

UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN EUROPE

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN EUROPE

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter, (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order.

I understand there is a representative of the Serbia-Montenegro government in the room, and I want to express on behalf of the Subcommittee, and I am sure the Committee and the Congress our deep sadness, our condolences on the tragic death of the prime minister. We will try to prevail on the very positive things that he was attempting to achieve in his country and in Europe.

Today the Europe Subcommittee will hear from Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, J.D. Crouch II, on U.S. policy priorities in Europe.

It is no coincidence that the first hearing of this Subcommittee for the new Congress would focus on U.S. foreign policy priorities in Europe. It is a good place to start, I think, and integral to that subject, the American view regarding Europe and vice-versa. By any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, "old or new," is one of the two or three most important foreign relationships we have.

No two regions in the world share a history, a common set of values and a global vision as much as do the United States and Europe. In Europe our core national interests are fully engaged. Not ignoring Australia and Japan, but for the most part our traditional and closest allies are in Europe. Our economy, and our systems of trade and security are integrally linked with the European continent. With our European partners we share a wider range of interests and a higher level of cooperation on issues ranging, for example, from counter-terrorism, to stability in the Balkans, to peace and unity on Cyprus, than with any other region in the world. Between the United States and Europe, we possess the greatest ability anywhere to address solutions to transnational issues such as organized crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of WMD, communicable diseases and money-laundering, to name a few.

Today I must admit that I am very concerned for the state of the transatlantic relationship. For example, there is a high level of disagreement between the United States and a few other countries that have been in the past or in recent years (especially, France,

Germany and perhaps Belgium) our closest allies in Europe. The harsh rhetoric we hear on both sides of the Atlantic in varying degrees has, I think, caused real harm to our overall relationship between America and these countries and could result in long-term damage.

The dispute over Iraq, a major current issue, could result in unintended, but extensive, collateral damage to the overall transatlantic relationship as we have seen in NATO there the good will and cooperation which generally prevails in that institution has been harmed, and if left unattended, it will damage our trade and investment relations, our cultural ties, and the attitudes of our general populations. We noted this by observing the anti-American undercurrent in the anti-war rallies in Europe and through the anti-European or at least anti-France rhetoric here.

Whether the difficulties we are having with some of our European friends—and again, I must emphasize some of our European allies—over Iraq will be simply a “one-time, one-issue” phenomenon is not yet clear. Will the dispute over Iraq somehow basically affect the very structure of the transatlantic relationship, and intensify the difficulties we have had all along with Europe? Whether it will result in long-lasting consequences is yet to be determined. No doubt we have entered a very difficult period in relations with some European countries like France and Germany.

In December 2001 at an address I gave on the campus of the National Defense University, I said that:

“For some years now, I have been concerned about a widening perception gap between the United States and our European partners, and about our increasingly divergent views about issues and about American’s actions and values. For example, on an increasing number of issues, it seems that in certain areas the European notions of what are legitimate U.S. national interest, and our actions to defend them, are fundamentally different than the views of the majority of Americans.”

That is what I said in December 2001, and I think it is, unfortunately, relevant today.

In the same month I wrote those words in 2001, there was an interesting article in *The Washington Post* by an American professor serving as a visiting fellow at the Cambridge Centre of International Studies in England. The headlines of the article read: “Allies in War,” he is talking about the war on terrorism, “Not in Perspective.” Dr. Peter Feaver of Duke University in that article warns:

“President Bush, and the American public he leads, should not assume that our allies see the world in the same way we do.”

And by the way he places the primary cause of that as the less objective media news coverage in Europe.

American Stanley Hoffman cogently wrote in *The New York Review* in October 10 of 1001 that:

“We Americans have tended, in the last 10 years, toward a form of self-congratulations that can be grating for others; we are the ‘indispensable nation’. . . . benign American hegemony

ony, we often say, provides a modicum of order without threatening anyone. And yet a powerful country can both attract and repel . . . We need not only to protect ourselves better at home. . . , but also to understand why even non-terrorists sometimes feel smothered by America's cultural, economic, political, and military omnipresence."

For these reasons and others, I believe that we must examine whether fundamental differences have emerged. Most troubling are increasingly apparent differences of opinion regarding our global, or at least our regional, responsibilities and differences on how those responsibilities should be legitimately translated into American foreign policy vis-a-vis the foreign policy of individual European actions and such multinational institutions like the European Union.

In the interest of time, I am going to skip for the moment some of the reasons why I think we have the divergent interest, why there is a gap in our views, but it has a lot to do with the fact the European nations place much more emphasis and confidence in multilateral institutions. It has to do with a greater sense of concern in this country about losing our national sovereignty, to mention a couple of the high points.

I want to now mention that I have some specific concerns regarding Europe which I hope can be addressed here by our two witnesses. I am concerned with the unfortunate breakdown of the negotiations in Cyprus, where I think Kofi Annan was doing a remarkably fine job. I note that Mr. Hogeland in today's *Washington Post* addressed the issue and responsibility of Mr. Denktash as the one person, I think thwarting the will of the Turkish Cypriots. This was a great opportunity—I have not given up on it—it is a great opportunity finally to have a resolution of the Cyprus problem.

We have, of course, a need for further progress in the Northern Ireland peace process, and in the Ngorno-Karabagh dispute which seems to be at a standstill.

In the Balkans, we have a slow pace in development and in Kosovo, the resumption of talks about Kosovo independence is, I think, problematic. The assassination yesterday, of course, of the Prime Minister in Serbia may raise concerns about the political stability and the strength of the rule of law in that nation.

Furthermore, in the Caucasus region, continued instability in Georgia, and the disappointing way recent elections in Armenia have been handled present challenges to our policies.

There are other areas of interest to the Subcommittee which hopefully our witnesses will address today. I appreciate very much the fact that you got us your statements in advance, and I have had a chance to look at them. They are an excellent overview of the circumstances we face and the reasons for our current policy with respect to Europe, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and their informal remarks.

But first I would like to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for his remarks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Today the Europe Subcommittee will hear from Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, J.D. Crouch, II, on U.S. policy priorities in Europe.

It is no coincidence that the first hearing of this Subcommittee for the new Congress would focus on the U.S. priorities in Europe, and integral to that subject, the American view regarding Europe and vice versa. By any measure, the relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe, "old or new," is one of the two or three most important foreign relationships we have.

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Today I must admit that I am very concerned for the state of the transatlantic relationship. For example, there is a high level of disagreement between the U.S. and a few other countries that have been in the past or recent years (especially France, Germany, and perhaps Belgium) our closest allies in Europe. The harsh rhetoric we hear on both sides of the Atlantic in varying degrees, has poisoned the overall relationship between American and these countries and could result in long-term damage. The dispute over Iraq, a major current issue, could result in unintended, but extensive collateral damage to the overall transatlantic relationship as we have seen in NATO, there the good will and cooperation which generally prevails in that institution has been harmed or as it has been damaged, too, in our trade and investment relations, our cultural ties, and the attitudes of our general populations. WE noted this by observing the anti-American undercurrent in the anti-war rallies in Europe and through the anti-European (or at least anti-France) rhetoric here.

Whether the difficulties we are having with some of our European friends—and again, I must emphasize some of our European allies—over Iraq will be simply a "one-time, one-issue" phenomenon is not yet clear. Will the dispute over Iraq somehow basically affect the very structure of the transatlantic relationship, and intensify the difficulties we have had all along with Europe? Whether it will result in long-lasting consequences is yet to be determined. No doubt we have entered a very difficult period in relations with some European countries like France and Germany.

In December of 2001 at an address I gave on the campus of the National Defense University, I said that:

"For some years now, I have been concerned about a widening perception gap between the United States and our European partners, and about our increasingly divergent views about issues and about America's actions and values. For example, on an increasing number of issues, it seems that in certain areas the European notions of what are legitimate U.S. national interest, and our actions to defend them, are fundamentally different than the views of the majority of Americans."

In the same month I wrote those words in 2001, there was an interesting article in the *Washington Post* by an American professor serving as a visiting fellow at the Cambridge Centre of International Studies in England. The headline of the article reads: "Allies in War [on terrorism], Not in Perspective." Dr. Peter Feaver of Duke University in that article warns: "President Bush, and the American public he leads, should not assume that our allies see the world in the same way we do." (He places the primary cause as the less objective media news coverage in Europe.) (*Washington Post* of 12/02/01)

American Stanley Hoffman cogently wrote in the *New York Review* (October 10, 2001) that:

"We [Americans] have tended, in the last ten years, toward a form of self-congratulations that can be grating for others: we are the 'indispensable nation'. . . ."

'benign American hegemony, we often say, provides a modicum of order without threatening anyone. And yet a powerful country can both attract and repel. . . . We need not only to protect ourselves better at home. . . . , but also to understand why even non-terrorists sometimes feel smothered by America's cultural, economic, political, and military omnipresence.'

For these reasons and for others, I believe that we must examine whether fundamental differences have emerged. Most troubling are increasingly apparent differences of opinion regarding our global, or at least regional, responsibilities and differences on how those responsibilities should legitimately translate into American foreign policy vis a vis the foreign policy of individual European nations and such multinational institutions like the European Union.

The U.S. is the world's sole remaining superpower. That is a fact—a fact not to be trumpeted proudly; with that status comes responsibilities not to be shirked or neglected either. Indeed, throughout our history, Americans as a people have often been reluctant to see their country take up the mantle of leadership that circumstances have thrust upon us. Our revered Founding Fathers after all had warned us to avoid foreign entanglements, and those words still resonate in parts of our electorate—yes, even in this era of globalization. During the last decade our Government and people, on occasion, acted as though our superpower status was an unwanted and inconvenient burden distracting us and draining our resources from domestic priorities. A great many Americans were impatient for "the peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War. But September 11th may well have largely put an end to that ambivalence or identity crisis, as well as ending any misbegotten sense of homeland invulnerability.

Our superpower status means that, quite frankly, our world-view is somewhat different than that of many Europeans. We are the force of last resort, drawn upon when other avenues of conflict resolution fail. As such, Americans are more suspicious about international efforts that would set limitations on our flexibility in using our power.

The next point I would raise to explain the widening European-American gap is the fact that Americans are highly protective of national sovereignty. In part that is because of geography and in part it is because of our history (pioneers carving a nation out of the frontier). When we deploy forces overseas, we expect that the rules of engagement for our military will serve U.S. interests, and will be drafted in Washington and not, for example, in the United Nations.

Americans always have reserved the right to use military force to protect our vital national interest and honor our treaty commitments. This is a right, we believe, that does not require the prior approval of the United Nations or any other international body. Certainly, when the United States (or any nation) engages in military operations, the support of the United Nations in the form of a resolution is highly desirable. But still most Americans probably believe and feel quite strongly that the absence of such support does not prevent American action to defend our national interests, or to meet our treaty obligations (certainly including the NATO Treaty), or to roll back an aggressor nation. A Security Council veto will not deter us. Americans tend to believe, if the cause is just and our motives are good or benign we can act unilaterally, if we must, to defend the security of our citizens or our allies.

Also, certainly, American attitudes and policies are influenced by our history and culture, and, of course, the same is true for Europe. Because of Europe's unique history, its geography, and the close proximity of so many strong nationalities—with all of their history of bitter wars and changing alliances—Europeans naturally have a predisposition today to support multilateral initiatives and institutions that limit the unfriendly or detrimental actions of individual nations on their neighbors.

This gradual embrace of multilateralism in the 20th Century has generally served Europe well, resulting in a level of integration and cooperation that Europeans' forefathers could not have imagined. It has also helped the smaller, less powerful European states act collectively to reduce the unilateral options or use of power of the larger European states—and to attempt to harness or limit the power of the United States as well. Some Americans certainly do see U.S. membership in multilateral institutions or treaties as foreign efforts to put limits on American powers to protect our national interest. Of course, such views neglect the full array of positive impacts that American also receives from such memberships or treaties. But some Americans' greater skepticism about multilateralism and the resultant limitation on our ability to effectively pursue our national interests increasingly are a major cause of the fundamental differences of opinions between Europeans and Americans. This factor, growing in importance, should not be underestimated.

While Europeans don't like to hear such words, the nations of the EU have given up increasing elements of their national sovereignty on a day-to-day basis and have

accepted a higher level of regulation and standardization than would be acceptable to the American public—ever or at least for the foreseeable future. The protection of American sovereignty rings strongly in the American consciousness. But as Philip Stephens writes in his *Financial Times* column of November 23, 2001: “Here [in Europe] governments have few hang-ups about pooling sovereignty in the cause of greater security or a cleaner world. They do it every day in the European Union.”

The difference in attitudes on the importance of national sovereignty and multilateralism is a big, big reason for the increasingly divergent attitudes and actions between European nations and the United States. These attitudinal differences are growing every day, too.

I do have other very specific concerns regarding Europe which I will mention briefly in closing, including the very unfortunate recent collapse of the U.N.-sponsored peace negotiations designed to resolve the Cyprus problem. The U.N. Secretary General worked very hard, along with others, to try to bring an end to the division of the island. I hope we can somehow salvage that matter where Mr. Denktash appears increasingly to be blocking the will of the majority of Turkish Cypriots. Also, I am troubled with the inability to make more progress in the Northern Ireland peace process and in the Ngorno-Karabagh dispute which seems to be at a standstill.

In the Balkans, the slow pace of development in Kosovo and the resumption of talk about Kosovo independence is problematic. Yesterday’s assassination of the Prime Minister in Serbia may raise concerns about the political stability and the strength of the rule of law in that nation.

Furthermore, in the Caucasus, continued instability in Georgia and the disappointing way recent elections in Armenia were handled present challenges to our policies.

There are other areas of interest to this Subcommittee which hopefully our hearing today will address. That will help us to better understand and more precisely define our foreign policy goals as they relate to Europe.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first thank you for holding today’s Subcommittee on America’s priorities in Europe. I also want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your extraordinary commitment to strengthening and preserving transatlantic relations, and especially for your leadership as the President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentarian Assembly.

I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan fashion, to protect America’s interests and security, to strengthen the historic transatlantic bonds, and to preserve common ideals of freedom and peace that the United States and Europe mutually embrace.

I also look forward to working with you on several pressing issues in Europe, including U.S./EU relations, European Union enlargement, U.S./Turkish relations, the Northern Ireland peace process, and developments, as you said, on Cyprus and in the Balkans.

I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Mr. Crouch, J.D. Crouch, for testifying before our Subcommittee.

As did Mr. Bereuter, I read both of your statements, and I know that you both agree that it is critical for the United States to strengthen its relations with our European allies.

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply, deeply disturbed about the growing rift between the United States and many of our European allies. It is terribly unfortunate that much of the international good will and solidarity directed toward the American people following the tragic events of September 11th has been squandered.

This troubling development in our transatlantic relations threatens our historic partnership with several of our European allies, weakens 50 years of NATO cooperation and strains valuable re-

sources and attention away from many of the most dangerous and pressing issues facing both Europe and America.

Undoubtedly, there will be policy differences between the United States and our European allies. Today some of our allies in Europe have taken an alternative approach to disarming Saddam Hussein. Despite differing policies, however, it is critical that the Bush Administration take steps to reverse this dangerous trend and continue to reach out and cooperate with our European allies.

In particular, I am deeply concerned about our longstanding strategic partnership with the Republic of Turkey. Last week, I traveled to Turkey with Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Rogers from Michigan following Turkey's parliament's decision not to allow U.S. troops deployment on Turkish soil.

I was disturbed by the vote in Turkey's parliament and I was disturbed what I saw transpiring. Six decades of incredibly strong relations from the Korean War through the Cold War through Turkey's commanding role in the international security assistance force in Afghanistan, all of this unraveling before our eyes.

My visit and the message that we brought with my other colleagues to our Turkish allies is one that I hope the Administration is also conveying to Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish people that the United States is sensitive to their concerns, appreciates and recognizes how vitally important Turkey and our other allies are to the United States' national interest, and to the future of global democracy and stability.

The rapid disintegration of our historic alliances, including Turkey, but not limited to Turkey, is something that we need to be deeply concern about, not just with respect to Iraq, but especially with respect to al-Qaeda and dictators such as Saddam Hussein.

In the case of Iraq, I hope that the Administration appreciate that they may not need our allies to win a military battle with Saddam Hussein, but certainly we will need them to win the peace in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the testimony provided to the Subcommittee by the two assistant secretaries will undoubtedly show in great detail the complexity of the challenges the United States and Europe face over the next decade.

I very much look forward to working with the Administration to address these critical issues, and to make certain that America's longstanding alliances remain in tact and strong enough to deal with mounting economic and security issues. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding today's subcommittee hearing on America's priorities in Europe. I also want thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your extraordinary commitment to strengthening and preserving transatlantic relations and for your leadership as the President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly. I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan fashion to protect America's interest and security needs during these difficult times, to strengthen the historic transatlantic bonds and to preserve common ideals of freedom and peace that the United States and Europe mutually embrace. I also look forward to working with you on several pressing issues in Europe, including U.S.-EU relations, European Union Enlargement, U.S.-Turkish Relations, the Northern Ireland Peace Process and developments on Cyprus and in the Balkans. Finally, as

this is our first subcommittee hearing of the 108th Congress, I also want to welcome both our Republican and Democratic members.

