partner for Germany. The US was always seen as more important than any other country, including France. Since 2001, the number of Germans who see the US as the most important partner has declined from 58 percent of the population in October 2001 to 47 percent in June 2003. In contrast, the numbers for the same question for France have increased from 36 percent to 43 percent. In May 2002, 88 percent of the German population still believed the relationship between Germany and the US to be good. Only 9 percent believed it to be bad. In June 2003 a majority of Germans, 56 percent, believed relations were bad and only 39 percent believed they were good.³

The most recent polls of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, published in June 2003 confirm this fundamental change. Key developments in the Pew Research Center study of June 2003 conducted from April 28–May 15, 2003 in the US, Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere are:

- In most countries, opinions toward the US are markedly lower than they were a year ago.
- The war in Iraq has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans,
 - further inflamed the Muslim world,
 - softened support for the war on terrorism and
 - significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era—the UN and the North Atlantic Alliance.⁴

Seventy-six percent in France, 62 percent in Turkey, 62 percent in Spain, 61 percent in Italy and 57 percent in Germany believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past. Of course, these numbers are snapshots of reality, but a reality nevertheless. They can change, but it will take new initiatives to make them change.

IV

It is important not to lose sight of the real issue the West will continue to face in the future: How to deal with and ultimately defeat terrorism. Transnational catastrophic terrorism is a new threat, which demonstrated its deadly force and determination on September 11, 2001 with the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in Washington causing the death of more than 3,000 innocent people, a greater loss of human life than the military attack on Pearl Harbor. Terrorist attacks and mass killings by international terror networks using the language of religion for political purposes threaten the entire Western civilization and must be resisted for existential reasons. In this long and difficult struggle Germany stands shoulder to shoulder with the United States and Jean-Marie Colombani spoke for Europe and the civilized world when he said, "We are all Americans."⁵ This initial commonality after September 11 unfortunately lost ground with the European-American disagreement over Iraq. Many Europeans in Germany, France and elsewhere, including in European countries whose governments supported the war in Iraq, did not see the conflict with Iraq as part of the war on terror. If ties between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government had been proven, Europe would not have hesitated to ultimately support military action.

The existential fight against terrorism is a complex issue and it will take a long time to free mankind of this new totalitarian threat. But we have to realize that this threat is very different from the totalitarian threat of the Cold War:

- it is asymmetric,
- the enemy is not a state or empire,

³Data from the *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen*, Mannheim, Germany, 2003

⁴"Views of a Changing World", The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, June 2003

⁵Jean-Marie Colombani: "Nous sommes tous Américains", in: *Le Monde*, September 13, 2001

- the new terror networks fight in the name and the language of faith, attempting to entangle the West in a clash of civilizations in the desperate hope that as a result of such a clash an energized and radical Islam would achieve its final victory.

This conflict is much more about the hearts and minds of people than the previous one and it needs to be fought on many levels: politically, economically, culturally and if necessary, but not predominantly, also on a military level.

To be sure, Europe shares the serious concern about weapons of mass destruction with the United States and in some cases if proliferation continues and even increases, European territory will be at risk too. That is why particularly non-nuclear European states put so much emphasis on an effective non-proliferation system. It remains to be seen whether weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq. If the search turns out to be negative, a crucial US argument for the war in Iraq would collapse and reinforce the concerns about the lack of legal authority and legitimacy to use force against Iraq.

V

The strategic reorientation and adjustment of the United States after September 11 allowing asymmetric conflicts, including terrorist attacks, to be addressed more effectively is quite understandable. In Europe a strategic reassessment is also in the making. The new German defense guidelines are an example of a new strategic thinking beyond the Cold War and in sync with the new threats, particularly asymmetric warfare like the September 11 attacks, transnational crime, drug smuggling and trafficking in persons. For the United States, the new strategic focus seems to be the arc of instability that reaches from Latin America, through parts of Africa, particularly northern Africa, the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia. This could have consequences for US troop stationing in Germany.

The *Bundeswehr* now focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory. International terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation are now major concerns of the German armed forces. All these issues, according to the new defense guidelines, can only be countered by a comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system. In fact, the German defense minister stated that German defense now begins in the mountains of Afghanistan. The United States is not alone in its strategic realignment and some of the European adjustments are quite compatible with American efforts. However, there is no way that European defense expenditures would ever match the US defense budget dollar for dollar. It is also not necessary. More important will be to undertake the necessary restructuring and transformation demanded by the new threats. To increase defense spending over the next few years will be difficult, given Germany's and other European countries' financial constraints.

But there is also concern in Europe about the direction of the new strategic doctrine. By adopting a doctrine of preemption, meaning that the traditional concept of self-defense, which relied on deterrence, no longer applies for the United States, America seems to shed basic principles of international law. Waiting to be attacked—keeping the experience of the September 11 and the devastating consequences of catastrophic terrorism in mind—is, as President Bush stated, indeed bad security policy and strategy. However, without changing the Charter of the United Nations the legal consequences of the doctrine of preemption would be quite dramatic. Article II (4) of the Charter of the United Nations clearly states:

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

It would be a good idea to initiate a reform process of international law as well as the UN system so that the new threats, particularly terrorist threats, could be dealt with more effectively. The US decision to use military force against Iraq without a UN mandate is often defended with the argument that in Kosovo—knowing a UN mandate could not be obtained—NATO did intervene. This is not quite the same situation and does not necessarily support the argument that an intervention in Iraq should have been supported by America's European allies. Not only was the rationale for war in the case of Iraq different. It was also a different category of war. Kosovo is a case of *coercive diplomacy*. Iraq is a *classical war*.

After WWII the international community considered the UN-ban on wars of aggression as an important step forward to a more civilized world order. Preemption, however, borders on illegality. One can safely say that prevention in general is part

of the concept of self-defense. The meaning of prevention is obviously an act to remove a clear and present danger, an example being the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility of Osirak in 1981. Preemption, however, is at best an act of putative self-defense, e.g. taking action on the assumption of a threat that might not even be real. Putative self-defense is a dangerous concept, because it removes all practical legal hurdles and inhibitions to wage war. Europe is not against prevention. In fact prevention in a civilian context is an important development tool. European powers have demonstrated their willingness to act preventively, for example in the case of Kosovo. Our differences reside in the concept of preemption. It would be better not to adopt a questionable concept of putative self-defense without at the same time changing the UN Charter.

Another even more important issue is that by adopting a policy of creating *coalitions of the willing* depending on which issue is at stake, the United States creates a dual world order where the UN, NATO or other multilateral institutions can be replaced at any given moment by a *coalition of the willing*. The result of a wider use of this concept would mean that a *coalition of the willing* can be super-imposed upon the UN, NATO or any other multilateral institution. Europeans, after many devastating conflicts, came to the conclusion that to give away the right to wage war—the right of self defense notwithstanding—is a major step forward and not an encroachment upon national sovereignty. By replacing permanent allies with ad hoc *coalitions of the willing* the United States would give up an enormous amount of normative power—rule setting capacity or soft power—for a narrow purpose.⁶ Coalitions of the willing—willingly or not—will waste away existing permanent institutions. As a result, maximum flexibility for the United States would come with a high price. It is not only the loss of American normative power that is at stake here. Maximum flexibility for the US can also be a source of new instability.

VI

It is not difficult to put together an agenda for transatlantic cooperation. In the recent past, several think tanks and experts both in Europe and the US have made a number of suggestions for renewed and strengthened transatlantic cooperation. The G8 AIDS initiative launched at the most recent G8 meeting in Evian, France is also an agenda item for transatlantic cooperation. And there are more, for example in the area of energy policy, particularly renewable energy. Another idea is to create a whole new architecture for the transatlantic relationship ushering in a new Transatlantic Charter. In order to solve the current transatlantic crisis architectural designs, however, should not be our first priority. There are many urgent problems that need to be addressed. In addition to Iraq a primary concern is the stability of Afghanistan. Stability in this war-torn country is far from assured. It might be necessary to increase substantially the security commitment of the anti-terror coalition. So far only the city of Kabul enjoys a measure of protection that allows the current provisional government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai to function. The rest of the country is still not at peace. And even in Kabul, al-Qaeda attacks are possible. Warlords are still a real threat. Germany and the Netherlands have taken over the leadership of ISAF. This will end in August after which the lead function will be handed over to NATO and NATO assets. The open question is how to create long-term stability in Afghanistan. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) may be the answer to this question. Germany sent a team to Afghanistan to address the question of a possible German participation in the PRT. A decision will be made on the basis of the team's report after its return.

The Alliance potential could also be brought into play for the necessary peacekeeping tasks in Iraq under a UN-umbrella. Since the Prague Summit an evolutionary process is underway within NATO to strengthen the European pillar. This evolutionary process is essential in order to apply NATO's full weight in the long struggle for peace and stability in Europe and beyond. The EU will take over a number of peacekeeping operations that no longer require the hardware of a military alliance. Europe's hybrid security and defense forces can step in where NATO's military assets are no longer required or are needed elsewhere. The first step in that direction took place in Macedonia where NATO's responsibility has been seamlessly transferred into the hands of EU forces. Bosnia is a potential next transfer opportunity from NATO to EU forces. An EU operation, backed by a UN mandate, is taking place in the Congo today where a genocide of major proportion happened without the international community even taking notice. Yet it ranks as one of the worst cases of genocide since 1945.

⁶Jürgen Habermas: "Was bedeutet der Denkmalsturz?", in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 17, 2003

The EU is now on its way to creating the first modern constitution of a confederation with strong institutions. This unique post-national effort of pooling national sovereignties is in itself an important contribution to peace and stability in Europe. The United States should recognize the enormous potential for stability and economic progress embodied in the work of the European Convention and the process of enlargement and should take the advice not only from Europe, but also from many Americans: let Europe be Europe.

In a unipolar world, multipolarity can hardly be a threat for the United States. Today, multipolarity is at best an aspiration or a preference for a different world order. Whether multipolarity can create a more stable and secure world order than the present system is an open question. Not every multipolar system must be by definition more stable than unipolarity. More importantly, multipolarity is the result of a process of power distribution. It is impossible to claim multipolarity and it is important to realize that multipolarity is not a question of will, but rather an issue of capability. For the stability of an international system—multipolar or unipolar—multilateralism is the more important principle. Without multilateralism, NATO and the UN cannot function and a European Confederation would not work either. Rules are essential for stability and so are permanent allies. This is what the US as a superpower should be interested in, too.

CONCLUSION

On April 29, shortly after the military operations in Iraq ended and the transition to civilian restructuring began, four European countries—France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, core participants of the original integration process in Europe—met to consider their own situation and at the same time the situation of Europe after the war in Iraq. This “Belgian Chocolate Summit”—as it was nicknamed in the press—did not take place under the best circumstances, time-wise or otherwise. Its background was a mixture of high politics and low politics. Low politics was involved because of pending elections in Belgium and a perfect opportunity to help the sitting government add to its prestige by holding a high-level meeting with enormous media attention. In this respect the meeting was indeed successful. The high politics aspect was much more important, though, because this small caucus meeting of like-minded governments favoring deep integration including a European Security and Defense Union was an excellent opportunity to provide the European Convention with some basic concepts for deeper integration, particularly in the area of defense. In the US, this meeting of the four countries which opposed the war raised quite a few eyebrows. The assumption was that this core Europe would try to design a European foreign policy not based on Atlanticism but anti-Atlantic Gaullism. The fear in Washington was indeed that the Four would be willing to give up the strategic partnership with the United States. The communiqué, however, states quite the opposite, namely that “the transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe,” and continues, “that this partnership is a precondition for security and world peace.”

Chancellor Schröder sees the initiatives that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg started on April 29, 2003, not as an effort of decoupling, but rather as an effort of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar. Despite much American concern, it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the Four is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. It is the old two-pillar concept first suggested by President Kennedy that drives the ambitions of the Four, and this is not a bad concept for a strong Atlantic Alliance in the future. For it is true that we do not have too much America. We have too little Europe in the Alliance. The revival of the old idea of a European Security and Defense Union is hardly a strategic challenge for the United States. On the contrary, it will emphasize compatibility with NATO activities, including Rapid Reaction forces. The only new message from the “Belgian Chocolate Summit” is the creation of a nucleus of collective capacity for planning purposes of the European Union. It remains to be seen how far this nucleus will advance in reality. The transatlantic context of all European operations—if the plan of the Four is going to be implemented—will be maintained. The Nice Summit created the foundation for NATO compatibility of European Forces. If the results of NATO’s Prague Summit are implemented and Europe gets its constitution for the enlarged European Union, the Alliance will be much better prepared for the future and it will be a change for the better.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will next hear from Justin Vaisse. We are pleased to have you with us today. You may proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF JUSTIN VAISSE, VISITING FELLOW,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Mr. VAISSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very honored to submit this testimony before your Committee.

Many of the questions that your letter invitation listed aimed at interpreting what went wrong in the transatlantic relationship this winter. I would like first to give an interpretation from the French side and distinguish what actually motivated French foreign policy and what did not; and, in the interest of time, I will skip and summarize some parts of this testimony.

Was that on the French side a defense of commercial interests? No. Was that about anti-Americanism? Even less so. And here I would completely agree with my distinguished colleagues. I think the recent poll by the Pew Center released earlier this month confirms this view and has a very interesting number to give. Seventy-four percent of French people think that the problem is with the Bush Administration—and this is the highest rate among the 20 countries surveyed—and only 21 percent think that the problem rests with America in general, which obviously defines anti-Americanism, and this is the third lowest rate of all the 20 countries surveyed. So I think that is interesting.

Was that about the Muslim community in France? I don't think so.

