

THE FUTURE OF NATO

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2002

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Joseph R. Biden (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, Lugar, Hagel, Gordon Smith, Allen, Brownback and Enzi.

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you to the hearing. I do not know what Bertie told you, but I would listen to him, because he controls the place.

All kidding aside, the hearing will come to order.

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Foreign Relations Committee for what I believe to be is an important hearing. This morning, we are going to examine the future of an institution that understandably has taken a back seat in capturing our attention in the last several months.

But no one should doubt that NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, remains absolutely critical to the security of the United States, in my opinion.

For more than half a century, NATO has been the cornerstone of our strategic defense. It is our most important tangible link to Europe. It demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United States, and the continuing commitment of the United States to being a European power.

Despite September 11 and all that it implies about a new security environment, I would submit that the circumstances I just mentioned have not changed.

Without a stable Europe, we cannot hope to carry out our ambitious goals elsewhere in the world. And without the active cooperation of vibrant, loyal European partners, we cannot succeed in our multifaceted war on terrorism. Nonetheless, the war on terrorism does require a reexamination of our rationale for NATO and how it should adapt to meeting these new challenges.

This is a particularly opportune moment to conduct a reexamination. In little more than 6 months, the Alliance will hold a momentous summit in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic. And the Prague summit will deal with three interrelated issues.

The first is the fundamental questions of NATO's scope and purpose. Second is the new relationship between NATO and Russia. And third is the next round of NATO enlargement.

It is no secret that many of our European allies have begun to question the depth of America's commitment to NATO. On the day after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Alliance for the first time in its 52-year history invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. I know the witnesses know this language well, but we the public hears us talk about the invocation of Article 5 and how momentous that was, and how significant it was, but I want to read the language: "The Parties agree," I am quoting, "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

As I said that day on the floor of the U.S. Senate, invoking Article 5 was a big deal, a very big deal. It was the ultimate gesture of solidarity with us by our European and Canadian allies.

And how did we react? I would submit that is a matter of debate as to whether we reacted in the way that was appropriate.

It is true that European NATO allies have piloted AWACS planes flying along the east coast of the United States in order to free up American crews for combat in Afghanistan. It is also true that special forces units of the United Kingdom and other allies alongside American forces have recently engaged units of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Some allied aircraft have flown close air support for U.S. troops.

But all in all, and one must raise the question, our NATO allies have until now played a peripheral role in the Afghan campaign. Maybe the Pentagon was correct in its apparent judgment that the war would go smoother if prosecuted in this manner because of the well-known capabilities gap between our allies and ourselves.

Whatever the accuracy of that assessment, NATO allies inevitably in my view, have concluded, A, that the United States demonstrated unmistakable, overwhelming domination of the war in Afghanistan; B, we have conveyed a strong impression that in future conflicts the United States will do the war fighting; and C, given our war-fighting capability, we choose to leave the other participants to start the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan; and, D, the Europeans will be expected to clean up after the parade.

My trip to Afghanistan in January convinced me that we must become actively involved in the International Security Afghan Force [ISAF]. The International Security Afghan Force, in order to bring security and stability to all parts of that country as quickly as possible, in my view, has to be enlarged.

Our allies have already stepped up to the plate, two of them in leadership roles. The U.K. currently leads ISAF; and Turkey has agreed to take over the command for 6 months beginning later this spring.

Does their example argue for NATO, through peacekeeping, to be the key player in strategically important countries outside of Europe? With regard to the capabilities gap, should NATO put to-

gether a quick start capabilities package, as suggested by former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Frank Kramer?

Such an effort would enhance Alliance interoperability and enable European NATO expeditionary forces rapidly to become operational.

The complexity of the Afghan situation raises questions. How extensively outside the North Atlantic area should NATO be involved? Before answering that question, we must look at the new challenges to our security. How much relative weight should NATO give to missions that until now have been peripheral? For example, what institutional role might NATO have in the struggles against terrorism, international crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

More fundamentally, what if there is no common threat perception within the Alliance? Most obviously, there is no unanimity about Saddam Hussein and whether or not he constitutes a clear and present danger to the United States and Europe. In that case, does NATO defer to a "new coalition of the willing," led by the United States? Is that the likely model for future campaigns outside of Europe?

Our witnesses today will have no shortage of "big picture" topics to discuss.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased that President Bush is carrying on important work begun by the last administration of bringing new members into NATO and reaching out to Russia. September 11 has created historic opportunities to continue the process of reconciliation with Russia. And if we get it right, we can reverse the titanic rivalry that dominated the second half of the 20th century.

President Putin, as I have said on numerous occasions, has cast his country's lot with the West with a determination not seen since Peter the Great. We should assist him in every way consistent with our national security interests.

Domestically, that means helping democratic civil society in Russia flourish. It means helping genuine rule of law take root. It means cementing rights for all segments of society, including safeguarding of the rights of religious groups.

We must also broaden our security cooperation with Russia. At the Reykjavik NATO Ministerial meeting later this month, a new NATO-Russian Council will be launched.

I would be very interested in hearing from our two distinguished administration witnesses exactly how that body will be structured and what issues it will have within its purview.

My own feeling is that, at the outset, the council should emphasize areas where there is already a meeting of the minds between NATO and Russia. The struggle against international terrorism is the most obvious example.

I would prefer to see the council not include peacekeeping operations in its initial catalog of responsibilities, since Russia was relatively actively opposed to NATO's last two peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, before eventually deciding to join them.

Despite the considerable suspicion and mistrust to overcome, I am optimistic that the new relationship between NATO and Russia can be mutually beneficial.

And I will ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement be put in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

“THE FUTURE OF NATO: PREPARING FOR THE PRAGUE SUMMIT”

It’s a pleasure to welcome you to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for what I believe is a very important hearing.

This morning we will examine the future of an institution that understandably has taken a back-seat in capturing our attention for the last several months. But no one should doubt that NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—remains absolutely critical to the security of the United States.

For more than a half-century, NATO has been the cornerstone of our strategic defense. It is our most important tangible link to Europe. And it demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United States to being a European power.

Despite September 11th and all that it implies about a new security environment, I would submit that the circumstances I just mentioned have not changed.

Without a stable Europe, we cannot hope to carry out our ambitious goals elsewhere in the world.

Without the active cooperation of vibrant, loyal European partners, we cannot succeed in our multi-faceted war on terrorism.

Nonetheless, the war on terrorism does require a re-examination of the rationale for NATO—and how it should adapt to meet new challenges.

This is a particularly opportune moment to conduct a re-examination. In little more than six months, the Alliance will hold a momentous summit in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic.

The Prague summit will deal with three great inter-related issues.

The first is the fundamental question of NATO’s scope and purpose.

Second is the new relationship between NATO and Russia.

And, third, is the next round of NATO enlargement.

It’s no secret that many of our European allies have begun to question the depth of America’s commitment to NATO.

On the day after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Alliance, for the first time in its then 52 year history invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 whereby:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them. . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area . . .

As I said that day on the floor of the United States Senate, the invoking of Article 5 was a big deal—a very big deal. It was the ultimate gesture of solidarity with us by our European and Canadian allies.

How did we react? I would submit that it’s a matter of debate as to whether we reacted in a way that was appropriate.

It is true that European NATO allies have piloted AWACS planes flying along the East Coast of the United States in order to free up American crews for combat in Afghanistan.

It is also true that Special Forces units of the United Kingdom and other allies, alongside American forces, have recently engaged units of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Some allied aircraft have flown close air support for U.S. troops.

But, all in all, one must come to the conclusion that our NATO allies have until now played a peripheral role in the Afghan campaign. Maybe the Pentagon was correct in its apparent judgment that the war would go smoother if prosecuted in this manner because of the well-known “capabilities gap” between our allies and ourselves.

Whatever the accuracy of that assessment, NATO allies inevitably have concluded that:

(a) The United States demonstrated unmistakable, overwhelming domination of the Afghan war.

(b) We have conveyed the strong impression that in future conflicts the United States will do the war fighting.

(c) Given our war-fighting capability, we choose to leave to others participation in the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

(d) The Europeans will be expected to clean up after the parade.

My trip to Afghanistan in January convinced me that we must become actively involved in ISAF—the International Security Assistance Force—in order to bring security and stability to all parts of the country as quickly as possible.

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Does their example argue for NATO, through peacekeeping, to be a key player in strategically important countries outside of Europe?

With regard to the “capabilities gap,” should NATO put together a “quick-start” capabilities package, as suggested by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Kramer?

Such an effort would enhance Alliance inter-operability and enable a European NATO Expeditionary Force rapidly to become operational.

The complexity of the Afghan situation raises the question of how extensively outside of the North Atlantic area NATO should be involved.

Before answering, we must look at the new challenges to our security. How much relative weight should NATO give to missions that, until now, have been peripheral? For example, what institutional role might NATO have in the struggles against terrorism, international crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

More fundamentally, what if there is no common threat perception within the Alliance? Most obviously, there’s no unanimity about whether Saddam Hussein constitutes a clear and present danger to the United States and Europe.

In that case, does NATO defer to a new “coalition of the willing” led by the U.S.? Is that the likely model for future campaigns outside of Europe?

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We should assist him in every way consistent with our own security interests.

Domestically, that means helping a democratic civil society flourish in Russia. It means helping genuine rule of law take root. It means cementing rights for all segments of society, including safeguarding the rights of all religious groups.

We must also broaden our security cooperation with Russia. At the Reykjavik NATO Ministerial meetings later this month, a new NATO-Russia Council will be launched.

I would be very interested in hearing from our two distinguished administration witnesses how that body will be structured and what issues it will have in its purview.

My own feeling is that, at the outset, the Council should emphasize areas where there is already a meeting of the minds between NATO and Russia. The struggle against international terrorism is the most obvious example.

I would prefer to see the Council not include peacekeeping operations in its initial catalogue of responsibilities, since Russia actively opposed NATO’s last two peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, before eventually deciding to join.

Despite the considerable suspicion and mistrust to overcome, I am optimistic that the new relationship between NATO and Russia can be mutually beneficial.

The third major issue for Prague is NATO enlargement.

Four years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for the Resolution of Ratification that gave Senate approval to the accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Since then, all three countries have proven themselves to be dependable allies.

The most persuasive argument for NATO enlargement remains as valid today as it was in 1998: extending the zone of stability eastward in Europe. Through the

well-conceived program of Membership Action Plans, many more aspirant countries are on the brink of being invited to join the Alliance.

By this summer it will be time to “name names”—to openly declare exactly which countries should be invited.

On many occasions I have said that Slovenia has been ready for several years. Recently the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made great strides toward qualifying. Slovakia has made similar progress, and if it elects a democratic government in October, it should be a strong candidate.

In the last few months, support for a so-called “Southern Dimension” has been gaining momentum.

Both Romania and Bulgaria are working hard to meet the NATO norms. Their case is strengthened both by their strategic geographic location, and by their exemplary support for the anti-terrorism campaign since September 11.

Aside from meeting the military criteria, all the aspirant countries must demonstrate to NATO that they truly are members of an Alliance of shared democratic values. In particular, ugly remnants of war-time fascism must be totally—and permanently—suppressed.

Whatever the final number of invited countries, the process of NATO enlargement will continue to strengthen the Alliance and to move the Continent toward the goal of a “Europe whole and free.”

Ladies and gentlemen, to discuss these and other issues this morning we have a truly outstanding group of witnesses.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman is a long-time friend. I didn’t say “old friend” because Marc certainly doesn’t fit that description. He is the State Department’s *Wunderkind*.

He served as our Ambassador to Turkey shortly after leaving high school—and that’s only a slight exaggeration. He now occupies the senior career post in the Department.

Doug Feith is Under Secretary for Policy at the Department of Defense. He came to the Pentagon from a distinguished career in the private sector and has already made his mark as a keen analyst and effective spokesman for the Department.

General Wes Clark, of course, capped a long, star-studded career in the U.S. Army as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, where he successfully prosecuted the Yugoslav air war. Most recently he has become a best-selling author. I have long turned to him for incisive advice, and he has never disappointed me.

Lieutenant General Bill Odom also served in the U.S. Army with great distinction. An internationally recognized strategist, he did a tour as Director of the National Security Agency. He is now affiliated with Yale University and the Hudson Institute.

Gentlemen, we are grateful to all of you for agreeing to appear before this committee.

[The following statement was submitted by Senator Feingold for inclusion the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. I think we are all eager to consider how to move forward at this crucial moment in building stronger, larger and ultimately more effective structures within NATO. And I am particularly grateful for this opportunity to consider specific issues related to the next round of NATO expansion, along with the establishment of a dynamic new NATO-Russia partnership.

As we begin the first of many such dialogues on these topics, I think we must first pause to consider the larger policy objectives that should guide future efforts to transform what is clearly the most crucial of our security alliances. We must ask how robust of an expansion we can support, while simultaneously maintaining military preparedness, preserving the close security relationships of existing member states, and securing a long-term but cost-effective investment in our own national defense.

Many of the candidate states have made exceptional progress in meeting the required standards for future NATO membership. I wish to congratulate all of the candidates on their progress. But now we must ask careful questions about how far each state has come in meeting those obligations. We must also consider the additional regional security advantages and potential economies of scale that could be gained by inviting a larger slate of candidates to join the alliance at the same time.

This is a security alliance, and our own national security interests must guide these decisions. But at the same time we must give careful consideration to the like-

ly effect of NATO membership within each candidate state, as our long-term objective must be to create secure democratic allies with effective military capacities that are willing to participate actively in the alliance. Some states could benefit tremendously from early membership, even if their membership could be premature by certain development standards. Other states could also find it difficult and ultimately unproductive to struggle to meet difficult membership standards prematurely. These will be difficult decisions that must be made on a case-by-case basis. I look forward to beginning these considerations here today.

[The following statement was submitted by Senator Helms for inclusion the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this significant hearing today. You did so at my request and I am grateful to you for doing so. During the previous debate over enlargement of the NATO Alliance, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a total of nine hearings on the issue of NATO enlargement. I am pleased that we are starting the process again today for what I expect will be a robust enlargement of our Alliance at the Prague summit in November.

In January of 2001 in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, I said, "perhaps the greatest moral challenge we face at the dawn of a new century is to right the wrongs perpetrated in the last century at Yalta, when the West abandoned the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to Stalin and a life of servitude behind the Iron Curtain."

When the Senate voted to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO in 1998 we began the process of righting that wrong. Senate ratification of the protocols to enlarge NATO and ensure that the new members would secure their rightful place in the community of Western democracies was one of my proudest achievements as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

However, the first round of NATO enlargement into the new democracies of Central Europe did not fully erase the scars of Yalta. During the cold war, many of us in the Senate fought to defend the independence of what came to be known as the "captive nations"—the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This second and historic enlargement of the NATO Alliance into Eastern and Central Europe will, I hope, bring the Baltic nations squarely into the transatlantic alliance.

Last June in a stirring speech in Warsaw, President Bush said that there would be "no more Yaltas" and committed "NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility." Senate bill 1572, The Freedom Consolidation Act, which I introduced with Senator Lieberman and numerous other cosponsors, endorses the President's vision. I hope that it will be enacted before he travels to Europe later this month.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DICK LUGAR

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND NATO'S FUTURE

Mr. Chairman, you are to be commended for calling this hearing and for assembling two panels of very fine witnesses.

Government deliberations as well as public debate are beginning to heat up on the NATO issue as Alliance members contemplate the run-up to the NATO summit in Prague this November.

When I refer to the NATO issue, I refer not only to the enlargement question or to the efforts to establish a new Russia-NATO relationship. I also refer to the question of NATO's purpose, of its transformation and its ability and willingness to adapt its roles, its missions and its capabilities to the post-September 11 world and to the war on terrorism in particular.

I would suggest for purposes of our hearing today that, on some NATO-related issues, there is considerable common ground in Congress, within the administration, and with Allies. But there also remain some rather weighty issues concerning the Alliance on which efforts at consensus remain difficult.

NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia

I sense that there is a common view on two key issues. First, there is general agreement that NATO enlargement should continue, that we should think about an ambitious round for Prague, and that the war on terrorism makes it all the more important to accelerate the task of consolidation democracy and security in Central

and Eastern Europe. The recent V-10 Bucharest summit has given added impetus to the prospect of including Bulgaria and Romania as possible candidates at Prague as part of a new “southern dimension.” Thus, we are now considering a second round of candidates that could include seven countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Second, there would appear to be something of a common view that the United States and NATO are also moving forward constructively on the NATO-Russia track. Reassurances provided by administration officials have answered many of the concerns that had been raised about the new NATO-Russia Council. While we await the outcome of the Ministerial in Iceland later this month, I believe it is fair to say that the administration’s approach has been a constructive one that is consistent with the provisions of the Senate resolution of ratification regarding the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

NATO’s Purpose, NATO’s Future

The third issue where there is less agreement and where the thinking of the administration as well as Alliance officials is also less developed, has to do with NATO’s future missions and capabilities. What do we want NATO to do in the future? I believe that this issue will and should be a central issue at the Prague summit.

The ongoing pace of military operations in Afghanistan and the escalating violence in the Middle East serve to underscore the simple fact that the greatest security challenges of our day no longer lie within Europe but outside of it. As a result, the trans-Atlantic relationship faces a paradox. We have the most successful Alliance ever created but it is or seems to be marginal or even irrelevant when it comes to dealing with the most urgent issues of the day.

And the fact that NATO—ostensibly America’s premiere alliance and the linchpin of the trans-Atlantic relationship—appears to be completely absent in our strategy on these critical issues raises important questions about this institution’s future centrality and vitality.

It also seems to me that the issue for NATO is also pretty simple if far-reaching: Should NATO remain focused on managing security in an already fairly stable European Continent? Or should it now seek to expand its missions beyond Europe in order to deal with the new threats? And should this issue be part of the agenda for the Prague summit in November of this year?

Addressing this challenge is the strategic issue of our time. It is as daunting as dealing with the USSR was in its day. September 11 can and, in my view, should lead to a renaissance of trans-Atlantic cooperation around this new agenda. If it does not, if NATO remains focused on Europe, the Alliance will be reduced to what might be called the “housekeeping” function of managing security on an already stable continent. It will cease to be America’s premier alliance for the simple reason that it will not be addressing the major security issue of our time. And if we stop investing in it, we can hardly expect the European allies to invest in it either.

On a more basic level, we must address a strategic disconnect. We have the most developed Alliance to deal with those strategic issues that are largely resolved and receding in importance and urgency, yet no alliance to deal with the most important and more deadly and immediate threats to our nations. That is hardly a recipe for a sound strategy or a healthy alliance!

The problem we face in NATO today is not just one of capabilities but of purpose. The two are inextricably linked. One cannot be solved without addressing the other. And our answer cannot be limited to the technocratic issue of devising a more effective successor to the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). A DCI-2 that focuses on specialization and special forces might be helpful but it no substitute for a common strategy that addresses the key strategic challenge for our time and harnesses U.S. and European will and purpose. Formulation of and fidelity to that common purpose is a fundamental prerequisite for generating the resources to create new capabilities, not the other way around.

The issue of what NATO is for, its basic purpose, is already part of the public debate. It will inevitably be an issue for the Prague summit—especially if events in the Middle East or Iraq make it a central issue in European-American relations this fall. Thus, the question is whether the United States will lead in embracing this kind of reform agenda or not. If U.S. policy wants to produce a strategic shift of this magnitude, then, in my view, there will never be a better opportunity for the Bush administration to initiate that process than the Prague summit.

I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith, on the administration’s efforts in these important areas. Our second panel is also very qualified to speak on these subjects, General Wes Clark, has led the Alliance in combat and

General Odom has been a longtime commentator and student of NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I look forward to our witnesses testimony.

[The following statement was submitted by Senator Enzi for inclusion the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MICHAEL B. ENZI

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing to look at the future of NATO. As we all know, NATO, as an organization, has been one of the strongest supporters of the United States following the attacks of September 11. The historical landmark of having NATO invoke Article 5 of the mutual defense policy was a good example of how NATO is supposed to work. The support from those nations currently being considered for NATO membership also showed how effective this alliance is and can continue to be. The aspiring nations, along with our NATO allies, provided the United States with permission to use their air space and many have sent their own troops to Afghanistan. We have also seen many of these countries take immediate action to address terrorism and the financing of terrorism within their own borders. As the United States continues to fight terrorism internationally, I believe we can be proud that so many nations stand with us.

I am pleased that the Bush administration has endorsed robust enlargement of the NATO Alliance. I personally have had the opportunity to meet with representatives of many of the aspiring countries. In these meetings, I have seen evidence of progress and strong desires to continue to have improved economies and stable governments. So much progress has been made in each of the countries over the last 10 years that each nation should be commended. As the President has stated repeatedly about the Prague summit in November, "We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom." I believe the President is correct. NATO is a defense alliance of nations who want to protect the freedom of their people and the freedom of their allies. The summit in Prague is an opportunity not just for aspiring countries to join the alliance, but for the world to see the continued advancement of freedom and democracy.

I believe NATO enlargement should continue to be a focus and a priority of the United States. I was pleased when Senator Helms led the effort in the Senate on the Freedom Consolidation Act and that this committee approved the Act last year. The Freedom Consolidation Act is an important statement that the Congress of the United States supports the President and supports NATO enlargement. The Act includes statements from both President Bush and President Clinton and has strong support from both parties. I hope the Senate will be able to take up this Act for consideration as soon as possible.

In this hearing we are not only examining NATO enlargement, but more generally, the future of the Alliance. One area where we can see the future of NATO changing almost immediately is in the relationship between Russia and NATO. While there will be many issues that the new NATO-Russia Council will not be able to address or reach consensus on, the Council can provide a good forum for an improved NATO-Russia dialog. I believe one of the most important ways to improve relations with Russia, on any issue, is through communication. The Council has great possibilities and should go forward with support from the United States. Critics must be assured that the Council does not give Russia a "back door" into NATO. The Council gives both NATO and Russia the opportunity to take actions together but does not threaten the Alliance. I believe the Council is a constructive tool that can improve international security.