I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch for testifying before our subcommittee. After reading both of your statements, I know you agree that it is critical for the United States to strengthen its relations with our European allies.

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply disturbed about the growing rift between the United States and many of our European Allies. It is terribly unfortunate that much of the international goodwill and solidarity directed toward the American people following the tragic events of September 11 has been squandered.

This troubling development in our transatlantic relations threatens our historic partnership with several of our European Allies, weakens 50 years of NATO cooperation, and strains valuable resources and attention away from the most dangerous and pressing issues facing both Europe and America. Undoubtedly, there will be policy differences between the United States and our European partners. Today, a few of our allies in Europe have taken an alternative approach to disarming Saddam Hussein than the United States. Despite differing policies, it is critical that the Bush Administration take steps to reverse this dangerous trend and continue to reach out and cooperate with our European allies, who share a common commitment to ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction, removing the scourge of terror and advocating democracy, freedom, and justice worldwide.

In particular, I am deeply concerned about our long-standing strategic partnership with the Republic of Turkey. Last week I traveled to Turkey following their parliament's decision not to allow a U.S. troop deployment on Turkish soil. I was disturbed by the vote in Turkey's parliament and what I saw transpiring—six decades of strong relations from cooperation during the Korean War and Cold War to Turkey's commanding role in International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan unraveling before my own eyes. My visit and the message I brought to our Turkish allies is one that I hope the Administration is also conveying to Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish people that the United States appreciates and recognizes how vitally important each of these nations are to America's national interest and to the future of global democracy, stability, and a world free from terror and weapons of mass destruction. The rapid disintegration of our historic international alliances—including, but not limited to, that of Turkey put America in a weaker position when facing common enemies, like Al Qaeda or dictators like Saddam Hussein with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. In the case of Iraq, I hope the Administration understands that they may not need our allies to win a military battle with Saddam but will certainly need them to win the peace in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the testimony provided to the subcommittee by the Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense show in great detail the complexity of the challenges the United States and our European allies will face over the next decade. I look forward to working with the Administration to address these critical issues and to make certain that America's long-standing alliances remain intact and strong enough to deal with mounting economic and security issues. I am sure that our subcommittee members have many questions regarding these matters as well. I welcome both of you to our hearing, and I look forward to discussing these most serious matters with you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. Thank you for your kind words. I look forward to a very productive and positive relationship with you, and our staffs are going to work well together, I am confident.

I understand that my two colleagues here have no opening statements; is that correct? But any opening statements of Members of the Subcommittee and this Member without objection will be made a part of the record.

And now I would like to introduce our two witnesses today. Our first witness today is The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

Ambassador Jones was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs on May 31, 2001. Previously, she served as Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, and as principal Assistant Secretary to the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Secretary Jones has also served as Ambas-

sador to the Republic of Kazakstan, and Deputy Chief of mission to our Embassy in Bonn, Germany.

She has served as a deputy principal officer in the U.S. interest-section in Baghdad. Her first foreign service post was in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Our second witness is Dr. Jack Dire Crouch II. Dr. Crouch was sworn in Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy on August 6 of 2001. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy.

Prior to jointing the Pentagon, Dr. Crouch was associate professor of defense and strategic studies at Southwestern Missouri State University in Springfield, Missouri. Dr. Crouch has served as the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security policy in the first Bush Administration. Prior to that he was a military legislative assistant to the former Senator from Wyoming, Malcolm Wallop.

We look forward to your testimony. Your entire written statements will be made a part of the record. They are very extensive and we appreciate them very much. They are going to be very valuable to us in the course of this year and this Congress, undoubtedly. I would like to give each of your about 10 minutes to summarize your statement, if that seems adequate, and we will proceed with you, Secretary Jones.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. JONES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to summarize my full statement.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you completely that we do have serious differences with some of our Allies in Europe, by no means with all of them. I would like to highlight, though, as we begin this hearing some of the positive areas where our cooperation continues and continues in very gratifying ways, particularly in fighting terrorism.

We have good cooperation on how to proceed on North Korea. We are working very well on a growing danger or growing threat to the region of HIV/AIDS. We are working together on new markets for exports. We have good cooperation in many, many areas in Afghanistan. We are working well with Russia and with European allies and friends to bring Russia into the European community, and we are making good progress in the Balkans, despite the serious tragedy yesterday of the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic.

As we focus on how to resolve the differences we have with some of our European allies, we nevertheless believe that the relationship will evolve, particularly as Europe expands, which I will address in a minute.

One of the areas that we are particularly focused on in our department and this Administration is the importance of enhancing our public diplomacy efforts and enhancing our ability to reach out to audiences, particularly in the former communist countries of Europe, and to reach the post-World War II generations.

The area where the focus is in terms of the transatlantic difficulties right now, of course, is Iraq. Three of the countries of Europe are with us in supporting the Security Council Resolution. The U.K. and Spain, of course, are co-sponsors of the Security Council Resolution that is on the table, and Bulgaria is in support of it.

Other countries in Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged political and military support to the growing coalition we have, working to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that it is imperative that he disarm or face a military attack.

Other European countries, France, Germany and Russia in particular, also on the Security Council, favor a longer period of time to allow Saddam Hussein to disarm.

One of the things that I would like to emphasize, however, is no member of the Security Council and virtually no country that has appeared before the Security Council in the debate in the last couple of days in New York, not one of them has maintained that Saddam is cooperating under 1441. That is not the issue. There is broad agreement and firm agreement about the importance of 1441 and the requirements of 1441.

Where the difference is is on the length of time that we should allow Saddam Hussein to demonstrate cooperation with 1441. The United States, Spain, the U.K. and quite a number of other of our European friends and Allies believe that the time is up, that Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to cooperate, has had 12 years to demonstrate—to make a strategic decision to disarm. He has not done that, and we do not think that more time for inspectors is going to change that.

In NATO, may I start, Mr. Chairman, by applauding your deep engagement and support for NATO, for the transatlantic relationship in your presidency of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

It is true that we had a very recent, very difficult time within NATO where some of our NATO Allies confused the request before it. The request before it was by Turkey for protection of a NATO Ally against Iraq should there be—should Turkey experience any danger from Iraq. Some of our NATO allies confused that with the debate about Iraq.

When we were able to move that discussion into the defense planning committee, the DPC, which works at 18 without France, we were able, with Germany's strong support and assistance, to agree at 18 to provide the kind of support for Turkey that Turkey had requested.

We nevertheless believe that NATO remains a strong transatlantic—the strongest transatlantic alliance. It is an alliance that we believe very strongly in. It is an alliance that is transforming itself to address the threats of the new century, and we are very committed to its expansion through the invitations that were issued in Prague, and to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, which brings closer the nations that are now on the edges of the broader Europe, particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia, into closer cooperation and collaboration with NATO.

The United States is equally supportive of EU enlargement. The elements that are required of the EU candidate countries for EU membership are all elements that the United States strongly supports, particularly in fighting corruption and conforming legislation

and regulation to international laws, conforming to the World Trade Organization, and bringing the practices and the legislation into conformity with the world community. These are all efforts that the United States strongly supports and applauds.

The European Union is the only other organization besides NATO that has the capacity to project the economic, political and cultural power that we think is appropriate. We have a tremendous amount of—tremendous number of areas in which we cooperative very productively, and I count in particular the law enforcement area and counter-terrorism efforts. And we believe that this is a relationship and an organization that deserves continued support and collaboration.

With Europe itself, of course, we have over \$500 billion in trade each year, and we are each other's largest investors.

There are a couple of trade issues that I would like to mention here as mentioned in my introduction, and the first is the WTO ruling against us in the foreign sales corporation case. There, we will be working with Congress on compliance to protect U.S. competitiveness and to avoid EU sanctions which could amount to up to \$4 billion in U.S. trade.

Similarly, the WTO ruling on the European Union's challenge to the steel safeguard is due on April 14. We believe we have acted consistently with WTO rules. But if the WTO rules against us, we need to review the WTO decision to decide whether or not we would ask for an appeal.

We are also concerned about the fact that the EU has blocked the approval of safe bio-tech foods for more than 4 years. We believe this violates WTO and EU laws, and we are seeking the best way to get the EU to lift its moratorium on bio-tech products.

With regard to Russia, we are very gratified that the Moscow Treaty was ratified unanimously by the Senate on March 6. We are disappointed by the Russian position so far on Iraq. We are working to try to gain greater cooperation with Russia as far as North Korea is concerned. We work with the Russians on money-laundering questions. We think that we have made some progress, but corruption is still an issue with Russia.

In terms of democratic freedoms, there have been advances such as jury trials, but freedom of the media and the treatment of foreign clergy remain problems that are on our agenda with Russia.

Chechnya, of course, is always an issue that is on our agenda with Russia. We are hopeful about the upcoming referendum. We have just designated three Chechnyan groups as terrorist groups. We did that extremely carefully, and with full review of intelligence on those groups.

In Chechnya itself, we still maintain and argue forcefully to the Russians on the need for discipline and accountability of their forces, particularly on human rights issues.

Mr. BEREUTER. Excuse me, Madam Secretary. We have a recorded vote in another Committee and will have to leave. I am going to ask Mr. Janklow if he will take the chair. I just wanted you to know where I am going, and not leaving in the middle of your testimony intentionally.

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And the last point on Russia I would like to make is that we look forward to graduating Russia from Jackson-Vanik.

The Chairman and Congressman Wexler mentioned Turkey. We can talk in greater detail about Turkey and where we are at the moment. We see Turkey as a strategic partner. The vote in parliament on March 1 was a setback to this partnership. We are equally focused on economic matters with Turkey. We look forward very much to IMF reform and to Turkey maintaining its adherence to the program, and we support the qualified industrial zones that Turkey is seeking.

We have been extremely supportive and active in support of Turkey's EU membership. On Cyprus, as you mentioned, we suffered a severe disappointment this week when Mr. Denktash refused to go along with a very extensive, very good proposal for reunification of the island.

In the Balkans, we were very saddened by Djindjic's assassination, the Prime Minister's assassination yesterday. We look forward very much to a new government forming, and honoring his memory by pursuing anti-corruption just as he did, and by pursuing cooperation with the international tribunal in The Hague.

In the Balkans, we do see progress there in terms of troop levels being down, refugee returns being up. There is good economic growth and elections are proceeding well, but we nevertheless harp on the importance of law enforcement, particularly as it relates to fighting corruption and closing down very porous borders.

The NATO role in the Balkans is a very—it remains an important one. That said, we are shifting focus from stabilization to long-term engagement. In that connection we are very focused on how the new European defense and security program can work with NATO to develop itself to assure all of the elements of Berlin Plus in the event that the EU should take over from NATO, if NATO agrees, in Macedonia.

There are quite a number of global issues on which we are very focused. I mentioned the importance of HIV/AIDs in our transatlantic relationship. That is something that we maintain quite a bit of focus on. The Holocaust and anti-Semitism is an issue that remains on our agenda constantly with our European friends and allies, in terms of property restitution. But also I would like to focus on the positive elements of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, of which 15 countries are a member, and of which the U.S. has just taken over the chair.

We have also gained agreement from the OSCE to host a specialized meeting on anti-Semitism in Europe sometime this year, which we hope will enhance the education elements that we think are very important to combating anti-Semitism around the world.

We continue to focus on the problems with respect to borders. That is a big focus in Europe and Eurasia because of the threats that we believe the Europeans are just as susceptible to as we are.

And as I conclude, I do not want to forget the importance of resources for the State Department to do the work that we expect to do and you expect us to do in order to be able to promote the United States' interests in all of these countries and to be able to combat the threats that are threats to all of us.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to review with you the Administration's priorities in Europe, including Russia and the Caucasus. At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on becoming chairman of this subcommittee. Mr. Gallegly, we appreciate your past work on the subcommittee and we look forward to working with you on the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights.

As you suggested in your invitation letter, it is a timely moment to assess the health of the overall trans-Atlantic relationship. While we are seriously concerned by differences between the U.S. and some European countries on the best way to achieve our agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament, it is also fair to say there are many areas in which the U.S.-European relationship is as strong as ever.

Our European Allies and friends are vital partners in the campaign against global terrorism. We are opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and addressing barriers to American exports and investment. We have achieved important milestones in our relationship with Russia. Progress in the Balkans is ongoing. Our efforts continue to promote regional stability in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Europe is changing in momentous and important ways. Thus, our relationship with Europe will continue to evolve as we adapt to, and in some cases participate in, these changes. Both NATO and the EU are expanding eastward, bringing in countries that are embracing democracy and market economies. These twin expansions bring us closer to President Bush's vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. The invitees bring a new perspective and a new energy to the EU and NATO.

These expanded boundaries challenge European nations to build a new concept of themselves. They challenge the U.S. to work constructively with this new reality.

The tensions with some of our traditional Allies are acute, but our longer-term common interests remain. Our economic relationship with Europe amounts to about \$2 trillion in trade and investment. Millions of travelers cross the Atlantic each year. We cooperate closely on matters of regional and global significance, from trafficking in persons, to trade liberalization, to terrorism financing. Europe remains our most important partner in promoting human rights, Europe joins us in seeking peace in the Middle East and supporting development in Africa.

We recognize that the bonds forged so firmly in the Second World War and the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe are matters of history to the younger generation of Western Europeans. For those in Central Europe, Russia and Eurasia, however, Cold War traditions of conflict and confrontation are legacies they would like to leave behind. The Secretary, Department Principals, my colleagues in EUR, and our Embassies abroad are actively using public diplomacy and other tools to reach *both* of these generations, in order to lay the groundwork for strong and vibrant U.S.-European relations for decades to come.

IRAQ

The most pressing challenge for U.S.-European relations today is how to ensure that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein complies with the requirements of more than 17 UN Security Council resolutions and fully disarms. Plainly, there is sharp disagreement among European and Eurasian countries about how to enforce compliance with the Security Council.

Some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, Spain, and Bulgaria, agree with us that Saddam Hussein has missed his final opportunity to disarm. They and others understand that the international community must be prepared to back up its writ with the use of force, as anticipated by UNSCR 1441. A number of countries in Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged forces and specialized units to the coalition we have assembled.

At this juncture, however, other European countries—notably UNSC members France, Germany, and Russia—favor giving the inspection process more time. These countries generally acknowledge that the Iraqis engaged only in limited and truculent compliance, but hope that more time and intensified inspections can achieve results. The German government insists that force should not be used under any circumstances.

We believe that, in the absence of a genuine commitment by the Iraqi regime to disarm, more time for inspections or more inspectors—as proposed recently by France—will not solve the fundamental problem of Iraqi non-compliance.

We know what genuine disarmament looks like. We have seen it in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan. Governments that accept the priority of disarmament don't dribble out concessions. They take on obligations and make commitments willingly, and they list their weapons sites freely.

We welcome expressions of support for our policy on Iraq from a number of European leaders. This includes the January 30 letter signed by eight European leaders (from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK) and the February 5 statement by the "Vilnius 10" (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). We also appreciate the statement of the EU Summit on Iraq on February 17, emphasizing the focus must be on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441.

In the United Nations, we are working intensively with the UK and Spain to ensure broad support for our draft resolution. We would like to see the Iraqi threat addressed through the Security Council, thus strengthening its credibility.

Should military action against Iraq take place, we are seeking the broadest possible international coalition. We have held private talks with many European governments about possible coalition action. In a number of cases, acting on a bilateral basis, we have requested and obtained base access and overflight and transit clearances. Some countries are already committed to providing military forces to participate. Should military action prove necessary, we would also look to our Allies and friends in Europe for post-conflict support, including humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

NATO

For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have been joined in a common cause through NATO. We have been working hard since the September 11th attacks to transform the Alliance to address these new security threats. The Summit meeting of heads of state and government in Prague last November represented an historic milestone in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in that organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague and your continuing support for NATO's transformation.

At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program proposed by the U.S. to develop "New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships" to transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed to improve their military capabilities, through resource pooling and specialization, helping NATO to undertake collective action against the new threats that we face around the globe. The Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force, which will give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability. We agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean, efficient and responsive to today's threats. Work on implementing our new capabilities initiative is well underway.

Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will extend the zone of NATO security and stability from the Baltic to the Black Sea, helping to further secure a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. We are pleased that each of the seven invitees has already made significant military contributions to the war on terrorism and we will look to them to provide specialized niche capabilities to the Alliance in the future.

Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between NATO and Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia Council as equal partners on selected projects aimed at expanding and deepening our mutual cooperation. Current projects are focused on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, non-proliferation and missile defense. I am pleased to report that so far the NATO-Russia Council has been relatively successful. Russian participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process continues, we will seek ways to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russia relationship. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a roadmap which, if implemented by Ukraine, will draw Ukraine closer to the Alliance and bolster internal reforms.