Was that a quest for multipolarity? You referred to this question in your introduction, and so I will elaborate a bit on that.

I think that the preference for a multipolar world does influence French foreign policy but only as a secondary and rhetorical factor, a sort of reinforcing one. It is not in my view a prime source of French foreign policy. Take an issue like Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. There was no talk at all about multipolarity, because the United States and Europe agreed on the necessity of routing out the Talibans and that it was a key part of the war on terrorism. President Chirac sent troops, fighter jets, an aircraft carrier battle group, and 73 percent of the French public opinion approved this American-led war, another demonstration that France is neither pacifist nor massively anti-American. So the French position about Iraq was, in my view, issue-specific and not general.

So now let's try to find the real reason behind the French attitude this winter.

I think that the war on terrorism is the most important one, definitely. The French see the invasion of Iraq as a step backward, not forward, in the war against terrorism, as quite a few experts do. There are many reasons for this assumption: Saddam was never convincingly linked to al-Qaeda. Terrorist recruitment is thought to get a boost from that. The show of force cannot deter a terrorist network that have no territorial basis and cannot coerce the countries that are the real problem behind that global terrorism, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, et cetera. So I think it is really an issue of national security for the French people.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another one, and I won't elaborate on that.

I think there is a cultural background to this divergence also, that there is a sort of European historical pessimism and weariness

of war to which my colleague just referred, and I think that is a really important factor.

Last but not least, I think that this war was seen as unnecessarily fueling a possible clash of civilization between the West and the Arab Muslim world.

So I think that, to summarize things briefly, these are the real main reasons behind the French position in the last few months. It has to be acknowledged, though, that a vast majority of experts, including myself, failed to predict that these reasons would be enough for France to attempt to stand in the way of United States action in Iraq. So the question is why did we misunderstand what France would do? I remember the time when we were all forecasting that in the end France would act according to old, familiar patterns.

In retrospect, my view is that France's action revealed that a new transatlantic system is slowly emerging, where old patterns are increasingly replaced by new ones, old rules by new rules. Many of us apply the old narrative of French-United States relations to the current crisis, the thought that in the end, however reluctantly, France would go along as it did in other instances.

Here, however, France did not conform to this bad-weather friend role; on the contrary, badly overplayed a weak hand. But it seems to me also indicative of the new transatlantic game that the U.S. didn't conform to its traditional role either and from my perspective overplayed a strong hand, if you will.

To put it succinctly, I think that if the Soviet threat had still been present, France would never have so clearly opposed the United States on an issue presented by Washington as vital for its national security, but Washington would also never have claimed that it faced a vital threat from a country without first achieving consensus from its allies on the threat or at least would not have requested absolute loyalty from its allies on this somewhat shaky basis.

So let's try to define the old and the new transatlantic system.

In the old transatlantic system, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and for most of the decade that followed, a set of norms, rules and habits of consultations went hand in hand with an American leadership that oscillated between sharing decisions on matters of common interest and cleverly pretending to do so while acting largely on its own; and I think that it was a good system. A dense network of first- and second-track diplomacy ensured that, even when they disagreed, allies would understand each other's position and make adjustments to avoid conflict and keep the fiction of an alliance of equals.

The new system has very different rules, which derive from power, not leadership. Basically, Washington decides and European allies are expected to conform without having a say, sometimes even without proper information and discussion. Let me quote this: "Diplomatic contact across the Atlantic is dropping precipitously in terms of quantity and quality," as one observer remarks, based on precise figures of talks and contacts between the two sides of the Atlantic, and in this respect the diplomacy preceding the first Gulf War and the Iraq war have been strikingly different.

So how has Iraq reacted to this new posture by Washington, to this implementation of these new rules? I think we can distinguish in Europe three groups, each of which exists in all European countries.

The first group plays by the new rules, either by necessity like some East European leaders or because the deal is better for them in the new game.

The second group still conforms to the old transatlantic rules, hopes they will return and thinks that the Iraqi crisis was just an exception.

And the third group tries to react to the downgrading of transatlantic relations by fostering European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follows a foreign policy more adapted to its ideals and its interests. This group, feeling that its real interests are not necessarily advanced or taken into account by America anymore, is ready to cooperate with Washington on a case-by-case basis, which leaves room for many joined projects, but doesn't ensure automatic cooperation. President Chirac's policy I think is a symptom of this pragmatic adaptation to the new rules.

So among these three groups, which one prevails in Europe? I think that one must remember that during the crisis if Chirac was definitely not speaking for Europe, he was certainly speaking for the Europeans, even majorities of the East Europeans he so rudely insulted.

In the long term, opposition to one's own public opinion can translate into electoral losses, and the recent defeats by Aznar and Berlusconi's parties in the Madrid province and Rome would seem to demonstrate this. So the real question for me is: Given its costs, would Blair, Aznar and Berlusconi agree to follow the same path again, the same path they did for Iraq in the next crisis? Would the next government of these countries, maybe from the opposition party, act the same way?

I think I need to conclude. I will leave this question open and just make five concluding remarks.

First, I think that credibility matters, and I don't have time to elaborate, but I think this is a very important asset for the transatlantic relation.

Dialogue matters, and at all levels.

My third point is that French bashing is dangerous for America, because it is misleading. The risk is to misinterpret the reasons for not only French but also European opposition and believe that if France had not opposed the United States the way it did, everything would have been fine. I don't think it is the case, and I am explaining that in the paper.

Four, the transatlantic agenda is much broader than just Iraq and terrorism, and I am happy to report that from my research there has been no spillover effect from the Iraq issue to other issues of especially French-United States relations, except for specific military exercise cancelled by the Pentagon, but on the rest people are still cooperating, and I think that is very good news.

And five, last but not least, let's keep all of this in mind for the next crisis, which will probably be Iran. I think now is the time to discuss before another crisis arrives which could bear dramatic consequences for the transatlantic alliance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Vaisse.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Vaisse follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUSTIN VAISSE, VISITING FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. Chairman, I'm very honored to submit this testimony before your committee ; all the more so since I have been teaching a course on American political institutions and American foreign policy back in Paris for the past three years. Getting a chance to actually take part in a hearing in this building is an experience which I do value.

During my testimony and the subsequent questions and answers, while addressing the issue of US-Europe relations as whole, I will focus on France. May I add, Mr. Chairman, that as an independent expert, I will explain, not defend, the French position—whether I personally agree with it or not.

Many of the questions that your letter of invitation listed aimed at interpreting what went wrong in the transatlantic relationship this winter. Let me first give you an interpretation from the French side and distinguish what motivated French foreign policy and what did not.

Defense of commercial interests ? No—trade with Iraq was somewhere between 0.2% and 0.3% of French trade, and if this had been a factor, the appropriate strategy for France and Germany would have been to join the coalition, and insist on getting a fair share of oil and other contracts afterwards.

Anti-Americanism ? Even less so—President Chirac is probably the less anti-American of all recent French presidents, and anti-Americanism, from a historical point of view, has been receding in French society since the high points of the 1950's, 60's and 70's. The French were against this particular war and anti-Bush, not anti-American. The recent poll by the Pew Center, released earlier this month, confirms this view : 74% of French people think that the problem (“with the US”) is with the Bush administration (this is the highest rate among the 20 countries surveyed), and only 21% think the problem rests with America in general (this is the third lowest rate of the 20 countries).¹

A lot has been written about *the Muslim community in France* and how that community might somehow determine French policy in the Middle East. I don't believe that is the case. There are an estimated 4 to 5 million Muslims in France, about 3 millions of them are French citizens, and 2 million or so are foreigners. While there is no doubt that President Chirac did welcome the renewed bond between the Muslim community and the rest of the French population that was a result of common opposition to the war in Iraq, as well as the personal popularity he gained among French Muslims for his stance, that was not a motivating factor in the first place. Chirac was ready to go along with the United States and to send troops into the region as late as January 7th—he sent an emissary in December to coordinate possible French participation with the Pentagon.² Had he felt that French participation was a good policy, he would have gone against the will of most French Muslims—as President Mitterrand did in 1991.

A quest for Multipolarity ?—this interpretation is fueled by the repeated use of the word in President Chirac's speeches, but there certainly is a vocabulary problem here, just like there was for the word “hyperpower”, for which you have a negative connotation in English which just doesn't exist in French. Similarly, when you say “multipolarité”, you describe the way you see the world in general—and the world is certainly multipolar, at least in economic and cultural terms. Here, when someone says “multipolarity”, you hear “blocking US power”, a purely negative and confrontational term. I believe that President Chirac's talk about multipolarity is more about multilateralism—deciding together about issues that concern us all—rather than checking American power.

The preference for a multipolar world does influence French policy but only as a secondary and rhetorical factor, a reinforcing one. It is not, in my view, a primary source of French foreign policy. Take an issue like Afghanistan in 2001–2002 : there was no talk about multipolarity, because the US and Europe agreed on the necessity of rooting out the Taliban as a key part of the war on terrorism. Chirac sent troops, fighter jets, an aircraft carrier battle group, and 73% of the French population approved this American war—another demonstration that France is neither pacifist

¹The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Views of a Changing World”, June 2003, available at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf>

²See “War in Iraq: how the die was cast before transatlantic diplomacy failed”, *The Financial Times*, May 27, 2003.

nor massively anti-American. The intervention in Kosovo provides another interesting example in this respect.

On the contrary, when France disagrees strongly with an issue, and feels it is in the mainstream of world public opinion, the idea that the US would decide to go against the will of most other countries naturally creates talk about multipolarity—not the other way around.

One more point : when you read about French foreign policy in the American press, it seems like its overriding goal, its daily obsession, its “grand strategy” almost, is to derail American foreign policy. Based on my personal experience as a consultant for the French foreign Ministry, I can testify that this is simply not true. There is, in the *Quai d’Orsay*, a great deal of expertise and knowledge about Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia—much less, unfortunately, about American foreign policy and the American political system. And what could be called the “American factor” (“how will it play in Washington ?”) in each regional issue is probably more often overlooked than overemphasized. The French complain, more loudly than most perhaps, about American arrogance and unilateralism, but at the end of the day, it is understood in the French government that the world still needs America—as it has for nearly a century now—for peace and stability, and for confronting the new transnational threats of the 21st century.

Now, let’s examine the real reasons behind the French attitude toward the war in Iraq.

War on terrorism is the most important one—definitely. The French see the invasion of Iraq as a step backward in the war against terrorism, as quite a few experts do.³ They feel that the invasion has made their daily life less secure—and they know about Islamist terrorism, having been targeted by terrorists many times since the 1980’s—and twice last year by Al Qaeda in Karachi and in the Arabian Sea. There are many reasons for this assumption : Saddam was never convincingly linked to Al Qaeda ; terrorist recruitment will be fueled ; the show of force cannot deter terrorists networks that have no territorial basis, and cannot coerce the countries that are the real problem—Saudi Arabia and Pakistan ; etc.⁴

Proliferation of WMD is another one. If even a tiny portion of Iraqi biological material mentioned by President Bush in his State of the Union address has slipped into the hands of terrorists just before or during the invasion, which would, in the French view, not have happened under Saddam’s rule, then the danger of catastrophic terrorism has increased. Moreover, there is a worry that exaggerations about Saddam’s WMD may decrease the ability of the international community to mobilize public opinion against proliferation in other places, particularly Iran and North Korea.

European historical pessimism and wariness of war—The U.S. strategy in Iraq had many bases, but beyond question one important basis was a peculiarly American optimism about the ability to change the world through the application of military power. Spurred on by their immense power and general historical optimism, Americans seem confident that they can meet the challenge of bringing freedom, stability, and democracy to a post-Saddam Iraq, and maybe even trigger a democratic wave in the region.

In France, and in Europe as a whole, the historical view is more pessimistic. Europeans see little in their long and sorrowful experience in the region—especially the British and French, the Mandatory Powers for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine after World War I—to support the notion that force and occupation can bring democracy to the Arab world.⁵ A vocal minority of French intellectuals and politicians, however, did emphasize that part of the agenda (democratization), and advocated supporting the US (from Bernard Kouchner to Alain Madelin, Romain Goupil, André Glucksmann, Pascal Bruckner . . .) because as a goal the idea of supporting democracy and conflict resolution in the Middle East enjoys widespread support in France. The question is the means.

And regime change through military intervention doesn’t have much appeal in France. Having experienced military conflict on their continent within living mem-

³Among other analysis, see the assessment by antiterrorist Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, available at <http://brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/bruguiere.htm> ; see also Peter Bergen quoted in Oliver Burkeman, “Bush feels the heat after Riyadh bombings”, *The Guardian*, May 15, 2003, and Steven Simon quoted in Paul Taylor, “Bin Laden Seen Gaining in Iraq War”, *Yahoo News*, April 2, 2003, available at <http://uk.news.yahoo.com/030402/80/dwt9w.html>.

⁴See also the declarations by Paul Beers, quoted in Laura Blumenfeld, “Former Aide Takes Aim at War on Terror”, *The Washington Post*, June 16, 2003.

⁵See Philip Gordon, “The Crisis in the Alliance”, *Brookings Saban Center Iraq Memo #11*, February 24, 2003, available online at <http://brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030224.htm> See also my “What Europe Knows”, *Newsday*, February 2, 2003, available online at <http://brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/vaisse20030202.htm>.

ory, Europeans feel they know more about its consequences than Americans, and their threshold for deciding when war as a last resort becomes necessary is consequently higher—which doesn't necessarily mean pacifism, for France at least. Last but not least, this war was seen as unnecessarily fueling a possible "clash of civilizations" between the West and the Arab / Muslim world.

