

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL LEON J. LAPORTE
COMMANDER UNITED NATIONS COMMAND,
COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

12 MARCH 2003



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you as Commander, United Nations Command; Commander Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea. On behalf of the more than 37,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and 5,700 civilians serving in Korea, thank you for your unwavering support which enables us to maintain readiness and accomplish our deterrence mission on the Korean peninsula. I appreciate this opportunity to present an assessment of the command's status.

This has been an extraordinary year in Korea. 2002 marked the 4th democratic transfer of power in the Republic of Korea, renewed South Korean efforts toward inter-Korean reconciliation, and the first World Cup hosted in Asia. In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents as well: North Korea's calculated armistice violation in the West Sea, exposure of the North Korean nuclear weapons programs, a tragic training accident in June, and cyclic rise of anti-United States Forces Korea sentiment. With consistency and determination, North Korea attempts to split the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by exploiting these events. Our Alliance weathered these incidents and continues to be the foundation of peace and security throughout the Northeast Asia region. These incidents have firmly reinforced three points: the consequences of events in Korea affect the entire world; continued United States presence in Northeast Asia is critical to regional stability; and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance is essential to regional security.

Today, I will address current and future requirements by looking at: ***the Northeast Asia security environment; the North Korean challenge to regional and global security; the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance; and my command priorities – Ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, Readiness and Training, Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, Transform the Command, and Make Korea an Assignment of Choice.***

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Northeast Asia Security Environment

Northeast Asia is a nexus of economic might, competing interests, converging threats, cultures, and historical animosities. Over 17 percent of the world's trade value is with countries in Northeast Asia, and United States trade with the region is second only to our trade with the North American Free Trade Association.¹ Many of the nations in the region—China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea—are contending for economic and political influence. Enduring cultural and historical animosities remain a dynamic political force. This region marks the convergence of five of the world's six largest militaries, and three of the five declared nuclear powers. Today, the current military demarcation line between North and South Korea is the most heavily armed in the world and remains an arena for confrontation. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of missile technology threatens regional and global stability. United States presence in Korea demonstrates our firm commitment to defend democratic values and prevent our enemies from threatening us—and our partners—including with weapons of mass destruction. Our forces in Korea send the clear message that we will stand with our allies and friends to provide the stability that promotes prosperity and democratic values.

The Republic of Korea Today

The Republic of Korea is fast becoming a global economic competitor. In 2002 the Republic of Korea's economy grew six percent while boasting the world's 11th largest Gross Domestic Product and third largest cash reserves.² The South Korean people are justifiably proud of these achievements and The Republic of Korea's increasing international prominence. The Republic of Korea's vision of the future is to diversify its economy by becoming the

¹ Derived from US Census data. For the first 11 months of 2002, total trade with Northeast Asia (\$US billion) are: Japan \$172.92, China \$148.13, Republic of Korea \$58.13, Taiwan \$50.60. Trade with NAFTA during the same period was \$557.39 (Canada \$342.55 and Mexico \$214.73), (<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2002/11/balance.html>, accessed 19 FEB 2003.

² United States Department of State, *Country Commercial Guide Korea, Fiscal Year 2003*.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

“transportation, financial, and information technology hub of Northeast Asia.”³ This vision seeks to route Northeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas trade through the Republic of Korea using an inter-Korean transportation system. To achieve this goal the Republic of Korea must significantly increase cooperation with North Korea. Inter-Korean initiatives begun by former President Kim, Dae Jung and continued by President Roh, Moo Hyun pursue reconciliation for cultural, economic, and humanitarian reasons. The Republic of Korea’s engagement policies toward North Korea profoundly affect how South Koreans view their relations with the United States and North Korea.

Many South Koreans under age 45, a generation that has lived in an era of peace and prosperity, have little or no understanding of the North Korean threat. These South Koreans perceive North Korea not as a threat but rather as a Korean neighbor, potential trading partner and a country that provides access to expanded Eurasian markets. This perception of North Korea contrasts with America’s view that North Korea is a threat to regional and global stability. This divergent view of North Korea, coupled with strong national pride, has been a cause of periodic tension in the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance.

There have always been groups in the Republic of Korea that are critical of United States policy and claim that the United States hinders inter-Korean reconciliation. Demonstrations against American policy and military presence increased sharply during this year’s Republic of Korea presidential election. Political interest groups made claims of inequity in the Republic of Korea-United States alliance a central issue during the presidential campaign. Opposition groups exploited a United States military court’s acquittal of two American soldiers charged with negligent homicide in the tragic training accident that claimed the lives of two

³ President Roh, Moo-hyun announced his intent to position the Republic of Korea as the “economic powerhouse of Northeast Asia”. In public appearances, he amplified this vision stating that he sought to make South Korea the transportation, financial, and information technology hub of Northeast Asia. For President Roh’s national priorities, see Korea Herald articles at http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2003/01/11/200301110003.asp, http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2002/12/28/200212280010.asp.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

South Korean schoolgirls last June. Non-governmental organizations asserted that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was unjust and that the acquitted soldiers should have been tried in a Republic of Korea court rather than by a United States military court. During the presidential election campaign, these groups used biased and inaccurate media reporting to inflame anti-United States Forces Korea sentiments and mobilize demonstrations, a traditional tool of political protest in the Republic of Korea. Regrettably, several of these protests turned violent.