It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at least initially, to confuse the obligation of the Alliance to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey with the broader debate over the question of what we should be doing about Iraq in the UN and elsewhere. This is not the first time NATO has experienced disagreement on a difficult and important issue. One only has to think back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is that NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee their common security and the indispensable defense link that binds North America to Europe.

NATO is also outward looking. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are important tools in enhancing cooperation with the Eurasian countries. Given the increased importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus as frontline states in the war on terrorism, we would like to see NATO do more to reach out to these countries.

EU

While NATO forms the foundation of the trans-Atlantic security framework, our relations with the EU underpin our economic and political relationship with Europe. The European Union has become increasingly important to our interests. As the only entity on the world stage with an ability similar to ours to project economic, political, and cultural power, the EU has an important influence on the environment both within and beyond Europe.

Some observers suggest the gulf dividing the U.S. and EU has never been wider. Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Kyoto, ICC, steel, FSC, beef hormones, and biotech are the most contentious issues. Putting the situation into context, we have been here before, with the Soviet pipeline, Helms-Burton and ILSA. Our common interests, bonds, and values proved stronger than these divisions. For all the differences, our areas of common belief and objectives with the EU remain greater than with any other potential partner. A perception of fundamental divergence is neither in our interest nor accurate.

Over \$500 billion in trade between the U.S. and EU takes place each year, creating jobs and boosting growth on both sides of the Atlantic. We are also each other's largest foreign investors, and those flows continue. The vast majority of trade and investment occurs without headlines, without rancor, without dispute. At the Doha meeting of the WTO, the U.S. and the EU came together to launch a new round and provide new momentum for free trade. At the last U.S.-EU Summit, we agreed to develop a Positive Economic Agenda. This is a mechanism to find common approaches to regulatory issues across a broad range of sectors, and to advance our active dialogue on access to financial markets. While these efforts hopefully will minimize areas of future trade disputes, where we have disagreements now, such as over agricultural biotechnology, we are pressing the EU to open its markets to us without delay. We will use all available tools, including where appropriate the WTO, to protect our interests.

Increased U.S.-EU cooperation receives little publicity in non-economic areas. In counter-terrorism, we negotiated an agreement that facilitates the exchange of information between EUROPOL and U.S. law enforcement. We have concluded negotiations toward a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty/Extradition Treaty, which must now enter the approval process. Coordinated U.S. and EU diplomacy and assistance have been key to Balkans stabilization. In Afghanistan, we jointly prevented a humanitarian crisis, and we continue to work together to build democratic government, infrastructure and jobs. Another example of EU-U.S. cooperation is the joint application of visa restrictions on the leadership of the secessionist Transnistria regime in Moldova. Together, we are sending a strong signal to the Tiraspol regime that it must negotiate seriously to bring this longstanding issue to a rapid settlement.

The accession of ten new countries to the European Union in 2004 is a significant EU achievement. It has also been a longstanding U.S. policy objective. EU enlargement will cement these nations, most of which were members of the former Soviet bloc, into the West. The accession process and adherence to the EU's body of law will also improve and standardize regulations, resulting in better business climates, improved human rights standards and treatment of minorities, and stronger capacity for law enforcement cooperation.

We are also working with the EU to encourage more engagement with the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, all of whom will become Europe's "new neighbors" after EU enlargement. We are seeking EU political engagement as well financial support for the kinds of reforms that will make these nations stable, democratic and prosperous members of Europe.

Finally, we support the EU's efforts to establish a European Security and Defense Policy that is closely coordinated with NATO, and that would allow the EU to take on tasks such as peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions in which NATO decides not to be engaged. We were pleased that in December last year the long-standing impasse over the participation of non-EU NATO Allies in ESDP operations was resolved.

Since that time, NATO and the EU have been working to finalize other elements of "Berlin-plus" arrangements that will set out the basic elements of cooperation between NATO and the EU. We expect that the Berlin-plus package will be completed in the next few weeks.

Once all arrangements are in place and NATO decides to end Operation ALLIED HARMONY, we will welcome the EU's assumption of that mission at the request of the Macedonian government.

THE OSCE

For the United States, the OSCE serves as an invaluable forum for protecting security, economic well-being, and human rights and democratization throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Let me recognize the U.S. members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from this Chamber, who have also used the OSCE with profound impact to advance U.S. values and interests.

The OSCE is engaged in improving the lives of citizens in numerous countries, with programs that range from election observation, to police training, to promoting civil society. OSCE human rights rapporteurs serve as beacons of credibility and frankness. This spring, at our urging, the OSCE will tackle the troubling increase in anti-Semitic violence throughout Eurasia with a special meeting on anti-Semitism.

In the aftermath of September 11, our partners at OSCE have also focused on combating terrorism. Through the OSCE we are assisting our most critical partners—the Central Asian and Caucasus nations—in the War Against Terrorism to address an entire agenda of measures that will help secure their regions and all of Europe against the threat of terror.

COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

A year and a half after September 11, our European and Eurasian allies continue to be strong supporters in the war against terrorism.

Most European countries, especially our NATO partners, acted quickly to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the follow-on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UK in particular played a central role with the U.S. in rooting out the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan. Although the countries of Central Asia are not part of the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, they are part of my bureau, so I wanted to note their important contribution to OEF as well, both in hosting coalition bases and in working with us on infrastructure improvements.

The nations of Europe and Eurasia continue to play a vital role in rebuilding a secure and democratically governed Afghanistan, with contributions of funds, military assets, supplies, humanitarian aid and infrastructure development.

There are 18 European coalition partners with forces deployed in Afghanistan, with either ISAF or in support of OEF. European countries have contributed air, sea and land assets, and have placed elite troops on the ground. European units are taking part in maritime interdiction operations. All of the countries that have led ISAF are from the European region.

Afghanistan must one day be able to ensure its own security, and to that end, European partners are center stage in building the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA now consists of seven combat battalions, with one more in training. Our European partners have trained four of these battalions. A number of European countries have provided equipment valued at over \$20 million.

Afghanistan's shattered infrastructure is another essential element in reconstruction and security. The European Union earmarked \$93 million for road reconstruction in Afghanistan for the next two years. European countries both donated and transported large amounts of humanitarian relief and reconstruction supplies. It has been a united effort in every sense.

In Georgia, Russian bombings of northern Georgia beginning in 2000 were a clear and unacceptable violation of Georgian sovereignty. Russia accused the Georgian government of failing to control Georgia's territory in the Pankisi Gorge and allowing the region to become a safe-haven for criminals, terrorists, and Chechen rebels. The Russians were demanding action against terrorism.

Our immediate response was to draw a clear "red line" against any further violation of Georgian territory. We made clear to the Georgian government that it could not allow its territory to act as a safe-haven for terrorists and urged its support for the Global War on Terrorism. We made clear to the Russian and Georgian governments that Georgia should be left to resolve the problems within its own territory.

As part of our effort to help Georgia develop the capabilities necessary to face this problem and protect its territory, we developed the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which began in May 2002. GTEP is designed to assist Georgia in border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response and military reform. The goal of the program is to train four Georgian Army light infantry battalions and a mechanized

company team. Selected elements of the Georgian Border Guards and other security forces are participating with the goal of providing greater interoperability with MOD in time of crisis. In December 2002, the program graduated its first combat battalion, which is now ready for deployment against international terrorists on Georgian territory. In our view, the program is successfully addressing the need to enhance Georgia's security and guarantee its sovereignty.

Efforts by coalition partners have helped thwart impending terrorist actions against the United States. Our European counterparts are sharing law enforcement and intelligence information, conducting investigations into the September 11 attacks, and strengthening laws to aid the fight against terrorism. Additionally, we are working with the OSCE to improve the capacity of member states to fight terrorism.

In Greece, several members of the November 17 terrorist group are now standing trial. In February the authorities arrested four suspected members of the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), another domestic terrorist group.

European police and intelligence agencies have also provided unprecedented practical help in investigating and bringing terrorists to justice, denying financing to terrorists and their supporters, and strengthening security against terrorist attacks. Many European and Eurasian countries have joined with us to place several individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee.

On the Eurasia front, Russia has been generous in its support for the coalition, from OEF planning to intelligence exchanges to support in the UN. It has also changed its financial enforcement infrastructure to block terrorist assets. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have also provided vital support in the war against terrorism. They have offered unequivocal political and military support, are playing critical roles in OEF, and have provided vital intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and information sharing on terrorist groups and assets.

Given the importance of European opinion in our counterterrorism efforts, we plan to enhance public diplomacy efforts to boost support for our policies and actions. We will reach out to the diverse Muslim communities in both Europe and Eurasia in an effort to improve the image of the U.S.

RUSSIA

Over the past year we continued to develop strong cooperation with Russia. Our relationship covers a broad spectrum. On strategic issues, we reached agreement with Russia last May on the Moscow Treaty, radically reducing strategic offensive weapons. We are pleased that the Senate ratified this treaty last Thursday.

Russia continues to be a key partner in the global war on terror, and we have cooperated in important ways on key regional problems, such as supporting the Middle East Peace Process in the "Quartet" and defusing tensions between India and Pakistan. On some other international issues, Russia's support has not been as solid. Thus far they have not been helpful on Iraq in the UN as noted earlier. And we are urging Russia to engage more actively on the DPRK nuclear problem.

In law enforcement matters, new Russian legislation on money laundering helped remove it from the Financial Action Task Force's list of countries of concern. Yet corruption remains a serious problem.

We strongly support democratization and economic reform in Russia, largely through U.S. assistance under the FREEDOM Support Act. There have been major advances in democratic freedoms in Russia, such as the introduction of jury trials and reform of the criminal code. But media freedom continues to be a problem, while the freedom of foreign clergy to enter Russia became a problem last year.

This year we are witnessing what may be the first serious effort at a solution to the Chechnya conflict, beginning with a constitutional referendum slated for March 23. We are concerned over the security and political conditions under which the referendum is being held. However, we hope this can be the basis for a political solution to that tragic conflict. As indicated by our February 28 designation of three Chechen organizations as terrorists, there are definitely terrorist elements among Chechen fighters. But our broader policy on the Chechnya conflict remains unchanged. In addition to seeking a political solution, the Russian government needs to exercise greater discipline over its forces, and there must be meaningful accountability for human rights violations committed by Russian forces against civilians.

In economic matters, the Russian government has made progress on market reforms. Large Russian companies are adopting more Western practices and becoming more transparent. But much remains to be done—the government must provide a more welcoming environment for investors, crack down on corruption, continue reforms and enforcement of the rule of law, improve IPR protection, uphold court deci-

sions, support the growth of small and medium enterprises, and pursue the breakup of monopolies. WTO accession for Russia remains a priority, as this will be a major force for reform. As we move to expand U.S.-Russian economic relations, there is a natural fit between Russia's desire to play a greater role in providing oil and gas to global energy markets and our interest in diversifying supply.

Jackson-Vanik graduation remains an Administration priority. The law has achieved its purpose, and we now have other more effective tools to manage the U.S.-Russian trade relationship.

UKRAINE

Our relationship with Ukraine has gone through a difficult period. President Kuchma's authorization of the Kolchuga transfer to Iraq has eroded trust. Yet Ukraine remains strategically important; its future will have a significant impact on the future of its neighbors and Europe as a whole. Despite the Kolchuga authorization and serious concerns about democracy and human rights, we are convinced that we must maintain our broad-based engagement with all segments of Ukrainian society, and especially with those promoting political and economic reform. This is in our long-term interest—and Ukraine's. Our agenda supports Ukraine's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whatever limitations Ukraine's leadership has demonstrated to date in fostering economic and political change, a new generation of leaders is waiting in the wings for a chance to give reform new impetus.

Our goal is to confront bilateral problems and find practical solutions that can inject positive momentum into the relationship. We plan to pursue reform of Ukraine's export control regime as a way to prevent future Kolchuga episodes. We have offered U.S. assistance for this purpose. Outstanding questions on Kolchuga remain and might never be fully answered. For now, we believe we should concentrate our energies in helping to implement reforms that will head off proliferation problems.

We continue to shift assistance resources from programs benefiting the central government to those that more directly support civil society. One of our particular areas of focus is media freedom, which we believe has been under attack in Ukraine and which will be crucial in helping to ensure free and fair Presidential elections in 2004. We will be watching closely the Ukrainian authorities' treatment of independent journalists and media outlets, particularly as the 2004 elections draw closer.

We will continue to deepen the good cooperation we have with Ukraine on strategic issues. The Ukrainian authorities have indicated that they are actively considering deploying a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense battalion to the Gulf, in case frontline states are targets of attack by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine has also stood shoulder to shoulder with us in the war on terror. They have allowed more than 5,000 overflights connected with Operation Enduring Freedom, and have fully equipped a battalion in the Afghan National Army.

We also want Ukraine's help in solving the Transnistria conflict in Moldova—one of Ukraine's neighbors. Ukraine has an important role to play, both as a constructive mediator in the ongoing Transnistria political settlement talks and as a partner for Moldova in increasing security along their common border.

TURKEY

Among our priorities in Europe is our relationship with Turkey. As a key NATO ally located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey is always a top priority. We have strongly supported EU membership for Turkey, and have worked hard with them in an effort to resolve the Cyprus issue.

Right now, the focus is on Iraq. We are seeking Turkish cooperation because the northern option can help shorten an eventual war, leading to fewer casualties and lower economic costs to all. On March 1, the Turkish Parliament did not approve permitting U.S. troop deployments to Turkey for a possible conflict with Iraq. This can be attributed, in part, to polling data indicating 90–95 percent of the Turkish public is opposed to war in Iraq. In addition, there was a lack of unity in the ruling party. This is a setback with regard to planning for Iraq, but we are consulting with the Turks on next steps in the spirit of the strategic partnership between our countries.

Both we and the Turks have very serious concerns over economic costs to Turkey of a war, as in 1991. Turkey also cites to us concern over northern Iraq, including Kurdish ambitions and the status of the oil fields. Turkey feels that ethnic Turkomen are not sufficiently represented in the Iraqi opposition leadership and we are working to resolve this issue.

We still hope we will be able to stage a Northern Option through Turkey. We are discussing options with the Turkish authorities.

In any case, we are also making clear that Turkey must not move into Iraq unilaterally.

In addition to ongoing discussions on Iraq, we are working with Turkey and international financial institutions to bolster the Turkish economy. Turkey must take adequate measures to get back on track with its IMF reform program.

THE BALKANS

Our goal and that of the Balkan governments is to promote democracy, market orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into NATO and the European Union. While challenges remain, there is progress. International troop levels are down. Refugee returns are up. Zagreb and Belgrade successfully negotiated an end to their dispute over the Prevlaka Peninsula without international mediation. Economic growth in the region was good at around four percent last year. There have been a number of successful elections in the region. The United States' level of involvement is decreasing as our European partners are picking up more diplomatic and military responsibility for the region.

The overall military presence in the region has been reduced significantly, with our European Allies now comprising over 80 percent of the forces there. SFOR has declined from its peak strength of approximately 60,000 to 12,000; KFOR from its peak strength of approximately 50,000 to 25,000.

NATO's presence in the region remains under periodic review to ensure that our forces are adequate but not excessive in light of conditions on the ground. The Alliance should continue to play a role in the international community's efforts in the region by gradually shifting its focus from stabilization to long-term engagement through institutions like the Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile, we are working closely with the EU and with NATO to pursue the European Union's offer to take on the military mission in Macedonia, once the important details, as envisaged in the "Berlin Plus" agreement, are worked out and NATO has decided to end its Operation ALLIED HARMONY.

The democratic process is taking root: elections were held in Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia, and were considered free and fair by international observers—although not all ended in a conclusive result.

Providing real opportunities for refugee and IDP returns is important for long-term stability and European integration. Refugee returns to Bosnia have gained their own momentum, and minority returns to Kosovo have outpaced minority departures. Still, refugee returns to Kosovo and Croatia have been disappointing overall, and we need to continue to press for progress.

Many countries in the region are reliable and vigorous partners in the global war on terrorism and have taken close and cooperative steps with us to combat proliferation and the gray arms trade.

Despite these positive developments, challenges remain. We seek to help resolve remaining post-conflict issues—including war criminals and refugee return—while we encourage the post-Communist transition through political and economic reform. We are focused significantly on building the rule of law through our assistance under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. It is particularly important to address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and porous borders, which make the region attractive for organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity, and unattractive for legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. We continue to work closely with the countries of Southeast Europe, our European Allies, and the international community as the region moves towards European integration. Much progress has been made since Milosevic presided over wars, ethnic cleansing, and the forced displacement of approximately four million people. But U.S. engagement in the region—in partnership with our European Allies—will be needed for some years to come.