These are the real reasons behind the French position in the last few months. It has to be acknowledged though that a vast majority of experts—including myself—, here and elsewhere, failed to predict that these reasons would be enough for France to attempt to stand in the way of U.S. action in Iraq. The surprise that resulted goes a long way in explaining the bitterness of the aftermath. So the question remains : why did we misunderstand what France would do?

In retrospect, France's actions reveal that *a new transatlantic system is slowly emerging*, where old patterns are increasingly replaced by new ones, old rules by new rules. This is why, Mr. Chairman, to your question "Do we really face a crisis in transatlantic relations ?", my answer would be yes. Some define "crisis" as the moment when an old order disappears, and a new order has not taken over yet, and this definition perfectly captures the current moment.

Many of us applied the old narrative of French-US relations to the recent crisis. They thought that in the end, however reluctantly, France would go along as it did in the Cuban missile crisis, in the Euromissile crisis, in the Gulf War, etc. Here, however, France did not conform to this "bad-weather friend" role. On the contrary, it badly overplayed a weak hand. But it is also indicative of the new transatlantic game that the US didn't conform to its traditional role either—and overplayed a strong hand.

To put it succinctly, if the Soviet threat had still been present, France would never have so clearly opposed the US on an issue presented by Washington as vital for its national security—but Washington would also never have claimed that it faced a vital threat from a country without first achieving consensus from its allies on the threat, or at least would not have requested absolute loyalty from its allies on this somewhat shaky basis.

This is why, to answer another question of your letter, it has become somewhat difficult to be a French or a European Atlanticist recently. We are ready to support the US, explain and defend its position, fight anti-Americanism (we were enthusiastic about Kosovo and Afghanistan, for example⁶), and condemn President Chirac's hardball diplomacy of this winter, but many of us had trouble following the US in its Iraq policy, in its new doctrine of preemption, in its talk of empire . . . and its hardball diplomacy of this winter⁷. This is not the America we used to know and defend, and many of us aren't sure, in the Iraq case, that it's the America which acts for the public good. On the contrary, some of us think that Washington has somewhat undermined the mobilization and credibility that are necessary to fight proliferation of WMD.

But let me get back to the evolution of the transatlantic game.

In the old transatlantic system, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and for most of the decade that followed, a set of norms, rules, and habits of intense consultations went hand in hand with an American leadership that oscillated between sharing decisions on matters of common interest and cleverly pretending to do so while acting largely on its own.⁸ A dense network of first- and second-track diplomacy ensured that even when they disagreed, allies would understand each other's position and make adjustments to avoid conflict and keep the fiction of an Alliance of equals.

The new system has very different rules, which derive from power, not leadership. Washington decides, and European allies are expected to conform without having a say, sometimes without even proper information and discussion. "Diplomatic contact across the Atlantic is dropping precipitously in terms of quantity and quality",

⁶See the book written by the Chief Editor of *Le Monde*, Jean-Marie Colombani, (*Tous américains ? Le monde après le 11 septembre 2001*, Fayard, Paris, 2002), where he defends strongly America's intervention in Afghanistan, arguing it was a good example of "global public good".

⁷See the position of Pierre Hassner, the most famous disciple of Raymond Aron, and in *Le Monde* : "Les deux pays ont compromis la partie valable de leurs positions respectives par des maladresses, des contradictions et des faux-semblants. Si la responsabilité première en revient aux Etats-Unis par leur style impérial et l'ambiguïté de leurs objectifs, Jacques Chirac et Dominique de Villepin sont, dans la dernière phase, largement responsables par leurs virages politiques et leurs gaffes spontanées ou préméditées d'une détérioration grave dans les chances non seulement de l'OTAN mais de l'ONU, de l'Europe et de la paix." Pierre Hassner, "Guerre: qui fait le jeu de qui?", *Le Monde*, February 25, 2003 ; and " Etats-Unis-Irak-Europe: le troisième round", *Le Monde*, 26 avril 2003.

⁸Cf. Coral Bell, "American Ascendancy and the Pretense of Concert", *The National Interest*, No 57, Fall 1999.

as one observer remarks, based on precise figures⁹, and in this respect, the diplomacy preceding the First Gulf War and the Iraq war have been strikingly different.

The best metaphor for the new system is probably the royal court, where the power of each courtier is not based on his capabilities but on its proximity to the king, which in turn is based on his unconditional loyalty to the king. That's why instead of hearing talk of "discussions, agreements, disagreements, negotiations", words that imply an alliance of democratic nations, one now hears talk of "punishment, reward, scolding, the cold shoulder" words that imply an absolutist central authority that has its favorites and its sycophants.

From an international relations theory point of view, such an evolution is perfectly normal in the absence of the Soviet threat, and only cultural factors can explain the delay in updating the transatlantic relation according to the new repartition of power. Washington maximizes its power by avoiding European unity on important questions (one administration official defines the new policy towards Europe as one of "disaggregation"¹⁰), and prefers dealing with each European country on a bilateral basis where its relative power is bigger. This, as well as the multiplication of different informal foras where participants are hand-picked by Washington, allows a much freer hand. Of course, one can wonder if this is really in America's long term interest, but that's another question.

The evolution from the old to the new transatlantic system should also be put in the context of the declining importance of Europe in military and strategic terms for the US, reinforced by 9/11.¹¹ It is, however, noteworthy that when America needs help for something—be it peacekeepers, financial support, intelligence about terrorist networks and the like—the continent where it finds its allies is Europe.¹²

So how has Europe reacted to this new posture, to the implementation of these new rules ? We can distinguish three groups—each of which exists in all European countries.

- The first group plays by the new rules, either by necessity—like some East European leaders—or because the deal is better for them in the new game.
- The second group still conforms to the old transatlantic rules, hopes they will return, and thinks that the Iraqi crisis was a just an exception. Many in Germany and Turkey, for example, wonder why their country is blamed for not having overridden public opinion and parliament, and interpret this as temporary incident, not a new structural environment.
- The third group tries to react to the downgrading of transatlantic relations by fostering European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follow a foreign policy more adapted to its ideals and its interests. After all, they say, if Europe is not at the center of America's strategic equation any more, the reverse is true also—Europe doesn't depend on America for its daily security anymore (except for some East European countries). This group, feeling that its real interests are not necessarily advanced or taken into account by America anymore, is ready to cooperate with Washington on a case-by-case basis, which leaves room for many joints projects, but doesn't ensure automatic cooperation. President Chirac's policy is a symptom of this pragmatic adaptation to the new rules.

So among these three reactions, *which prevails in Europe ?* As Phil Gordon has noted, "last month's Security Council vote authorizing the American-led occupation of Iraq was seen by many in Washington as vindicating a certain style of American leadership: "if we lead they will follow".¹³ But, as the same author notes, this interpretation is only partially true.

One must remember that if Chirac was not speaking for Europe, he certainly was speaking for the Europeans—even majorities of the East Europeans he so rudely insulted. Public opinion, as captured by polls, is admittedly fickle, but in the long term opposition to one's own public opinion can translate into electoral losses—as the recent defeats by Jose-Maria Aznar and Silvio Berlusconi's parties in the Madrid

⁹ Ivo Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism", *Survival*, vol. 45 n°2, summer 2003. Available online at <http://brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/daalder/20030601.pdf>

¹⁰ Charlemagne, "Divide and Rule", *The Economist*, April 24, 2003.

¹¹ Ivo Daalder, *op.cit.*

¹² Europeans have provided more financial and peacekeeping support to Afghanistan than has the United States. Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking A New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, July / August 2003.

¹³ Phil Gordon, "US Must Fight for Europe's Soul", *The Financial Times*, June 2, 2003. Available online at <http://brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030602.htm>

province and Rome would seem to demonstrate¹⁴. So the real question is : given its cost, would Tony Blair, Jose-Maria Aznar and Silvio Berlusconi agree to follow the same path they did for Iraq in the next crisis? Would the next governments of these countries, maybe from the opposition party, act the same way ?

To some extent, any time President Bush has chosen to play by the new rules of the transatlantic game (“We decide based on our interests, and you follow”), from the rejection of Kyoto protocol—whatever the merits of the treaty—to the Iraq crisis, he has been encouraging those in Europe who think that building a stronger EU is key to defending Europe’s interests in the new strategic landscape. One more big crisis, in which, for example, even London cannot follow Washington, and President Bush will truly be a “father of Europe” in his own right, alongside Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer.

I would like to make five concluding remarks about the crisis in transatlantic relations.

1—*Credibility matters*, because ultimately public opinion matters. I’m not speaking only about finding Iraqi WMD, but also about the importance of an American leadership that is based on trust, confidence, and clarity, and which can inspire a long-term support based on shared convictions. Let me give you just one example. When Secretary of State Powell declares about Iraq “This is a conflict that we did not ask for, we did not seek, we did not want, we did everything to avoid,”¹⁵ please do not ask me, even as a European who believes strongly in the transatlantic alliance, to defend this against anti-American commentators in France. I just cannot, because I don’t believe it myself. Atlanticists in Europe need stronger weapons than this from their allies in America.

2—*Dialogue matters*, at all levels. I still hold the view that part of the crisis, or at least its most unpleasant aspects, could have been avoided if the dialogue had been as intense and genuine as it used to be. In this respect, I would like to quote from Olivier Roy, a French expert on the Middle East often consulted by officials here :

“The problem is that no American official ever bothered to express the real motivation to the usual allies. One reason for this partial disclosure may have been that the consensus in Washington was built only on the lesser aspect—removing Saddam Hussein. But the broader, regional plan could at least have been privately conveyed by President Bush to his European counterparts. It was not. Mr. Bush does not like to travel and meet his peers, in contrast to his father and Ronald Reagan. No private contacts were maintained where ideas could be put forward without being couched in official statements.

[. . .] Any European diplomat or expert who addressed American officials about the broader goals being discussed in the many think tanks close to the Pentagon—democratization, reshaping the Middle East, getting to Iran and Syria after Baghdad—were told that such debates did not reflect official views.”¹⁶

3—*France-bashing is dangerous for America*, because it is misleading. The danger is that people might come to believe francophobe commentators when they blame any setback, like the failure to get a UN resolution or America’s deteriorating image in the world¹⁷, on France—as if Europe and the world would have been forthcoming if Paris had not led the opposition. It is not the case. To give you just one example, I think that Foreign Minister de Villepin’s travelling to the three African countries had actually no significant impact on their votes, it may even have been counter-productive. It is also dangerously misleading to believe the dark motives francophobes attribute to France’s behaviour, because it hides the fact that the French reaction was more typical than exceptional.

I would submit the thought-provoking hypothesis that France actually offers a sort of barometer for gauging global support and for understanding the rest of the world. To some extent, it seems to me that for America, France can serve as a canary in a coal mine—if it fails you, the global environment is not welcoming. I am not implying that Paris should somehow have a veto on US foreign policy, that is not my point. But France, if you will, is to the global perception of American power what the New Hampshire primary was until recently to the presidential election—a fairly reliable predictor.¹⁸

¹⁴ Roland Flamini, “Vote Losses in Spain, Italy Blamed on Iraq”, *The Washington Times*, May 27, 2003.

¹⁵ Declaration by Colin Powell at the House appropriations subcommittee overseeing the State Department’s budget, quoted in Glenn Kessler, *The Washington Post*, March 27, 2003.

¹⁶ Olivier Roy, “Europe Won’t Be Fooled Again”, *The New York Times*, May 13, 2003.

¹⁷ Cf. the declarations by Jeane Kirkpatrick in New York, quoted in Corine Lesnes, “C’est la faute aux Français”, *Le Monde*, June 6, 2003.

¹⁸ In all but two cases, every U.S. President elected since 1952 finished first in the New Hampshire Primary. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush are the sole exceptions to that rule,

4—The *transatlantic agenda is much broader* than just Iraq and terrorism, and areas of cooperation are much more numerous than areas of disagreement—without even mentioning the economic sphere¹⁹. Actually, the Middle East has always been a cause of discord in the transatlantic relation, and focusing on this issue exclusively can only lead to a deteriorating climate. The good news is that, to the best of my knowledge, there seems to have been little spillover of the Iraq crisis onto other areas of French-US cooperation, except for the unwelcome cancellation of joint military exercises by the Pentagon. On joint efforts in counter-terrorism, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in Africa (with three resolutions endorsing French multilateral efforts in Côte d'Ivoire and Congo in the last six months, each of them strongly supported by Washington), etc., French and American soldiers, diplomats and officials continue to cooperate on a daily basis.

5—Let's keep all of this in mind for *the next crisis, which may be Iran*. The US and Europe must talk now, before the usual cycle of rhetorical inflation begins, before we put our credibility and unity at stake. Europe and America must address together fundamental questions : a) What are the consequences if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon? (Is it a conservative or a revisionist power ? What threat does it represent to us and to other countries ?) b) What can we do about it without being counter-productive, given the specific domestic situation in Iran, its political system and its population ? c) What precedent do we set for other non-proliferation issues ? These are the questions we need to ask and talk about now. If we passively wait for this crisis to unfold, we could easily see a repeat of bitter transatlantic disputes, this time with significantly worse consequences for American and European interests.

Mr. BEREUTER. Next we would like to hear from Mr. Sikorski. Welcome. Glad to have your testimony. You may proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF RADEK SIKORSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE AND RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE**

Mr. SIKORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the invitation to speak before this Subcommittee.

You posed searching questions in your letter of invitation. I should like to answer them, skipping for the sake of brevity.

Do we really face a crisis in transatlantic relations; and, if so, why?

Well, taking a longer view, enmity between America and European powers is nothing new. As you, Mr. Chairman, know better than me, the United States has fought wars with most major European countries—except France and Poland—and it is the last 60 years that have been an exception for this reason: A shared perception of an overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union. When that threat has disappeared, bonds of alliance were bound to loosen. The question is whether we can come up with a new sense of a common mission.