As we look at improving the relationship between the Alliance and Russia, I believe it is important to see other areas in need of improvement. NATO has been criticized for taking actions that go beyond the original mandate. This is simply not true. NATO continues to be a strong alliance with an important mandate of providing defense and security for its members. We saw the evidence that this remains true after September 11. The organization of NATO, however, should be examined by its members to determine how it can be made better. Improvement can and should be made in how the organization operates. I believe it is our responsibility to ask the questions: Is NATO operating efficiently, is NATO responding timely and appropriately to international crisis, and what can be done to improve NATO operations? These questions must be addressed by the United States and our delegates should have proposals to take to the organization.

Mr. Chairman, I am impressed with the witnesses prepared to testify before this committee. Experience is a learning tool that cannot be reproduced, but it can be shared. Today's witnesses have the experience and knowledge that will make this

hearing a productive discussion on NATO's future. I look forward to hearing the testimony of both panels. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. And by way of closing, I am suggesting that of the two witnesses whom I will introduce later, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman is a long-time friend. I did not say "old friend," because Marc certainly does not fit that description.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Marc served as Ambassador to Turkey shortly after leaving high school. That is only a slight exaggeration. He now occupies a senior career post in the Department.

And Doug Feith is Under Secretary for Policy at the Department of Defense. He came to the Pentagon from a distinguished career in the private sector and has already made his mark as a keen analyst and effective spokesman for the Department.

We are also going to hear from others; I will introduce them later. Well, I might as well do it now, so I do not have to do it later. General Wes Clark, of course, capped a long, star-studded career in the U.S. Army by serving as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, where he successfully prosecuted the Yugoslav air war. Most recently, he has become a best-selling author. And I have long turned to him for advice, as have many of us up here on this panel. And he has never disappointed me, or I suspect, anyone on the panel.

Lieutenant General Bill Odom also served in the U.S. Army with great distinction. An internationally recognized strategist, he did a tour as Director of the National Security Agency, and he is now affiliated with Yale University and the Hudson Institute.

We have a very, very distinguished group of Americans before us today and I am anxious to, after I turn to my friend from Indiana, to get to hear what they have to say and be able to question them.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing, for assembling two panels of excellent witnesses.

Government deliberations, as well as public debate, are beginning to focus on the NATO issue, as Alliance members contemplate the runup to the NATO summit in Prague this November.

When I refer to the NATO issue, I refer not only to the enlargement question, or to the efforts to establish a new Russian-NATO relationship, I also refer to the question of NATO's purpose, of its transformation, its ability and willingness to adopt its roles, its mission, its capabilities to the post-September 11 world and to the war on terrorism in particular.

I would suggest for purposes of our hearing today that on some NATO-related issues there is considerable common ground in Congress, within the administration and with our allies. But there also remains some weighty issues concerning the Alliance, on which efforts at consensus remain difficult.

I sense there is a common view on two key issues. First there is general agreement that NATO enlargement should continue, that we should think about an ambitious round for Prague and that the war on terrorism makes it all the more important to accel-

erate the task of consolidating democracy and security in Central and Eastern Europe.

The recent V-10 Bucharest summit has given added impetus to the prospect of including Bulgaria and Romania as possible candidates at Prague, as part of a new southern dimension. Thus we are now considering a second round of candidates that include seven countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.

Second, there would appear to be a common view that the United States and NATO are moving forward constructively on the NATO-Russia track. Reassurances provided by administration officials have answered many of the concerns that have been raised about the new NATO-Russia Council.

While we await the outcome of the Ministerial in Iceland later this month, I believe that the administration's approach has been a constructive one that is consistent with the provisions of the Senate resolutions of ratification regarding NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council.

The third issue, where there is less agreement and where the thinking of the administration as well as Alliance officials, is also less developed, has to do with NATO's future missions and capabilities. What do we want NATO to do in the future?

I believe that this issue will and should be a central issue at the Prague summit. The ongoing pace of military operations in Afghanistan, the escalating violence in the Middle East serve to underscore the simple fact that the greatest security challenges of our day no longer lie within Europe, but outside of it.

As a result, the transatlantic relationship faces a paradox. We have the most successful Alliance ever created, but it is or seems to be marginal or even irrelevant when it comes to dealing with the most urgent issues of the day.

And the fact that NATO, ostensibly America's premiere alliance and the linchpin of the transatlantic relationship, sometimes appears to be absent in our strategy on these critical issues raises important questions about NATO's future centrality and vitality.

It also seems to me that the issue for NATO is also simple if far-reaching. Should NATO remain focused on managing security in an already fairly stable European continent, or should it now seek to expand its mission beyond Europe in order to deal with the new threats? And should this issue be a part of the agenda for the Prague summit in November of this year?

Addressing this challenge is the strategic issue of our time. It is as daunting as dealing with the USSR was in its day.

September 11 can and, in my view, should lead to a renaissance of transatlantic cooperation around this new agenda. If it does not, if NATO remains focused on Europe, the Alliance will be reduced to what might be called the housekeeping function of managing security in an already stable continent. And it will cease to be America's premiere alliance for the simple reason that it will not be addressing the major security issues of our time. And if we stop investing in it, we can hardly expect European allies to invest in it either.

On a more basic level, we must address strategic disconnect. We have the most developed alliance to deal with those strategic issues

that are largely resolved and receding in importance and urgency, yet no alliance to deal with the most important and more deadly and immediate threats to our nations, United States and European.

That is hardly a recipe for a sound strategy or a healthy alliance. The problem we face in NATO today is not just one of capabilities, but of purpose. The two are inextricably linked, and one cannot be solved without addressing the other.

And our answer cannot be limited to the technocratic issue of devising a more effective successor to the Defense Capabilities Initiative, the DCI. A DCI-2, that focuses on specialization and special forces might be helpful, but is no substitute for a common strategy that addresses the key strategic challenge for our time and harnesses U.S. and European will and purpose. Formulation of and fidelity to that common purpose is a fundamental prerequisite for generating the resources to create new capabilities and not the other way around.

The issue of what NATO is for, its basic purpose, is already part of the public debate, and it will be an issue for the Prague summit, especially if events in the Middle East or Iraq make it a central issue in the European-American relations this fall. Thus the question is whether the United States will lead in embracing this kind of reform agenda or not. If U.S. policy wants to produce a strategic shift of this magnitude, then in my view, there will never be a better opportunity for the Bush administration to initiate that process than the Prague summit.

I will look forward to hearing from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, on the administration's efforts in these important areas.

Our second panel is exceptionally well qualified to speak on these subjects. General Wes Clark has led the Alliance in combat, and General Bill Odom has been a long-time commentator and student of NATO and the transatlantic relationship.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Under Secretary Grossman.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. First of all, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, other members of the committee. I thank you very much for this opportunity to testify today. It is always an honor and a privilege to be here.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit a longer statement for the record, and if you might just allow me to make—

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the whole statement will be placed in the record.

Mr. GROSSMAN. If you would allow me to make some comments, I would very much appreciate it to start this conversation.

First of all, before I do anything else, let me thank you and all of the members of the committee and, indeed, Members of the Senate for all the consultation and the time and the effort that you have taken with us, not just over the past few months, but over the past few years as we try to get NATO right.

Those are in formal sessions and informal sessions and we have always very much benefited from your advice and from your wisdom. And we know that as we go forward, especially on the issues of capabilities and relationships and this relationship with Russia, we will need to be in the closest possible consultation with the Senate. And we very much look forward to that.

Mr. Chairman, as you both said, the conversation about NATO and "What is NATO's purpose? What is NATO all about? Is NATO relevant to the future?" is now on—in our publics, in our parliaments and in our administration. And I have got to say I welcome this debate. This is not something that I shrink from at all. And I do not think the administration shrinks from it at all, because we ought to be talking about the future of NATO, and we ought to be considering new relationships and new partners and new members for NATO. And that seems to me what democratically supported foreign and defense policy is all about.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, and also Senator Lugar, the attacks on the 11th of September and NATO's response, which as Senator Biden said was a big deal, proved to me that NATO's continuing value in the world, in this world of new and unpredictable threats, to me, as to Senator Biden, invoking Article 5 for the very first time in NATO's history sent a clear message that this is an Alliance that is united and is very much determined.

We very much, all of us, ought to very much welcome NATO's collective response as well as the contributions of individual allies. From our perspective, these 50 years of people working together in NATO made it possible for allied forces to work together in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Take first the collective response. As Senator Biden noted, NATO AWACS have logged over 3,000 hours patrolling American skies. NATO standing naval forces are working with U.S. naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

All of the NATO allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refueling assistance, and stepped up intelligence efforts. Sixteen of the 19 allies are supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle with military forces and with military capabilities. Fourteen of our 19 allies have deployed forces in the region, and 9 are actually participating in combat operations in Afghanistan.

So we believe that what the NATO allies have done is made a significant contribution both collectively and individually to Operation Enduring Freedom.

As Senator Biden pointed out, almost all of our allies are also involved in the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Current allies, aspiring allies are all there to be part of the effort to bring Afghanistan into the modern world. NATO, to me, still matters.

Senator Lugar talked a little bit about the question of the vision of NATO. Where do we want to take this Alliance? I think when

President Bush and his counterparts meet in Prague later this year, their gathering will symbolize the changes that have taken place in Europe and NATO's central role in making these changes possible.

Think about Prague: Prague, a city that was once behind the Iron Curtain; Prague, a city that was once synonymous in a famous spring in 1968 with the rebellion against the system that we defeated. And in 1991, Prague was the city in which the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. So it seems, to me anyway, that it is a perfect place to think about the future of this Alliance.

NATO remains a fundamental pillar of our foreign and defense policy. As President Bush said last month when NATO Secretary General Robertson was here, "NATO remains an anchor of security for both Europe and the United States."

As you both know, Senators, I have just returned from a meeting with all of our NATO allies in Brussels and then I went on to 8 individual allies to consult on our agenda for Prague, our vision of the future. And we proposed that Prague be defined by three themes: First, new capabilities; second, new members; and third, new relationships.

And Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would just like to say a word about each of these categories.

First, September 11 brought home to every single person in this room and certainly in the United States, and I believe to each one of our allies, how dangerous our world still is, as you both noted.

Czech President Havel, who will host the Prague summit, observed that September 11, and these are his words, "alerted us to the evil existing in this world."

September 11 also demonstrated how important it is that we have allies if we are to defend our way of life and if we are to defend our democracy.

So to me, NATO is no less important to our security today. Indeed, it is possible that NATO is more important to our security today. And so as I report to you, our agenda for Prague has three parts. First, ensuring that NATO has the capabilities needed to meet emerging new threats; second, to extend NATO membership to more new European democracies; and third, to renew NATO's partnerships and relationships with Russia and the Ukraine and other partners. It is new capabilities, new members, and new relationships.

It seems, to me anyway, that these three themes are very much rooted in NATO's values and goals as set out in the 1949 treaty. The chairman read from that treaty.

I also took a look, since we are 53 years almost exactly from the treaty being signed, at what President Truman had to say on April 4, 1949 about this NATO treaty. And I think it goes very much along with what the chairman said.

This is what Truman said in announcing this treaty, "It is altogether appropriate that nations so deeply conscious of their common interests should join in expressing their determination to preserve their present peaceful situation and protect it in the future. And with our common traditions, we face common problems."

He did not talk about one problem. He did not talk about one geography. He did not talk about one set of issues. But in Truman's

speech, he talked about the need to defend common values, common traditions and our common security.

Since the end of the cold war, Mr. Chairman, the Alliance has taken steps to revise its doctrine and improve its command and force structures to meet today's threats. The 1999 strategic concept, which all of us worked so hard on, defined those new threats explicitly, noting that the new risk to the Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming clearer: oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism.

I think it is clear that while we have recognized these new threats, there has to be lots more done at NATO to meet them. In order to defend ourselves against these new threats, NATO needs to be able to deploy at short notice flexible, well armed forces capable of conducting sustained military operations across a range of options.

And while the United States now possesses these kinds of forces, in large measure our European allies do not. And I believe that this growing capabilities gap between Europe and the United States is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO. It must be addressed.

And I would say to Senator Lugar that I think there is consensus on this; there is consensus that Europeans need to do more to close this capabilities gap. In order to fight effectively alongside the United States, our European allies need more flexible, sustainable forces able to move long distances quickly and deliver overwhelming firepower on arrival. This will mean that they need to invest in airlift, and in sealift, precision strike capabilities and the ability to communicate with the rest of us at the fight.

In our view, at Prague, NATO must begin to address these issues and must begin to take serious steps to improve overall Alliance capabilities. Under Secretary Feith will have more to say on this. I would like—as I have said, I have more on mine that is part of the record, but this is a very, very important issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Do not short-circuit your comments on that issue, I mean, do not worry about the time.

Mr. GROSSMAN. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the central issue for most of us sitting up here.

Mr. GROSSMAN. It is a central issue. I will just make one more comment since both of you raised it.

What I said at NATO the other day to all of our allies sitting around the table was, "If we get to a point where it is the truth that the United States fights and NATO cleans up or the United States fights and the European Union cleans up, that is bad for us and it is very, very bad for our European allies."

So I just could not agree with both of you more and, as I say, the Under Secretary will say more about the precise parts of these capabilities. But I believe that if we work ourselves into this position where there is this division of labor, we will all have done ourselves—we will have done ourselves a considerable amount of damage, not just to the United States, but certainly to the Europeans as well.

I will talk for a minute about new members, Mr. Chairman. Our second goal for Prague is to continue the process of building a united Euro-Atlantic community, by extending membership to those democratic European countries who have demonstrated their determination and their ability to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

As the President observed last year in Warsaw, "Yalta did not ratify a natural divide. It divided a living civilization."

And I believe that a fair review of the enlargement to Europe's new democracies in 1997, which this committee so successfully supported, has brought us closer to completing the vision of NATO's founders of a free and united Europe. But our work on this is not yet done.

In his first meeting with allies last June, President Bush secured a consensus to take concrete, historic decisions in Prague to advance enlargement. And we take as our guidance the President's view that NATO "should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

We have been working very hard with the aspirant countries and with other allies so that people are ready for NATO membership.

You all know that a team led by U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns completed a tour of all 9 of the aspirant countries focusing on the need for reform. We have told aspirants that the United States has made no decision on which countries to support for membership, and we have urged them all to accelerate their reforms between now and Prague.

Members of this committee, Members of the Senate, members of the public, I think will rightly ask: "What capabilities, what contributions will these aspirant countries bring to the Alliance if they are allowed to join our treaty?"

Well, the Washington treaty makes clear that states invited to join NATO should be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Many aspirants have already demonstrated their determination to do just this.

The Vilnius Group, which met in Sofia last October declared its shared intention, and I quote here from their statement, to "fully support the war against the terrorism" and to "act as Allies of the United States of America." And when Deputy Secretary Armitage was in Bucharest not 3 weeks ago, this commitment was very much reaffirmed.

Aspirants have offered overflight rights, transit and basing privileges, military and police forces, medical units and transportation support to U.S. efforts. Most of them will participate in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. And most aspirant countries have contributed already to our efforts in the Balkans.

Some people have said that after September 11, enlargement should not remain a priority. I think that is wrong. I believe that enlargement should remain a priority for this Alliance because, as you said, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, the events of September 11 show us that the more allies we have, the better off we are going to be. The more allies we have to prosecute the war on terrorism the better off we are going to be.

And if we are going to meet these new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values and are able to act effectively with us. With freedom under attack, we must demonstrate our resolve to do as much as we can to advance our cause.

It is our goal and it is also our expectation that, working with you, we will be able to forge a solid and united approach to enlargement and to build an equally strong consensus within the Alliance.

I might say, if I could take this opportunity also, that we very much appreciate the support that members of this committee have given to the Freedom Consolidation Act, and we hope that the solid bipartisan support for this act might help it pass in the very near future. We look forward to the closest possible consultations with the Congress, and especially the Senate, as we go forward on the questions of enlargement.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a word or two about new relationships. And I appreciate what Senator Lugar said, that there seems to be a consensus on the fact that we need to have the right new relationship with Russia, but I also appreciate the point that you made, Mr. Chairman, that we have got to get it right and we should not leave doubts and anxieties on either side about what this relationship is to be about.

Our goal for Prague is to advance this NATO core principle, which is that NATO ought to live in peace with all peoples and promote stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO-Russia have taken important steps to give new emphasis and direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of September 11.

And as you both said, NATO is now working with Russia to complete negotiations on the creation of a new body to be called the NATO-Russia Council that will permit joint decisions and actions in areas of common interests. At the upcoming Reykjavik Ministerial, we are optimistic that Secretary of State Powell will be able to conclude with his colleagues the agreement on this new structure.

And then to acknowledge the potential significance of the new relationship, President Bush and other NATO leaders have been invited to a summit on the 28th of May in Rome to celebrate the new NATO-Russia Council.

Mr. Chairman, let me answer your question as directly as I can. From our perspective, here is what this new NATO-Russia Council will do: First, it will focus on practical, well-defined projects, where NATO and Russia share a common purpose and a common goal. Second, it will offer Russia the opportunity to participate in shaping the development of cooperative mechanisms in areas such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and civil emergency preparedness.

Very importantly as well, here is what the NATO-Russia Council will not do: The body will not give Russia the ability to veto any NATO actions in any area. Second, it is not a back door to NATO membership. Third, the NATO-Russia Council will not infringe on NATO's prerogatives.

NATO members will continue to take any decision by consensus on any issue. And the NATO-Russia Council will be fully separate

from the North Atlantic Council, which will continue to meet and make decisions as it always has on the full range of issues on NATO's agenda.

Mr. Chairman, while forging these new links with Russia, we also need to pay attention to countries like Ukraine, to the countries we are working with in Central Asia. And very importantly from my trip to the region, we want to pay attention to what is called NATO's Mediterranean dialog as well.

Mr. Chairman, nearly 53 years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the United States commitment to Europe and the bedrock of our security. A Europe whole and free and at peace is a goal fast becoming a reality thanks to NATO.

As we look to Prague and to our agenda for new capabilities, new members and new relationships, we look forward to working closely with members of this committee to ensure that NATO will meet tomorrow's challenges as successfully as it met those of the past. I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Marc.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Members of the Committee, it is an honor and a privilege to be here. I thank you for the opportunity to address the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with my friend and colleague, Doug Feith.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking you and other members of this Committee and the Senate for your strong and consistent support for NATO, which has helped ensure it remains the greatest Alliance in history.

It has been a privilege and my good fortune to have had the opportunity to consult with you and take your advice over the years on NATO. I look forward to continuing this dialogue and consultation in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your invitation today at a time when the future of NATO is being actively discussed on both sides of the Atlantic.

I welcome this debate. Our governments, our parliaments and our publics ought to talk about the future of NATO. That is what democratically supported foreign and defense policy is all about.

The attacks of September 11 and NATO's response prove to me NATO's continuing value in a world of new and unpredictable threats. Invoking Article 5 for the first time in history, NATO sent a clear message that the Alliance is united and determined.

We greatly value NATO's collective response, as well as the contributions of individual Allies. Fifty years of NATO cooperation made natural the participation of Allied forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO AWACS have logged over 3,000 hours patrolling American skies. *All* NATO Allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refueling assistance, and stepped up intelligence efforts. Sixteen of our Allies are supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle with military forces and capabilities. Fourteen Allies have deployed forces in the region, and nine are participating in combat operations with us in eastern Afghanistan as we speak.

Almost all contributors to the International Security Assistance Force, initially led by Britain and soon by Turkey, are current Allies, aspiring Allies, or countries who have trained with NATO in the Partnership for Peace. Their varied contributions include air reconnaissance, refueling, cargo, and close air support missions, special forces missions, specialized nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons units, mine clearing and medical units, and naval patrols. Altogether Allies and Partners have deployed nearly 4,000 troops to Afghanistan.

NATO's actions in response to September 11 come as no surprise to me. Throughout its history, NATO has adapted to meet new threats and seize new opportunities.

Nothing illustrates this fact better than the number of countries seeking to join. Secretary Powell made this point last week, observing that countries want to join "because they want to be a part of a political and security organization that is anchored in its relationship with North America."

NATO TODAY: ENDURING VALUES AND COMMON PURPOSES

When President Bush and his counterparts meet in Prague later this year, their gathering will symbolize the changes that have taken place in Europe and NATO's central role in making these changes possible.

Prague: Once behind an Iron Curtain.

Prague: Synonymous in a famous spring in 1968 with rebellion against oppression and thirst for democracy. And in 1991, Prague hosted the meeting that dissolved the Warsaw Pact.

In 2002, NATO leaders will come to Prague to continue shaping that new Europe and to reaffirm the strength, unity and vitality of the Atlantic Alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a fundamental pillar of our foreign and defense policy. As President Bush said last month, NATO remains "an anchor of security for both Europe and the United States."

I have just returned from meeting with all of our Allies at NATO. I then traveled to eight Allied capitals to consult on our agenda for Prague.

We proposed that Prague be defined by three themes: New Capabilities, New Members, and New Relationships.

21ST CENTURY NATO: NEW CAPABILITIES, NEW MEMBERS, NEW RELATIONSHIPS

September 11 has brought home to us how dangerous our world has become. Czech President Vaclav Havel, who will host the Prague summit, observed that September 11 "alerted us to the evil existing in this world." September 11 has also demonstrated how important our Allies are in helping to defeat the new threats that face us. To protect our way of life, the Alliance must be an effective tool in the world after September 11.

That is why NATO ministers agreed last December to intensify common efforts to meet the threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that all Allies face. When President Bush meets with Allied leaders in Prague later this year, we expect that Allies will approve an action plan aimed at enhancing NATO's ability to deal with these and other threats.

NATO is not less important to our security today, NATO is more important.

Our agenda at Prague will be threefold:

- Ensuring NATO has the capabilities needed to meet emerging new threats,
- Extending NATO membership to more new European democracies, and
- Renewing NATO relationships with Russia, Ukraine and other Partners.

New capabilities. New members. New relationships.