REGIONAL STABILITY: CYPRUS, NORTHERN IRELAND, CAUCASUS, BALTICS

Outside the Balkans, we are promoting regional stability in other areas. In Cyprus, we have strongly supported the efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve a settlement before Cyprus signs the EU accession treaty April 16 so Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would enjoy the benefits of EU membership. We were deeply disappointed that the Secretary General's talks with the two leaders in The Hague did not result in an agreement to put his plan to referenda in both communities. We regret in particular that Mr. Denktash refused to allow the Turkish Cypriots to decide for themselves on their future. Despite this setback, the U.S. remains committed to seeking a just and durable settlement to the Cyprus problem.

In Northern Ireland, we wholeheartedly support the UK and Ireland in their efforts to push the peace process to a new level of stability. Prime Ministers Blair and Ahern have just concluded marathon sessions in this regard with the parties. Northern Ireland Assembly elections have been rescheduled from May 1 to May 29 to give time for reflection and discussion within the parties and communities. We urge the leaders, communities, and people of Northern Ireland to seize this opportunity to build on the success of the Good Friday Agreement.

In the Caucasus, the United States serves as a Co-Chair along with France and Russia of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this role, the U.S. continues to pursue actively a comprehensive, mutually acceptable settlement to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. With presidential elections in both countries this year, neither side currently is willing to make the politically difficult compromises necessary to negotiate a peace agreement. However, the Co-Chairs continue their efforts in the hope that the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships can find the political will needed to reach a permanent solution to this conflict.

Regarding the conflict in Abkhazia, the U.S., as a member of the UN Secretary General's Friends of Georgia Group (FOG), continues to work with France, Germany, Russia, and the UK to pursue a comprehensive, negotiated settlement that respects Georgia's territorial integrity.

At the other corner of Europe, we have been promoting regional cooperation in Northern Europe under the Northern Europe Initiative and the U.S. Baltic Charter. Active U.S. engagement in Northern Europe will continue as the Baltic States move into NATO and the EU and the region becomes more prosperous and secure. We are crafting an updated U.S. approach that recognizes much has been achieved in the Nordic-Baltic area through multilateral cooperation, and builds on this success. We anticipate focussing on three major substantive areas: political security, healthy societies/healthy neighborhoods, and our trade, investment, economic and business ties.

GLOBAL ISSUES

As NATO and other European institutions enlarge, we have been acutely aware that a Europe whole, free, and at peace can function only if it is truly a community of shared values. For that reason, the United States has pressed hard for continuing progress on issues left unresolved from the Holocaust, World War II, and the communist era. We have encouraged property restitution, we recently assumed the Chair in Office of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, and we have strongly supported the holding this year of an OSCE Specialized Meeting on Antisemitism.

Enhanced defense and security cooperation and intelligence sharing must be buttressed by societies committed to democratic principles such as those in the Final Act in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A number of European countries have concluded agreements with us under Article 98 of the International Criminal Court (ICC), ensuring that U.S. citizens would not be surrendered to the ICC. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with our trans-Atlantic partners to address problems that respect no borders, such as HIV/AIDS and infectious disease, narcotics trafficking and environmental degradation.

We are working with our partners in Europe and Eurasia to combat the growing problem of trafficking in persons. This grave, transnational human crime is something we can only eliminate by working together. Governments from Western Europe to Central Asia have passed important legislation to outlaw trafficking and have cooperated with each other on the prosecution of these traffickers. We are also encouraging prevention of trafficking through public awareness and protection of victims, both in destination countries and upon return to home countries. We have encouraged governments and NGO's—both integral partners in this fight—to share expertise and resources to respond to the criminal aspect of this tragedy as well as the needs of the victims. Most recently, we concluded the congressionally mandated international conference on sex trafficking here in Washington, D.C. Over 300 participants from the region attended.

Success in addressing transnational problems is more important than ever in pursuing America's trans-Atlantic agenda. Stable countries able to withstand terrorist and other threats are based on respect for the rule of law, human rights, religious freedom, and open media. Stable countries have vibrant civil societies. They are committed to the principles of free market economies.

RESOURCES

On the management side, we are also addressing the needs of our diplomats who represent us overseas. Appropriate and secure facilities are critical to operational

success. We continue our work with the Bureau of Overseas Building Operation to press forward with building projects in our region. In FY03 we expect that four New Embassy Compounds will be occupied and four new projects initiated. As our nation's priorities and policies develop and change, it is essential that adequate funding be made available to allow flexibility in our building plans. Rightsizing and controlling growth are an integral part of our facility planning process.

As we further engage on the war on terrorism and as the number of EU and NATO members and aspirants continues to grow, Mission activities and workloads increase commensurately. Through the Secretary's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), additional staff are being deployed to posts throughout the region. In January the DRI provided 23 positions for EUR, and we expect to receive additional positions when the FY03 phase of the DRI is fully implemented.

We have a highly dedicated group of people working in our missions. They are keenly aware that their contributions to promote U.S. interests are important, particularly during these challenging times. Heightened worldwide tensions have increased the need for contingency planning and actions, taxing already strained resources. Despite facing greater personal security concerns for themselves and their families, employee morale overseas is good. It is essential, however, that we continue to support our staff and their families with improved workplaces and housing and through incentives and other means of recognition.

The entire State Department is carrying out this important work around the world. To do the job effectively, we need adequate resources. I appreciate your taking the time to listen to my testimony today, and I will be pleased to address your questions.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much, ma'am, and with your permission, Mr. Wexler, we will go ahead and take Mr. Crouch, and the questions when Mr. Bereuter gets back.

Mr. Crouch, will you please go ahead, sir, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. CROUCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Europe. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the United States priorities in Europe. I will try to do that, sharing the perspective of the Department of Defense. And as Chairman Bereuter noted, I will have my longer statement placed in the record if that is okay.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to congratulate—Chairman Bereuter is not here—for his election last November as president of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliament Assembly. His action participation in that assembly since 1987 has been a very powerful reflection of America's commitment to NATO, and I think it is very helpful for us in the Administration. I, for one, have been spending a lot of time working with NATO since I was sworn in a year and a half ago, and the help of him, the help of other Members of this Committee, we are very grateful for.

At the outset, let me step back and reaffirm what I think are the underlying principles that are the foundation of this Administration's defense relationship with Europe.

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and united in peace, democracy, and common values is in the interest of the United States. Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, allied with United States is America's natural partner in global affairs.

I realize, of course, that there are differences between the United States and a few of our European allies regarding how best to handle Iraq's persistent defiance of the United Nations resolutions

mandating the disarmament of Iraq. These differences are not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of our relationship, the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor, in my view, the strategic imperative that we maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance.

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the same threats, and we both face the same opportunities in changing and in managing the global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist organizations, and terrorist states present an urgent and lethal danger to both North America and Europe.

Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and material support.

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe both in terms of the members, but also in terms of people—states that are outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the forward-presence of U.S. military forces. Today, U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in Europe, enhancing both America's and Europe's security.

It is with the foregoing in mind that I wish to briefly update the committee on the Department of Defense's activities in Europe, particularly those concerning NATO, the Balkans, and Russia.

First, NATO: Over its years of existence, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in the international security environment, and it will have an important role to play in the future. This year NATO took the historic step to support the lead nations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a step that brings the alliance well out of its traditional geographic domain.

At the Prague Summit last November, allied heads of state responded to the tremendous change we are experiencing in Europe's strategic landscape and the global security environment. They approved an historic agenda featuring the extension of NATO membership to seven central European democracies, a new focused capabilities initiative, and strengthened relations with Russia, Ukraine and NATO partners.

We have been very supportive of the countries—in the department—invited to join the alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Our support is matched by their enthusiasm and their willingness to contribute.

Even prior to their invitation to NATO, these seven countries have been acting as de facto allies through their contributions and participation in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF.

We will work closely with these invitees throughout the accession process and beyond to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities that we think that they can provide and that are sorely needed by the North Atlantic Alliance.

The next step in the accession process will be the signing of the accession protocols on March 26 in Brussels, and we hope that all

seven members will have completed the necessary requirements to sign the protocols on that date.

The door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing through NATO's membership action plan to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the goal of Ukraine's integration into Europe, which will not be complete as long as Ukraine remains outside its key political, economic and security institutions.

And I would say on a bilateral level, the department is working very closely with all of these aspirants as well as new NATO members and members in the Partnership for Peace to develop bilateral security relationships.

The decision at Prague to establish a NATO response force promises the alliance the ability to deploy a force capable of fulfilling the entire spectrum of combat operations. If implemented to the standards proposed by the United States, the NRF will be a lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on a short notice.

The Secretary of Defense has often said in a changed global security environment, things that take months and years to react or to act are not interesting, but the things that take days and months to act are very interesting, and we are definitely trying to build that kind of capability in the NATO response force.

Our goal for the NRF is an initial operating capability for training by October 2004, and a full operational capability by October 2006, and we hope to maybe even best that. We expect the NRF to become a focal point also for NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats that the alliance faces.

Also at the Prague Summit, heads of state and government approved the Prague capabilities commitment, to try to overcome longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, NBC equipment and precision guided munitions.

As you know, many of our European allies have consistently failed to meet agreed upon NATO defense obligations. If this trend continues, and allies fail to fulfill the Prague capabilities commitment, the future success of the NRF would be jeopardized. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague capabilities commitment in order to be effective.

At Prague, heads of state and government also approved the broad outline of a streamlined and more effective NATO command structure. Specifically, NATO agreed to establish two new strategic level commands; one operational and one functional.

In the new structure, NATO will reduce the number of second level commands from seven to three, and the number of third level commands from 11 to 6.

Also, a senior officials group established by defense ministers, co-chaired by myself and my counterpart from The Netherlands, has been making good progress in leading the effort to develop recommendations for NATO defense ministers for their approval of the final command structure at the upcoming defense ministers meeting in June.

September 11th showed us that the United States and Russia face threats and have much to gain from bilateral cooperation. We are making progress in confronting global challenges together. The U.S. seeks a broad relationship with Russia that addresses not only issues related to security but economic, political, technical and scientific issues.

Our new strategic relationship with Russia has shifted away from the Cold War era's focus on reaching agreements or treaties. We are now trying to change the way we do business. We are emphasizing openness and cooperation in areas where we share common interests, and honest dialogue even when we disagree.

We approach this relationship with a realistic assessment of Russia's policies, some of which are contrary to U.S. interest. For example, we remain very concerned by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technologies and materials associated with these weapons. Grey arms activities continue as a result of Russia's weak export control regimes. Of course, we also oppose violations of Georgian territorial sovereignty by Russian military, and continue to press for a non-military political solution in Chechnya.

An important measure of the success of our efforts to build a new strategic relationship with Russia will be that Russia ceases developing strategies, plans and capabilities that treat the United States as a probable adversary. We think we have made progress in this area.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I understand that you have given some thought to our future force posture in Europe as well as maybe other Members of the Committee. When the President asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he also asked him review our entire defense posture around the globe. DoD's 2001 quadrennial defense review called for reorienting the U.S. global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment, the war on terrorism, DOD's new strategy, and particularly the imperative to deter forward in critical regions of the world. We have been examining our posture and presence broadly across the globe, to include Europe, east Asia, central Asia, and southwest Asia. This work is ongoing, and I might add a prudent responsibility of all administrations is to ensure that our military forces are appropriately structure, equipped and deployed.

Our approach is to establish a presence appropriate to each region; increase our capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises; diversify access; provide more flexible expeditionary forces; increase allied contributions; and strengthen the command structures that we have to support our national security strategy. And you have seen many of these things in the way we have changed through the Unified Command Plan and the like.

Any present changes, obviously, would put a premium on flexibility and forward access, but not new large, permanent bases. We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and of course will consult closely with the Congress, allies, NATO, and relevant partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the Committee might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you for this opportunity to discuss United States priorities in Europe. I will try to do that, sharing the perspective of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to congratulate you on your election as President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly. Your active participation in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since 1987 has been a powerful reflection of America's commitment to NATO. Your leadership has catalyzed numerous Assembly policies—many of which have been adopted by NATO. NATO enlargement is but one important example.

At the outset, let me step back and reaffirm the underlying principles that are the foundation of this Administration's defense relationship with Europe.

First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the interest of the United States. Both America and Europe need each other. An undivided Europe, whole and free, and allied with the United States is America's natural partner in global affairs.

I realize, of course, that there are differences between the United States and a few of our European Allies regarding how best to handle Iraq's persistent defiance of United Nations resolutions mandating the disarmament of Iraq. These differences are not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic imperatives of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the same threats, and they both face the same opportunities in the changing global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist organizations, and terrorist states present an urgent and lethal danger to both North America and Europe. Cooperation with Europe is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and material support. Despite differences with some Allies on Iraq, I am pleased to report that all our European Allies and partners are making important contributions in our undertaking to take down the scourge of terrorism.

Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. Moreover, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of a forward presence of United States military forces. Today, approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in Europe, and they enhance both America's and Europe's security.

It is with the foregoing in mind that I wish briefly to update the Committee on the Department of Defense's activities in Europe, particularly those concerning NATO, the Balkans, and Russia.

NATO

Those who have recently questioned America's commitment to Europe and NATO only need to look to the Global War on Terrorism. The relevance of this relationship is demonstrated each day by the fact that U.S. and European soldiers are sharing dangerous risks together in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. The swiftness with which this coalition brought an end to the Taliban regime and introduced freedom back into Afghanistan is rooted in over fifty years of NATO joint planning, training, staffing and operations that can be found no where else in the world.

Over its years of existence, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in the international security environment, and it will have an important role to play in the future. This year NATO took the historic step to support the lead nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a step that brings the Alliance well out of traditional geographic domain.

At the Prague Summit last November, Allied heads of state responded to the tremendous change we are experiencing in Europe's strategic landscape and the global security environment. They approved an historic agenda featuring the extension of NATO membership to seven Central European democracies, a new focused capabilities initiative, and strengthened relations with Russia, Ukraine and NATO Partners.

NATO Enlargement

In Warsaw in June 2001, President Bush declared: "I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings...As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom." The decision by NATO's Heads of State and Government at Prague to

invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to begin accession talks with the Alliance is an essential step towards a complete Europe.

The U.S. has been very supportive of the 7 NATO invitees. Our support is matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute. We are asking these 7 invitees to make difficult decisions regarding defense reform, involving increased defense spending and tough choices on personnel reductions and base closures. We will work closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond, to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities enabling them to become contributors to transatlantic security.

The next step in the accession process will be the signing of the accession protocols on March 26th in Brussels. We hope that all 7 will have completed the necessary requirements to sign the protocols on that date.

Even prior to their accession into NATO, these 7 countries have been acting as *de facto* Allies through their contributions and participation in the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, and ISAF. Without being exhaustive, I will give you some examples of their important contributions. All 7 have contributed forces to SFOR and KFOR. Bulgaria hosted U.S. KC-15 refueling aircraft; Lithuania deployed 37 Special Operations Forces personnel to Afghanistan; and Romania contributed a 400-man infantry battalion in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. To assist with ISAF, Estonia deployed 2 explosive detection dog teams; Latvia will send medical personnel; Slovakia deployed a 40-man engineering unit; and Slovenia has donated equipment to the Afghan National Army Training Project.

The door to NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are continuing through NATO's Membership Action Plan to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work with Kiev on the future goal of Ukraine's complete integration into Europe. We must not allow Ukraine to remain outside of Europe's political, economic, and security institutions.

Foreign Ministers from NATO and Ukraine met during the Prague Summit and agreed to a substantive action plan that includes goals in areas such as political, economic, and defense reform. On a bilateral basis, the U.S. continues to assist reform efforts within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The focus is on developing a professional force that is interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces.

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) provides a mechanism to work with Partner nations to develop interoperability between their forces and NATO forces. NATO is greatly benefiting from years of PFP programs in the Global War on Terrorism, as the Partner nations were already familiar with NATO procedures when called upon to support this important effort.

NATO RESPONSE FORCE

The decision at the Prague Summit to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) will provide the Alliance with both a capability to deploy a force that can address the entire spectrum of NATO missions quickly, as well as focus capability improvements. We believe that, for the U.S. and its Allies to fight together effectively in NATO, the Alliance has a requirement for a credible force that is lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice (5–30 days). This force should be able to conduct forced entry into a hostile area. It should be self-sustaining, capable of fighting alone for 30 days. It should be able to serve as a stand-alone force or as an initial entry force that prepares a theater for follow-on forces.

Potential missions cover the spectrum of operations and could include: deployment as a stand-alone force that is reacting to an immediate crisis; deployment as a proactive force package, prepared to accept follow-on NATO forces; peacekeeping or peace support missions; or service as an initial entry force for a large-scale deliberate operation that secures lines of communication and points of debarkation and prepares a theater for force flow.