Did the Iraq dispute represent a fissure in transatlantic relations or merely a policy disagreement with four nations of Europe?

The fissure in Europe was not really, I would say, about Iraq but about how to react to the United States assertion of global dominance. Britain and France had drawn contrary lessons from the Suez operation in 1956 in which they were sabotaged by the United States. Britain decided that, henceforth, it would pursue its interests in harmony with the United States strategic agenda; France,

though it is worth noting that both presidents finished second in their parties' respective contests.

¹⁹Cf. Joseph P. Quinlan, "Drifting Apart or Growing Together ?", paper for the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, available at <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic/Quinlan%20Text.pdf>

that she can only maintain her position by relying on its own national resources and by thwarting United States designs. Unsurprisingly, the two countries have been leaders of the two halves of Europe reacting differently to United States initiatives on Iraq.

Is there a growing anti-American sentiment in Europe or were the recent anti-American protests more narrowly tied to anti-United States military power/anti-Iraq policy?

Anti-Americanism, Mr. Chairman, in Europe predates the founding of the United States and will always, I would argue, be with us. In some countries, such as France, I believe it is endemic. One-third of Frenchmen wished victory to Saddam Hussein during the recent confrontation. In others, such as Poland, it is almost non-existent. Europe, indeed most of the world, entertains a love-hate relationship with the United States. While admiring American technology, mass culture, American-style democracy, American energy and enthusiasm, historically-rooted societies also resent the disruption of traditional customs and hierarchies that American culture brings. America stands for modernity, and most cultures are by nature conservative, hence the inevitable resentment. However, latent, culturally-based anti-Americanism tends to flare up only over particular United States policies, once over Vietnam and the positioning of cruise missiles in Europe, today over policies toward the Middle East.

America has a store of goodwill in Eastern Europe. This is partly the result of the United States' staunch stand against Communism and partly the result of programs that were carried out during the cold war. Both dissidents and party apparatchiks came to the U.S. on Fulbright scholarships. They all listened to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Today, thousands of young East Europeans go on European Union-sponsored scientific exchanges and only dozens come to the United States. Unless this trend is reversed, therefore, the next generation of east Europeans will become more Euro-centric.

Is Europe anti-Bush?

Yes. I think we have more than a foreign policy problem. We have a political problem. Many West Europeans objected to President Bush even before he took any significant foreign policy decisions. European politics is simply shifted way to the left of American politics, I would argue. Mainstream democrats in this country would function as conservatives in Europe. The majority of West European countries and mainstream media are dominated by social democrats whose stances would make them liberal democrats in the United States. Hence, President Bush's position on such domestic issues as the death penalty, guns, abortion or taxation were greeted with animus by Europe's socialist establishment. West European Social Democrats see the Bush presidency as a challenge to their own internal political consensus and a possible source of encouragement to their own conservative critics.

Attitudes to President Bush are very different in Western and Eastern Europe. In the new democracies, people tend to remember that the man who had done the most to bring about their liberation from communism, President Ronald Reagan, was also denounced by transatlantic chattering classes. Therefore George Bush gets the

benefit of the doubt. During the same European journey in June 2001 during which there were riots against President Bush in Goteborg, Sweden, in Warsaw, in Poland, there were also demonstrators—hundreds of well-wishers demonstrating in George Bush's favor.

Also, in Western Europe, the public likes their politicians to be suave, cynical and intellectual in the Enlightenment tradition. Toughness, earnestness and public expressions of faith go down badly.

Can Europeans be at once pro-Europe and pro-Atlantic or are these growing more incompatible?

In my judgment, France has an alternative geostrategic vision, a vision of a "European Europe" that would be a counterweight to American power. To put it metaphorically, France would like to create a situation in which Germany is the horse, the rest of Europe is the cart, and France is the driver of this horse and cart. One suspects that she will then drive the vehicle toward a head-on collision with an American tank. I don't believe this is in the interest of the majority of Europeans. I don't believe it is even in the interest of France.

I do believe that the great majority of the European public still wishes to be both pro-EU and pro-Atlantic. This has been the traditional policy not only of countries such as Britain but, crucially, of Germany. The new entrants into the EU will, I believe, strengthen the pro-Atlantic lobby, but the swing country is Germany. With Germany remaining pro-Atlantic, the project to construct a European counterweight to the United States remains a Gaullist eccentricity. However, with Germany backing the French vision, Europe splits into roughly equal pro-Atlantic and anti-American halves. It is in the vital interest of the United States and of Europe to make Germany return to its traditional position as a linchpin of both the EU and of NATO.

Mr. Chairman, I shall conclude by saying that, despite the concerns that I have expressed, I believe that what unites Europe and the United States is still far deeper and far more important than what divides them. When the two halves of our western civilization act in concert, we rule the world. When we divide, each suffers. It is therefore in the interest of all our peoples to work for the improvement of relations between our continents.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sikorski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RADEK SIKORSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE AND RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen,

Thank you for your invitation to speak before this august body. You posed searching questions in your letter of invitation to me. I shall answer them:

Do we really face a crisis in transatlantic relations?

Friends and allies wish each other well because they expect that the success of one will enhance the power and well being of all. Rivals, on the other hand, see the success of one as a threat to the other. During the recent war in Iraq, around a third of the people of France wished victory to Saddam Hussein rather than their formal ally, the United States. Whatever the causes, I would call that a crisis, all the more severe for having reached from the diplomatic and political elites down to the people.

Another major European ally, Germany, asserted its sovereignty for the first time since unification. In the guise of pacifism, Germany said 'No' to the United States on a matter of vital American national interest for the first time in half a century.

Other nations supported the United States in its confrontation with Saddam Hussein even though their governments were not truly convinced of the case for war, and their public opinion largely opposed it. Europe has divided into those countries that are comfortable with American leadership, and those that are not. This, I think, is a useful definition of what has been called 'old' and 'new' Europe.

If so, why?

Enmity between America and European powers is nothing new. Since its foundation, the US has fought wars with most major European countries (except France and Poland) and it is the last sixty years that have been an exception, for obvious reasons: a shared perception of an overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union. When that threat has disappeared, bonds of alliance were bound to loosen.

Is the alleged transatlantic drift more than just a dispute over foreign policy?

Some people in Europe claim that it is more than that. European socialists claim that they have developed a unique social model, the social market economy, which combines the free market with the leveling of living standards through high transfer payments. Protection for those already in jobs and state provision of health and pension services allegedly differentiate the European model of capitalism from its supposedly raw, American variety. In view of the stagnation of the main Continental European economies, however, one is led to suspect that this view, though sincerely held, is a way of avoiding facing the need to carry out fundamental reforms.

Philosophically, much of Europe is tending towards post-national progressivism. Many Europeans see the nation state not as the locus of their loyalty and the most natural unit of exercising democratic control over their governments, but as the agent of waging wars, which devastated Europe in the last century.

Many in Europe see the project of European integration as the only way to make war truly unthinkable and they are ready to pay the price of loss of sovereignty for this which would be unacceptable to the US public or politicians.

Europeans of this viewpoint are happy, for example, to treat the UN as the nascent world government solely responsible for authorizing the use of force, to advocate an international criminal court, and to support the Kyoto protocol, even if its provisions are detrimental to their own economies. As a result, some Europeans argue that Europe and America are diverging, not only in their interests but in their deepest values.

When did this begin—in 2001?

By 2001 the process was already well advanced. When President Bush went to the European Union summit in Goteborg, in June 2001, Europe's mostly Social-Democratic leaders harangued him about the death penalty and Kyoto, while anti-Bush mobs rioted outside.

August 2002?

I presume that this date refers to the leaking of the Pentagon war plans on Iraq to a US newspaper, which was the first signal that was noticed in Europe that the US was serious about going to war. To my knowledge the drawing up of the plans had not been preceded by consultations with allies either as to strategy or as to tactics.

The decision to go to war with Iraq without consulting allies and without a clear *casus belli* exacerbated tendencies I had already mentioned and made it harder for European governments to explain the case for war to their citizens. If the US had decided to remove Saddam Hussein at a time when he threw the UN inspectors out of the country, more Europeans would have been supportive. The US made far less effort to explain the case for the second gulf war than for the first gulf war, even though the case for the first war—invasion of a neighboring country—was more apparent. US diplomatic effort seemed perfunctory and were certainly ineffective.

Did the Iraq dispute represent a fissure in transatlantic relations or merely a policy disagreement with 4 nations of Europe?

It represented both because those countries that supported the US did not do so because they truly believed the case for war against Iraq but because they believed that it is important to show solidarity with the United States on a matter which the US administration deemed to be in its vital national security interest. Those European governments that supported the war did so because in their judgment the necessity to preserve good relations with the US outweighed their doubts about the advisability of going to war without a clear provocation.

The fissure in Europe was not really about Iraq but about how to react to the US assertion of global dominance. Britain and France had drawn contrary lessons from the Suez operation in 1956 in which they were sabotaged by the US. Britain decided that henceforth it would pursue its interests in harmony with the US strategic agenda; France, that she can only maintain her position by relying on its own national resources and by thwarting US designs. Unsurprisingly, the two countries have been leaders of the two halves of Europe reacting differently to US initiative on Iraq.

Is the overall European attitude about how Europe views the outside world, assesses threats and seeks to meet them that different from the US?

Yes, it is, partly thanks to American influence. One of the most striking intellectual surprises a European experiences in Washington is that the US thinks strategically on a global scale. In Europe, we tend to think on a regional scale—and this is a result of the implicit bargain that obtained during the Cold War. Protecting their own continent from Soviet attack really was the best thing that Europeans could do for the United States and for the transatlantic alliance as a whole. The US supported European integration as part of that strategy. Being the main putative theatre of operations, West Europeans did not have spare capacities to project power in the rest of the world; they were mostly glad for the US to carry the burden of protecting global sea lanes and countering Soviet ambitions in the third world. Barring a few exceptions, such as the British war in the Falklands and French interventions in Africa, Europeans lost interest, and forgot the habits, of global responsibilities. Because the European Union has evolved as a consensual, semi-legal process, a growing number of Europeans tend to think that most disputes can be solved in this manner. Because the European Union is founded on the ethos of overcoming national sovereignty, many Western Europeans are suspicious of countries which speak and act as they themselves used to do.

Is there a growing anti-American sentiment in Europe or were the recent anti-American protests more narrowly tied to anti-US military power/anti-Iraq policy?

Anti-Americanism in Europe pre-dates the founding of the United States and will always be with us. In some countries, such as France, it is endemic while in others, such as Poland, almost non-existent. Europe, indeed most of the world, entertains love/hate feelings for the United States. While admiring American technology, American mass culture, American-style democracy, American energy and American enthusiasm, historically-rooted societies also resent the disruption of traditional customs and hierarchies that American culture brings. America stands for modernity, and most societies are by nature conservative, hence the inevitable resentment. However, latent, culturally-based anti-Americanism tends to flare up only over particular US policies: once over Vietnam and the positioning of Cruise missiles in Europe, today over policies toward the Middle East.

America's store of goodwill in Eastern Europe is partly the result of the US's staunch stand against Communism and partly the result of programs that were carried out during the Cold War. Both dissidents and party apparatchiks came to the US on Fulbright scholarships; they all listened to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Today, thousands of young East Europeans go on EU-sponsored scientific exchanges and only dozens come to the US. Unless this trend is reversed, therefore, the next generation of East Europeans will become more Euro-centric.

Is Europe anti-Bush?

Many Europeans objected to President Bush even before he took any significant foreign policy decisions. European politics is shifted to the left of American politics. Mainstream democrats would function as conservatives in Europe. The majority of European countries, and mainstream media, are dominated by Social-Democrats, whose stances would make them liberal Democrats in the US. Hence, President Bush's positions on such domestic issues as the death penalty, guns, abortion or taxation were greeted with animus by Europe's socialist establishment. European Social Democrats see President Bush as a challenge to their own internal political consensus and as a possible source of encouragement to their own conservative critics.

Attitudes to President Bush are very different in Western and Eastern Europe. In the new democracies, people tend to remember that the man who had done the most to bring about their liberation from Communism—President Ronald Reagan—was also denounced by transatlantic chattering classes. Therefore George W. Bush gets the benefit of the doubt. During the same European journey in June 2001 to which I had already referred to, President Bush was greeted by angry rioters in Goteborg, Sweden. In Warsaw, Poland, there were also demonstrators—hundreds of well-wishers, demonstrating in his favor.

In Western Europe, the public likes their politicians to be suave, cynical and intellectual in the Enlightenment tradition. Toughness, earnestness and public expressions of faith go against the grain.

Can Europeans be at once pro-Europe and pro-Atlantic or are these growing more incompatible?

France has an alternative geostrategic vision of a 'European Europe' that would be a counterweight to American power. To put it metaphorically: France would like to create a situation in which Germany is the horse, the rest of Europe is the cart, and France is the driver of this horse and cart. One suspects that she would then drive the vehicle toward a head-on collision with an American tank. I don't believe this is in the interest of the majority of Europeans, or even in the interest of France.

I believe that the great majority of the European public still wishes to be both pro-EU and pro-Atlantic. This has been the traditional policy not only of countries such as Britain but, crucially, of Germany. The new entrants into the EU will, I believe, strengthen the pro-Atlantic lobby. But the swing country is Germany. With Germany remaining pro-Atlantic, the project to construct a European counterweight to the United States remains a Gaullist eccentricity. However, with Germany backing the French vision, Europe splits into roughly equal pro-Atlantic and anti-American halves. It is in the vital interest of the United States and of Europe to make Germany return to its traditional position as a linchpin of both EU and NATO.