Since the December 2002 Republic of Korea presidential election, anti-United States Forces Korea demonstrations have virtually disappeared, due in large part to positive steps taken by United States Forces-Korea, the United States Embassy, and the Republic of Korea government. Through our Republic of Korea-United States Status of Forces Joint Committee process, we identified ways to improve implementation of the 2001 Status of Forces Agreement. Convening a Republic of Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement Special Joint Task Force, we incorporated recommendations in vehicular safety, convoy operations, and joint investigation procedures. This Special Joint Task Force assisted United States Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea's government in explaining the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement to the Korean people.

The prompt and comprehensive actions of the Status of Forces Agreement Joint Committee addressed the concerns of many South Koreans. Shortly after his election, President Roh, Moo Hyun voiced support for a strong Republic of Korea-United States alliance and continued United States military presence in Korea even after reconciliation. Acknowledging the rationale for the Alliance, he expressed a desire to re-examine the relationship based on the principles of equal partnership and greater emphasis on shared interests. Since the presidential election, pro-American groups, some as large as 100,000 people, in the Republic of Korea have conducted demonstrations supporting the continued

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

stationing of United States forces in the Republic of Korea. In this the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, we have an opportunity to revitalize the Alliance in constructive ways that enhance this mutually beneficial partnership while ensuring peninsula and regional security.

We can improve the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by closely examining the roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of our respective forces. This includes the Republic of Korea assuming the predominant role in its defense and increasing both Republic of Korea and United States involvement in regional security cooperation. These efforts will enhance our partnership while fully acknowledging the Republic of Korea's contributions to burdensharing, support to the war on terror, and their modernization program for defense of the Republic of Korea.

Republic of Korea Defense Burdensharing

Defense burdensharing is an important part of maintaining the readiness of United States Forces Korea. The Republic of Korea burdensharing contribution in 2002 was \$490 million, 41 percent of total United States Forces Korea non-personnel stationing costs, behind Japan and Germany in Allied burdensharing. In 2003, the Republic of Korea's contributions will increase to \$539.5 million. The Republic of Korea's annual burdensharing contributions have increased significantly since the Asian financial crisis, rising over \$206 million (62 percent) since 1997.

The Republic of Korea's support for the war on terror

The Republic of Korea has continued its steadfast support to the global war on terror. The Republic of Korea's National Assembly extended its mandate through 2003 and increased its commitment of support forces to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Today Republic of Korea liaison officers are planning and coordinating with their United States counterparts at both Central Command and Pacific Command headquarters. The Republic of Korea's military is supporting the war on terror from Tampa, Florida, throughout the Pacific, and in Kyrgyzstan and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Afghanistan. The Republic of Korea has provided several contingents of support troops to include a navy transport ship moving essential airfield material to Diego Garcia, four C-130 cargo aircraft to support the United States Pacific Command's operations, and a hospital unit in Bagram. In February 2003, a Republic of Korea engineering unit began deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. In addition, the government of the Republic of Korea has provided \$12 million of their \$45 million pledge to fund humanitarian and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.

Republic of Korea's military modernization

The Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense has made a long-term commitment to acquire the necessary capabilities to secure the Republic of Korea against current and emerging threats. The Republic of Korea's military modernization program involves significant purchases of United States equipment to improve interoperability. Over the last decade, 82% of the Republic of Korea's equipment purchases have been United States equipment. Last year direct Foreign Military Sales of United States military equipment to the Republic of Korea exceeded \$1.8 billion and commercial agreements were reached to deliver over \$4 billion of additional military equipment over the next few years. Boeing was awarded the contract to deliver 40 F-15K aircraft between 2005 and 2008. This year, the Republic of Korea is taking delivery of 20 additional KF-16 aircraft, procuring its second battalion of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and extended range munitions. The Republic of Korea's Navy is building three new destroyers, equipped with the AEGIS system.

The Republic of Korea's military has made strides in improving its capabilities; however, its small budget, as a fraction of Gross Domestic Product, restrains modernization efforts. In 2003, the Republic of Korea's defense budget increased 6.5 percent to \$14.2 billion but fell from 2.8 percent to 2.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product. This has left some key programs unfunded or delayed, continuing a 10 year trend. The Republic of Korea has delayed purchase of critical equipment in the required quantities—theater air and missile defense systems, early

warning and control aircraft, and upgraded equipment for their Special Operations units. Acquiring these systems provides critical capabilities to ensure the Republic of Korea's security against threats posed by North Korea.