We have agreed to develop and implement the NRF with a view toward an initial operational capability for training of October 2004, and full operational capability by October 2006. The NRF will be commanded by a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters (HQ) which will be able to draw from a rotational pool of air, land, and maritime forces that can be available on short notice, be tailored for specific missions, and be able to deploy anywhere to conduct the full spectrum of operations as decided by the North Atlantic Council. The forces participating in an NRF rotation will be on a high state of readiness and will train together under the CJTF HQ that will command an actual operation. The forces that participate in the NRF rotations will be the first beneficiary of the new capabilities initiative. The NRF will

become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats we face.

Prague Capabilities Commitment

At the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment as part of the Alliance's continuing effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. Individual Allies made political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. In preparing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, particular attention was devoted to the potential offered by multinational projects and various forms of role sharing and role specialization. These mechanisms offer advantages in terms of cost effectiveness (e.g., through economies of scale) and also provide a way for smaller countries to make significant contributions in demanding capability areas that might otherwise be unaffordable to them.

Many of our European Allies have consistently failed to meet agreed upon NATO defense obligations. Failure by Allies to fulfill the Prague Capabilities Commitment would jeopardize the future success of the NRF. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment in order to be effective.

Streamlining NATO's Command Structure

At Prague, Heads of State and Government approved the broad outline of a streamlined and more effective command structure. Specifically, NATO agreed to establish two new strategic-level commands, one operational and one functional.

The Allied Command for Transformation will be located in Norfolk, Virginia, close to U.S. Joint Forces Command so that we can better ensure that U.S. and European forces transform together. The Transformation Command will also have a footprint in Europe. The strategic commander for transformation should be responsible with Allied Command Operations for ensuring that NATO has a pool of forces available that is ready, deployable, sustainable and militarily capable to perform the full range of missions that may challenge the Alliance. A Senior Officials Group (SOG), established by Defense Ministers and co-chaired by myself and my counterpart from the Netherlands, has been making good progress in leading the effort to develop recommendations for NATO Defense Ministers approval at their meeting in June.

In response to the changing global environment, NATO has streamlined the previous "Cold War" command structure by eliminating unnecessary headquarters and creating a command structure that is deployable and capable of conducting joint operations. In the new structure, NATO will reduce the number of second level commands from 7 to 3. Third level commands will be reduced from 11 to 6. And the number of Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) will be reduced from 10 to 4 static and 2 deployable.

NATO-European Union Relationship

As the European Union has developed its Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the U.S. has worked to ensure it is done in a cooperative way, and results in Europeans providing more for Europe's security, as we have urged for decades. A breakthrough for the NATO-EU relationship came last December, when the EU committed to terms for "participation" by the non-EU European NATO members in ESDP plans and operations. This cleared the way for NATO to finalize its long-proposed arrangements for the EU to use NATO planning, assets and commands. These arrangements, known as "Berlin-Plus," will serve important U.S. and NATO interests by anchoring EU planning and operations in NATO, avoiding wasteful EU duplication of NATO assets, and promoting ESDP compatibility with NATO capabilities and procedures.

In this connection, the EU has offered to take over NATO's small military monitoring mission in Macedonia. Any transfer of NATO's mission to the EU can only occur, however, once the NATO-EU arrangements are in place, to ensure the EU operation would be consistent with NATO command and control, and once NATO has decided to end this mission. There also needs to be Macedonian support for the mission and its objectives. (The current NATO operation does not include U.S. forces, although there are 17 U.S. personnel on staff at NATO HQ Skopje.)

BALKANS

U.S. forces have been engaged, together with our NATO Allies, in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans since 1995. The U.S. contribution to NATO's military efforts in the Balkans—SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo—has been important. Having gone in together with our Allies, the President has committed that we will go out together as well. In this regard we have successfully accomplished most of the original military tasks. The stationing of our forces need not be indefinite. We seek to hasten the day when NATO's remaining forces can be withdrawn, while ensuring that the region does not return to conflict or become a safe haven or way station for terrorists. The key will be to provide better support for civilian governance and institutions, in particular by promoting the rule of law and apprehending persons indicted for war crimes and promoting economic growth. By doing so, we will break the cycle of dependency and allow the people of the Balkans to take responsibility for their own security.

In Bosnia, the original force deployed in 1995 consisted of 60,000 troops, with 20,000 Americans. Today, SFOR consists of roughly 12,000 troops from 36 nations, including about 1,800 Americans.

In Kosovo, the original force deployed in 1999 consisted of 47,000 troops, of whom 7,000 were American. Today, KFOR consists of roughly 27,000 troops from 34 nations, including about 3,000 Americans. Given the progress that has been made on the ground, further reductions in U.S. forces are anticipated this year as conditions continue to improve.

As the situation on the ground further improves, NATO and the U.S. will continue the forward looking transition from force deployments to more normal security cooperation activities and initiatives to cement integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.

U.S.-Russia Relations

September 11th showed us that the United States and Russia have common threats and that both sides have much to gain from cooperation. We are making progress in confronting global challenges together. We now seek a broad relationship with Russia—one based not only on security issues, but also on cooperation on economic, political, technical, and scientific issues.

Our new strategic relationship with Russia is not based on an agreement or treaty, but is a change in the way we do business based on openness, cooperation in areas of common interest, and honest dialogue in areas where we disagree.

We won't always agree, but this should not provoke a crisis in US-Russia relations. For example, we didn't agree on our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, but, contrary to the predictions of some, after we withdrew our relationship not only survived, but was strengthened by the candor and openness of our approach towards Russia.

There have been other positive developments between our two countries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has moved our nations toward a more flexible approach to strategic nuclear weapons reductions that is better suited to our relations. The U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security (CGSS) held its first meeting last fall. The meeting was held in Washington, D.C., in September 2002 between Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, and the Russian Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. This Group also met with President Bush and National Security Adviser Rice. The meeting allowed for high-level consultations on regional and security topics.

During their Summit last summer, President Bush and President Putin also agreed to look for ways to cooperate on missile defense. There is an ongoing working group on Missile Defense that was established at the CGSS meeting. The working group is exploring possible areas for missile defense cooperation as well as an expansion of our existing missile defense exercise program.

Despite progress in our relationship, Russia continues to pursue some policies contrary to U.S. interests, including: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive technologies and "gray arms" activities resulting from a failure to strengthen export-control regimes. Furthermore, we are opposed to violations of Georgian territorial sovereignty, and we continue to press Russia for a non-military, political solution in Chechnya.

The U.S. must try to reinforce positive developments and influence the strategic decisions that Russia will make. Thus, our security cooperation seeks to increase Russia's understanding—particularly within its military—that the United States does not pose a threat to its sovereign interests. A clear measure of the success of these efforts will be that Russia ceases developing strategies, plans, and capabilities that treat the United States as a probable adversary.

We have worked in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established last May, to improve security cooperation among Russia, our NATO Allies, and ourselves. Through the NRC, we seek security cooperation with Russia through practical, concrete projects. The NRC is focused on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness, combating terrorism, mil-to-mil cooperation, and civil emergency preparedness exercises.

TURKEY

Turkey's hesitation to cooperate fully with us as we prepare for possible war against Iraq is disappointing, but does not irreparably damage our relationship. The U.S. and Turkey have a deep, longstanding relationship—especially in the defense area—which we expect will continue both bilaterally and through NATO. Turkey has made significant contributions to other aspects of the Global War on Terrorism, including leading Phase II of ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The existence of this democratic, Islamic state straddling Europe and Asia is important to the security of the U.S. and NATO, and we are working with our NATO Allies to provide the appropriate defensive measures as requested by Turkey.

U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN EUROPE

When the President asked Mr. Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense, he asked him to review our defense posture and circumstances around the world. DoD's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for reorienting the U.S. global military posture in light of changes in the international security environment, the war on terrorism, and DoD's new strategy, particularly the imperative to deter forward in critical regions around the world. We have been examining our posture and presence broadly, across the globe, to include Europe, east Asia, central Asia, and southwest Asia. This work is ongoing.

While reviews of our defense posture have been part of the normal routine for decades, the security environment has changed—especially in Europe. The nexus of terrorist states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and the global reach of terrorist organizations all make it prudent for serious study of the best use of our military forces in Europe.

Our approach is to: establish a presence appropriate to each region; increase capabilities to act promptly and globally in response to crises; and strengthen the command structures to support our strategy. Any presence changes would put a premium on flexibility and forward access, not new, large, permanent bases. We recognize the sensitivity of any changes to U.S. force posture and will consult closely with Congress, Allies, NATO, and relevant partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you or the Committee have.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much to both of you for your testimony. If I can, I am going to ask you a couple of questions, and then ask Mr. Wexler if he would do his round of questioning.

Secretary Jones, you and I share somewhat of a common heritage, and that you were born in Germany, and I lived there when you were born, in 1948, 1949 and 1950. My father was affiliated with the Neuremburg War Trials after the war, and we lived there for 3 years.

I well remember when Germany was divided by the four powers. There was a Berlin blockade, and I can remember the American pilots day after day, hour after hour flying supplies into the people of Berlin. I can remember stories of airplanes crashing in bad weather hauling nothing but coal to heat the people of Berlin.

I grew up in a wartime era, so I am well familiar. My father was a career officer in the service. So I well remember the stories of the combat in Europe.

As we look at the Middle Eastern questions today and the role that the European Community, the United States, Soviet Union, China play in trying to bring out a resolution, the Quartet, how useful are the Europeans really in moving forward given the animosities that several of them have expressed somewhat publicly,

but albeit very privately, with respect to the Country of Israel? How useful are they really in helping bring about a solution?

Ms. JONES. I would suggest that they are very useful. I know Secretary Powell feels very strongly that the Quartet is a mechanism that he uses, that he wants to use. It is clear that the United States is the country with the greatest influence in Israel, there is no question about that.

But there is also a requirement for influence on the Palestinian, on the Palestinians, on the Palestinian Authority, and on Arafat himself, and it is there that the Europeans as part of the Quartet can be the most useful and are the most useful. It is—

Mr. JANKLOW. Go ahead.

Ms. JONES. It is very important that the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority understand that they must reform, that they must select a prime minister, which they have now done, if they are to be a credible partner in trying to discuss and resolve the Middle East problems.

Mr. JANKLOW. And forgetting a lot of the turmoil involving France—well, I should not say forgetting it—putting it on the shelf for a moment to both of you, let me ask you, if I could, recognizing that France's relationship toward the United States has been somewhat unique ever since de Gaulle first came to power in terms of approaches they have taken with the NATO are really approaches out of NATO with respect to the way that they did it. The trade issues, a lot of which have centered historically around issues that emanated with wheat farmers and others in France.

How do you sense the other European communities look at their relationship with France themselves?

I think the key was the issue involving Turkey recently where France actually indicated it may object to assisting Turkey, which you have alluded to. But what is the issue, what is it that makes France somewhat separate from the rest of the European Community even on European issues?

Ms. JONES. I think the best way I can explain it is that France feels very strongly that it has a unique position in Europe and in the world; that as much as it is part of the European Union, part of the European common security and defense policy and foreign policy, that its views are very weighty.

What has been interesting to us is to see how differentiated the attitudes and positions and policies of so many members of the European Union have been about so many of these issues, including Iraq, and how differentiated the attitudes and policies have been of the EU candidate countries, and the new NATO invitees about Iraq and about many of these issues.

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me put you on the spot for a second, okay? When Mr. Schroeder made those comments that he did, took the position he did shortly before the election, was it the sense of our government at that point in time that this was true conviction, or it was what politicians sometimes do in a very close political race, engage in a bit of demagoguery and swing the balance of an election over a little bit, or both?

Ms. JONES. I believe in the case of Chancellor Schroeder, he was in a very tight election campaign, and he found this a very useful, a very useful issue around which to coalesce support.

Mr. JANKLOW. And do you think maybe it took on a life of its— it got legs underneath itself and moved farther than he had anticipated?

Ms. JONES. I would not want to suggest that there is not extremely strong support for the anti-war movement in Germany, there is.

Mr. JANKLOW. Could you tell me, if you would, ma'am, why do we hear so little about Italy's position? Or why do we hear so little about Italy and the positions that they have taken with respect to these issues? Do they not also see themselves somewhat as France sees itself based on their unique history.

Ms. JONES. Prime Minister Berlusconi is a very strong supporter of the United States. He is a close personal friend and ally of the President. Italy is working very closely with us in quite a number of ways militarily in Afghanistan. There are a variety of ways that they are in support of the coalition.

Because they do not sit on the Security Council, their voice is not heard right now. They do not need to be heard right now. They do not need to make statements right now. I think that is probably the best way to characterize it.

Mr. JANKLOW. And I will close with this question to you, Mr. Crouch, if I could. The vote in Turkey was decided by four votes with a lot of abstentions, I believe. It was thrust on them relatively suddenly with a brand new government following elections, while they were still sorting out the implementation of their new government.

Recognizing public opinion sways all politicians, how much do you think the suddenness of thrusting the vote upon Turkey had with respect to the outcome of that vote? Is that a fair question?

Mr. CROUCH. It is a fair question. I think it is important to go back and look at the fact that we have actually been engaged with the Turks and discussions with the Turks for quite some time. But clearly there was a timing—a number of problems with the timing both in the run-up, you know, we had prior to the election. We did not know what the outcome of the election was going to be, and there was a period after the election where it was not clear how quickly a government would be formed.

Additionally, you also had the additional complications that the leader of the AKP party, Mr. Erdogan, was not actually a member of the parliament until very recently and he recently won election.

So all of these things clearly were complicating factors in terms of the timing.

But I guess I would say that we have worked and our state department colleagues have taken the lead in this in working closely with the government in trying to make our position clear on a variety of issues that were sensitive to the Turks, as well as working on the economic side, the political side, and the military side of potential cooperation here.

So I think that while I would not exactly describe it as suddenness, I guess, as I would say, but clearly the fact that the government is new, and that the government is not only new, but it is a new party in effect that has never had this kind of position of leadership before in the government definitely complicated the vote.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank Mr. Janklow for taking over in my absence. We had a recorded vote in Financial Services Committee. I am involved in a markup there.

And Secretary Crouch, thank you for the kind remarks apparently you made in your oral statement, and I do look forward to working with you.

And I am pleased now to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, for his time.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to preface my question to Secretary Jones by simply saying that I have great admiration for our State Department. I think it is the single department that should make every American extremely proud, not to the exclusion of the others, from the Secretary on down. And Secretary Powell has brought a degree of credibility and integrity to his position that has benefitted America. I do not think America could do better than Mark Grossman and Bill Burns and yourself.

I remember very distinctly when Secretary Armitage came back after negotiating, mediating, whatever the right word is, between India and Pakistan, and he received accolades from both sides of the aisle in this Committee, deservedly so. I think it was a high moment in American diplomacy in that we assisted or helped divert a nuclear catastrophe.

As I mentioned earlier, I, along with two of my Republican colleagues, was in Turkey last week. If Mr. Armitage's mission was a high moment in American diplomacy, with all due respect to this statement department that I so admire, I think what has transpired in Turkey in the past 2 weeks is a low moment.

And I say it not from the point of view of blaming the United States because certainly there is enough blame to share on both sides, but what essentially has occurred from my perspective two allies sat down at a negotiation table, two allies who have shared 6 decades of common experiences and common strategic goals, two allies sat down at a negotiation table, and they figured out how both could walk away losers. That is not a good example, in my view, of diplomatic expertise on either side.

And I think Secretary Crouch is correct. There are many factors on the Turkish side that have nothing to do with the United States. They have a new government. We have what was then the leader of the party but not a prime minister who to a certain degree has strains with his own military, who was effectively undercut by six of his own ministers in the vote. That has nothing to do with the United States.

But in fairness, what does have to do with the United States was the day before the vote we organized a meeting in northern Iraq in the Kurdish part of northern Iraq, and apparently we invited every representative under the sun, even though they have allegiance to Iran and other countries that we do not necessarily get along with, but we forgot the Turkomen representatives, or at least they were not there, and it was the Turkish government's perspective that we essentially excluded them.

Well, that made them very nervous, nervous that before a vote where 94 percent of their population opposes a war, they were

deeply concerned about what, in fact, were our objectives and missions as it relates to northern Iraq.

Now, there cannot be two sides on this. Either we have been talking to them for months and months, which I know we have, or we have not been talking to them, and things were rushed. But clearly what our congressional delegation learned is Mr. Erdogan and the Turkish government does not have comfort with American plans post-Iraq.

Now, I am not casting blame, but if we are going to succeed in creating a northern front, should it be necessary, from our long-time ally, we are going to need a much more coherent and cogent way to explain to the Turks what our plans are, and I do not, quite frankly, understand why it has been so difficult that it has not been done at this point.

I understand at this point we have no commitment from the Turkish government in terms of American troops using their soil as a base. If you could describe to this Subcommittee what efforts are currently being undertaken so as to put American troops, should they be needed, in the strongest position possible in terms of the northern front, in terms of the diplomatic effort going on.