This agenda is rooted in NATO's values and goals as set out in the 1949 Washington Treaty—to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples, live in peace with all peoples and governments, and promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area.

NEW CAPABILITIES

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has taken steps to revise its doctrine and improve its command and force structures to meet today's threats. The 1999 Strategic Concept defined these new threats explicitly, noting that "new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming clearer—oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism."

While we have recognized the new threats, we have more to do to prepare NATO to meet them. The September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that the threats to Allies and to our Alliance can come from anywhere, at any time, employing devices ranging from a box cutter to weapons of mass destruction. In order to defend ourselves against these new threats, NATO needs to be able to deploy at short notice flexible, well-armed forces capable of conducting sustained operations across a range of military options.

While the U.S. currently possesses forces with such capabilities, in large measure our European Allies do not. I believe the growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO and must be addressed. In order to fight effectively alongside the U.S., our European Allies need flexible, sustainable forces, able to move long distances quickly and deliver overwhelming firepower on arrival. This will require improved strategic lift and modern precision strike capabilities, as well as enhanced combat support and combat service support. Unless the disparity is substantially narrowed, NATO will be increasingly less able to play its part in countering the threats that now face us.

At Prague, NATO must begin to redress this imbalance by agreeing to steps aimed at improving overall Alliance capabilities. These will include further streamlining NATO's command structure to make it more responsive to today's threats and a commitment to provide the deployable, capable and ready forces NATO needs.

We are seeking a comprehensive improvement in European military capabilities. Although the DCI initiative identified many areas where improvements were needed, much remains to be done to fulfill its goals. We need to sharpen and narrow our focus. Increased defense spending remains an important goal, and we believe Allies can also use resources more effectively by greater pooling of their efforts. Among the proposals we would favor is creation of a European Mobility Command to coordinate existing and future European airlift assets.

Afghanistan has also demonstrated the importance of Special Operations forces in combined land-air operations. To enhance NATO capabilities in this area we will also propose creation of a Special Operations Coordination Center at SHAPE.

NATO must also develop the means to defend its forces and members against weapons of mass destruction fielded either by rogue states or terrorist groups or by some combination of the two. Here we have proposed initiatives on biological weapons defense and bio-terrorism and will soon offer proposals on missile defense.

NEW MEMBERS

Our second goal for Prague is to continue the process of building a united Euro-Atlantic community by extending membership to those democratic European countries who have demonstrated their determination and ability to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

As the President observed last year in Warsaw, "Yalta did not ratify a natural divide, it divided a living civilization." He made it clear that his goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe and to "welcome into Europe's home" every European nation that struggles toward democracy, free markets, and a strong civic culture.

The process of enlargement to Europe's new democracies launched in 1997 has fulfilled NATO's promise and brought us closer to completing the vision of NATO's founders of a free and united Europe. But our work is not done.

In his first meeting with Allies last June, the President secured a consensus to take concrete, historic decisions at Prague to advance enlargement. We take as guidance the President's view that NATO "should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

We have been working with Allies and the nine current aspirant countries to strengthen their preparations. A team led by U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns visited the aspirant countries earlier this year to reinforce the importance of addressing key reform priorities in the months before Prague. Our team came away from its meetings impressed by the commitment of the aspirants to meeting their Membership Action Plan goals and advancing reforms, even while recognizing that they all have serious work ahead to prepare for membership. We have told aspirants that the U.S. has made no decision on which countries to support for membership, and we have urged them to accelerate their reforms between now and Prague.

Members of this Committee and the rest of the Senate will rightly ask what capabilities and contributions potential new members will bring to the Alliance.

The Washington Treaty makes clear that states invited to join NATO should be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is the standard that we and our Allies will apply as we approach decisions at Prague. Many aspirants have already demonstrated their determination to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. The Vilnius Group, meeting in Sofia last October declared its shared intention to "fully support the war against terrorism" and to "act as Allies of the United States." Aspirants have offered overflight rights, transit and basing privileges, military and police forces, medical units and transport support to U.S. efforts. Most will participate in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Most aspirant countries have also contributed actively to NATO efforts to prevent further hostilities in the Balkans.

Some have asked in the aftermath of September 11 whether enlargement should remain a priority. I believe the answer is "yes." The events of September 11 have reinforced the importance of closer cooperation and integration between the United States and all the democracies of Europe. If we are to meet new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values and are able to act effectively with us. With freedom under attack, we must demonstrate our resolve to do as much as we can to advance its cause.

It is our goal and expectation that, working with you, we will be able to forge a solid and united approach to enlargement and build an equally strong consensus with the Alliance.

We welcome the support from members of this Committee for the Freedom Consolidation Support Act, and believe that a solid bipartisan majority behind this bill will send a message of our commitment to an enlarged and strengthened Alliance.

We look forward to the closest consultations with the Congress on this subject and to the debate in the Senate on ratification as we approach these historic decisions.

Our third goal for Prague is also aimed at advancing NATO's core principles—those of living in peace with all peoples and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the vision of a united Europe from which, Winston Churchill once observed, “no nation should be permanently outcast,” we must continue to reach out and expand cooperation and integration with all of NATO's Partners.

NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of September 11. President Bush's vision is of a Russia “fully reformed, fully democratic, and closely bound to the rest of Europe,” which is able to build partnerships with Europe's great institutions, including NATO.

NATO is now working with Russia to complete negotiations on creation of a new body—the NATO-Russia Council—that will permit joint decisions and actions in areas of common interest. At the upcoming Reykjavik ministerial, we are optimistic that Secretary Powell will conclude with his colleagues the agreement on the new structure. To acknowledge the potential significance of the new relationship, President Bush will join NATO and Russian leaders at a summit May 28 in Italy to inaugurate the NATO-Russia Council.

Here's what the proposed NATO-Russia Council will do:

- It will focus on practical, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share a common purpose and a common goal.
- It will offer Russia the opportunity to participate in shaping the development of cooperative mechanisms in areas such as counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and civil emergency preparedness.

Here is what the NATO-Russia Council will not do:

- The new body will not give Russia the ability to veto NATO actions in any areas.
- It is not a back door to NATO membership.
- It will not infringe on NATO prerogatives. NATO members will continue to take any decision by consensus on any issue.

The NATO-Russia Council will be fully separate from the NAC, which will continue to meet and make decisions as it always has on the full range of issues on NATO's agenda.

While forging new links with Russia, our cooperative vision for NATO embraces all of NATO's Partners, including Ukraine, countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Mediterranean Dialogue partners.

Our Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine has helped ensure that Ukraine continues to progress along the reform path and expand its links to the West. Ukraine has signaled its desire for closer integration with NATO. NATO has made clear to Ukraine the need for greater substantive progress in a number of areas. At Prague, we should welcome Ukraine's interest while looking to develop initiatives aimed at concrete results in strategic areas of common interest.

We want to focus at Prague on NATO's Partner activities with countries of Central Asia that have played such constructive roles in the war against terrorism. The Partnership for Peace and EAPC have been successful vehicles for integration, but we believe that much more can be done to expand cooperation between NATO and these countries. Through the PFP, NATO can help build reformed, stable, democratic societies in Central Asia and the Caucasus. We need to make sure PFP programs and resources are tailored to their needs, so that they can develop the forces and training they need to meet common threats and strengthen stability.

Nearly fifty-three years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the United States commitment to Europe and the bedrock of our security. NATO has kept peace in Europe for over half a century, it continues to provide for Allies conventional and nuclear defense, and it is the nexus of cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus. No other organization can fulfill these roles.

A Europe whole, free and at peace is a goal fast becoming a reality thanks to NATO. We and our Allies have much work ahead, but also an historic opportunity to achieve our goals of defending, integrating, and stabilizing the Euro-Atlantic area

and continuing to strengthen this greatest of Alliances. As we look to Prague and our agenda of new capabilities, new members, and new relationships, we look forward to working closely with members of this Committee to ensure that NATO will meet tomorrow's challenges as successfully as it has those of the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Feith.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. FEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I would like first to echo Secretary Grossman's comment about the usefulness of the consultation that we in the administration have had with members of this committee and other Members of the Senate.

We have been impressed by the degree of interest in NATO. It is useful to us to learn your perspectives and it is gratifying to see that there is the kind of support, bipartisan support for NATO that remains very strong today despite all—no, I would not even say “despite.” I would say largely because of all the questions that people continually raise about NATO's relevance to the current world.

Chairman Biden began his remarks by reading from the North Atlantic Treaty. He quoted from Article 5. I would like to quote a short passage from the preamble of the 1949 treaty. It said, “The parties are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”

NATO achieved these purposes during the cold war, and since then it has fulfilled them in the Balkans through its peacekeeping work in Bosnia and in the war against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

NATO has adapted itself to play an important role now in supporting the U.S.-led war on terrorism. And in the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to promote Euro-Atlantic stability. The Alliance will continue to safeguard the community of North Atlantic democracies against all types of threats, including, I suppose, threats that we cannot now anticipate.

Since 1949, we have had a broad and bipartisan support for NATO as an element of U.S. national security policy. I take this as a sign that the phrase “Atlantic community” is meaningful.

The United States and its European and Canadian allies indeed are a community. We are not just a collection of members of a multinational forum. We share fundamental beliefs, for example about the nature of human beings, their rights and their relationship to their respective governments. And the security of the community's different elements is of a piece.

Among the Atlantic community's members there are common interests, large common interests, economic and political, as well as military. And there is true fellow feeling that motivates action.

For an alliance of this kind to remain vital for over 50 years, there must be more than a treaty underlying it. There must be sentiment, a sense of community, that makes the Alliance richer than a simple legal obligation. And this point, I think, was illustrated in the response of NATO and NATO members to the attack on the

United States on September 11. Our allies responded to the attack quickly, loyally and usefully.

Less than 24 hours after the World Trade Center and Pentagon were hit, the Alliance for the first time in history, as Chairman Biden noted, invoked Article 5, the collective defense provision of the NATO treaty. And since last fall, as has been commented on, we have 7 NATO AWACS aircraft patrolling U.S. skies.

The war effort and the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in Afghanistan are benefiting from the contributions of our NATO allies and partners. Those contributions have come from within and outside the formal Alliance structures. All, as Secretary Grossman stressed, are the result of more than 50 years of joint planning, training, and operations within NATO.

The contributions have entailed great sacrifice. America is not the only NATO ally to have lost soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom. The forces of our Canadian and European allies have also suffered losses, as have other Enduring Freedom coalition states.

In speaking to the NATO Defense Ministers last June, Secretary Rumsfeld listed terrorism first among the new threats facing the Alliance. The other threats he mentioned were cyber attack, high-tech conventional weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Members of this committee also recognize these new threats. As Senator Lugar pointed out in a recent speech, "The terrorist attacks on the United States of last September have graphically demonstrated how vulnerable we are. And when I say 'we,' I mean the West in general, including Europe. The next attack could just as easily be in London, Paris, or Berlin as in Washington, Los Angeles or New York. And it could involve weapons of mass destruction."

NATO's core mission remains the collective defense of its members, as stated in Article 5. But there is room and need for change in how NATO fulfills its responsibility to protect the Alliance's interests and promote its principles. NATO will need to transform itself to handle new threats and serve its other purposes.

The Prague summit will be an important event and as Secretary Grossman said, it is going to stress the themes of new capabilities, new members and new relationships.

The military forces of the Alliance are the essence of the Alliance's essential function, common defense. But I agree with Secretary Grossman that the notorious capabilities gap between the United States and its European and Canadian allies continues to grow, and if the divergence is not reversed, it will impede the allies' ability to operate with U.S. forces in the future and will ultimately weaken the Alliance's political cohesion.

So our first goal at Prague must be to remedy the capabilities deficiencies within the Alliance. We will work to secure the commitment of allied leaders to specific measures and definite timelines to fix shortfalls in four top priority areas. And I would like to review these top priority areas:

First, nuclear, biological, and chemical defenses to protect allied forces and missile defenses to protect Alliance forces, territory and population centers against the range of missile threats; second, platforms and support capabilities to transport Alliance forces rapidly to wherever they are needed and to supply them until their

mission is completed; third, communication and information systems that will connect Alliance forces securely before and during combat and peace enforcement operations; and, fourth, modern weapons systems, such as all-weather precision guided munitions, jamming systems and capabilities to suppress enemy air defenses that will enable allies to make first tier contributions to combat operations.

To achieve these goals, we believe allies should seek both to increase defense spending and to use their resources more effectively by pooling efforts.

At Prague, the United States will also seek agreements to streamline NATO's command force structures. As you know, the United States is changing its own Unified Command Plan. Likewise, NATO should ensure that its command and force structures are reorganized for 21st century missions.

One of the U.S. Unified Command Plan changes has implications for the job of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, SACLANT. SACLANT heads one of the two existing NATO strategic commands. Today, the commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as SACLANT.

The new U.S. Unified Command Plan, however, is going to refocus the U.S. Joint Forces Command solely on its transformation mission. Secretary Rumsfeld has approved the decision to divest the commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command of his SACLANT responsibilities.

Now, various allied officials have told us that NATO's connection to an American four-star combatant commander based in the United States is an important transatlantic link for the Alliance. And we are consulting with Lord Robertson, NATO's Secretary-General, and with the allies on the future arrangements for SACLANT.

We are intent on bolstering, not cutting the transatlantic links of NATO. And we will do so in ways that serve the common interest in promoting defense transformation and streamlining NATO's Command Structure.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer a word or two on this issue of new members. The goal of inviting additional European democracies to join the Alliance has been well addressed by Secretary Grossman, who cited this important statement by President Bush that, as we plan the Prague summit, "We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

Mr. Chairman, I recall that you and Senator Helms and other members of this committee wrote to President Bush a few weeks before his Warsaw speech stating that, "It is in America's strategic interest that the process of NATO enlargement continue."

The events of September 11 have intensified the President's commitment to this goal. The administration wants to preserve a bipartisan approach as we move forward. An enlarged Alliance of democratic states with improved military capabilities and interoperability, joint defense and operational planning, and realistic training will be better able to fulfill the Alliance's purpose to increase the security of its members and provide for their common defense effort against terrorism and other threats.

The aspirant countries are demonstrating their ability to operate with the Alliance. For example, in the past year, 7 of the 9 NATO aspirants contributed forces to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo; and 8 of the 9 participated in the NATO-led operation in Bosnia.

Aspirants have contributed in various ways to Operation Enduring Freedom through intelligence, overflight rights, use of their air bases, offers of personnel to support operations in the region, and public and diplomatic support. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies to act.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the Alliance is not an exercise free of risks and difficult judgments. People of experience and wisdom have warned us of the dangers of making the Alliance unwieldy. They do not want the Alliance to dilute its military capabilities through enlargement, and they are concerned about NATO's relations with neighbors.

They want to ensure that any enlargement will strengthen NATO's ability to perform its defense mission. And they want to ensure that the commitment of new members to the Alliance's principles and work will be real and enduring. We respect these views and share the concerns. Receiving these concerns is one of the useful elements of the dialog that the administration has been having with the Senate. It is clear that enlargement must be done with care.

As part of this process, the Defense Department is working with the aspirants to help them become the best possible candidates. We are assessing the state of each aspirant's military structures, its implementation of defense reforms, the readiness of its military units dedicated to NATO-led missions, and the military value it can bring to NATO. We are telling them clearly where improvements are necessary.

As to the issue of new relationships and NATO's relationship in particular with Russia, President Bush has made a top priority of creating a new, cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship. And that effort is integrated with the work that we are doing with the NATO allies to create the NATO-Russia relationship based on specific practical cooperation. The goal is to erase the vestiges of cold war hostility.

Fostering improved NATO-Russia cooperation can induce further democratic, market and military reform in Russia and contribute to improving Russia's relations with its neighbors.

As we move forward, first to the NATO-Russia summit that is coming at the end of this month, and then beyond, NATO should take, and will take care to retain its ability to decide and act on security issues as its members see fit.

The North Atlantic Council will decide by consensus on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. As Secretary Grossman stressed, Russia will not have a veto over Alliance decisions, and we will ensure that NATO-Russia cooperation does not serve to discourage or marginalize other partners.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we plan to use the Prague summit to improve the Alliance, to make it more capable militarily, better able to secure the peace and more tightly knit across the Atlantic.

I believe we have strong bipartisan support for this approach. I look forward to working with you and the members of this com-

mittee as we move forward to the NATO summit in Prague. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you NATO's future in the run-up to the Alliance's summit meeting in Prague next November.

The preamble to the 1949 NATO Treaty states:

[The Parties] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.

NATO achieved these purposes during the Cold War. Since then, it fulfilled them in the Balkans through its peacekeeping work in Bosnia and in the war against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. NATO has adapted itself to play an important role supporting the current U.S.-led war on terrorism. In the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to promote Euro-Atlantic stability. The Alliance will continue to safeguard the community of North Atlantic democracies against threats of all types, including, I suppose, threats we cannot now even anticipate.

Since 1949, broad, bipartisan support for NATO has been an element of U.S. national security policy. This is a sign that the phrase "Atlantic community" is meaningful. The United States and its European and Canadian Allies indeed constitute a community. We are not just a collection of members of a multinational forum. We share fundamental beliefs—for example, about the nature of human beings, their rights and their relationship to their respective governments. And the security of the community's different elements is of a piece. Among the Atlantic community's members, there are large common interests—economic and political as well as military—and there is true fellow feeling that motivates action. For an alliance of this kind to remain vital for over fifty years, there must be more than a treaty underlying it. There must be sentiment—a sense of community—that makes the Alliance richer than a simple legal obligation.

This point, I think, was illustrated in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack on the United States.

NATO and our NATO Allies responded to the attack quickly, loyally and usefully. Less than 24 hours after the World Trade Center and Pentagon were hit, the NATO Alliance, for the first time in history, invoked Article 5—the collective defense provision of the 1949 NATO Treaty. Since last fall, seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft have been patrolling U.S. skies. The war effort and the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in Afghanistan are benefiting from individual NATO Allies' and Partners' contributions. Such Allied contributions have come within and outside formal NATO structures. All those contributions, however, are the result of more than 50 years of joint planning, training and operations within NATO.

Those contributions have entailed great sacrifice. America is not the only NATO Ally to have lost soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom. The forces of our Canadian and European Allies also have suffered losses, as have other coalition states in Operation Enduring Freedom.

In his statement to NATO defense ministers last June, Secretary Rumsfeld listed terrorism first among the new threats facing the Alliance. The others he mentioned were cyber-attack, high-tech conventional weapons, and ballistic and cruise missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Members of this Committee also recognize these new threats. As Senator Lugar pointed out in a recent speech:

The terrorist attacks on the United States of last September have graphically demonstrated how vulnerable we are. And when I say "we", I mean the West in general, including Europe . . . The next attack could just as easily be in London, Paris, or Berlin as in Washington, Los Angeles or New York. And it could involve weapons of mass destruction.

NATO's core mission remains the collective defense of its members, as stated in Article 5. But there is room and need for change in how NATO fulfills its responsibility to protect the Alliance's interests and promote its principles. NATO will need to transform itself to handle with new threats and serve its other purposes.

NATO's Prague summit meeting this fall will be an important event. At Prague, the United States will stress three themes: new capabilities, new members, and new relationships.

NEW CAPABILITIES

NATO's military forces are the essence of the Alliance's essential function: common defense. But the notorious "capabilities gap" between the United States and its European and Canadian Allies continues to grow. If this divergence is not reversed, it will impede the Allies' ability to operate with U.S. forces in the future and will, ultimately, weaken the Alliance's political cohesion.

So our first goal at Prague must be to begin to remedy the capabilities deficiencies within NATO. We shall work to secure the commitment of Allied leaders to specific measures and definite timelines to fix shortfalls in four top-priority areas:

- First: Nuclear, biological, and chemical defenses to protect Allied forces, and missile defenses to protect Alliance forces, territory, and population centers against the range of missile threats.
- Second: Platforms (and support capabilities) to transport Alliance forces rapidly to wherever they are needed, and to supply them until their mission is completed.
- Third: Communication and information systems that will connect Alliance forces securely before and during combat and peace enforcement operations; and
- Fourth: Modern weapons systems—such as all-weather precision guided munitions, jamming systems, and capabilities to suppress enemy air defenses—that will enable Allies to make first-tier contributions to combat operations.

To achieve these goals, we believe that Allies should seek both to increase defense spending and to use their resources more effectively by pooling efforts.

At Prague, the United States will also seek agreements to streamline NATO's command and force structures. As you know, the United States is changing its own Unified Command Plan. Likewise, NATO should ensure that its command and force structures are reorganized for 21st century missions.

One of the U.S. Unified Command Plan changes has implications for the job of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). SACLANT heads one of the two existing NATO strategic commands. Today, the Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as SACLANT. The new U.S. Unified Command Plan, however, will refocus the U.S. Joint Forces Command solely on its transformation mission. Secretary Rumsfeld has approved the decision to divest the Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command of his SACLANT responsibilities.

Various Allied officials have told us that NATO's connection to an American four-star Combatant Commander, based in the United States, is an important trans-Atlantic link for the Alliance. We are consulting with Lord Robertson, NATO's Secretary General, and with the Allies on the future arrangements for SACLANT. We are intent on bolstering, not cutting, the Alliance's trans-Atlantic links. We shall do so in ways that serve the common interest in promoting defense transformation and streamlining the NATO Command Structure.

NEW MEMBERS

Our second goal at Prague will be to invite additional European democracies to join the Alliance. President Bush declared his policy on NATO enlargement in a speech last June in Warsaw:

I believe [the President said] in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings . . . As we plan the Prague summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.

Mr. Chairman, I recall that you, Senator Helms, and other Members of this Committee wrote to President Bush a few weeks before his Warsaw speech, saying:

It is in America's strategic interest that the process of NATO enlargement continue.

The events of September 11 have intensified the President's commitment to this goal. The administration wants to preserve a bipartisan approach as we move forward. An enlarged Alliance of democratic states with improved military capabilities and interoperability, joint defense and operational planning, and realistic training exercises will be better able to fulfill the Alliance's purpose to increase the security

of its members and provide for their common defense against terrorism and other threats.