North Korean Challenges to Regional and Global Security

North Korea is a dangerous dictatorship that continues to threaten peace, security, and stability in Northeast Asia. The Kim Jong-il Regime uses illicit activities to fund the extravagant lifestyles of the inner circle and is using its military capabilities to extort resources from the international community. North Korea poses several threats to global stability: an economy on the brink of collapse; an active nuclear weapons development program; growing proliferation of missiles, chemical, and biological weapons technologies; and large conventional forces and special operations forces that directly threaten our Allies. North Korean brinksmanship ensures that the Korean Peninsula remains a place of palpable danger, illustrated by North Korea's unprovoked attack on a Republic of Korea patrol boat in the West Sea on 29 June 2002 and North Korean efforts to develop highly enriched uranium nuclear weapons. North Korea continues to flagrantly violate its international agreements resulting in increased regional tensions. The Republic of Korea and United States forces continue to face the possibility of a high intensity war involving large conventional forces and significant weapons of mass destruction.

North Korean Political Environment

Kim Jong-il is firmly in control. He is the ultimate decision maker who controls the state security apparatus and occupies all key party, military, and government leadership positions. Kim relies on a core group of elites to maintain power. This inner circle, not the formal hierarchy of the party and government, run all the major North Korean institutions. Kim provides the ruling elite with a relatively luxurious lifestyle, while the masses live in poverty. Kim's overriding goal

is regime survival. His intent remains to dominate the Republic of Korea and to reunify the peninsula under North Korean leadership.

North Korean Economic Environment

The most pressing problem facing North Korea is its failing economy. Economic output has shrunk by nearly one-half since 1993. The country suffers from obsolete production facilities and severe shortages of capital, energy and raw materials. Industrial facilities, other than those devoted to defense industries, are nearly beyond repair as a result of more than a decade of under-investment and critical spare parts shortages. Most factories operate at less than 25 percent capacity.

Despite severe economic problems and acute deprivation among the general populace, the Kim Regime chooses to maintain a large, capable, and forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea's "Military First" policy ensures the military receives top priority in all resources, at the expense of the North Korean people. The military consumes about one third of the North Korean budget. The military operates a parallel economy producing conventional weapons, missiles, and illegal drugs for sale on the open market as well as large-scale smuggling and currency counterfeiting. Most of the profits from these activities accrue directly to the military, with the remainder going to Kim and the elite. Kim Jong-il continues to buy the loyalty of his elite by providing luxury cars, housing, food, and special medical care.

To prop up the progressively deteriorating North Korean economy, Kim Jong-il has implemented a number of initiatives. He has invigorated ideological campaigns that demand loyalty and perseverance – encouraging the North Korean people to endure hardships for the good of the nation. To complement the ideological campaign, the Kim Regime has tightened security and increasingly militarized North Korean society to preclude broad internal dissent. North Korea has turned to foreign aid, primarily from the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China to meet its food and fuel needs. The Kim Regime has implemented limited

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

economic reforms, including unprecedented wage and price increases, designed to jump-start the economy; however these efforts have not revitalized the North Korean economy. Unless North Korea embraces a more open market economy – a prospect that Kim, Jong-il fears will threaten his control – we expect no significant economic improvement in the foreseeable future.

North Korean Nuclear Issues

North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses a very serious threat to the United States and our allies, risks regional stability, and challenges the international non-proliferation regime. During a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in early October 2002, North Korea acknowledged its pursuit of a covert program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In a 16 October statement, North Korea admitted a series of actions that violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement, the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the 1994 Agreed Framework. We assess that the Kim Regime believes possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee survival.

The North Koreans have again resorted to brinksmanship using the nuclear issue in an effort to gain economic and political concessions through negotiations. On 10 January 2003, they expressed their intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Restarting the Yongbyon nuclear reactor near Pyongyang has prompted fears that it intends to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. If North Korea begins reprocessing existing fuel rods at the Yongbyon facility, it could produce enough material for five to eight nuclear weapons within a year. North Korea's history of selling missiles and missile-related technologies to any state or group with hard currency raises serious concerns about the potential for nuclear weapons technology or scientific know-how to find their way from North Korea to the hands of terrorists.

North Korean Ballistic Missile Sales

North Korea's ballistic missiles, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, are a threat to the region and a destabilizing influence in the world. North Korea remains one of the few countries willing to sell to anyone with cash complete missile systems, production facilities, and technological assistance. These sales in turn contribute to instability in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. Although Kim Jong-il told President Putin and Prime Minister Koizumi last year that the current ballistic missile flight-testing moratorium will remain in place beyond 2003, North Korea has repeatedly threatened to restart missile test launches.

Role of the North Korean Military

The Korean People's Army ensures regime survival by controlling the internal situation and deterring external threats. It is the one instrument of national power that enables North Korea to extract aid from its neighbors in the region. The military also plays a major role in the economy. Although a decade of resource shortages has left the North Korean military ill-prepared to fight and win a war to reunify the Peninsula, there are no indications that the Kim Regime has abandoned the forced reunification option.