And if I could close with this observation. I was reading the history of the Gulf War and the effort that was made by then Secretary Baker and other high level administrative offices. As I understand it personally they went to our several allies on many occasions and used personal diplomacy, they cajoled them with subtleties, with support, and worked out a coalition that was ultimately very successful.

It appears from a distance that that is not occurring now, and I would ask why not, if that is a correct assessment.

Ms. JONES. I will go ahead and start and address some of the issues, and ask my colleague, Dr. Crouch, to address the military aspects of it.

It is true exactly as Dr. Crouch said that this is a new government. It is a government that has not had governing experience. We have been in lengthy, lengthy discussion with the Turkish government, the prior Turkish government. Many of the people, of course, are in the various ministries who remain the same throughout.

The discussions, the negotiations we had on the documents that the Turkish government asked to have for a parliamentary vote were lengthy negotiations, detailed negotiations. I participated in them. Many others participated in them. Those were negotiations that helped both the United States and Turkey understand better and to reach agreement on how best to address many of the issues or virtually all of the issues that have to do with the future of Iraq in terms of our joint understandings, and in particular, the economic issues and financial issues that are so important to Turkey and therefore so important to the United States.

So I would argue there was absolutely no lack of patience, no lack of very detailed negotiation and discussion, no lack of effort to make sure that every part of the U.S. concerns were completely clear in every possible detail.

We had a disagreement about the importance of Turkey adhering to its IMF requirements. We absolutely maintain that that is the

only way and the primary way for Turkey to assure its economic stability and its financial future. We maintain that absolutely. And it is absolutely in the U.S. interest that Turkey not experience any kind of economic downturn.

In terms of our common vision of the future of Iraq, we felt it was very important for Turkey and the United States to come to some over-arching agreement about it, but at the same time we wanted to be very careful not to dictate to the people of Iraq what that future was going to be in more detailed terms than is appropriate.

At the same time we were very clear with the Turks that, as we have been for years, including in my time in the Middle East bureau when I was responsible for this relationship, discussion with the Turks about the Kurds, that it is a fundamental U.S. policy that the future of Iraq includes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq in which there would be no separate Kurdish entity of any kind. That is a hard core, firm policy that we have explained to the Turks in every possible way we know how. There can be no misunderstanding on the part of any Turkish politician, any member of the Turkish government as to the firmness of this policy and the firmness of our intention to pursue this policy.

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, I agree with you. I concur. However, in fairness, if you and I were in the Turkish parliament and we watched an American organized meeting the day before the vote in northern Iraq, and the one party we cared about as Turkish parliamentarians were excluded from that meeting, how would they ever be reasonably convinced that that was our view?

Mr. BEREUTER. I think we had better leave it there. Well, briefly—

Ms. JONES. Maybe I can just say one sentence.

Mr. WEXLER. I have taken up more than my time.

Ms. JONES. Zal Khalilzad, my colleague who was the President's representative at that meeting, worked extremely hard to address that question. He is still working hard to address it. He is going back to Turkey tonight to address that question, and I know he will do his best.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

The Chair is going to recognize himself under the 5-minute rule, and then I will turn to Mr. McCotter.

As I have been listening and talking to people who are around the North Atlantic Council, the NATO perm reps sitting together, for some period of time, and these people are not just Americans, these are people, various allies representing various allies at the table, they say that what happened with respect to Article 4, Turkey's request under Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty, is just the most visible example of what is constantly going on, and that is, impediment after impediment, minor things in many cases, but not so minor in other cases, are put into the mix by the French representative there.

Reluctantly I have reached the conclusion that France, or at least President Chirac, wants to marginalize the influence of the United States, and wants to marginalize the influence of NATO vis-a-vis the EDSP, European Defense and Security Policy, and I think it is

axiomatic that if the French government politically treats as an enemy, they cannot be regarded by us as a friendly government.

Now, I do not expect you to remark about that. This would not be politic for you to do that. But I do hope that you think about, and that people in our government are recognizing what I believe to be a fact, and that you are basing your actions on that premise, set of premises.

And I hope that I am very much wrong about this situation because it will be quite a change, but I have reached that conclusion.

And of course, what Germany has done is perhaps the most irresponsible of all because they have said regardless of the circumstances, regardless of what is revealed with respect to Iraq, we will not engage in military action with any kind of coalition, and the kind of anti-American rhetoric that took place before the election, you know, was extremely disappointing to the American people.

Now, I am not going to ask you for a reaction to that because I do not think it is good form or good politics or good government for you to reach, but we in the legislative branch can express our opinions on these issues.

I would like to ask you with respect to public diplomacy the following: We have a reduction in the 2004 operating budget for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which could, as I understand it, result in elimination of our broadcasting to Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia. Several of these countries have brought this issue up, government leaders. They are concerned about that.

In contrast to what some people might expect, they do not object to this broadcast. They regard it as continued interest on the part of the United States and their well being, and that it is a compliment to them, they suggest, for Americans to be concerned about public opinion in their countries as long as they continue the high level of excellence and unbiased kind of news they would like to see that continue.

I would like to get the reaction of you, Secretary Jones, and Secretary Crouch, if you have an opinion from the Defense Department, I would appreciate it too.

Ms. JONES. We know of their concern of the funding for RFE/RL. However, it is our firm view that RFE, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were particularly focused on liberating these countries and ensuring that there was free media, ensuring that there was access to information that was otherwise not available.

These countries have all graduated from needing that, and we need the funding for countries that are not so fortunate.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Crouch, do you want to offer an opinion?

Mr. CROUCH. I would just say that I am not obviously familiar. It is not in our budget. But I think it is important that we continue to have a public diplomacy effort in those countries, I guess, and I think we will continue to do that. And one of the way that our department can help to contribute in terms of our relationship is in these mil-to-mil relationships where we will be hopefully, I think, requesting increases in funding for military education, and for providing opportunities for exercises between our two militaries. And these government have actually told us this also has a very positive effect.

So I think in a way what Assistant Secretary Jones is saying is that these countries have graduated and they are up to the next level. We need to find not only new ways but continue in having a broader security relationship with them and we are doing that in the department, and I know the state department is doing that in other ways as well.

So again, I cannot comment specifically on the RFE/Radio Liberty issue.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would just say in conclusion of my time that they are very positive about the kind of things that you discuss, the mil-to-mil contact, the IMET, they cannot get enough positions as far as they are concerned on IMET for education in our military institutions for their senior and middle range officers and their noncommissioned officers.

So I think what you are doing in that respect is very good, and the Administration is again asking for a significant plus-up in IMET funds which happens to be within the jurisdiction of this Committee.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. McCotter, is recognized.

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for being new to the hearing, but probably if it has been asked and you have already answered it, please let me know so I do not waste your time.

I was curious, a lot of talk here, especially in this country, about the relationship between America and Europe, and about what type of long-lasting consequences the current disagreement over the situation in the Persian Gulf could cause. There is even talk that this could be an irreparable breach. I would just like to put out an opinion and then see your response.

It is always funny to hear things like that. It is because I think we are a young country in so many ways, and that when we deal with countries that have been around far longer, more established, that in many ways there is a natural tension there, especially when we share so much in common it seems so obvious that it gets overlooked.

Much of the philosophy that led to the revolution came from French philosophics, Rousseau, Voltaire. That thinking went into our very constitution. It was the French who helped us in the Revolutionary War. French were our help in War of 1812. In fact, you could even add the Louisiana Purchase which made possible Billy Tosin, for which I think we are all quite grateful.

Mr. BEREUTER. Speak for yourself.

Mr. MCCOTTER. And I think that regarding the rest of Europe throughout those times there is a core agreement on the inherent dignity of the individual, how every individual is important and governments must respect that. We have been through two World Wars, European wars, allies were different, but in the end I think our relations are better than they were 50 years ago despite what is happening because it is so easy to forget that 50 years ago half of Europe was covered by communism, and that clearly was not good in the interest of this country or in the interest of those countries that were occupied.

My question to you is, in the historic view, I do not believe it is possible to have an irreparable breach with Europe. My question

is, what is the time frame and the extent to which those relations will be damaged at the present time, and are there any steps we can do to mitigate that because I do agree with our President that it is our sovereign right as a country to defend American lives and interests, and while we may consult with our European allies, we must never abdicate that to an outside entity?

So given what I believe is going to happen, I would like to know what you think the extent is and what steps we can take to mitigate that.

Ms. JONES. Maybe I can start if that is all right.

I would argue that the problems between us and Europe are quite overstated in the following respect. The majority of European countries are very supportive of the United States, are speaking up in support of 1441 and the fact that it is time now for Saddam Hussein to comply. The new members of NATO, the new candidate countries for the European Union are very energetic. They add a tremendous amount to the discussion in a very positive way. They have a very clear sense of the importance of freedom. They have a very clear sense of their new voice in Europe, and we very much appreciate that.

The disagreement tends to be with a couple of countries of Europe whose voice is loud but those are by no means the only voices. The intense focus on the disagreement tends to revolve around the group of eight who wrote a letter in a newspaper in support of the U.S. views in Iraq. It was seconded then by the Vilnius Ten. That is a lot of European countries who agree with the United States and agree with the importance of the way we are pursuing the issue in Iraq. That means that France and Germany are very much in the minority.

Mr. MCCOTTER. If I can on that point, Mr. Chairman, I can understand, I can appreciate that, but as the entire movement in Europe is toward integration amongst themselves to the European Union, while we can downplay the importance of France or Germany at the present time to the present situation, maybe you would like to limit yourself to that.

The reality is that Europe is continuing to view itself almost as a collection of individual states rather than sovereign nation states combined in a collaborative effort.

So my question is, even if there is a rift and only half of Europe is mad at us, how long will they be mad at us and what can we do to mitigate that?

Ms. JONES. I do not know how long that will be the case. There certainly is quite a bit of discussion even now about the roles that any number of countries might play in reconstruction efforts.

Mr. MCCOTTER. If I can, I just want to reiterate, I agree with the President's position, and in no way do I want my remarks to be seen as disagreeing with that. I agree with the President, and I want to understand what the consequences will be and how to mitigate them, and I do appreciate your response about the emerging countries, democratic countries, especially in the eastern, especially the Baltics, which I think have stepped up and have shown an enormous amount of support for which we will always be grateful for.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. McCotter, thank you, and welcome to the Subcommittee. Glad to have you as a Member.

We are going to proceed with another round under the 5-minute rule until in fact we have votes which I think are not too far off, so the gentleman from South Dakota is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, years ago when I was visiting the Country of Israel and talking to Mr. Perez, I told him a statement that he had made earlier in the hours he was being somewhat inconsistent and he said you must understand in Israel three Jews, five opinions.

I believe it was Golda Meir that once said that in Israel everybody thinks they are the foreign minister. Well, in America everybody thinks they are the President and the Commander in Chief, and we have but one.

There cannot be any greater responsibility than our President has at this time where he has to sit and decide the fate of young men and women in America's armed forces, and those of our friends and allies who may be with us. In war, civilians get killed, maimed and crippled, and families are destroyed, and there cannot be any greater responsibility than he sits with.

Yet on the other hand this country has been under attack for many years as we all know. It is our war. We did not pick it. We did not choose it. We did not look for it. Our country has no history of conquering a country and staying. It is our friends the Soviets that had that kind of history. I believe it our friends the Germans that also had that kind of history, and our friends the French.

But I believe it is our country once we have gone in and freed the people in lands, we spend money, we reconstruct, we help build factories and schools and agriculture and institutions, and we go home. I think that's what our Marshall Plan did. I think that's what we are doing in Afghanistan today. I think we have a long history of that.

The point that I am trying to make is that it is easy for us to all sit and talk about war and peace, but the fact of the matter is there can be no greater responsibility than the safety of every man, woman and child in this country, and ultimately the President of the United States bears that responsibility, and not all of us, but there are an awful lot of us in this country and in this Congress that support this President and what he is doing, and what he may have to do.

But as we talk about Europe, we always seem to emphasize those with which we have disagreements. You talked about the eight, you talked about the ten. I think it is ironic that all those countries that have recently thrown off their yoke of tyranny and oppression, undemocratic governments with a small "d" are the government that are supporting our endeavors as we continue to move forward.

I believe no one could have been more eloquent than the President of Czechoslovakia in the way he has spoken out and admonished the premier of France, the President of France I should say, in the comments that the President of France had made, and the arrogance when Mr. Chirac had spoken down to some of these countries that are seeking to join the European Union.

I think the admonishment that he got from them, letting him in effect know that there are things more important than joining the European Economic Union, were very, very important.

So I close those comments by asking the question of both of you, if I can, what is it, what is it that you think is the most important thing that binds together the people of Europe other than a common heritage in a lot of respect, common culture in a lot of respect? What is the thing that is going to bring us back—albeit we're going to have disagreements and they will probably be very magnified in the future, trade is more and more taking a very significant role in the animosities that people have in an economic sense, what is it that you think is the mucilage that is really going to hold us together in the future if it is not a threat from another country because there is no recognized super power at this time?

Ms. JONES. I will make a start if I may.

I believe that what binds us together is the common understanding of what the fundamental values are that hold us together and that we must work toward throughout the world. And there I am thinking in particular of human rights, I am thinking in particular of democratic principles, of economic reform, market economies.

We have found that we are able to work really without questioning the basis of our projects, of our agreements with our European friends and allies on any and all of those questions without difficulty.

Right now we have a huge effort underway also on counter-terrorism. We disagree right now on the threat, with some countries on the threat specifically from Saddam Hussein and Iraq, but otherwise there is fundamental agreement about the importance of going after terrorist organizations and terrorists.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired. I would turn to Mr. Wexler. I understand he wants to defer to Mr. Engel, which we appreciate. Thank you.

Mr. Engel, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ENGEL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the Ranking Member for deferring to me.

Secretary Jones, I am the Chair of the Albanian Issues Caucus in the Congress, and one of the things I am concerned about is that our focus on the Middle East and Central Asia is diverting attention away from regions like the Balkans where I think America has a very important role to play, and we obviously have made significant investments.

So I would like you to assure me, and I know Iraq is on everyone's mind, but while what happens in Iraq is going to happen, we still obviously have to concentrate on other places in the world. Can you assure me that we are going to continue to give a high priority to Kosova, to Macedonia and to Albania, which were former hot spots that the previous Administration did give priority to?

Ms. JONES. I certainly can assure you of that. We are very focused right this minute, of course, on the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic yesterday, and the implications of that. We are very focused on finding ways to maintain his strong work

against organized crime, against corruption, in support of getting war criminals to The Hague.

We are very focused also in Kosovo in support of Michael Steiner's effort to put benchmarks forward and keep working toward the standards that are necessary in order to address the question of status in Kosovo.

In Macedonia, we spoke earlier about the importance of maintaining peace and security there through development of a European security and defense force, using the Berlin Plus requirements, adhering strictly and forcefully to the Berlin Plus requirements to make sure that whatever that force is is knitted up with NATO in all the appropriate ways.

In terms of funding, we look forward to the Europeans taking up more of the—taking up more responsibility on supporting some of these programs, but we will stay very closely engaged with them to ensure that all of the work that we have done there continues.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I hope that we will continue, and you said we will, but I want to emphasize the importance of moving forward on the final status of Kosova as they meet the standards laid out by Mr. Steiner. Up front I have said I favor independence for Kosova because I think it is the only viable alternative, having them as part of Serbia is no longer viable because of the way they were treated, and I do not think that an indefinite stay of troops is viable either. I think independence is the ultimate viability there, and it should be the final status, so I thank you for that.

Secretary Crouch, first, I want to commend you your deputy, Mira Baratta, with whom I have worked closely in the past. I want to also talk to you about the Albanians.

The Albanians and the Balkans, whether they are in Albania or Kosova or Macedonia, they are certainly, I believe, among the most pro-American population certainly in Europe and possibly anywhere. And although the Albanians all identify themselves ethnically, they are mostly Moslems, and there are many Orthodox Christians and Catholics, but they are mostly Moslems. I would urge you to involve members of the Albanian army, the integrated Macedonian Security Services, and the Kosova Protection Corps, or a Kosova police entity as we conduct military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan or other majority Moslem areas. I feel that the Albanians can be of enormous help as pro-American Moslems to show the world that what we are doing in Iraq is fighting terrorism, not fighting against Islam.

So I am wondering if you can comment on that. Working with the U.S. military would be a great source of pride for the Albanians. Albania has been one of the nations that has shown strong support for what the United States is doing in the Gulf, and I think it would be a good thing to use this bridging population standing with us.

Mr. CROUCH. Well, as you know, and thank you very much for your comments about Ms. Baratta. She actually has been married recently so she is now Ms. Ricardel, but she still has the same commitment to the region as she did ahead of time, and she has been spending a lot of time in that part of the world as well as the Caucasus, in trying to fashion our defense relationships there.

Clearly, our relationship with Albania is growing, and mil-to-mil, I have personally met on a number of occasions with key members of the government, including the defense minister, and I know that she is in regular contact with them.