The aspirant countries are demonstrating their ability to operate with the Alliance. For example, in the past year, seven of the nine NATO aspirants contributed forces to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo, and eight of the nine participated in the NATO-led operation in Bosnia. Aspirants also have contributed in various ways to Operation Enduring Freedom—for example, through intelligence, over-flight rights, use of their air bases, offers of personnel to support operations in the region, and public and diplomatic support. They have conducted themselves as we want our Allies to act.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the Alliance is not an exercise free of risks and difficult judgments. People of experience and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the Alliance unwieldy. They do not want the Alliance to dilute its military capabilities through enlargement and they are concerned about NATO's relations with neighbors. They want to ensure that any enlargement will strengthen NATO's ability to perform its defense mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new members to the Alliance's principles and work will be real and enduring. We respect these views and share the concerns. Enlargement must be done with care.

As part of this process, the Defense Department is working with the aspirants through bilateral and NATO channels to help them become the best possible candidates. We are assessing the state of each aspirant's military structures, its implementation of defense reforms, the readiness of its military units dedicated to NATO-led missions, and the military value it can bring to NATO. We are telling them clearly where improvements are necessary.

NEW RELATIONSHIPS

A third goal for the Prague summit is to strengthen NATO's relationship with Russia and revitalize its relations with members of NATO's Partnership for Peace.

President Bush has made a top priority of creating a new, cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship. That effort is integrated with the work we are doing with the NATO Allies to enhance the NATO-Russia relationship based on specific, practical cooperation. The goal is to erase any vestiges of Cold War hostility. Fostering improved NATO-Russia cooperation can induce further democratic, market and military reform in Russia and contribute to improving Russia's relations with its neighbors. President Bush supported a NATO-Russia summit at the end of this month as a means to press forward on this path.

As we do so, NATO will take care to retain its ability to decide and act on security issues as its members see fit. Protecting Alliance solidarity and effectiveness is of the utmost importance. The North Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus, on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will not have a veto over Alliance decisions. And we shall ensure that NATO-Russia cooperation does not serve to discourage or marginalize other Partners.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we plan to use the Prague summit to improve the Alliance—to make it more capable militarily, better able to secure the peace and more tightly knit across the Atlantic. I believe we have strong, bipartisan support for this approach. I look forward to continuing to work with you and all Members of this Committee as we move toward the Prague summit. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Because we have good attendance and we have a second panel of two very distinguished Americans, I am going to suggest after consultation with Senator Lugar that we limit our rounds to 5 minutes, even though I am confident we each have a good half hour or more worth of questions apiece. But you both have always been available, so we still have you at our disposal.

Let me also point out in our audience today, that I and the staff have recognized, and we may not have recognized them all, Ambassadors to the U.S. from NATO aspirant countries, including Bulgaria.

Would each of the Ambassadors stand up? We have the Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States, the Romanian Amba-

sador to the United States, the Slovenian Ambassador to the United States, the Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States, the Estonian Ambassador to the United States, and the Latvian Ambassador to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you all.

Thank you very much for your interest and the efforts your countries are making.

Now, let me—you can begin the time for me, Bertie.

Let me state at the outset, I think Senator Lugar's statement was brilliantly succinct and to the point and laid out in stark relief what the most pressing concern is. We are all talking about this in three parts, one of which is expansion.

I would argue that the single most significant aspect of expansion of NATO is the process itself. The aspirant countries may very well have engaged in every reform even without the carrot of admission to NATO, but I would suggest that the last three admittees, which was significant.

So I think we should not lose sight of the process itself. The process itself has had an incredibly democratizing impact on Europe as a whole. And if we did nothing else, in my view, that would make it all worthwhile, even beyond getting to the question, but Secretary Feith talked about our shared democratic values. Aside from meeting the military criteria, all the aspirant countries have to demonstrate that they do share those values, and in particular that they have rejected the very ugly remnants of wartime fascism that must be totally and permanently suppressed. It is something of great consequence.

I realize this is a difficult time in Europe, and I realize that circumstances in the Middle East and population shifts as well as immigration in many of the countries that are part of NATO, or are seeking to be part of NATO, have resulted in some real demonstrations of anti-Semitism speaking only for this Senator, and I am not making any accusations, but I suggest that just speaking for myself, were I to conclude that any of the aspirant countries, when picked, were not doing every single solitary thing in their power to deal with that issue, I would be part of a one-man band to keep them from becoming part of NATO, whether or not the administration recommended them.

But let me speak to, and I ask permission of my colleague: I ask if I can see his statement. I just want to read two sentences from Senator Lugar's statement, because it is what I want to focus on in my remaining 3 minutes or so.

He said, "We have the most successful Alliance ever created, but it is or seems to be marginal or even irrelevant when it comes to dealing with the most urgent issues of the day." Continuing the quote, "And the fact that NATO, ostensibly America's premiere alliance and the linchpin of transatlantic relationship, sometimes appears to be absent in our strategy on these critical issues, raises important questions about NATO's future, centrality and vitality."

I could not agree more with any statement that I have heard about NATO in the last 10 years.

One of the things I know you know, but I want to emphasize, is that we are having, "increasing difficulty," though that may be an exaggeration. I find myself, as a strong proponent of NATO over

the past 30 years being a United States Senator 29 years, having to “make the case” for NATO among my colleagues. I have never had to “make the case” for NATO before. It was sort of self-evident. But the case is having to be made. And unless there is a growing understanding and a resolution of what role NATO plays outside of Europe, I fear that you may find the very support you both spoke to so eloquently, that you found in the Senate, not there.

And so my question is to you, Secretary Grossman: What is your sense of our NATO allies’ sense of the need to resolve this issue, the relationship issue? My discussions with our NATO allies have primarily been discussions about the relationship issue vis-à-vis Russia and vis-à-vis this force that the Europeans are talking about, having this ESDP, this European Security and Defense Policy.

I get very little blowback about the larger question which is, in my view, the central question. So can you give me a sense—not how high in the agenda—but how concerned and/or interested our allies are in an enhanced if not an initial, definition, of this new relationship?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me try to do exactly that. If I could, though, first say that I very much agree with your opening comment that the process itself of having people get ready to be NATO members has been hugely important, both to the three new members in 1998 and to the aspirants today.

And may I, also speaking for myself, associate myself with your comments about remnants not only of wartime fascism, but I would also say of remnants of communism as well. And I think you are exactly right. We would not come to you with a recommendation that those countries get a nod from the United States if these are problems. So I personally associate myself with your remarks.

In terms of the Alliance and what Europeans are thinking about us and our commitment to the Alliance, as I said, I was in Europe. I visited with all the allies a couple of Mondays ago. I went to 8 different European countries after that to talk about the Prague summit.

And I will tell you a couple of things. First, most people are very pleased with the three themes that we have got for Prague, and I think that is a start.

Second, there is some anxiety in some of the European countries about where we are headed with NATO, and whether we believe in NATO. And one of my jobs, and I think one of Under Secretary Feith’s jobs and our Secretary’s job, is to keep making the case, not just in the United States, but to Europeans, that this Alliance still matters.

Part of it, Senator, of course, is not our problem. Part of it is their problem—

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Mr. GROSSMAN [continuing]. In the sense that they do not have the capabilities. It makes them feel bad. They are focused in on the European Union. That is a big project. They wonder where we are headed. They worry about that.

But what we have got to do, it seems to me, at Prague and before Prague, is make sure that we are all focused in on the same new

threats. And that is why Senator Lugar's speech at NATO, your comments, other comments from the committee are so important.

It seems to me that if you can have a terrorist operation that is planned in Afghanistan, refined in Hamburg, financed in other places in Europe and around the world, and then carried out in the United States of America, that what you have got is not an issue here or out of area, but a return in many ways to the fundamentals of the 1949 treaty.

I thought what was interesting was you quoted the 1949 treaty, Under Secretary Feith quoted the 1949 treaty, Senator Lugar did, and I quoted President Truman's speech on the day it came into being. In a way, we are not talking about new things for the Alliance. We are going back to the old thing about the Alliance, which was the defense of—

The CHAIRMAN. But do they sense that? My sense is they are not anxious to talk about that right now. But I have not recently, meaning in the last couple of months, made the tour that you and Senator Lugar, and others have.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I think our European allies are certainly interested in talking about capabilities. I also believe that if we do this right and keep working at it, we will get more and more conversation going in Europe about weapons of mass destruction.

And I just highlight the point that my colleague made in his presentation: We have got to focus Europeans on the threat that they face from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trespassing my own rule, but the only thing that I got from allies whom I met in Afghanistan, as well as here is that they are somewhat miffed that once they did invoke Article 5, they were not, in fact, embraced and used immediately. And I found that to be a diplomatic problem in terms of my discussions with them. But the—

Mr. GROSSMAN. May I say, I think that that was probably true, with all due respect, kind of September and October. But if you see where we are now, with the collective response of NATO, AWACS and ships, and then with the number of allies that are fighting with us in Enduring Freedom, the number of allies and aspirants that are in ISAF, the number of allies that have provided all these kinds of rights, I mean, it may not be that everything started as fast as everybody wanted. And part of it also is that I think we kind of blew off, a little bit, the NATO AWACS. I mean, people at first, said, "Oh, it's no big deal."

But as you said in your opening statement, it was a big deal. So as I said, it took time to get some traction, but when you now have collective and individual responses of allies, I think we are doing a lot better.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is the blowback again, and I yield to the Senator, we are saying that we do not want to be part of ISAF, and they are saying, "Whoa, wait a minute." But I will go to that later. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that a statement by the committee's Ranking Member, Senator Helms, be placed at the start of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator LUGAR. I thank the Chair.

Secretary Feith, I appreciate your four ideas on capabilities. And I want to center on the last two; communication and information, weapons or equipment and modern weapon systems.

The Senate has heard, recently, testimony by a young member of our Special Forces, who was in Afghanistan. He described, among other things, communication gear that allowed him to bring air power over a target that he had designated with special gear and provided its coordinates, he called in the requisite aircraft, and they destroyed the enemy with a precise hit.

Now, I mention this because without going into more elaborate detail from a classified briefing, this illustrated for many of us the equipment and communications dilemma of NATO.

For example, NATO countries have special forces; many of them highly trained, extraordinarily capable, but without the lift capacity to get the special forces to the scene, in this case Afghanistan; or the communications equipment and targeting equipment, or finally, the aircraft, they are unable to deploy sophisticated tactics. We had aircraft being deployed to attack targets just as if they were taxicabs being summoned to the Hart Building. An extraordinary way in which a war is being fought, which most of us still only barely comprehend, and the American people have really not been introduced to it. But this is at the heart of the issue.

Now, how do we work with NATO allies so that they are able to produce either the equipment to locate the enemy, the communication gear, quite apart from the aircraft with precision munitions that have the ability in a humane way, to eliminate the target without civilian casualties or unintended consequences?

Should we create a united fund, in which the United States and various European countries collectively provide capital? And do we begin to have production facilities for such equipment in other NATO countries? Should we share with our allies the extraordinary expertise and technical capabilities that underlie this breakthrough?

Secretary Feith, I ask this question because you have touched on a critical question, but the solution to it, given classification, given all of the intellectual property issues, quite apart from the security issues, is really quite profound, even if absolutely necessary, if everybody is to contribute.

I mention this because as I said in my statement, special forces without the gear, equipment, aircraft, or the lift capability, are limited to very limited missions.

Can you give any insight as to how you think we might begin to make headway? I do not ask you for the solution, because I know you and the Secretary of State and others are working very arduously in these areas, attempting to think about Prague.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, the attempt, a few years ago, to address this problem was the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which, looking back, we think was not as successful as it might have been, partly because it was diffuse. There were so many capabilities cited as deficient, that we did not concentrate attention on the highest priority problems.

Senator LUGAR. There were 58, apparently, on the list.

Mr. FEITH. And one of the ways that we are going about this, addressing this problem now, in the hope that we can actually get some of these problems fixed, is to narrow our focus to the highest priority problems. That is why I wanted to emphasize these four categories of deficiencies.

Another thought that we have is it is time to set deadlines. And we are going to be working with the allies to see if we cannot talk about performance the ways serious people talk about performance, with real time lines to accomplish different jobs. And we also want to try to use the summit meeting in Prague to get the highest level of commitment.

And one of the things we find is, you get a bunch of Defense Ministers sitting around a table, they are all happy to talk about a commitment to higher defense spending and remedying deficiencies. It is not that hard to get Defense Ministers to support that. But the Defense Ministers cannot always deliver. And working to get the heads of government committed to these goals, we think, is an important step, also.

You have raised a number of other ideas, talking about the usefulness of sharing expertise, technology, and the like. Those are also good ideas and are, I think, part of the solution to this problem.

And overall, what I think we also need to address is an attitudinal problem within the Alliance: the notion that there is something belittling about a country having less than the full range of military capabilities. Specialization is sometimes considered a dirty word, but I think it does not make a whole lot of sense that every country within the Alliance should have the full range of capabilities.

This is sometimes, when this topic is raised, it is the response of some of our Allies, is America wants to do the high end work and wants to leave, you know, the clean-up, as I think you and the chairman referred to it earlier, leave the cleanup or the less glamorous tasks to the allies. That is not at all the case. And specialization does not mean that the United States would have a monopoly on the high-end work. We would be delighted if some of our allies could provide some of the highest-end military capabilities to the Alliance. And we should work toward that. But it does not have to be the case that every one of our allies has strategic lift capability.

I mean, if we could get some countries specializing in lift and other countries specializing in other aspects, that could be a way of addressing this deficiencies problem and could help us make sure that our allies are spending smart and not just spending more.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. In his visit to Texas last year, what did President Putin discuss and what did he express about his concerns over the expansion of NATO next year?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I have to refresh myself, Senator Nelson, about the specific conversations in Texas. What I can tell you is that it is my impression that this was not a main subject of conversation, it was not a subject of controversy; and that for their own reasons,

I think the Russians have come to realize that the first NATO expansion added to stability in Europe, made better the relationship between Russia and some of the new members, and Russia and NATO; and that President Putin, like many of us, has focused hard on the war on terrorism.

Senator NELSON. Will this be a discussion item when the President goes, Memorial Day, to Russia?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I think it would not be a discussion, in the sense we have to be very careful that we are not asking the Russians for permission to expand. We are not consulting with the Russians on our expansion. I would be very surprised if the President would not take the opportunity and perhaps give President Putin a report on where things stand in the Alliance.

But I want to be very clear, here, that we would not want to put ourselves in a position of even looking like we were asking that question of the Russians.

Senator NELSON. The most recent countries that came in, what have we learned from their entry? Have their defense budgets met the expectations? And how about the political and military aspects of their admittance?

Mr. GROSSMAN. First, I think the answer to your question is, have they met our expectations? And the answer is yes, in my view. I mean, these countries got involved in NATO, and 3 weeks later they were at war in Kosovo. And so, they are living proof that they did not join a country club.

They have all contributed in the Balkans. They have all contributed in Afghanistan, both to the larger war and to ISAF.

Have their defense budgets met the standards that we would like to see? No. Everybody's defense budgets, with perhaps the exception of the United States, ought to go up. I mean, if you look at the chart of NATO defense spending, too many of our NATO allies are under 2 percent. And we need to increase defense spending for everybody. I would also say that in terms of the politics of the expansion, that worked out extremely well, also.

When the President visited Warsaw last year, one of the things that every single Pole told him was that their relations with Russia had never been better since they joined the Alliance.

We also saw that there were a lot of internal and intra-controversies between those countries that got settled in the weeks running up and the months running up to their accession.

So, I think the presentation that we made, that they ought to have become members, the decision that the Senate took to amend the treaty to make them members, as we look back on it, was the right decision.

If I might say one other thing, Senator Nelson, it is that we have got a better process this time, which is, I think, that one of the great lessons we learned, was to have a Membership Action Plan and a Membership Action Program. And we did not have that last time.

We made good judgments and it turned out right, but we are better off, now, having a much better and longer and stricter set of criteria.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing this morning. We are grateful for your service and your leadership.

Secretary Feith, I want to read back one of the points you made in your testimony. From your prepared statement on page 5, "To achieve these goals, we believe that allies should seek both to increase defense spending and to use their resources more effectively by pooling efforts. At Prague, the United States will also seek agreements to streamline NATO's command and force structure. As you know, the United States is changing its own Unified Command Plan. Likewise, NATO should ensure that its command and force structures are reorganized for 21st century missions."

What is happening with that effort? Can you report any progress? What's going on? Is there a panel? Is there a task force? Are we leading that, or what is actually tangibly occurring to address these issues, especially in light of what both of you have mentioned this morning, as has been mentioned by my colleagues, the wide and widening gap of capability? So, where are we?

Mr. FEITH. Senator, there is work underway; analysis of how the NATO command structure can be modified and simplified. There are studies that we have been working on within the Pentagon. We are talking with the allies about them. There is a general sense that NATO is a little top-heavy. And there are ways of flattening the organization and rationalizing it, that will eliminate a lot of wasteful bureaucracy. And we have begun the consultation process with the allies. It is going to intensify in the defense ministerial meetings that are coming up in a few weeks.

Senator HAGEL. So, we are at the study phase.

Mr. FEITH. Well, we have done studies. We are actually in the phase of engaging our allies in talking about specific changes that we are going to be proposing.

Senator HAGEL. To actually have NATO do what the United States is doing, and some of the recent decisions that we have made, in fact, are changing some of Unified Command structure—

Mr. FEITH. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Would you anticipate that we are a year away from NATO command structure changes, or what would you put as a time line?

Mr. FEITH. I do not have that schedule in mind. I know that there is a schedule. I just happen not to have it in my head.

Senator HAGEL. When we are talking about that universe of change command, address the challenges of the 21st century, which we have heard much about today, which you both live with daily, the widening gap of capability and all of the consequences that flow from that. Then, in addition to that, we are talking about, most likely, inviting new members in NATO.

I happen to be one, as you both know, who thinks it is a good idea to do that. So, my question should not be interpreted as slighting off that position I have had since I have been in the Senate.

But is there some inconsistency here? As you have noted, Secretary Feith, you say, "Our first goal at Prague must be to begin to remedy the capabilities deficiencies within NATO," what we are

talking about, but yet we are going to load NATO up with more members.

Is that a complicating factor to what we are trying to accomplish here: to reinstitute a more capable organization to deal with the new complexities of the challenges of this new century? Is it contradictory? Or maybe you could give me an answer to that.

Mr. FEITH. Senator, I do not believe it is contradictory. The Alliance is a complex organism. And we need to do more than one thing at a time within it. Addressing the capabilities problem, I think, we all agree, everybody who has spoken on the subject this morning agrees, is the top priority project for the Alliance.

At the same time, there are other very high priority projects for us, if we are going to preserve the well being, the relevance, the capabilities of the Alliance, and enhance the security of the Atlantic community. And expansion of members is one of those things.

I see no contradiction at all between the effort to expand members and the effort to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance. If we do the expansion properly, it will contribute to additional capabilities.

We saw, with the last expansion, that NATO had greater capability. The new allies came in and contributed valuably to the operations that Secretary Grossman just cited in the Balkans, in Afghanistan. New members have the ability to be not a drag on resources, but a revitalizing and valuable contribution to the Alliance.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Gentlemen, you have both said that invoking Article 5 was an important thing and that the NATO allies contributed to the war on terrorism, but I have heard, also, I think, in your words, some disappointment in the gap between what different members can do and what the United States had to do in responding to terrorism. And I have heard recently from high-ranking Foreign Ministers in Europe that they are deeply disappointed in the way the United States responded to the invocation of Article 5 and now believe it was a mistake to invoke it at all.

And I think we are all saying the same things in, perhaps, slightly different ways. Is the gap just so great, now, that it is inevitable that when action is called for, we have to disregard NATO and send a message to them that they are just not important in our national security pursuits?

Mr. FEITH. Senator, I do not believe that we have to disregard NATO, and I do not believe that we did disregard NATO.

Senator SMITH. But Secretary Grossman indicated that we could have done some things better. What could we have done better?

Mr. FEITH. Well, let me, if I may, having played a role in this issue, I think that it might be useful to offer you a worms-eye point of view on this particular subject of how we dealt with the allies in the days after September 11.

We received, from the allies, an impressive and gratifying, spontaneous outpouring of offers of support after September 11. These came at a time when the entire United States, not least the Government, was stunned by an attack that nobody expected. We were

quickly organizing a response. We were organizing a war in a place that we did not expect to go to war before that. There was an enormous amount going on. And pulling together the efforts of the whole government, working with CENTCOM to develop the war plan, was an enormous challenge. And as you recall, after being attacked, we actually went to war within a month, having had no plan for going to war in Afghanistan.

This involved a lot of work, to put it mildly. And while we were doing that work, we were giving thought to how we could best make use of these very generous offers that we got from many allies, but it was not the easiest thing in the world to organize the receipt of those offers, the integration of those forces, into our own war effort. It took a little time.

We have since organized for excellent relations down in Tampa, at CENTCOM, where we have liaison officers from numerous countries, from the NATO Alliance and outside. And that system is working extremely well, now. And I think if you talk to any of the NATO allies or the other coalition members and ask them how that operation is going, where General Franks is running this "coalition village" and his people meet daily with the coalition representatives down there, they say it is going extremely well.

I cannot say that it went extremely smoothly and well from day one, because nothing in the government, regarding the war, went extremely smoothly and brilliantly from day one. It was a hectic and difficult time in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack.

I think a lot of the comments that you are hearing are actually vestiges of the few weeks immediately after September 11. We have worked on integrating—I mean, it is hard enough within the U.S. Government to integrate the actions of different combatant commanders, let alone different countries, in an effort like that—within weeks of the kind of attack that we suffered on September 11.

We have managed to do so. We are taking advantage of allied forces that have been made available to Operation Enduring Freedom. We are now benefiting from it enormously. I believe the allies have the opportunity to take a role of significance in the war. And they are doing so, and we are grateful for it. And I think they are, as I said, if you were to check with them now, you would find that they are quite gratified.