Conventional Forces: With 1.17 million personnel, the Korean People's Army is the fifth largest active duty military force in the world. The North Korean air force has over 1,700 aircraft and the navy has more than 800 ships, including a large submarine fleet. The ground force is the world's third largest, with almost one million soldiers, and an estimated six million reserves. About 70 percent of the North Korean Army is deployed south of Pyongyang, where they are capable of attacking with very little tactical warning. The preponderance of the North Korean long-range artillery force can strike Seoul from its current locations.

Asymmetric Threat: The North's asymmetric forces are dangerous, well trained, and well funded by the North Korean military budget. They continue to make methodical improvements in weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and special operations forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

North Korea is openly pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Their program to develop both plutonium and uranium based nuclear weapons has been well documented. North Korea maintains a substantial chemical weapons stockpile and production capability that threatens both our military forces and the civilian population centers in the Republic of Korea and Japan. Additionally, North Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and potentially weaponize biological warfare agents. The principal risk attendant to the North Korean weapons of mass destruction is proliferation – the sale of fissile materials, completed nuclear weapons, and the technology to produce chemical or biological agents to other nations or terrorist organizations.

Their ballistic missile inventory includes over 500 SCUD missile variants that can threaten the entire peninsula. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range No Dong missiles capable of striking cities and United States bases in Japan. According to estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea has an untested ballistic missile capable of delivering a payload the size of a nuclear weapon to parts of the continental United States. Continued research on a three-stage variant of these missiles will provide North Korea the capability to target all of North America. As with weapons of mass destruction, North Korean missile proliferation poses a threat far beyond the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's 122,000-man special operations forces are the world's largest and pose a significant asymmetric threat. We consider them a tough, dedicated, and profoundly loyal force. They undergo year-round training to develop and maintain their skills. During wartime, these forces would attack to disrupt command facilities of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command and seek to destroy our force generation capability. The North will concentrate their special operations forces against our critical war fighting nodes while seeking to deny reinforcement from the continental United States.

Force Improvements: The North Korean military is adaptive. They have studied our military actions, most recently in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and adapted their tactics to offset

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

our technological advantages. They concentrate their efforts against the combined surveillance, precision attack, and force generation capability of the Republic of Korea and the United States. North Korea continues to improve their command, control, communications and intelligence systems, harden and bury their facilities, improve lines of communication, disperse forces, and improve camouflage, concealment, and deception measures. These efforts increase the survivability of North Korean combat power, and complicate our attack warning capability.

Assessment: North Korea poses a dangerous and complex threat to peace and security on the peninsula and throughout the region. Their growing missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, including a re-vitalized nuclear weapons program, constitute a substantial threat to the world. Moreover, they have shown willingness to sell anything to anybody for hard currency. They will continue to support the military at the expense of the general population and extort aid to prop up their failing economy. We see no indications that the Kim Regime will change the policies of military first, brinkmanship, and missile proliferation throughout the world.

United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea

Since I took command in May 2002, I have had several opportunities to assess the capabilities and readiness of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Key events included response to the West Sea Armistice Violation by North Korea, security for development of the inter-Korean transportation corridors through the Demilitarized Zone, and security support for the 2002 World Cup and Asian Games.

United Nations Command


Under the mandate of Security Council Resolutions 82, 83, and 84, the United Nations Command in Seoul provides a standing coalition with 15 member nations to address trans-national interests in regional stability. United Nations Command led the international response

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to the 29 June 2002 West Sea Armistice violation by the North Koreans. This egregious, unprovoked North Korean attack in the West Sea sank the Republic of Korea patrol boat *SOSAN*; killing 6 and wounding 19 Republic of Korea sailors. The United Nations Command member nations promptly issued strong statements denouncing the North Korean aggression. Facing this international censure, North Korea reluctantly expressed regret over the incident and agreed to the first United Nations Command–Korean Peoples Army General Officer talks in almost two years. At the General Officer talks, North Korea guaranteed not to interfere with a United Nations Command-led salvage operation. Under the United Nations flag, the Republic of Korea's navy successfully salvaged the sunken boat. United Nations Command observers ensured neutrality and transparency of the salvage operation. The strength of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, backed by the United Nations Command member nations, led to a successful West Sea recovery operation and reinforced the legitimate authority of United Nations Command to enforce the Armistice. United Nations Command again provided a stabilizing force and prevented a dangerous situation from escalating into open hostilities.

Following the West Sea salvage operation, the Republic of Korea and North Korea held the Seventh Inter-Korean Ministerial talks, during which they re-invigorated efforts to establish inter-Korean transportation corridors. These corridors allow reconnection of rail lines and roadways through two designated points in the Demilitarized Zone to facilitate inter-Korean humanitarian visits and commerce. To support this Republic of Korea reconciliation initiative, United Nations Command worked closely with the Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense to establish special coordination measures between the Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense and the North Korean People's Army to speed construction and operation of the transportation corridors while ensuring compliance with the Armistice Agreement and security of the Demilitarized Zone. The first group of passengers crossed the Military Demarcation Line through the eastern corridor on 14 February 2003. This was the first time in

50 years that citizens of the Republic of Korea crossed directly into North Korea and is a clear demonstration of successful cooperation between the Republic of Korea and United Nations Command. The figure below illustrates the location of the east and west inter-Korean transportation corridors through the Demilitarized Zone.