It is also crucial to spread the perimeter of the Atlantic community to those countries of the former Soviet Bloc, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and further, that are likely to pursue the kinds of policies that West European nations have pursued until recently. It is also vital for European states to retain national decision-making in security policy for the foreseeable future and for that security policy to be based on the NATO alliance, which gives political and legal basis for the US presence in Europe.

Is it evident that European and American security are no longer indivisible?

On the contrary. I believe that Europe and America share two vital geostrategic interests: first, cleaning up the detritus of the Soviet empire and helping nations of that region make a transition to free-market democracy; And, second, democratizing the Greater Middle East. Most of Europe has behaved as a status quo power toward that region but now that the US has led the way many Europeans are beginning to see the obvious, namely, that they are the immediate destination for refugees, criminal networks and terrorism emanating from failed Muslim states and that Europe would present the most convenient target of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, Europe would be the biggest beneficiary if those societies became successful. Democratizing the Greater Middle East could be as important a transatlantic project as democratizing the Soviet Bloc once was. But if this is to happen, allies have to be involved in every stage of decision-making. Nobody likes being taken for granted, even if it is in their interest to agree.

Are there forces in Europe which are intent on marginalizing US influence in Europe and NATO?

It is impossible to marginalize the US in NATO because without the US NATO would not exist so it is, rather, a question about those people who would like to replace NATO with a purely European defense pact. There are such people, both on the right and the left of European politics, and in the more obscure parts of the European bureaucracy. The Iraq dispute has also convinced many mainstream people in Europe that Europeans need to coordinate their foreign policies more if they are to gain influence in Washington.

In the eyes of Europe, how badly were the EU and NATO damaged over the war in Iraq?

There ought to be a silver lining to the fact that the EU split down the middle on an issue on which the European public was united. Those who would like to build Europe on the basis of anti-Americanism should understand that if they could not united Europe in opposition to the unpopular American-led war in Iraq, than the project cannot succeed.

NATO should also benefit in the medium term. The war in Iraq put an end to the post-cold war period and everybody seems to have understood that the alliance has to re-tool for new challenges.

Putting aside Iraq, where would the relationship likely be today?

It would be a mix of co-operation and competition. In bodies such as the UN Human Rights Commission, the West still acts together in solidarity against dictatorships, giving witness to our shared common values. In trade matters, EU and the

US are equals and are guilty of similar sins in, for example, protecting their agriculture. In military matters, the US global supremacy will be a fact of life for at least a couple of generations. The latter has not been fully appreciated in Europe and needs adjustment in policy planning.

As a result of the recent dispute over Iraq, will German-American and Franco-American relations be less predictable or coherent?

Evidently, so. Germany can no longer be counted on automatically to take America's lead on major issues. France, on the other hand, seems to have stepped into the shoes of the former Soviet Union as the *de facto* leader of the non-aligned movement that is suspicious of American projects and will resist US initiatives in international bodies.

What kind of United States does Europe want?

It depends on who in Europe you ask. Some of us, mainly on the right in the new democracies, are happy with America being the leader of the West both on the international scene and on domestic issues, in giving example on how to roll back socialism. Others, largely on the left in Western Europe, would like the US to become a giant Canada, that is a country that recognizes the superiority of the European economic model, downgrades its military and follows the lead of the elites of transnational progressivism on philosophical and lifestyle issue.

Most Europeans would like a United States that shows respect for the views of mankind, that works harder to make its arguments on the international scene and that leads by persuasion and example.

May I conclude Mr. Chairman, by saying that despite the concern I have expressed, I believe that what unites Europe and the United States is still far deeper and far more important, than what divides them. When the two halves of our Western civilization act in concert, we rule the world; when we divide, each suffers. It is therefore in the interest of all our peoples to work for the improvement of our relations.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will have time to hear from Mr. Riotta before we have a series of votes. So pleased to have your testimony today. You may proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF GIANNI RIOTTA, COLUMNIST, CORRIERE
DELLA SERA**

Mr. RIOTTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members.

When I received your invitation, I was reminded of the day I had to pick out the title for my column on *Corriere della Sera* on transatlantic relationship. I choose Titanic as the name, and the readers wondered why. I said, like, because trying to communicate between Europe and the United States is a tough job, and as you will see after the war, many, many icebergs came on our route.

I will try to explain today why I think that these icebergs that come against us, both Europeans and Americans, are not differences in values as many, many op-ed articles try to point out, but a difference in interest; and it is actually—it is a little easier for us to deal with them, because it is very difficult to reconcile differences in values more than it is to negotiate interests between France and allies.

To say it in a slogan, Europeans are not from Venus, and Americans are not from Mars. This very fortunate cliché does not explain why Europeans have been most of the time at war since World War II in France, Algeria, Vietnam and Suez and the Falkland Wars; and, of course, the Balkans and Russia has had quite a few wars too many. Yesterday, at the end of a meeting, the Serbs and Croats rioted; and I am pretty sure that should the NATO troops and the European-American troops withdraw from the Balkans tomorrow, a new war will start right away.

Not even is it a matter of rhetorics that separates us. If you read the book of Mr. Galozeau de Villepin—there is actually two books, *The Cry of the Gargoyle* and *One Hundred Days*—they are filled up with that kind of sense of war-like rhetoric and attitude that in this country you would associate with Secretary Rumsfeld. The two big enemies, rivals of the Iraq crisis, Villepin and Rumsfeld, they do share the same language. Read their statements, and they are pretty much the same.

So what makes them different? Mars, Venus, I don't think so. You have to do, Mr. Chairman, and Members, a simple exercise. Please take the speech from your colleague Senator Edward Kennedy and compare it with the editorials of the European newspapers that were criticizing President Bush during the Iraq crisis, *Corriere della Sera*, *Le Monde*, all the other publications. The set of values that Mr. Kennedy advocates are exactly the same set of values that *Corriere della Sera* or *Le Monde* advocates. It is not a matter of values or rhetorics. It is a matter of interest.

What I am trying to say is that the U.S.—I guess the U.S. fails to appreciate that the Euro is a political project. It was German Foreign Minister Josckha Fischer to state this famously in a speech a couple of years ago when he said the Euro is a political project. What does it mean? That not only the Euro now allows you to travel from my own town of Palermo, Sicily, to Berlin or Spain with the same coins. That is an achievement that we were not able to get since the 13th century when the Emperor Frederick II was ruling. So it is quite an achievement.

But the Euro compels Europe to form a foreign defense and a foreign—and a common defense and a common foreign policy, and this has brought the split at the U.N. where you saw two—at the Security Council during the Iraqi crisis, you saw two European countries on one side, Spain and Great Britain, and two European countries on the other side, France and Germany. This was a single European work. It was not a U.S.-induced split. But the United States, to deal fairly with Europe, has to understand that the Euro is a political project.

What is Europe failing to understand? Europe is failing to understand this deep sense of insecurity that the United States—I live and I have always lived most of my life in New York City. I consider my country New York City. The Europeans do not understand the sense of insecurity in this country after September 11th, but what the American leadership should address is does unilateralism serves this country better in terms of the war of terrorism.

Today, *The Wall Street Journal* quotes an American Special Forces Commander in Afghanistan telling Senator John Warner, we are glad that the Europeans are here in Afghanistan, the French, the Italian, the British, the Germans, because without them we would not be able to do our job here. And I leave my comments to that gentleman with my wishes for him.

Europe has a long set of strategic dilemmas, a decreasing birth and wedding rate and to find a common foreign policy and a common defense and new immigration law, but the United States has problems as well. Of course, as a superpower it can find its way through the world, but the trade deficit, the budget deficit need the

cost and team flow of foreign capital; and if Americans do not address these as friends, they will have to address these as rivals.

I am leaving aside, Mr. Chairman, the frivolous side of this, the pulling of French wine, the smashing of McDonald's windows, but these kind of frivolous things irks me and they make me nervous because when they hit an undereducated population both in this country and in Europe we don't know what kind of nasty stuff can come out.

Summing up, friendship of the United States and Europe is not a zero-sum game. Both can prosper in it.

The two major issues, Mr. Chairman, that we have seen so many times, Kyoto and the World Criminal Court—the United States didn't sign Kyoto. Only three European countries are in touch with the Kyoto standards; and I regret to say France, Germany and Great Britain, Italy, Greece, all the others are failing. This is an argument that could start negotiation again, because the American side could say, see, even Europe is lagging behind. Why don't we sit down and discuss on it?

The World Criminal Court, wouldn't it be interesting and an asset for this country in an era where we lead more and more criminal leaders brought to justice to have an independent court? I would say so. Usually in foreign politics, Mr. Chairman, you have to decide between the cold Machiavellian strategy and the idealistic Wilsonian strategy. This is a case where we can be Machiavellian and Wilsonian if we stick to the alliance of Europe and the United States.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Riotta.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Riotta follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GIANNI RIOTTA, COLUMNIST, CORRIERE DELLA SERA

1) In 1994 I started a column on Euro-American relations for the leading Italian daily newspaper, Corriere della Sera. For many years readers wondered why I had titled the column "Titanic": then the war in Iraq came and they understood. The real relationship between the two continents has been covered by the harsh realities of the Cold War but it is now emerging after the melting of the Soviet Union. Relics of the past that we thought buried forever are resurfacing with disconcerting results. Writing an essay for the magazine Foreign Policy in the fall of 2000, I anticipated "the coming war of identities" between Europe and the Us. It is a confrontation that can ruin the world or enrich it with its outcome. I will try to tell you why.

2) The recent animosity between Europe and the United States is not rooted on a different set of values. Americans are not from Mars and Europeans are not from Venus (a Goddess, I must say, to be treated with full respect: after a full reading of Greek mythology her warlike record is not bad at all and includes the foundation of mighty Rome through her champion Aeneas). Since 1945, despite Mr. Kagan fortunate book, Europeans have fought in Vietnam, Suez, Algeria, Cyprus, Greece against Turkey, Portugal in Angola, the Brits in the Falklands. Russia should have fought and invaded a little less and if you think of the Balkans you see that those presumed peaceful European countries were busy waging war at the first opportunity. War was banned only from the continental territories of the founding members of the European Community, thanks to the American nuclear umbrella and the wisdom of leaders. I am thinking of president Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy in America and Churchill, Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schumann and Monnet in Europe.

3) Contrary to what many op-ed articles suggest, Europe and the United States do share a code of values. I will condense them in a nutshell, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, freedom of speech and research, economic and social growth. What divide the two Atlantic Coasts, therefore, is a matter of interests. Much has been said in Europe about the macho talking of some members of President's Bush cabinet, and to be sure, some rhetoric could be curbed if we are to find common ground.

But you should read Mr. Dominique Galozeau de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister and the leading opponent of the war in Iraq at the UN. He is the author of two books, "One hundred days" and "The cry of the gargoyle" about Napoleon and French military history. Mr. de Villepin writes about "death more honorable than defeat", the "eternal France" and confesses that "no day passes without me inhaling the fragrance of the violet", the flower that was symbolic in the Napoleonic Empire. Secretary Rumsfeld could not beat his colleague de Villepin in military aspirations.

4) The difference, alas, is in interests. France president Jacques Chirac, a man from Mars that fought in Algeria and is willing to send troops, invited or not so invited, in Africa at the first opportunity, German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, his Foreign secretary Josckha Fischer (a gentleman, it must be said, instrumental in sending German troops in the Balkans during the war in Kosovo, for the first time since War World II) and other European leaders felt that it was not in European interests to join the war. Please do not think that this is due to the peculiar Dna of the Bush administration. French Foreign Secretary Hubert Vedrin coined the term "hyperpuissance", hyperpower, to define President Clinton foreign policy, when France prime minister Lionel Jospin, British premier Tony Blair, Italian prime minister Romano Prodi were busy working on the "third way strategy" alongside Bill Clinton. After the success of the euro ad a common currency, a success that is social, cultural and political more than economic, Mr. Fischer said famously "The euro is a political project". After all, the last time you could travel from my hometown of Palermo, Sicily, to Berlin, Germany, paying with the same coins Emperor Frederick the II Hohenstaufen, *stupor mundi* war ruling, in the 13th century

5) But what is a "European political project" without foreign policy and a common defense? While Europe was slowly pondering the issues, the terrorist attack on America on September 11 changed the national security strategy of this country and the perception of the world. Europe, indeed, after the first surge of solidarity that brought articles V of the Nato charter in use for the first time in history, failed to appreciate the new American sense on insecurity. It would have served the transatlantic community much better to have a common strategy at the United Nations in the fall and winter 2003-2003 and to follow what the conduct of British prime minister Tony Blair: do not leave the fighting against Saddam only to the American and then have a saying in reconstruction. Chirac preferred to go alone, vis a vis Schroeder and the astute Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Pentagon listed many European countries that remained friendly to the Us, led by Spain and Italy in very old Europe and Poland and the Czech republic in the so called new Europe. Distinguished congressman please do not be deceived by the cabinet's position. I supported the war effort in my columns and the volume of mail was impressively against (death threats followed and there are couple of kids collecting signatures to incriminate me at the World Criminal Court, that, by the way, I fully support). Even in Spain, Italy, Poland and the Czech republic support for the war never went above 25%. As the French historian Emmanuel Todd, that writes of the "decaying of America", pointed out whatever the different governments said European public opinion was set against the war.

6) This is not a cultural divide, it is a very political one. And politicians, as you well know, are keen on interests and reality. If you compare Senator Edward Kennedy objections against the war in Iraq with the editorials of the leading French daily newspaper *Le Monde* you will find the same set of ideas. It is not a matter of culture but of politics. Should America rule alone? Do the Un, the Eu, all international organizations matter anymore? What is the balance between military intervention and diplomacy? How do we avoid a double standard, going to war against some dictators, Milosevic and Saddam, while being cozy with others? Why do we implement some Un resolutions and forget about others? This is the concrete test of the future, not a clash of images or perceptions.