One other point that I would make about this that helps explain some of the comments, there is an interesting phenomenon among coalition partners, and that is a phenomenon that we recognize from our own experience within the U.S. Government. Not every part of every government speaks all that clearly and well and easily to every other part of the government. And one of the things we have found is that the liaison officers, the military officers that are representing coalition partners down in Tampa, are thoroughly wired in with CENTCOM, but there are sometimes problems that what they know and are being told is not necessarily getting back to the Foreign Ministries or the Prime Minister's office in those countries.

And one of the things that we discovered is that to keep our coalition partners informed and happy, we have to not only rely on the

liaison people down in Tampa, but have direct contacts from Washington with the other offices of their government. Because one of the things that they were complaining about, when they said, you know, "We, as a coalition partner, we are not being informed," they were complaining about lacking information that, in fact, their liaison people had in Florida, but they have their own internal communications issues.

So, I think we are doing a whole lot better on that subject now. And I actually think the situation is quite good. But there was a sense, in the first weeks of the war, that some of the allies did not feel that they were being responded to as quickly as they would have liked.

Senator SMITH. Do you have a comment on that?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I do, Senator Smith. If you would allow me, I will just make two short comments—three.

One is I agree with Doug. As I tried to say to the chairman, I think a lot of this is sort of vestige of things from last September and October.

Second, though, a very important point that he makes, without the 50 years of practice and working together that NATO brought to the 11th of September and afterwards, we would still be trying to set up all of these arrangements. I mean, as confusing, and perhaps it is not as perfect as it was, without 50 years of practice of this, it would never have happened.

And third, I just wanted to pick up on one question that was imbedded in yours, which is, is this capabilities gap inevitable? And I think the answer to that question is no, but we ought to get on this fast. And the reason I say no is that some of the capabilities that we have been talking about are not mysteries. They are: buy more ships, buy more planes, buy some communications, make sure you can sustain people once you get them to the fight. This is not a mystery. These are things that you have to spend your money on.

Senator SMITH. Well, gentlemen, I think Senator Lugar has offered some ideas. I do not know if they are right or they are wrong, but I think they ought to be seriously considered, because the truth is, if the gap is not closed, then it is going to be irrelevant in how you fight and defend your nation; NATO is going to become less relevant.

I also think we have got to have a more focused purpose. I mean, it used to be the Soviet Union. Today it is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. And that ought to be clearly stated at Prague.

And, Mr. Chairman, if I may have permission to ask one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator SMITH. It will be brief.

I am concerned, as we bring in a whole lot of new members, all of whom I am anxious to see a part of this coalition, that we do not have a mechanism in NATO for, frankly, suspending or expelling members that may simply stray away from values that the Western civilian includes.

As we look at the rise of ultra-rightists or racists or people who would expel Jews, not return their property, these kind of things, ultimately, as we take in new countries whose democratic tradi-

tions are just being born, I think we need to really consider if there ought not to be a mechanism for inclusion in NATO, because if it is not about values, it is not about much.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Senator Smith. It is about values. And that is what this is about, because it is about defending values.

I have been giving this question a huge amount of thought. Senator Lugar and I have talked about it on a number of occasions. Here is where I have come to on this question of suspending or putting in a mechanism to kick people out of the Alliance. One, we have got a lot better process now, it seems to me, for bringing people in. As I tried to say to Senator Nelson, I think the MAP process gives us a much better feel for who it is that we are taking in, what their challenges are, what their opportunities are.

Two, that we have made utterly and totally explicit the fact that values and democracy and long-term commitment to democracy matter, and you are not getting in the door unless there is a commitment to democracy.

But third, and here is the part I am debating, is if you have a process for suspending people or kicking people out, what I worry about is then it drives people to the bottom. Everybody is trying to meet those minimum standards. How do I keep here?

Whereas, with the NATO treaty and NATO being an Alliance of values, we ought to be making sure that people meet the highest standard. And I have to tell you that the only way I can figure out to keep people meeting the highest standards, is to keep them in, and not figure out a way to kick them out. And this is a conversation we are going to have to have lots more, because that is not a complete answer, but it is where I have come to at the moment.

I did a little research over the last few weeks, and if you look back at some of the things that were said about Greece and Turkey, for example, in 1951, when they became members of the Alliance, "Oh," people said, "it is too far away. They cannot possibly manage the Alliance. They are not really like us in culture or tradition." And I think the fact that Greece and Turkey have been in the Alliance for 50 years has been a good thing for them and has raised their standards, rather than lowered them.

So, I do not want to rush to the bottom. And my worry is, given the way bureaucracies and human beings work, as soon as you set that lower standard, that is where everybody is going to head.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. It is very instructive. And I very much appreciate your remarks and those of Senator Lugar, and I associate myself with them. I thank Secretary Feith and Secretary Grossman for your comments.

Secretary Grossman, your remarks about how historic and appropriate it is that this meeting is in Prague in October of this year, it struck me, as well, while I was Governor, we were on a trade mission, and Westvaco had made an investment, it is a Virginia company, an investment in the Czech Republic. We were going into a building to try to get the Czechs to get an agreement with the Slovaks, so, thereby, Westvaco could get the export from the Czech Republic into Poland, but Poland wanted that deal with the Slo-

vaks, which also helped out the mill in Covington, Virginia, and so, showing all of these deals being done.

And we go into this building, which was, it was maybe about an 80-year-old building. It was an old bank. And this was where the Czech Ministry of Commerce and Trade was located. And I walked in, and you saw a Star of David, with a wreath on it. And I said, "What is this here for?"

And it was in memory of the killing, murder of many Jews. And they said that this was once a bank, before the Nazis took it over. And when the Nazis took it over, this was where the SS headquarters were. Then, after the Communists took over, that was a Communist office building.

I was thinking, "What great progress is being made, that we are talking about something as simple as paper products being transported."

And more and more people, obviously, diverse cultures and people in Central Europe are now enjoying the sweet taste of the nectar of freedom. And this is all very, very positive.

That is why I am a supporter of the enlargement of NATO, and signed onto this bill, Senate bill 1572, because I think NATO, with all of the problems we are talking about here, has had a positive impact. I think it will help bring more peace and stability. And I also think it will enhance freedom and advance freedom when terrorism remains a constant threat.

I think it is vital, some of the issues were mentioned for expanding the NATO Alliance, as to the threat of global terrorism. We see that this threat is a more multifaceted threat. Yes, military is important; logistics, intelligence. Those sort of efforts are important, as well as there are corridors. I think it also a good signal to these nations that have battled back from dictatorships and communism. They have made tremendous strides; some in different ways, but strides, as far as freedom.

Now, these countries also want to, not just taste the sweet nectar of freedom, they also want to be responsible; responsible in securing it for themselves and for their neighbors in Europe, as well as for this country.

And then, as far as militarily, on the southern region of Europe, with that enlargement approach, that would provide a bridge with the central part of the Alliance with Greece and Turkey.

There are also a lot of improvements in business, such as, as far as Virginia companies, Phillip-Morris is the second largest U.S. investor in Lithuania; not necessarily for Marlboros, but for Kraft Foods there. And they are the No. 1 taxpayer in Latvia. They have business interests in Romania. There are Virginia information technology corporations that have business in Romania. All of those who have come to me have had positive remarks and experiences in Romania.

Now, Secretary Grossman, you have visited these 8, at least 8 of the allies in Brussels. And what I would like to know is, as we are going forward with this MAP or this, I want to use the right term, the Membership Action Plan, which comes up with an objective criteria for membership, requiring military modernization, economic/political reform, and so forth. No. 1, what are the reactions of our European existing members in NATO? And if you could, share with

us how various interested countries, such as Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and other aspirants, are progressing to fulfill the requirements of the Membership Action Plan.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

First, I thank you very much for your comments. As I did in my statement, I just also would like to join you in another pitch for S. 1572, for the Freedom Consolidation Act. We would like to see that passed in a bipartisan way.

The other thing I would agree with you completely, also, is that we need to look at a multifaceted response to terrorism. And one of the things that we have all looked at, not only in NATO countries, but in aspirant countries, is how they have responded, for example, to U.N. Security Council 1373, on the financing of terrorism, and what they are doing in the intelligence and law enforcement fields. And, here, I think we have seen a lot of progress, as well.

In terms of views, first, of our allies, in terms of expansion, what I found on my trip was that there is a consensus forming around President Bush's view that we ought to have as robust an enlargement as possible. It ought to be as big as possible. There is nobody yet, thank goodness, ready to name names. We are way too soon, I think, to name names, because people have a lot more work to do. But I think, generally, when I went around, people felt that a bigger rather than a smaller enlargement would be good for all of the reasons that you cited.

Second, in terms of what we have found in terms of the aspirant countries, the aspirant countries are working away on their Membership Action Plan, but every single one of them has more work to do. And that is why we are not ready to name names. People have more work to do in the military area. As you said, they have maybe more work to do in the democracy area. People have issues about security and the sanctity of NATO documents.

So, there are a whole range of things that are yet to be accomplished, but Nick Burns, when he was around in all of the aspirant countries, laid this out pretty clearly; said they had more work to do. And the thing that gratifies us is that every single one of them seems to want to do the work.

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, if I may followup?

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Senator ALLEN. I guess if you are having this for a school report card, you just get a final grade. It would be good to know where they are.

It is, first, encouraging to hear that our NATO allies in Europe are, as you said, a consensus is forming that it ought to be a larger enlargement, as opposed to a smaller enlargement.

I am not going to pressure you to name names. I could understand that. Secretary General Robertson asked not to start backing particular ones. Do you foresee progress, though, that by October, there will be sufficient action taken, that there would be the evidence, the progress, the developments along these requirement lines, that there could be a larger enlargement of NATO?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator ALLEN. Good. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. As I said, you have always been available, and you know we will continue to call on you.

I would like to make one brief comment before I bring the second panel up on a slightly different subject; but what triggered my thinking was a comment made by you, Mr. Secretary. And I am not expecting any of you to comment on this, but that is the cooperation of the U.N. on terrorism.

I would like to make the point, I am going to be making a longer speech on the floor of the Senate about this today, that all of the furor over "the massacre in Jenin" and the U.N. sending a, wanting to send an investigative team. I know all three of the people that Kofi now is suggesting to send. Two of those people are what you might call, had less than a sympathetic view toward Israel, that they have expressed over years. I tried to get a hold of Kofi, the Secretary-General, to hope that he would expand that team, if we were going to be a team, so there was more, it was fair.

But, second, I would also point out that it is interesting the Palestinians and the Fatah chief now is arguing that it was not a massacre but a victory for the Palestinian people. And I quote from today's Washington Times, which I seldom do, "Jenin, West Bank. Palestinian officials yesterday put the death toll at 56 in the 2-week Israeli assault on Jenin, dropping claims of a massacre of 500 that had sparked demands for U.N. investigation. The official Palestinian body count, which is not disproportionate to the 33 Israeli soldiers killed in the incursion, was disclosed by"—and I am embarrassed, I cannot pronounce the name of the official—"the director of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement for the northern West Bank, after a team of four Palestinian-appointed investigators reported to him in his Jenin office."

So, I think we should have prospected this so-called massacre. And I would note that the United Nations, and I am, as you know, a strong supporter of the United Nations, I think they shoot themselves in the foot frequently, like this team that was being put together. And I know he's a great man, Kofi Annan. I have great respect for him, but I think it was a serious mistake, the team he picked.

And the closing comment before you leave, so you hear my comments, not to respond though you are welcome to, if you wish—but the other point is that since the curfew has lifted, there have been hundreds of international press there. Now, if I want to keep something secret, the first thing I want is the U.N. team in and not reporters. If I worry about something being reported, the last folks I want are international reporters wandering all over the site. I find it fascinating that there were probably hundreds, I do not know how many international reporters. Every major news outlet in the world has sent their "best" to Jenin. I have not seen any reports about the stench of bodies coming from the rubble and the rest.

So, I hope we, and I know the President has, but I hope we keep in perspective a little bit of what is happening and not jump to conclusions.

But, again, as a supporter of the United Nations, I am occasionally frustrated by the ineptness in the way in which they proceed, but I did not want to say that in your absence. But I am not asking you to comment. You are welcome to comment. You are both good diplomats, otherwise I will recommend that you not comment.

I thank you both very, very much. And I will call the next panel of witnesses.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army, retired, former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, The Stephens Group, he now represents, but he is representing himself here.

Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, U.S. Army, retired, former Director of National Security Agency, Yale University and the Hudson Institute.

I welcome you both. And as you know, this committee, and I, in particular, have an inordinately high regard for both of you. You are two of the best. I have to say this while folks are moving out; I have said this to both of you before, when I got here as a 29-year-old kid, during the Vietnam war, my image of every general in the United States military was someone like that movie—what was that movie? Doctor No?

STAFF MEMBER. Dr. Strangelove.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; where there is a general on top of a bomb, smoking a cigar, riding down on an atom bomb. And I have found, over my career, that the single most informed group of people I have come across are you guys with stars and bars on your epaulets. And we have two of the finest before us today.

And if the room does not clear shortly, I will say more nice things about you, but really and truly, it is an honor to have you both here. I know you have gone out of your way to adjust your schedules to be here.

Why do I not begin in the order in which you were called? General Clark, welcome; great to have you back. And we are anxious to hear from you.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE; THE STEPHENS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC**

General CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I did prepare a statement. I would like to just summarize from it if I could.

First, I want to thank you on behalf of all of the men and women who have served in the military for your dedicated attention to our foreign policy needs and especially for your support of NATO. It has meant a lot to me personally and to all of us who have served there throughout the years.

Of course, as the hearing has acknowledged, there are many questions about NATO today including its possible enlargement and its relationship with Russia, its continued role in the Balkans. And each of these is an important question. But the fundamental question is different.

That is a question about NATO's purpose and whether NATO is going to simply become a cold war relic which is usefully maintained as one channel of communication to our friends in Europe,

or whether it is going to serve a vital purpose in facing the ongoing and fundamental challenge to American security that we face today, including the threat of international terrorism.

The answer to this important question is not yet resolved, not today, not in Washington, not in the administration. Yet on this answer hangs the perspective and the basis from which to address all of the other questions about NATO's membership, relationships, and the scope of its activities. And the answers to these, in turn, will determine whether NATO has value and even whether it survives as an organization.

When we launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, we faced a worldwide challenge and threat, the challenge of Marxism-Leninism, the threat of the Red army. We knew that the United States could not survive if the Continent of Europe were occupied by a power hostile to us, and we fought two world wars to prevent it. We recognized we could not meet the challenges and threat of the cold war unless our wartime allies recovered and resumed their place alongside us.

Now, at that point, we recognized our European allies were weak, their economies wrecked, their militaries consumed, their morale and expectations shattered, but we organized, supported and led these countries, recognizing their sovereign prerogatives. Consulting repeatedly, we gained the consensus required to meet the challenges of the day.

NATO was the principal framework for these consultations and for the exchange of information. It was never a collection of equals, but in fact, it was a collection of a group of equals in law. And we acted on the principle of unanimity and we recognized NATO as the essential underpinning for our actions.

At the end of the cold war, when some predicted NATO's demise, urgent problems of instability and conflict in Europe forced NATO reform and evolution. And with the support and encouragement from this committee, NATO did evolve and change, and NATO also acted, as you all know and supported, helping to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, going to war to halt and reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and subsequently establishing the peace implementation force there to provide stability en route to a final status.

NATO in all of these actions, some completed, some ongoing, has been remarkably successful. Today we are facing another challenge: the resentment, despair, and hatred fueled by extremism and poverty, and the threat of international terrorism. And it should already be clear that the United States cannot face this challenge and defeat this threat alone.

We prevailed in the cold war by organizing our friends in Europe. And if we are to prevail today, we are going to need the strong and full commitment of those same allies.

Now much has been made this morning of the so-called capabilities gap. I am very much aware of that gap. I participated in some of the initial work that went into the Defense Capabilities Initiative. But to be quite honest, we lack the proper analytical framework, and we vastly overstated the requirements, when we are dealing with the forces and capabilities of our European allies. The

Alliance was never an organization of equals. We never sought, nor should we seek, mirror images of forces.

We worked in the 1990s to create a new command structure for NATO so that it could operate beyond the NATO area. We call it the Combined Joint Task Force. We organized it, voted on it, exercised it, and we have even funded it. And its equipment is coming on. I have heard no discussion about using this in the most obvious place, in the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan where, in fact, it could be very carefully used.

And when we look at the Defense Capabilities Initiatives, it is true: there were 58 initiatives, and they were overstated. What we need to do instead is, we need to go back to the fundamentals of NATO. What is it militarily we expect the Alliance to do today? I would submit that it is not to be measured in terms of armies, navies, and air forces. Rather it is to be measured in terms of operational tasks.

We know we have to be able to take down enemy air defenses and air defense networks. We have to be able to destroy command centers. We have to be able to attack and defeat land forces. We have to be able to fight in urban areas to finish the job. And we have to handle the post-conflict operation. These are five combat tasks. They can be performed by any combination of service members or service members from differing services or differing nations.

We should be using these as a basis for organizing NATO's forces, not the methods we have been using of the cold war. And then, from that basis, we can logically draw the requirements.

And I very much support what former Assistant Secretary Kramer gave in terms of sharpening the focus. We need some special forces with communications, with laser rangefinders, and with the kind of courage and hardiness to get in there up front.

Every nation does not need a B-2. Every nation does not need satellites. Every nation does not need the long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. We can share this. What we desperately need is an organizing rationale for our forces and a purpose.

But let me go beyond where this discussion has gone so far. I believe we would be making a classic and egregious mistake if we believe that the allied contribution is measured by the strength and capabilities of the Armed Forces or even those that they commit to NATO. It is not and cannot be.

Now some have included the nonforce contributions, such as bases, facilities, and access rights. But even this is not enough. Bombs, bullets, and bases alone are not going to be adequate to win the war against terrorism. And in some ways it may be counterproductive in facing the broader challenges that the United States is going to face in the 21st century.

Instead of just looking for additional manpower, ships, and aircraft, we need to focus on the problems of eliminating al-Qaeda through the exchange of information and sensitive intelligence, through the harmonization of legal and judicial standards and procedures and the coordination of law enforcement activities. We need to make the international environment as seamless for our counterterrorist efforts as it is seamless to the terrorists themselves.

However, exchanges of information, harmonization, coordination of activities are extraordinarily difficult. There is no international organization to do this. In fact, even though this is mentioned in the NATO strategic concept, the United States' position in the past has always been: We would prefer to do this bilaterally.

The problem is that you cannot have effective coordination when every different agency of the U.S. Government is working bilaterally with 10, 15, 20 different governments. Getting this coordination involves compromises in long-standing procedures, changes in laws, and probably a perceived sacrifice of sovereignty.

Definitions of crime, standards of evidence, requirements for extradition, many other aspects of the overall systems of law enforcement and judicial processes must be worked. That is the only way we are going to ever be able to root out the networks, indict and punish the perpetrators, and prevent the use of our allies and other democratic states as forward bases and staging grounds for continuing attacks on us.

Beyond simply attacking al-Qaeda and Afghanistan and elsewhere, we have to ensure we maintain our legitimacy throughout the process. And we must concert our work in dealing with conditions in failed states wherever poverty and extremism may provide the breeding grounds for future threats.

And all of this is simply more than the United States can do by itself. In fact, U.S. efforts that are perceived as unilateral can set us back in our efforts. We need to work with and through multinational institutions, taking full advantage of the backing of international law and seeking the deepest possible commitments from our friends and allies.

The experience of over 40 years suggests that all this work is best concerted in institutional, rather than ad hoc, relationships. As we heard in a previous panel, military liaison is not enough. It has to be imbedded at every level of the government. It has to go from the top down.

If we did not have NATO, we would be in the process of inventing it or reinventing it today. But I think NATO, if it were properly utilized, could provide the institutional framework that we need. We did reference terrorism in the 1999 strategic concept. The NATO machinery is a time-proven consensus engine. It forces nations to grasp issues and resolve them in a timely manner.

There has been a lot of discussion about what the real meaning of the Kosovo campaign was. And I have been told by some high-ranking members of the Defense Department and other places that they have learned the lessons of Kosovo, and nobody is going to tell us what we can or cannot do. They prefer flexible arrangements rather than institutional arrangements.

But the simple truth is that it was the consensus engine of NATO that enabled us to break the will of Slobodan Milosevic and his Russian backers during the Kosovo campaign. Working with allies is always difficult because, when you deal with them as sovereign nations, they all have their own sovereign opinions. And yet what we found in Kosovo was that the use of NATO was the way to get the camel into the tent with us. We let them stick their nose into the tent. They came into it. And when they came to us and

said, "Please, you cannot fail at this or our governments will fall," then we knew we had allied support.

The question we have to ask ourselves is: What needs to be done to ensure today that in capitals in our closest allies, they are treating this problem just as seriously as we are? And what I would suggest is that it needs to be worked through institutional channels and that NATO is the most important and central institution in this process. It can give us the vital edge in winning, just as it did during the cold war.

Can we operate beyond contiguous areas? Yes. Can we survive if we admit five or seven or more new members? Yes. Can we establish a NATO at 20 relationship with Russia and still remain NATO? Yes, but only if NATO remains a centerpiece of American security efforts worldwide. Together with our European allies, we are close to 700 million people. We are one-half of the world's gross domestic product. We are three of five vetoes on the European Security Council.

These allies in NATO constitute our base. It is not a matter of collecting forces. It is a matter of mobilizing our base. With NATO we can move the world. We can move it successfully. And we can move it with legitimacy. The alternative, of course, is to play with the form of NATO, to preserve the myth, as some would say, but to do the real work elsewhere.

If that is to be the American approach, then NATO can be enlarged. It can be altered. It can be showcased. But it will inevitably lose its relevance and vitality. And the greatest impact of that loss will be felt not abroad, but here, for NATO has been our creation, our instrument, and vital to the United States. We need it every bit as much today in the current challenge as we have in the past.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. I think that was a brilliant statement.

