

STATEMENT OF
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NATO **ENLARGEMENT**
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The North Atlantic Treaty established an alliance that has endured over half a century. During its first forty years, NATO manifested the political will and military capability to deter Soviet expansionism, and that deterrence worked. It provided for the rearmament of Germany within a framework acceptable to her wartime foes. It solidly linked, through forward presence and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the security of Western Europe. The stable security environment, combined with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the subsequent growth of Western Europe into our largest trading partner. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the vibrant markets of the Alliance, crumbled and collapsed.

Without a common foe, some commentators argued, NATO would lose its reason for existence, yet the member nations chose to continue their alliance, and to transform and adapt it to new circumstances. Massive, static conventional defenses were reduced and made more mobile. Numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of stability in an uncertain, New World order, and as a bastion of democratic experience. These countries were linked to NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

The end of the Cold War bipolar order unleashed nationalist, ethnic, and religious tensions resulting in widespread outbreaks of violence. NATO's relevance in the face of these new threats was reaffirmed by its stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European security problem in the Balkans, outside of NATO's perimeter, confirmed the enduring value of the Alliance. The inclusion of Partner nations in Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the reform of former communist militaries and in the relief of the manpower burden on NATO.

An unexpected dimension of NATO's security guarantee, and its relevance to U.S. security, came to worldwide attention after September 11th. America's NATO allies agreed to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering the attack on New York and Washington as an attack against them all. A dramatic manifestation of this support is the

deployment of part of NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control Force to patrol America's skies. Additionally, NATO's standing naval forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to prevent terrorist movement and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies.

Thousands of allied troops are supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the CENTCOM Theater. Allies, and Partners as well, have granted access to their airspace and facilities. Less visible but equally important is the enhanced information sharing occasioned by the invocation of Article 5, which has provided numerous leads in the global war on terrorism. In sum, the Alliance continues to play an enormously valuable role for **the United States**

NATO began with 12 members, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for the accession of further European states. To be invited, members must unanimously agree that a candidate would adhere to the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. The record of the three newest members bears on the desirability of further enlargement.

At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated 10 years would be required for full integration. The integration processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first three years have been largely successful; the new members are fully engaged in the NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their NATO staff positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the forces and resources that NATO is asking of them. Despite the progress to date, we are learning that some long-term efforts, such as development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps or major weapons systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation, before completion.

The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained strong since accession despite domestic economic challenges. For example, the Czech Ministry of Defense was the only ministry to be spared cuts during their recent two year-long recession, and Poland's six-year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 percent of GDP. According to the Secretary of Defense's 2001 report on allied burden sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, respectively, are ranked 6th, 8th, and 11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all three defense budgets will continue to face pressure from competing ministries, clearly the three new members have demonstrated the will to support national defense.

The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, thanks to their similar backgrounds, have proven to be excellent mentors to the current round of NATO aspirants. They are working to extend peace and security eastward. The Poles are particularly active with military-to-military contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with the Slovaks and Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the 2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, expecting to be ready for duty by 2005.

All three nations have made substantial contributions to ongoing operations, particularly in the Balkans. They supported Operation ALLIED

FORCE by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO troops and aircraft. Their combined Stabilization Force (SFOR)/Kosovo Force (KFOR) troop contribution has historically averaged nearly 2,000 troops. In response to NATO's April 2000 call for additional reserve forces, the Poles quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned 60-day KFOR rotation lasted more than five months. More recently, the Czechs contributed an additional 120-man contingent to support Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia.

The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have established. We are watching their progress closely, and find significant challenges lie in areas such as developing a viable NCO corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting, and procurement process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment. Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment. Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western style thinking, leadership, and especially decision-making.

Elected officials in all three countries face competing priorities for resources while their social systems and economies are still in transition. They must carefully prioritize, focus on their long-term goals, and avoid short-term expedient solutions. The key to success is sustained national will; only that can ensure the new member nations continue to progress in NATO integration.

With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost, defensibility, and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil budget from 23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent to 26.2 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) **budget fell** from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share the common costs of the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at \$1.5 billion over 10 years, through the military budget and the NSIP. Of those costs, \$1.3 billion is for infrastructure improvements that are to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share of that cost would be approximately \$400 million - or roughly one-fourth over 10 years. The payoff resides partly in having airfields and logistics facilities able to support NATO and U.S. operations and exercises. Readiness also improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces exercising in these countries.

An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the financing of purchases of U.S. equipment and training through Security Assistance. The President's request for FY 03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under \$41 million. These Department of State grant funds support important Department of Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, while providing U.S. access to new member militaries, governments, and bases. Thus, this sum could be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF funds return to the American defense industry in the form of equipment purchases. (IMET funds also return to the U.S. through the purchase of training and education.) I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other DOD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the upcoming round of enlargement.

We must also consider the potential cost of not enlarging. The aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith toward becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made membership an important part of their public agenda and sought to increase public support for NATO. From a military standpoint, the outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop contributions to ongoing operations and the use of infrastructure and transit rights could be jeopardized.

President Bush has endorsed enlargement in principle, as did the heads of state of the other allies at last June's informal summit. The enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision. A country with a relatively weak military may still be a productive addition to the Alliance for strong political reasons alone. A case could also be made where a country with a strong military may not be a productive addition due to political concerns. There are nevertheless valid military considerations bearing upon suitability for membership.