And I am well aware of the potentialities that you have talked about in terms of the importance of having sort of Muslim states involved in this activity and this operation, and it is certainly something that we are looking at hard inside the department.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I have a million more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I know we are under a time constraint. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

We all have a million more questions, and I have a number of very straightforward information seeking questions for both of you, and if we could ask those in writing, they are relatively simple to answer, I think, but it would be helpful for our record, and your testimony, your written testimony was extremely helpful as well. They will provide a good basis for our work for this year and next as the Europe Subcommittee.

So I want to thank all of my colleagues for their interest and participation and preparation for this, and the staff, and to our two witnesses, thank you for your information, for your testimony and your responses to our questions. We appreciate your help. Thank you.

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will be happy to answer any further questions.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. And the Subcommittee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, AND RESPONSES

Question:

As you know, on February 12, 2003, Belgium's high court ruled that legal proceedings may be initiated against foreigners in absentia, opening the door for the prosecution of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Director General of the Ministry of Defense Major Gen. (Ret.) Amos Yaron for alleged human rights violations committed in Lebanon in 1982.

The Subcommittee is concerned about this highly politicized ruling, which sets a dangerous precedent for international prosecution of war-time leaders by granting Belgium the authority to try any individual for war crimes—with or without a substantive link to Belgium itself and with or without the presence of the accused. This decision deviates from widely recognized tenets of international law, epitomizes a larger trend of anti-Israel sentiment growing throughout Europe and potentially places American military and government officials in harms way. While today the discussion involves Ariel Sharon, however, according to the wide-spread implications of this ruling, tomorrow it may be Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, President Bush, or quite frankly, any one of us at this hearing.

- *What is the Administration doing to exert pressure on Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and the Belgian parliament to nullify this ruling, whether by repeal or modification of Belgium's current universal jurisdiction law?*

Answer:

We have repeatedly expressed our concerns to Prime Minister Verhofstadt and other Belgian officials that the legislation as written enables politically-motivated charges. This has now happened. On March 18 a criminal proceeding was filed on behalf of Iraqi civilians killed during Operation Desert Storm accusing former President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell and General Schwarkopf (ret.) of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since then, we have had further discussions with the Prime Minister and his staff and other senior Belgian officials about the need to enact amendments to the legislation that would provide the means to dispose of the current case and prevent the filing of new ones like it. The Belgian Government is actively considering how the legislation can be revised to meet our concerns.

Question:

Over the past two years we have witnessed a disturbing rise in anti-Semitism in Europe. Can you please tell me if the State Department instructed our Embassies to increase their efforts in monitoring the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe?

Answer:

In our instructions on preparation of the annual Human Rights Reports, in our cables to posts on the work of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, and in other ways, the Department steadily instructs and encourages the monitoring of anti-Semitism. This has become increasingly important as the number of incidents has increased and the salience of the issue has grown.

Question:

What type of outreach is being done by U.S. Embassy officials in gathering information on anti-Semitism in Europe?

Answer:

U.S. Embassies are in frequent contact with Jewish communities, NGOs, a wide variety of human rights monitors and advocates, and with governments concerning the issue of anti-Semitism.

Question:

What does the United States expect to result from the planned OSCE special event on anti-Semitism?

Answer:

The planned OSCE Specialized Meeting on Anti-Semitism should identify best practices for combating anti-Semitism and additional measures which the OSCE and its member states can undertake, and its results should be fed into the OSCE's Human Dimension Meeting for implementation review.

Question:

What type of consultation has occurred between the State Department and interested NGOs?

Answer:

There has been very close and very frequent consultation between Department officials and the interested NGOs regarding both the subject of anti-Semitism and the proposed meeting. Our Special Envoy for Holocaust issues, Ambassador Bell, maintains constant and detailed contact with a wide variety of NGO representatives.

Question:

Finally, what are the lessons learned from years of fighting anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union and how can this be applied to Western Europe?

Answer:

While anti-Semitism always arises out of bigotry and prejudice, its manifestations are not the same in each case. When the countries of central and eastern Europe were under communist rule, state-supported policies and actions were often the primary source of anti-Semitic behavior. Efforts to combat those policies in an earlier era bear no direct relationship to the challenges of molding public attitudes and improving and enforcing laws in today's European democracies. The common thread is willingness to confront both the past and the need for action. In the International Task Force and via the OSCE Meeting, we are encouraging this approach throughout Europe.

Question:

What is the Administration doing to influence Russia so that restrictive religion laws, such as the recently drafted laws discriminating against non-Russian Orthodox religious denominations, are not passed by the Duma?

Answer:

To our knowledge there are no recent draft laws discriminating against non-Orthodox religious denominations.

This question may refer to a draft report by a working group headed by the nationalities ministry that came to light last December. The document was leaked to the press, and its authenticity as a complete document as not been confirmed. As published in the press, the document cited certain non-traditional religions in Russia, such as Roman Catholicism and various protestant groups, as threats to national security. Judaism was not/not cited in the document as such a threat. The document has not led to any draft legislation, nor is there evidence that it is on its way to becoming public policy.

Regarding anti-Semitism in Russia, Jewish leaders have stated publicly that the State-sponsored anti-Semitism of the Soviet era no longer exists. However, Jews continue to face prejudice, social discrimination, and some acts of violence.

At all levels of our inter-action with the GOR, the USG continues to emphasize the importance of religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds.

Question:

How are human rights concerns being addressed when considering the proposed graduation from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of Russia, Armenia and Moldova?

Answer:

Since it was passed in 1974, Jackson-Vanik has been an extraordinary success story in securing freedom of emigration in the Soviet Union and its successor states. We have also seen improvements in the situations of the Jewish communities in these states. It is estimated that the Russian Jewish community numbers over one million in both the United States and Israel.

We raise human rights, including religious freedom, rule of law, and freedom of speech issues at all levels with these governments, where appropriate. These efforts are reinforced by the State Department's annual reports on human rights practices.

Freedom of religion issues will continue to be a prime U.S. focus. We note that progress has been made in advancing freedom of religious expression in Russia, though more needs to be done and there have been setbacks in some areas (particularly denials of visas to Roman Catholic clergy), about which we continue to engage the Russian Government. President Putin and other officials have spoken out forcefully against anti-Semitism. We engage the Government of Russia at the highest levels to promote religious freedom for all its citizens. The function of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with regard to religious freedom has been superseded by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The IRFA requires preparation of annual reports on religious freedom and authorizes the President to take action against countries of particular concern.

Human rights are integrated into all aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Lifting the application of Jackson-Vanik does not end our dialogue on human rights.

Question:

Many in this country see the war on terrorism as one dimensional—that being the military fight against terrorists. This view makes it easier for skeptics to criticize the Europeans for not being cooperative or not doing enough in this fight against terrorism. However, we know that the largest element of the effort against global terrorism is being conducted on the non-military level such as in the intelligence field, law enforcement, financial services, customs and border security and others.

- *How would you rate the level of cooperation we are receiving from our European friends and allies in this global war on terrorism?*
- *Can you give the Subcommittee some very specific examples of the types of cooperation we have received from the Europeans thus far?*
- *Can the Administration continue to generate broad allied support and cooperation for the non-military war on terrorism?*

Answer:

Our European and Eurasian allies continue to be strong supporters in the war against terrorism. The Administration continues to garner broad allied support and cooperation to the non-military war on terrorism.

We work through a variety of multilateral mechanisms, including NATO; the EU; OSCE; UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), which monitors implementation of UNSCR 1373; and UN 1267 Sanctions Committee, which specifically targets sanctions at Usama bin Laden, members of the Taliban and al-Qaida and their associates.

The EU has worked closely with us in preventing terrorists from exploiting international financial markets. The EU has also designated under its regulations most of the individuals and entities designated under our own terrorist financing Executive Order 13224.

European police and intelligence agencies also provide unprecedented practical help in investigating and bringing terrorists to justice, denying financing to terrorists and their supporters, and strengthening security against terrorist attacks.

Many European and Eurasian countries joined with us to place several individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee.

Most European countries, especially NATO members and partners and the EU, acted quickly to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In fact, Turkey was the lead nation in ISAF from June until December, and Germany and the Netherlands took over in February. We also share law enforcement and intelligence information, conduct investigations into the attacks, and strengthen laws to aid the fight against terrorism.

We are also working with the OSCE to improve the capacity of member states to fight terrorism.

We have negotiated new treaties with the EU facilitating law enforcement cooperation.

We also work bilaterally, including through working groups. A prominent example of this is the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism, which held its most recent session in January in Moscow.

Other bilateral cooperation includes:

The UK remains one of our staunchest allies in the war on terrorism. It played a central role with the U.S. in rooting out the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, and continues to play a role in reconstruction, training, and capacity building there.

In addition to its contributions to OEF and ISAF, Greece made significant inroads against the November 17 (N17) terrorist group. The trial of 19 N17 suspects began on March 3 in Athens. Additionally, in February, the GOG arrested four suspected members of the "Revolutionary People's Struggle" (ELA), another Greek domestic terrorist group.

Russia has been unwavering in its support for the coalition, from OEF operations planning to intelligence exchange to support in the UN. It has also changed its financial enforcement infrastructure to block terrorist assets.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have also provided vital support in the war against terrorism. They have offered unequivocal political support and have provided vital intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and information sharing on terrorist groups and assets. Azerbaijan has also contributed troops to ISAF. Georgia has focused internally on removing terrorist cells and enhancing control over its borders and territory through the Train and Equip Program (GTEP). GTEP assists Georgia in developing capabilities on border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response, while advancing military reform. Several nations have made this program possible with their substantial donations of equipment and services.

The countries of southeast Europe have actively supported the international coalition against terrorism. Albania and Bulgaria have extended blanket landing and overflight clearances. Along with Croatia, they have also contributed troops to ISAF and weapons and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. Albania and Bosnia have shut down NGOs with links to terrorist networks, and the Bosnian government arrested and transferred to U.S. control several terrorist suspects accused of planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.

Question:

One of the keys to implementing a successful foreign policy is the ability of the U.S. Missions abroad to carry out their responsibilities in appropriate facilities, with adequate staff and in a secure environment. Some of our Embassies abroad are not in the best condition, some are not adequately secure, some need to be replaced. I can think of several problems including Belgrade, Sofia, Athens, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Ljubana just to name a few.

- *Can you give us an assessment of the condition of our Missions in Europe in general?*
- *Can you highlight those particularly severe problems areas and what is being done to address these shortfalls?*

Answer:

The European and Eurasian Bureau works closely with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) to make our vulnerable facilities more secure and to address the most serious of our facilities' issues. We agree that a number of our buildings are in poor condition. Age, expansion of missions to support U.S. national priorities, and physical security concerns all impact the need for improved facilities.

Over the past two years this Administration has worked on a vigorous embassy replacement and special projects plan. Already, funding has been requested and received for new facilities in Astana, Athens, Dushanbe, Istanbul, Sofia, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Tirana, Yerevan, and Zagreb. A number of these new facilities will be ready for occupancy this year. Funding for Belgrade and Berlin will be requested in the FY2004 budget.

The Department will shortly present to Congress an updated Long Range Overseas Building Plan for FY 2003-2008, which will include prioritization for additional projects in Skopje, Sarajevo, Kiev, Bucharest, St. Petersburg, Riga, Bratislava, Valletta, Milan, Baku, Thessaloniki, Ankara, Krakow and Oslo.

Question:

The situation in the Balkans is an unfinished story, and for some, one of mixed success.

- *What are the Administration's political, economic and assistance priorities in Southeast Europe?*

Answer:

Our policy in Southeast Europe is to promote democracy, market orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into NATO and the European Union.

To this end, we have sought to help the countries of the region address post-conflict issues. We have worked hard to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons have the right to return to their homes. We have focused significant U.S. SEED (Support for East European Democracy Act) assistance on helping the region build an effective rule-of-law structure to address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and porous borders to combat organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity, thereby promoting legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. The arrest of and transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of indicted war criminals is key to ethnic reconciliation and respect for the judicial process, and we have worked hard to encourage cooperation.

While work remains, there has been progress. The democratic process is taking root, and there have been a number of successful elections in the region. Economic growth in the region was good at around four percent in 2002. We will continue to work closely with the countries of the region and the international community as Southeast Europe moves towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

Question:

- *Are you convinced that the on-going peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions are being conducted with the utmost integrity and effectiveness?*

Answer:

The SFOR and KFOR missions have succeeded in maintaining a safe and secure environment and preventing a return to armed conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. They have facilitated the work of the civilian organizations that are building the institutions necessary to maintain the peace and helping these areas move beyond their recent conflicts.

The American servicemembers who are part of SFOR and KFOR have distinguished themselves in their performance of their duties and are well received by the local populations. American commanders have instituted a series of standing orders to address areas of specific concern in the Balkans. These, combined with the normal provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, provide the tools for appropriate handling of situations should U.S. soldiers become involved in illegal activity such as trafficking in persons.

While discipline is a national responsibility, the commanders of KFOR and SFOR have strongly encouraged national contingents to ensure their troops adhere to the highest standards of conduct.

Question:

- *Do continuing pockets of instability and underdevelopment in the Balkans provide any prospective avenues of opportunity for terrorist groups or networks?*

Answer:

An environment born of years of corruption, ineffective law enforcement and porous borders that has been attractive to organized criminals and political extremists is also attractive to terrorists.

Criminal and terrorist networks are often connected and exploit the weaknesses of states in the region. Funds generated by criminal networks, which flourished within corrupt structures weakened by a decade of war and ethnic cleansing, can benefit cells that support terrorism. The U.S., together with other international donors, has provided significant bilateral and multilateral assistance to the countries of Southeast Europe to improve their institutional capacity to deal with these problems. A functioning rule-of-law structure is particularly important in fighting organized crime, trafficking, political extremism and terrorist activity.

Despite resource constraints, the countries of Southeast Europe are actively supporting the international coalition against terrorism and have stepped up their efforts to combat terrorism within their territories. Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia have all joined the Coalition of the Willing to Disarm Iraq, have military liaisons with CENTCOM, have extended blanket landing, basing and over-flight permission,

and are open to requests for post-conflict support. Along with Croatia, they have also contributed troops to ISAF. Albania, Bulgaria and Croatia were able to contribute weapons and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia also expressed strong and early political support by signing the Vilnius-10 statement in support of enforcing UNSCR 1441 by military means. Albania and Bosnia have shut down NGOs with links to terrorist networks, Albania has frozen terrorist assets and deported Islamic fundamentalist agitators, and the Bosnian government arrested and transferred to U.S. control several terrorist suspects accused of planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.

Question:

- *How important is the economic development of Serbia and Montenegro to the overall development of the region?*

Answer:

The economic development of Serbia and Montenegro is central to the development of the region as a whole. Not only does Serbia and Montenegro have a highly skilled, literate workforce and a pre-Milosevic economy which was one of the most dynamic in the region, but its geographic location ensures its status as, potentially, one of the key engines of economic activity in Southeast Europe, thus bolstering economic prospects across the region, particularly in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

Belgrade has made significant strides since the fall of Milosevic by putting in place the building blocks of a functioning market economy. The USG has been strongly supportive of the government's efforts to date and, at this crucial time, will continue to support those in Serbia and Montenegro who seek to more fully integrate their country into the regional and international economic systems.

Question:

- *Has the Administration's position of no independence for Kosovo at this time, changed at all?*

Answer:

The Administration still believes it is premature to begin a process that would determine Kosovo's final status. We have taken no position on final status as yet and believe that it would be harmful to do so at this time.

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which the Administration fully supports, Kosovo's future status will be addressed in a political process facilitated by the Secretary General's Special Representative after the development and consolidation of democratic self-government. While Kosovo has made real strides since 1999, much more remains to be done including, ensuring the rule-of-law, supporting returns and guaranteeing freedom of movement and human rights for all communities, developing the economy and establishing constructive relations with its neighbors.

To help Kosovo reach these goals, UN Special Representative Michael Steiner laid out last year a set of benchmarks intended to guide Kosovo toward democratic self-government. We endorse Mr. Steiner's approach of "standards before status," and believe that if a process to determine final status were to begin now, attention would be diverted away from these important issues before Kosovo's democratic foundation is secure. We believe the time is right to expedite the turnover to the provisional government the remaining powers not reserved to the UN Special Representative, and support Mr. Steiner's plan to do so by the end of this year.

Question:

A while back, in a policy memo, Mr. Dimitri Glinski-Vassiliev, of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Science, wrote a rather scathing assessment of U.S.-Russian relations. He wrote: "over the past year, Russian President Putin initiated a stream of diplomatic overtures to probably the most unresponsive and self-centered of U.S. Administrations since the Roosevelt era."

Citing Russia's outreach to NATO, the closing of Russian military bases in Vietnam and Cuba, accepting a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, conciliatory positions on the ABM Treaty and NATO expansion into the Baltics Glinski, reflecting on the perception that Putin has gotten nothing concrete in return, concluded, "the balance sheet of a year of this foreign policy is plainly negative and demeaning for Russia."