[The prepared statement of General Clark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I know I speak on behalf of all the men and women who have served in the military in thanking you for your dedicated attention to our foreign policy needs and activities, and especially your support of NATO.

There are many questions about NATO today, including its possible enlargement, its relationship with Russia, and its continued role in the Balkans. I believe each of these is important. But the fundamental question is different. It is about NATO's purpose, and whether it is simply a Cold War relic which is usefully maintained as one channel of communications to our European friends, or whether it serves a vital purpose in facing the ongoing and fundamental challenges to American security, including the threat of international terrorism.

The answer to this important question is not yet resolved, not today, and not in Washington. Yet on this answer hangs the perspective from which to address questions about NATO's membership, relationships, and scope of activities. And the answers to these will in turn prove NATO's value and even determine its survival.

When the United States launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, the United States and its friends faced a world-wide challenge and threat, the challenge of Marxism-Leninism and the threat of the Red Army. We knew then that the United States could not survive if the continent of Europe were occupied by a power hostile to us—and we had fought two World Wars to prevent it. We also recognized that we could not meet the challenges and threat we were to face in the Cold War unless our wartime Allies recovered and resumed their place alongside us.

At the dawn of the Cold War we recognized the weakness of our European Allies, their economies wrecked, their militaries consumed, their morale and expectations

shattered amidst the bomb craters and casualties. But we organized, supported, and led these countries, recognized their sovereign prerogatives and consulted repeatedly to gain the degrees of consensus required to meet the challenges of the day. NATO was the principal framework for these consultations—never a collection of equals, but nevertheless acting on the principle of unanimity and recognized as essential underpinning for American actions and policies.

At the end of the Cold War, when some predicted NATO's demise, urgent problems of instability and conflict in Europe forced NATO reform and evolution with support and encouragement from this Committee. NATO created a new strategic concept, changed its force structure, revised its plans, created outreach to former enemies in the partnership for peace, developed new relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and brought in three new members. NATO also acted, with strong support from this Committee, helping to enforce the peace agreement in Bosnia, and going to war to halt and reverse Slobodan Milosevic's design for ethnic cleansing of the Serb province of Kosovo, an subsequently establishing the peace implementation force to provide stability en route to a final status determination for that province. NATO in all these actions, some completed, some ongoing, has been remarkably successful.

Today, the United States is faced with another world-wide challenge—resentment, despair and hatred fueled by extremism and poverty, and the threat of international terrorism. And it should already be clear that the United States cannot face this challenge and defeat this threat alone. We prevailed in the Cold War by organizing and leading our friends in Europe. We brought stability to Europe in the post-Cold War period in conjunction with allies and partners. And if we are to prevail today, the strong support and full commitment of our Allies will be required.

We would make a classic and egregious mistake if we were to believe that this Allied contribution is measured by the strength and capabilities of their armed forces. It is not, and cannot be. Some recognize that we must also include non-force contributions such as bases, facilities, and access rights in the classic Cold-War burdensharing type of discussion. But even this is not enough. For bombs, bullets and bases alone will be inadequate to win a war against terrorism, and may well be counterproductive in facing the broader challenges of extremism and poverty.

Instead of just looking for additional manpower, ships and aircraft, we need to focus now on the problems of eliminating al-Qaeda through the exchange of information, the harmonization of legal and judicial standards and procedures, and the coordination of law enforcement activities. We need to make the international environment as seamless for our counterterrorist efforts must be at least as seamless as that environment is for the terrorists.

But these exchanges, harmonization and coordination are extraordinarily difficult. They need the strongest possible encouragement, protection, and incentives. They will inevitably involve compromises in longstanding procedures, changes in laws, and some perceived sacrifice of sovereignty. Definitions of crimes, standards of evidence, requirements for extradition, and many other aspects of the overall systems of law enforcement and the judiciary must be worked. This is the only way that we will actually be able to root out the networks, indict and punish the perpetrators and prevent the use of our Allies and other democratic states as forward bases and staging areas for continuing attacks on us.

Beyond simply attacking al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and elsewhere with military and law enforcement methods, we must also insure that we maintain our "legitimacy" throughout the process. And we must concert our work in dealing with the conditions in failed states and wherever poverty and extremism may provide breeding grounds for future threats, as well as against those states who would acquire and proliferate to terrorists weapons of mass destruction.

All of this is simply more than the United States can do by itself. And, in fact, U.S. efforts which are perceived as "unilateralist" can even set us back. We need to work with and through multinational institutions, taking full advantage of the backing of international law, and seeking the deepest possible commitments from our friends and allies. And in Europe we have the strongest possible base, over 350 million people, a GDP as large as our own, and nations whose values most closely reflect our own.

And the experience of over forty years suggests that all of this work is best concerted in institutional rather than ad hoc relationships. The methods must be to gain commitments, to bind governments, to insure that these issues are so central to the governments themselves that they cannot afford to fail or neglect them.

NATO could today, if properly utilized, provide the institutional framework for the vast coordination and concerted activities that must be worked between states. The problem of international terrorism is in fact referenced in the 1999 Strategic Concept. The NATO machinery is a time-proven consensus engine, forcing nations to

grasp issues and resolve them in a timely manner. It was this consensus engine which enabled us to modernize nuclear forces during the Cold War, and it was this consensus engine which broke the will of Slobodan Milosevic and his Russian backers during the Kosovo campaign. To be sure, operating the Alliance and employing it for these tasks is arduous work. It certainly was during the Kosovo operation. But there is simply no better mechanism available for the task. Today, NATO could be central to our effort against terrorism, instead of peripheral, and it could today, just as in the Cold War, provide us the vital winning edge.

Can NATO operate beyond its contiguous areas? Can it survive if it admits five or even seven new members? Can it establish a NATO at twenty relationship with Russia and still "remain NATO?"

The answer to these questions is yes, but only if NATO remains a centerpiece of the American effort worldwide, if we tend it, consult with, and use it at the heart of operations.

The alternative is to play with the form, to "preserve the myth," as some would say, but to do the real work elsewhere. If that is to be the American approach, then NATO can be enlarged, altered, and showcased, but it will inevitably lose its relevance and vitality. And the greatest impact of that loss will be felt not abroad but here, for NATO has been our creation, and our instrument. . . . And we need it today as much or more than ever.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer questions of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. General Odom.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; YALE
UNIVERSITY AND THE HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON,
DC**

General ODOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be back and testifying—

The CHAIRMAN. It is nice to have you back, General.

General ODOM [continuing]. Before you again. I think it is a terribly important hearing, as other people have said. I endorse that enormously, because I have long been a great supporter of NATO. Senator Lugar and I have exchanged many common opinions and views on the first round of enlargement, and so it is good to be onto the second round now.

I have written a fairly long statement, which I will not read, but ask you to enter into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be placed in the record.

General ODOM. I will just touch on a few points in the name of shortening time, so you can spend more time for questioning than listening to me read.

I did try to draw a historical perspective, because I think it is important. It is important to realize, in light of some of the questions about missions that General Clark has raised and that Senator Lugar and others raised, the Alliance did not start out as a military alliance. In 1949, Truman stopped all the military planning. Every initiative to put forces in Europe was stopped. It became a military alliance only with the outbreak of the Korean war.

Senator Vandenberg was promised we would not put troops there to get him to sponsor the ratification of the alliance here. The purpose of NATO was, in fact, to put a political military authority over our allies in Western Europe so they would not fight each other, so they could cooperate in economic reconstruction. Europe has never been able to provide that kind of thing for itself. We gave them a surrogate. And after the Soviet military challenge became

central, we were continuing to perform this mission throughout the subsequent decades.

Today in Eastern Europe it looks very much like 1948. We have a band of states from north to south that do not like each other, have difficulties with each other, have different legacies. It was the destruction by a hot war as opposed to destruction by cold war Communist rule that created the differences. But again, NATO's purpose is bringing them under a supranational political military authority so they can begin to create these values that were emphasized by Secretary Grossman and others.

So I would just make that point for thinking about NATO's continuing missions.

The next point I wanted to raise is about countries to admit to NATO. I certainly strongly support 5, 7 if possible. I have questions about going further right now. I would like to emphasize a specific reason for admitting the Balkan countries. We do not have really a good framework for containing an outbreak of general hostilities in the Balkans. I think General Clark—I would be interested in his views on this, too.

Bosnia and Kosovo were not contiguous to the external borders of Yugoslavia. Therefore, containing them was easier than it would be if war broke out in Macedonia. You could see the Bulgarians and the Macedonians begin to dispute borders then, the Greeks, the Albanians, and others. Having Romania and Bulgaria in the Alliance gives us at least the building blocks for a larger framework. So I would emphasize that.

On the Baltic States, I am for their inclusion, and I will not repeat my points as to why.

On Russia, I do not think that deserves a lot of time now, because it has been pretty adequately covered. I will just say that I think President Putin has come to recognize what I remember discussing with Senator Biden here before the first round of NATO enlargement, that Russia's interests are served well by prosperity and security in the states between Russia and the central part of Europe. He does not have the military power or the economic power to provide either. Only NATO does. Therefore, Russia benefits from NATO enlargement.

Now to the missions: I agree with what has been said about new challenges. I may differ a little bit about how we go about achieving what General Clark wants to achieve, what I have heard you say, Senator Lugar, and others. Senator Brownback also emphasized this.

If we have a big open debate about this in NATO, it will end up with a lot of hot air and no real results. I have gone back and looked at some of the arguments in the 1950s and 1960s. And it is instructive. We have always had these debates. We have never achieved a consensus throughout the whole Alliance, period. It has been constantly a struggle to keep the Alliance behind simple policies.

I picked up Kissinger's old book, "The Troubled Partnership," 1965. And, you know, it is déjà vu. You would think we were right back to the arguments of that time. I am sure we could have had a hearing like this, we would have wrung our hands about the future of the Alliance.

So I have a more optimistic view about where we can go without a debate on NATO mission. But I do share the views, some of the points, that General Clark expressed, on institutional arrangements. It is my impression, as an outside observer, that the number of big NATO exercises, like Reforger were dropped in the 1990s. We also reduced troop levels rather dramatically.

If we want to run those kinds of training programs to maintain integrability standards, helping close the military capabilities gaps, I am not sure we have the capability to do so. Rather than talking about the new mission, he suggests, choosing skillfully exercises of the kind General Clark talked about with his strategic reserve force is a more promising way to bring NATO to accept it.

I mentioned in my testimony what may sound outlandish to some people, that the United States should take the initiative and run an exercise in place of a Reforger which picks up two divisions, moves them to Europe in 2 weeks, and force the Defense Department to begin to build the capabilities that would be required. They will realize that two divisions cannot get to Europe in 2 weeks unless we quadruple the number of C-17s, which the Defense Department realizes it needs more of, as a result of the stretch to Afghanistan.

I would then reverse the exercise and let the Europeans move heavy forces the same way to North America. If you started doing those kinds of things, you will end up creating a lot of the coordination, overcoming many of the gap capabilities that you discussed earlier and have been concerned about. I think we will never get everybody up to speed on NATO, but we will get a coalition of the willing that will come along. And then, if those capabilities are sufficiently exercised, when we have a particular problem, like Afghanistan, we will have to work the politics inside the Alliance, generating the consensus to do such an out-of-area kind of operation. But we will already have had the operation details for how to do it worked out.

I am not so sure that you will get the kind of interagency coordination General Clark wants through nonmilitary departments either here in the United States or among the allies. That seems to me to be a big stretch. Maybe that is something to look at way down the road. But right now, a lot of the capabilities issues and a lot of the debate about the future of NATO can be best dealt with by very vigorous program of military activities or the kind NATO once had but we dropped out of and have just not committed the resources to continue.

That is the main point I would emphasize there. And let me just end on that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Lt. General Odom follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you to discuss the wisdom of NATO enlargement. I would like to address four topics concerning this important issue: (1) historical perspective on contemporary challenges in absorbing more countries into the alliance; (2) how much to enlarge and why; (3) the Russia factor; and (4) NATO challenges.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Let me begin by offering some historical perspective. Europe's security needs today are similar to those of the period right after World War II. The end of the Cold War, like the end of that war, left a band of weak European states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, more connected by wars and ethnic conflicts than by cooperative relations, mutually suspicious, and uncertain about how to pursue postwar reconstruction. The debates in Europe about creating NATO at that time ignored the Soviet military threat while focusing more on economic reconstruction and fear of Germany. Even the United States saw the Soviet threat as more political than military until the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950. The initial purpose of the alliance, therefore, was not to "keep the Russians out," but "to keep old enemies in Western Europe from drifting back toward war" while proceeding with economic recovery.

Reconstruction in Western Europe, therefore, succeeded dramatically because traditional enemies—France and Germany—cooperated in the European Coal and Steel Community which was soon eclipsed by the European Economic Commission, based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This story is well known, but we tend to forget that it was only possible because the United States took a hegemonic role in the North Atlantic Alliance and maintained large military forces in Europe. This effectively made NATO a surrogate for a supranational political-military authority that could keep the peace, something modern Europe has never been able to do. Although the ensuing five decades have produced the European Union, this organization is a long way from being able to assume the governing role that NATO has played.

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Today's parallels to 1949 are striking when we consider Eastern Europe. Again, we see a band of states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean in economic distress, mistrustful of their neighbors because of nationalism and ethnic tensions, and uncertain about how to proceed. Their problems, however, differ somewhat from those faced by Western Europe in the 1940s and 50s. Rather than the destruction in war suffered by Western Europe, they confront a different kind of destruction, namely, the devastating legacies from Communist party rule, command economic systems, and Soviet hegemony. Let me describe each briefly.

Communist party rule. The Soviet regime-type had as its core a single dictatorial party tightly embracing the secret police and military officer corps. The post-communist leaders in these states mostly come from these old organizations, which socialized them in ways that are inimical to liberal democracy and market economies. Some are able to change sufficiently to play a positive role in the new political and economic systems, but many are not. The problem was different in Western Europe where the Nazi and fascist elites were deposed and destroyed. No Nazi Party was left to compete in elections. The old communist elites have not suffered the same fate; they survive in large numbers and lead successor communist parties and communist-like parties, actually winning office in a case or two. I am not suggesting that the communists are likely to re-establish durable communist regimes throughout the region (although Belarus and Moldova have such regimes, Bulgaria had one for a couple of years). They have neither the public support nor the organizational discipline necessary, but because they play a significant role in the politics of these countries, they obstruct and slowdown progress in effective reform.

Command economic systems. The old economic system in all of these countries squandered capital in unprofitable investments for four decades, making most of their industries unviable in a market economy. Perhaps more troublesome are the institutional legacies of command economies. Western Europe did not lose its old legal and economic institutions, but in Eastern Europe the communists destroyed them, such as they were; thus they must be rebuilt today. This is a much bigger challenge than anything faced in Western Europe after 1945.

Soviet hegemony. The effects of Soviet control over these countries were many, but the residue of a few of them is especially worrisome. A few former party, military, and intelligence officials, now well-placed within the post-communist regimes, still have personal connections with their old Russian counterparts. Not only does this allow Russian intelligence officers to make political trouble in these countries, but it also permits cooperative criminal activities with Russian intelligence and criminal circles. Western European communist parties after WW II, of course, caused some, but not all, of the same problems we see today in Eastern Europe.

Nationalism and ethnic tensions. Not something attributable to Soviet influence, these problems are most conspicuous in the breakup of Yugoslavia. To presume, as critics of NATO enlargement have done, that only Yugoslavia is afflicted by them is a dangerous illusion.

The history of Europe from the Protestant Reformation right up through WW II is a record of religious, ethnic, and nationalist strife. England's border with Scotland saw continuous war from 900 to 1746 with two brief pauses. No border in the Balkans can match that record!

It is frequently said that peace is now permanent in Western Europe, but such a claim may be premature. European leaders would have laid the foundations for future wars in 1990 had not the United States overruled them. Lady Margaret Thatcher and President Francois Mitterrand struggled to prevent the reunification of Germany. Suppose they had succeeded. Germany probably would have reunited anyway, quitting NATO and expelling U.S. troops, being furious at Britain and France, and more beholden to Moscow than Washington. That might also have allowed the Warsaw Pact to survive. British and French handling of the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s actually contributed to the spread of civil war in Yugoslavia. Unlike in the case of German reunification, the United States did not become involved and overrule until much too late.

In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia provides a picture of what will inexorably occur there over the next several years without NATO enlargement. The Hungarian minorities in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, Poles in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, the Roma in several countries, Turks in Bulgaria, and Albanians in Macedonia are other potential sources for ethnic strife and wars throughout the region. The Czech government recently used the old Sudeten German issue to sour its relations with Berlin. And Russia's province of Kaliningrad, part of old East Prussia, is a potential source of many problems.

Why have most of these "sleeping dogs" not barked, or not barked louder? Because prospective NATO members do not want to spoil their prospects for admittance. Without that hope, some of their leaders would feel free to exploit these issues for domestic political purposes.

Anyone who objects to enlarging NATO, therefore, should be obliged to explain how we are to deal with the plethora of problems that these four legacies have bequeathed Eastern Europe if admitting new members is ruled out. Still, we must face the question, how much enlargement and how fast?

HOW MUCH TO ENLARGE AND WHY NOW?

The answer to how much is at least five countries, although seven would be better. Thereafter, a long interval should precede any additional enlargement. The answer to "why now" varies.

The Baltic states have been very successful in their political and economic transition programs. Latvia, having the largest Russian minority, faces more difficulties but has made impressive progress. Bringing them into NATO will help sustain what is being accomplished in these countries.

Some observers insist that the Baltic countries are militarily indefensible. This judgment is wrong on two counts, technical and strategic. On the first count, given the great lethality of U.S. and NATO forces against the greatly deteriorated Russian military, a local defense is highly feasible in Estonia, the most exposed of the three countries. On the second count, Berlin was indefensible during the Cold War, but the strategic context prevented a Soviet attack on it. The same holds for the Baltic states today. If Russia invaded them, it would risk general war with Europe and the United States. The strategic question, therefore, is the defensibility of Europe, not the Baltic states. Thus the indefensibility objection is a red herring, not to be taken seriously.

Romania and Bulgaria can arguably be given a higher priority than the Baltic states, not because they are better prepared. Far from it. They face large internal difficulties. Romania, surprisingly, has done more to get ready for NATO membership after its disappointment in 1998 than most observers expected. The key reason for including both countries now is stability in the Balkans.

Bosnia and Kosovo are terrible problems, but compared to civil war in Macedonia, they could look small. It most likely would lead to the country's breakup, which could bring Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, and Greece into a conflict there. In other words, a general Balkans war could arise from it unless NATO creates a framework for maintaining security in the entire Balkans. Making Romania and Bulgaria NATO members is the most obvious way to begin, because it puts NATO astride all countries there rather than entangled on one side or the other. This probably explains why Turkey and Greece are uncharacteristically cooperating to support Romanian and Bulgarian admission.

Slovenia and Slovakia might as well be included if these other five countries are. Slovenia is well-prepared, but Slovakia needs to make greater progress.

THE RUSSIA FACTOR

After the dire warnings about Russian reactions to the first round of NATO enlargement failed to materialize, new ones should not disturb us this time. Russia is now conciliatory toward enlargement, and for very good reasons.

Stability and economic prosperity in the states of Eastern Europe are very much in Russia's interest. Civil war and poverty are not. Russia lacks the military power to prevent the latter and the economic power to provide the former. Only a U.S.-led NATO has both. Several Russian political and economic leaders have come to recognize this, especially Putin, who seems determined to integrate Russia's economy into the West.

Then why not include Russia in NATO? First, its policies in the CIS and Chechnya are incompatible with NATO membership. Second, it is too big and its problems too intractable for Putin to achieve broad Russian integration with Western economies any time soon. Third, inside NATO Russia would periodically play a spoiling and blocking role that could fatally weaken the alliance. Fourth, the seven states now seeking membership want security against Russia. Russian membership, some of them have warned, would be dangerous for them. We should not underestimate their fears as an important subjective political factor.

All of these reasons argue strongly against upgrading Russia's link to NATO beyond the 1999 "founding act." Until Moscow uses this connection constructively for several years, it would be unwise to allow it greater access to NATO deliberations and policy discussions.

WHITHER NATO?

Serious questions need to be addressed about where NATO is headed with enlargement. Will it lose its vitality? Is it being diluted so that it amounts to little more than OSCE? Does it really have a mission today? Is NATO being displaced by the EU's moves to take over responsibility for Europe's security?

Dilution is a danger if more than the seven candidates now being considered are admitted. That must wait until the present prospective members are successfully integrated into NATO. Experience already gained from the three new members shows that it takes time. For example, the Czech Republic is creating serious problems, especially with the increasing signs of unpunished criminal activities by high-level government officials. No doubt, some of the candidates for admission this year will prove troublesome once they become members. Still, dealing with these problems is a major reason for enlargement. If the Czech Republic were outside of NATO, our leverage for solutions would be less.

At some point, however, troublesome new members could prove more than NATO can handle. For that reason, the alliance ought to consider amending the treaty to establish rules and procedures for expelling members that have become a danger to NATO from within. Alternatively, it needs to review the measures it contemplated in the past when the domestic politics of a member country appeared to endanger the alliance, e.g., Portugal in the early 1970s when it appeared headed toward a revolution and possibly a communist regime coming to power, and Greece when it became a military dictatorship for a time.

The analogy with OSCE is instructive on the dilution issue, not against expansion, however, but as a strong reason for not including Russia or increasing its status in Brussels. The weight of the mature liberal democratic countries in an expanded NATO must greatly exceed that of countries still struggling with internal transformations into liberal regimes with market economies. U.S. hegemony guaranteed that in the early years of the alliance and still does to considerable degree, but change in Western Europe added to NATO's capacity to handle the proposed enlargement today.

NATO's mission has become a matter of debate. That is unfortunate and to a large degree the fault of the United States, which seems confused about it. It has always been "missions" plural, not singular, and there have always been lingering differences between Europe and the United States over them. If NATO proved highly effective for fifty years with these differences, I do not see the need to iron them all out today in a major public debate. It cannot lead to agreement, and that cannot be good for NATO.