The nine aspirant nations have made considerable progress under the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) established in 1999. They have agreed to pursue Partnership Goals related to the MAP within the PfP Planning and Review Process. The Partnership Goals integrate lessons learned from the previous round of enlargement and the tenets of the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), providing a roadmap toward reform. NATO has provided the aspirants with feedback on their progress through assessments of both their accomplishments of Partnership Goals and their MAP annual national plans. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has conducted in-country assessments of aspirants' progress at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The aspirants have a common legacy of authoritarian Communist defense planning that was unaccountable to the public. They have dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy documents in a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main categories: those who inherited a burden of obsolete Warsaw Pact equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those who had to build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania fit clearly into the first category, and Slovakia to a lesser degree, since it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining a disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been stripped bare of all equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of Soviet forces. Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any part of the **Yugoslav** armed forces upon independence. Aspirants with legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic situation. Aspirants without legacy militaries have struggled to recruit sufficient qualified personnel and acquire a coherent mix of equipment.

Areas of concern to both categories, on which they have made good progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in support of operations, the ability to secure classified information, infrastructure to support NATO deployments, NCO corps development, and quality of life for troops. All are financially constrained in their

reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete with other national reform priorities.

ASPIRANT MILITARY CAPABILITIES

As EUCOM's military contribution to the political decision making process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for admission to NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with an assessment of each aspirant's current military posture. The aspirant countries have worked to develop their military capabilities, based on lessons learned in the previous round of NATO enlargement (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) and through participation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, SFOR, KFOR, PfP, and the MAP. In making our assessment of their progress and current status, EUCOM has focused on four primary areas: strategy and force structure, defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security procedures. Following is a general description of the criteria EUCOM is using to examine the aspirants in each of these four areas.

STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE. Sound national security and military strategy documents, effective interagency resource management, rationalized force structures, personnel management, and English language capability are top-level indicators of military potential. The capstone **national strategy documents** with public and parliamentary support are at various levels of development and approval, with no obvious stragglers. Planning, programming, and budgeting system-type **resource planning** is being implemented slowly.

Military **force structure** is currently being revised to combine immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the first two. In all cases, transition requires painful personnel restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound National Military Strategy. **Personnel Management** includes accession, knowing what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an effective NCO corps, quality of life, and professional education. These are building blocks of a quality force. Similarly, **English language** is the foundation of interoperability. All have made excellent progress in training key individuals during the last few years.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. Defense capabilities, aligned according to the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness, and proof of sound planning and budgeting. The bottom line is: can they deploy a reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate with it, protect it, and fight effectively with it? **Deployability and Mobility**, particularly by air and sea, are generally weak areas for all aspirants. **Sustainability and Logistics**, to include the nation's ability to support its deployed forces and to support NATO deployments on its national territory (host nation support, air transport handling, airfield, road, rail, and port infrastructure), vary among the aspirants.

Effective Engagement includes a basic ability to fight, on the offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, weather, terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and training elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant's ability to engage effectively, we closely examine the capabilities of their land, air, and maritime forces. Air forces are expensive, and flying hours have been under-funded, resulting in degraded training. All aspirants have

marginally effective air forces. **Survivability of Forces and Infrastructure** ensures the military can continue to fight once attacked. Survivability and engagement capabilities vary among the aspirants.

Consultation, Command, and Control (a NATO term synonymous with U.S. C4), through reliable and secure communication and information systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces. Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from comprehensive C4 studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF Electronic Systems Center. Most have demonstrated progress in establishing centralized C4 planning. Most aspirants can monitor their airspace, but have limited ability to enforce their airspace sovereignty. The U.S.-funded Regional Airspace Initiative has provided modern Air Sovereignty Operations Centers to all aspirants except Macedonia and Albania.

Wrapping up defense capabilities, EUCOM assessed the aspirants' ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in support of NATO and their ability to sustain, protect, communicate, and fight with that force. NATO considers this size effort to be the lowest common denominator of capability that would be expected of any NATO aspirant.

LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to reinforcement of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment of national forces in support of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession. All have resolved or are in the process of resolving these obstacles.

SECURITY. Another area of interest is the ability to protect classified information. The aspirants have fairly strict traditions regarding classified handling and are making good progress in the establishment of national authorities and policies, investigative clearancegranting services and document registries. Security of communications and information systems is generally weaker than physical and personnel security. Information assurance programs are at varying levels of development and progress.

The military assessments of the aspirants, based on these criteria, continue to be updated. It would be premature at this point to publicly release relative comparisons or rankings.

CONCLUSION

It is important to reaffirm that NATO's overarching objective of opening up the Alliance to new members is to enhance stability in Europe as a whole, more than to expand NATO's military influence or capabilities or to alter the nature of its basic defense posture. Clearly, the aspirants have focused their efforts on areas crucial to the previous NATO enlargement, as identified through the MAP process

The steady integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed. While being cognizant of the dollar cost of enlargement, we should keep in mind the potential costs of delaying enlargement. NATO remains relevant and viable in the post-September 11th world, and the aspirant nations offer limited but improving military capabilities and infrastructure to the Alliance. I **will** be pleased to provide the Committee with any additional information it may require on this or other matters of concern.