Combined Forces Command

Combined Forces Command ensures the security of the people of the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command provides the military force that deters external aggression and stands ready to defeat any external provocation against the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command, composed of air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations components, conducts combined training exercises and readiness inspections to maintain the warfighting readiness that is essential to deterrence. Combined Forces Command headquarters is a fully integrated staff, manned by Republic of Korea and United States military officers. This thoroughly integrated headquarters coordinates the operations that deter external aggression. In 2002, Combined Forces Command assisted with the successful United Nations Command

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

salvage operation in the West Sea and with military security support to the World Cup and Asian Games

Leveraging Combined Forces Command wartime operational procedures, United States Forces-Korea and Republic of Korea forces shared information and conducted combined exercises to deter terrorist infiltrators seeking to disrupt the games. Combined Forces Command operated Crisis Action Response Teams to quickly respond to any type of incident. United States Forces-Korea provided unique biological and radiological defense assets to augment the Republic of Korea military capabilities. Our close cooperation ensured secure 2002 World Cup and demonstrated the agility of Combined Forces Command to conduct wide range of operations

United States Forces Korea

United States forces in Korea are the tangible demonstration of United States commitment to peace and stability in Korea and throughout Northeast Asia. United States Forces-Korea brings the robust technological superiority, information dominance, and warfighting prowess that complement and buttress the Republic of Korea military capabilities. Our forward presence deters North Korean aggression and convinces North Korea not to start devastating actions that would only have tragic consequences throughout the region. To maintain the dominance that ensures deterrence, we must maintain state-of-the-art capabilities in Korea. My top priorities for force modernization are: increasing **C4ISR functionality and interoperability**, increasing the pre-positioned stocks of **preferred munitions**, improving **counter fire capabilities, missile defense, force protection, and logistics**. These capabilities support peninsular defense and regional security operations.

C4ISR functionality and interoperability

United States Forces-Korea continues to work hard to achieve the decision superiority needed to execute effects-based operations. We have made significant improvements in the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

combined Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence architecture in Korea. Over the last year we have created a combined Common Operational Picture that integrates Republic of Korea Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Tactical Data Links from both Republic of Korea and United States air and naval vessels and live video feeds from throughout the theater. We seek to expand these capabilities by adding logistics and engineering Common Operational Picture currently under development at Joint Forces Command. We thank you for your support, which has allowed us to progress this far. However, this common operational picture is built on an aging communications infrastructure that is increasingly expensive to maintain. We need to continue improving Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence functionality and interoperability.

The strategy for improving our Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence requires improved secure digital networks, collaborative planning tools, and enhanced interoperability. Our secure digital networks need significant technology upgrades to improve the efficiency of information exchange. High-speed internet encryption will enable us to prioritize and rapidly transmit secure data throughout the theater. We also need to increase our secure long-haul communications networks to effectively collaborate with United States Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Improving these networks provides the infrastructure required to upgrade our collaborative planning tools and interactive displays to provide real-time decision support.

Improving interoperability of Republic of Korea and United States Forces-Korea communications systems is paramount. The Program Budget Decision 725 has helped us to address our Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence shortfalls. Some examples of key interoperability programs that need your continued support are integration of Republic of Korea Command Post Automation System and United States Global Command and Control System-Korea; integrating tactical Mobile Subscriber Equipment; and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

expanding Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. Urge your continued endorsement of Program Budget Decision 725 to maintain this funding across the Future Years Defense Plan.

Preferred Munitions

The complexity of Korean terrain and weather require the all weather capability provided by precision munitions. Our operational planning leverages “preferred munitions” to conduct precision strike against essential military targets. While we can conduct a successful campaign without precision munitions, it would be longer and more costly in terms of infrastructure damage and human suffering. Korea’s weather often impacts our munitions choices, but Global Positioning Satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition and inertial-guided Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser give us the capability to sustain our operations when the weather precludes the use of other munitions. Some key requirements for this theater are: Joint Direct Attack Munition, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile upgrades, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, JAVELIN and HELLFIRE anti-tank weapons. We must maintain adequate stocks of these munitions on the peninsula. Critically important are early development and fielding of munitions to defeat the hard and deeply buried targets prevalent throughout North Korea. Toward that end, United States Forces-Korea is sponsoring two promising Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations—*thermobaric weapons* and *tactical missile system penetrator munitions*, which will carry the fight to the enemy wherever they seek to hide. Ask that you continue to support development and production of the advanced precision munitions required to support all contingency plans.