More important, if we consider the traditional NATO missions, it is not at all clear that the United States would be better off if they were changed. It is clear, however, that the United States deserves most of the blame for neglecting two of its most serious missions. Let me review them.

1. Providing a substitute for a European supranational political-military authority. This oldest and implicit mission remains valid today, and NATO enlargement gives it added importance in the decades ahead. We need to *be more* conscious of it with-

out *talking more* about it. The Europeans know its importance but do not like to admit it. If the European Union achieved a political federation with an effective central government, it might well displace NATO, something the United States cannot oppose, not least because Washington was the original sponsor of European integration. The danger today, however, is that we could forget this mission while the Europeans create unjustified illusions about EU defense capabilities. The combined misunderstandings could precipitate a premature U.S. withdrawal from Europe, catalyzing the slow but sure process of growing tensions and instability in Europe.

2. *Training for coalition warfare.* The coalition that fought the Gulf War against Iraq was greatly facilitated by NATO interoperability standards and practices. No other organization but NATO provides the development and maintenance of interoperability essential for effective multilateral coalition warfare. If we did not have NATO to provide this service, we would have to invent it. In a word, NATO needs no direct enemy to justify its existence. This training mission alone is enough.

The greatest threat to NATO's future has been U.S. neglect of this mission since the end of the Cold War. It requires a yearly set of large-scale exercises involving multi-national operations. And those in turn demand a series of smaller scale national level training endeavors to prepare for them. Large-scale NATO "combined" exercises have virtually ceased. The militaries of the new NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, therefore, have had neither the chance nor the demand to become involved in such training at more than a very low-level. Their national defense staffs are not forced to become operationally involved on more than very limited small unit operations. Thus they can drift along with little change from their old communist military practices.

One of the reasons for the huge gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe is the lack of a regular and demanding combined exercise program. If, for example, the United States began an annual exercise, projecting three to six heavy Army brigades to Europe, almost entirely by airlift (C-17s can carry M-1 tanks), to participate with NATO forces, that would draw them into demanding operations, showing up their "gaps" and needs for modernization. Their defense ministries could not easily ignore them.

The Cold War REFORGER exercises accomplished this with the Central Front scenarios, but the United States had weapons and equipment already deployed in Europe (POMCUS stocks), making the lift requirements relatively small. Today, such exercises should involve lifting ALL of the weapons and equipment in very short time periods. A score of fast RO/RO ships and a fleet of 300 C-17s could put two U.S. heavy divisions in Europe in two weeks.

On alternate years, heavy brigades of European forces should be projected on the same high-speed basis for exercises in the United States and Canada. If the United States offered the lift and invited European militaries to "play" in this game, their military commanders would likely jump at the opportunity. The professional enhancements offered and the chance to show their own governments what their real shortfalls are in capabilities for operating with U.S. forces would be powerful incentives to European officers. The new NATO member states would scramble to be the first to participate.

Two major gains could result from such training. First, it would show up the EU's "common security and defense policy" for what it is—little more than a piece of paper. And it would do so without any public comments from U.S. officials, comments that infuriate European leaders without changing their behavior.

Second, the technological gap between U.S. and European forces would likely narrow. Moreover, it does not exist in some areas, something that exercises would force the U.S. defense department to acknowledge. And it would be especially helpful for military reforms in NATO's new member states.

3. *Out-of-area operations.* The Europeans long opposed so-called "out of area" operations. The crisis in Bosnia changed that. As Senator Lugar argued at the time, NATO had to go "out of area or out of business." The biggest obstacle to NATO's undertaking the operation in Bosnia was initially Britain, supported by France, but then the United States itself became a hurdle—ambivalent and unwilling to commit troops to the enterprise for the decades-long operation it would obviously become.

When Washington finally became engaged, it did not put NATO fully in charge but left the United Nations involved as well. The resulting feckless organizational arrangements have caused much slower progress than could have been achieved. The task was defined as "peacekeeping," a term given operational meaning by the United Nations' experiences in the 1950s. It should have been defined as transforming the political and economic institutions of all the republics of Yugoslavia, i.e., the task the United States carried out during its occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1955. UN "peacekeeping" allows only very specific and limited activities,

which cannot create the new institutions needed there. Only military occupation and governance can.

The Kosovo operation produced much the same kind of ineffective arrangements for accomplishing the long-term transformation task, again because the United States never really took it seriously enough to accept the full scope of the challenge involved.

I review this record briefly because it is the backdrop for the occasional proposals for turning NATO in an alliance committed to fighting terrorism everywhere. Gaining a consensus on a comparatively limited “out of area” operation in the Balkans proved difficult although it deals with a problem within Europe and directly threatening Europe’s internal well-being. Moreover, the United States was and remains the reluctant participant although its role is critical to success.

To convince all countries in NATO to commit to a vastly larger and more ambiguous mission, making NATO the vehicle for the war on terrorism, would be infinitely more difficult, probably impossible. Because one country’s terrorist can be another country’s freedom fighter, the United States could rue the day it signed up to such a mission. We already have this problem with Russia over the war in Chechnya where the United States does not consider President Maskhadov’s forces terrorists although Russia does. Within NATO the problem exists between Turkey and Europe over Kurdish insurgency groups. The United States has been generally more aligned with Turkey on this issue than with its European allies.

There will be times that NATO can reach a consensus to act “out of area,” but it will be on a case-by-case basis. And in some cases, the United States itself may be the spoiler. At the same time, a few NATO countries are likely to be willing to form “coalitions of the willing,” to use Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s felicitous term, in support of military operations far out side of NATO’s region. And the multilateral training and interoperability provided by NATO will make those coalitions far more effective if the United States has pushed ahead with NATO exercises of the kind suggested above. If it has neglected that NATO mission, “out of area operations” and “coalitions of the willing” will be far less effective.

4. *Collective defense*, as prescribed by Article 5 of the treaty, remains a core NATO mission, just as it was during the Cold War. It is no longer pressing in the way it once was, but it still deserves a lot of thought. Enlargement contributes to it. Some out-of-area operations can improve the alliance’s collective defense, e.g., the ones in the Balkans do so in the long run by preempting the spread of civil war and instability. Diverse and varied NATO exercises also improve collective defense if they are properly conceived. In sum, all four foregoing missions contribute in different ways to this basic NATO mission.

This brief review should demonstrate why NATO need not worry about new missions. The present puzzlement about them reflects forgetfulness about the alliance’s old missions and especially the constant disagreements about them.

For example, most European countries never took the Soviet military threat as seriously as did the United States. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in his book, “The Troubled Partnership” (1965), the United States focused on the technical military issues at the expense of the larger political consensus issues in the late 1950s and early 1960s. De Gaulle’s image of Europe’s future clashed with the U.S. image, and dilemmas of managing nuclear weapons employment strategy remained irresolvable. In fact, technical progress was slowly achieved while political consensus on all the big issues never was reached. Today’s debate over the “military gap” has much in common with the gaps that troubled the United States in NATO’s early decades. Looking back to how it narrowed them suggests that slogging along with military house-keeping to overcome the “military gap” today is a better approach than engaging in a major political debate over NATO’s purpose.

CONCLUSION

Let me end by applauding this committee’s efforts to put the case for NATO enlargement—pros and cons—before the American public. Admitting new members is not a step to take lightly. Moreover, if the United States continues to let the alliance drift without leadership and direction, and if it spends more time condemning the EU’s military planning than improving NATO’s military activities, enlarging NATO will yield few of the results and possibly contribute to the alliance’s decline.

I strongly favor enlargement this year not only because it serves a broad range of interests, including those of Russia, Europe, and the United States, but also because it should force the United States to wake up to most of these long neglected tasks.

The CHAIRMAN. Since there are three of us, maybe we can go to 7-minute rounds. OK? Actually, the three of us have all worked a lot on this. Why not just feel free to interrupt, if you have a follow-on question?

Senator LUGAR. Can I introduce a statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that the statement by Senator Enzi be entered in the record at the front end of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. And again, I invite my colleagues, at least on my time here, to jump in and follow up.

General Clark, you talked about the CJTF in Afghanistan. It seems to me a pretty interesting and important notion and concept. I mean, you both made a generic point, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. NATO, which is now viewed and discussed only in terms of military and interoperability and procurement and the like, is, it started off something far beyond that, unrelated initially. And I think its most significant role in 50 years has been the initial responsibility it had, which was not in effect military.

Now obviously, it played a gigantic role, the dominant role, in the ultimate victory over communism. But the initial role still is the reason why, I think, we must remain a European power, why it is so vitally important. To use your phrase, general, it is the platform for everything else.

But can you expand for me a little bit on how, if you were, if Senator Lugar were President and you were Secretary of State and he said, "OK. Afghanistan, coordination from this point on," how do you engage the CJTF? How do you deal with that?

General CLARK. Well, the central idea behind the CJTF was to be able to operate outside the area of the major NATO commanders and to do so by bringing in other non-NATO members. And so you would form a command structure. You would have a core of it from the NATO elements, but you could bring outside players in. It could be Chinese, it could be Russians, it could be Pakistanis. And you would put them inside that command center.

And so the question is: Can you form a command center and deploy it? And does it have the communications it needs to coordinate? And then does it take its guidance from the North Atlantic Council? And then you would have to, of course, augment the Council appropriately.

But all these mechanisms have been talked out for a long time. You could have done it in the case of Afghanistan. You would have simply said you would want General Franks to be the NATO CJTF commander. And he would have a carved-out portion for the U.S. special capabilities that are U.S.-only classified capabilities, just like we did during the Kosovo campaign. You have a U.S.-only NATO, if necessary, and so forth, so you protect sensitive national information. Then you build up the command center around it.

But the important point is not the military point. It is the political point. It is the fact that NATO and NATO governments are going to have to engage and agree, "Are we going to bomb here? Are we going to do this?"

We have to provide them the information. We have to build the case. And they, in turn, have to accept their responsibilities for act-

ing on that case, making decisions, and carrying it to their own public.

The CHAIRMAN. Now there is an obvious reason why I asked the question, because I, quite frankly, am beginning to wonder whether it is the military, whether it is the Defense Department and the civilian leadership, whether it is the administration, or whether it is us in the Congress, or a combination of all.

But I thought we did learn, and you and I have had many conversations on this, we did learn some important lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo. I am not at all sure we have learned many lessons from Kosovo to Afghanistan at all. And granted, I only spent 5 days on the ground in Afghanistan. So I am not going to extrapolate from that the universe.

But I have not met anyone that wears a uniform, who is on the ground, from colonel to one star, British, German, anyone, Turk—although I did not meet any Turks at the time—who suggests that there is any possibility, any real possibility, of achieving the agreement masterly reached by the President of the United States in Bonn, to put an interim government in place with a mechanism to provide for the historic way in which Afghans chose an elected leadership, a Loya Jirga, and an ultimate government 2 years down the road, that was probably a loosely federated democratic republic, that had a military that was untrained, in training, that was multiethnic, that probably by that time would be in the area of 20,000 moving to 40,000.

I have not found one single person who says you can get from here to there without a significant increase in security capability and requirements on the ground. I found myself, and I am going to ask you both to comment on this. I found myself confronted with the following dilemma. And I will not name the military personnel wearing non-American uniforms with whom I met in the International Security Force in Kabul, which was, when I was there, about 1,700, working toward 4,800 or 5,000.

Every place I went and every political leader I met from various NATO countries made the following statement, “If you want us in, you have to be in.”

I actually had an interesting meeting; I think we both did. I am about to say something that I am not positive on, but I think Senator Hagel was at the meeting when Kofi Annan came down.

And Kofi Annan was saying, “Hey, no blue helmets here. You guys have to do the hard job” which is an unusual thing for a head of the United Nations to say. And Kofi Annan was saying to us that “You have to understand, if,” in my phrase, if the big dog is not in the hunt, no one else is going to be in the hunt.

So I do not, basically, I do not care how you guys work it out, but you have to work out something that satisfies the British, the Germans, the Turks, and/or anyone else that CJTF would envision and I realize that is not the operational organization right now, but you have to make sure the big dog is on the ground.

If you are there, you may find they are really willing. I found the Turks excited about taking over command until they found out that we announced, I would argue prematurely, we wanted no part. We were not going to be any part of the International Security Force.

Then, I thought we were going through a period where that was just a way to avoid the political dilemma, which I fully understand—I am not being critical—the administration may have about nation-building, because of 2, 4, 6, 8 years of beating up the other team about nation-building. So I thought it was going to be OK.

Basically, here is the deal, guys: We are staying on the ground, going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban. We will get that job done. It is going to take us awhile, but we are on the ground. We may not be part of the force, but we are here. Do not worry. And extraction capability resides with us, and we will do it.

But then I found without, again quoting administration officials, very high-ranking administration officials, when I continually raise the security issue in Afghanistan, say, “Do not worry.” One very high-ranking official said to me, “Well, it is—do not worry. Izmail Khan has everything under control.”

I am serious. This is not a joke. I am being very earnest about this. And my response was, “Well, Izmail Khan. We have always worried about Izmail Khan and the Iranians.”

One of the things I thought the purpose of an international force was to let this government mature, let this government come into being. And the only way that government has any chance—is if you keep the six surrounding countries out of the deal, so they do not think they are invested in the outcome, et cetera.

So I am thoroughly confused right now. And I am not being facetious. It seems to me that it is still not too late, although it may be, that something has to happen here. I am convinced the administration is going to reach the conclusion that with 4,800 troops in Kabul, extended 3 months under Turkish leadership, a U.N. mandate evaporating, will increase concern about our longevity in the deal, because rightly or wrongly—and I am not making any assertion—our allies assume the reason we do not want to be there is we want to amass a significant force to be prepared to go into Iraq.

Therefore and I want to conclude with this—this is a long non-question, but it is the core of what I think one of the problems is.

The case I keep trying to make is: One of the reasons why the Europeans and the Arab nations are worried about us going after Saddam is not that they like Saddam. As one prominent Arab leader, one of the most prominent Arab leaders in the Arab world said, “Hey, he tried to assassinate me twice. I do not like him.” It is that they have no doubt we will take him down, but they have great doubt as to whether we are going to stick around and help build a stable nation so there is not chaos in the region.

And they now are looking and saying to me, “Afghanistan, if you are ready to leave Afghanistan before it is secure, what the heck are you going to do”—and so I have two questions.

One, is my concern, not illegitimate, but out of proportion to how I have described the problem? And two, if it is not, what is able to be done, based on where we are at the moment?

That is a heck of a question. But, General Clark, we will start with you and then General Odom.

General CLARK. Well, I think the concern for security in Afghanistan is well-founded. And I have favored an expansion of the mandate and structure of the ISAF for some time and have said so on a number of occasions. But I understand also the dilemma that the

administration is in with the overhang of the expectations for moving against Iraq and elsewhere.

And the United States Armed Forces, as two of the commanders stated, are stretched thin, unless you call up the National Guard and Reserves and get very serious about this. It is probably very difficult for the administration to do that in the absence of knowing what they are going to do and making the firm decisions on war plans. But at some point, I think that will come.

In the meantime, what is going on in Afghanistan is a holding action. It is a gamble. It is a calculated gamble that you can use the forces that are there, attack the remnants of al-Qaeda, show strength around the country, particularly in the eastern part, and intimidate and cow the opposition so that Hamid Karzai will survive, that the Loya Jirga will happen, and there is a chance.

I think there is a chance. But there is one other factor in that, you know, we do have allies that are in there now. The Turks are in there. They are going to put, I think, the latest I heard was 1,100 people on the ground. And for some of our allies and friends, participation in ISAF may be a good alternative to participation in U.S. action elsewhere in the region. So there may be some counter-vailing recruiting pull for ISAF, as we go forward with plans elsewhere.

But in the near term, I think what we have to do is recognize that the creation of the Afghan National Army is an enterprise fraught with difficulties. And we have to be preparing some kind of a fallback position that, as we begin to phase out the active combat operations with the 5,000 to 7,000 troops and airmen that are there we move toward a more active participation in ISAF, because I think in the near term there is no alternative to an enlargement of its mandate and some involvement on the part of the United States, if active combat operations there decline.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just—and then I will yield to you, General Odom. Well, actually, I will withhold.

General.

General ODOM. I think your point is exactly right and should have been asked early on. It is easy to go in and knock off Saddam. We did not think it was going to be so easy to go in and knock off the Taliban Government, but it has proved to be easier than we anticipated. But the bigger question is what you do next.

I am not sure. I think the dilemma we face now is whether we get into what is called nation-building in Afghanistan and stay with it for 10, 15, 20 years or not, it is an issue we have to face. And if you are going to intervene someplace else, if you are going to invade Iraq, you certainly are going to take on a nation-building mission there. If you do not, then you will create a situation that is as bad as what you have right now.

You can, of course, make an argument that it is too risky to stay involved in Afghanistan and just say, "We are going to take the calculation that political instability is inevitable and get out." And I do not think we ought to leave our allies trapped there, if we do.

There is another terribly important point about what you said that I want to underscore. If you are going to have a common policy for an occupation, the United States had better have the lion's share of the troops on the ground. In Kosovo right now, there are

6 armies. And they all talk directly to their national governments, so you do not have a common occupation policy.

If the United States had put in 40 to 50 percent of the troops, we could impose a working policy. The model is Germany 1945. We had the lion's share of occupying forces in Germany. Therefore, the British and the French coordinated their policies with us. "Nation-building" is now a bad odor, I know, because of Vietnam. But we have had successful nation-building: Germany, Austria, Italy, South Korea, Japan, other places. So one failure should not put this whole issue of nation-building in such bad odor.

And I think it has to be brought back. When we make these decisions about where to go to war, we have to think about the next act, what we do after the war.

Let me just end this by commending to you an article that Sir Michael Howard wrote a couple years ago in *Survival*. I think it was his IISS speech, "When are wars decisive?" Winning the military victory is only the first criterion, in his view. For the second victory has to be so overwhelming, that you destroy the old elites and make it clear that the outcome cannot be reversed.

Then third, a new elite has to be cultivated that wants to bring that country into the Western international system. That certainly is what we ought to be doing in Kosovo and Bosnia.

Whether we should try to do that in Afghanistan is an open and very debatable question. Whether it could be done in Iraq strikes me as a debatable question.

So that is how seriously I take your point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I wanted to also thank the two of you for appearing here today and for your selfless service to this country over many years. This country has depended on the two of you many times over, and we are grateful for that service. And you continue to each contribute.

And this kind of exchange is important, as you know, because it further develops a base of understanding for us and knowledge and appreciation for all the complications here that go into these policies. And people like you can give us that, and we appreciate it.

Following up a bit on where Chairman Biden has taken this: As you know, there has been some conversation about the possibility of peacekeeping troops in the Middle East, if we would get to that point. There has been conversation about the possibility of a NATO force, should the United States be in that force, if it would come to that, if we have a peace to guarantee, if both parties would want us in. All those things have to obviously fit.

I would be very interested in each of your thoughts about that issue. Take it wherever you like. It is my opinion that we are going to have to face this question. And it is probably sooner rather than later. And I am not advocating that we do that. But I think the reality of what we have before us demands us to think this through a little bit sooner rather than later.

General Clark.

General CLARK. Senator, I think it is a critical question. First, I think that the sequence has to be right. And I think that the right sequence for consideration of introduction of U.S. troops or peacekeeping troops is a sequence we had in Bosnia from 1995 on.

That is, get in agreement; then let the cease-fire fall out during the process of getting the agreement. And then if there are tasks that have to be enforced, then you can put in a force so that it has pre-agreed authorities to go with the responsibilities that are given it.

It is absolutely foolhardy and likely to be ineffective, as well as dangerous to the people that are involved, to put a force in with hopes and responsibilities but no authorities from the parties it is engaged with.

This is what happened to UNPROFOR in the early days in Bosnia. They were responsible for everything. They were authorized to do nothing. And they ended up getting people hurt, lots of people hurt, and failing. And the consequences are still being felt from that.

So what we learned in the Bosnia mission is: The authorities for the force have to be greater than its responsibilities. And that is what we secured through the agreement.

So I would not want to put a force on the ground until there was a comprehensive peace agreement, until the tasks of that force were clearly laid out. What are they? Are they to search for terrorist cells inside Palestinian encampments? Do they have the authority to go through every police desk in Gaza, to search tunnels, to go into a cell when people are under interrogation, to view the records of that interrogation, to search for wire tapping?

I mean, all of those authorities were written into our police annex in Bosnia, for example. They have not all been implemented well, but they gave total assurance to the international community that we had the authority to do whatever was necessary to maintain the peace.

And I think that is the precondition for putting any forces in. Obviously, in the best of circumstances, I would not want any forces in there at all, because I think, I would like to see us get a comprehensive peace agreement out of this that would obviate the requirement for enforcement activities. And then we are out of it.

If we do have to put a force in there, and it is a NATO force, it has to include American forces. Our views, our forces are the bona fides of NATO moderation and of NATO perspective in there. We cannot turn responsibility like this over to the European Union, for obvious reasons, nor would they accept it, nor would the Israelis accept it.

So if we write a peace agreement that requires enforcement, then we are going to be involved in it. And we should be endeavoring to write a peace agreement that does not require enforcement, that has some very clear, openly acknowledged phases and meets the needs well enough that it can be enforced by the parties who are benefiting from it, not by us.

Senator HAGEL. Would you keep the possibility on the table, that if it would require, and all of the pieces were right, as you suggested, that that NATO force, obviously with American troops, should be on the table as a discussion?

General CLARK. I would not take it off of the table, because I think it is premature to take anything off of the table that could lead toward a resolution of the problem there.

But here is what is critical about that: Thus far, terrorism has proved to be an effective weapon in the views of the Palestinian

Authority. They have used it. Yes, a lot of destruction has been brought to bear; but on the other hand, a lot of public heat has come against Israel. And Israel has basically lost the public relations battle. And so terrorism has not been invalidated as a weapon. In fact, if anything, it has sort of been confirmed.