- *How would you respond to this assessment? What has the Bush Administration offered President Putin of a substantial nature that he has been able to use to continue to put a positive spin on his policy of reaching out to the West and especially the U.S.?*

- *Does the recent position of Russia at the U.N. reflect a disappointment in Russian-U.S. relations and has the perceived lack of a two-way street with the U.S. driven Putin closer to Europe as Russia's primary benefactor?*

Answer:

President Putin has drawn closer to the United States because he perceives that is in the best interests of Russia. Naturally, some critics of his in Russia disagree. But I believe President Putin continues to believe that friendship and cooperation with the United States are in Russia's interest. I don't think that international relations can be reduced simply to the sum of all transactions any more than domestic politics can. However, we do believe our relations with Russia are a two-way street, and that President Putin has many positives to point to in the U.S.-Russia relationship:

- the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions will enable both countries to reduce drastically our deployed nuclear stockpiles, reducing the threat for both countries.
- Russia and the U.S. share a common interest in the War on Terrorism, where the deposing of the Taliban regime removed a source of terrorism that directly threatened Russia and Central Asia. We stood with Russia in condemning the seizure of the Moscow Dubrovka theater by Chechen terrorists last October. And we have worked with Russia and Georgia to reduce tension between them and to assist Georgia in controlling the Georgian-Russian border, reasserting control over the Pankisi gorge, and eliminating Al Qaida-linked forces operating there.
- Cooperation in law enforcement is helping us confront the shared threat of international organized crime and money laundering.
- We share with Russia a strategic interest in global energy security. Last October we held the Houston Energy Summit, which launched the Commercial Energy Dialogue and is laying the groundwork for major new U.S. investments in the Russian energy sector.
- Other key developments include the establishment of the new NATO-Russia Council, and our granting of Market Economy Status to Russia.

On Iraq, Russia simply has a different view. We nevertheless believe that this difference is outweighed by our continuing shared interests. We are still in an early phase in the history of post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relations, and believe there is considerable potential for both countries to gain and prosper from our partnership.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BY THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, FOLLOWED BY RESPONSES

Question 1:

At the Prague Summit, our NATO allies agreed to create a NATO Response Force, which would allow our European and Canadian allies to contribute significant land, sea and air forces to expeditionary missions. Our allies also agreed to the Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which they pledged to improve needed capabilities in areas like secure communications, strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions, and WMD defenses.

- *Are our European and Canadian allies making sufficient progress toward developing the NATO Response Force and toward implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment?*

Question 2:

NATO defense ministers in June are supposed to approve a command restructuring plan that will eliminate static sub-regional commands and create a leaner, ore deployable set of headquarters.

- *Are you finding that some of our allies are fighting this plan in an effort to keep open unneeded headquarters that are relocated on their national territory?*

Question 3:

With NATO and the European Union having reached agreement on EU access to NATO capabilities, the EU is planning to undertake its first mission under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), by taking over the 450-strong peace operation in Macedonia from NATO. EU officials have also suggested that in 2004 the EU will be able to take over the SFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, with about 13,000 troops.

- *Are you confident that the EU can successfully run the Macedonia operation? Is it in U.S. interests for the EU to take over SFOR, and will the EU be capable of doing so?*

Question 4:

In 2002, Belgium, France and Germany put forth proposals for ESDP to go beyond the crisis management tasks for which it was originally created. These ideas have been incorporated into the report of the official EU working group on defense. Among these ideas are creation of a European Security and Defense Union, or a "euro zone for defense" in which those EU countries desiring a collective defense commitment could do so "within the framework of the Union."

- *If this proposal were adopted by the EU, to what extent would it affect European commitments to collective defense within NATO?*
- *Given the role of France in advocating these ideas, and given the role of France last month in obstructing NATO planning for the defense of Turkey, do you see an effort to diminish the role of NATO in European defense and shift responsibility to the EU, where the United States does not have a seat?*

Question 5:

The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, has suggested that NATO should take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping force in Afghanistan when the mandate for German-Dutch leadership of the force ends.

- *What does the Administration think of having NATO take over ISAF?*

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE J.D. CROUCH II

Hearing Date: March 13, 2003
Committee: HIRC
Member: Bereuter
Witness: Assistant Secretary Crouch
Question #: 1

NATO RESPONSE FORCE / PRAGUE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT

Question: At the Prague Summit, our NATO Allies agreed to create a NATO Response Force, which would allow our European and Canadian allies to contribute significant land, sea and air forces to expeditionary missions. Our Allies also agreed to the Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which they pledged to improve needed capabilities in areas like secure communications, strategic airlift, precision-guided munitions and WMD defenses. Are our European and Canadian allies making sufficient progress toward developing the NATO Response Force and toward implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment?

Answer: NATO is now developing a comprehensive concept for the NATO Response Force (NRF), based closely on the original U.S. White Paper (attached) that was the basis of the Summit proposal. The NRF will consist of a specific, rotational pool of national air, land and maritime forces drawn from the new NATO Force Structure. The units in each successive NRF rotation will plan, train and be certified for rapid deployment under a rotational Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ). If implemented to the standards proposed by the U.S., the NRF will be lethal, technically superior, and readily deployable on short notice. It will also become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet the new threats facing the Alliance. As a major thrust of work, the NATO Military Authorities are preparing a proposed Military Concept and developing the requirements and standards for NRF preparation, training and certification. NATO Defense Ministers will receive a report on all this concept development work this June. Work is progressing toward planned initial operational capability for training by October 2004 and full operational capability by October 2006.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment included national political commitments to improve particular capabilities in high-priority areas, such as those the question notes. In addition, several "consortia," typically comprising 6-10 interested Allies, have been set up for respective PCC areas, to work on multinational projects and role specialization, which are cost effective approaches and provide contributions for smaller countries. Failure regarding the Prague Capabilities Commitment would jeopardize the NATO Response Force. Allied contributions to NRF rotations must provide the capabilities envisioned at Prague if the NRF is to evolve from a paper concept to a fighting force. Accordingly, the U.S. is pressing Allies to work harder on the PCC. NATO's Defense Review Committee is

working to keep Allies focussed on shortfalls and commitments that were identified at Prague, and is preparing a follow-up plan. NATO Ambassadors are regularly discussing progress reports, and Defense Ministers will receive progress reports in June and December.

WHITE PAPER**NATO RESPONSE FORCE**

Introduction: At the NATO summit in Prague we must prove to our publics that the Alliance is committed to, and is indeed making, significant improvements to its military capability. The credibility of the Alliance is at stake.

Heads of State and Government at Prague will approve two initiatives to improve Alliance military capability: 1) a new Prague Capabilities Commitment to drive forward specific near term capability improvements; and, 2) a restructured and streamlined NATO command structure that can tackle the new threats before us. When combined with the new high readiness force structure already agreed, the Alliance will have taken significant steps to transform fundamentally the Alliance's ability to meet future military challenges.

The U.S. proposes a third initiative that builds on the aforementioned. Heads of State and Government at Prague should agree to establish an Alliance capability to deploy quickly a response force that can go in or out of area to take on the full spectrum of NATO missions. This capability could be called the NATO Response Force (NRF). If underpinned by capable and deployable Allied forces and command structure, it would provide a needed sharpening of NATO's capabilities. At the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government should task the NATO Military Authorities to develop the concept and organizational structure of such a force, with a view toward an initial operational capability for training of October 1, 2004, and full operational capability by October 1, 2006.

The improvement in NATO's military capabilities, and thus the effectiveness and credibility of NATO, depends upon Allied governments making specific capability commitments, with clear timelines, both at Prague and in national plans to improve military forces. Allied efforts at Prague will have an impact on U.S. participation in future Alliance military efforts.

The NATO Response Force: We believe that, for the U.S. and its Allies to fight together effectively in NATO, the Alliance has a requirement for a credible force that is lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice (5-30 days). This force should be able to conduct forced entry into a hostile area. It should be self-sustaining, capable of fighting alone for 30 days. It should be able to serve as a stand-alone force or as an initial entry force that prepares a theater for follow-on forces.

The NRF will turn to ongoing NATO programs and initiatives to establish a rotational pool of air, land and maritime forces, organized under a Combined Joint

Task Force (CJTF) HQ. This force could be tailored to the mission and available for rapid deployment wherever it is needed to conduct a full range of Alliance missions as directed by the NAC. It would give SACEUR and NATO's second level commanders an earmarked force available on short notice.

Potential missions cover the spectrum of operations and could include:

- deployment as a stand-alone force that is reacting to an immediate crisis; example: non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs);
- deployment as a proactive force package, prepared to accept follow-on NATO forces; example: deployment to deter aggression; or
- serve as an initial entry force for a large-scale deliberate operation that secures lines of communication, points of debarkation and prepares a theater for force flow; example: akin to NATO operations conducted in Kosovo.

The NRF will help coordinate, focus and accelerate Alliance initiatives to improve military capabilities and optimize Allies' defense spending. For example, Allies would focus elements of their defense acquisition programs on specific transformational capabilities needed by the NRF. Many of these are in the new Prague Capability Commitment (such as CBRN force protection). The NRF can help drive interoperability and modernization and is a potential test bed for transformation concepts.

The NRF will help operationalize Allied initiatives, including CJTF, the Initial Entry Concept, the new high readiness force structure, and a reformed command structure. The CJTF concept would involve an integrated pool of forces rather than forces assembled on an ad-hoc basis. The NRF could be the principal product of a new NATO command structure-force relationship for rapid deployment and joint warfighting. The NRF would link existing CJTF headquarters to HRF headquarters and forces for Alliance use, while providing a tool to optimize their readiness.

The NATO Response Force would:

- Plan and train for rapid deployment with assigned forces under a Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQs).
- Consist of a specific, rotational pool of national air, land and maritime forces drawn from the new NATO Force Structure organized under a rotational CJTF HQ.

- Draw land and maritime forces from the Graduated Readiness Force pool. The Air component would be a formation of mixed air capabilities drawn from existing NATO air forces, perhaps organized in a similar fashion as the land and maritime graduated readiness forces.

For the most challenging missions, the capabilities-based joint force could notionally consist of sufficient air assets and command and control capabilities to support up to 200 combat air sorties per day; up to a brigade-sized land force; and/or maritime forces up to the size of NATO's standing naval forces. The force could consist of up to 21,000 total personnel.

The NRF would be trained and certified by Allied Command Europe as a combined unit. NATO would focus its exercise program and joint training on the units that will be participating in an upcoming NRF rotation so they can be certified as ready for rapid deployment under the command of a CJTF by the time of their rotation. Rapid deployment and joint warfighting would be the priority of the efforts.

The NRF must draw its forces from the pool of Allied high readiness forces. To provide such a pool of capable forces, the focus of Allied acquisition programs will need to shift to transformational capabilities that can be deployed in the near term. The Prague Capability Commitment will be critical in getting Allied forces ready to participate in the NRF. For example, Allies will need to:

- equip their forces that participate in NRF rotations with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defenses;
- ensure they have secure, interoperable command, control, and communications capabilities;
- improve the interoperability and combat effectiveness of those forces that participate in a rotation; and
- ensure rapid deployment and sustainment of NRF combat forces.

Existing Alliance member national forces -- land, sea, and air -- will need to be placed in a rotation schedule with units identified in advance and linked to a CJTF HQ for each rotation. Nations will need to focus their modernization efforts on their forces that will participate in a NRF rotation.

The desired end-state is for NATO to have at its command a force that can be deployed on short notice in its entirety or in any number of lesser force packages to engage in the full spectrum of operations.

U.S. participation in the NRF will be a function of Allies interest. An Allied force of this kind should not depend disproportionately on U.S. forces and capabilities. This initiative will not succeed unless Allies make serious commitments. Indeed, that is the only way NATO can emerge from the Prague Summit with increased relevance to today's threats and challenges.

Conclusion: What is at stake at Prague is the credibility of NATO as a military Alliance. The commitment of Allies to making improvements to their own national forces, to meeting shortfalls described in the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and to improving the command structure will determine the future course of the Alliance.

For the NRF to be effective it must be able to pull from a pool of deployable and capable Allied forces shaped by the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and it must be under the command of an efficient command structure.


Hearing Date: March 13, 2003
Committee: HIRC
Member: Congressman Bereuter
Witness: Assistant Secretary Crouch
Question #: 2

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE


Question: NATO defense ministers in June are supposed to approve a command restructuring plan that will eliminate static sub-regional commands and create a leaner, more deployable set of headquarters. Are you finding that some of our allies are fighting this plan in an effort to keep open unneeded headquarters that are relocated on their national territory?

Answer: While a number of nations have expressed their respective desires to retain current NATO headquarters assigned to their territory, all Allies have acknowledged that a number of headquarters, including the seven Joint Sub-Regional Commands, must be closed in order to satisfy the Heads of State and Government decision at Prague to reduce the number of headquarters from 20 to 11. The Senior Officials Group (SOG) for NATO Command Structure (which I chair with my Dutch counterpart) expects to produce an agreed plan by the June NATO Defense Ministerial meeting that will mandate a leaner and more deployable set of headquarters. A few nations may not join consensus until the eve of the Ministerial, but all 19 Allies have committed themselves to resolving command structure issues by the Ministerial.

Prague-Approved Command Structure



Allied Command Operations



Hearing Date: March 13, 2003
Committee: HIRC
Member: Bereuter
Witness: Assistant Secretary Crouch
Question #: 3

EU BALKANS OPERATIONS

Question: With NATO and the European Union having reached agreement on EU access to NATO capabilities, the EU is planning to undertake its first mission under the EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), by taking over the 450-strong peace operation in Macedonia from NATO. EU officials have also suggested that in 2004 the EU will be able to take over the SFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, with about 13,000 troops. Do you believe that the EU can successfully run the Macedonia operation? Is it in U.S. interests for the EU to take over SFOR, and will the EU be capable of doing so in the next year?

Answer: On March 17 NATO and the EU finished the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements that can facilitate EU use of NATO planning, officers, assets and commands. These arrangements are a sound basis for the turnover to the EU of NATO's operation in Macedonia, and we foresee an EU success in this modest operation. This is a strong precedent for NATO-EU cooperation -- and a step toward Europeans taking more of the burden for their security. (NATO's current operation includes no US troops.)

It is premature to reach conclusions about an EU operation in Bosnia. The situation in Bosnia, and NATO's operation there, remain very complex, with many challenging political and military issues to address. Continued NATO involvement will be essential -- even as NATO steadily reduces the numbers of its troop deployments. (Europeans already provide the bulk of the troops.)

Hearing Date: March 13, 2003
 Committee: HIRC
 Member: Bereuter
 Witness: Assistant Secretary Crouch
 Question #: 4

PROPOSALS FOR EU'S ESDP

Question: In 2002 Belgium, France and Germany put forth proposals for ESDP to go beyond the crisis management tasks for which it was originally created. These ideas have been incorporated into the report of the official EU working group on defense. Among these ideas are creation of a European Security and Defense Union, or a "euro zone for defense" in which those EU countries desiring a collective defense commitment could do so "within the framework of the Union." If this proposal were adopted by the EU, to what extent would it affect European commitments to collective defense within NATO? Given the role of France in advocating these ideas, and given the role of France last month in obstructing NATO planning for defense of Turkey, do you see an effort to diminish the role of NATO in European defense and shift responsibility to the EU, where the United States does not have a seat?

Answer: A few European nations may harbor such motives. The great majority of European nations have not expressed any desire to increase the role of the EU at the expense of NATO.

There is wide European support for an ESDP that is NATO-friendly, and oriented to crisis management -- not collective defense. This was affirmed in last December's joint "NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP," which strongly re-affirmed prior Summit-level statements that:

- ESDP's focus is crisis management
- NATO "remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members"
- ESDP will strengthen European capabilities and so strengthen NATO

The recently completed NATO-EU "Berlin-Plus" ties will help anchor ESDP into NATO. We are working, with much European support, to make them strong. ESDP, if closely tied with NATO, can help Europeans to take more security responsibility, as we have long urged.

Hearing Date: March 13, 2003
Committee: HIRC
Member: Congressman Bereuter
Witness: Assistant Secretary Crouch
Question #: 5

NATO ROLE IN ISAF

Question: The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, has suggested that NATO should take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping force in Afghanistan when the mandate for German-Dutch leadership of the force ends. What does the Administration think of having NATO take over ISAF?

Answer: The United States supports the concept of NATO playing a lead role in ISAF. As we address this issue with Allies, it is important to recognize that NATO already plays a key role in ISAF. NATO Allies have led ISAF from the beginning, first with United Kingdom, then with Turkey, and now with Germany/Netherlands combined. Last fall NATO agreed to provide a "menu" of support elements that a lead nation could choose from. Options included: force generation, movement, communications, staff augmentation, and AWACS.