Counter-fire Capabilities

In the event of a conflict, the ability to rapidly destroy North Korean long-range artillery is essential to deterrence. An aggressive counter-fire battle achieves early destruction of one of North Korea’s essential military capabilities, while minimizing casualties and protecting Seoul--

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the Republic of Korea's seat of government and hub of economic power. My vision for the counter-fire fight is two-fold: a *proactive capability* to destroy North Korean artillery systems before they fire; and an *overwhelming* response to any North Korean fires into the Republic of Korea. A fully resourced and integrated ground, sea, and air counter-fire capability is essential to achieving this decisive overmatch. Key components of the theater counter-fire system are: state-of-the art counter-battery radars, precision munitions, operational-level and strategic-level Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and state-of-the art Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. Your support of these programs provides the capabilities needed to destroy the North Korean artillery at the time and place of our choosing while simultaneously protecting Seoul.

Missile Defense

North Korea's theater ballistic missiles can range deeply into the Republic of Korea, and deliver both conventional and chemical weapons on the civilian population and military targets. To defeat the North Korean missile threat, I need to increase the number of advanced PATRIOT missiles in the Republic of Korea. Increasing the density of these advanced air defense weapons on the peninsula ensures the needed protection for critical nodes.

Force Protection

Protecting the force remains essential to operational readiness – I will not compromise the safety of our service members and their families. We remain vigilant and have taken critical steps to improve our security posture – most notably increasing perimeter security forces, installation of closed circuit television monitors at key access points, fielding *Portal Shield* chemical and biological detection systems, and conducting intensive anti-terrorism and force protection training exercises.

Although we continue to assess the terrorist threat as low, we have implemented additional force protection measures and increased our physical security presence to ensure the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

safety of our people. In addition to our normal security forces, the Korean National Police are integrated into our installation security plans. Their sustained presence adds depth and effectiveness to the security of our key facilities. We have worked closely with the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense to increase military security cooperation during times of heightened force protection posture. These prudent measures ensure the Republic of Korea—United States Alliance is prepared to meet any terrorist threat to our installations.

Over the past year, we completed a detailed vulnerability assessment of our installations. This assessment identified over 130 major tasks required to comply with anti-terrorism and force protection requirements, many of which require changes to our infrastructure. Key requirements to improve force protection focus on establishing adequate standoff protection around our key facilities and installations and upgrading structural integrity on mission essential and vulnerable buildings. We have taken prudent measures to mitigate these shortfalls with the available resources. I encourage you to support all force protection related projects

Logistics and Sustainment

Adequate logistical sustainment is essential to our campaign plans. In Korea, our operations are sustained by a combination of pre-positioned equipment stocks and replenishment from the continental United States. In addition to the precision munitions requirements I've presented, I need your support to correct shortfalls in Army Pre-positioned Set-4 equipment, supplies, and maintenance facilities. These war reserve sustainment stocks are essential to execute operational plans. To ensure timely arrival of additional forces and sustainment supplies, I fully support initiatives to field robust strategic transportation systems like the High Speed Vessel and C-17. Equally important to the Korean Theater is the continued improvement of Joint Logistics Over The Shore equipment, which provides the flexibility to sustain the force against an enemy's anti-access strategies. Improved strategic mobility and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

robust pre-positioned equipment and supplies ensure sustainment of forward deployed forces and rapid reinforcement from the continental United States.

Command Priorities

As the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces-Korea, my command priorities are: ***Ensure Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula, Readiness and Training, Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, Transformation of the Command, and Make Korea an assignment of choice.*** I want to elaborate on each of these, identify the key programs and the resources needed to make them a reality.

Ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula

Maintaining the Armistice and deterring aggression are the most important missions have as Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces-Korea. Readiness to fight and win decisively is critical to these missions. We must also foster broader regional security cooperation to enhance solidarity among our allies and friends. It is essential that the two key elements that deter conflict on the peninsula, the United Nations Command member nations and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, continue cooperation to actively promote peace and stability. Our common purpose, steadfast resolve and advanced capabilities are essential to continued stability in Korea.

Readiness and Training

Readiness is my number one priority. Readiness is our ability to deter, and if required, defeat aggression on the Korean peninsula. The proximity of the threat, the complexity of combat in this theater, and high personnel turnover demand intensive, combined training at all levels. Our year-round combined exercise program, which leverages the results of Joint Forces Command experimentation, provides a great venue to maintain our warfighting proficiency and implement new operational concepts that support transformation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Combined Forces Command uses the combined exercise program to maintain readiness that is essential to defeat a limited warning attack by North Korea. Our robust annual training program consists of three major exercises: ULCHI-FOCUS LENS; RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION; and FOAL EAGLE. Collectively, these exercises train over 400,000 personnel and ensure that the Combined Forces Command Team of active and reserve component units remains proficient in all war fighting tasks. In Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002, our capstone training exercise, we improved our Common Operational Picture with interactive command and control displays. We used the Common Operational Picture at all command levels to achieve common situational awareness. We also implemented a new collaborative planning and execution system to coordinate theater-level operations. Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002 provided an opportunity to test Integrated Total Asset Visibility and automated language translators.