7) I did not mention the frivolous side of the friction, the violence against the McDonald's restaurants, the pouring of French wines in the gutter, the Freedom fries, not to offend this House. Nevertheless I do not underestimate them as symptoms of an animosity that predates on the less educated sectors of society and can, little by little, poison an alliance in resentment.

8) A close look at the two giants tells us of an American GNP of 10260 billion euro (I use the euro not to be expelled by Villepin from the Eu) against 8879 billion of a European Union at 25 countries. Population 283 million against 452. I do not want to bother you will all the figures, but both continents come out with zone of distress if closely examined. I start with Europe's strategic dilemmas. A) An aging population. B) A decreasing birth and wedding rate: New York has a population of 16.7 million in its metropolitan area against Paris's 9.6. In the year 2015 estimates take New York to 17.9 million while Paris is set only at 9.9. The US has a wedding rate of 8.5 per 1000 citizens against Europe's 5 and will reach 400 million people

much earlier. C) European immigration laws fail to bring new brains to the continent: German Bundestag recently killed a bill to let a few computer software experts from Bangalore, India, in the country because, (believe it) "They do not speak German". D) A stiff job market and a generous welfare and pensions system make harder for Europe to compete in the global market. E) A common European defense will siphon funds away from the welfare, but without a more or less unified Eu army there is no common foreign policy. The first draft of the European Constitution, as written by France former president Giscard D'Estaing (why so many aristocrats I wonder!) fails to create a political union. America is facing challenges not less daunting: the US deficit could get to 400 billion dollars, according to former ambassador Felix Rohatyn. The Congressional Budget Office estimates a deficit of 1,800 billion dollars by the year 2013. Foreign capital sustains the US trade and budget deficit. America is still growing faster than Europe but professor Charles Kupchan believes that the future is European and the real clash of civilization will be between the former Atlantic allies.

9) I do not agree. As a columnist I do think that any real clash between Europe and the US would be detrimental for both of them. While no international crises can be solved without the US, the US alone cannot solve any crises. The American budget is depending on foreign capital, but it is difficult to think of a prosperous Europe should Japanese style deflation contaminate the US. Partisan forces can think that the interests game between the Atlantic is a zero sum game, either Europe wins or the US. I think that if the US gambles its future on a purely military option and Europe deludes herself on keeping her comfortable habits and having a saying in the international arena without an Army, the world will be worse off and the US will be reduced to a propaganda forum. When you cut the propaganda you will find a lot of common ground. The Europeans are mad at Washington because America does not sign the Kyoto protocols, dear to former Vice-president Al Gore. But in the European Union only Germany, France and Great Britain are respecting the Kyoto schedule of pollution reductions: all other members are failing, in a way confirming American claims that the treaty is too strict. Washington is adamant in denying the utility of the World Criminal Court but in the war of terrorism, with all the mishaps from Guantanamo, to Kabul to Baghdad, a respected, internationally prestigious Court, could be a formidable asset.

10) Congressmen: I do thank you for the honor of inviting me. So far I have shared with you my thought as an analyst. Now please do accept my perspective as the son of Europeans, that is proud of his dual citizenship in the US and the EU and is the father of two American citizens. There indeed is a clash of civilization but is not between us and them as professor Huntington suggests. It is the fight between the forces of tolerance and the legions of intolerance, a battle that divides America, the EU, the Third World, all the established religions, academies and the world of ideas. Many passing interests can divide Europe and America. But if we fail to see that in this small planet the forces of democracies cannot fail to join hands and stand together that loss of vision, more than any number on GNP, inflation, growth, will put in danger the future of our children. Thank you and God bless America, Europe and all people of good will.

Mr. BEREUTER. We have a series of three votes. We are going to recess until 2:45. I think only three votes. I might say that the written testimony as well as the oral summaries and supplemental material has been excellent, and we look forward to the question period.

So the Subcommittee will stand in recess until approximately 2:45.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order.

We will now proceed under the 5-minute rule for questions of the witnesses. I will begin by asking any and all of the witnesses to address, if they will, two questions.

First of all, Charles Kupchan, the author of the recent book entitled *The End of the American Era*, suggests that Europe is the United States' next great rival, suggests we are headed for a clash of civilization. In a recent article in the *Financial Times* he stated that the diplomatic divide that has opened between the United States and Europe is bringing the Atlantic Alliance to a definitive

end. He certainly has the same thing to say about NATO. Dr. Kupchan has stated that Europe and American security is no longer indivisible. I wonder if you think the Europeans share such dire assessments and, if so, to what proportion.

Second question I would ask is related to the European Union. It is expected later this month to present a proposal for a common security doctrine. Reportedly, it outlines the need to fight the threat of weapons of mass destruction and may include the use of force as a means to prevent their proliferation.

My question about that is, do you expect the European Union to agree to a security doctrine similar to the United States national security strategy that would include preemptive strikes as an option to counter the threat of WMD, given the fact that the threats we now commonly agree we face include terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and WMD and the nexus among those three.

Who would like to address first either of those questions? Dr. Dettke.

Mr. DETTKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two very important, interesting questions.

First to Professor Kupchan, Charles Kupchan, and his book about the end of the West and this clash of civilizations and here is Rome, there is Constantinople, two different empires. It is wonderful to hear this, but whether it is true and to what degree is open for me. I don't think it is true.

Let's take the issue of a clash of civilizations within the West. Yes, we do have a values gap, no doubt about it. If you look at public opinion polls and you ask Americans what they think about patriotism, family values, you name it, church going, all these different value attitudes—or take sexual orientation and go down the whole list of issues where values come in, what I found out in all the data that I was able to obtain is, in reality, it is a matter of degree. It is not a total conflict, not a clash. It is a typical situation for a pluralistic society where you have different values and where people do think differently. In many ways, America is much more conservative than Europe in these social values in particular.

Yes, of course, we have these differences and we have a difference that has been mentioned in our hearing here, the death penalty. Look at the figures we have. And, yes, we have a clash of our legal systems in many ways. You have Americans who are concerned about the death penalty, that is for sure. You might have a stronger majority opposing death penalty in Europe than in America, but people are not totally different. It is not a clash of civilizations. It is a matter of degree. That would be my answer to Charles Kupchan.

Second point, the EU and common security and particularly the last issue that you mentioned: Weapons of mass destruction. At the EU meeting in Luxemburg, the EU recognized that a combination of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, the appropriate delivery systems for WMD is going to threaten Europe, too. We know that. It is a good possibility, it can happen, and Europe has to be prepared for that. Europe has to begin to think about it, which we have not done thoroughly enough in the past.

But your question really is, is it now the same doctrine as the United States security doctrine? And here I would put in one qualification. It is an important one. It is about preemption.

If you ask me about a possible identity of views between Europe and the United States, I think Europe would make a big difference between prevention and what is called preemption. In my view, prevention is certainly part of self-defense. Prevention is normal if it is a clear and present danger. Preemption is something different. I want to point that out. Preemption really is putative self-defense. It is not a clear and present danger. It is something you think another country might threaten but it is not a clear and present danger.

And here the difference between prevention and preemption is important. I think Europe would not follow a doctrine of preemption. And, if at all, then we also need to talk about changing article 2 of the United Nations charter. We have to look into the NATO treaty, whether we can operate on a common basis if the doctrine of preemption would prevail.

Mr. BEREUTER. I have already exhausted my time. If anybody would like to give a very short response, we could hear from several, to either question. Mr. Vaisse.

Mr. VAISSE. Just very quick on the second point. Preemption is actually part of the French doctrine. If you look at the Loi de Programmation Militaire of 2002, it is part of the French doctrine.

The distinction I would make with my colleague is just that it is the other way around. Preemption, that is to say when have you a clear and present danger, is in the French doctrine because it can be a necessary tool. So at one point I think that, under the French influence, it could be put in the new strategic doctrine. Whereas preventive war, that is to say, maybe someday this country will develop dangerous weapons of mass destruction, I think will not be put in the EU strategic doctrine. I think it is the other way around. A preemption is really when you need it and when you know there is going to be a strike, whereas prevention is more further.

But I would emphasize the closeness between the French and the American doctrine on this point.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you think it is possible, in maybe just a word or two to respond, that it would be productive for Europe and the United States to try to sit down and decide what is preemptive, when it is used, when it could be used, that kind of consultation would take place among countries? Is that a productive exercise?

Mr. VAISSE. Yes. That takes us to the question of assessing threats together, that is to say, what is the limit between preemption and prevention. This will come naturally from the assessment of the threat.

Just to give an example, I think that Iraq would not have qualified under the French doctrine of preemption because it was seen as too remote, too far a danger.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. Sikorski—I think we will hear from the additional three: Mr. Sikorski, Mr. Riotta, Ambassador Paemen.

Mr. SIKORSKI. On a point of information, Chairman, you said you mentioned the case of the death penalty as a case where values differ. Actually, it is an extremely interesting point. Studies that I

have seen suggest that about the same majority of Americans and Europeans—about 70 percent—support the death penalty. The fact that in America it is legal in some States and in Europe it is illegal, and it has been made illegal in Europe without any reference to the people (there has never been a referendum on it) shows you how much Europe is already run by transnational progressive elites. It also shows you that Bill Clinton, who as Governor authorized executions, a Democrat, would in Europe be regarded as a right-winger, which illustrates the point I made earlier about the leftward shift of European politics.

On the point of Professor Kupchan's analysis, he is a follower of the German philosopher Karl Marx, and therefore believes in economic determinism. Europe and American being two roughly equal economies—the agreement goes—the economic bases will create different superstructures of capabilities and of interests that will make us diverge.

I personally don't believe in such determinism. I believe that history is made by people, and we can restore a sense of shared interests and a sense of a common mission. I believe that the revolutionary American project of democratizing the greater Middle East could be our glue, could be the kind of mission that we can all bring assets to the table, as much as the democratizing of the Soviet Bloc once was. We could regain our sense of purpose.

Mr. BEREUTER. If anybody is writing for the media here, notice he picked out one aspect of Mr. Marx's views, determinism.

Mr. RIOTTA.

I agree 100 percent with democratizing the Middle East, the point that we have to win. We have to do it. Because if we say that we are going to do it and we don't do it, not only do we lose the real war but we lose the propaganda war and that is not, as my son would say, very cool.

Where Mr. Kupchan is wrong I think he underestimates—he is right on a lot of things, a good friend of mine, but he underestimates the population problem with—that Europe has in terms of population in New York today, 16.7 million; Paris, 9.6. In the year 2015, New York will be 18 million and Paris 9.9. We are not growing very fast, not only that we are getting older. I don't disagree with that because I am going to be one of those geezers then. But, innovation, we won't be the very strong innovation.

On your point on defense, Mr. Chairman, that is exactly the big strategic dilemma for Europe. We have to agree on a common defense, and we have to build an army that is suited to that strategy. It will be interesting if discussions on these matters could be going on, but I don't see any right now.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Ambassador Paemen.

Mr. PAEMEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't believe in the clash of civilizations and certainly not between the United States and Europe. At a certain moment the problem could rather be to have enough diversity. The more important issue is the one of the security doctrine, and is, I think, to a large extent going to depend on the United States. Because, who is capable of deciding which security doctrine will prevail? The United States is the only one. And therefore, the doctrine will de-

pend on the world vision of the United States. Right now, there clearly is a difference between the American and European concepts. The document which was published in September last year on the security strategy of the United States is based on the concept of balance of power between the major countries of the world under the guidance of the United States. As such, there is no room for Europe. There is only room for individual member states as good allies of NATO. Right now there is no European doctrine, and there are no separate European resources for collective security.

Because the European Union, as such, is a community of law, its approach of bringing countries together on the basis of common rules will be reflected in whatever foreign policy will be worked out. That concept could be somewhat different from what the United States has in mind, at least at this moment. And it would be advisable to have a good dialogue on that subject.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador.

My double question, which I shouldn't have asked both of them, have precipitated 10 minutes plus. So, Mr. Wexler, I will make that for you and for Governor Janklow as well. So please proceed. We will give you 10 minutes for questions plus answers.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. I don't think I need that long. But thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was struck by Mr. Vaisse's recitation of the public opinion polling with respect to French public opinion in terms of the apparent discrepancy of anti-Americanism versus opposition to this particular President. And not that it is relevant, but I try to relate to that, and I can't. I try to relate to it because I disagree with this President on almost every fundamental issue, particularly as it relates to domestic policy. So I try to find some comfort in the fact that, well, maybe on some level the European view, particularly the French view, is consistent with a view of opposition in the United States, at least to the context of this President.

But to me, unfortunately, the analogy or the stretch runs hollow. Because on the French side it seems to me there was a complete failure to recognize the undeniable fact that, but for the persistence, but for the doggedness of this particular President in his pursuit of Iraq, whatever the justification, the inspection process at the U.N. never would have been resumed.

It wasn't as if this President disrupted a successful French policy in Iraq. It wasn't as if this President disrupted a successful U.N. program that would have brought an inspection process back to Iraq. There was none of that. So it seems to me in this instance the unfortunate reality was that Europe, the French policy in particular but Europe as a whole, collectively, offered no resolution with respect to Iraq.

The only reason I mention it is because to a certain degree I think we are now seeing that same repetition of roles with respect to the Middle East. Once again, more often than not, the European view is that there is a fundamental flaw with American policy in the Middle East. I don't agree with Europe in this regard, but I understand that their perspective would be that the United States is somehow too tilted toward Israel and that the more correct tilt would be the European tilt which is somehow maybe more balanced in the European eyes.