We know that any peacekeeping force we put in there is going to be effective in deterring or enforcing actions on the Israelis and, overtly, on the Palestinians. But to deal with terror, no. Can we stop suicide bombers with a NATO mission on the ground? No, we cannot do it. We will be less effective than the Israelis.

So what we have to understand is that we keep this force on the table, but if we do not get a peace agreement and the full support of outside powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt—

Senator HAGEL. Exactly.

General CLARK [continuing]. That completely cuts off any possible resources for Palestinian terror to reemerge, then we are building ourselves a long-term problem.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Odom.

General ODOM. I would add to that, that this is a good example for making the distinction between peacekeeping and nation-building. This is really quite different from what we are doing in Bosnia or Kosovo. It is really quite different that what we will be doing in Afghanistan, if we go down the road you are suggesting.

This is really to presume that there is a settlement, and many of the things he said, obviously, have to occur before you get to a settlement. If you are going in there to deal with terrorists, I am not for going in. It seems to me that that is just a hopeless endeavor.

If you are going to go in that way, you might as well say, "Well, I am going to go in and occupy both Israel and Palestine and we are going to be the political authority as an occupation force. We will operate a military government."

But if you can pull off these other things, such as support from the outside, and there is a genuine faction in the Palestinians that seem to accept whatever it is, then I could see putting a force in there in those conditions. But it strikes me as very unlikely right now.

I would end my point by saying it is terribly critical, in my view, to have the Europeans and the Americans both involved. This issue can end up dividing the United States from Europe, and we do not want that to happen. That is not to the United States' advantage. It is not to Europe's advantage. And I do not think it is to Israel's advantage.

So keeping us all together on that issue strikes me as probably the most critical thing about thinking through the alternatives in the future.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I followup on an aspect of that with both of you?

I will start with you, General Clark. The EU as a force—Macedonia is about to be a handover. There is a "peace agreement," quote/unquote, there. I am, I think it is fair to say, one of the biggest boosters of NATO and along with some of my colleagues here

in this committee, and a strong, strong supporter of doing all we can to get it right in NATO, I do not want to offend our European friends. But I am very concerned about the “handoff,” quote/unquote, in Macedonia.

But again, you were on the ground. You are the guy that ran the show, not the entirety of it, but you are the guy that got us to the point where there are not people hiding up in the mountains and tens of thousands of people being killed like the couple hundred thousand people that were killed before we did it the right way in Bosnia.

Tell me, just talk to me a minute about the EU taking over the baton from us, which is scheduled to occur——

STAFF MEMBER. It is not for sure yet.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not for sure, but if it is, we are talking about scheduling, it being something, A, to be decided upon and, B, as a matter of fact, I suspect one of the reasons why Prodi and Patton want to talk to me today at 5 o'clock may have something to do with that. Maybe not. But talk to me about that for a minute.

General CLARK. Well, Senator, my view on it would be that there is, assuming that all generally stays at the same level of discomfort and low-level violence that it is right now in Macedonia, that it will not make any practical difference whether the EU is running the mission or not, because there is close and continuous coordination between the European Union forces on the ground, Europeans, and the Europeans who are running the force in Kosovo.

The CHAIRMAN. KFOR.

General CLARK. Right. The only difference is that the United States' voice will be missing in deciding what the missions are in the force in Macedonia. But we will have a U.S. Ambassador there. The real question is, will the United States still be interested in the outcome? It is my impression that the whole move to the European Union force has been driven by Washington——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General CLARK [continuing]. Not by the Europeans. And I understand the need to conserve resources. I understand the need to withdraw forces from the Balkans if they are not needed there and so forth. But I think, as General Odom indicated, these are long-term problems.

General ODOM. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CLARK. When you go into an area and you attempt to rectify it, the military does not do the nation-building. The military puts the stability there so that nation-building can take place. But that nation-building will not take place without strong leverage from outside powers and especially from the United States.

So the European Union does have some leverage, but not much, even though it is economically dominant. The principal leverage will come from the United States. The question is: If things start to go wrong, will the United States step back in and exert that leverage, or will it not?

And this is the start of a pattern that is going to, it is going to be troublesome if it is the start of a pattern in which we go in at the start, we withdraw, we go somewhere else, because these are decade-long problems that require persistence. We are going to end

up destabilizing countries rather than stabilizing them, if all we do is enter and leave and turn the problem over to others less capable.

The CHAIRMAN. I would agree, yes. You are right.

General CLARK. So that is the concern.

The CHAIRMAN. Especially since, as you talked about in your statement, that in Prague the organizing rationale and purpose of NATO is a little bit in flux here. And one of the reasons why I agree with General Odom's recommendation about the expansion of NATO, particularly including some of the Baltic States and Balkans, is for that very reason, as part of the stability.

I mean, I am not where I was; I pushed very hard in the first round for Slovenia, not because I think people in Peoria or in Salisbury, Maryland or in Seaford, Delaware, were going to rest easier—and I do not mean to denigrate Slovenia—rest easier knowing the Slovenian military is with us, but as a window to the rest of the Balkans saying, "You behave correctly, you can become part of NATO." One of the two methods of being permanently integrated into Europe are NATO and the EU. And if we have to go first with NATO, so be it.

And so I am even more inclined to give the benefit of the doubt and a close call to Bulgaria and Romania. And Romania has had some, how can I say it, regression. But, so that is the reason why I think it is important that your recommendation, General, as I read your statement relative to that area. But do you have a view on the EU and its role?

General ODOM. Speaking bluntly, I think it will be a disaster to turn it over to the EU. And I do not think it will be a force-heavy requirement for the United States to play a very significant role there. General Clark is much more familiar with the details over there, but I suspect a battalion reinforced is a big enough capability in that country to deal with these ragtag Albanian dissidents or any parts of the Macedonian Government forces that might make trouble. It is the presence that is so critical.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General ODOM. And we will have as much say there as we have troops. If we do not have troops, we will not have any say.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General ODOM. It will go to pot, and I hate to contemplate how to get back in effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. Last question. And I am sorry to keep you so long, but having you both before me is a great opportunity, for me anyway, and for us.

And I will end with this: General Clark, you talked about the need for seamless cooperation and coordination relating to what everyone acknowledges is, in a sense, the greatest concern of the war of the future. And that relates to terrorist activities and it relates to the breakout, if it occurs, in my words, not yours, of ethnic conflict in Europe and other places. And I was intrigued by your raising the possibility, because if I understand it correctly, I agree with you, raising the possibility, I would argue the necessity, of somehow integrating institutionally the elements of the war on terror which we talk about fighting, that are almost as critical as what we think of as the military component of that war. And that is: I

do not know how you actually engage in that war without integrating the non-military——

General CLARK. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Intelligence components of these various governments, i.e., the FBI and Scotland Yard. We can go down the list.

I do not know how that will happen absent a successful coordination in what every European leader recognizes is a serious possibility, particularly as it relates to the prospect or the possibility, on which I have held extensive hearings, including secret hearings, on access to weapons of mass destruction, either rudimentarily made nuclear weapons, of fissile material if it is available, radiological weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons.

That is a genuine and legitimate concern that every informed nation in the world has, particularly us. No one pretends the desire does not exist among the terrorist organizations to gain access to this.

And so, I agree with your assessment, and I am doing all that I can to avail myself of all of the information in the hands of our Government, within the domain of the Federal Government, but there is no effective coordination right now. There is coordination on an ad hoc basis, but not seamless, you know, cooperation. And so you talk about the need for there to be an institutional relationship.

And I will end with this: It would seem to me that this could be, if we could ever articulate it well enough and sell it without creating more of a bureaucratic drag within NATO than need be, that the debate about our failure to participate in the International Criminal Court could, in fact, dissipate a great deal.

One of the reasons why we do not want to be part of the International Criminal Court, and one of the reasons why the last President said there had to be changes for us to be there, and I have said there had to be changes, and this administration has flatly, as I understand it, rejected the idea, which I do not—is that we have not done the things that you have said.

We have not rationalized the rules of the road. And this seems to me to be a way that is difficult, but, to begin to try to rationalize the rules of the road, if there were an institutional coordinative capability.

Am I getting the drift of what you are suggesting correctly? And can you expand on it a little bit?

General CLARK. Yes, sir, you are. And that is, what I am suggesting is that you enhance the use of NATO to deal with problems of information sharing and judicial and legal reform. Now, in reality, every ambassador has an FBI representative or a CIA representative and they all have somebody who can deal with law and so forth. But NATO does not. And we have always said we want to deal with these things bilaterally because these agencies in our own Government like to work on a case-by-case basis. Can we extradite so-and-so? Can we take specific action against a ship, such-and-such, which is registered somewhere carrying this set of parts to this prescribed country?

And the problem with that is that we have so many issues right now that we have a, probably a 5- or 10-year backlog in trying to

work our way through this. We need to jumpstart the program. This is very, very tough stuff.

The European Union is working right now to harmonize some of their laws, but that does not let us in the door directly. We are aware of it through our ambassador there and through their ambassador here, but we need to do more on a day-to-day basis, on an issue-by-issue basis. I think we need an institutional framework.

And the NATO framework is as good as any other. Yes, when you add more issues, it becomes difficult. And to be very candid with you, people in government hate NATO issues. The cables are long; the language is abstract. People are arguing over where the comma is and where the sentence is. And it is very unpleasant to do that kind of work.

But it just happens to be the kind of work that is necessary to bring agreement forward between countries. And I would very much like to see us move toward a broader definition of what NATO does, not only a geographic extension of its conventional activities, because the world we are moving into requires a deeper level of cooperation between governments. And if we cannot create a multilateral structure that can handle these issues, we are not going to be able to be safe in the global environment on which our prosperity and freedom depend.

The CHAIRMAN. I will never forget sitting around that very large table with you, a group of U.S. Senators, when you were directing the operation in Kosovo. I am not reporting any specific conversation, but the issue at the time was, when we Senators marched in to sit with you on our fact-finding trip, was whether or not someone, whoever was picking targets, and that the difficulty that existed was in dealing with sovereign nations who are part of an institutional structure called NATO and conducting a war in Kosovo.

And some of my colleagues, and it surprised me—most of them were of the World War II generation—some of my colleagues were insisting that there had to be in the future the ability to eliminate that kind of confusion.

And I kept thinking to myself, “What the hell would General Eisenhower ever have done if these guys were in the room?” I cannot think of a more difficult task than being in the midst of a life-and-death struggle, having to deal with the personalities and the heads of state of all of the allied countries and deciding on things like when and if D-day, where D-day, whether or not to go into—I mean, I—has there ever been a time—you are both military historians, by your backgrounds. Has there ever been a time where there has been a collective action of allied countries where there has not been the needed, difficult and painful process of reaching consensus?

General CLARK. Well, no, but normally it is handled on an ad hominem basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General ODOM. I would like to offer a dissenting view on this right now.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear it.

General ODOM. If you look at Governor Ridge’s problems in homeland security, you run up against the Constitution and the

Federal system. Now, you can eliminate his problems by canceling the Constitution. Now, you know this very much, sir. You cannot even get coordination across agencies. There are at least nine agencies that deal with the border controls. They are in five departments. And we, I think legitimately, could create a border control department, put those agencies in it, and make some progress.

Consider Europe. Just look at the EU trying to coordinate these things seamlessly. It may be a good goal to go for, but I suggest it is a goal like the horizon. You will approach it, and it may be healthy to try to approach it, but you are not going to reach it. I think it unrealistic in a policy time horizon of 4 to 8 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is—

General ODOM. If we get off onto a debate of this kind, it will be more counterproductive than productive, in that you do have to deal with that group of people that are giving you a hard time. And General Eisenhower did not have an easy time of it either, dealing with DeGaulle and Churchill and Montgomery and a few other tough guys to get to support one course of action.

The CHAIRMAN. That is kind of my point. I guess what I am trying to say here is that we seem to have gotten ourselves into, up here, not you all, we in the Congress, have gotten in this sort of false debate, in my view a false debate. And it really comes down to—and I realize this is a philosophic—it seems to get down to, the alternative to the hard slogging you had to do sitting there, and you got it right. You got it done. The alternative to that hard slogging is to go it alone. I mean, I do not know how you do it. I do not know what the in-between is. And given those options, it seems to me it is an incredibly easy choice, that the very hard slogging has to take place.

General ODOM. Yes. There are some in-betweens. I said in my statement that if NATO has no foreign enemy, if it does not declare war on terrorism, we would still need it because it is the only place we train for coalition warfare. You need it as a training area.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

General ODOM. And then if you have these capabilities, you do not have to go with a NATO flag, but you could go as a coalition willing to do other things. I do not mind a NATO flag if NATO wants to go on the operation. But I think we can manage NATO and exercise it in a way that it gives us, de facto, this interoperability, as we had in the gulf war.

Let me add one point, having had more than a little experience with dealing with the multinational intelligence in NATO. It is better not handled in NATO. It is—

The CHAIRMAN. It is better what? I am sorry.

General ODOM. It is better not handled in NATO. Multinational intelligence is not intelligence. There are other ways to do this, and if you try to get NATO agreement on them, you run into the sovereignty issues. If you leave it to the professionals, it is amazing how far you can get toward de facto multinational cooperation without a problem. Those problems I would want to surface. I suspect a lot of the law enforcement cooperation is of the same order.

And until we have our own intelligence structures more in line, particularly the FBI's with the other intelligence community, we

are not in any good position whatsoever to begin to interface with a changed or even the contemporary situation in Europe.

General CLARK. I think all of those concerns are valid. The question is, putting those concerns on the table and looking at what the task is ahead, how can you succeed? You cannot succeed in this campaign with bombs and bullets. You cannot. I mean, you cannot use bombs and bullets in Germany and France and Italy and Spain. That is where the terrorists are.

Now I was in Germany last weekend, and we finally got, 2 weekends ago, and we finally got traction with Germany. You know how? Because the mosque that was blown up in Tunisia killed, I think, 17 Germans, and they finally realized that the terrorist threat was real, and they would actually make changes in law. So maybe that is going to take some traction.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CLARK. But we do not have our allies engaged on the domestic side in the way we are engaged in this country. And until they are, we are not going to resolve this problem. It is a very clear social sciences problem. It is: How large and complex a system can you create before the system fails? We are trying to go to a global system in trade, in communications, and in many, many other ways. And we are at the boundary; we are at the horizon right now. Can we push it further? That is the challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is tough, hard work. I think you meant to say a synagogue was blown up, not a mosque.

General CLARK. I am sorry. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CLARK. I said—

The CHAIRMAN. I think it was a synagogue, not a mosque.

General CLARK. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not, I mean, it is relevant either way, because it got the Germans' attention. Germans were killed and it got German attention.

Well, gentlemen, I think we all agree on one thing, that the hard part is now beginning. That is not to suggest that the sacrifices made by our military thus far and the risk we have taken as a Nation has not been difficult, but compared to what we have to do to coordinate this from here on out is really going to get tough.

And because of the accumulated—and I am not being facetious—the accumulated wisdom of men like you and women out there who have thought a lot about this, we will get through it. But it is going to be painful. It is going to be a painful ride. And, you know, I do not see any simple solutions here, but I do see solutions. And with you all, we will get through it, and we will figure it out.

And with that, I thank you both for coming. I apologize for keeping you so long, but you have a lot we can learn from you. And we are adjourned.

General CLARK. Thank you.

General ODOM. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT OF THE FREEDOM CONSOLIDATION ACT

Question. I and many of my colleagues are co-sponsors of the Freedom Consolidation Act. The bill, which passed the House overwhelmingly last session, support the vision of NATO enlargement articulated by President Bush in his Warsaw speech. Is the administration supportive of this legislation and do you believe that it would be useful in your deliberation with our allies?

Answer. Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell plan to jointly send letters to Senators Daschle, Lott, Elden, Helms, Levin, and Warner to express the Administration's strong support for the Freedom Consolidation Act. A draft of the letter is attached.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., *Chairman,*
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

The Administration strongly supports S. 1572, the Freedom Consolidation Act. This bill, which reinforces the efforts of European democracies preparing themselves for the responsibilities of NATO membership, will enhance U.S. national security and advance vital American interests in a strengthened and enlarged Alliance.

Speaking in Warsaw last June, President Bush said that "Yalta did not ratify a natural divide, it divided a living civilization." From the day the Iron Curtain descended across Europe, our consistent bipartisan commitment has been to overcome this division and build a Europe whole, free, and at peace. The 1997 Alliance decision to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic brought us a step closer to this vision.

Later this year at NATO's Summit in Prague, we will have an opportunity to take a further historic step: to welcome those of Europe's democracies, that are ready and able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, into the strongest alliance the world has known. As the President said in Warsaw, "As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

We believe that this bill, which builds on previous Congressional acts supportive of enlargement, would reinforce our nation's commitment to the achievement of freedom, peace, and security in Europe. Passage of the Freedom Consolidation Act would greatly enhance our ability to work with aspirant countries as they prepare to join with NATO and work with us to meet the 21st century's threats to our common security.

We hope we can count on your support for this bill, and look forward to working closely with you in the months ahead as we prepare to make historic decisions at Prague.

Sincerely,

Question. Secretary Grossman, you recently traveled to eight NATO capitals including Brussels. What is the current atmosphere in Europe regarding enlargement? Does Europe have a sense of what this round of enlargement is all about?

Answer. All of our NATO Allies support further enlargement. A broad consensus is forming behind President Bush's vision of the most robust round possible, as long as aspirants are ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. In our talks, Allies shared the U.S. view that the events of September 11 highlight the importance of building the broadest, strongest possible Alliance.

Allies have agreed that the question of which countries should be invited to join NATO should not be addressed until later this fall. They, like us, are continuing to assess aspirant countries' efforts to meet reform goals through the Membership Action Plan.

Question. Many of the aspirant countries, if not all, have contributed to KFOR, SFOR, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the phrase that I hear being thrown around by these countries is that we are already acting as a "de facto" ally. While the United States is greatly appreciative for their assistance, what is the administration doing to ensure that acting as a "de facto" ally is not a guarantee for NATO membership?

Answer. While we welcome the support of the aspirants in the international efforts to fight terrorism and stabilize the Balkans, we have made clear that their efforts receive no guarantee of either an invitation, nor of any protection that is due to Allies under Article V of the Washington Treaty.

Question. Have the aspirant countries done enough with regard to property restitution?

Answer. Both the U.S. Government and prominent NGOs maintain an active dialogue with all the aspirant countries and with the Jewish communities in each of them on restitution issues. In the context of that dialogue, aspirant countries are not only conducting the necessary historical research, but are also undertaking the framing of laws and responsive measures. For example, Romania has twice extended the filing deadline for restitution claims, and other aspirant countries are continuing to evaluate their restitution programs.

We have strongly supported these actions and underlined their importance in the context of NATO's commitments to democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, and pluralism. As in countries that are already NATO and EU member states, resolving the issues of restitution is a complex undertaking. We have consistently encouraged and built upon the aspirant countries' political will to resolve outstanding issues rapidly.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Question. Addressing the growing capabilities gap between the United States and its NATO allies has been placed on the agenda of the Prague Summit. In your view, what are the costs of this capabilities gap continuing to grow and how can we persuade our European allies that it is in their interest to put more resources toward their defense?

Answer. Current and projected levels of Allied defense spending are a source of significant concern. Allies need to invest more in defense if they intend to field a 21st century force. It is estimated that overall European Allied defense spending will fall roughly 1 percent from 2001 to 2002. The downward budget trend is unlikely to reverse soon because Allies are dealing with sluggish economies and continued domestic pressure to increase spending on priorities other than defense. Moreover, Europe's fragmented defense industries and investments in outdated force structures are two major contributors to their capabilities shortfalls.

To address the capabilities gap, we are encouraging our Allies to concentrate in the immediate future warfighting requirements in four areas:

- Defense against weapons of mass destruction.
- Strategic lift and logistical support.
- Communications and information connectivity.
- Precision guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other combat systems.

Over the next several months, we intend to work closely with our Allies in developing a new capabilities initiative for the Prague Summit that will produce tangible, significant improvements in these four areas. These needed improvements will provide key military capabilities to the entire range of NATO missions, ensuring strong and relevant contributions to the war on terrorism by NATO.

Question. Slovakia has national elections scheduled in October shortly before the Prague Summit. The party of former Prime Minister Meciar is polling very well. I believe it is the view of Slovakia's neighbors, NATO allies, and the EU that when Mr. Meciar was in power, the actions of his government fell well below what we would call upholding Western values. In fact, when he was Prime Minister, the other Visegrad countries would not even meet together with him. How will the administration view the inclusion of Slovakia into NATO should Mr. Meciar's HZDS be part of the governing coalition?

Answer. NATO is not simply a military alliance but is a community of countries with shared values. NATO is open to countries that can show an enduring commitment to democracy, free markets, and the rule of law, and add to the security of NATO. In making invitation decisions, the United States and our Allies will take into careful consideration the extent to which a country shares NATO's commitment to these core values.

Prior to the election of the Dzurinda government in 1998, the former Slovak government did not demonstrate a record of commitment to democracy and rule by law. There is no evidence that Meciar or the party leadership have changed. There is also no reason to believe that Meciar or his party, should they return to power, would share the core values and principles of the other Member States of the NATO Alliance. Almost every European official who has visited me has indicated that the

return of Meciar or his party to government raises serious concerns about Slovakia's NATO candidacy.

The current Slovak government has passed a significant number of laws since 1998, as well as amending the constitution, in order to guarantee that Slovakia will be a democratic country that is ruled by law.

We believe that a cornerstone of democracy is informed voter participation. We encourage all Slovak voters to understand the issues and vote for whomever they believe can best lead the Slovak Republic in the future.

RESPONSES OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY,
TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH

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Answer. On May 7, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell jointly sent letters to Senators Daschle, Lott, Biden, Helms, Levin, and Warner to express the administration's strong support for the Freedom Consolidation Act. The text of the letter jointly sent by Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld to Senators Daschle, Loft, Biden, Helms, Levin, and Warner is attached.

MAY 7, 2002.

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DONALD H. RUMSFELD,
Secretary of Defense.

COLIN L. POWELL,
Secretary of State.

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