Our 2003 exercise program focuses on implementing effects based operations. To enhance the exercise program, we are continuing the development of the emerging Northeast Asia Regional Simulation Center to provide simulation support to joint, combined, and bi-lateral exercises. This effort is becoming the preferred venue to resolve difficult coalition integration and doctrinal issues. As this center moves toward its objective state in 2008, it has the potential to support multilateral exercises and simulation with other regional partners and allies. Our 2003 exercise program is essential to maintaining warfighting proficiency and implementing new doctrinal concepts that improve operational effectiveness.

Training Area Encroachment

In addition to simulation training, we must conduct regular live force-on-force training to practice combat tasks and maintain maneuver proficiency. Korea's increasing urbanization encroaches on training areas, restricting our ability to train in Korea. For example, armored and mechanized units cannot maneuver outside of small and discrete pockets of land located in a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

corridor North of Seoul. Artillery live fire training is limited to two small training areas, which prohibit effective integration of fire and maneuver techniques. We have the same problem with our Air-to-Ground ranges and must continually work to ensure we have the proper separation for adequate aircrew training while maintaining safety for the people who live near the ranges. The Land Partnership Plan provides the mechanism for us to improve our training areas and reduce the effects of encroachment. By 2008 we expect to have the land necessary to create a consolidated Korean Maneuver Training Center. ask you to fully support this initiative.

Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance

For 50 years the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has been a standard by which all others are judged. To strengthen the Alliance, we need to improve public understanding of United States contributions. It is also essential that we review and re-affirm the military relationship of the Republic of Korea and United States Forces-Korea. These complementary efforts will ensure that the Alliance endures well into the future.

To improve the public understanding and appreciation of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces-Korea, I have implemented a "Good Neighbor" program that encourages closer interaction between our units and the people of the Republic of Korea. This program uses local unit outreach programs such as tutoring English language students in area schools, Arbor Day activities, and sponsoring charitable contributions for orphanages. One of our largest volunteer efforts occurred in the aftermath of Typhoon Rusa in September 2002. United States Forces-Korea volunteers assisted with clean-up operations and delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies. These efforts reduced suffering and sped recovery in the affected communities. Community outreach programs develop personal relationships that increase understanding and appreciation for United States Forces-Korea.

In addition to these one-on-one programs, I've established new channels of communication with South Korean community leaders, nongovernmental organizations, media

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

representatives and concerned citizens. The Commander's Korea Advisory Council provides a venue for military and community leaders to help with our efforts to positively influence the Alliance. Unit commanders have established hot lines to receive and address issues of concern to the South Korean people. We are also educating local civic leaders about provisions of Status of Forces Agreement, improved safety programs, and Land Partnership Plan implementation. We are now developing a Korean language web site to provide command information to the South Korean public.

Because of our high annual personnel turnover, Eighth United States Army has instituted a cultural awareness program called "New Horizons Day." New Horizons Day teaches our service members and civilian employees about Korean culture, safety, risk mitigation, and command policies on appropriate off-duty behavior. New Horizons Day reinforces our efforts to improve understanding of the close ties that are the foundation of the Alliance.

We have begun the process of re-defining the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance. In December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Lee, Joon agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative to guide Alliance transformation. The Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative – jointly led by the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense – will focus on future roles, missions, functions, structure, and stationing in the Alliance; combined transformation and modernization; and the role for the Alliance after reconciliation. These policy discussions will ensure the Alliance has the right balance for the future.

The defense ministers also directed the Republic of Korea-United States Military Committee develop new operational concepts for combined operations. These operational concepts take advantage of new military technologies and lessons from other theaters to implement an effects-based warfighting structure. Using the lessons of *Millennium Challenge 02* we will implement the systems needed to make these concepts a reality. We are rapidly

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

revising our contingency plans to achieve rapid decisive maneuver and simultaneous engagement throughout the battlespace. These initiatives increase our ability to defeat the North Korean threat and to transform the command.

Transformation of the Command

We must prepare today to shape the uncertain future in Northeast Asia. My transformation vision is the core of an enhanced Alliance and ensures our ability to provide security throughout the region. As we conduct the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative with the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense, we will closely examine how to make the command structure more efficient, modernize our capabilities, and develop a future regionally capable combined force that can protect Korea and conduct regional security missions. This vision is achievable in the near to mid-term and we're on the right path to making it reality.

The Land Partnership Program, ratified by the Republic of Korea's National Assembly in November 2002, is a great foundation for transformation. LPP is a plan that returns 50% of United States Forces Korea installations to the Republic of Korea government and consolidates United States Forces Korea into 23 centralized installations. What's most important about Land Partnership Plan is its flexibility to accommodate future changes in force structure, command arrangements, and basing. In addition to the Land Partnership Program, we are conducting a combined Republic of Korea-United States Initial Master Plan to reduce United States presence in Seoul. This study will identify the needed facilities and a less intrusive location for our units currently stationed in Seoul.