Okay, let's look at the facts as to what the United States has done and what the United States is prepared to do.

The previous Administration we saw a Herculean effort by a President of the United States to engage in a real Middle East peace process with effectively no European participation.

The next President—and you can argue, if you wish—was too slow to engage in the Middle East, but now that he has engaged in the Middle East, not in the context of an American proposal but in the context of a proposal of the quartet of which the European Union is supposedly an equal partner along with Russia and the U.N., what do we see coming from Europe? The last time I was in Israel 2 weeks ago what we saw coming from Europe, in particular from France, was the French foreign minister dancing out to Ramallah to visit with Yassar Arafat.

Now Yassar Arafat shouldn't be—or the fate of Yassar Arafat shouldn't be an American issue. It is a quartet issue. It is an international issue. It would seem that both the United States and Europe have a vested interest in, to the degree we can as humanly possible, to bolster up Abu Mazen. And yet Europe for its part seems at every instance to go a different way.

I have met with Terge Larson, who certainly does not have an American perspective, but a European perspective, somebody I think is extremely knowledgeable. Even he—and I don't want to quote him improperly—suggested that the continual ritual of each and every European foreign minister visiting Yassar Arafat is working in entirely counterproductive purposes to the goal of the quartet and that Europe could maintain its contact with Yassar Arafat, maintain its proper perspective by going through a European representative or a U.N. representative, a singular representative, rather than every 4 days or 6 days undermining Abu Mazen's credibility in terms of the international world.

My point of this is that in each and every instance of a significant world conflict, what I am beginning to conclude—and I am no George Bushie and I am no Donald Rumsfeld follower, but it seems to me that for those that would like to find an alternative of credibility with respect to the European view, what happens is that, at the time of the conflict, Europe ends up essentially being bankrupt of ideas that would end the conflict and finds itself simply in the role of criticizing the United States.

So in that context I would simply ask what is it, that in the context of the continual ring of complaint with respect to the United States, about the road map that Europe objects to, even though Europe is a part of it? Here we have a President engaged as a President could be engaged in the last couple of weeks, and yet there is still this significant perception, as I understand it, from some of the speakers and clearly throughout Europe that American policy in the Middle East somehow is a negative as it relates to the transatlantic relationship. What is it that America is now doing wrong with respect to the Middle East that adversely affects our relationship with our European allies?

Whoever wishes. Please, Mr. Paemen.

Mr. PAEMEN. I think on Iraq you are right. For years the Security Council has allowed Iraq to violate all kinds of resolutions. The Security Council included the United States. If there had not been

September the 11th there would not have been a war against Iraq either.

So that is my comment on your statement on Iraq.

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, what is the relevance of that? If there was no September 11th, there wouldn't have been a war in Afghanistan. If there wasn't September 11th, there wouldn't be a hundred things.

Mr. PAEMEN. I thought, Congressman, that you said nothing came from Europe—no idea had come from Europe to participate in the settlement of international problems; and I think you were right. You were right as far as Europe is concerned. I simply added to that—and you were right as far as the United States is concerned—that the United States has woken up to the problem of Iraq because of September the 11th. That was my comment.

Mr. WEXLER. Okay.

Mr. PAEMEN. On Israel-Palestine, I think there was a kind of agreement between Israel and the United States to keep Europe out of the discussion for a certain number of reasons, which one can very well understand. Probably the contribution of Europe would not have been substantial. Clearly, Israel knew that its best ally, and for good reasons, is the United States. So the Europeans were only an embarrassment, could only make life more difficult. And for having been involved in a certain number of discussions, at least the feeling, the perception in Europe was that the Middle East problem was something which the United States wanted to solve on its own. And don't forget that in 1973 the European countries together suggested one should think of giving statehood to the people of Palestine. It took the United States 30 years to come to the same conclusion.

Mr. WEXLER. Does another gentleman wishes to respond?

Mr. VAISSE. Just two words.

You raised a number of interesting points. Just for the record, and as far as what my neighbor said previously: He mentioned this poll where one-third of the Frenchmen supposedly wished the victory of Saddam Hussein. I want to say that this is not true. The question that was asked was, which side to you feel the closest to? Of course, do you feel the closest to a population that is suffering in times of war? Or do you feel closer to the bomber pilot that wages the war? I think that the way the question is asked affects significantly the answer. And if the question had been put to an American audience, I am not sure the answer would have been different.

Mr. WEXLER. I was referring to what you mentioned which I thought, unless I misunderstood you, was comparing the French attitude toward the United States versus the French attitude toward this particular President.

Mr. VAISSE. Absolutely. There are a couple of reasons for that.

First, I think George Bush is a very polarizing figure. I think he sort of—for many public opinions, especially the British one, for example, and the French one, too, he sort of synthesizes a number of stereotypes about America. He is a concentrate of all these. And so it becomes sort of easier to charge him with these negative views rather America as a whole, which still has a significantly good image. I think that is one part of the answer.

The second part is I think we have to take that poll seriously. That is, I think that public opinions, particularly in France, were against this particular policy that Bush was pursuing; and so for a large part I take this poll at face value.

Then on the third and last point: I don't think that there was a negative reaction to the Bush initiatives—Mr. Chirac at the G-8 meeting in early June was extremely supportive of what Bush was going to do in the next few days in Agaba. I think he was extremely supportive.

I would totally agree with my colleague here. For Europe and the Middle East, it is a bit “damned if we do and damned if we don't.” If we intervene and suggest things, then we are sort of recused. But then if we don't, you say we are criticizing but not offering anything. So it is a bit of this situation that is at play here.

Mr. RIOTTA. Yes. Simply, I don't think that it is very, very dangerous if Mr. Villepin or other European ministers or leaders meet with Arafat. Because that is a very, very complicated issue. We know that if Arafat tries to derail the peace process he can do it easily or at least he can slow it down a lot. Then there is an ego factor that is very, very important. After all, President Clinton met with Chairman Arafat a couple of years ago.

So, in a way, this is what a healthy relationship should be, I guess. If we play like good cop, bad cop, it is very useful. When you have to do a negotiation in the Middle East there are so many aspects to the table that if the United States shuns Arafat 100 percent and the European Union shuns him like 50 percent, I think that is useful in a negotiating table in the Middle East.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Dr. Dettke, forgive me. I would like to go on to the next person, if I may. All right. Very briefly.

Mr. DETTKE. I wanted to quickly respond to Congressman Wexler's point that Europe didn't offer any resolution for Iraq. Maybe it was the wrong one, but they tried one, and that was the idea of containment, and you probably feel this is not enough. We don't know, we can't answer that for sure, whether containment might have had a chance if it would have been addressed properly. It could have. I don't know. I can't answer it. But you had one. The solution that Europe offered and preferred was, in American eyes, not a working one. I wanted to make that point.

The second one, on the Middle East, I think you are right. Europe tried to be much more evenhanded in the Middle East conflict, and it ended up in a situation where Europe looks like Arafat's supporter, defender and tilted toward PLO. That is probably an accurate statement in some sense.

But I want to emphasize one point where we do agree and where we maybe should start from and that is Europe agrees to a reform of the Palestinian Authority. I think there is a commonality that we could use. Maybe Europe could have put a little more pressure on Arafat. I understand that, and it might happen. But it is not only that we oppose the American policy in the Mideast, certainly not the road map. That is something—that is our platform, too.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

The gentleman from South Dakota, Governor Janklow, is recognized.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I read the testimony of you gentlemen and listened to your oral comments, I found you all or most of you to be far more sanguine with respect to the American relationship with Europe in your oral testimony than your written testimony.

We talk about a quartet. I think the reality of the situation is, if, in fact, it was truly a quartet, it is not a matter of whether or not Israel and the United States should decide to keep the Europeans out, it is whether or not everybody wants to sing in the group. There has only been one singer in this quartet. So, as a result, some people complain about the music. The reality of the situation is, if all four of them were harmonizing, it would probably work a lot better, one.

Two, we talk about how maybe we should have pushed the Palestinian Organization a little more for reform. I am not aware of anything substantive that has been done in these visits to Arafat or through other diplomatic channels where the Europeans have really taken a hard hand in terms of helping the Palestinians reform. We are talking about decades of action here, not months or a few years.

The other thing that I think is really important is that none of you have really testified as to any substantive reason that the relationship between the United States and some of Europe—I think we make a mistake—all of us make a mistake in treating Europe with some monolithic institution. The reality is it is a diverse area made up of different cultures and different languages. They may have a common currency and common laws, but they clearly have a far more diverse society than we do in this country because of the homogeneity that we have in the United States.

I am really puzzled. Sometimes I sense that maybe our relationship with Europe is kind of like a bad marriage. We are going to stick together for the kids, but we really don't have any intent on sticking together after the kids are grown up. And I don't think it is much different with respect to what I see today.

Am I incorrect that since DeGaulle became President of France with American help to keep the French Foreign Legion in Algeria from invading France, I believe it was the United States that announced they wouldn't tolerate an invasion of France by the French armed forces on the North African continent, but from and after that period of time virtually every major issue that hasn't involved the shooting of guns the French have tried to diverge it from what it is that we have tried to do with respect to other nations even to the point—if I can bring this point up—of the French trying to convince some of their old African colonial states that American free food that has been genetically modified—something that people in this country have been eating for 20 years—is somehow unhealthy for them to the point that they leave them in a position where they deny the food aid. Yet under those circumstances it should be the French, then, that are supplying the food aid.

What is it that I am missing? Are we just glossing over something this far? I don't think this came about as a result of the war. I think our relationship with Germany is different than our relationship with France. We get angry at Schroeder for demagogging the last 2 weeks of an election when he was slipping in the polls.

It is unheard of in America, no American politician would do that. So he has taught us something new in terms of a slipping politician.

But the French make it an art form. They don't do it just around the elections.

I am one of those people that grew up wishing the French would have gone communist like they were threatening to do all the time and they never did. They just threaten to all the time in their municipal elections. What am I missing with respect to our relationship with France specifically, Mr. Vaisse?

Mr. VAISSE. I think you are missing the good part.

Mr. JANKLOW. You have got 2 minutes. Give it to me.

Mr. VAISSE. I didn't mean any disrespect, but I mean by that the historical record remembers mainly—it is like the press that records the trains that don't arrive on time. It is a bit the same. It sort of takes out all the good things that we have done together and that we are doing together in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Africa, in counterterrorism, et cetera, that are not on the front burner of our relationship.

Mr. JANKLOW. Would you run through that list again?

Mr. VAISSE. Oh, sure. I think, by order of importance, the first one would be counterterrorism cooperation. This is extremely important, because France has a very good record in fighting terrorism. Because it was the target of terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s, and we were struck by al Qaeda twice last year in the Arabian Sea and in Karachi.

Second would probably be in order of importance the Balkans, where France is the country that provides the biggest number of troops to NATO operations in the Balkans.

Third one would probably be Afghanistan, I guess.

And then for the fourth one, there has been a remarkable cooperation on Africa, on Cote d'Ivoire. The statements by Ari Fleischer or even by President Bush have been amazingly positive about the French action in Cote d'Ivoire because this was seen as helping this part of the continent, a very important part of the continent, to sort of stay afloat. And the same goes for Congo. There were three resolutions at the U.N. that were voted unanimously with the support of Washington in favor of supporting the French operations in Cote d'Ivoire and in the Congo.

We have to take all this good part also in account in order to have a sort of fair and balanced view of the global relationship. And I am not even talking about all the United States-Europe economic relationship.

Mr. JANKLOW. Could you give me some examples where the French government, absent security issues, minor security issues where the French government has worked with our government or our government with the French government very closely to truly solve problems?

Mr. VAISSE. For example, it was at the very end of 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested at the border from Canada to the United States. He was headed to Los Angeles to do a terrorist bombing at this airport on the night of December 31st.

Mr. JANKLOW. Is this the one where the Customs agent found the person in the car as they were crossing the border from Canada out in Oregon or Washington?

Mr. VAISSE. But the whole story is that Ressay's co-conspirators were rounded up based on information given by Jean-Louis Bruguière, who is sort of the head of the counterterrorism apparatus in France. So this is just one precise example of this cooperation. But if we take only anti-terrorism measures it goes really a long way in exchanging information.

Mr. JANKLOW. I agree on anti-terrorism. There is no argument with me on anti-terrorism. Because it is in everybody's self-interest. They don't respect the French any better than they respect us. The French will just get their turn later. That is a different issue than looking at these global issues that we have to deal with.

Specifically, I am focused on the relationship with the French. Because, obviously, America has had a unique relationship with the British over the last couple of centuries. I think there have been times where we have been friends and we have been foes. I think 1812 was probably the last time we didn't get along too well.

Mr. DETTKE. Can I help out? The Gulf war is a good example. The French sent troops into the Gulf War.

Mr. JANKLOW. But that was a U.N. Security Council action, I believe one of two that they have ever ordered with respect to the U.N. Security Council. But that wasn't the French doing anything with us as much as they were responding to the United Nations.

Mr. RIOTTA. The Kosovo war was brilliant, I think, Congressman.

Mr. JANKLOW. That is a NATO issue.

Mr. RIOTTA. Yeah, but, apart from the labels, Europe and the United States took out the bad guy, pacified the situation, cooperated. German troops were out of the country for the first time since World War II. I think it was exactly the opposite in the Iraq war. The transatlantic alliance really worked fine there.

Mr. JANKLOW. In Kosovo, no question. I think we would all agree it took an awful long time to get the Atlantic Alliance moving. There is an awful lot of dead people that died from ethnic cleansing or other types of things before we moved on the situation, and I find it somewhat paradoxical that it had to be in Europe where that took place. We have these things going on in Africa all the time, and people don't get nearly as upset about it. They went on in Cambodia for an extended period of time. People didn't get that upset about it. But, finally, the NATO group moved with respect to Kosovo.

Mr. RIOTTA. Mr. Congressman, when you made the brilliant analogy about the bad wedding, I think that is what is love in this wedding. Love is the love for democracy. So when you decide the alliance has to stay together, think about interest. Sometimes Europe has to give something—

Mr. JANKLOW. I don't argue with that.

Mr. RIOTTA [continuing]. Or the United States. But the point is that if Kupchan is right and the big clash is between Europe and the United States, that is the new clash of civilization. What about the civil war in Congo? It would be worse and worse. What about the next Balkan war? Nobody go home, festering, because nobody will care. So the bottom line of this alliance is exactly where it was

in 1945: Democracy. So if we don't care, we can let freedom fries and all these kind of things take us apart, but if we care—

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman. This has been very informative, and I commend the Chair for bringing it together, this extremely well-qualified group. Your views are well received.

Just let me make an observation. I think it was the Governor that indicated earlier there is a tendency sometimes to examine relationships and discuss the details in monolithic terms. And that is not the case. I think it is important to note that in this particular body—and I speak specifically of Iraq—a majority of Democrats—large D, Democrats—voted against the resolution authorizing the military intervention by the United States. There were 125 Democrats that voted in opposition to the policy, and I think there were some 90 that supported it.

So as you look at the United States I think it is important to know that there is much diversity and disagreement among us, and we had some this morning when we were speaking about the weapons of mass destruction. Where are they? And did the President of the United States receive solid intelligence that was properly vetted? There was a vote that was taken that reflected party lines.

Let me ask you this question: As time moves on and no weapons of mass destruction are discovered, is there a sense in Europe or among the individual nations of Europe about this particular issue?

I noted just recently, for example, the conservative opposition in the United Kingdom, Mr. Smith, who vigorously supported the war in Iraq is now claiming that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, cannot be believed. Not a single word, he says, should be believed. I mean, that is a very serious assertion by the conservative opposition in the United Kingdom. So I would be interested in hearing your response to that.

Let me just make one other further observation. It is my own belief that young, new Europe as time moves on will merge with old Europe and that there will be a confluence of interests among the nations of Europe because of proximity, because of interests affecting the continent. I think the United States has to recognize that, to not be disappointed in it, and understand that we do share these democratic values. I think the differences between the policy of the Bush Administration and Europe when it comes to what preceded the war in Iraq will dissipate over time, will abate for all the reasons that many of you have pointed out.

I just heard Secretary Rumsfeld has communicated with 41 nations saying we need help in Iraq; and if you read the news reports coming from Iraq, we need help. It is about time for some burden sharing. That will be the new term after nation building that you will be hearing from Washington. Yeah, we want your troops.

As far as I am concerned, whether they are German troops or French troops or Italian troops or Belgian troops, please understand that there are some of us that welcome assistance and support in Iraq as well as please help us pay for the reconstruction of Iraq.

Let me conclude with that. And I would be interested in your response to the issue of what is being described in American newspapers and American media outlets as a growing credibility gap be-

cause of—at least to this point in time—the lack of discovery of weapons of mass destruction. What is the response, what is the opinion in Europe?

Mr. SIKORSKI. I think I may speak for the Slav Street, if you like, in Central Europe if I say that the general feeling is that, whatever happened to Mr. Saddam Hussein, it could not have happened to a nicer fellow; and that because we have so recently emerged from living under dictatorship, it was the part of the argument for war that was much more persuasive for us than the technical argument about weapons of mass destruction.

Quite frankly, we in Central Europe did not feel threatened by Iraq. What we did feel was solidarity with the United States. We felt that the spirit of the alliance is that America has made the judgment that to remove Saddam Hussein is vital to its national security interest. Therefore, we will be with you, just as we hope you will be with us if we are threatened.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. DETTKE. Let me try and answer, and let me start with the second question. And it bothers me, of course, because we have this disagreement, and the insinuation then should be, well, Europe should say no because we oppose the war. And I have trouble with that, to stand there and, as the war happened against our will, to say, well, the United States is responsible for all of this and they should do all the reconstruction themselves. I don't think that is a responsible position.

The German government came quickly to the conclusion that we can't maintain and pursue a policy on the back of the victims. So let's be decent and help the victims. That is the idea. Help with civilian reconstruction. That is what we are willing to do.

Do we get enough credit for this? I don't think so. I think we should get a little more credit for what Germany is—Europe is willing to do in spite of its initial opposition.

So “no” is not a good answer. I think, in spite of our differences, the responsible policy, the moral thing to do, the right thing to do is to help as much as we can; and we want to do that.

But I have to say to the first point that this is a more worrisome issue. Because what is at stake here, if the primary rationale for the war is weapons of mass destruction and you try to convince your own country and other peoples that this is the issue and then not find them, then of course the central argument collapses and the consequence is, of course, a credibility gap. And I would go a step further even. I would say what America would lose is not only credibility, also, a good part of its power to set rules for the international community. That is a worrisome issue I believe.

Now, can it be healed? We see all the human rights violations and the terrible things that happened. Does it justify, as Europeans would think, an illegal war? Maybe. Maybe this can—we can come along over that issue. But as Europeans see these pictures from mass graves and from what happened, yes, there is a sense of relief that this dictator is gone.

I would say, let's get beyond our disagreements and move forward and not stick giving it to the Germans and the French, the old saying that we hear in Washington, punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians. I think that is not the best

language. That doesn't help us very much to get over the issue. But I would urge you, let's move on.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will yield to Ms. Lee.

I thought I saw—Mr. Paemen, did you have your hand raised?

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized.

Ms. LEE. Thank you. I want to thank the Chairman and our Ranking Member in his absence for holding this very important hearing, and I want to thank our distinguished panelists for being here and apologize for not being here earlier. But I will take your testimony and read it.

I think this is such an important issue that we need to address at this Subcommittee and then Full Committee level. We all understand very well the fact that United States-European relationships have undergone and continue to undergo many strains. Many of our allies, many of us actually here in Congress supported the continuation of United Nations inspections; many of us were opposed to the war against Iraq.

Furthermore, differences over Iraq I think must also be understood in the context of what many of us, many of our allies view as a pattern of unilateralism, including the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, abandonment of the ABM Treaty, the refusal to participate in the International Criminal Court.

Also, I am concerned with the perception of the Europeans with regard to our foreign policy doctrine of first strike and preemption. I would just like your feedback and your sense of how the policy of unilateralism on all fronts—and there are surely others, other policies that I haven't even mentioned—but how the Europeans are viewing the United States within the context of unilateralism and what can we do actually to try to strengthen the transatlantic relationship now and try to rebuild and move forward, given the context and given the real, I think, push toward preemption, first strike unilateralism.

Any of you, feel free to answer the question. But I really would like to hear your sense of where Europe is coming from. Let me ask Mr. Paemen first.

Mr. PAEMEN. I think there is concern in Europe about unilateralism in the United States. I believe it is partly due to style and rhetoric, which I think are manageable. But there is also the substance.

I mentioned in my previous remarks that the doctrine paper—I understand it was mainly written by Condoleezza Rice in September—raises great concern in Europe, at least with a certain number of people, who worry that the vision of the future world relations is becoming different in the United States and Europe. Europeans, and I imagine some Americans, would rather expect the United States to use this exceptional situation, namely being the only superpower in the world, to establish some rules of the game for the future. There are great nations coming onto the world scene, and perhaps one day the world will no longer be dominated by one superpower.

And perhaps at that time we would be very happy, or our children or grandchildren would be very happy, if the United States and Europe, but let's say mainly the United States, given its

unique position now, would have used this moment to try to agree with the rest of the world on the basic rules of the game. I think that would be a reassuring thought for lots of parents in Europe and probably in the United States.

Ms. LEE. Thank you.

Mr. Riotta.

Mr. RIOTTA. Thank you.

I think that the reason of the superpower apart from the United States and is the international public opinion is what we were mentioning, like how does the world judge our unilateralism or what is perceived as unilateralism, or what the gentleman was saying before, the weapons of mass destruction, what will come of that, will they be found. Very often I think that the Administration—that President Bush and the Administration underestimates the impact, that it lacks public relations skills, and very often, as anybody knows in the marketing sector, you can have a good product, but if you don't sell it well, it won't go on the market.

There are things that the Europeans would agree on with the Americans, and they sometimes don't because of the way they are offered from the Administration or the White House. When we read about anti-Americanism, you told us about the South and how divided this was about the war. Do people in Europe have the perception that many Americans were against the war, that many Americans voted in Congress or there were many citizens in New York, Los Angeles where councilmen and councilwomen voted against the war, where there was a huge peace movement? No, because the perception that the United States was for the war 100 percent, everybody marching together, prevailed. This is a media fault for sure, but at the same time, the country as a whole fails to give the entire spectrum of its opinions, I am afraid.

Ms. LEE. I would like to hear Mr. Sikorski's response, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKORSKI. I would like to underline what Ambassador Paemen said about style. I think it is very important. I think it was a robust American President, wasn't it, who said, speak softly and carry a big stick. Well, the speak softly part is very important.

As to your question about unilateralism, I think this is crucial for the next likely crises, and let me use a particular one. Poland was for 40 years a member of the Neutral State Supervisory Commission on the Korean Peninsula. We, therefore, have some experience there, and we have a situation in which a totalitarianism Communist regime is hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons in North Korea. It is also a regime that, as we speak today, is keeping hundreds of thousands of its people in concentration camps.

So on the one hand, I would advise that when we come to deal with North Korea, the humanitarian aspect and not just the technical weapons of mass destruction aspect should be used, because it is going to be much more persuasive to European audiences.

But number two, we have a real security crisis here in which America wishes to share responsibility with other powers, but there are apparently no takers. This time, the others are saying, "no, you United States, deal with it on your own." So I think we have a la carte complaints about the American unilateralism.

Ms. LEE. May I ask the other two witnesses to comment with regard to our foreign policy doctrine of preemption and the use of first strike? What is your view of that, and what do you think we need to do in communicating that better to the world in terms of that being central now of the United States military and foreign policy?

Mr. VAISSE. Just a very brief point. I think that this is the perfect example of what Ambassador Paemen was saying about style and presentation. Sometimes preemption is necessary, and I was referring to that in my previous comments, sometimes you have to do it, but don't say it loud—don't say that it is a general theoretical thing that will be applied in all cases, et cetera.

And it is very interesting to me that Condoleezza Rice a couple of weeks after the doctrine was published sort of qualified the doctrine saying there are cases in which this applies, there are cases in which it doesn't apply. But the damage was already done. I think this was not needed. Do it, but don't say it. And so I would also agree with my neighbor here.

And, for example, I think it cannot do anything else than sort of worsening the security dilemma of countries like Iran or North Korea who say, look at the Iraqi example, look at the doctrine. So we have to protect ourselves and get a nuclear weapon as soon as possible, because this actually prevents the U.S. from applying this doctrine. And so for all kinds of reasons, it seems to me that it is the perfect example of the thing not to do.

Ms. LEE. Dr. Dettke.

Mr. DETTKE. Yes. If I may add one brief comment to what my colleague has said. Unilateralism is, of course, a great concern, and I can see where it would be possible to cooperate on important issues, and that cooperation doesn't take place. The doctrine of preemption that concerns me a lot is one point. We can see how difficult it is to find a good answer to international terrorism. Just to wait and see if something happens is not a good strategy.

But the other issue here is that if you do a war of aggression—and that was technically what it comes down to—you violate U.N. Charter Article 2, a very important achievement after World War II. Why is it not possible to transform or translate this American concern into an effort to adjust the rules that we have and that we want—that we need to live with? And that is a civilized world order and adjust the rules, because the threat that we are talking about here is just as valid and important for Europe as it is for the United States. This is not a national issue. This is an international issue, and it should be addressed as an international issue and not as a national American doctrine.

That would be my point, and I think the other issue that I see coming up on the basis of unilateralism is, of course, that America can create coalitions of the willing. Fine. Great. But what you do is you create a dual world order, and you somehow superimpose coalitions of the willing upon existing international institutions, NATO, United Nations. That is not the proper way. Why don't we talk about the necessary adjustment and the reform of these institutions? It can be done in NATO. We are on the way of doing it, by the way, on security issues. We are adjusting NATO to meet the requirements of the war against terrorism. It can be done, but the

issue is it has to be taken up in that way by the United States and not pronounced as a doctrine.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again for this hearing. I think this Subcommittee can be very useful in coming up with suggestions on how we can move forward on policies that benefit mutually both the United States and the European alliance. I think it is very important.

Mr. BEREUTER. I agree with the gentlelady, and while I think we need to call this good hearing to a conclusion, I do think we need to think about common projects that can pull us together, very important projects. If you think about the number of countries that perform consistently as real democracies that believe in free and fair elections and implement them and pluralism and rule of law, it is within the international community a relatively small number, a minority of countries, and sometimes our multilateral institutions really don't perform as if they are a full community of democracies. And I think it would be good for us to consider how we could move together, sort of reinforce the transatlantic alliance which constitute a very major share of the democracies, the effective democracies, in the world.

The entire panel's written statements as well as statements of the Members will be on the Web site very shortly, in a matter of a few minutes from now. I think the written statements were outstanding, and the comments here today, the summaries, the supplemental comments, responses to questions were extremely helpful, and I do thank all of you gentlemen for giving us this time and your thoughts today.

By the way, we are pleased to have had today with us the contingent of French military officers who are visiting the United States from the Center for Higher Military Studies. Welcome, gentlemen.

And all Members' written statements, including, for example, Mr. Chabot, who submitted them for this hearing, will be made a part of the record.

Thank you very much again. This Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