Make Korea "The Assignment of Choice"

Today, Korea remains the least desirable assignment for all services, largely because of family separation, poor living and working conditions, and financial hardship. Improving housing

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

conditions, re-capitalizing the infrastructure, and correcting the pay disparity will create an “irreversible momentum” in making Korea an assignment of choice.

To reduce family separation in Korea, I want to provide command-sponsored housing for at least 25 percent of our married military members and their families by 2010. We currently provide government owned and leased housing for less than 10 percent of our married service members, far less than the 70 percent in Europe and Japan. We plan to station the vast majority of our families south of the greater Seoul metropolitan area. To accomplish these goals, we must increase our housing and support leasing authorities to 15 years. This will make the programs attractive to South Korean construction companies and create a “build-to-lease” market in the Republic of Korea. With stable Military Construction funding levels, increased leasing authority, and Host Nation Funded Construction under the Land Partnership Program, we can afford this initiative to improve living and working conditions in the Republic of Korea.

With your support, we are continuing to improve accompanied housing with phased renovation of family housing units. In Fiscal Year 2004, we will start the second phase of a three-phased housing project that will add housing for 111 more families at Osan air base. We began these efforts two years ago and we continue to make progress on this important initiative.

Even with your great support to housing last year (\$185.3 million), over 40% of our unaccompanied service members live in inadequate quarters; many in buildings erected shortly after the end of the Korean War. Because of overcrowding and sub-standard facilities, many unaccompanied personnel must live in dense urban areas outside our installations, creating force protection concerns and requiring our service men and women to pay high out-of-pocket living expenses. We have a plan to provide unaccompanied enlisted service members with quality housing by 2008, as mandated by the Department of Defense. The Air Force Dormitory Master Plan and Army Barracks Upgrade and Buyout Plan allow us to use funds where they are most needed for renovation and new construction. The Fiscal Year 2004 Military Construction

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

program requests three Army dormitory complexes and another Air Force dormitory that will significantly reduce housing deficiencies. Your continued commitment to stable Military Construction will have a major impact on correcting the housing shortage our service men and women endure in Korea.

Deteriorating work facilities impair readiness, reduce the efficiency of uniformed and civilian workers, and lower retention rates of highly qualified and otherwise motivated people. Our facilities and infrastructure are old—over one third of all buildings in the command are between 25 and 50 years old, and one third are classified as temporary buildings. We are working hard to maintain existing permanent facilities through an aggressive Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance program funded with Operations and Maintenance accounts.

Environmental stewardship is important to me personally and to the command. Our most immediate environmental concern is the command's aging fuel tanks. We are continuing to work through challenges with environmental protection and mitigation programs. Although there have been improvements in the last two years, more needs to be done with environmental project funding in 2004. Environmental requirements have been integrated into military construction and Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance funding. These resources will be wisely invested in our enduring installations under the Land Partnership Plan.

The final element of making Korea an assignment of choice lies in correcting the pay disparity between serving in Korea and equally harsh shorter tours in southwest Asia and the Balkans. Our service members are motivated by more than money; however, financial hardship and low morale are clearly linked. An Army Sergeant serving a six-month tour in Bosnia receives \$500 more per month than one of his or her peers serving a 12-month unaccompanied tour in Korea. Additionally, our men and women pay significant out of pocket costs to maintain a second household in Korea, where cost of living expenses exceed those in San Francisco and Frankfurt, without the benefit of a cost of living allowance. We are participating in a Department

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of Defense study to explore possible solutions such as separate rations, additional hardship duty pay, a cost of living allowance, and distributed incentive pay. We are also exploring other initiatives to reduce financial inequities, such as expanding the Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Plan, implementing Assignment Pay Initiative, and implementing partial Basic Allowance for Housing to compensate for sub standard housing, but we need your support to make these initiatives a reality for our service men and women.

In conclusion, I'd like to leave you with these thoughts:

Northeast Asia is a key region for the United States and our partners. We must maintain our presence in the region to demonstrate our commitment to ensure peace and security in the region. Congressional support is vital to our future in Korea and Northeast Asia. We thank you for all that you've done.

Events in Korea affect the entire world. North Korea's aggressive posture and continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction pose serious danger to the peace, security, and prosperity of the peninsula and the region. It has substantial military capability and is selling high technology missiles to the highest bidder. North Korea continues to violate its agreements and extort aid from the international community. North Korea's renewed efforts to develop nuclear weapons pose a formidable threat to the world. North Korea is a threat to Northeast Asia and all peace-loving nations. It is a threat that requires a strong Republic of Korea Alliance, a robust forward United States military presence, and an active international domestic effort.

The Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has weathered challenges for over 50 years, and this partnership will continue to endure. Now is the time to transform this alliance to meet the changing conditions in the region. We need your support to implement our transformation vision.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

You can be justifiably proud of all the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians in Korea that serve the American people. Their daily dedication and performance reflect the trust and support that you've placed in them.